among the petty Oosbeg states, as to enable him, with their assistance,
to make an effort to regain his lost dominions, the Ameer had
contemplated a flight into the Persian territories. But the Governor of
Balkh intercepted the fugitive, and invited him to that place. Jubbar
Khan went on the part of the Ameer, and was detained until the arrival
of Dost Mahomed himself. Then the Ameer was informed that the Khan of
Bokhara desired the presence at his capital of the ex-ruler of Caubul.
Sorely perplexed, and almost helpless, but not without some misgivings,
Dost Mahomed then went to Bokhara.
[28] _Jellalabad, February 23, 1840. MS. Correspondence._
[29] Mehrab Khan, the Wullee of Maimouna, said to Arthur Conolly, in
the autumn of 1840, “My ancestors were content to serve the King of
Caubul, and when members of that house fell into misfortune, they found
hospitality here. Shah Soojah is again upon his throne at Caubul; but
now another Suddozye King calls upon me to submit only to Herat, and
your English agent advises me to send my son there. On the other hand,
the Commander of the Faithful claims allegiance for Bokhara. The Khan
Huzzrut desires me to put myself under him; and you know how I was
forced to act when the Persian Asoph-ood-dowlah crossed the Moorghaub.”
[30] Sir W. Macnaghten to Mr. Robertson, April 1, 1840.
[31] On the 21st of March, Macnaghten had written to the Agra Governor:
“Lord Auckland tells me that the Russian force consists only of
3000 cavalry Cossacks, 800 mounted artillerymen, and twelve light
field-pieces; but Burnes tells me that he knows, from good information,
that the force is much larger. Let us hope the armada may be dispersed
before it reaches Bokhara, whatever may be the strength of it. If the
Russians are likely to establish themselves there, we had better be up
and doing.”—(_MS. Correspondence._)
But on the 15th of April he wrote from Jellalabad: “You will see from
Captain Abbott’s report how contemptible is the enemy with which the
Russians have to contend, and I fear they will experience no obstacle
to their progress all the way to Bokhara. Had we not been here, they
would by this time next year have established themselves without
the slightest opposition or difficulty in Afghanistan. They appear
to have completely gained over (whether by promises or threats) the
King of Bokhara, who turns a deaf ear to all our advances.”—(_MS.
Correspondence._)
On the 23rd, the Court having then commenced its progress to Caubul,
the Envoy wrote in a still less confident strain: “All accounts concur
in stating that the Russians have reached Khiva, and I anticipate
anything but a bed of roses unless something be done to distract
people’s attention from the intrigues ahead, by putting a stop to those
in our rear. We are now on the field of battle on which Shah Soojah
lost his throne in 1810. What must his Majesty’s feelings be now?”
[32] May 10, 1842.
[33] “The price of flour in the Herat bazaar was, about this time, one
Company’s rupee for less than four Hindostanee seers; and the whole
supply from Toorkistan, the markets of which had been opened by our
negotiations with Khiva. On our arrival at Herat, although the harvest
had been reaped, five maunds of flour were with difficulty procured in
the bazaar; and to meet the demand which the arrival of the Mission
(consisting of about 120 persons) occasioned, we had immediately to
send for supplies to Seistan.”—[_Facts relating to Herat, by Dr. J. S.
Login._]
[34] “When Major Todd, in June, 1839, arrived as envoy at Herat, he
selected Moollah Hussan, a Mahomedan priest of great respectability,
as bearer of a letter of friendship to the Khan Huzzrut (Supreme Lord)
of Khiva, called also Khaurism Shah, or King of Khaurism. Moollah
Hussan, arrived at Khiva when the state was threatened with a Russian
invasion, was well received; and on his return was accompanied by an
Oosbeg Lord, Shookkurroola Bre by name, as ambassador from the Khan
Huzzrut to the Indian Government. The letter borne by this ambassador
accepted of the tender of British friendship, and made several demands
which could not be complied with on the responsibility of Major Todd.
It was in answer to this mission that the Envoy deputed me to visit
the Court of Khiva.”—[_Captain Abbott’s Narrative of a Journey from
Herat to Khiva: Preliminary Remarks._] For an account of Captain
Abbott’s personal adventures, with a glimmering here and there of his
political negotiations, I would refer the reader to his interesting
volumes. Abbott says, at the commencement of his narrative: “We (Todd
and Abbott) separate under circumstances sufficiently gloomy. I leave
him in the very stronghold of robbers. I go myself as agent of the
British Government to a Court, of the language and manners of which I
am utterly ignorant, and to accomplish that of which the most sanguine
have no hope. It is simply a matter of duty, and as such entered upon
cheerfully, and with full determination to carry my efforts to the
utmost.”
[35] Ghorian, the frontier post of Herat, had been taken by the
Persians in 1838. When, in the spring of 1840, the perfidy of Yar
Mahomed was discovered, the Wuzeer expressed some contrition, and
an anxiety to prove his sincerity, by fitting out an expedition for
the recovery of Herat. All that he wanted was money. If the British
agent would advance him two lakhs of rupees, he would speedily
recover Ghorian. The money was advanced; and of course Ghorian was
not recovered. It was believed by the Mission that, whilst pretending
to make his preparations for the expedition, the Wuzeer was sending
messages to the Persian commandant at Ghorian, telling him not to be
under any apprehensions, for that although the British desired him to
recover the place, he had no intention of making the attempt.
[36] In Council, the Commander-in-Chief was consistently opposed
to the project of an advance on Herat or the countries beyond the
Hindoo-Koosh. On the 25th of May he wrote in his journal: “In a quiet
way, without any formality, I placed in the Governor-General’s hands
to-day in Council a paper detailing the numbers of regiments and troops
or companies of artillery now beyond our frontier. It is very great:
1 troop and 5 companies of Artillery; 1 regiment of Native Cavalry; 9
regiments of European and 15-1/2 of Native Infantry; 2-1/2 companies
of Golundauze, and 2 companies of Sappers. I remarked at the foot that
this aggregate exceeded, except in horse artillery and cavalry, the
two armies which, in 1803, beat down the great army of Scindiah, under
Lake and Wellesley. I did this in the hope of inducing Lord Auckland to
pause before he sanctioned any advance upon Balkh or to Herat, for we
can ill afford any such extension of our force. In truth, we are much
weaker now than in 1838, when the first augmentation was ordered in
view to our later campaign.”—[_MS. Journal of Sir Jasper Nicolls._]
[37] _MS. Correspondence._ See also letters to Mr. Robertson, Major
Todd, and Sir J. R. Carnac;—quoted in first edition.
[38] 30,000 rupees (or 3000_l._) per annum.
[39] In connection with the Ghilzye affairs at this time, comes in the
unpleasant story of the surrender of Wulloo Khan. I believe that the
following account of the transaction, which appeared in a Calcutta
journal, is substantially correct: “Wulloo Khan, after his beating,
wished to make terms. Anderson allowed him to go into Candahar to do
so. He was successful, and received a dress of honour from Major Leech,
and one from the Shah-zadah ruling Candahar. He declared he had been
instigated to resistance by men in Candahar, and that he would show
their letters. He returned to Anderson, and then to his home; when
hearing that Lieutenant Nicolson and Shah-zadah Timour were near,
relying on the pledged words of our political agent, Major Leech, and
the Shah-zadah Futteh Jung, Wulloo Khan went to make his obedience,
and was immediately seized and made prisoner. His letters and dress of
honour, together with a strong protest against such proceedings from
Anderson, may have saved his head, but he is sent prisoner to Caubul.”
The writer adds, that “three of the prisoners made over to Lieutenant
Nicolson and the Shah-zadah Timour had their heads struck off;” but I
have before me a specific declaration, made by the Envoy in a letter to
Lord Auckland, dated November 24, 1840, that “not a single political
execution has taken place since his Majesty’s accession to power.”
[40] Lieutenant Walpole Clerk—a young officer of conspicuous gallantry
and zeal.
[41] The defence of the former place by Captain Lewis Brown, and of
the latter by Captain Bean, are among the most noticeable incidents of
the war, and deserve more extended notice than I can give them in this
place. I am compelled to leave it to others to chronicle more minutely
the progress of events in Upper Sindh.
[42] Commenting on the neglect of all ordinary precautions, by which
the insurrection had been suffered to make so much head in Upper
Sindh, Burnes, on the 7th of August, wrote to Macnaghten:—“In April,
1839, when called upon by you to state officially what should be done
to chastise the treachery of the chief of Khelat, I recommended,
in common with yourself and Lord Keane, his deposition; but I as
plainly stated in my letter of the 10th of that month, ‘that while
our troops continued at Shawl, this may be an unnecessary arrangement
(to raise national troops), but both at Moostung and Cutchee very
energetic measures will be required to these countries; and happily
their resources are such, that this will amply repay the labour and
expense.’ Was this vigour displayed by his Majesty’s Government on the
spot, or by our own authorities? One of his Majesty’s governors has
joined the insurgents, and the political agent was taken by surprise
on an occasion which the slightest foresight might have anticipated.
What right have we to expect that any chief placed in power shall
flourish by us, unless his government is better than that which we
have overthrown? Did Shah Newaz muster or even organise his troops?
Did he point out the necessity for payment, or the means of making
them superior to his adversaries? We advanced him a lakh of rupees,
and allowed him to continue most at Caubul, while we withdrew all our
troops. Khelat is the capital of Beloochistan—a poor but vast country,
stretching from the mountains in sight of the Indus to the confines
of Persia. Through this wide tract our discomfiture affects our
reputation; the only solace in it will be found in our chief, not our
troops being vanquished.”-[_Papers privately printed._]
[43] This, however, was not until the beginning of November. Loveday
had then been for some months in captivity.
[44] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._
[45] About this time Macnaghten had been much vexed by the conduct of
General Nott, who, from first to last, treated the royal family of
Caubul with the supremest contempt. Nothing could induce him to behave
towards any one of them with ordinary respect. At last Macnaghten was
compelled to lay his complaints before the Supreme Government. “It was
with much regret,” he wrote to Lord Auckland, “that I felt compelled
to refer to government a difference of opinion between myself and Sir
Willoughby, but if such an outrage as that committed by General Nott
is to be tolerated and justified, there must be an end of our efforts
to make it be believed that Shah Soojah is king of this country. I
know how embarrassing these references are, and I should have been
happy to have saved government the trouble of passing orders on the
question, had Sir Willoughby so far supported me as to have conveyed
a censure to General Nott for the deliberate and gratuitous violence
which he had committed. The _animus_ by which he has been actuated is
apparent throughout—he refused to pay the Prince the common compliment
of calling upon him, although told that such a civility was expected.
