ACTIVITY AT THE CAPE
Boer annexations continued with insolent persistency, and the High
Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, telegraphed thus to Mr. Chamberlain:--
"_16th November_--Having been informed that Orange Free State
have issued Proclamations annexing Griqualand West and portions
of the Aliwal North, Albert, and Colesberg districts, I issued
counter-Proclamation on 10th November and 15th November of a
similar kind to that in my telegram of 28th October, and have
declared latter districts to be under martial law."
[Illustration: SERGEANT-MAJOR OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES LANCERS.
Photo by Gregory & Co., London.]
At this time the British reinforcements arriving in Cape Colony were:--
3rd Battalion Staffordshire, 1st Highland Light Infantry and
Mounted Infantry, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, 2nd Northampton
Regiment, 2nd Battalion Royal Highlanders, part of 2nd East
Surrey, 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, 2nd Battalion
Devonshires, 12th Lancers, Engineers, R.A.M.C., Field
Hospitals, Post-Office Corps, Seamen and Marines, and 2nd Royal
Irish Rifles--about 10,900.
It must here be noted that among the many prominent persons who had
placed themselves at the disposal of their country and were leaving for
the front were Sir W. MacCormac and Mr. Makins, whose surgical skill was
offered to relieve the suffering. Mr. Treves, the eminent surgeon, had
also volunteered his services. The following regiments arrived at Cape
Town on the 20th of November, and went on to reinforce the advance
columns or to preserve the lines of communication under the command of
Lieut.-General Sir W. E. F. Forestier-Walker:--
12th Lancers, one squadron 14th Hussars, 2nd Northumberland
Fusiliers, 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers, four companies 2nd
Berkshire, 2nd Royal Highlanders, 1st Highland Light Infantry,
2nd Seaforth Highlanders, 1st Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, 1st Welsh Regiment, several Corps of Engineers,
including Balloon Sections, Batteries, Field Hospitals, Seamen
and Marines, Post-Office Corps, Railway Engineers, Corps of
Light Horse (in course of formation), New Zealand
contingent:--a total of about 8000 men.
The South African Light Horse, a corps formed of the Uitlanders, was
being rapidly organised, and great enthusiasm prevailed among the
Colonists. All were anxious to be first in the field and to display
their loyalty to the Sovereign. Indeed, there was not a little jealousy
lest other Colonists might debar those at the Cape from proving their
devotion to the full. The new regiment started on the 30th of November
for the north amid enthusiastic cheers.
Quantities of reports having been circulated and a great deal of
misapprehension caused as to the policy and intention of the Government,
Sir Alfred Milner issued a proclamation addressed to the people of Cape
Colony. In it he said:--
"Misleading manifestoes from beyond the borders represent the
Imperial Government as desiring to oppress the Dutch, and the
idea has been spread abroad that the Dutch are to be deprived
of constitutional rights.
"There is absolutely no truth in such allegations. The Imperial
Government desires the greatest freedom of self-government for
Dutch and British alike, and the extension, not the
curtailment, of the above. The Constitution can solely be
endangered by rebellion.
"The Imperial Government adheres firmly to the principles of
equal freedom for all loyal Colonists.
"Her Majesty the Queen during her long reign has given
innumerable proofs that she does not favour one race at the
expense of another. All allegations to the contrary are made
either in ignorance or with the deliberate intention of shaking
the loyalty of a section of the community, including many
connected by close ties of kinship with a people with which we
are now at war.
"An attempt is being made to inflame their minds, and to
convert feelings of sympathy with kinsmen into a spirit of
rebellion, by representing the Imperial Government as hostile
to the Dutch, and by otherwise distorting its acts and objects.
"I gladly recognise that the majority, nevertheless, maintain a
law-abiding attitude, and I am proud of their worthiness of the
confidence reposed in them. But the statements which continue
to be spread abroad are producing a deplorable effect in some
quarters, and I therefore most earnestly warn all against being
misled into defection from their allegiance, and thereby
exposing themselves to grave consequences.
"I call upon all the Queen's subjects, of whatever race, to
stand together in support of the Crown and its authority."
But, for the treachery of some of Her Majesty's subjects, the devotion
and fealty of others made glorious atonement. There are loyal people in
the Cape, who, if they live to be as old as Methuselah, will never
forget the opening of December. The streets of Cape Town were literally
panting with enthusiasm, every hole and corner being alive with animated
crowds to welcome the New Zealanders, Australians, and Canadians,
gallant fellows, who, from sheer pride in being associated with the
defence of the mother country, came trooping to do battle in her cause.
Each successive arrival of the Colonists was the cue for fresh
demonstrations and for the display of flags and banners bearing mottoes,
"For Queen and Empire," "Welcome, Brother Colonists," and the like; and
by the time the Canadians had landed patriotic feeling had reached its
climax. Then public enthusiasm literally seemed to burst all bounds.
The streets, windows, verandahs, roofs, were packed with an excited,
surging, shouting, cheering throng, and the air was thick with hats, and
flags, and handkerchiefs, waving a hearty welcome to our British
brethren from across the seas. The Canadians, about 1000 strong, were "a
sicht for sair e'en," as the Scots would say, a hale, well-grown,
muscular set of men, who evidently appreciated the magnificent reception
that was accorded them, and who as evidently meant to earn laurels in
the service of the great Queen Mother. Indeed, all the Colonial troops
were remarkable for their excellent appearance, and the sight of them
arriving from every corner of the earth to support the honour and
prestige of the Empire was vastly inspiriting. One may safely assert
that such an exhibition of patriotic solidarity and power was without
precedent in the world's history.
There never was such a show of fine men, said all who saw them; but--.
There was a great But. We were deficient still in other ways. We had the
men, but in the matter of guns we were still lamentably weak; we could
not compete with our enemies. Those in power seemed to have been
ignorant of, or apathetic to, the fact that the expenditure of the
Transvaal Government for artillery during the previous four years had
been enormous. The marvel was that our Intelligence Department should
have taken no cognisance of these gigantic preparations, or that if it
had, the Cabinet had not acted on its information. In 1894 L100,000 was
handed over to Krupp of Germany, and the same amount to an Austrian
firm. Two of the finest guns in the world were imported in 1895. These
were 48 feet long, 120 tons in weight, throwing a shell weighing 2300
lbs., and requiring 904 lbs. of powder for each discharge. Both were
amply provided with ammunition, which, in addition to the great steel
and iron shells, consisted of shrapnel holding 3000 balls, weighing 3 1/2
ounces each. One of these treasures was pointed at Ladysmith, and the
other was used to defend the fortifications of Pretoria.
This was not all. In 1895 Krupp received another L100,000, and
field-guns of long range, which we now know too well, were forwarded,
and also certain mountain and bush guns suited to high ground and hot
climate. In 1896 further developments took place. Six Creusot guns were
introduced, to be followed later on by eighteen more. In 1897, '98, and
'99 further additions to the Boer artillery were made, and the frontier
kopjes fortified, and distances marked and measured. Then were bought
forty-eight rapid-fire Schneider-Canet 14 1/2 pounders, that throw a
shrapnel containing 234 bullets, to be fired 200 times per minute, with
a range of 3 1/2 miles. Maxims in plenty were invested in, as those in
Mafeking and Ladysmith knew to their cost, and the Boers also secured
four batteries of 12-lb. quick-firing Vickers Maxim guns, with a range
extending up to 5000 yards. Four guns with a range of 1200 yards were
distributed between hills guarding the Drakensberg passes, Ladysmith,
and Pretoria.
With this array of guns only our Naval guns could compete. As regards
horses, we were also deficient. The sea-voyage played terrible havoc
with the poor beasts. Ill-luck seemed to pursue us, for on the 4th of
December grievous news arrived that the _Esmore_ with the 10th Hussars
and a battalion of infantry on board had gone ashore at St. Helena, some
180 miles from Cape Town. Fortunately the men were rescued from the
transport, but their chargers were all lost. This was a terrible blow,
for at the time cavalry was almost a nullity, and operations were
somewhat suspended, if not entirely crippled, owing to the lack of that
arm. Indeed, Lord Methuen's brilliant operations on the Orange River had
all been heavily handicapped owing to the impossibility of pushing his
victories home, and at this time the one cry of the commandants in
chorus was, "Oh for a Cavalry Brigade!" There was General French, a born
cavalry commander, minus mounted troops; General Gatacre with his
division distributed in fragments everywhere; Lord Methuen hampered as
before described, all because the nation had allowed itself to slumber
and drift, and put its hand to the helm too late!
As there were continual changes in the military situation, it may be as
well to make a rough computation of the troops engaged in the various
campaigns. In Ladysmith, Sir George White had some 9500 men, while at
Colenso, Weenen, and Natal, Generals Buller and Clery had between them
some 23,000. Advancing from Queenstown to attack Stormberg was General
Gatacre with 6000 men, while a probable 3000--cavalry and infantry--were
with General French at Naaupoort. In the west, advancing from the Modder
River to the relief of Kimberley, Lord Methuen had less than 8000 men,
and on the line of communications at Graspan, Orange River, and De Aar
were some 8000 more. At Kimberley there were about 2000 troops, while
with Colonel Baden-Powell at Mafeking and Colonel Plumer in Rhodesia
were about 1000 men respectively. The newly-arrived Canadian contingent,
numbering some 1000 men, were sent to the front to act in concert with
the Black Watch and Seaforth Highlanders. Quantities of soldiers and
volunteers were daily arriving, all of them in high spirits at a chance
of seeing service. Among the many passengers who landed on the 11th of
December was one whose zealous determination to serve his country caused
not a little emotion in those who heard his story. He was a reservist
belonging to the Seaforth Highlanders, who was absent when called up. He
had been in France, and only arrived in England twenty-four hours after
the troopship which brought out his regiment started. He therefore
proceeded to Southampton, paid his passage to Cape Town, and went on to
the front at his own expense.
