“In the year 1839, on the accession of Shah Soojah, he granted to

the Kohistanee chiefs, who had embraced his cause and raised the

insurrection (which so paralysed the movements of Dost Mahomed Khan),

an increase of wages, amounting to five hundred tomauns a year, which

sum, however, was not payable in ready money, but by order on the

land-tax of the chief himself, or on that of some turbulent district

where regular payment was doubtful, and the influence of the chief

necessary to secure any payment at all. The value of the sum thus

given, might, therefore, in the government amount be rated at nothing.

I may here mention that all the pay, as termed, of these chiefs, was

of the same kind; and I am not aware of any instance in which the

amount surpassed that of the land-tax payable by the chief, or, indeed,

equalled it; and, in my opinion, it would have been better to have

released the chiefs altogether then from the payment of that tax, for

the manner of realising it was one of the greatest grievances, as our

power rendered it unnecessary for the tax-gatherers to show the same

consideration for these nobles which they had formerly been obliged

to do. Our instructions not to interfere in these internal affairs,

rendered us powerless to afford relief, though we saw discontent and

disloyalty growing around us. During the year 1840 the chiefs in the

different parts of the country found that the change of government

was inimical to their interests and power, insomuch that it had given

them a master who was able to compel obedience, instead of one who

was obliged to overlook their excesses in exchange for their support.

They therefore gladly revolted to support the return of Dost Mahomed

Khan. No doubt other causes largely combined to irritate them. Hatred

of foreign domination, fanaticism, the licentiousness of the troops,

and especially the impunity with which women could be seduced and

carried off in a country celebrated for the strictness of the late

ruler on this point, and the extreme jealousy of the natives. The

consequence of this revolt was the despatch of General Sale’s force

to the Kohistan in the autumn of that year. The force was too weak

for the destruction of the rebels; and Sir A. Burnes, the Political

Agent, with a force, found it necessary to temporise and treat with

all who had not made themselves very remarkable in opposition; and

of those who had, the most extreme step ventured upon was delivering

over the possessions of the rebel to his cousin, or nearest of kin,

who was of the royal party; and Sir A. Burnes (under the authority of

Sir W. H. Macnaghten, afterwards sanctioned by the Governor-General in

Council) promised to those persons, and the others who had remained

neuter during the contest (joining us at the end), that they should

enjoy the pay and advantages promised on the succession of Shah

Soojah. It was also understood that no alteration would afterwards be

made. These agreements were made by Prince Timour, who had plenary

powers from his father, and the arrangements were finally approved

of by the Shah himself; and under the feeling that the promises of

the British Government would be sacredly observed, the discontented

who remained untouched sate down and turned their attention to

agriculture.”—[_Major Pottinger’s Report. MS. Records._]

WARNINGS TO SIR ALEXANDER BURNES.

[_Book V., chapter 1, page 169._]

“Before daylight a well-wisher of Burnes came to report to him that

a plan had been hatched during the night, which had for its chief

object his murder. Unfortunately, Sir Alexander could not be convinced

that the man was telling the truth, and paid no heed to what he said.

Shortly after, the Wuzeer, Oosman Khan, arrived (by this time the mob

was assembling). The Wuzeer urged him to leave his house, and proceed

to cantonments. Sir Alexander scorned the idea of quitting his house,

as he had every hope of quelling the disturbance; and let the worst

come to the worst he felt too well assured that neither the Envoy nor

General would permit him to be sacrificed whilst in the performance of

his public duty, so long as there were 6000 men within two miles of

him.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Journal: MS. Records._] “The King’s minister

went to Burnes early on the morning of the 2nd, and warned him of what

was about to happen—of the danger of remaining in his house—and

requested him to accompany him to the Balla Hissar; but he was deaf

to all entreaties, incredulous, and persevered in disbelief that any

outbreak was intended; yet I am told he wrote into cantonments for a

military force to protect him.”—[_Letters of Brigadier Shelton: MS.

Records._] The native friend said by Captain Johnson to have warned

Burnes early in the morning of the 2nd of November that his life was

in danger, was Taj Mahomed, who, as stated elsewhere in a note, on the

authority of Mohun Lal (and the same story is told by Lieutenant Eyre

and Lady Sale, in their journals), visited Burnes on the preceding

night. Bowh Singh, Burnes’s chuprassie, the only surviving witness of

what passed in that officer’s house upon the fatal morning, says that

his master did not wake before the arrival of the Wuzeer, and that the

man (Wullee Mahomed by name), who had called to warn Burnes of his

danger, was not admitted, nor was his message ever delivered. “On the

day of the murder,” says this witness, “as early as three o’clock

in the morning, a Cossid (Wullee Mahomed) came to me. I was on duty

outside; he said, ‘Go, and inform your master immediately that there

is a tumult in the city, and that the merchants are removing their

goods and valuables from the shops.’ I knew what my master had said

on the subject the day before, so I did not like awakening him, but

put on my chuprass, and went to the Char Chouk. Here I met the Wuzeer,

Nizam-ood-Dowlah, going towards my master’s house. I immediately turned

with him, and on my arrival awoke my master, who dressed quickly, and

went to the Wuzeer, and talked to him some time.” As this man speaks

of what he saw, and what he did on the morning of the 2nd of November,

I conceive that his evidence is the best that is now obtainable. He

states that “Sir Alexander Burnes was duly informed by his Afghan

servants, the day previous to his murder, that there was a stir in the

city, and that if he remained in it his life would be in danger; they

told him he had better go to the cantonments; this he declined doing,

giving as his reason that the Afghans never received any injury from

him, but, on the contrary, he had done much for them, and that he was

quite sure they would never injure him.”

A statement of a directly contrary tendency has, however, been made by

Lieutenant Mackenzie, late of the 41st Regiment, who has illustrated

the melancholy history of our Caubul disasters in a poem of twelve

cantos. “I am enabled,” he says, “to state positively, on the authority

of a letter from Sir Alexander Burnes himself (one of the last he ever

wrote, and addressed to an officer of high rank, and one of his most

intimate friends), that poor Burnes had long foreseen the crisis which

had arrived; for, in the letter alluded to, he states his conviction

in the most solemn terms that he was a marked man and would inevitably

be the first victim;—but, nevertheless, he would never flinch from

what he conceived to be his duty, although all his warnings had been

disregarded.”

INDECISION OF GENERAL ELPHINSTONE.

[_Book V., chapter 2, p. 187._]

The following is the letter alluded to in the text; written by General

Elphinstone to the Envoy on the 2nd of November:—

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

Since you left me, I have been considering what can be done to-morrow.

Our dilemma is a difficult one. Shelton, if re-inforced to-morrow,

might, no doubt, force in two columns on his way towards the Lahore

gate, and we might from hence force in that gate and meet them. But if

this were accomplished, what shall we gain? It can be done, but not

without very great loss, as our people will be exposed to the fire

from the houses the whole way. Where is the point you said they were

to fortify near Burnes’s house? If they could assemble there, that

would be a point of attack; but to march into the town, it seems, we

should only have to come back again; and as to setting the city on

fire, I fear, from its construction, that is almost impossible. We

must see what the morning brings, and then think what can be done. The

occupation of all the houses near the gates might give us a command of

the town, but we have not means of extended operations. If we could

depend on the Kuzzilbashes, we might easily reduce the city.

Yours, truly,

W. K. ELPHINSTONE.

DEATHS OF LIEUTENANT RATTRAY AND CAPTAIN CODRINGTON.