There is, I regret to say, a feeling too prevalent amongst the officers
of the force against his Majesty, who is considered the sole cause of
their detention here—and I hope that though they may not be compelled
to treat the royal family with becoming respect, yet that they will not
be permitted to offer them a direct insult with impunity.”
[46] “His Lordship in Council has a strong desire, in which he
looks for your concurrence, to uphold the military position of
Brigadier Roberts. Whenever the regular troops shall be withdrawn
from Afghanistan, he will be your first military authority; and every
British officer employed in that country, should be led to look to him.
His Lordship can only express his approbation of the care which is
exhibited by the Brigadier for the force committed to his charge, and
he will be glad when circumstances will permit him to carry into effect
his views for its discipline and comfort.”
[47] _MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten. Caubul: Aug. 12,
1840._
[48] _MS. Correspondence of Arthur Conolly. Caubul: May 16, 1840._
[49] See “The British on the Hindoo-Koosh,” an admirable series
of papers published in more than one Indian periodical, and in
_Stocqueler’s Memorials of Afghanistan_. In referring to these papers,
I acknowledge, with pride, my obligations to a brother’s pen.
[50] He arrived at Bajgah on his way from Kooloom, and volunteered his
services to Hay.
[51] Saleh Mahomed, of whom mention will be made in a subsequent
part of this narrative, told Captain Johnson that the conduct of the
European non-commissioned officers had disgusted him and his men, and
moved them to desert.
[52] Major Pottinger, who was subsequently employed as Political Agent
in this part of the country, has left on record an account of the
causes of this general disaffection, a part of which will be found in
the Appendix.
[53] Writing on the 1st of October, the Envoy thus sketched the aspect
of affairs: “The result of the victory at Bameean has not been by any
means such as I could have wished. Dost Mahomed will not come in, and
the Wullee of Khooloom will not give him up. The latter has omitted to
reply to Dr. Lord’s last overture, so I imagine we must retreat from
Syghan, _re infectâ_. Two of the Dost’s sons have escaped from Ghizni,
and they will no doubt endeavour, and probably with success, to raise a
disturbance in the Ghilzye country. In short, the aspect of affairs is
by no means agreeable, and we shall have abundance of work on our hands
for next season. Bajore, Khooloom, and divers other places it will
be requisite to visit with our arms before the country can be called
settled. Amongst a bigoted people accustomed to anarchy, it never can
be difficult to scatter the seeds of rebellion.”—[_MS. Correspondence
of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._]
[54] _MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._ The Envoy took a
very gloomy view of this affair. In another letter, he says, “You will
have heard of the disaster at Joolgah, which I think was a worse affair
than that of Pushoot.”
[55] _Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Lord Auckland: October 31, 1840.
Unpublished Correspondence._
[56] Some of the troopers were pursued for a considerable distance. “I
learn,” wrote the Envoy, on November 6, “that two squadrons of them
were pursued for a mile or two by twenty Douranees.”
[57] A detachment of our troops was then returning to India. The
Company’s European regiment, and Captain Garbett’s troop of Horse
Artillery, marched from Caubul; and the 48th Native Infantry joined the
escort at Jellalabad. At the same time, Sir Willoughby Cotton, who had
commanded the troops in Afghanistan, set his face towards India: and
the command temporarily devolved on Sir R. Sale.
[58] _Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Mr. Robertson: Jan. 12, 1841. MS.
Correspondence._
[59] _MS. Correspondence._
[60] Writing to the same correspondent shortly afterwards, he cautioned
him not to expect any very speedy or extensive reforms; and, above
all, not to look for any favourable financial results. “By-and-by his
Majesty,” said the Envoy, “will, I hope, be able to make both ends
meet. At present, pecuniary assistance to a considerable extent will be
indispensable. As I said when we first reached Candahar, the country
must be looked upon as an outwork, requiring large expenditure to keep
it in repair. You are a little too sanguine, I think, in your hope
of a speedy and universal reform in this country. For thirty years
the inhabitants of most of the districts have never paid a fraction
of revenue, until they were coerced into payment by the presence of
troops. The habit has grown into second nature with them, and we
cannot expect them to subside at once into the condition of cheerful
tax-payers.”—[_Unpublished Correspondence._]
[61] See Major Rawlinson’s “Douranee Report,” quoted in the Appendix.
[62] Major Rawlinson went out to India as a cadet on the Bombay
Establishment in 1827. He was a fellow-passenger of Sir John Malcolm,
from whom he imbibed his earliest taste for Oriental literature.
In 1828, having passed, whilst yet a cadet, an examination in the
Hindostanee language, he was posted to the 1st Grenadier Regiment, with
which he served until 1833. In this interval he passed in two other
languages, Mahratta and Persian. In 1833, when Lord William Bentinck
despatched a party of officers to Persia to drill the army of Abbas
Meerza, Rawlinson, still an ensign, was selected as adjutant of the
detachment. In Persia he continued to serve until the rupture with that
state. During a space of nearly three years he was in military command
of the province of Kermanshah, living entirely among the Persians, and
becoming as familiar with their language and literature as with his
own. He graduated in diplomacy under Sir John M‘Neill,
by whom he was entrusted with various political duties, and
strongly recommended to Lord Auckland for employment in Afghanistan.
[63] Other grounds of complaint may have subsequently arisen, but this
dilatoriness was the first offence. Leech pleaded in extenuation that
he had been removed from one appointment to another, before he had had
time to make up the financial statements of his last mission; and sent
in a list of no less than _eight_ different accounts of which he had to
bring up the arrears.—[_Major Leech to Sir W. H. Macnaghten: June 30,
1840._]
[64] It would be foreign to the objects of this work to discuss the
question of Nott’s supercession. It was at one time a fertile subject
of discussion in India, involving, as it did, a general question of
military rank in the higher grades. General Willshire was an older
officer and an older lieutenant-colonel than General Nott, and the
Indian Commander-in-Chief had decreed that the relative ranks of the
major-generals should be determined, not by the dates of their brevets
as such, but by the dates of their lieutenant-colonels’ commissions.
[65] 25,000 rupees (2500_l._) _per mensem_.
[66] I cannot refrain from quoting here a letter on this subject from
Todd to Outram, written before his removal from political employment:
“Your kind letter of November 3rd reached me a few days ago. I would
fain send you an adequate return, but I am out of sorts, and, besides,
have but little to tell you. Shakespear’s proceedings have been in
all respects admirable. The zeal, perseverance, and judgment he has
displayed throughout his arduous undertaking, entitle him to the
highest praise; and I trust he will be rewarded as he deserves. The
property restored by Russia is valued at upwards of a crore of rupees;
and the number of merchants and others released, exceeds 600. The news
was received at Khiva with every demonstration of joy; and Shakespear’s
name has been inserted in the calendar of Oosbeg saints! The Russians,
by liberating their captives immediately on the arrival of Shakespear
and his ‘company,’ have given a strong proof that they are unwilling
or unable to renew their attempt on Khiva; and I hope that they will
now be prevented taking up that formidable position on the road to
India. I cannot help congratulating myself on even the small share
which I have had in these proceedings. Had I waited for orders, the
Russians might have been within a few marches of Khiva; and had we been
satisfied with the tales of Sir Alexander’s agents, we should have
now believed the Russians 300,000 strong, and to be within as short a
distance of Caubul. The road between Teheran and this place is infested
by roving bands of Toorkomans, who have been let loose on Persian
Khorassan by the Khan of Khiva. His Highness thinks that he is thus
doing us service; but I have written to undeceive him in this matter,
and I have pointed out to him that the practice of man-stealing is
abhorrent to us, whether the man be a Russian or a Persian. His conduct
on this occasion reminds me of an answer given to me by Mahomed Shah’s
Wuzeer, one Meerza Mahomed, a great oaf. I had been superintending some
artillery practice at Teheran. A jackass having been placed at the
target, I remonstrated against the cruelty of putting up one of God’s
creatures as a mark, when wood or canvas would answer every purpose.
The Wuzeer replied, ‘On my eyes be it, I will stick up a pony next
time.’ As if I had specially pleaded the case of jackasses.
“Sheil thinks that the prospect of a settlement of our differences
with Persia is as distant as ever, and is strongly opposed to my plan
of allowing the Shah to keep Ghorian, and retaining possession of
Kharrack.”
[67] Major Rawlinson to General Nott, Feb. 18, 1841.—Quoted in
Stocqueler’s “Life of Sir William Nott.”
[68] Major Rawlinson to Sir W. H. Macnaghten, March 11, 1841.—[_MS.
Records._]
[69] _MS. Correspondence._
[70] Captain Woodburn to General Nott, July 6, 1841.—Stocqueler’s
“Life of Sir William Nott.”
[71] _MS. Correspondence._
[72] Nott’s disparagement of the Janbaz so irritated Macnaghten,
and displeased Lord Auckland, that his removal from Candahar was
contemplated. The following extracts from Macnaghten’s correspondence
show what was thought on the subject:—“_September 2._—Between you
and me, Lord A. is much displeased with General Nott for his light
and indiscriminate censure and disparagement of the Janbaz; and I
think his displeasure will be increased when he peruses the General’s
subsequent and most uncandid despatch, in which he omitted all notice
of the exemplary conduct of the Janbaz at Secunderabad.” “_September
5._—You are not likely to have Nott with you much longer. His conduct
in respect to the Janbaz has elicited the severest displeasure of
government, by whom he has been declared disqualified for his present
important command.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]
[73] _MS. Correspondence._
[74] Captain Macgregor.—[_See Macgregor’s Report on the Causes of the
Caubul Outbreak._]
[75] Shelton had come up from India with the 44th, through the
Punjab. His brigade was employed against the refractory tribes of the
Sunghoo-Khail in the month of February, and reduced them to a fitting
state of subjection; but not without the loss of two valuable officers.
Lieutenant Pigou, of the Engineers, was blown to pieces, whilst
endeavouring to force in, with powder, the gates of a fort; and Captain
Douglas, Assistant-Adjutant-General, was shot dead by the side of the
Brigadier.