Of course, this is a solitary example of devotion to duty, but there are
thousands which might be recorded. Millionaires rushed from their
palaces, from the lap of nineteenth-century luxury into sober kharki,
with all its accompaniment of bully beef and muddy water; bridegrooms
tore themselves from winning brides, and scurried from the altar-rails
to sacrifice their lives--at that moment more precious than at any other
time--for the honour of the Empire. Not only "Dukes' sons," but a Duke
indeed joined in the magnificent mob who clamoured to fight for the
great cause. This impetuosity of gallantry had even its comic side, for
deserters came from hiding ready to face shot and shell rather than be
out of it; small boys tried spurious dodges to bring themselves to
"regulation" height; and many fibbed right royally as to their ages!
Some even, when rejected, were found stowed away after the transports
had put to sea! "Trifles these," some prosaic readers will remark.
Possibly, but to others such trifles made confirmation "strong as holy
writ" that the martial majesty of our mighty nation was never more
grandly evident than in the declining years of Victoria's reign!
The glorious work done by Cape Colony in aid of the Empire may be
appreciated in viewing the following figures, which show that nearly
6000 South African volunteers were called out for service during the
month of December:--
Prince Alfred's Own Artillery, Cape Town, 120; Cape Garrison
Artillery, Cape Town, 450; Duke of Edinburgh's Own Rifles, Cape
Town, 1000; Cape Town Highlanders, Cape Town, 500; Prince
Alfred's Guard, Port Elizabeth, 600; Uitenhage Rifles,
Uitenhage, 200; Kaffrarian Rifles, East London, 400; 1st City
Volunteers, Grahamstown, 500; Queenstown Rifle Volunteers,
Queenstown, 300; Kimberley Regiment, Kimberley, 650; Diamond
Fields Artillery, Kimberley, 120; Frontier Mounted Rifles,
Cathcart, 200; Komgha Mounted Rifles, Komgha, 100; Transkei
Mounted Rifles, Butterworth, 125; Xalanga Border Mounted Rifle
Club, 72; Tembuland Mounted Rifle Club, 52; Engcobo Mounted
Rifle Club, 47; Cape Medical Staff Corps, 200:--total, 5636.
This number only included volunteers, and did not take in the paid
irregular regiments, Mounted Police, and other bodies, of which there
were several thousand more. In fact, it was estimated that the Colonial
levies in Cape Colony alone numbered, at the end of 1899, about 12,000
men.
The troops in South Africa early in December, apart from the force under
Sir George White, were approximately the following:--
CAVALRY DIVISION (Lieut.-General French).--1st Brigade
(Major-General Babington)--R Battery R.H.A., 6th Dragoon
Guards, 10th Hussars, Mounted Infantry, Ammunition Column, No.
9 Field Hospital. 2nd Brigade (Major-General Brabazon)--O
Battery R.H.A., 1st Royal Dragoons, 6th Dragoons, 2nd Dragoons,
Ammunition Column, No. 12 Company R.A.M.C.
KIMBERLEY RELIEF COLUMN (Lord Methuen's
Command).--Major-General Sir H. E. Colvile's Brigade--1st Scots
Guards, 1st Coldstream Guards, 2nd Coldstream Guards, 3rd
Grenadier Guards. Major-General Pole-Carew's Brigade--1st
Northumberland Fusiliers, 2nd Northamptonshire Regiment, 2nd
Yorkshire Light Infantry, 2nd Loyal North Lancashire Regiment
(half-battalion). Major-General Wauchope's Brigade--1st
Highland Light Infantry, 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders,
2nd Royal Highlanders, 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, No. 8 Field
Hospital. Naval Brigade, G and P Batteries R.H.A., 18th, 37th
(howitzer), 62nd, and 75th Royal Field Artillery, 9th and 12th
Lancers, 7th Field Company Royal Engineers, Ammunition Column,
No. 19 Field Hospital.
COLONIAL FORCES (in support of Lord Methuen).--Canadian
Contingent, New South Wales Lancers, New Zealand, South and
West Australian, Tasmanian, and Victorian Contingents.
TROOPS IN SOUTH NATAL (Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clery's
Command).--Major-General Hildyard's Brigade--2nd Royal West
Surrey, 2nd West Yorkshire, 2nd East Surrey, 2nd Devonshire.
Major-General Lyttleton's Brigade--2nd Scottish Rifles, 1st
Durham Light Infantry, 1st Rifle Brigade, 3rd King's Royal
Rifles, No. 14 Field Hospital. Major-General Barton's
Brigade--1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers,
2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, 2nd Royal Fusiliers, Field Hospital.
Major-General Fitzroy Hart's Brigade--1st Connaught Rangers,
1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
No. 10 Field Hospital Company, No. 16 Bearer Company, 2nd
Somerset Light Infantry, 1st Borderers, 2nd King's Royal
Rifles, 1st Gordon Highlanders, 7th, 14th, 64th, 66th, and 73rd
Batteries R.F.A., 12th Field Company R.E., Ammunition Column,
No. 3 Field Hospital.
IN CAPE COLONY (Lieut.-General Gatacre's Command).--1st Welsh
Regiment, 1st Royal Scots, 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, 2nd
Royal Berkshire, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, 1st Rifle Brigade, 1st
Royal Munster Fusiliers, 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry,
2nd Shropshire Light Infantry, 74th, 77th, and 79th Batteries
R.F.A., Two Station Hospitals.
CORPS TROOPS.--4th, 38th, 61st, 65th, and 78th Batteries
R.F.A., 4th Mountain Battery, 13th Hussars, 1st Telegraph
Division R.E., 10th Railway Company R.E., 26th Field Company
R.E., 1st Field Park R.E., Pontoon Troop R.E., Balloon Section
R.E., No. 5 Field Hospital.
UNATTACHED.--1st Suffolks, 1st Essex.
WITH GENERAL GATACRE
By the end of November two British forces were advancing from East
London by way of Queenstown to the Stormberg and Colesberg districts in
the north of Cape Colony. With General French's advance we must deal
anon: that of Major-General Sir W. F. Gatacre calls for immediate
attention. The General had under his command what was by courtesy termed
the 3rd Division, namely, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, four companies of the
1st Royal Berkshire Regiment, a troop of the New South Wales Lancers,
some companies of Army Medical Corps, Field Hospital, and Volunteer
Mounted Infantry. The total was about 5000 men.
On the 28th of November he was reinforced by the 2nd Northumberland
Fusiliers. His force, as we see, was none too large, for he was
proceeding through country where it may be said that every hand was
either openly or stealthily turned against him. For strategical reasons,
and for the purpose of reassuring the British population, however,
General Gatacre had decided that some sort of advance must be made. He
reconnoitred in and around Molteno, and visited the outposts of
regulars, irregulars, and police, and ascertained to an almost pitiful
degree the slenderness of his resources should any strain occur.
[Illustration: STORMBERG PASS--THE SCENE OF GENERAL GATACRE'S
OPERATIONS.
Drawing by J. C. S. Wright.]
On the 26th November the Boers occupied Stormberg, and on the 28th
General Gatacre moved to Bushman's Hoek with a battalion of infantry and
some mounted infantry, the main body being at Putter's Kraal. On the
29th he accomplished a smart piece of work, though any really decisive
action could not be attempted till more troops arrived from the Cape.
The General concentrated a force at Molteno, commandeered five trains,
and secured 1000 bags of flour which were in danger of being captured by
the Boers.
On the 5th December the headquarters of the 3rd Division were still at
Putter's Kraal, and here reinforcements were arriving daily.
Manifestations of disloyalty grew more and more prevalent throughout
Cape Colony, and the spread of the spirit of rebellion around Stormberg
pointed to the fact that there were deliberate designs to assist in the
overthrow of British supremacy.
On the 5th of December it was decided that a forward movement must at
last be made. The plan was for the column to start by train to Molteno,
and from thence march to the Boer laager at Stormberg. A dash was to be
attempted in the darkness preceding dawn, and the position was to be
carried at the point of the bayonet.
The project was fraught with extreme risk, but General Gatacre, though
fully aware that he was without the necessary reinforcements to make
good a continuous advance, resolved to accept the hazard for the sake of
the chance of success, and for the sake of the moral effect such success
might make in a district weevilled with disaffection. The game of war is
one where reputation, armies, and empires are the stakes, and needs to
be played not only with science, but with bluff, and no committee of
generals, not even one composed of Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and
Wellington, could have laid down any fixed theory on the art of war as
practised in the Transvaal at that moment. So our officers had to watch
which way the wind blew and trim their sails accordingly; and Sir
William Gatacre judged that it would be perilous to delay an attack on
Stormberg until circumstances seemed to be absolutely propitious. The
Colonial Boers were daily joining the enemy in considerable numbers,
British subjects were imploring aid to save their property from
destruction, and it was imperative to make some strong move which, if
successful, would immediately arrest the threatened tide of rebellion.