[_Book V., chapter 4, pages 227-231._]

Some interesting particulars of the deaths of Lieutenant Rattray and

Captain Codrington are given in a narrative of the events at Charekur,

supplied by Major Pottinger’s Moonshee. It appears that some chiefs

had warned the former officer that if he left the fort he would be

killed by the people outside; but that Rattray had replied, “They

have eaten our salt, and could not be guilty of such an act.” The

Moonshee then goes on to say: “When Mr. Rattray came near them, all

the chiefs paid their respects to him, saying, ‘Inshallah! we shall

go to-morrow and fight with Meer Musjedee.’ Mr. R. said, ‘Very good!

If you will go, I shall give your people presents on their return;

and to-morrow they shall receive five rupees each for their expenses,

and I will also go with my sowars.’ Mr. R. then turned to go back to

the fort; but Jubbar Khan asked him to look at his men, to which he

agreed, and turned back again. When he had taken about six or seven

steps, one of the Kohistanees called him by name, and ran at him,

firing his gun at Mr. R., who turned and ran towards the fort. I, the

Meerza, and the Chuprassie, all ran towards the fort. When I had nearly

reached it I looked back, and saw Mr. R. lying down on the plain.

I ran again towards him, and when near him, he called me, and told

me to take hold of him and help him into the fort. Directly I took

hold of his hand about fifty Kohistanees fired, and Mr. R. received

a ball in his forehead. I then ran back and got into the fort, where

I found Major Pottinger looking towards the Kohistanees, and firing

at them.” The touching circumstances of Captain Codrington’s death

are thus related:—“When Captain Codrington saw that Major Pottinger

was wounded, he went out to the two companies; but was very severely

wounded by a shot in the back. All his Sepoys began to cry for him

... Captain Codrington was able to walk into cantonments; but fell

down before he reached his house, and asked for water. We carried him

and laid him on the same bed as Major Pottinger, whom he asked for

pen, ink, and paper, and wrote a letter to his wife, whose picture

he also gave to Major Pottinger. He lingered on until the night of

the 7th, when he died. We buried him and Lieutenant Salisbury in one

grave.”—[_MS. Records._]

SECRET WRITING.

[_Books IV. and V. passim._]

In the letter quoted in the above-named page, the Envoy alludes to

the system of secret writing which has now superseded the old plan

of correspondence by cypher; and as at a later period, during General

Pollock’s occupation of the passes between Peshawur and Caubul, it was

found of the utmost service to our officers, it may be interesting to

describe the method in the words of the Envoy: “Are you in possession

of the _hikmut_ of concealed writing, by means of conjee-water and a

solution of iodine? This is much better than any cypher. The paper

is to all appearance blank, but when rubbed over with the solution,

the words written with conjee-water start into life, as it were, most

miraculously. Something unimportant is generally written with common

ink, and what is intended as secret is interlined with conjee-water.

Try this some day. Any medical man in your neighbourhood will give the

solution. The paper intended to be used should first have a gentle coat

of the solution passed over it, and suffered to dry.”

In another letter to the same correspondent, the Envoy again adverts to

this mode of cypher writing: “I find it is not necessary to prepare the

paper in the first instance. You write on ordinary paper, and having

spread a solution of iodine over it, the invisible writing becomes

apparent. When there is any writing of this kind on my paper, I shall

put the day of the month in letters, instead of figures. Perhaps you

would adopt the same sign.”

SIR WILLIAM MACNAGHTEN AND THE PRICE OF BLOOD.

[_Book V., chapter 5, pages 265-267._]

[The following passages, containing much authentic evidence relating

to this painful subject, is extracted from the _Friend of India_

(Serampore newspaper).]

“To crown the evidence of Sir William Macnaghten’s never having been

implicated in this alleged assassination of the two chiefs, we have an

acknowledgment under Mohun Lal’s own signature. When he was claiming

remuneration for his services of the Court of Directors, he delivered

in the following document, which has been copied for us from a paper in

his own hand-writing.

Advanced to Abdool Aziz, who offered to kill

Abdoollah Khan, by such means which

the Envoy did not approve, therefore the Rs.

balance 11,000 rupees was not paid. 4,000

“Thus it appears that while Mohun Lal told the Reviewer that Sir

William objected to pay the balance, because he had not seen the heads;

he told the Court of Directors that the balance was not paid because

the Envoy did not approve of the means that had been used!” * * * *

Major Colin Troup writes thus in a letter now before us:

“Akbar Khan never would allow Macnaghten’s name to be mentioned before

him but in terms of the greatest respect; and has in private, both to

poor Pottinger and myself, over and over again regretted the deed,

and stated that it never was premeditated; so far the contrary, that,

having been accused by Ameen-oollah’s party of being friendly to, and

intriguing with the English, to disarm suspicion, he in open Durbar

volunteered, if he was allowed time, to bring Macnaghten a prisoner

into Ameen-oollah’s house within eight days. This being agreed to, it

was then that he planned the treacherous conference with Sir William;

but, finding, after some delay, that he was not likely to accomplish

his object, and fearing to meet his party if he failed in his boasted

adventure, and hearing a cry that our troops were marching out of

the cantonments to where he and Sir William were sitting, he, in a

moment of desperation, out with his pistol and shot Sir William; but

he always loudly declared that on the morning of the conference, when

he came out to meet Sir William, he never for one moment contemplated

doing him any harm whatever. I have all this written down, and can,

if necessary, take my oath to what I have written, as coming from the

mouth of Akbar Khan himself, and you are most welcome to make what use

of it you please, in defence of the character of one of the brightest

ornaments our country ever did, or ever will produce.” ... We have the

most abundant evidence that Sir William Macnaghten’s character for

integrity and good faith always stood equally high among the Afghans;

and that when their chiefs were triumphant, and bitterly reproached

the British prisoners for the wrongs their nation had inflicted

on Afghanistan, the charge of encouraging assassination was never

whispered for a moment. Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence states: “During

our lengthened imprisonment, I unhesitatingly affirm that not one of

the prisoners ever heard Mahomed Akbar, or any of the chiefs, accuse

Sir William of bribing men to assassinate them; and it is not likely

they would have been silent, if they had so heavy a charge to bring

forward. On the contrary, I, as well as others, have heard both Mahomed

Akbar Khan and other chiefs express deep regret at the Envoy’s untimely

death, and much admiration of his character. Ameen-oollah Khan, when

I was his prisoner, told me that Sir W. H. Macnaghten had offered a

lakh of rupees for his head. Prisoner though I was, I denounced it in

open Durbar as an infamous lie, and never heard any more about it.”

Captain Colin Mackenzie writes: “If Sir William had ever instructed

Mohun Lal or any other person to employ assassins for the removal of

our treacherous and inveterate enemies, it would have been well known

to the Afghans themselves, and they would not have failed to urge so

plausible a ground of complaint against us, while we were captives in

their hands, which they never did, although they constantly reproached

us with every act of supposed injustice on the part of government, and

with the private vices and improprieties of individuals.” Captain W.

Anderson, another of the prisoners, writes: “I never heard any Afghan

accuse Sir W. H. Macnaghten of any acts for which any friend of his,

or any Englishman, need feel ashamed. On the contrary, I always heard

him spoken of with great respect, and frequently with admiration.”