[76] A small pony, says Lieutenant Rattray, was backed by an officer to
scramble down the ditch and over the wall.
[77] For Brigadier Roberts’ Correspondence on the subject of the
Cantonment Barracks, see Appendix.
[78] For a pleasant descriptive sketch of the amusements of the English
at Caubul, see Mr. Gleig’s account of the _Operations of Sale’s Brigade
in Afghanistan_.
[79] _Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson. MS. Correspondence._
[80] Brigadier Roberts says, that when the Kohistanee expedition
of 1840, which nearly had such a disastrous termination, was first
projected, it was looked upon as a mere party of pleasure, and that
ladies were talking of joining it. It does not appear whether they had
any notion of participating in the pleasures of the popular expedition
to Zao.
[81] _Major Pottinger’s Budeeabad Report._
[82] Pottinger was of opinion that the Ghilzyes, the Kohistanees, and
the Douranees, were all leagued together; and that the compact between
them was formed about the end of September.
[83] _Sir Jasper Nicolls’ MS. Journal_—some passages of which may be
cited in illustration of this part of the inner history of the war:
“_March 12._—My letter of the 10th of November will be found difficult
to parry, after all; and I regret to say, that the immense expenditure
cannot long be borne. A million a year will not cover our charges; and
Lord Auckland’s answers to the last week’s applications prove to me
that he begins to feel it.
“_March 21._—We are called upon to make early and large remittances
to the Upper Provinces; and fifty lakhs have been ordered (their
requisitions increased in a week to eighty lakhs). Thirty lakhs went
last week to Bombay, and twenty-nine are now at Ferozepore, waiting
for transmission. This will never do. Even if we had a firmer hold of
Afghanistan than we have, we should be compelled to give it up, for a
drain of a million a year will infallibly swamp us. Even a good share
of the Punjab would not cover this great charge. Lord Auckland is
not inclined to look this in the face, and acknowledge by a loan the
unfortunate result of our successes.
“_March 26._—Lord Auckland sent home a long minute regarding Herat....
He means to preserve our footing in Afghanistan. Mr. Bird and Mr.
Prinsep approve of this, though the latter roundly and justly asserts
that it cannot be done under a crore and a quarter (a million and a
quarter) annually; and that no present mode of extending our receipts
to that extent, is open to us. Lord Auckland wrote a note to ask our
opinions on the subject. Mr. Maddock never circulated the note. Sir W.
Casement and myself were therefore silent. We are clearly in a great
scrape. That country drains us of a million a year and more; and we
only in truth are certain of the allegiance of the people within range
of our guns and cavalry.... One part of Lord Auckland’s paper only will
be received for a time. He states our resources to be only a crore less
than when we crossed the Indus. The Accountant-General says, that on
the 30th of April we may expect the reduction to amount to three crores
and three-quarters. I told Prinsep that he had been very complaisant
not to point this out.”
[84] _Sir Jasper Nicolls’ MS. Journal, March 29._—“At last the
advertisement for a loan is prepared, and will shortly appear. Though
Lord Auckland did not advert to a deficiency of three-and-a-half crores
in his paper on Afghanistan, he now acts upon it. This will force on
the Court a decision as to our maintaining our position in that quarter
at such a price, for they will assuredly never pay even the charges of
the Shah.
“_May 12._—Before I close this book (volume of the Journal), I
would record my opinion, that the whole thing will break down. We
cannot afford the heavy, yet increasing drain upon us. Nine thousand
troops between Quettah and Kurachee; at least 16,000 of our army and
the Shah’s to the north of Quettah. The King’s expenses to bear in
part—twenty-eight political officers to pay, besides Macnaghten—Dost
Mahomed’s allowance—barracks—a fort or two to build—loss by
exchange, &c., &c. To me it is alarming. The silver does not return,
and it is becoming scarce.”
[85] “You will have seen that Government is opening a new five per
cent. loan. What can this be for? I apprehend it augurs ill for
the Chinese settlement, and that we shall have that work to do
over again.”—[_Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson: April 20,
1841._—_MS. Correspondence._]
[86] _Sir Jasper Nicolls’ MS. Journal, May 20._—“Here is a very
untoward account of the Afghan finances. It will never do to have India
drained of a million and a quarter annually for a rocky frontier,
requiring about 25,000 men and expensive establishments to hold it
even by threats, as at present. The specie, too, is drawn away not to
return. Little comes from China. How is it to end? Money is not rapidly
subscribed to the loan, because it gains twelve to eighteen per cent.
for short periods elsewhere—amongst natives, twenty-four per cent. or
more. Unless a large accession of Punjab territory comes in to connect
us safely with Caubul, and to aid our very heavy expenses, _we must
withdraw_.”
[87] _MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._
[88] The retrenchments, too, were to touch the Court. “I have suggested
sundry retrenchments,” he wrote to Rawlinson, “which, though necessary,
will be most unpalatable to his Majesty and his myrmidons.”
[89] “The Ghilzyes, however, had another grievance—viz., that
during the rule of Ameer Mahomed Khan (Dost Mahomed’s brother), who
had managed partially to subdue this wild tribe, he had effected a
reduction in their pay of 13,000 rupees, which was restored to them
in 1839, on the return of the Shah; but was again reduced on the
present occasion. Further, they were held responsible for thefts
committed beyond their respective boundaries.”—[_Captain Macgregor’s
Report._—_MS. Records._]
[90] _MS. Records._ See the Duke of Wellington’s Comments on this
subject in the Appendix.
[91] The 37th Native Infantry and the 5th Cavalry were not a part of
the relieved brigade.
[92] “_October 11._—One down, t’other come on, is the principle with
these vagabonds; and lucky for us that it is so. No sooner have we put
down one rebellion than another starts up. The Eastern Ghilzyes are now
in an uproar, and our communications with Jellalabad are completely
cut off. This state of things—_Inshallah!_—will not last long. Only
imagine the impudence of the rascals in having taken up a position,
with four or five hundred men, in the Khoord-Caubul Pass, not fifteen
miles from the capital. I hope they will be driven out of that either
to-day or to-morrow; but the pass is an ugly one to force. They fired
last night upon the 35th Regiment, and succeeded in killing or wounding
twenty-four Sepoys. Tugao has been the nursery, and Humza Khan the
dry-nurse of this insurrection. Tugao will be visited, I hope, in a
day or two, and I have solicited his Majesty to put Humza in durance
vile, and to confiscate all his property. This _émeute_ of ours is
particularly provoking just as I am about to quit Afghanistan. I had
hoped to leave the country in perfect tranquillity; and I still think
that it will be quieter than ever it was, after the insurrection is
put down. It is particularly provoking that Macgregor is absent with
a large portion of our force at this juncture. My accounts from Burn
at Gundamuck are very satisfactory. The efforts of the rebels to raise
the tribes are as unavailing as incessant. His Majesty’s name has been
freely used, as usual; no wonder—it is a tower of strength; but never
was a more foul calumny uttered than that which would associate his
Majesty with our enemies.”—[_Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson.
MS. Correspondence._]
[93] Captain Younghusband, of the 35th, Captain Wade, the Brigade-Major
of the force, and Lieutenants Mein and Oakes, of the 13th, were wounded
in this affair.
[94] _Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor: October 17, 1841. MS.
Records._
[95] _Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor: October 18, 1841. MS.
Records._
[96] _Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson._—[_MS. Correspondence._]
[97] “The only officer killed, Wyndham, a captain of the 35th Native
Infantry, fell nobly. Himself lame from a hurt, he had dismounted at
that moment of peril to save the life of a wounded soldier, by bearing
him from the combat on his charger. When the rear-guard broke before
the onset of the Ghilzyes, Wyndham, unable to keep pace with the
pursued, turned, fought, and, overpowered by numbers, fell beneath the
swords and knives of an unsparing foe.”—[_Calcutta Review._]
[98] I must give Mohun Lal’s own words, in spite of their eccentric
phraseology: “On the 1st of November,” he writes, “I saw Sir Alexander
Burnes, and told him that the confederacy has been grown very high, and
we should fear the consequence. He stood up from his chair, sighed, and
said he knows nothing but the time has arrived that we should leave
this country.”—[_Letter of Mohun Lal to J. R. Colvin, Esq., January
9, 1842._—_MS. Records._] In a letter to another correspondent,
Mohun Lal makes a similar statement; and adds that, upon the same
night, Taj Mahomed called upon Burnes, to no purpose, with a like
warning: “On the 1st of November I saw him at evening, and informed
him, according to the conversation of Mahomed Meerza Khan, our great
enemy, that the chiefs are contriving plans to stand against us, and
therefore it will not be safe to remain without a sufficient guard in
the city. He replied, that if he were to ask the Envoy to send him a
strong guard, it will show that he was fearing; and at the same [time]
he made an astonishing speech, by saying that the time is not far
when we must leave this country. Taj Mahomed, son of Gholam Mahomed
Khan, the Douranee chief, came at night to him, and informed what
the chiefs intended to do, but he turned him out under the pretended
aspect that we do not care for such things. Our old friend, Naib
Sheriff, came and asked him to allow his son, with 100 men, to remain
day and night in his place till the Ghilzye affair is settled—but he
did not agree.”—[_Letter of Mohun Lal to Dr. James Burnes._—_MS.
Correspondence._]
[99] This is stated on the authority of Sir William Macnaghten: “I
may be considered culpable,” he said, in an unfinished memorandum,
found after his death, “for not having foreseen the coming storm; to
this I can only reply that others, who had much better opportunities
of watching the feelings of the people, had no suspicion of what
was coming. The late Sir A. Burnes was with me the evening before
the insurrection occurred, and it is a singular fact that he should
have congratulated me on my approaching departure at a season of
such profound tranquillity.”—[_Unpublished Papers of Sir W. H.
Macnaghten._] See further illustrations of this subject in _Appendix_.
[100] “The principal rebels,” wrote Sir William Macnaghten, in a letter
to Lord Auckland, of which only a fragment has been recovered, “met,
on the night before, and [relying] on the inflammable disposition
of the people of Caubul, they first gave out that it was the order
of his Majesty to put all infidels to death, and this, of course,
gained them a great accession of strength. But his Majesty has behaved
throughout with the most marked fidelity, judgment, and prudence.