The worst of it was that everything depended on the strength of the
move, and it was exactly this strength that was wanting. The Third
Division was broken up and distributed in various parts of the country,
and General Gatacre was forced to make a hazardous venture with only
such forces as he could muster. On all sides the same unfortunate tale
of weakness could be told. Our force was so divided up that each general
was crippled with the consciousness that he had no hope of getting
reinforcements for some time to come. Lord Methuen, now on the extreme
west, while struggling for the relief of Kimberley, had kept the Free
Staters at bay with great loss to himself, and was suffering from the
weakness consequent on violent strain to his resources. General French,
his eye fixed on Colesberg, with a diminutive and totally inadequate
force, had dodged about from town to town, keeping the enemy ever on the
alert and allowing him no time to snore behind his intrenchments, and no
opportunity to proceed farther in his invasion of the Colony; while
General Gatacre was now about to do his best in the midst of a swarming
enemy to capture Stormberg. Thus we see that at one and the same time
four different battles, in the most trying circumstances, were taking
place in the Transvaal, and that the flower of our army was being
exposed on all sides to the murderous shells of an overwhelming foe
powerfully posted in places of his own choosing--at Modder River, at
Arundel, at Stormberg, at Colenso--in each of these regions the
continuous thunder of guns, the gallant advance of heroes, the stubborn
and courageous defence of a preponderating enemy. It is some
satisfaction to think that, though from the first the British suffered
from inferiority in numbers, though they were out-fought by sheer weight
of the Boer commandoes and guns, still they displayed an undismayed
front, and those superb fighting qualities which tradition has taught us
to look for in the British race, and which the enemy, misled or
self-deceived, had chosen to under-estimate. It was also a matter for
congratulation that the foe, with all the natural advantages of the
situation, his knowledge of every inch of the ground, his great mobility
and advanced preparations, merely succeeded in repelling the British
attack, and never took the initiative in attempting one single forward
movement in the face of the British army. But it must be allowed our own
forward moves were so stubbornly resisted, that General Sir William
Gatacre, while attempting to advance, recognised that in some bold and
well-conceived plan of action lay his only chance of success. Such a
plan he attempted to carry out, but with deplorable results, as we shall
see.
THE REVERSE AT STORMBERG
General Gatacre left Putter's Kraal and concentrated at Molteno the 2nd
Northumberland, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, and Nos. 74 and 77 Batteries of
Field Artillery, with Mounted Infantry, Cape Mounted Rifles, the 12th
Company of Engineers, and details--in all about 2500 men. At 9 P.M. on
December 9th, began the march that was destined to be so ill-fated. The
night was black, the ground was rocky, and the guide, a local policeman,
from ignorance, under-estimated the distance and led the troops by a
circuitous route absolutely into the teeth of the enemy. Instead of
going north-east for nine miles, the men were led north-west, a detour
of twenty miles. A terrible night-march this, which none who undertook
it can ever forget. Tramp, tramp, through the long midnight hours, over
hills and down nullahs, through rivers and stumbling over stony kopjes
with bayonets fixed, in grim silence, with scarce a whisper allowed, and
with never a pipe as consolation lest the scent should betray the
stealthy advance. For seven long hours the force, like a phantom
procession, trudged and stumbled until they came to a small V-shaped
plateau surrounded by kopjes, which, unknown to them, was fronting the
enemy's position. This was on a high unscalable eminence called Rooi
Kop, that jutted black against the clear grey of early morning. From
here the Boers, chuckling doubtless at their own cunning, were slyly
watching the approach of the party; for it was now dawn. On nearing the
plateau below this eminence, the Irish Rifles, with General Gatacre and
his staff at the head of the column, were greeted, to their
astonishment, by a fierce tornado which was suddenly opened by the enemy
on the right. Though the column was marching in fours and utterly
unsuspicious of the position of the enemy, they gathered themselves
together with marvellous rapidity. Following the Rifles were over a
hundred of the Northumberland Fusiliers, and in the rear the artillery.
In a very short space of time General Gatacre got his column into line
for action, and a hot fight ensued, in which the Rifles--all honour to
them!--distinguished themselves in distressing circumstances. It was not
possible to recover easily from the surprise, and it was evident that
the General and his men were totally unprepared to meet, and unequal to
crushing, a powerful enemy in an intrenched position. Naturally the
casualties were many. However, the artillery were soon climbing a small
kopje on the left, while the Rifles and Northumberland Fusiliers, in
skirmishing order, mounted the hill held by the Republicans. Footsore
and weary with their long midnight march, they toiled up the steeps
amidst a cruel hailstorm from the enemy's fire, which came pouring at
the same time from three separate quarters in flank and rear. One of
the almost impregnable hill-tops was gained at the point of the bayonet,
but so furious became the storm of bullets that the British, now
outnumbered at the rate of seven to one, were forced to retire.
Meanwhile the artillery were drawing the fire of the enemy's guns and
launching their shrieking shells into the fort that the Boers had
constructed at the corner of the kopje. But the position was
unassailable. The Boers had expected the attack, and by an elaborate
system they had measured and marked off distances from their
batteries--a system which could not be upset in a moment. The Dutchmen
swarmed in hundreds behind excellent cover and were not to be routed.
Our men, who, many of them, had been occupied the whole previous day in
fatigue-work, were numb from exhaustion, dropping here and there,
fainting or asleep, in the very face of death.
[Illustration: MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS ON THE SOUTH OF THE
ORANGE RIVER]
The infantry, with the Maxim detachment, were then ordered to retire
towards Molteno, while the artillery remained to cover the retreat. But
the retirement was not so easy. The triumphant Boers now brought their
guns to the tops of the kopjes, and sent shell after shell to catch the
troops as they slowly wound along the valley. Many of the shells burst
with terrific force, ploughing up the roadway around our men, and
shooting clouds of blinding dust into eyes and ears and throats, but
fortunately doing little damage. The Boers also brought their rifles to
bear on the little force, and our worn-out troops suffered the horrible
experience of being hunted like hares along roads through which they had
so laboriously, so hopefully, toiled the night before, tramping the
weary ten miles to Molteno with the enemy taking long shots at them from
innumerable points of vantage. Their progress was necessarily slow, for
sometimes they had to hide in cornfields, to crouch among boulders, and
occasionally to fall prone to earth when shells came screaming and
bursting along their line of route. Afterwards they would rise again,
still holding their life in their hands, and plod on in the expectation
that every step would be their last. For eight long miles this exciting
form of torture was experienced, numbers of the poor fellows dropping
all along the road from wounds, exhaustion, and from the effects of the
now fiercely blazing sun. Terrible was their plight both during the
attack and after it, for the Boers, as usual, paid no heed to the sacred
demand of the wounded or of the white flag, and no sooner saw a party of
stretcher-bearers approach to pick up a man than they made the event the
signal for a volley. All, therefore, that could be done for those
stricken down was to wait patiently till they could crawl a short
distance out of the line of fire and swoop down on them and bear them
hastily away. The unfortunates who were too severely wounded to so
crawl, and those who were killed, had to be left where they fell. Nor
did those who were successfully removed in the ambulance waggon fare
much better, for this was fired on continually, but luckily, owing to
the shells not bursting, caused more horror than harm.
They reached Molteno at last in safety, but with numbers woefully
thinned. When they formed up for the roll-call, the ominous silence that
followed the call of name after name was more than tragic. Dismay
blanched every face. Where were the 366 splendid fellows of the
Northumberland Regiment who had started out in rude health only the
night before? They were missing, perhaps dead! Where, too, were the
roistering, cheery boys of the Royal Irish Rifles--some 294 of
them--none of whom, when his name was spoken, was there to give back the
word? They too were missing, perhaps dead! In this hour of mute regret
those who were left could only thank God that they had come safely
through the terrible ordeal, and think with awe on the strange workings
of fate that had caused some to be taken and others left.
Naturally enough after a disaster so great, all had something to say of
the mistakes which brought it about. Reuter's correspondent declared
that "the primary and greatest mistake made on the 10th inst. was that
what was to have been at the utmost a four hours' night-march lengthened
out to over seven hours, and landed us right into the enemy's position
in broad daylight. Of course, the guides went wrong, took the force a
roundabout way, and are accordingly blamed. But how is it that our
leaders, knowing that four hours should suffice to take them to their
objective, should have wandered on for seven without suspecting that
something was radically wrong? Then, also, at the end of that time our
troops walked, in daylight, in a column four deep, right under the
enemy's nose. No scouts or skirmishers were out, and it was here that we
lost so heavily, the Boers from covered positions firing volley after
volley right into the mass of men below. Again, the men, most of whom
had been on duty since 4 A.M. the previous (Saturday) morning, were
tired and hungry, and yet were asked to storm the position without rest
immediately after a long and tiring night-march."
The _Times_ correspondent attributed some of the misfortune to the fact
that "the Berkshire Regiment, by whom the redoubts now occupied by the
Boers at Stormberg had been built, and to whom every inch of the ground
was familiar, were left at Queenstown, instead of being employed to
recapture the works which they had so unwillingly evacuated about a
month previously. The consequence of no one knowing where he was going
or what he had to attack or when proximity to the enemy had been
reached, was that the infantry, marching in fours, were suddenly fired
into at a point where, after ascending but a few feet, their further
advance against the enemy was precluded by an unclimbable precipice. The
moment that the first shots were fired companies doubled straight at the
points whence the firing seemed to have proceeded, and commenced to
scale the hill. Soon, however, they came upon a perpendicular wall of
rock, from the summit of which the Boers were plying their rifles at
half-a-dozen yards' distance. Here fell Lieutenant-Colonel Eager, and
close to him Major Seton of the Royal Irish Rifles. Colonel Eager was
the man who reached the highest point attained by any of the attackers,
and was then shot down, where many another British officer has fallen
before now, at the head of his battalion, gallantly leading them as in
the days of old, when long-range weapons had not been invented."