Captain Warburton states: “I went into Caubul to the Newab’s on the

28th, I think, of December, 1841. I remained in his house till we were

forced out of it on the 12th of April following. During that time no

one was prevented seeing us. Our party consisted of J. Conolly, Airey,

Walsh, Webb, Drummond, and myself (besides Haughton and Campbell, who

joined us afterwards). We had an opportunity of seeing and conversing

with most of the chiefs at Caubul, who remained after Akbar Khan had

left. None of these people ever concealed their opinions regarding the

acts of our government or people. Ameen-oollah Khan, in particular,

spoke at times very strongly, but neither from him, nor from any other,

during the period of my residence, did I ever hear a word regarding the

charge now brought forward against Sir William of having offered money

for the assassination of the chiefs. I had sufficient opportunities of

hearing something about the matter, if any such offer had been made.”

THE QUESTION OF CAPITULATION.

[_Book V., chapter 5, pages 270-272._]

The following are the letters referred to in the text, which passed

between the Envoy and the General, from the 5th to the 8th of December:

5th December.

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

It becomes my duty to inform you that our stock of provisions is

reduced to nine days, on half-rations; it therefore becomes imperative

upon us to consider what can be done. We have, for the last few

days, been disappointed in our expectation of getting any, and our

hopes of success in doing this seem every day less. The objections

to retreat on the Balla Hissar I have already stated; our wants

there might be the same, with the additional one of fuel, and part

of our ordnance for protection. Retreat without terms I think with

you almost impossible, and that few would reach Jellalabad. The only

alternative (as there now seems little chance of the Ghilzyes renewing

the negotiation you were led to expect), is to try if terms can be

made in any other quarter, if we do not hear something favourable

to-morrow. With provisions we could hold out, but without them I do

not see what can be done, or how we are to avert starvation. It is

true the responsibility is great, and may fall on us; but are we

justified in risking the safety of so many people when we can no

longer do anything? When reduced to the last extremity (where we now

are almost), I think honourable terms better for our government than

our being destroyed here, which, without food, is inevitable. All this

I write in confidence for your own consideration, that you may think

what is best to be done, as I have told our real situation.

Yours, truly,

W. K. E.

December 5.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have received your note of this morning. I am perfectly aware of

the state of our supplies; but as we have nine days’ provision, and

had only provisions for one or two days when the siege commenced, I

conceive that we are better off now than we were a month ago. Whenever

we go, we could not carry with us more than two or three days’

supplies, and, therefore, it does not seem necessary to come to an

immediate decision. But I will speak to you on the subject to-morrow,

and will omit no favourable opportunity of negotiating.

W. H. M.

(Private.)

Cantonments, 6th Dec., 1841.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I now proceed to give you my opinion on your note of yesterday.

There are three courses which may be said to be open to us. First, a

retreat on Jellalabad, without terms. Secondly, a retreat to India,

with terms, abandoning our position in this country. And, thirdly, to

retire into the Balla Hissar. The first I regard as impracticable;

and, if practicable, the adoption of such a measure would cover us

with everlasting infamy, as we could not take the King’s family along

with us, and his Majesty would not stir without them. The second I

regard as nearly equally impracticable, from the conflicting interests

of the parties with whom we should have to treat. This cause would,

I think, render any promised protection ineffectual, and, if this

course could be safely adopted, the consequences would be terrific as

regards the safety of our Indian Empire and our interests in Europe.

The third course seems to me (though certainly attended with risk)

to be by far the most safe and honourable which we could adopt. With

four or five disposable regiments in the Balla Hissar, it would be

strange if we could not obtain fuel and provisions; we should be in a

position to overawe the city, and to encourage the Kuzzilbashes and

our other well-wishers to come forward to our support; and we should

probably find in the Balla Hissar provisions for a fortnight or a

month. I would, therefore, lose no time in sending every night, by all

possible contrivances, our stores, and sick, and wounded. Should the

report of the advance of troops from Candahar prove correct (which

we shall, in all probability, hear to-morrow), all our troubles will

cease. Should we have reason to believe it unfounded, we can then

commence destroying our powder and superfluous stores. In the mean

time, I think we have daily proofs that the forces of our enemies are

diminishing; and, with the blessing of Providence, some event may

arise from their misunderstandings to relieve us from our present

perilous position, even without the accession of fresh troops.

Very sincerely yours,

W. H. M.

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

Since your departure, I have thought over, and given my utmost

attention to, every part of the subject of our conversation. The first

proposition was a night expedition against the Deh-Hadjee, said to be

distant about three coss, part of the road through a narrow gorge,

through which I now hear guns could not go; and I am also told that

parties (of cavalry) have, for the last five or six days, been seen

going in that direction: no doubt for the object of preventing our

getting supplies. If we succeed in taking the fort (if only one), we

must hold it (to enable us to remove any quantity of grain with our

means) for some time; during which, the enemy, hearing of our attack,

would, no doubt, come out against our detachment; and from Captain

Johnson’s account, it is difficult to find grain. Another difficulty

is our want of local knowledge (this may, perhaps, be obtained). These

are the objections that present themselves to this plan.

With respect to a like enterprise on Killa Bolundee, that appears, I

confess (and I would willingly grasp at anything to enable us to hold

out), to be more difficult, from the facility with which a party might

be cut off by a sortie from the city. The other alternative is the

Balla Hissar; from thence seems the only chance we have of getting

supplies; and as you now think our being able to make any terms is

impossible, that seems the only one left. Colonel Chambers has been

with me, and says his horses would be quite unequal to a forced

march to Jellalabad, and that many of those of Anderson’s regiment

are unserviceable from want of food. Captain Anderson reported, this

morning, one-half.

After leaving cantonments, terms, I should suppose, are quite out of

the question; our quitting would be, I presume, considered as our

total defeat; and, until re-inforced, as we must sacrifice nearly all

our cattle, we would not have the power of moving, for, without the

means of transport, we would not go.

The next consideration is, whether our being annihilated here, or

entering into honourable terms, would have the worst effect for our

government. The responsibility is great for you and I; and (if we do

not hear of the force from Candahar to-morrow) it only remains for us

to consider whether we shall incur the responsibility, or risk the

loss of this force; for, under the most favourable view we can take,

the risk is great. Looking practically at the obstacles we have, they

are in reality very difficult to surmount.

I submit all this for your consideration, and have sent Major Thain

with this to you.

Yours, &c.,

W. K. E.

We must not think of treating, after any attempt either to retreat,

or go to the Balla Hissar, or if we fail in any attempt. We are

now comparatively entire; a loss or failure would increase our

destitution, and the terms will, of course, be worse. We could not

expect anything else.

Dec. 8, 1841.

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

The commissary has just reported to me, that on examination of the

grain he has in store, he finds from the quantity of dirt mixed with

it, he has not above four days’ supplies left, at most. Under these

circumstances, it becomes absolutely necessary for us to come to a

decision as to our future measures, as I do not see how we are to hold

out, without food for our Sepoys, beyond that time.

Yours truly,

W. K. E.

THE SURRENDER OF THE FORTS.

[_Book VI., chapter I., page 291._]

The subjoined letters are those to which reference is made in the text:

Dec. 16, 1841.

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

I wish you would write me an official letter, with your opinion as

to the necessity of giving up the forts, in furtherance of your

negotiations. I think, if absolutely necessary, it must be done. Our

situation cannot be made worse, but I think they ought to take them

one at a time, beginning with Zoolfikar’s (the grain fort) and the

Ricka-Bashee, they sending us supplies. This will be a mutual proof of

confidence: the abandoning of these forts if they are not sincere,

giving up these cantonments and the possibility of retreat from them.