By forged orders from him for our destruction, by the well-known
process of washing out the contents of a genuinely sealed paper, and
substituting their own wicked inventions. * * * *” (_Sentence left
imperfect._)—[_Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._]
[101] _Statement of Emaum-oollah-Khan—a chuprassie in the service of
Lieutenant John Conolly._—[_MS. Records._]
[102] Hyder Khan, who had been cutwal of the city, and had been removed
through Burnes’s instrumentality, is said to have brought fuel for the
purpose from some contiguous _hummams_ or baths.
[103] _Statement of Bowh Singh, a chuprassie in Sir A. Burnes’s
service._
[104] This is Bowh Singh’s statement. He says: “His brother, Captain
Burnes, went out with him, and was killed dead before Sir Alexander.”
Mohun Lal says that Charles Burnes was killed before his brother went
down to the garden.
[105] “A lakh and seventy thousand rupees (17,000_l._) of public money,
besides my private property, amounting to upwards of ten thousand
rupees.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Journal._—_MS. Records._]
[106] In 1834.—[_See Book I., Chapter VII._]
[107] This, however, in all probability is a very exaggerated
statement. There were, probably, not more than two or three hundred
people in the Caubul bazaars opposing the march of the regiment.
Eyewitnesses affirm that the latter fought with little gallantry
on this occasion. It is said, too, that Futteh Jung, instead of
encouraging the Hindostanees, encouraged the insurgents.
[108] _Statement of Brigadier Shelton._—_MS. Records._
[109] _Private Correspondence._
[110] _Journal of Captain Johnson._—_MS._
[111] Letter from Captain Colin Mackenzie to Lieutenant Eyre.—[_Eyre’s
Journal._]
[112] _Letter of Mohun Lal to Mr. Colvin, Private Secretary to the
Governor-General._—_MS._
[113] _Captain Johnson’s Journal._—Eyre says that the commencement
of the insurrection was “an attack by certainly not 300 men on the
dwellings of Sir Alexander Burnes and Captain Johnson.” The precise
number of the rioters, at the commencement of the outbreak, is of
little consequence. All are agreed in opinion as to the insignificance
of the movement, and the facility with which it might have been
suppressed. It seems probable that, as Mohun Lal says, there were
only some thirty men there by previous concert, but that the number
was swelled by accidental rioters, moved by the greed of plunder.
To the evidence already adduced in the text, may be added that of
Lalla Gungadeen, a hospital gomastah (or steward) attached to Captain
Johnson’s establishment, who says, “For three or four days, it was
the general belief that there was no formidable foe to contend
against—perhaps merely a small body, similar to a gang of _decoits_.
If at this time an attack had been made upon the city, it would have
been well. One ‘pultun’ would have been enough. The people were in
great terror, and said every moment, ‘They are coming—they are
coming.’”—[_MS. Records._]
[114] _Private Correspondence of Brigadier Shelton: near Caubul, May
28th._—[_MS. Records._]
[115] _Sir William Macnaghten’s Report to the Secretary of Government.
Left unfinished at his death._—[_MS. Records._]
[116] _Report of Major-General Elphinstone._
[117] _Letter of Brigadier Shelton: May 28, 1842._—[_MS.
Records._]—The engineer officer sent by Shelton to the Balla Hissar
was Lieutenant Sturt, who had been despatched to the Brigadier’s
camp, at Seeah Sungh, with instructions from General Elphinstone,
and arrived there about nine o’clock. So writes Lady Sale. Brigadier
Shelton’s report confirms the accuracy of that portion of Lady Sale’s
narrative—based, it is to be presumed, upon the information of
Lieutenant Sturt.
[118] See the expression of the Envoy, in a letter quoted in the
Appendix.
[119] _Letter from Brigadier Shelton, May 28, 1842._—[_MS. Records._]
[120] Major Griffiths.
[121] “As soon,” says Mohun Lal, in a letter to Mr. Colvin, “as the
murder of Sir Alexander (whose name was awfully respected), and the
pillage of treasure was known in the adjacent villages, it brought
next day thousands of men under the standard of the rebels.”—[_MS.
Records._]
[122] It would seem that the party, instead of taking the shortest
and safest route to the Lahore gate, took the longest and the most
dangerous.
[123] General Elphinstone had, on the preceding day, expressed his
desire to garrison this fort with our own troops; but Sir William
Macnaghten declared that it would not be politic to do so.
[124] General Elphinstone speaks of this party as a reinforcement. He
says: “On the 4th instant another attempt to throw in reinforcements
failed. The troops employed suffered considerably, particularly the 5th
Cavalry.” Two different attempts are here mixed up together. Captain
Johnson says, that the first was an attempt to reinforce Lieutenant
Warren; but that the second, on which the 5th Cavalry were employed,
was an attempt to bring off the commissariat guard. Lieutenant Eyre and
Lady Sale speak of _both_ movements in the light of efforts made to
enable Lieutenant Warren to abandon his position. It is certain that
the second was.
[125] “Early on the morning of the 5th, the commissariat fort was
abandoned by its garrison, the enemy having attempted to fire the
gate and escalade. The garrison came out by a hole made from the
interior—tools having been sent overnight, with a view to the
introduction of reinforcements and the withdrawal of supplies from the
store.”—[_Report of General Elphinstone._]
[126] _Captain Johnson’s MS. Journal._
[127] Captain Mackenzie’s narrative in _Eyre’s Journal_; a very
interesting and well-written report of one of the most honourable
incidents of the war.
[128] November 5, 1841. 5 A. M.—[_Unpublished Correspondence of
General Elphinstone._]
[129] _Unpublished Correspondence of General Elphinstone._
[130] Mohun Lal says: “I had a very narrow escape, and was saved by
taking a shelter under the garment of Mahomed Zemaun Khan in the
street. Everything in my house (which I had saved in the course of my
twelve years’ service) was plundered, besides the murder of several
servants belonging to Sir Alexander and myself.”—[_Letter to Mr
Colvin._—_MS._]
[131] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._
[132] November 8, 1842.—_Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H.
Macnaghten._
[133] He had sent in a medical certificate some time before, and
received permission to return to Hindostan. He was to have accompanied
the Envoy.
[134] _Memorandum found among the effects of the late Major-General
Elphinstone, C.B., in his own hand-writing._
[135] “About four o’clock on the morning of the 9th,” says Brigadier
Shelton, “I got a note from Elphinstone calling me into cantonments,
desiring me to take the Shah’s 6th Infantry and a 6-pounder gun with
me. I left the Balla Hissar between six and seven, and marched in broad
daylight without the enemy attempting to dispute my passage. I was all
prepared for opposition had any been made. I was cordially received,
but could read anxiety in every countenance, and they had then only
three days’ provisions. I was sorry to find desponding conversations
and remarks too generally indulged, and was more grieved to find the
troops were dispirited. Never having been much in cantonments, I went
round and found them of frightful extent—the two sides of the oblong,
including the two mission compounds, about 1400 yards each, the two
ends each 500, with a rampart and ditch an Afghan could run over with
the facility of a cat, with many other serious defects. The misfortune
of this was that so many troops were necessary for the actual defence
of the works, that only a few could be spared for external operations.
I was put in orders to command cantonments, and consequently, in course
of my inspections, gave such orders and instructions as appeared to me
necessary. This, however, Elphinstone soon corrected, by reminding me
that he commanded, not I.”—[_Statement of Brigadier Shelton._—_MS.
Records._]
[136] “On the 9th,” says General Elphinstone, in the memorandum
which I have before quoted, “not finding myself equal to the duties,
particularly at night, when I could not go about on horseback, I
recalled Brigadier Shelton from the Balla Hissar, but I regret to
be obliged to disclose that I did not receive from him that cordial
co-operation and advice I had a right to expect; on the contrary, his
manner was most contumacious; from the day of his arrival he never
gave me information or advice, but invariably found fault with all
that was done, and canvassed and condemned all orders before officers,
frequently preventing and delaying carrying them into effect. This and
many other instances of want of assistance I can corroborate by the
evidence of several officers still living. Had I been so fortunate
as to have had Sir Robert Sale, than whom I never met any officer
more disposed to do everything for the public service []. I wish I
could say the same of Brigadier Shelton,—he appeared to be actuated
by an ill-feeling towards me. I did everything in my power to remain
on terms with him. I was unlucky also in not understanding the state
of things, and being wholly dependent on the Envoy and others for
information.”—[_MS. Records._]
[137] In a public letter to the Secretary to Government written by
General Elphinstone from Badeeabad, on February 23d, 1842, he says, “I
beg to be allowed to express my sense of the gallant manner in which
the various detachments sent out were led by Brigadier Shelton, and of
the invariably noble conduct of the officers on these occasions.” I am
not aware whether this letter has been published. I have never seen it
in print.
[138] _MS. Records._ On the 10th of November, Captain Macgregor
received the first official intelligence of the outbreak, in a letter
from Sir William Macnaghten, urging him to bring back the brigade to
Caubul.—[_Captain Macgregor’s Narrative._—_MS. Records._] This was of
course, a previous letter.
[139] Two horse-artillery guns, one mountain-train gun, Walker’s Horse,
her Majesty’s 44th Foot, under Colonel Mackrell; the 37th Native
Infantry, under Major Griffiths; the 6th Regiment of Shah’s Force,
under Captain Hopkins.—[_Eyre’s Journal._]
[140] “I was occupied,” says Brigadier Shelton, “in telling off the
force, about 10 A.M., when I heard Elphinstone say to his aide-de-camp,
‘I think we had better give it up.’ The latter replied, ‘Then why not
countermand it at once?’—which was done, and I returned, as you may
conceive, disgusted with such vacillation. About two hours after he
again consented to attack it.”—[_Statement of Brigadier Shelton: MS.
Records._]—Eyre says that the force assembled, not at 10, but at 12
A.M.; and as Brigadier Shelton’s statement was written from memory, it
is less likely to be correct in such small matters as these. The point
is of little consequence.
[141] H.M.’s 44th, the 37th N.I., and Shah Soojah’s 6th Infantry.
[142] “We had only four or five days’ supplies for the cantonment. The
Balla Hissar as well as the cantonment was in a state of siege. We
could not hope for provisions from thence, nor would the place have
afforded us either food or shelter, and, in the opinion of the military
authorities, to return thither would have been attended with ruin. A
disastrous retreat seemed the only alternative, but this necessity was
averted by the attack, on the 10th ult., of a neighbouring fort, which
had intermediately furnished us with a scanty supply of provisions, but
which subsequently espoused the cause of the rebels.”—[_Unfinished
Report of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._—_MS. Records._]
[143] “_November 11th._—About six hundred maunds of wheat, found in
one of the forts yesterday, captured and brought into cantonments.