Others hinted that it was the habit of the General to overwork his
troops--a habit so well known that it had earned for him in Egypt the
title of "General Backacher." Further comments were made by those who
always find the art of criticism so much easier than the art of
performance, but to repeat them at a time when the principal actors in
the sorry affair are unable to defend themselves would be unjust and
ungenerous. Our Generals, besides treachery, had from the first unusual
ignorance to deal with. One of our misfortunes has been the necessity to
rely for information on friendly Kaffirs, or those who affected to be
friendly. Now, as all know, the Kaffirs, even when honest, are scarcely
reliable. Their notions of size, for instance, are on a par with those
of the man who described the dimensions of a bump by saying it was about
the size of a piece of chalk. To the Kaffir an impi is an army, whether
small or large, and it is almost impossible to bring home to him the
value of exactness. In fact, in the matter of ambiguity the Kaffir has
the makings of a politician, and therefore it was no wonder that so many
of the well-organised military schemes in this unlucky war came to
grief. But in the case at Stormberg there were other difficulties to
contend with. The map of the ground was utterly unreliable. The
configuration of the hills was incorrectly presented and the distances
badly judged. The general knowledge of the direction was so imperfect
that none was sufficiently well informed to put a check upon the
movements of the guide, nor had the position been reconnoitered by any
of those engaged against it. In this way the winding and circuitous
route more than doubled the march, knocked up the troops, and ruined the
effect of the night assault; for it was full daybreak before the British
approached the point of attack. One of the sufferers from the disaster
declared that the British were so worn out that after the engagement
they threw themselves down and did not mind whether they were taken
prisoners or not. He himself crawled to within three miles of the base
camp, and then lay down on the veldt and fell asleep. How long he
remained asleep he did not know. Most of the prisoners, he believed,
were taken by the Boers while the men were asleep.
A report was circulated that General Gatacre had shot with his own hands
the guide who led him astray, but this statement was entirely incorrect.
The military authorities thoroughly sifted the case of the sergeant of
the Cape Police who acted as guide on the occasion, and it was allowed
that he erred genuinely in mistaking the enemy's position.
The following officers were wounded in the engagement at Stormberg:--
2nd Royal Irish Rifles--Lieutenant-Colonel Eager (since dead),
Major Seton, Captain Bell, Captain Kelly, Lieutenant Stephens,
Lieutenant Barnardstone. Suffolk Regiment--Second Lieutenant
Maynard. Missing: Captain Weir, Lieutenant Christie, Second
Lieutenant Rodney. 74th Field Battery--Lieutenant Lewis. 77th
Field Battery--Major Percival. 2nd Northumberland
Fusiliers--Missing: Major Stevens, Captain Fletcher, Captain
Morley, Second Lieutenant Wake, Second Lieutenant Coulson,
Lieutenant Radcliffe. Dorset Regiment--Three hundred and six
non-commissioned officers and men were also missing.
The scene of General Gatacre's disaster was on the junction of the
eastern line of railway in Cape Colony running from East London through
Queenstown, Molteno, and Burgersdorp to Bloemfontein in the Orange Free
State. There were many strategical reasons for wishing to seize upon it.
First, it was desirable to engage the enemy in the centre, and so save
the Boer commandoes from falling in too great strength on Lord Methuen's
line of communications. Secondly, from the situation of the place it was
possible also to effect a junction by rail with General French. Thirdly,
a victory gained in the centre of the disaffected districts would have
been a feather in the cap of the General, for it must have drawn to him
such waverers whose vacillating loyalty was daily growing dangerous. The
melancholy reverse was, therefore, from many points of view to be
regretted. Perhaps, however, it achieved one object. It forced those at
home to realise the necessity for sending more than sprinklings of
troops to meet a strong, courageous, and well-equipped foe.
The General, in giving an explanation of the reverse, declared that the
operation which proved so wretched a failure was started under the
promise of complete success. By himself and the local guide, however,
the distance was under-estimated. He did not consider that the guide was
guilty of treachery, merely of unintentional error. However this may
have been, it is certain that the British plans were entirely well
known, and that the Boers had had ample time to prepare for the coming
of the force. It was evident that the gallant General did not take a
leaf out of the book of Metellus, the Spanish commander, who, when asked
how he should proceed the next day, said, "If my shirt knew I would put
it in the fire." Possibly, being a great theorist, as was poor Sir
George Colley, he may have agreed with the opinion held by Marshal
Bugeaud, that military affairs were too often wrapped in mysterious
silence. Certainly there was no secrecy about the strategy of the
advance on Stormberg, and the guileless manner in which the General
trusted to the guidance of a local policeman was commented on none too
generously by the distressed public, whose disappointment was too great
to allow them to look coolly at the ups and downs of warfare and the
fallibility of human designs. General Gatacre, after the reverse, held
Bushman's Hoek and Cyphergat, two positions to the south of Molteno,
where he could await the reinforcements which would shortly reach him
from the Cape.
AT MODDER RIVER
At dawn on the day following the battle the guns opened fire, with a
view to effecting the clearance of the enemy, but it was soon discovered
that the Boers had made themselves scarce, preferring to march through
the long midnight hours to remaining where a chance of the bayonet might
be awaiting them. Their artillery they at first left, but discovering
that the British had not crossed the river, they returned and removed it
to Spyfontein, where the next encounter was expected to take place. Had
only the troops been less worn out--they were so expended that they
could scarcely move one leg before the other--these guns might have been
captured and victory assured. But fatigue must overcome the finest
warriors, and ours had done prodigious work in circumstances of the most
trying and varied kind. The next morning Lord Methuen's forces quietly
occupied the town, and spent the day in the melancholy duty of burying
the dead.
Owing to the carcasses of beasts and the corpses of dead men in the
stream, the troops had soon to bivouac some three miles farther up.
There they could enjoy the rare luxury of a bath and drink their fill in
safety. No "wee drappie" ever cheered the heart of Scotsman as did the
quarts of Modder that went down the throats of thirsty Highlanders who
had been toasted inside and out during the long hours of the battle. As
one appropriately, if not elegantly, described it:--
"When it comes to slaughter
You'll do your work on water,
And lick the bloomin' boots of him that's got it."
But the water everywhere was bad, and for safety boiling was imperative.
For some days the men had been bathing in and drinking from the polluted
stream, and it was quite wonderful that enteric had not seized upon the
troops. A Dutch lady stated that she had seen four dead Boers with
stones round their necks thrown into the river by their comrades, but
when the bed of the stream came to be investigated, at least seventeen
corpses were hauled out. The enemy's loss was estimated at 500, and
doubtless those of the slain who were not lying under an inch layer of
sand were disposed of in the river. The air, too, was far from
salubrious. The winds of evening were reminiscent of the dead horses and
mules that remained half-buried on the banks. Fortunately the vultures
and ants, and other useful agents, soon reduced the pestiferous masses
to harmless skeletons.
Meanwhile the rest of the Highland Brigade was on its way up to join
Lord Methuen at headquarters. Some went by train and others marched, as
the line--a single one--was frightfully congested with traffic. Stores
and ammunition and baggage of all kinds were being sent up, while the
wounded, in "emptied" trains, were being sent down. The march was a
trying one, even for hardy men who could well have managed twenty-five
to thirty miles a day on their native heath. Now, they were supposed to
carry 35 lbs. each, without counting clothes, and twelve miles a day in
the broiling heat of a South African midsummer was counted remarkably
good going. What with rifle, 100 rounds of ammunition, a big coat, a
two-quart water-bottle, field-glasses, and haversack, officers and men
were nearly as heavily weighted as itinerant peddlers. They carried
their warlike pack over sandy roads that threw off clouds of dust which
caked hair and skin, and made the whole outer man a complete study in
kharki. What failed to go down their throats went into their eyes,
blinding or worrying, while overhead a merciless sun blazed and
tortured. There was no shade; there was little water. The night was cold
as the day was hot. In the small hours the men were thankful for the
single blanket which was allowed each of them, and which was carried in
mule and bullock waggons for their use. Luxuries for the toilet were no
longer in vogue. A sponge, a shirt, a pair of socks--these made the sum
total of the Highland officers' wardrobe. Some still stuck to their
razors, and others had succumbed to necessity and wore nature's hirsute
decorations, plus a peppering of ochreous dust. But they were in the
best of tempers, and looked forward to some reviving dips in the Modder
on their arrival there.
Lord Methuen resumed command of the troops on the 6th of December, and
all were glad to find that the injury to their gallant commander had
been slight. It was now clear that the Boers intended to make a stand at
Spyfontein, for they were preparing for themselves fortified positions
such as their souls delighted in--deep, and long, and rocky. They had
time at their disposal, for a long halt at Modder River was imperative
for the purpose of replenishing the ammunition of the artillery
batteries and for bringing up relays of stores and food. Our expenditure
of ammunition in the fight on the 28th was said to have been 200 rounds
per gun, and consequently an extra supply was necessary before pursuing
aggressive operations.
Having deserted the river, the Boers were now planted in front of and on
the British right flank, so close indeed that daily passages at arms
took place between our patrols and those of the enemy. Several of
Rimington's Scouts were wounded, and wild rumours of approaching attack
were afloat. During the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th the
communications by rail and telegraph at Enslin were cut.
On this occasion the 2nd Northamptonshire Regiment had a narrow escape.
They had been left by Lord Methuen to guard the line of communications
at Enslin, and there they were attacked by a Boer force 1000 strong.
Fortunately the General, hearing the news, despatched in hot haste to
the assistance of the regiment the 12th Lancers and the Seaforth
Highlanders, who had just arrived at the camp, under Brigadier-General
Wauchope, together with the 62nd Field Battery. The attack commenced at
4.30, and continued till eleven, at which time the Lancers and Seaforths
appeared. The Boers thereupon retired with all speed, the Lancers
following closely in pursuit. The British loss was one killed and six
wounded. On the same day the first train ran over the temporary bridge
which had been rapidly constructed by the Engineers, whose smart
workmanship elicited general admiration.