Of _course_ the hostages will be sent, as you think they ought to be:

pray name them in your letter, if they have offered, or you proposed

any.

I herewith return the two letters from Trevor and Captain Drummond.

Yours truly,

W. K. E.

The magazine fort is, in fact, part of our cantonments, and ought for

the present to be dispensed with, as an act of courtesy and faith to

us.

December 16, 1841.

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint you that I have received a proposition

from Mahomed Oosman Khan and Ameen-oollah Khan, to the effect that

we should give up to them certain forts in the vicinity of the

cantonments, with a view to convince the population of the sincerity

of our intention to leave the country; by which arrangement also they

stated that they would be able to supply us punctually with provisions.

I am aware of the objections to such an arrangement in a military

point of view; but as I am of opinion that the proposition has

emanated from a suspicion of our intentions, rather than from any

sinister motive on the part of the Afghan chiefs, I would strongly

recommend that the proposition be complied with. We are clearly

completely in the power of our new allies as regards the article

of provisions; and it is not clear to me what other course than

compliance is open to us. By this course we show confidence, and have

at least the chance of making a safe and honourable retreat out of the

country: whereas, by refusal, we may exasperate those with whom we are

treating, and be utterly cut off from the means of subsistence.

Since the above was written, I have received an intimation that no

further supplies will be sent us, until the proposition of the chiefs

be complied with; and I request that you will inform me whether you

are prepared to give up the forts

(The new Magazine Fort,

The Musjeed,

The Fort of Zoolfikar,

The Fort of Ricka-Bashee)

this afternoon.

The chiefs have promised that thirty men, who shall be under control,

are to occupy each of the places to be delivered up; and I hope that

the brother of Newab Mahomed Zemaun Khan will reside in the cantonment

as a hostage until our departure.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c.,

W. H. M.

Head-Quarters, Caubul, Dec. 16, 1841.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this

day’s date, in reply to which I beg to say that, from the emergency of

the case, as therein stated, I see no alternative left us but to give

up the forts mentioned to the chiefs with whom you are treating; and

I shall accordingly give orders for their being vacated and delivered

over to the persons who may be authorised to receive them, immediately

on your intimating their arrival.

I have the honour, &c.,

W. K. ELPHINSTONE, Major-Gen.,

Commanding in Afghanistan.

SUPPLIES FROM THE AFGHANS.

[_Book VI., chapter I., pages 291, 292._]

Captain Johnson’s journal furnishes the best information extant

relative to the measures taken throughout the siege, and after the

capitulation, to supply the force with provisions. Under dates _Dec.

12th_ and _13th_, he writes: “A few provisions sent into cantonments

by the Sirdars. A lakh of rupees advanced to Mahomed Akbar for the

purchase of camels—not one as yet forthcoming. The Seeah-Sungh

gateway, through which all supplies come in, is daily infested by

parties of Afghans, calling themselves _Ghazees_, or fighters for

religion. They are, without exception, the most barefaced, impertinent

scoundrels under the sun. Armed with swords, daggers, and matchlocks,

they acknowledge no chief, but act independently—they taunt and insult

the whole of us. Not a Sepoy can venture twelve paces from the bridge

over the ditch without being plundered of what he has. People from the

town, bringing in grain or _boosah_ (bran), are often plundered and

beaten. Although our cattle and men are starving, no measures are

taken by our military authorites to check all this. It is true, our

ramparts are lined with our soldiers, and plenty of cannon at each

bastion, and a six-pounder at the bridge loaded with grape—but to what

purpose? Our men are told, on no account to fire upon the Afghans,

without the most urgent necessity, for fear of putting a stop to the

good feeling existing on their part. The chiefs have been applied to,

to use their influence to prevent these people assembling near our

cantonments. Their reply is, ‘We cannot do so—they are not under our

controul; but if they misbehave themselves, fire upon them.’ To-day,

I was at the Seeah-Sungh gateway, anxiously looking out for some food

for my public cattle. About thirty loads of _boosah_ came to within six

paces of the bridge, and where the guard was standing. The officer on

duty, as also the field officer of the week, was there. The wretched

rabble above alluded to, stopped the drivers of the donkeys and abused

them, beat them and ordered them back, and threatened them with more

ill-usage in the event of their returning to sell any article to the

Feringhees. This was reported by me to the General, and there it ended.”

And again, on the 15th, the active commissariat officer writes: “A few

supplies sent into cantonments, and people still bringing in private

speculations; but are subjected to the same ill-treatment as noticed on

the 12th and 13th. Attah and barley sell from 1-1/2 to 3 and 4 seers

the rupee (from 3lb. to 6lb. and 8lb. for 2_s._) ... To-day a flock of

sheep belonging to cantonments was grazing outside of the walls, under

the care of the shepherd. Two men attacked him close under where our

sentries, with loaded muskets, were standing. The shepherd fled, and so

did the two men with the whole flock of sheep, and drove them along the

whole face of cantonment. Report made to the General, whose reply was,

‘They had no business to go outside;’ and all this time our garrison

starving!”—[_Captain Johnson’s Journal: MS. Records._]

CIRCUMSTANCES PRECEDING THE DEATH OF THE ENVOY.

[_Book VI., chapter I., pages 299, 300._]

_Statement of Captain Mackenzie._

“The proposition which induced the Envoy (in opposition to his

theretofore avowed principle and practice in refusing to meet Mahomed

Akbar or any of the other Khans, save in a body) to grant the fatal

interview to the Sirdar and his more immediate confederates, had

emanated from the murderer himself, and had been conveyed to the Envoy

the night previously by Mahomed Sadig Khan, half brother of Akbar, by

Surwar Khan Lohanee, who came into the cantonment in company with the

late Captain Skinner, then released for the first time from the custody

in which he had been retained, first by Ameen-oollah Khan, and latterly

by Mahomed Akbar himself.

“The Sirdar had acquainted Captain Skinner with the nature of his

pretended wishes, as if in friendly conference, requesting him to

act the part of chief ambassador, Captain Skinner’s disapproval of

which in all probability saved his life for the time being; but he,

Captain Skinner, was the only officer present during the eventful

conference of the evening of the 22nd, and from him I subsequently

derived the information, which I now give, of the nature of Mahomed

Akbar’s message. It was to this effect,—that he and his particular

friends (to wit, the Ghilzyes) should either come over in a body into

the cantonment, placing themselves under the orders of the Envoy,

or that, at a preconcerted signal, without giving warning to the

other confederates, in concert with a body of British troops, take

possession of the fort of Mahmood Khan; then seizing the person of

Ameen-oollah Lohganee, whom for a pecuniary reward they proposed

to murder; that the Sirdar should acknowledge Shah Soojah for his

sovereign, his reward being the payment—a present bonus from the

British Government—of thirty lakhs of rupees, and a stipend of four

lakhs of rupees per annum for life; that the British troops should be

allowed to remain unmolested, as if with the perfect concurrence and

by the express wish of the so-formed Afghan Government, for a period of

six months, at which time they were to evacuate the country as if by

their own free will, thus carrying with them an untarnished reputation

(the expression was ‘saving their _Purdah_’), and thus securing a

favourable opportunity for the British home Government to negotiate

a treaty to the security of our Indian frontier with the cabinet of

St. Petersburgh. Up to that date, viz., 22nd of December, Sir Wm.