_November 12th._—Busily employed purchasing provisions. The fight of
the 10th had a good effect in giving the villagers some confidence in
bringing their stores for sale.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Journal. MS.
Records._]
[144] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._
[145] _Ib._
[146] It consisted of two squadrons of the 5th Light Cavalry, under
Colonel Chambers; one squadron of Shah Soojah’s 2nd Irregular Horse,
under Lieutenant Le Geyt; one troop of Skinner’s Horse, under
Lieutenant Walker; the Body Guard; six companies of her Majesty’s 44th,
under Major Scott; six companies of the 37th Native Infantry, under
Major Griffiths; four companies of the Shah’s 6th Infantry, under
Captain Hopkins; one horse-artillery and one mountain-train gun, under
Lieutenant Eyre, escorted by a company of the Shah’s 6th Regiment,
under Captain Marshall.
[147] “My very heart,” said Lady Sale, “felt as if it leapt to my teeth
when I saw the Afghans ride clean through them. The onset was fearful.
They looked like a great cluster of bees, but we beat them and drove
them up again.”
[148] _Eyre’s Journal._
[149] “Major Scott, of her Majesty’s 44th, repeatedly called on his men
to descend with him to drag the six-pounder away, but, strange to say,
his frequent appeals to their soldierly feelings were made in vain;
with a few gallant exceptions, they remained immoveable, nor could the
Sepoys be induced to lead the way where their European brethren so
obstinately hung back.”—[_Eyre’s Journal._]
[150] _Lieutenant Eyre._
[151] “This step they ventured on in consequence of our want of
cavalry, which prevented us from having patrols, and encouraged them to
march above forty miles across a level plain, in no place twenty miles
from our own post, and in some parts of the latter half approaching
within eight miles.”—[_Major Pottinger’s Budeeabad Report._—_MS.
Records._] Charekur is fifty or sixty miles to the north of Caubul.
[152] _Major Pottinger’s Budeeabad Report._
[153] “When the party got in motion the enemy retreated on all
sides. One very large body, however, remained in a position on the
mountain side, threatening the flank of the column. Ensign Salisbury
was detached with a company to remove this. The enemy retreated as
they advanced, and the Goorkhas being young soldiers, having once
got heated, followed with great eagerness, despite the frequently
sounded recall; and on their finally stopping, the enemy perceived
they were too far separated from the main body, and followed them up
with a boldness which obliged Mr. Salisbury to make frequent halts. In
consequence, Mr. Haughton was obliged to halt the convoy, and detach
the greater part of his men, to extricate the compromised company.
This halt encouraged the other parties of the enemy, who had retired,
and they closed in from all sides in most formidable array (apparently
not less than 4000 men). Mr. Haughton, however, maintained his ground
till joined by Mr. Salisbury, when, seeing the hopelessness of making
good his way, he retreated and gained the barracks in safety. A great
number of men fell in the retreat, as they were obliged frequently
to halt, formed in close order to resist the enemy’s cavalry, which,
being closely on them, was only kept in check by the gallantry of
Mr. Haughton, who, with a few men and the gun, remained in the rear,
and covered the retreat of the disheartened party. Mr. Salisbury
was mortally wounded, and the trail of the field-gun gave way at
the elevating screw just as they reached support.”—[_Pottinger’s
Report._—_MS. Records._]
[154] “In the castle of Lughmanee,” writes Pottinger, in his official
report, “we abandoned the hostages from the Kohistan chiefs, two boxes
of treasure, containing 10,000 rupees, and about sixty Afghan firelocks
(confiscated from the deserters of the Kohistan corps), all my official
records, Mr. Rattray’s, Dr. Grant’s, and my own personal property, and
a very large number of horses belonging to ourselves and the horsemen
who had not deserted. The Heratees and seven or eight Peshawerees
were the only Afghans who adhered to me. All the Caubulees deserted,
and one principal cause of so immediate a termination to my defence
may be traced to the reduction of a portion of my escort, which had
so disgusted the men who remained, that they deserted as soon as Mr.
Rattray was killed.”—[_MS. Records._]
[155] Havildar Mootee Ram, of the Goorkha regiment, who gave a detailed
account of the defence of Charekur, described this attack on their
position by saying, “there were whole _beegahs_ (acres) of gleaming
swords moving towards us.”
[156] “Some sheep were given to us by the officers; we found relief
from sucking the raw flesh, and some of the men placed the contents
of the stomach of the sheep in cloths, and, ringing them very hard,
obtained some moisture to assuage their raging thirst. The sick and
wounded now increased to a frightful amount, and were continually
screaming for water in piercing accents. Our muskets were so foul
from incessant use, that the balls were forced down with difficulty,
although separated from the paper of the cartridge which usually wraps
them round. The lips of the men became swollen and bloody, and their
tongues clave to their palates.”—[_Evidence of Mootee Ram, Havildar._]
[157] Major Pottinger does not mention in his report when and how these
officers fell. Lieutenant Melville, in his narrative, says: “From all
that can be gathered from the reports brought in, it appears that the
devoted corps had struggled on to Kardurrah, gallantly headed by Ensign
Rose and Dr. Grant, where it was cut to pieces. The former officer
fell, having first killed four of the enemy with his own hand; and the
latter, although he contrived to escape from the murderous hands at
Kardurrah, yet just as he had arrived in the sight of the haven of his
hopes, within three miles of the cantonments, was massacred by some
wood-cutters.”
[158] This account of the defence of Charekur and the destruction of
the Goorkha corps, is taken from Major Pottinger’s Badeeabad Report
(MS.). Eyre seems to have had access to it. I have learnt since the
original edition of this book was published, that Captain Colin
Mackenzie, with characteristic self-devotion, offered to proceed, with
200 horse to Charekur, and convey ammunition to Pottinger. This aid
might have saved the Goorkha corps.
[159] _Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._—[_MS. Records._]
[160] _Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._—[_MS. Records._] A
version of this letter is given in the published papers; but there
are some curious errors in the official text, which illustrate, in a
very forcible manner, the value of these public documents as guides to
historical truth. The private letter, in spite of its very unofficial
style, is turned into an official one, commencing, “Sir.”—The words,
“the weather is very cold,” are printed “the _water_ is very cold;” and
instead of “We must look for support chiefly from Peshawur,” Macnaghten
is made to say, “We must look for _supplies_ chiefly from Peshawur.”
The evils of such carelessness as this have received a remarkable
illustration in Major Hough’s _Review of the Military Operations at
Caubul_, in which are some pages of remark on the subject of _Supplies
from Peshawur_, based upon this identical passage in the mis-copied or
mis-printed letter.
[161] _Macnaghten’s Unfinished Report to Government._—[_MS. Records._]
[162] The substance of this letter is given very correctly in Eyre’s
journal.
[163] Eyre says, that “though to carry the sick would be _difficult_,
it still was not _impossible_; for so short a distance two or even
three men could be conveyed in one _doolie_: some might manage to walk,
and the rest could be mounted on yaboos, or camels, at the top of their
loads.” He says, too, that “if we had occupied the Seeah Sungh hill
with a strong party, placing guns there to sweep the plains on the
cantonment side, the enemy could have done little to impede our march
without risking a battle with our whole force in fair field, to which
they were generally adverse, but which would, perhaps, have been the
_best_ mode for _us_ of deciding the struggle.”
[164] _Lieutenant Melville’s Narrative._
[165] The force consisted of five companies of her Majesty’s 44th,
under Captain Leighton; six companies of the 5th N.I., under
Lieut.-Colonel Oliver; six companies of the 37th N.I., under Captain
Kershaw, of the 13th; a squadron of the 5th Cavalry, under Captain
Bott; a squadron of Irregular Horse, under Lieutenant Walker; 100 men
of Anderson’s Horse; one Horse Artillery gun, under Sergeant Mulhall;
100 Sappers, under Lieutenant Laing, of the 27th, N.I.
[166] The officers who so distinguished themselves were Captain
Macintosh and Lieutenant Laing, who were killed; and Captains
Mackenzie, Troup, and Leighton.
[167] The loss upon our side was severe. Four officers fell—namely,
Colonel Oliver, Captains Mackintosh and Walker, and Lieutenant Laing.
Six others were wounded.
[168] Lady Sale says: “Osman Khan was heard by our Sepoys to order his
men not to fire on those who ran, but to spare them. A chief, probably
the same, rode round Kershaw three times when he was compelled to run
with his men; he waved his sword over his head, but never attempted to
kill him; and Captain Trevor says his life was several times in the
power of the enemy, but he was also spared.”
[169] No small quantity of military criticism has been lavished upon
this unfortunate action of the 23rd of November. Eyre’s criticisms
are well known; and their soundness has been acknowledged by almost
every subsequent writer. Major Hough, however, says, with reference to
Eyre’s assertion that Shelton formed his infantry into squares on the
Beh-meru hill, that the Brigadier assured him that he formed no squares
at all, but only threw back his flanks _en potence_. Captain Evans,
of the 44th, also assured him that there were no squares. Every other
writer, however, makes a similar assertion relative to the squares on
the Beh-meru hill. Of the atrocity of the single gun there is only
one opinion. With regard to the general plan of operations, Lady Sale
says: “The misfortunes of the day are mainly attributable to Shelton’s
bad generalship, in taking up so unfavourable a position after his
fault in neglecting to surprise the village and occupy, which was the
ostensible object of the force going out.” But I have shown that it was
not Shelton’s fault that the village was not surprised. A simultaneous
attack on the village and on the hill was the course recommended by
the Brigadier; but he was overruled in council. He went into action
feeling certain that the plan mapped out for him was a wrong one—and
the battle was not fought the better for the feeling that he had been
thwarted and opposed.
[170] _Correspondence of General Elphinstone._—[_MS. Records._]—The
substance of this letter is given in Eyre’s Journal.
[171] _Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._—[_MS. Records._]
[172] _Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._—[_MS. Records._]
[173] _Unfinished Report of Sir W. H. Macnaghten to the Supreme
Government—found in his writing-desk after his death._—[_MS.