An interesting affair took place on the 9th of December. At night one of
the Naval 4.7-inch guns, which had been fitted with a field-carriage and
dignified with the name of "Joe Chamberlain," was hauled by a team of
thirty-two oxen to a ridge on the north side of the town. At an early
hour in the morning the Naval detachment manned the gun and opened fire
on a Boer position that had been previously located by Colonel Rhodes.
More than a dozen shells were scattered among the enemy, causing
frightful consternation. The Boers at the time were busily engaged in
constructing an emplacement for one of their 40-pounders, but when "Joe
Chamberlain" made himself not only heard but felt, there was a stampede.
The lyddite ploughed up the hills with terrific uproar, and the
surrounding atmosphere appeared as though a sirocco of red sand had
swept over the district.
The force now massing on the Orange River, with Lieutenant-General Lord
Methuen in command, consisted of:--
2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry, 2nd Northamptonshire, 1st Loyal
North Lancashire (Mounted Infantry), 1st Loyal North
Lancashire, 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, 3rd Grenadier Guards,
1st Coldstream Guards, 2nd Coldstream Guards, 1st Scots Guards,
9th Lancers, 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1st
Highland Light Infantry, 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, Part of 2nd
Royal Highlanders (Black Watch), several Companies of Royal
Engineers, 18th, 62nd, and 65th Field Batteries, one or two
Horse-Artillery Batteries, part of Kimberley Light Horse, part
of Diamond Fields Horse, Naval Brigade, Contingents from
Australia, several Companies of Army Medical Corps, Field
Hospitals, Colonial Mounted Irregulars, Rimington's Scouts,
South African Reserve.
The total was about 14,000 men.
The number of Boers prepared to meet the British advance was supposed to
be between 15,000 and 18,000, but, in spite of this, it was decided that
some onward move must soon be made. The week's delay for the arrival of
reinforcements and other preparations was now over, and Spyfontein was
ahead. There the Boers held, if possible, a stronger position than any
that had yet been attacked. Towards the east they were congregating from
the direction of Jacobsdal, and the extent occupied by them was already
enormous. Lord Methuen, if he meant to get to Kimberley at all, was
forced to attempt to do so by frontal attack, as the area occupied by
the Boers was so great that no other means of tackling them was
feasible. Still the troops were in excellent spirits, the prospect of
shortly relieving a besieged multitude giving them courage to compensate
for their fatigue.
On the morning of the 10th there was a voluntary Church Parade.
According to a wag who reported from the camp, a Saturday-night's order
was given, which stated briefly that Presbyterians must go washed,
Church of England might go unwashed! The question of ablutions did not
affect the devotions of Tommy, who heartily joined in the singing of
hymns, which he said reminded him more than anything else of home.
THE BATTLE OF MAJESFONTEIN
On Sunday, the 10th of December, Lord Methuen, having completed his
plans, moved forward from his position for the momentous fight, which
was not only to decide the fate of Kimberley, but determine the attitude
of the waverers among the Dutch, of which there were now very many. The
Boers occupied a wide crescent-shaped front, extending some six miles
from the hills on the west of the railway at Spyfontein to the kopjes on
the east of the Kimberley road at Majesfontein.
The northern portion of the position consisted of a kopje about three
miles long, and the southern end terminated in a high hill which was
looked upon as the key to the position. Towards these rugged kopjes the
veldt sloped gently upwards from the river a distance of five miles, and
though from afar this plain seemed to face the ridge of hills spreading
from east to west, it in reality penetrated wedgewise into the
boulder-strewn area. Someone described the great Boer position as the
end of a pocket, a veritable _cul de sac_, doubtless lined with Boer
guns and Boer trenches--the jaws of a dragon, in fact.
[Illustration: THE MODDER RIVER.
Photo by Miss E. C. Briggs.]
Orders were given that this stronghold was to be bombarded, and from
4.50 P.M. to 6.30 P.M. the guns, including the Naval 4.7-inch, played
over kopjes and trenches with accuracy, and, it was thought, with deadly
effect. The operation was carried on with precision and perseverance as
long as a gleam of daylight lasted, but no response was elicited from
the enemy, who carefully concealed their very existence. At night a
tremendous downpour of rain descended and saturated the troops, who were
bivouacking where they were, some 4000 yards in front of the
Majesfontein position, thus rendering their already uncomfortable
situation more uncomfortable still. But this was merely an item in the
misfortunes they were shortly destined to endure.
The general plan was for the Highland Brigade, supported by guns, to
assault the southern end of the kopje, their right and rear being
protected by the Guards Brigade. According to Lord Methuen's despatch,
it seems that before moving off Major-General Wauchope explained all
that was to be done, and the particular part each battalion was to play
in the scheme: namely, that they were to march direct on the south-west
spur of the kopje, and on arrival near the objective before daybreak the
Black Watch were to move to the east of the kopje, where he believed the
enemy to be posted under shelter, while the Seaforth Highlanders were to
march straight to the south-east point of the kopje, with the Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders prolonging the line to the left; the Highland
Light Infantry to be in reserve until the action was developed. The
brigade was to march in mass of quarter columns, the four battalions
keeping touch, and, if necessary, ropes were to be used for the left
guides. The three battalions were to extend just before daybreak, two
companies in firing line, two companies in support, and four companies
in reserve, all at five paces interval between them.
Soon after midnight the march began. The distance was only two and a
half miles, and daybreak was due about 3.25 A.M. But the gruesome night
rendered the progress of the troops unusually slow. Rain came down in
torrents, thunder growled, lightning played over the hill, glinted on
rifles, and disorganised the compasses by which Major Benson was
steering his course. Towards dawn the gloom of Erebus seemed to deepen
rather than lift, and in the obscurity they must have been quite unaware
of the exceedingly close proximity of the enemy, for the Highland
Brigade--in the following order, Black Watch, Seaforths, Argyll and
Sutherland, and Highland Light Infantry--continued to approach in
quarter column though within some two hundred yards of the Boer
entrenchments. It was imagined that the Dutchmen were in force on a
kopje on the other side of the veldt, and not a soul suspected the
existence of the formidable line of intrenchments on which our soldiers
were gaily advancing. Before they could discover their mistake they were
greeted by the Dutchmen--who had allowed the brigade to approach without
showing any signs of life--with a raking fire on their flanks. The whole
hill seemed on the instant to become alive with the roar of musketry.
Fire vomited as from a live volcano at their very feet. A moment before
they had seen only a dark barrier of bush and shrub, and then, flash!
the earth yawned, crackled, and emitted the flame of hell.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF MAJESFONTEIN]
So seemed to them the sudden conflagration in that first, awful moment.
They started back--a confused, congested mass, with death in their
midst. Their Colonel then ordered the Seaforths to fix bayonets and
charge. The officers commanding other battalions followed suit. At this
moment, darkness still reigning, some one called "Retire." There was a
rush, many hurrying and hustling off to obey one order, while others
were still charging forwards to obey the other. The confusion was
intense, dead men dropping thick as autumn leaves, bullets whirring,
shouts, orders--conflicting orders--ringing out on every side. For some
seconds the rout of the gallant Highlanders seemed to be imminent. Their
retirement, however, was due mainly to sudden panic, the consternation
and amazement at the murderous outburst, blazing as it did in the dim
deceitful dusk, from the unsuspected trenches. These, it must be owned,
were most skilfully concealed at the foot of a series of kopjes. They
were screened from sight by a tangle of brushwood and scrub, while round
the glacis of the trenches was crinkled a triple line of barbed wire.
When, therefore, a deadly furnace broke from this tangle, the troops
were aghast. For the first moment the superb crowd, unduly huddled
together and helpless, threatened to become disorganised, but it was
only for a moment. The Highlanders retired some 200 yards, and then they
instantly formed up, such as were left of them, for out of two companies
of the Black Watch only fifty men escaped. A more tragic scene than that
at the onset of the battle cannot be conceived. From all directions came
an avalanche of lead, sweeping south and east and west in the gloaming,
and flecking the whole visible universe with red. Cries and groans and
curses and shouts intermingled with orders innumerable. "Advance,"
shouted some one; "Retire," called another; "Fix bayonets," cried a
third; "Charge," roared a fourth. Meanwhile Seaforths and Black Watch,
scrambling and tripping over the bodies of fallen comrades, were
pressing on through the high wire entanglements, tearing their already
excoriated legs, and struggling for the enemy's trenches. Here fell
their gallant leader, dauntless Wauchope--fell never to rise again. But
dying he cheered on the men of the Black Watch by his side. "Good-bye,
men," he called to them with his last breath; "fight for yourselves--it
is man to man now." And they did fight, struggling over and over again
to make their way to the trenches in spite of the menace of almost
certain death. Valiantly they held their ground, availing themselves of
such cover as there was, bushes and scrub that were dotted here and
there, and returning to the deadly greetings of the Mausers no mean
reply. At this time the avalanche of buzzing, whirring, death-dealing
lead was enough to make the stoutest heart quail, but the officers were
seen marching boldly forward, and where they led--veritably into the
jaws of death--there their loyal Highlanders followed. Meanwhile, so
soon as it was light enough to see, the artillery had come to the
rescue, and so remarkable were its performances that even the enemy
confessed that on this day they had suffered greater loss than at any
other time during the war. The howitzer battery was placed directly in
front of the position, and poured forth a terrible fire over the whole
face of the hill. Lyddite shells sped snorting into the trenches, and,
with a terrific detonation, shot up the earth in clouds. One destroyed a
laager on the kopje, others did fearful execution, striking the hard
rocks and boulders, and spreading devastation far and wide. But still
the enemy failed to budge from their strong entrenchments. The 62nd and
18th Field Batteries, under Majors Grant and Scott respectively, took up
a position behind the Highlanders, sending shell after shell into the
enemy's position with such amazing accuracy that the Boer numbers were
considerably thinned. During this feat they were assailed with a
scourging storm of lead from the whole line of intrenchments. The Boers
displayed more than their ordinary courage, standing upright in their
trenches, and sometimes advancing, the better to aim at the aggressive
"men-women," as they called the kilted warriors, though at other times
they completely hid themselves and fired wildly, in consequence of
holding their guns above the level of their heads. The Brigade,
nevertheless, advanced to within 300 yards of the enemy, where they
pluckily held their position in the teeth of galling fire for some
hours. Both their tenacity and their dash were astounding, for the
volleys of the enemy were accurate and persistent, and sufficiently
deadly to demoralise the most veteran troops in the world. The Boers,
having been reinforced during the engagement, their number had now
mounted to some 18,000 men. Eye-witnesses have described this, his
fourth fight, as quite the stiffest on Lord Methuen's record, and have
declared that the obstinate resistance of the Highland Brigade, and the
magnificent coolness and daring of its officers, quite equalled the most
splendid deeds of British history. The Brigade about noon was reinforced
by the Gordons, and these, as they advanced towards the wire-girded
trenches, were exposed to a terrific cross-fire from the enemy, their
route having taken them past a Boer trench from which the concealed foe
promptly assailed them, and they found themselves literally battered by
volleys in front, flank, and rear.