Macnaghten had, in spite of his conscientious fulfilment of his verbal

engagements with the assembled Khawaneen (for no written treaty had

theretofore been exchanged), been worn out by their utter falsehood and

bad faith, their original demands having risen to a pitch of insolence

and unreasonableness which amounted to open mockery—their conduct

had, in fact, virtually released him from any obligation to adhere to

any of his original propositions; and in despair, as a drowning man

catches at straws, the troops having long before proved themselves

utterly inadequate to his support, or in fact to their own protection,

with immediate ruin and disgrace to himself and his country staring him

in the face, he was in an evil moment induced to assent to the above

proposals, with the exception of the _murder_ of Ameen-oollah, from

which (Captain S. assured me) he shrank with abhorrence and disgust,

assuring the ambassadors that as a British functionary nothing would

induce him to pay a price for blood. So far as it may be said that the

late Envoy allowed himself to be duped by a man of the notoriously

bad character of Mahomed Akbar Khan in all matters of good faith,

even among his treacherous countrymen, I can only say that it is not

only my firm belief, but that also of Captain Lawrence, and others

who best knew Sir William, that two months of incessant fatigue

of mind and body, and the load of care which had during that time

weighed him down, had at last completely unhinged his strong mind.

Contrary to his usual practice, he consulted none of those who had all

along possessed his perfect confidence; his manner was flurried and

agitated; and when, previous to leaving the cantonment on the morning

of the 23rd, I, having for the first time learnt his intentions,

declared my conviction ‘that it was a trap,’ he abruptly answered,

‘Leave me to manage that: trust me for that.’ He also observed, I

believe, to Captains Trevor and Lawrence, while riding forth to the

scene of his murder, ‘Death is preferable to the life we are leading

now.’”—[_Answer to Interrogatories put by Gen. Pollock. MS. Records._]

_Mohun Lal’s Statement._

Mohun Lal’s story, as given in a letter to Mr. Colvin, is worth

quoting, though its meaning is somewhat obscured by its dubious

phraseology:—“Mahomed Akbar, being afraid of the union to the

Douranees with the Shah, induced Surwar Khan and others, by the hope

of reward, to deceive the Envoy, by saying that he will either spread

dissension in the city to allow us to remain in the country, see

us safely pass down to Jellalabad, or act as the Envoy tells him,

on the condition that Mahomed Akbar was to receive four lakhs of

rupees annually, besides the reward of thirty lakhs from the British

Government, and made the Vizier of the Suddozye King from generation

to generation. As soon as I heard this by the Persian chief, I wrote

to the Envoy that Mahomed Akbar was deceiving us, and he should place

no faith in anything he says. I also particularly informed him that

he may give money to anybody he likes, to espouse the cause of the

Shah and us, but never to the chiefs, as it will not induce them

to do us service like the others, but will incite and prepare them

against us. Unfortunately he was assured by Surwar Khan, Naib Ameer,

&c., of their favourable service, and to advance lakhs of rupees.

He was also prompted by these individuals to give the paper of the

above-mentioned agreement to Mahomed Akbar. He showed it, and said

falsely to Ameen-oollah that the Envoy has promised the money it

contains, if Mahomed Akbar were to kill, catch, or send him alive to

the Envoy. Ameen-oollah threw himself at his feet, and said he is doing

all this against us merely for the good of his father, and he (Akbar)

has sense to know it perfectly; therefore he should not lose time

either to catch or murder the Envoy, which will procure him all the

power and money he wishes. I wrote all this to the Envoy on the very

morning of his murder, begged him to take very great care of himself,

and do not go so often to meet Mahomed Akbar out of the cantonment, as

he is the man that nobody can trust his word upon oath. I also added

that the Douranees, as well as Ameen-oollah (the instigation of Akbar),

being jealous of the return of his father, have taken the part of the

Shah, and will, in the course of two days, wait upon his Majesty, ask

us to remain here in the hope of receiving the money promised them by

me.”—[_MS. Records._]

SIR WILLIAM MACNAUGHTEN’S REPORT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CAUBUL

OUTBREAK.

[Found unfinished in the Envoy’s desk after his death.]

[_Book V. and Book VI., chapter I._]

SIR,

1. It is with feelings of the deepest concern that I acquaint you,

for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in

Council, of my having been compelled to consent to the abandonment of

our position in this country.

2. The Major-General commanding in Afghanistan will doubtless detail

the military disasters which have led to this direful necessity; and I

shall have occasion, therefore, to touch upon them but briefly in the

course of this narrative.

3. On the morning of the 2nd ult., I was informed that the town of

Caubul was in a state of commotion, and shortly afterwards I received

a note from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes, to the effect that his

house was besieged, and begging for assistance. I immediately went

to General Elphinstone, and suggested that Brigadier Shelton’s force

should proceed to the Balla Hissar, thence to operate as might seem

expedient; that the remaining troops should be concentrated, the

cantonment placed in a state of defence, and assistance; if possible,

sent to Sir A. Burnes.

4. Before Brigadier Shelton could reach the Balla Hissar, the town had

attained such a state of ferment that it was deemed impracticable to

penetrate to Sir A. Burnes’s residence, which was in the centre of the

city. I also sent messages of assurance to his Majesty by my assistant

(Captain Lawrence), but so great had become the excitement, that, by

noon, the road between the cantonment and the city was hardly passable.

5. His Majesty, on first hearing of the insurrection, had sent out

his son, Futteh Jung, and the Minister, with some of the household

troops, to repress it; but this party was speedily repulsed with great

slaughter, and in the meantime I grieve to state that Sir Alexander

Burnes, his brother, Lieutenant C. Burnes, and Captain W. Broadfoot,

had fallen victims to the fury of the mob.

6. From that time affairs grew generally worse. The enemy showed

great judgment in their work of annoying us. They seized the

strongest positions between the cantonment and the city, and,

what was worse than all, they seized the fort which contained all

our stores and provisions. This step was well-nigh effecting our

immediate destruction, and it is chiefly to it that I attribute our

final discomfiture. We had only four or five days’ supplies for the

cantonment. The Balla Hissar, as well as the cantonment, was in a

state of siege. We could not hope for provisions from thence, nor

would the place have afforded us either food or shelter, and, in the

opinion of the military authorities, to return thither would have been

attended with ruin. A disastrous retreat seemed the only alternative,

but this necessity was averted by the attack, on the 10th ult., of a

neighbouring fort, which had intermediately furnished us with a scanty

supply of provisions, but which subsequently espoused the cause of

the rebels. The place was carried after a desperate resistance. We

lost in the operation no less than sixty men killed and wounded of her

Majesty’s 44th Regiment alone, but our immediate wants were supplied

by the provisions found in the fort. I lament to add, that Colonel

Mackrell, Captain M’Crae, and Captain Westmacott, fell on the occasion.

7. On the 6th ult. I received a hurried note from Major Pottinger, to

the effect that he was closely besieged at Charekar, and unable to

hold out for want of water. Major Pottinger himself, with Lieutenant

Haughton, came into cantonments a day or two afterwards, having left

the 4th Regiment in a disorganised state in the neighbourhood of

Istaleff; but, melancholy to relate, that no authentic tidings of them

have up to this day been received. There is every reason to believe

that the entire corps (officers and men) have been annihilated.

