The question of the application of armies to labor purposes, which has
acquired amongst us an enormous importance from the point of view of
principle, was approached by us by the path of practice, not at all on
the foundations of theoretical consideration. On certain borders of
Soviet Russia, circumstances had arisen which had left considerable
military forces free for an indefinite period. To transfer them to
other active fronts, especially in the winter, was difficult in
consequence of the disorder of railway transport. Such, for example,
proved the position of the Third Army, distributed over the provinces
of the Ural and the Ural area. The leading workers of that army,
understanding that as yet it could not be demobilized, themselves
raised the question of its transference to labor work. They sent to
the centre a more or less worked-out draft decree for a labor army.
The problem was novel and difficult. Would the Red soldiers work?
Would their work be sufficiently productive? Would it pay for itself?
In this connection there were doubts even in our own ranks. Needless
to say, the Mensheviks struck up a chorus of opposition. The same
Abramovich, at the Congress of Economic Councils called in January or
the beginning of February--that is to say, when the whole affair was
still in draft stage--foretold that we should suffer an inevitable
failure, for the whole undertaking was senseless, an Arakcheyev
Utopia, etc., etc. We considered the matter otherwise. Of course the
difficulties were great, but they were not distinguishable in
principle from many other difficulties of Soviet constructive work.
Let us consider in fact what was the organism of the Third Army. Taken
all in all, one rifle division and one cavalry division--a total of
fifteen regiments--and, in addition, special units. The remaining
military formations had already been transformed to other armies and
fronts. But the apparatus of military administration had remained
untouched as yet, and we considered it probable that in the spring we
should have to transfer it along the Volga to the Caucasus front,
against Denikin, if by that time he were not finally broken. On the
whole, in the Third Army there remained about 120,000 Red soldiers in
administrative posts, institutions, military units, hospitals, etc. In
this general mass, mainly peasant in its composition, there were
reckoned about 16,000 Communists and members of the organization of
sympathizers--to a considerable extent workers of the Ural. In this
way, in its composition and structure, the Third Army represented a
peasant mass bound together into a military organization under the
leadership of the foremost workers. In the army there worked a
considerable number of military specialists, who carried out important
military functions while remaining under the general control of the
Communists. If we consider the Third Army from this general point of
view, we shall see that it represents in miniature the whole of Soviet
Russia. Whether we take the Red Army as a whole, or the organization
of the Soviet regime in the county, province, or the whole Republic,
including the economic organs, we shall find everywhere the same
scheme of organization: millions of peasants drawn into new forms of
political, economic, and social life by the organized workers, who
occupy a controlling position in all spheres of Soviet construction.
To posts requiring special knowledge, we send experts of the bourgeois
school. They are given the necessary independence, but control over
their work remains in the hands of the working class, in the person of
its Communist Party. The introduction of general labor service is
again only conceivable for us as the mobilization of mainly peasant
labor-power under the guidance of the most advanced workers. In this
way there were not, and could not, be any obstacles in principle in
the way of application of the army to labor. In other words, the
opposition in principle to labor armies, on the part of those same
Mensheviks, was in reality opposition to "compulsory" labor generally,
and consequently against general labor service and against Soviet
methods of economic reconstruction as a whole. This opposition did not
trouble us a great deal.
Naturally, the military apparatus as such is not adapted directly to
the process of labor. But we had no illusions about that. Control had
to remain in the hands of the appropriate economic organs; the army
supplied the necessary labor-power in the form of organized, compact
units, suitable in the mass for the execution of the simplest
homogeneous types of work: the freeing of roads from snow, the storage
of fuel, building work, organization of cartage, etc., etc.
To-day we have already had considerable experience in the work of the
labor application of the army, and can give not merely a preliminary
or hypothetical estimate. What are the conclusions to be drawn from
that experience? The Mensheviks have hastened to draw them. The same
Abramovich, again, announced at the Miners' Congress that we had
become bankrupt, that the labor armies represent parasitic formations,
in which there are 100 officials for every ten workers. Is this true?
No. This is the irresponsible and malignant criticism of men who stand
on one side, do not know the facts, collect only fragments and
rubbish, and are concerned in any way and every way either to declare
our bankruptcy or to prophecy it. In reality, the labor armies have
not only not gone bankrupt, but, on the contrary, have had important
successes, have displayed their fidelity, are developing and are
becoming stronger and stronger. Just those prophets have gone bankrupt
who foretold that nothing would come of the whole plan, that nobody
would begin to work, and that the Red soldiers would not go to the
labor front but would simply scatter to their homes.
These criticisms were dictated by a philistine scepticism, lack of
faith in the masses, lack of faith in bold initiative, and
organization. But did we not hear exactly the same criticism, at
bottom, when we had recourse to extensive mobilizations for military
problems? Then too we were frightened, we were terrified by stories of
mass desertion, which was absolutely inevitable, it was alleged, after
the imperialist war. Naturally, desertion there was, but considered by
the test of experience it proved not at all on such a mass scale as
was foretold; it did not destroy the army; the bond of morale and
organization--Communist voluntarism and State compulsion
combined--allowed us to carry out mobilizations of millions to carry
through numerous formations and redistributions, and to solve the most
difficult military problems. In the long run, the army was victorious.
In relation to labor problems, on the foundation of our military
experience, we awaited the same results; and we were not mistaken. The
Red soldiers did not scatter when they were transformed from military
to labor service, as the sceptics prophesied. Thanks to our
splendidly-organized agitation, the transference itself took place
amidst great enthusiasm. True, a certain portion of the soldiers tried
to leave the army, but this always happens when a large military
formation is transferred from one front to another, or is sent from
the rear to the front--in general when it is shaken up--and when
potential desertion becomes active. But immediately the political
sections, the press, the organs of struggle with desertion, etc.,
entered into their rights; and to-day the percentage of deserters from
our labor armies is in no way higher than in our armies on active
service.