Records._]
[174] Principally cabbages. It was apprehended by some that the broad
leaves might conceal bottles of spirit, wherewith it was designed to
intoxicate the garrison previous to an attack on the cantonment; but
they proved on examination to be very harmless cabbages after all.
[175] It was generally believed in the cantonments that he had died
from the effects of his wounds. Lady Sale says: “Abdoollah Khan’s death
has, it is said, created some confusion in the city. Whilst still
living a report was spread of his decease; and, like Alexander, he
mounted his horse and showed himself to his followers; but the exertion
was too great for him, and he shortly after expired.”—_See_ Appendix.
[176] It was believed by the British that he had been poisoned. Lady
Sale says: “Meer Musjedee is dead. Some say he has been poisoned;
others, that he died in consequence of the wounds received last year in
the Kohistan. A number of this chief’s followers have gone off with the
body to the Kohistan, there to attend his funeral obsequies.”
[177] In this letter Macnaghten writes: “Mohamed Meerza Khan has not
yet come near me. When he does, I shall be glad to advance him 5000
rupees out of the 50,000 which is to be given to him for Khidmut
(service).... I had another overture this morning from Zemaun Khan’s
party, offering us a safe retreat to Peshawur; and they said that Khan
Shereen was with them—the party being Jewan Khan, Jubbar Khan, Oosman
Khan, Mahomed Akbar Khan, Ameen-oollah Khan, and Khan Shereen Khan. I
suspect, from the insertion of the name of the last mentioned, that the
whole thing is a fabrication. Let me know your opinion on this point.
I replied to their overture by saying that I would not now do anything
without the consent of his Majesty.”
[178] _Answers of Captain Colin Mackenzie to Questions put by General
Pollock._—[_MS. Records._]—Captain Skinner was the only British
officer who attended Macnaghten at this conference on the 22nd
December. Captain Mackenzie says that he had the assurance from Captain
Skinner himself. _See_ Appendix.
[179] The garrison consisted of about 100 men, 40 being Europeans,
under the command of Lieutenant Hawtrey, 37th N.I. Lady Sale says: “The
Afghans planted their crooked sticks, which served them for scaling
ladders; got up one by one; pulled out the mud (with which the window
had been blocked up) and got in. A child with a stick might have
repulsed them. The Europeans had their belts and accoutrements off, and
the Sepoys the same. They all ran away as fast as they could! The 44th
say that the 37th ran first, and as they were too weak they went too.
Hawtrey says there was not a pin to choose—all cowards alike. After
he was deserted by the men, he himself threw six hand grenades before
he followed them.... It was the most shameful of all the runaways that
occurred.”
[180] Lady Sale says that the 44th wished to wipe out the stain on the
name, as did the Sepoys also (the 37th N.I.). Lieutenant Hawtrey’s
company volunteered to go with him and “take it without the assistance
of any other troops.” The General sent a message to the engineer
officer (Lieutenant Sturt) asking if the fort was practicable and
tenable—that is, whether our men could take it and hold it. Sturt’s
answer is worth recording—“Practicable if the men will fight—tenable
if they don’t run away.”
[181] The letters to which reference is here made will be found in the
Appendix.
[182] It is said that Akbar Khan proposed to seize the Envoy at this
meeting, but that the other chiefs were adverse to the proceeding. I do
not know whether this story rests upon good authority.
[183] _Unfinished Report of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._—[_MS. Records._]
[184] The General had announced, as early as the 6th of November,
that his ammunition was failing him; but on the 13th of December the
magazine was so well supplied that he ordered it to be served out
to the camp-followers. The Balla Hissar had, in the meanwhile, been
liberally furnished from cantonments.
[185] At the suggestion of Lieutenant Conolly they endeavoured to
obtain re-admittance to the Balla Hissar, but were fired upon by the
garrison, who had been ordered by the King to admit no one.
[186] _Narrative of Lieutenant Melville._
[187] _Eyre’s Journal._
[188] _MS. Records._
[189] Mohun Lal says that this was the Envoy’s design. “This
agreement,” he wrote in a letter to Mr. Colvin, “which the Envoy had
prudently made to create dissension, disappointed all the Douranee
rebels, &c., who were alarmed at the return of the Dost. They
immediately began to communicate with the Shah, and assured him to
take his side, which, in fact, was the object of the Envoy.”—[_MS.
Records._]
[190] The correspondence upon this subject will be found in the
Appendix.
[191] Shelton was opposed to the cession of the forts. “On my opinion
being asked,” he says, “I pronounced it injudicious, and it was
declined; but about two days afterwards the order was given, and I was
directed to give up all.”—[_MS. Records._]
[192] It was thought, however, that there was too much disunion among
the Afghans, at this time, to render the hostage-giving any kind of
security—inasmuch as the sacrifice of a hostage might have pleased
more than it offended. It was said by Sultan Jan, of the hostage now in
our camp, “Oh! he is a dog of a man; what should we have cared if you
had killed him?”—[_Lieut. Melville’s Narrative._]
[193] _Eyre’s Journal._
[194] Mahomed Sadig was a first cousin of Akbar Khan. Surwar Khan had
been, in the earlier stages of the campaign, extensively engaged in
supplying the army with camels. He was in the confidence of Sir A.
Burnes, and was generally esteemed a friend of the British.
[195] _Letter of Captain Colin Mackenzie to Lieutenant Eyre: Eyre’s
Journal._
[196] “On the morning of the 23rd,” says General Elphinstone, “I
received a note from the Envoy, saying that he hoped he had made an
arrangement which would enable us to remain in the country; and that he
would shortly acquaint me with all the particulars. I soon afterwards
received a message from him, desiring to see me, when he informed me
that he had made an arrangement with Mahomed Akbar, by which Shah
Soojah would remain on the throne—Mahomed Akbar being Wuzeer. He was
to receive a large sum of money, and Ameen-oollah was to be delivered
to us a prisoner. I then asked what part Newab Zeman Khan and Oosman
Khan were to take in this? To which I received answer that they were
not in the plot. I replied that I did not like the word ‘plot’—that
it was an ominous one—and I begged to know if there were no fear of
treachery? The Envoy’s reply was, ‘None whatever—I am certain the
thing will succeed. What I want you to do is to have two regiments and
guns got quickly ready, and, without making any show, to be prepared
the moment required to move towards Mahmood Khan’s fort.’ I further
discussed with him the danger he was incurring; but he replied, ‘Leave
it all to me—I understand these things better than you do.’ I then
left him, and he shortly afterwards proceeded with his suite and a few
of his cavalry escort to the interview. Before we separated, I asked
him if there was anything else I could do? He replied, ‘Nothing, but to
have the two regiments and two guns in readiness, and the garrison to
be on the alert;’ which was accordingly ordered.”
[197] “On the morning of the 23rd,” wrote Shelton, “about ten o’clock,
I got an order to have two corps and some guns ready, to march out
to seize, as I understood, the Logur chief. While thus occupied in
giving it out, an invitation came from the Envoy to accompany him to an
interview with the Sirdar. Being busy, I fortunately could not go, or
should probably have shared the same fate.”—[_MS. Records._]
[198] Captain Grant, the adjutant-general of the Caubul force. “It
seems,” says Captain Mackenzie, “that Mahomed Akbar had demanded
a favourite Arab horse belonging to Captain Grant, assistant
adjutant-general of the force. To avoid the necessity of parting with
the animal, Captain Grant had fixed his price at the exorbitant sum
of 5000 rupees. Unwilling to give so large a price, but determined to
gratify the Sirdar, Sir William sent me to Captain Grant to prevail
upon him to take a smaller sum, but with orders that, if he were
peremptory, the 5000 rupees should be given. I obtained the horse for
3000 rupees, and Sir William appeared much pleased with the prospect
of gratifying Mahomed Akbar by the present.”—[_Captain Mackenzie’s
Narrative: Eyre’s Journal._]
[199] A handsome pair of double-barrelled pistols belonging to Captain
Lawrence, of which Akbar Khan had expressed his admiration at a
previous meeting, and which had accordingly been presented to him.
[200] That it was not actually committed is, of course, nothing
to the point. The question is to be argued as though the seizure
of Ameen-oollah Khan had been a perpetrated act and not a baffled
intention.
[201] It appears to have been Akbar Khan’s intention to have seized the
person of the Envoy, and to have held him as a hostage, to secure both
the evacuation of Afghanistan and the restoration of Dost Mahomed. I
have been informed that, during the struggle, a cry was raised that the
English were coming out of cantonments, and that Akbar Khan, thinking
that he might still be baffled, in a sudden gust of passion drew out a
pistol and fired.
[202] “Some time after I had given the necessary orders (for the two
regiments and the guns), Captain Anderson came to me and said, ‘They
have seized the Envoy;’ and one of the escort at the same time said,
‘They have seized the Lord Sahib and taken him off to the city.’ By
myself and others it was thought at the time that Sir William had
proceeded to the city for the purpose of negotiating. I was also
told that a few shots had been fired. The garrison was got ready and
remained under arms all day.”—[_Statement of General Elphinstone._]
[203] On these additional hostages being sent, Captains Skinner
and Mackenzie, who had been detained in the city, were released.
Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie have each drawn up a narrative of the
circumstances attending their capture, and their detention in the city,
the former in the house of Ameen-oollah, and the latter in that of
Akbar Khan. Both the English officers owed their lives to the efforts
of the chiefs, who, at much personal risk, defended them against the
furious assaults of the _Ghazees_. “I must do Mahomed Akbar the justice
to say,” writes Captain Mackenzie, “that finding the Ghazees bent
on my slaughter, even after I had reached his stirrup, he drew his
sword and laid about him right manfully, for my conductor and Meerza
Baoodeen Khan were obliged to press me up against the wall, covering
me with their own bodies, and protesting that no blow should reach me
but through their persons. Pride, however, overcame Mahomed Akbar’s
sense of courtesy, when he thought I was safe, for he then turned round
to me, and repeatedly said, in a tone of triumphant derision, ‘Shuma
moolk-i-ma gereed’ (You’ll seize my country, will you?)” The conduct of
Akbar Khan and other chiefs towards Lawrence and Mackenzie may be taken
as a presumptive proof that the murder of the Envoy was not designed.
His seizure, however, was deliberately planned between Ameen-oollah and
Akbar Khan.
[204] See remarks by the English on the 4th of the additional articles
of the draft-treaty; which, with the ratified treaty, is given at
length in the Appendix; with the notes both of the English and Afghan
chiefs.