Captains Codrington and Rattray and Lieutenant Salisbury were killed

before Major Pottinger left Charekar, and both he and Lieutenant

Haughton were severely wounded.

8. I had written to Candahar and to Gundamuck for assistance

immediately on the occurrence of the outbreak, but General Sale’s

brigade had proceeded to Jellalabad, the whole country between this and

that place being in a state of insurrection, and a return to Caubul

being deemed impracticable. From Candahar, though I sent Cossids with

pressing requisitions for assistance almost every day, I could gain

no intelligence, the road being entirely occupied by the troops and

emissaries of the rebels. We learnt from native reports that Ghuznee

was invested by the enemy, and that Captain Woodburn, who was on his

way to Caubul from Candahar, had been massacred, with a party of

leave-of-absence men by whom he was accompanied, in a small fort on

this side of Ghuznee.

9. We continued, up to the commencement of the present month, to derive

a scanty supply, at great pecuniary sacrifices, from the neighbouring

villages, but about that time the enemy’s plans had become so well

organised, that our supplies from this source were cut off. The rebels

daily made their appearance in great force in the neighbourhood of the

cantonment, and I lament to add that their operations were generally

attended with success. The details will be communicated by the military

authorities. In the midst of their successes Mahomed Akbar Khan arrived

from Toorkistan, an event which gave new life to the efforts of the

rebels.

10. In the meantime I had received so many distressful accounts from

the General commanding of the state of our troops and cattle from

want of provisions, and I had been so repeatedly apprised by him (for

reasons which he will himself doubtless explain) of the hopelessness

of further resistance, that on the 24th ultimo, I deemed it my duty

to address an official letter to him, a copy of which accompanies, as

Appendix A.[254]

The General’s reply was dated the same day; a copy accompanies, as

Appendix B.

At my invitation, deputies were sent from the rebels, who came into

cantonment on the 25th ultimo, I having in the meantime received

overtures from them of a pacific nature, on the basis of our evacuating

the country. I proposed to them the only terms which, in my opinion,

could be accepted with honour; but the temper of the rebels may best be

understood when I mention that they returned me a letter of defiance

the next morning, to the effect that, unless I consented to surrender

our arms, and to abandon his Majesty to his fate, we must prepare for

immediate hostilities. To this I replied, that we preferred death to

dishonour, and that it would remain with a higher Power to decide

between us.

11. Affairs had attained so desperate a state on the 8th instant, that

I again addressed the General a letter, copy of which accompanies, as

Appendix C., and a copy of the General’s reply of the same date, signed

by three of his principal officers, accompanies as Appendix D. On the

next day I received another letter from the General, copy of which is

sent as Appendix E.

12. I had subsequently a lengthened correspondence with Mahomed Oosman

Khan, Barukzye, the most moderate and sensible man of the insurgents,

and as on the 11th instant we had not one day’s provisions left, I held

a conference with the whole of the rebel chiefs. The day previous I had

learnt from a letter from Colonel Palmer, at Ghuznee, that there was no

hope of reinforcements from Candahar. I had repeatedly kept his Majesty

informed of the desperate state of our affairs, and of the probability

that we should be compelled to enter into some accommodation with the

enemy. 13. The conference with the rebels took place about a mile

from cantonments. I was attended by Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and

Mackenzie, and there were present on the part of the rebels the heads

nearly of all the chief tribes in the country. I had committed to paper

certain propositions, to which I had reason to believe they would

have no objection, and I read it to the meeting. A copy accompanies

as Appendix F.[255] When I came to the second article, Mahomed Akbar

interrupted me, and observed that we did not require supplies, as there

was no impediment to our marching the next morning. I mention the above

fact to show the impetuous disposition of this youth. He was reproved

by the other chiefs, and he himself, except on this one occasion,

behaved with courtesy, though evidently elevated by his sudden change

of fortune.

14. The next day I was waited upon by a deputation from the chiefs,

with a proposition that Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk should be left nominally

as king—the Barukzye exercising the functions of minister; but this

proposition, owing to the mutual jealousies of the parties concerned,

as will appear in the sequel, fell to the ground.

15. From the foregoing review of occurrences, I trust it will be

evident that I had no recourse left but that of negotiation; and I had

ascertained beyond a doubt that the rebel chiefs were perfectly aware

of our helpless situation, and that no terms short of our quitting

Afghanistan would satisfy them.

16. The whole country, as far as we could learn, had risen in

rebellion; our communications on all sides were cut off; almost every

public officer, whether paid by ourselves or his Majesty, had declared

for the new governor, and by far the greater number even of his

Majesty’s domestic servants had deserted him. We had been fighting for

forty days against very superior numbers, under most disadvantageous

circumstances, with a deplorable loss of valuable lives, and in a

day or two we must have perished from hunger, to say nothing of the

advanced season of the year, and the extreme cold, from the effects of

which our native troops were suffering severely. I had been repeatedly

apprised by the military authorities that nothing could be done with

our troops; and I regret to add that desertions to the enemy were

becoming of frequent occurrence amongst our troops. The terms I secured

were the best obtainable, and the destruction of fifteen thousand human

beings would little have benefited our country, whilst our government

would have been almost compelled to avenge our fate, at whatever cost.

We shall part with the Afghans as friends, and I feel satisfied that

any government which may be established hereafter, will always be

disposed to cultivate a good understanding with us.

17. A retreat without terms would have been impracticable. It is true

that, by entering into terms, we are prevented from undertaking the

conquest of the entire country, a measure which, from my knowledge of

the views of government, I feel convinced would never be resorted to,

even were the means at hand. But such a project in the present state

of our Indian finances, and the requisitions for troops in various

quarters, I knew could not be entertained. If the expense already

incurred in such a case would have been intolerable ... [_Sentence

imperfect._]

18. I would beg leave to refer to the whole tenor of my former

correspondence for the causes which have produced this insurrection.

Independently of the genius of the people, which is prone to rebellion,

we, as conquerors and foreigners, of a different creed, were viewed

with particular disfavour by the chiefs, whilst the acts of some of

us were particularly calculated to excite the general jealousy of

a sensitive nation. The haughty demeanour of his Majesty was not

agreeable to the nobles, and, above all, the measures of economy, to

which it was found necessary to resort, were particularly galling.

Throughout this rebellion I was in constant communication with the

Shah, through my assistant, Lieutenant J. B. Conolly, who was in

attendance on his Majesty in the Balla Hissar. On the 18th inst. it

was agreed upon that our troops should evacuate the Balla Hissar, and

return to the cantonments, while the Barukzyes should have a conference

with his Majesty with a view to his retaining the nominal powers of

sovereignty, they for their own security placing a guard of their own

in the upper citadel. No sooner, however, had our troops left the Balla

Hissar, than his Majesty, owing to some panic or misunderstanding,

ordered the gate to be shut, and the proposed conference was thereby

prevented. So offended were the Barukzyes, that they determined never

to offer his Majesty the same terms again. In explanation of his

conduct, his Majesty states that the party whom the Barukzyes desired

to introduce was not that party which had been agreed upon.

His Majesty shut * * * *

True Copy.

(Signed) G. ST. P. LAWRENCE, Capt.,

Mil. Sec., late Envoy and Minister.

[_MS. Records._]

THE TREATY OF CAPITULATION.