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP OF POSITIONS AT MAJESFONTEIN]
The Guards Brigade meanwhile were taking a heavy share of the work. They
occupied the centre and right, moving due north over a level plain which
was shelled by the Boers from the ridges. The extreme right rested on
the river, where the Yorkshire Light Infantry, under a tremendous fire,
held the drift. These clung tenaciously to their position throughout the
day, even after all their ammunition was exhausted. They fired in all
some 7000 rounds, inflicting terrible damage and losing only ten
wounded.
About two o'clock, after the enemy had been reinforced, the firing,
which had temporarily slackened, began again with stertorous uproar. The
air was thick with projectiles dealing death and mutilation on every
side. Then it was that the real disaster of the day occurred. The
portions of the shattered Highland Brigade, which, in spite of the
shock to its numbers, had stuck manfully to its terrific duty, suddenly
became disorganised. As a matter of fact, though it was not at the
moment recognised, nearly all its officers had fallen. A few minutes
later and they retired, by whose order none knows. The order was given.
No shouting of counter-orders could rally them; and indeed how could it,
since the revered familiar voices of their commanders were silent, some
of them perhaps never to be heard again! Major Ewart, Brigade-Major of
the Highlanders, rode up with an order--almost an entreaty, some
say--from the commanding officer to the effect that all he asked of the
Brigade was to hold the position till dark. But the officer in this
desperate situation could actually find no other to help him to repeat
the command to the scattered remnant, and he was thankful for the
assistance of Colonel Dawney, who, as a civilian, was surveying the
battle from Horse Artillery Hill. Eventually a rally was effected, and
the brigade, stiffened and supported by the Scots Guards, got back to
the guns; but their nerve was shattered by the terrific experiences of
the morning, by the losses they had sustained, and by the disappointment
of being unable to fulfil the glorious expectations which the renowned
Highland Brigade has ever encouraged and ever nobly fulfilled.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL ANDREW G. WAUCHOPE, C.B.
Photo by Horsburgh, Edinburgh.]
It will serve no purpose to dwell further on the miserable details of
mighty effort wasted, splendid lives sacrificed, and gallant hearts
crushed by mischance. There are moments when, like the Oriental, one can
but lift helpless hands to the Unseen and cry "Kismet!"
While the engagement was going forward, Major-General Pole-Carew sent an
armoured train, under cover of a Naval gun, within 2500 yards of the
Boer position. This gun during the whole day, whenever occasion
required, made itself prominent by its magnificent practice, firing
lyddite shells behind the main ridge, and searching kopjes, trenches,
and laager with amazing accuracy. For instance, at one moment a train of
bullocks drawing guns was seen by the Naval Brigade--in the next the
whole affair had ceased to exist! In the same summary way the Guards
dealt with the foe. They came on a picket of some forty Boers, who had
been left for purposes of observation, and in shorter time than it would
take to tell the tale the whole party were killed, wounded, or taken
prisoners. The troops held their own in front of the enemy, entirely
clearing them out of the upper intrenchments until darkness put a stop
to the operations. This was another of the day's misfortunes, for at the
very hour of dusk the Boers were deciding to evacuate their position.
Then our troops intrenched themselves in face of the Boer position. But
finally, on the following day, they had to retire to Modder River on
account of the scarcity of water.
Nearly all the loss was borne by the Highland Brigade, who lost
fifty-three officers either killed, wounded, or missing, and a total of
650 of all ranks. Our line was three and a half miles long, while that
of the Boers was almost double. The loss of the enemy in mounted
infantry was enormous, and their Scandinavian commando of eighty strong,
which, under Baron Faderscwold, had been removed from Mafeking, was
entirely destroyed, every man being killed or wounded except seven, who
were taken prisoners.
There seems to be little doubt that Lord Methuen's ill-success was
largely due to treachery, for in the course of the battle an officer
detected a Cape Dutchman on the left rear in the act of exchanging
signals with the Boers. In fact, much of the information supplied both
to General Gatacre and General Methuen was found to be deliberately
false, and it was known that the districts through which they had to
pass were seething with disaffection. For this reason most probably this
glorious and desperate fight proved a drawn battle, but there were, of
course, other possible causes to be considered. Lord Methuen had
advanced from De Aar with a brilliant army which had already acquitted
itself nobly, though with great loss, in three battles, against an enemy
entrenched in stony hills. With his thinned force of some 8000 men he
now hurled himself against troops which not only had been greatly
reinforced, but were situated behind complicated earthworks miles in
length, built on the most approved system of modern tactics.
In regard to strategy, there was no doubt that the Boers had scored.
They had been lying in wait fully aware of our plans, and had the
approach of the troops signalled to them by means of a lantern fixed
high on the hills. The Highlanders were fairly at their mercy. By the
time the shouts and orders and counter-orders had rung out, those who
had uttered them were dead or dying, and many who were left were
rushing--rushing and dropping--to get out of the fiery furnace into
which they had been led. It must be remembered that on that day there
was no artillery preparation; the heights had not been searched, and the
enemy was master of the field. The artillery operated later in the
morning; but after the first momentary retirement the Brigade of its own
accord formed up, consigned itself again to the hell of flame and death,
and there stuck as targets for the enemy till midday.
In the official despatch occurs the line, "I attach no blame to this
splendid brigade." Fortunately there is none among the great multitude
to whom the story of the tragic affair is known who would dream of
associating the word blame with the glorious band who so grievously have
suffered. Where the blame rests it is not for the civilian to say.
Indeed the exact facts of the matter can never be known, as the two dead
heroes most concerned cannot speak, and those who live can never argue
with certainty of facts occurring in the turmoil of battle. In reference
to the Brigade Lord Methuen said:--
"I have made use of Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes Hallett's report
(the acting Brigadier) for the description of the part the
Highland Brigade took in this action. Major-General Wauchope
told me, when I asked him the question, on the evening of the
10th, that he quite understood his orders, and made no further
remark. He died at the head of the brigade, in which his name
will always remain honoured and respected. His high military
reputation and attainments disarm all criticism. Every soldier
in my division deplores the loss of a fine soldier and a true
comrade. The attack failed; the inclement weather was against
success; the men in the Highland Brigade were ready enough to
rally, but the paucity of officers and non-commissioned
officers rendered this no easy matter. I attach no blame to
this splendid brigade."
Examples of individual daring and individual self-abnegation during this
glorious though ineffectual fight were too numerous to be quoted. The
Medical Staff, for instance, exposed themselves with a persistence that
was truly marvellous, succouring the injured and carrying them off to
shelter, till in some instances they themselves were shot. Very tragic
was the state of the gallant wounded, the bravest of the brave, who had
dared to advance too near the trenches, for these in the wretched plight
could not even enjoy the medical attention lavished on the others, as no
sooner were the doctors seen to be approaching them than a storm of fire
was immediately sent in their direction. The patience of the sufferers
was at times more than heroic. Notwithstanding their agonies and the
horrible pangs of thirst that are the inevitable result of wounds, some,
knowing that water was too scarce to go round, would not consent to do
more than moisten their lips from the water-bottle offered them, while
others hid the fact of their being wounded, so as not to absorb
attention from those more in need of it than themselves.
The Marquis of Winchester was one of those who fell nobly. For the most
part of the day he seemed to have a charmed life, and though bullets
whizzed through his helmet and round his ears, he moved fearlessly among
his men instructing each as to the direction in which he should fire. At
last, however, came the fatal shot which pierced his spine and laid him
low.
The gallant colonel of the Gordons, Colonel Downman, was seen shouting
on his men till a bullet dealt him a mortal wound. Another Scottish
hero, a private, was heard wildly remonstrating as the stretcher-bearers
tried to remove him from the field. His ankle was smashed, but he still
roared that he had been wounded for twelve hours, and had been fighting
all the while, and was still as fit as any man in the army!