[205] The following extracts from Captain Johnson’s Journal will show
better than anything else the indignities to which they were subjected:
“_December 28._—Very busy, buying camels and yaboos—the price of
the former 160 rupees each. The Ghazees still infest our gates and
insult us in every possible way—stop our supplies coming in from
the town, and abuse and ill-treat those who bring them. No notice
taken by our military leader, although our officers and soldiers are
burning for revenge. Several of my native friends from the city come
daily to see me, and all agree, without one dissenting voice, that we
have brought the whole of our misfortunes upon ourselves, through the
apathy and imbecility displayed at the commencement of the outbreak.
They also tell me that our safety on the retreat depends solely on
ourselves—that no dependence is to be placed on the promises of any
of the chiefs, and more especially Mahomed Akbar Khan. Every one of
them will now, that they are in a measure paid before-hand, do his
utmost to destroy us. _December 30._—A body of Ghazees made a rush
at the rear gate of cantonments; but did not effect an entrance. More
guns and ammunition made over to the enemy, or what are called our new
allies. Precious _allies_, who are only waiting the opportunity to
annihilate us!... _December 31._—The chiefs say they cannot control
their men, and that if their people misbehave themselves at our gates,
or around our walls, we must fire upon them. No orders, however, given
by General Elphinstone to punish our insulting foe, who naturally
attribute our forbearance to dastardly cowardice, and take every
opportunity of taunting us with it. The error lies with our leader, not
with our troops. Several camels laden with grain plundered close to the
Seeah-Sung gateway, within a few paces of a gun loaded with grape, and
a large guard of Europeans and Natives. No steps taken to recover the
plundered grain or punish the offenders. How we must be despised by our
miserable foe! Mahomed Zemaun Khan sent in word that some of the chiefs
will be in attendance to escort us to Jellalabad to-morrow. In the
evening another message came that we must halt another day. Every day’s
delay increases our difficulties on the road. _January 1, 1842._—New
Year’s Day! God grant that we may never see such another. My kind
friends, Naib Shureef, and Khan and Ali Reza Khan (both Kuzzul-bashes),
sent me in secretly some very excellent cakes to carry with me on the
road, as we shall not get a particle of firewood for cooking for a
distance of ninety miles, ere we can get into a milder climate. How
dreary a prospect we have before us—having to traverse ninety miles,
and the greater part of this distance through snow now upwards of a
foot deep and the thermometer at night below zero. Some negotiations
still going on. All the firewood that was laid in for the winter’s
consumption expended, and almost every tree in cantonments cut down.
They had long ago been stripped of their bark, and everything eatable,
for the purpose of feeding our starving cattle.”—[_MS. Records._]
[206] _Letter of Mohun Lal to Mr. Colvin._—[_MS. Records._]
[207] _Captain Johnson’s Journal._—[_MS. Records._]
[208] “On the 6th of January, the military authorities refused to wait
for the safeguard; and notwithstanding my advice to the contrary,
marched out of our entrenchments.”—[_Major Pottinger’s Budeeabad
Report: MS. Records._]
[209] In this letter, written from Jellalabad (Nov. 15), General
Sale says: “I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
9th instant, requiring the force under my command to move again upon
Caubul. In reply, I beg to represent that the whole of my camp-equipage
has been destroyed; that the wounded and sick have increased to upwards
of 300; that there is no longer a single depôt of provisions on the
route; and that the carriage of the force is not sufficient to bring
on one day’s rations with it. I have, at the same time, positive
information that the whole country is in arms, and ready to oppose us
in the defiles between this city and Caubul, whilst my ammunition is
insufficient for more than two such contests as I should assuredly
have to sustain for six days at least. With my present means I could
not force the passes of either Jugdulluck or Koord-Caubul, and even if
the _débris_ of my brigade did reach Caubul, I am given to understand
that I should find the troops now garrisoning it without the means of
subsistence. Under these circumstances, a regard for the honour and
interests of our government compels me to adhere to my plan already
formed, of putting this place into a state of defence, and holding it,
if possible, until the Caubul force falls back upon me, or succours
arrive from Peshawur or India.”
[210] _Captain Macgregor’s Report: MS. Records._
[211] Macgregor says the 3rd, Broadfoot the 4th. The former probably
speaks of the first intelligence, the latter of its confirmation.
[212] It has been said (_Calcutta Review_, vol. xiv.) that the
instructions sent to Sale were of such a character as to throw a large
amount of responsibility upon him; and that Sale always shrank from
responsibility,—but the letters from the Envoy to Macgregor were
couched in unqualified and unconditional language, and the official
letter from Elphinstone ordered Sale to return “_at all risks_.”
[213] “_Sale’s Brigade in Afghanistan._” _By the Rev. G. R. Gleig,
Chaplain to the Forces._
[214] The place, at the request of Captain Macgregor, was officially
given over to the British garrison by the nominal Governor, Abdool
Rahman, who ruled the Jellalabad district in the name of Shah Soojah.
Abdool Rahman continued for some time to reside in the town under
Captain Macgregor’s protection.—[_Captain Macgregor’s Report: MS.
Records._]
[215] “_Sale’s Brigade in Afghanistan._” _By the Rev. G. R. Gleig._
[216] _General Sale to Secretary to Government, April 16, 1842._
[217] _Captain Broadfoot’s Report—Jellalabad, April 16, 1842._
[218] “The iron,” says Broadfoot, “was good in quality, but imperfectly
smelted, and requiring ten times as much labour and time as English
iron.”
[219] Cheerfully, too, worked the Europeans without their accustomed
drams. There were no ardent liquors in Jellalabad; and the consequence
was, that the men enjoyed, even on half-rations, an amount of health
and strength and elasticity, and preserved a regularity of discipline
unknown to even the 13th, when the fire-water was served out to them.
[220] I append the letter itself, as well as one, also in French,
written two days afterwards to Mackeson at Peshawur:
“Cabool, 28^[me] Déc. 1841.
“MON CHER MACGREGOR,
“Notre situation devient perilleuse de plus en plus; les forts à
l’entour du cantonnement ayant été rendus aux chefs, selon le traité
que le feu Envoyé et Ministre avoit commencé. Nous nous trouvons dans
la necessité de renouveler les negociations depuis qu’il a été tué. Le
manque de vivres, desquels ils ne nous restent que pour huit jours, et
des moyens de transport pour nos malades et blessés, qu’ils nous ont
promis de jour en jour, font autant de raisons de plus pour que nous
faisons traité, s’il est possible. Mais aussi leurs promesses meritent
si peu de foi, que peut-être nous serons obligés de battre de retraite
sur Jellalabad; sur tout, qu’ils exigent que nous marchons par le route
de Bungeish—demande que nous ne pouvons pas agréer.
“Pour ces causes alors, si vous avez reçu l’ordre de marcher du feu
Envoyé et Ministre, il ne faut pas le faire à present, mais attendre
jusqu’au temps que vous recevez nouvelle ordre d’ici, quand le traité
de paix sera fait.
“Votre ami,
“ELDRED POTTINGER.”
“Cantonnements à Cabool, 30^[me] de Décembre, 1841.
“MON CHER MACKESON,
“J’ai eu le plaisir de recevoir votre lettre du 12^[me] au feu Envoyé.
Notre situation ici est des plus dangereuses. L’Envoyé était tué à
une conférence, qui avait lieu hors d’ici, le 23 de ce mois. Quand je
prenais charge je trouvais qu’il avait engagé du part du gouvernement
de quitter Afghanistan, et de donner _hostages_ pour que le Dost soyait
mis en liberté, aussi que pour préliminaires il avait rendu le _Balla
Hissar_ et les forts qui dominent les cantonnements. _Ces acts_ et
le manque des vivres faisaient les cantonnements untenable, et les
quatre officiers militaires supérieurs disaient qu’il fallait résumer
le traité au lieu de forcer une marche rétrograde sur Jellalabad. Nous
avons aujourd’hui finis les termes du traité, et nous espérons partir
d’ici demain ou après demain. De leur promesses je m’en doute, malgré
que les ordres ont été expédiés pour que nos troupes quittent Candahar
et Ghizny. Il faut que vous tenez ouvert le Khyber, et que vous soyez
prêt nous aider le passage; car si nous ne sommes pas protégés, il
nous serait impossible faire halte en route pour que les troupes se
refraichissent, sans laquelle j’ai peur qu’ils soient désorganisés.
“Votre ami,
“_Ελδρεδ Ποττινγερ_.
“Après aujourd’hui j’écrirai mon nom en lettres Grecques. Lorsque
le Cossid vous remettra cette lettre, vous lui donnerez trois cent
rupees.”
[221] _Captain Macgregor’s Report: MS. Records._
[222] _General Sale to Sir J. Nicholls, Jellalabad, January 11, 1842:
MS. Records._
[223] _Captain Broadfoot’s Report._
[224] The letter ran thus:—
Caubul, January 4th, 1842.
MY DEAR MACGREGOR,
Pottinger being busy, I write to tell you of the Envoy being murdered,
and Trevor, on the 23rd. We have been obliged to conclude the treaty,
and it is settled we march to-morrow. Whether we are attacked on the
road depends upon their good faith. I believe we do not run very much
risk as far as Jugdulluck, except from the weather, which is very
severe here; and we are obliged to march very lightly, and may expect
to lose many men. Orders have been sent to you to evacuate Jellalabad
before our arrival: if, however, the treaty is broken by our being
attacked, you will consider the orders cancelled, and you will use
every exertion to aid us. We have received your letter of the 24th,
but our word cannot be broken. Pottinger wishes you, if possible, to
send intelligence of these matters to government and Rawlinson, that
the latter may be aware of the state of affairs, and not do anything
hurriedly. If you understand faith has been kept and are obliged to
leave Jellalabad, you had better not pass the Khybur till we come, as
it is feared our troops will be so disorganised as to require your
aid through that pass. If you could take supplies for us to the mouth
of the Khybur, it would be very desirable. We are all well. Lady
M(acnaghten) ditto, though still much afflicted. Keep your scouts on
the road, and give us as much intelligence as you can. You must chiefly
depend on yourself for news of us, as all our Afghans have deserted us.
We have no money in our treasury; so tell Mackeson to have some ready
for us, if possible.
Yours, &c., &c., G. ST. P. LAWRENCE.