[_Book VI., chapter II., pages 320 to 326._]

[The following are translations of the different documents referred to

in the above-mentioned chapter, marking the different stages of the

treaty under which the English evacuated Caubul. No. I. is the draft of

the original treaty which Macnaghten was negotiating at the time of his

death. The articles, as proposed by the Afghan chiefs, are in inverted

commas. The observations which follow, contain the assent of the

English representative. And the _Remarks_ in brackets are those of the

Afghan chiefs; the original being in the hand-writing of Akbar Khan.]

No. I.

_Rough Draft of the Treaty with the Assent of the English Authorities._

_Article 1._ “There shall be no delay in the departure of the English

Army.”

Agreed to. They will march twenty-four hours after having received a

thousand carriage-cattle, which shall be either camels or yaboos.

[_Remark._ It rests with them (the English); let them pay the hire as

they may be able.]

_Article 2._ “Afghan Sirdars shall accompany the army, to prevent any

one offering opposition, and to assist in procuring supplies.”

It is very advisable.

[_Remark._ Sirdar Oosman Khan and Shah Dowlut Khan.]

_Article 3._ “The Jellalabad army shall march for Peshawur before the

Caubul force starts.”

It is agreed to. Do you name some person who shall accompany them.

[_Remark._ Abdool Ghuffoor Khan.]

_Article 4._ “The Ghuznee force, having made their preparations, shall

speedily march to Peshawur by Caubul.”

It is agreed to. Do you name some proper person to accompany them.

[_Remark._ A relation of the Naib or of Mehtur Moossa.]

_Article 5._ “The Candahar force, and all other British troops in

Afghanistan, shall quickly depart for Hindostan.”

It is agreed. Let proper people accompany them.

[_Remark._ Newab Jubbur Khan.]

_Article 6._ “The whole of the property of the Ameer (Dost Mahomed

Khan) which is in the hands of the English Government, or of individual

officers, shall be left behind.”

It is agreed to. Whatever is with the public authorities is known to

you; whatever is with private officers point out and take.

_Article 7._ “Whatever property belonging to the English cannot

be carried away, shall be taken care of, and sent by the first

opportunity.”

It is agreed to: but we have given over all that remains to the Newab.

[_Remark._ The guns, ordnance stores, and muskets, must be given to me.]

_Article 8._ “In case Shah Soojah should wish to remain at Caubul, we

will give him yearly a subsistence of a lakh of rupees.”

It is agreed to. Do whatever you think advisable, wishing to show your

friendship for us.

_Article 9._ “In case the family of Shah Soojah should be left behind,

from want of carriage-cattle, we will fix the place now occupied by

them in the Balla Hissar for their dwelling-place, until they can

depart for Hindostan.”

It is agreed to. The honour of the King is the honour of the Douranees;

and it is becoming in you.[256]

_Article 10._ “When the English army arrives at Peshawur, arrangements

shall be made for the march of Dost Mahomed Khan, and all other

Afghans, with all their property, families, and children.”

It is agreed to. They shall all be sent to you with honour and in

safety.

_Article 11._ “When Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and the others arrive

safely at Peshawur, then the family of the Shah shall be at liberty to

depart; that departing they may arrive at the place fixed upon.”

It is agreed to.

_Article 12._ “Four English gentlemen shall remain as hostages in

Caubul until Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and the other Afghans shall have

arrived at Peshawur, when the English gentlemen shall be allowed to

depart.”

It is agreed to.

[_Remark._ Let there be six hostages.]

_Article 13._ “Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan and Sirdar Oosman Khan

shall accompany the English army to Peshawur, and take them there in

safety.”[257]

It is agreed to.

[_Remark._ Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan.]

_Article 14._ “After the departure of the English, friendly relations

shall be continued,—_i.e._, that the Afghan Government, without the

consent and advice of the English Government, shall not form any treaty

or connection with a foreign power; and should they (the Afghans) ever

ask assistance against foreign invasion, the English Government will

not delay in sending such assistance.”

It is agreed to, as far as we are concerned; but in this matter the

Governor-General of India alone has authority. We will do our best to

bring about friendship between the two governments; and by the blessing

of the Almighty this wish will be obtained, and friendship exist for

the future.

_Article 15._ “Any one who may have assisted Shah Soojah and the

English, and may wish to accompany them, shall be allowed to do so.

We will not hinder them. And if they remain here, no one will call

them to account for what they have done, and no one shall molest them

under any pretence. They may remain in this country like the other

inhabitants.”[258]

We have interpolated a few words, and it will be friendship if you

comply with them.

_Article 16._ “Should any English gentleman unavoidably be detained, he

shall be treated honourably until such time as he can depart.”—[_MS.

Records._]

II.

[The following articles contain the further demands of the Afghans

advanced after Macnaghten’s death. The observations immediately

following the articles are by the English negotiators. The _remarks_ in

brackets by the Afghans.]

_Article 1._ “Whatever coin there may be in the public treasury must be

given up.”

We have set apart two lakhs of rupees for our expenses to Peshawur,

which is twenty-four yaboos’ loads. If there is more than this in the

public treasury, either in gold mohurs, ducats, or rupees, it is yours.

If you do not believe this, send some one to note and inspect the loads

on the day of our departure. If we have said truly, give us a blessing;

and if we have spoken falsely, it is your property, take it away, and

we shall be convicted of falsehood.

[_Remark._ Let them pay the hire of the yaboos and camels.]

_Article 2._ “With reference to the remark that was made that we should

give up all our guns but six, we have with the force one and a-half

companies of artillerymen. You have fixed six guns. Half of a company

would remain without equipments. Be good enough to give three more

small guns, such as are drawn by mules, for the other half-company. It

will be a great kindness.”

[_Remark._ They cannot be given.]

_Article 3._ “The muskets in excess of those in use with the regiments

must be left behind.”

This is agreed to. Whatever muskets are in addition to those in use

with the regiments, together with shot and powder and other ordnance

stores, all by way of friendship shall be the property of the Newab.

_Article 4._ “General Sale, together with his wife and daughter, and

the other gentlemen of rank who are married and have children, until

the arrival of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and the other Afghans and

their families, and Douranees and Ghilzyes, from Hindostan, shall

remain as guests with us; that when the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan shall

have arrived, they also shall be allowed to depart with honour from

Afghanistan.”

General Sale is with the army in Jellalabad, the departure of which is

fixed to take place previous to our arrival; and as for the other two

or three gentlemen who are married and present here, we have sent a man

to them. They, having seen their families, report that their families

will not consent to this proposal; (adding) that you men may do as you

like—no one can order us. This proposal is contrary to all order. We

now beg you to be good enough to excuse the women from this suffering,

and we agree to give as many gentlemen as you may wish for. In

friendship, kindness and consideration are necessary, not overpowering

the weak with sufferings. Since, for a long time past, we have shown

kindness and respect to all Afghans of rank and consequence with

whom we have had dealings, you should consider what we have done for

them, and not forget kindness. As Shah Soojah was father of a family,

and the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan was with his family, and no one gave

them annoyance, and we showed them respect, you also now show similar

kindness, that friendship may be increased.

[_Remark._ Let them remain with their families. Let the family of the

General stop in Caubul, until he himself comes from Jellalabad,—Sturt

with his family, Boyd with his family, and Anderson with his family.]

ELDRED POTTINGER, Pol. Agent.

W. K. ELPHINSTONE, Major-Gen.[A]

III.

[The following is a draft of the new treaty submitted by the Afghan

chiefs, containing the additional articles, and embodying the matter in

Akbar Khan’s “Remarks.”]