The statement that the armies, in view of their internal structure,
can produce only a small percentage of workers, is true only to a
certain extent. As far as the Third Army is concerned, I have already
pointed out that it retained its complete apparatus of administration
side by side with an extremely insignificant number of military units.
While we--owing to military and not economic considerations--retained
untouched the staff of the army and its administrative apparatus, the
percentage of workers produced by the army was actually extremely low.
From the general number of 120,000 Red soldiers, 21% proved to be
employed in administrative and economic work; 16% were engaged in
daily detail work (guards, etc.) in connection with the large number
of army institutions and stores; the number of sick, mainly typhus
cases, together with the medico-sanitary personnel, was about 13%;
about 25% were not available for various reasons (detachment, leave,
absence without leave, etc.). In this way, the total personnel
available for work constitutes no more than 23%; this is the maximum
of what can be drawn for labor from the given army. Actually, at
first, there worked only about 14%, mainly drawn from the two
divisions, rifle and cavalry, which still remained with the army.
But as soon as it was clear that Denikin had been crushed, and that we
should not have to send the Third Army down the Volga in the spring to
assist the forces on the Caucasus front, we immediately entered upon
the disbanding of the clumsy army apparatus and a more regular
adaptation of the army institutions to problems of labor. Although
this work is not yet complete, it has already had time to give some
very significant results. At the present moment (March, 1920), the
former Third Army gives about 38% of its total composition as workers.
As for the military units of the Ural military area working side by
side with it, they already provide 49% of their number as workers.
This result is not so bad, if we compare it with the amount of work
done in factories and workshops, amongst which in the case of many
quite recently, in the case of some even to-day, absence from work for
legal and illegal reasons reached 50% and over.[9] To this one must
add that workers in factories and workshops are not infrequently
assisted by the adult members of their family, while the Red soldiers
have no auxiliary force but themselves.
[9] Since that time this percentage has been considerably
lowered (June, 1920).
If we take the case of the 19-year-olds, who have been mobilized in
the Ural with the help of the military apparatus--principally for wood
fuel work--we shall find that, out of their general number of over
30,000, over 75% attend work. This is already a very great step
forward. It shows that, using the military apparatus for mobilization
and formation, we can introduce such alterations in the construction
of purely labor units as guarantee an enormous increase in the
percentage of those who participate directly in the material process
of production.
Finally, in connection with the productivity of military labor, we can
also now judge on the basis of experience. During the first days, the
productivity of labor in the principal departments of work, in spite
of the great moral enthusiasm, was in reality very low, and might seem
completely discouraging when one reads the first labor communiques.
Thus, for the preparation of a cubic sazhen of wood, at first, one had
to reckon thirteen to fifteen labor days; whereas the standard--true,
rarely attained at the present day--is reckoned at three days. One
must add, in addition, that artistes in this sphere are capable, under
favorable conditions, of producing one cubic sazhen per day per man.
What happened in reality? The military units were quartered far from
the forest to be felled. In many cases it was necessary to march to
and from work 6 to 8 versts, which swallowed up a considerable portion
of the working day. There were not sufficient axes and saws on the
spot. Many Red soldiers, born in the plains, did not know the forests,
had never felled trees, had never chopped or sawed them up. The
provincial and county Timber Committees were very far from knowing at
first how to use the military units, how to direct them where they
were required, how to equip them as they should be equipped. It is not
wonderful that all this had as its result an extremely low level of
productivity. But after the most crying defects in organization were
eliminated, results were achieved that were much more satisfactory.
Thus, according to the most recent data, in that same First Labor
Army, four and a half working days are now devoted to one sazhen of
wood, which is not so far from the present standard. What is most
comforting, however, is the fact that the productivity of labor
systematically increases, in the measure of the improvement of its
conditions.
While as to what can be achieved in this respect, we have a brief but
very rich experience in the Moscow Engineer Regiment. The Chief Board
of Military Engineers, which controlled this experiment, began with
fixing the standard of production as three working days for a cubic
sazhen of wood. This standard soon proved to be surpassed. In January
there were spent on a cubic sazhen of wood two and one-third working
days; in February, 2.1; in March, 1.5; which represents an exclusively
high level of productivity. This result was achieved by moral
influence, by the exact registration of the individual work of each
man, by the awakening of labor pride, by the distribution of bonuses
to the workers who produced more than the average result--or, to speak
in the language of the trade unions, by a sliding scale adaptable to
all individual changes in the productivity of labor. This experiment,
carried out almost under laboratory conditions, clearly indicates the
path along which we have to go in future.
At present we have functioning a series of labor armies--the First,
the Petrograd, the Ukrainian, the Caucasian, the South Volga, the
Reserve. The latter, as is known, assisted considerably to raise the
traffic capacity of the Kazan-Ekaterinburg Railway; and, wherever the
experiment of the adaptation of military units for labor problems was
carried out with any intelligence at all, the results showed that this
method is unquestionably live and correct.
The prejudice concerning the inevitably parasitic nature of military
organization--under each and every condition--proves to be shattered.
The Soviet Army reproduces within itself the tendencies of the Soviet
social order. We must not think in the petrifying terms of the last
epoch: "militarism," "military organization," "the unproductiveness of
compulsory labor." We must approach the phenomena of the new epoch
without any prejudices, and with eyes wide open; and we must remember
that Saturday exists for man, and not vice versa; that all forms of
organization, including the military, are only weapons in the hands of
the working class in power, which has both the right and the
possibility of adapting, altering, refashioning, those weapons, until
it has achieved the requisite result.