He was not alone in his valour, for instances of remarkable gallantry
occurred on every side. Sergeant Gash (Rimington's Horse) singly
assisted a wounded man, sticking to him under a heavy fire till the poor
fellow was placed out of harm's way, and Lieutenant Riley (Yorkshire
Light Infantry) bore on his back a man of the Mounted Infantry while
covered by Sergeant Cassen and Privates Bennett and Mawhood. The reason
why so many officers fell may be attributed to the fact that the Boers
employed sharpshooters who walked coolly about lifting their
field-glasses and picking off such persons as appeared in any way
conspicuous. The prominence of the officers, however, was not due to
peculiarity in their uniforms, they having discarded swords, revolvers,
and belts, and adopted kharki aprons over their kilts. One of the
Seaforth Highlanders wrote pathetically of the awful day's work. He
said:--
"We were in quarter-column of companies in line--that is, we
were offering a front of, say, 50 yards--and immediately
behind, following in double ranks, were company after company
of the Highland Brigade, of, say, 3500 men. Suddenly the whole
hillside was one mass of flame, and the Seaforths, leading,
received a discharge of rifle-fire from over 16,000 Boers. It
was awful. Talk about 'hell'--the hillside was one continuous
line of fire. We immediately scattered and spread one in lines
right and left.... Monday's work was a huge blunder, and who is
to blame I do not know; but there is no doubt the Highland
Brigade were led like lambs to the slaughter. We were led more
as if we were on a Volunteer review at Hyde Park. We had a
sorrowful job on Tuesday night. We had fifty-three dead brought
in and buried. You could hear nothing but the wailing of the
pibrochs as the Highlanders were buried."
A colour-sergeant of the 2nd Black Watch writing from hospital thus
described the moments when the unlucky Brigade which had stood
gloriously against the terrific shock first became disorganised:--
"The brigade was moving in mass of quarter-column, with a few
mounted scouts in front and our battalion leading the Brigade.
We had to file through a narrow part and form up as we got
through, and when my company got to its place I could see the
dim outline of the hill in front, and thought we were in a very
dangerous place if the enemy, as I thought, occupied it, for it
was the extreme left of their position, and therefore they were
bound to strongly hold the flank. However, the brigade formed
up nicely on the open ground, and a lamp that was shining on
the left on a prominent spur was put out. Simultaneously the
whole of the hillside was lit up with the most damnable
discharge of rifles, &c., that any one can possibly imagine.
They seemed to be formed up in tiers all up the hillside, and
were pouring magazine fire into us at a terrific rate. Then
came all sorts of shouts--'Lie down,' 'Charge,' 'Extend,' &c.,
and of the whole brigade there was only the front rank of A
Company of ours that could have used their rifles, as everybody
else was straight in rear of them. Well, two companies in front
did charge, but were stopped by barbed wire fences and
entanglements fifteen yards from the trenches and mostly shot
down. Others broke to right and left or retired, and after
waiting about a minute for a bullet to hit me, as it appeared
impossible to escape one, and as it did not arrive, I thought
perhaps it was advisable to go with the remainder. I walked
away to the right, still expecting one, but they were all going
too high, and it was not yet light. I got clear away and
discovered a mob of excited soldiers of all regiments, and with
Captain Cameron we tried to get them together, but they had
lost their head, and several Boers who had moved out of the
trenches to get round our flank happening to fire in this
direction, they became disorganised. It was then daylight
before sunrise. The Boers, moving smartly, then showered us
with bullets, and many were bowled over. I walked along quite
casually, shouting to one and another to take cover and keep
cool, and I was once followed about 200 yards by quite an
accompaniment of bullets, I should say about twelve keeping it
up; but as they were evidently aiming at me, none hit me.
Slowly getting back with any amount dropping, I lost sight
eventually of these persevering gentlemen, when another alarm
came from a fresh direction. Thinking possibly it was some of
our own troops, I lay down behind an ant-heap facing the
direction, loaded my rifle, and waited to be certain before
firing. I did not fire, however, as at that moment somebody hit
me on the back of the neck with a bar of iron weighing two tons
and a half, for so it seemed to me; it quite numbed me for a
few seconds, and a chap who had lain down beside me shouted he
was shot and began to howl, upon which I politely asked him to
shut up and get it bandaged, and I then moved away to find out
where they were forming up. After half an hour my equipment
became too heavy for me, and meeting a stretcher-bearer he took
it off and bandaged me up. The bullet had entered the left side
of my neck, and, taking a downward course, passed through the
neck and out at the back of the right shoulder. I was then
conducted to the ambulance and away to hospital, and on my way
down saw the Gordons marching up from the baggage to take a
part in it, but the artillery had been working away for two or
three hours then."
Could any troops, officerless, unhinged, riddled through and through,
instantly gather themselves together with sufficient force to hold out
against a foe flushed with triumph and intoxicated with success?
Impossible! Students of Napier may recall the description of the panic
to the Light Division in the middle of the night, when no enemy was
near, and may understand how the bravest and most warlike troops, when
exposed to unexpected and unknown danger, have shrunk back in dismay. On
the occasion referred to some one called out "A mine!" and such was the
force of the shock to the imagination that "the troops who had not been
stopped by the strong barrier, the deep ditch, the high walls, and the
deadly fire of the enemy, staggered back appalled by a chimera of their
own raising." If this result can have been effected by a chimera, how
then could anything else be expected by a real shock, a tangible shock,
such as the gallant Brigade suffered in that dark hour of horror and
despair? It is difficult for the outsider within the protecting walls of
home to realise the awful moments, each long as a lifetime, through
which these noble fellows passed--moments full of heroism as they were
full of pathos! For instance, when the clamour of battle was at its
loudest, when no voice of officer could be heard, and the stricken
Highlanders were groaning in heaps upon the blistering veldt, Corporal
M'Kay, of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, standing in the midst
of the cyclone of lead, struck up "The Campbells are coming" in order to
rally the unfortunate men. These, jaded and broken as they were, drew
taut their aching limbs, and, reviving with the heartening strains, once
more dragged themselves towards the whirlwind of lead, determining once
more either to do or to die.
The desperate situation in which the Highlanders were placed may also be
pictured from descriptions given by two more of their ill-starred
number.
The first wrote:--
"At twelve o'clock we started to advance. Well, we got to
within 500 yards of the position, and if ever a man was led
into a death-trap my regiment was. We led the brigade. Our
general must have been under the impression that the Boers had
left the hill, for he had us up in mass of quarter column. When
we got within 500 yards they opened fire at us. My God, I shall
never forget it in my life. It was terrible, fearful; we were
shot down like dogs, without a chance to return their fire. The
groans of those hit sound in my ears yet, and will do for many
years to come. Well, as soon as they opened fire we fell flat,
and got the order to fix bayonets and charge. We did so. The
Black Watch only got into their trenches, and I am happy to
tell you my bayonet has still got on it the stain of a Boer's
blood. Not having any support from any other regiment, we got
the order to retire to 400 yards, and I can tell you there were
not many who got into the trenches who ever left them. There is
hardly any man in the regiment that has any part of his
equipment left whole. I have three holes in my kilt."
The second corroborated the above statement:--
"The Black Watch in front made an attempt to charge the
position, but we had to retire and simply run for it, the enemy
blazing at us all the way and dropping our fellows like
skittles from their splendid positions. There was nothing for
it but to lie down and pretend to be dead, and this I did about
5.30 A.M. till I suppose 6 P.M., the sun pouring down on me all
the time, and not a drink of water all day, and dare not stir
hand or foot, and expecting every instant to be my last. I
could hear nothing but the cries, moans, and prayers of the
wounded all round me, but I daren't so much as look up to see
who they were. Shots and shells were going over me all day from
the enemy and our side, and plenty of them striking within a
yard of me--I mean bullets, not shells--and yet they never hit
me. I believe some of the fellows went off their heads and
walked right up to the enemy's place, singing till they dropped
them. One youngster lying close to me said he would make a dart
for it about 3 P.M. I tried my best to persuade him not to, but
he would go. A couple of seconds after I could hear them
pitting at him, and then his groans for about a minute, and
then he was quiet. About this time the sun began to get
fearfully hot, and I began to feel it in the legs, which are
now very painful and swollen, besides was parched with thirst.
Most of the wounded round me had ceased groaning by this time.
As it began to get dark, I managed to wriggle my body through
the shrub farther back, and after I had been at it some time,
on looking up found myself right in front of another
intrenchment of the enemy. They sent a few rounds at me, but
they struck just in front and ricochetted over my head. After a
bit, it getting darker, I got up and walked back, and there was
nothing but dead Highlanders all over the place."
Can anything be more pathetic than these rough outlines of the tragic
scene where so many valiant souls sacrificed their lives without a
chance to win for themselves even the shroud of glory? Truly in this
surprisingly-fought yet disastrous battle--
"A thousand glorious actions that might claim
Triumphant laurels and immortal fame,
Confused in crowds of gallant actions lie,
And troops of heroes undistinguished lie."
Dim, as the dawn of that dire December morning, is our knowledge of the
real agony of those appalling moments, the absolute magnificence of
these human souls who were ordered to march to the grave as surely as
was the Light Brigade at Balaclava. For though Balaclava was a scene of
triumph and Majesfontein was one of misery, both brigades started
gloriously forth, and both were martyrs to a mistake. If ever monument
should be erected to the brave Scottish dead who were sacrificed at
Majesfontein, these four words should be carved thereon, that all who
hereafter may read of their high failure may remember also, that this
failure was entirely due to the tragic fact that "Some one had
blundered."
The picture of disaster given by the _Daily News_ was heart-breaking:--
"General Wauchope was down, riddled with bullets; yet gasping,
dying, bleeding from every vein, the Highland chieftain raised
himself on his hands and knees and cheered his men forward. Men
and officers fell in heaps together. The Black Watch charged,
and the Gordons and the Seaforths, with a yell that stirred the
British camp below, rushed onward--onward to death or disaster.
The accursed wires caught them round the legs until they
floundered, like trapped wolves, and all the time the rifles of
the foe sang the song of death in their ears. Then they fell
back, broken and beaten, leaving nearly 1300 dead and wounded."