[225] It is said that Colonel Dennie predicted that not a soul
would escape except one man, and that he would come to tell that the
rest were destroyed. “The voice of Dennie,” says Mr. Gleig, “sounded
like the response of an oracle, when he exclaimed, ‘Did I not say
so—here comes the messenger.’”—[_Sale’s Brigade in Afghanistan._]
[226] “The advanced-guard consisted of the 44th Queen’s, 4th Irregular Horse,
and Skinner’s Horse, two horse-artillery six-pounder guns, sappers
and miners’ mountain-train, and the late Envoy’s escort. The main
body included the 5th and 37th Native Infantry, the latter in charge
of the treasure; Anderson’s Horse, the Shah’s 6th Regiment, two
horse-artillery six-pounder guns. The rear-guard was composed of the
54th Native Infantry, 5th Cavalry, and two six-pounder horse-artillery
guns. The force consisted of about 4500 fighting men, and 12,000
followers.”—[_Lady Sale’s Journal._]
[227] “About eleven o’clock, when about half of the column had moved
off, I received a letter from Newab Zemaun Khan, remonstrating against
our march. But as the enemy had been enabled to seize the enclosures
of the late Envoy’s house and offices, owing to the early withdrawal
of our guards, we could not consent without commencing an action for
the recovery of part of our works. I represented this to the Newab,
and begged Mr. Conolly to explain our situation. In consequence, about
one P.M., I received another letter from the Newab, agreeing to our
movement, and promising that he would protect us as far as he could;
and it is my duty to state that he did so to the utmost of his power;
but the quantity of baggage delayed the march of the rear-guard, which
was obliged to retreat with severe loss, abandoning two guns and much
baggage, notwithstanding it did not reach the bivouac at Begramee till
two the next morning.”—[_Major Pottinger’s Budeeabad Report: MS.
Records._]
[228] Brigadier Shelton says: “I knew nothing of the arrangements
for the retreat till they were published the evening before. The
order was for the baggage to assemble at eight A.M. At that hour I
went to Elphinstone’s quarters, to beg he would let the carriages
of the gun-waggons go out that were to form a foot-bridge for the
infantry over the Caubul river, about 300 yards from cantonments,
and got offended for my trouble. He was just sitting down to
breakfast. They did not go out till between nine and ten, and having
to be dragged through a canal caused further delay, so that the
bridge was not completed for the advanced-guard to pass till past
twelve.”—[_Statement of Brigadier Shelton: MS._]
[229] Eyre says that “the General had often been urged to destroy
these guns rather than suffer them to fall into the enemy’s hands; but
he considered that it would be a breach of the treaty to do so.” We
cannot restrain a smile at Elphinstone’s simplicity; but at the same
time, the circumstance noted affords rather a pleasant indication of
the General’s honesty of purpose and singleness of character. As an
honourable English gentleman, having covenanted to give up his guns,
he considered himself bound to deliver them over in the state in which
they were at the time the covenant was made. The enemy do not seem
to have appreciated Elphinstone’s generosity, for they burned the
carriages of the guns, as soon as our troops evacuated the cantonments.
[230] Lieut. Hardyman, of the 5th Cavalry, was shot through the heart.
[231] A writer in the _Calcutta Review_ says: “Major Pottinger told us
that when the retreat was decided on, and no attention was paid to his,
Lawrence’s, and Conolly’s advice to concentrate in the Balla Hissar, he
urged the officers to have all the old horse-clothing, &c., cut into
strips, and rolled round the soldiers’ feet and ankles after the Afghan
fashion, as a better protection against snow than the mere hard leather
shoes. This he repeatedly urged, but in vain, and within a few hours
the frost did its work. Major Pottinger said that there was not an
Afghan around them who had not his legs swathed in rags as soon as the
snow began to fall.”
[232] The mountain-train guns here fell into the enemy’s hands, in
spite of the gallantry of Lieutenant Green, who was in charge, and the
artillerymen under his command. Green succeeded in spiking the guns,
but being poorly supported by the infantry, he could not recapture
them. Two horse-artillery guns were abandoned soon afterwards.
[233] “About mid-day I received a letter from Newab Zemaun Khan
and Naib Ameen-oollah, requesting us to halt till they dispersed
the fanatics, and promising us supplies of provisions and firewood
if we did so. I communicated this to General Elphinstone, with the
information that the defile in front was strongly occupied. The General
having taken this into consideration, the utter confusion which
prevailed, the exhausted state of the Sepoys, who had been under arms
in deep snow from daylight of the 6th (with scarcely any rest, and
neither food nor water at the bivouac), joined with the pressure on
the rear-guard, he determined to halt till night and then pursue his
march.”—[_Major Pottinger’s Budeeabad Report: MS. Records._]
[234] “I had just formed up a corps near Boot-Khak to resist a
threatened attack, and was moving on again, when I heard the General
had ordered a halt. I immediately hurried forward and entreated him
to continue the march, having only come three miles, and assured him
a halt on the snow, without tents or food, would destroy the troops;
but he was immoveable, talked of the Sirdars’ promises, and sending
a letter to Caubul to know why they had not sent us a safeguard.
Here was another day entirely lost, and the enemy collecting in
numbers.”—[_Statement of Brigadier Shelton: MS. Records._]
[235] _Eyre’s Narrative._
[236] Lieutenant Melville.
[237] “I volunteered to go in his place, thinking that such a mark
of confidence would induce the chief not only to spare that officer
(Shelton), but also Captain Lawrence (whose presence was requisite in
charge of the Mission, as my wound rendered me incapable of exertion),
and probably some other officers whose services in the disorganised
state of the force could scarcely be dispensed with.”—[_Major
Pottinger’s Report: MS. Records._]
[238] The Jezailchees whom he commanded had been by this time nearly
annihilated, and “his services with them, therefore,” said Pottinger,
“could be of little further use.”
[239] “Down the centre,” says Eyre, “dashed a mountain torrent, whose
impetuous course the frost in vain attempted to arrest, though it
succeeded in lining the edges with thick layers of ice, over which
the snow lay consolidated in slippery masses, affording no very easy
footing for our jaded animals. This stream we had to cross and recross
eight-and-twenty times.”
[240] “On leaving Caubul,” says Captain Johnson, “each Sepoy had 40
rounds of ammunition in pouch, and about 60 camel loads per regiment,
with 100 spare loads. We have not at present (January 8), for the whole
force, three camel loads in box, and numbers of the Sepoys have not a
single cartridge in pouch.”
[241] Eyre says: “On the force reaching Koord-Caubul, snow began to
fall and continued till morning.”—[_Military Operations_, page 210.]
General Elphinstone says: “Ere we reached the bivouac snow fell and
continued during the night.” Brigadier Shelton says, on the other
hand, “On approaching Koord-Caubul it begun to snow, but fortunately
cleared up about dusk.” Such discrepancies as these may well excuse the
historian, if he be guilty of any slight errors of detail.
[242] _Statement of General Elphinstone._
[243] The party consisted of Lady Macnaghten, Lady Sale, Mrs. Sturt
and one child; Mrs. Trevor and seven children; Captain Boyd, wife and
child; Captain Anderson, wife and child; Lieutenant Waller, wife and
child; Lieutenant Eyre, wife and child; Mr. Ryley, wife and child;
Mrs. Mainwaring and child; Serjeant Wade and family. Captain Troup and
Lieutenant Mein, being wounded and unserviceable, went with them. Eyre
says that it was the intention of the General that all the wounded
officers should go; but that there was not time to make known his
intentions.
[244] Eyre says “seventy files.” I give the above number on Shelton’s
authority—they were men of his own corps, and he was with them.
[245] _MS. Records._ Eyre says: “Brigadier Shelton commanded the
rear with a few Europeans; and but for his persevering energy and
unflinching fortitude in repelling the assailants, it is probable the
whole would have been sacrificed.”
[246] “As scarcely any Europeans of the advance now remained, and the
enemy were increasing, the General called several of the officers
(about twenty of us) to form line and show a front. We had scarcely
done so, when my friend Captain Grant, who was next to me, received
a ball through his cheek, which broke his jaw. I lifted him off his
horse, and seated him on the ground.”—[_Capt. Johnson’s Journal._]
[247] “Subsequently,” says Captain Johnson, “we had the extreme
mortification to learn that not one particle of food or water had
been tasted by the troops from their arrival to their departure from
Jugdulluck.”
[248] Mahomed Shah Khan was father-in-law of Akbar Khan.
[249] Brigadier Anquetil; Col. Chambers, Captain Blair, Captain Bott,
and Lieut. Bazett, (5th Cavalry); Captain Nicholl (Horse Artillery);
Major Thain, A.D.C.; Captain Dodgin; Quartermaster Halahan; Surgeon
Harcourt (H.M.’s 44th); Lieutenant Steer (37th N.I.); Captain Marshall,
Shah’s force.
[250] This was written in 1851, since which time Dum-Dum has ceased to
be the head-quarters’ station of the Artillery—but the column, which
was imperfectly constructed, has been blown down, and I believe that
only the base with the inscription remains.
[251] _Captain Johnson’s Journal._
[252] _Ibid._
[253] The officers known to have perished at Gundamuck, were Captain
Grant, Assistant-Adjutant-General, who had been severely wounded at
Jugdulluck; Lieutenant Stewart (Horse Artillery); Captain Hamilton (5th
Cavalry); Captain Collins, Lieutenants Hogg, Cumberland, and Swinton,
and Assistant-Surgeon Primrose, of H.M.’s 44th; Lieutenant Horsburgh
and Dr. Metcalfe, of the 5th N.I.; Captain Reid and Lieutenant Hawtry,
of the 37th N.I.; Lieutenants Weaver, Morrison, and Cunningham, of the
54th N.I.; Lieutenant Hobhouse, of H.M.’s 13th; Captain Hay, Lieutenant
Green (Artillery); and Lieutenant Macartney, of the Shah’s service.
[254] The letters here alluded to are printed in the body of the work,
or above, in the Appendix.—_Author._
[255] Given at pages 278, 279, 280.—_Author._
[256] The 8th and 9th articles are scored out in the original by Akbar
Khan, as though, on consideration, they were distasteful to him.
[257] This article is scored out in the original.
[258] The whole of this article also is scored out. Its provisions seem
to have been extended, suggestively, by Pottinger, but disapproved by
Akbar Khan.
Transcriber’s note:
—Obvious errors were corrected.