Yes; dead and wounded--for many of the latter even remained there till
morning. Among these was poor young Wauchope, the soul of gallantry. He
was hit in four places, and lay for hours in the bitterly cold night
glued to the ground in his own gore. He was not picked up till dawn. But
gruesome as was his position, he was in the company of heroes. Round and
about were the most splendid fellows that had ever worn kilt; Colonel
Coode, and brave brilliant MacFarlan, the Adjutant of the Black Watch,
who, times and again, rallied not only his men, but any stragglers who
could be got to follow his dauntless lead. And beyond all these, close
in the teeth of the enemy, was the glorious General, the intrepid
warrior, who, after distinguishing himself in many battlefields, in the
shambles of Majesfontein "foremost fighting fell."
No word, no lament, can sufficiently express the mourning of the nation.
Of him only can we say, as was said of Sir John Moore at Coruna, "If
glory be a distinction, for such a man death is not a leveller!" Neither
for such a man is there any death! Though his dust may mingle with the
dust of the veldt, his actions must stand out for all time, and remind
his countrymen that of such glorious, immemorial dust the British Empire
has been built!
General Wauchope was born in 1846, and entered the army in
1865; was Lieutenant in 1867, Captain in 1878, Major in 1884,
Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel the same year, Colonel in 1888, and
Major-General in 1898. He served in the Ashanti War in 1873, was
slightly wounded in the advance-guard engagement of Jarbinbah, and
severely wounded at the battle of Ordashu. He was mentioned in
despatches, and was awarded the medal and clasp.
In the Egyptian War of 1882 he served with the Black Watch, and took
part in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, receiving medal with clasp and the
Khedive's Star. Two years later he was in the Soudan Expedition under
Sir Gerald Graham as D.A.A.G., and was severely wounded at El Teb,
receiving the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and two clasps for his
bravery. In the Nile Expedition of 1884-85 Colonel Wauchope was attached
to Major-General Earle's river column, and in the engagement of Kerbekan
was again wounded--this time very severely. At the conclusion of the
campaign he was awarded two clasps. In 1898 he took part in the Soudan
Expedition under Lord Kitchener, and led the first British brigade into
action at the battle of Omdurman. For his services he was made
Major-General, was awarded the medal and the Khedive's medal with
clasps, and received the thanks of Parliament. When the present war in
South Africa began, he was appointed to command the Highland Brigade of
Lord Methuen's column.
In the political sphere Major-General Wauchope distinguished himself
also, though he never entered Parliament. He was, however, Mr.
Gladstone's opponent in the re-election for Midlothian in 1892. It was a
fight which excited the keenest interest all over Great Britain, and was
conducted by Colonel Wauchope with untiring energy. The result was that
he reduced the Radical majority from the 4631 of the previous election
(of 1885) to 690. He would probably have been returned in 1895, but he
was then once more on the active list of the army. In June 1898 he
contested South Edinburgh, but lost by a Liberal majority of 831. The
news of his death caused a feeling of great distress in the Scottish
capital, and the sorrow among his tenantry in Midlothian was intense.
The following is the list of officers killed and wounded:--
Highland Brigade (Staff)--Killed: Major-General Wauchope.
Seriously wounded: Lieutenant Macleod (West Riding Regiment).
Wounded: Lieutenant Wauchope (2nd Royal Highlanders),
Lieutenant Vaughan (1st York and Lancaster Regiment), slightly.
2nd Royal Highlanders--Killed: Lieut.-Colonel Coode,[9] Captain
Elton, Lieutenant Edmonds, Captain Hon. Cumming Bruce, Captain
MacFarlan, Lieutenant Ramsay. Wounded: Major Cuthbertson,
Captain Cameron, Lieutenant St. J. Harvey, Lieutenant Berthon,
Lieutenant Tait, Second Lieutenant Bullock, Second Lieutenant
Drummond, Second Lieutenant Innes. Slightly wounded: Major
Duff, Major Berkeley, Lieutenant J. Harvey. 2nd Seaforth
Highlanders--Killed: Captain J. R. Clark, Lieutenant Cox,
Second Lieutenant Cowie, Captain Brodie. Missing: Major K. R.
Mackenzie. Wounded: Captain Featherstonhaugh, Lieutenant
Chamley, Second Lieutenant Waterhouse (dangerously), Second
Lieutenant Hall, Second Lieutenant Wilson, Second Lieutenant
Clive, Second Lieutenant Baillie. 1st Highland Light
Infantry--Killed: Captain Cowan, Captain Lambton. Wounded:
Lieut.-Colonel Kelham (slightly), Captain Noyes (severely),
Captain Wolfe Murray (slightly), Captain Richardson, Second
Lieutenant A. J. Martin, Second Lieutenant Knight, Second
Lieutenant Fraser, 1st Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders--Killed: Lieut.-Colonel Goff.[10] Wounded: Major
Robinson (since died), Lieutenant Graham, Second Lieutenant
King, Second Lieutenant Scott (seriously), Captain Campbell
(slightly). 1st Gordon Highlanders-of wounds: Captain Wingate.
Dangerously wounded: Lieut.-Colonel Downman,[11] Captain W. E.
Gordon, Second Lieutenant Campbell. Seriously
wounded: Captain Macnab. Guards Brigade.--1st Coldstream
Guards--Wounded: Lieut.-Colonel Codrington, Major Hon. W.
Lambton, Captain J. Sterling, Second Lieutenant W. Beckwith,
Second Lieutenant G. Follett. 2nd Coldstream Guards--Killed:
Major the Marquis of Winchester.[12] Cavalry Brigade
(Staff)--Wounded: Captain Briggs (1st Dragoon Guards),
Brigade-Major. Mounted Infantry--Killed: Major Milton, Major
Ray (1st Northumberland Fusiliers). Wounded: Lieut.-Colonel
Bigron (Australian Artillery) (attached), and Lieutenant Cowie.
Royal Horse Artillery--Wounded: Lieutenant Tudor (G Battery)
and Major Maberley. Royal Army Medical Corps--Wounded:
Lieutenant Douglas. Taken prisoner: Major C. H. Burtchaell.
FOOTNOTES:
[9] Lieutenant-Colonel John Henry Collier Coode, of the 2nd Battalion
Royal Highlanders (Black Watch), entered the army in 1875, obtained his
company in 1882, was major in 1890, and lieutenant-colonel in June 1898.
From 1884 to 1889 he was an adjutant of the Auxiliary Forces, but until
the present campaign had seen no active service.
[10] Lieutenant-Colonel Gerald Lionel Joseph Goff, of the 1st Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, was the eldest surviving son of the late Mr.
Joseph Goff, of Burton Grange, Herts, by his marriage with Lady Adelaide
Henrietta Louise Hortense, a daughter of the second Earl of Ranfurly. He
was born on March 8, 1855, and entered the army on March 10, 1875, from
the Militia, being posted as a lieutenant to the 91st Foot (now the Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders). He obtained his company on July 1, 1884, and
was adjutant of the 1st Volunteer Battalion of the North Staffordshire
Regiment from January 2, 1888, to January 1, 1893. He reached the rank of
major on September 21, 1892, and that of lieutenant-colonel on July 23,
1898. This was not his first service in South Africa, he having taken part
with the 91st Highlanders in the Zulu war of 1879, when he was present at
the action of Gingindhlovu and the relief of Ekowe, for which he had the
medal with clasp. He was a magistrate for Hants and Wilts, and resided at
Hale Park, Salisbury. He married in 1894 Ellen, the youngest daughter of
Sir Robert Dundas, of Arniston, Midlothian, who survives him.
[11] Lieutenant-Colonel George Thomas Frederick Downman, of the 1st
Battalion Gordon Highlanders, who subsequently died of wounds received in
this battle, joined the army twenty-three years ago, became captain in
1883, and major in 1891. In 1896 he was appointed second in command of his
regiment, and received a brevet lieutenant-colonelcy in May 1898. He first
saw service in the Soudan campaign of 1884, and was present at El Teb and
Tamai, receiving the medal with clasp and the Khedive's star. In the Nile
Expedition which followed he was with the River Column under Major-General
Earle, and was awarded a clasp. In 1895 he was with his regiment in
Chitral under Sir Robert Low, and took part in the storming of the
Malakand Pass, being mentioned in despatches and receiving the medal with
clasp. Then in 1897-98 he went with his battalion to the North-West
Frontier under Sir William Lockhart and was present in the engagement at
Dargai and at the subsequent storming of the Dargai heights, being
mentioned again in despatches. He was present also at the capture of the
Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, and went through the succeeding operations in
the Maidan, Waran, and Bara Valleys. His name was mentioned also in these
despatches, and his services secured for him, besides his brevet of
lieutenant-colonel, two clasps. He was forty-four years of age, and was
gazetted to the lieutenant-colonelcy of his regiment in July 1899.
[12] Augustus John Henry Beaumont Paulet, Marquis of Winchester, Premier
Marquis of England and the fifteenth bearer of the title, was born in
1858, and succeeded his father in 1887. Educated at Eton, he entered the
Coldstream Guards in 1879, was lieutenant in 1881, captain in 1890, and
received his majority in April 1897. He served in the expedition to the
Soudan in 1885 as aide-de-camp to Sir John M'Neill, and was present in the
engagements at Hasheen and the Tofreck Zereba, and at the destruction of
Tamai, receiving the medal with two clasps and Khedive's star. He went out
to the Cape with his regiment in the _Gascon_, arriving there just a month
ago. It was only on the previous Saturday that his appointment as second
in command of the regiment was notified, the vacancy having been caused by
the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Stopford at the battle of Belmont. Lord
Winchester was the hereditary bearer of the Cap of Maintenance--a cap of
dignity carried before the Sovereigns of England at their coronation. He
was a D.L. for the county of Southampton, was unmarried, and is succeeded
by his brother, Lord Henry William Montagu Paulet, formerly a lieutenant
of the 3rd Battalion Hampshire Regiment, who has just attained his 37th
year.