_Agreement of Peace that has been determined on with the Frank English

gentlemen, to which engagement, if they consent and act accordingly,

on the part of the heads and leaders of Afghanistan henceforward no

infractions will occur to their friendly engagements._

1st. That the going of the gentlemen shall be speedy. In regard to the

carriage-cattle, let them send money that they may be purchased and

sent.

2nd. As regards the going of the Sirdars with the English army that no

person may injure it on the way, Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan or Sirdar

Mahomed Oosman Khan, whichever may be wished by the English, will be

appointed and sent.

3rd. The army of Jellalabad shall march previous to the army of

Caubul, and proceed to Peshawur. Sirdar Abdool Suffoor Khan having

been appointed, will leave this and proceed, that he may previously

accompany them; secondly, the road of Bhungush has been appointed.

4th. The Ghuznee force having got quickly ready will proceed by the

road of Caubul to Peshawur. A relative of Naib Ameen-oollah Khan, with

Mehtur Moosa Khan, has been appointed to accompany it.

5th. The army of Candahar and other parts of Afghanistan, wherever an

army may be, will quickly depart for India. Newab Abdool Jubbar Khan

has been appointed to carry this into effect.

6th. Whatever property of the Ameer may be with the English will be

returned, and nothing retained.

7th. Whatever property of the English may be left for want of carriage

will become the property of the Newab.

8th. If the family of Shah Soojah, on account of want of carriage, may

remain here, they will be placed in the house of Hadjee Khan.

9th. Whenever the English army may arrive at Peshawur, they will make

arrangements for the return of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, the Afghans and

their families, that are in India.

10th. That the English gentlemen, with their families, will be left at

Caubul as hostages, until the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, with the rest of

the Afghans and their families, may arrive at Peshawur; or, secondly,

that six hostages may be left.

11th. After the departure of the English there shall be perfect

friendship between the two states, in so much so that the Government of

Afghanistan, without the advice and approval of the British Government,

shall enter into no connection or correspondence with any other power;

but if, in its defence, it may require the assistance of the English,

they will not delay to afford it. Should the British Government not

consent to this, the Afghans are free to make friends with any one they

like.

12th. If any gentleman would wish to remain in Caubul, on account of

his private affairs, he may do so, and will be treated with justice and

respect.

13th. Whatever cash, whether gold or silver, may be in the treasury,

shall be paid to Newab Zemaun Khan. A trustworthy person will be

appointed, who will issue supplies from stage to stage as far as

Peshawur.

14th. With regard to artillery, six guns have been determined on. They

are enough. More will not be given. Secondly, the three mule guns will

be given.

15th. The spare arms shall be given to Newab Mahomed Zemaun Khan.

16th. The hostages to be left here, and these persons with their

families—General Sale, Captains Sturt, Boyd, and Anderson.

17th. Let General Sale go with the army to Jellalabad, and his family

remain here; after taking the army to Jellalabad, let him return to

Caubul.

18th. If any of the Frank gentlemen have taken a Mussulman wife, she

shall be given up.

If there may be questions about any article, send a note quickly by the

bearer.—[_MS. Records._]

IV.

THE RATIFIED TREATY.

_Translation of a Treaty between the English Authorities at Caubul and

the Afghan Nobles. (Dated in the month of Ze-vol-Kadh.)_

The cause of writing this confidential paper, and the intention

of forming this unparalleled friendly treaty, is this:—That at

the present happy moment, to put away strife and contention, and

avert discord and enmity, the representatives of the great English

nation—that is, the high of rank and respected Eldred Pottinger,

the ambassador and agent of the English Government, and General

Elphinstone, the commander of the English forces—have concluded a

comprehensive treaty containing certain articles, which they have

confided to the hands of the Afghan nobility, that by it the chain of

friendship may be strengthened. And it has been settled that the Afghan

nobles shall give a similar writing.

An engagement is now made by his Majesty Newab Mahomed Zemaun Khan,

King of Afghanistan, and Naib Ameen-oollah Khan, and the chief nobles

of Afghanistan, whose seals are affixed to and ornament this document.

The articles of the treaty are as follow:—

_Article 1._ That the British troops shall speedily quit the

territories of Afghanistan and march to India, and shall not return;

and twenty-four hours after receiving the carriage-cattle the army

shall start.

_Article 2._ That on our part the Sirdars, Oosman Khan and

Shoojah-ool-dowlah Khan, be appointed to accompany the before-mentioned

army to the boundaries of Afghanistan and convey it to the boundary of

the Sikh territory; so that no one shall offer molestation on the road;

and that carriage-cattle and provisions may be procured for it.

_Article 3._ That the English force at Jellalabad shall march for

Peshawur before the Caubul army arrives, and shall not delay on the

road.

_Article 4._ Having brought the force at Ghuznee in safety to Caubul,

under the protection of one of the relations of Naib Ameen-oollah

Khan, we will send it to Peshawur unmolested under the care of another

trustworthy person.

_Article 5._ Since, according to agreement the troops at Candahar

and other parts of Afghanistan are to start quickly for India, and

make over those territories to our agents, we on our part appoint

trustworthy persons who may provide them with provisions and

protection, and preserve them from molestation.

_Article 6._ All goods and property, and stores and cattle, belonging

to Sirdar Dost Mahomed Khan, which may be in the hands of the English,

shall be given up, and none retained.

_Article 7._ Six English gentlemen, who remain here as our guests,

shall be treated with courtesy. When the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan

and the other Afghans shall arrive at Peshawur, we will allow the

above-mentioned English gentlemen to depart with honour.

_Article 8._ After the departure of the English army according to the

treaty, should assistance against foreign invasion be at any time

demanded, they (the English Government) shall not delay. Between (the

Governments) friendship and good-will shall exist; and we will not make

a treaty with any but the above-mentioned English Government. And in

case the Governor-General of India should not agree to this proposal,

we are at liberty to form an alliance with any other power.

_Article 9._ Should any English gentleman be unavoidably detained in

Caubul, we will treat him with all respect and consideration, and on

his departure dismiss him with honour.

_Article 10._ The English can take six horse-artillery guns and three

mule guns, and the rest, by way of friendship, shall be left for our

use. And all muskets and ordnance stores in the magazine shall, as a

token of friendship, be made over to our agents.

_Article 11._ Such English soldiers as may be left sick or wounded at

Caubul shall be at liberty to return to their own country on their

recovery.

This is the treaty, the articles of which have been entered into

between the nobles of the Mahomedan faith and the distinguished

gentlemen. From which articles we will not depart. Written in the month

of Ze-vol-Kadh, in the year of the Mahomedan faith 1257.

(Sealed)

MAHOMED ZEMAUN KHAN.

MEER HAJEE KHAN.

SEKUNDUR KHAN.

DARWEESH KHAN.

ALLEE KHAN.

MAHOMED AKBAR KHAN.

MAHOMED OOSMAN KHAN.

GHOLAM AHMED KHAN.

GHOLAM MAHOMED KHAN.

KHAN MAHOMED KHAN.

ABDOOL KHALIK KHAN.

AMEEN-OOLLAH KHAN.

MEER ASLAN KHAN.

SUMUD KHAN.

MAHOMED NASIR KHAN.

ABDOOLLAH KHAN.

GHUFFOOR KHAN.

MEER ALTEB KHAN.

[_MS. Records._]

CONDUCT OF AKBAR KHAN ON THE RETREAT.

[_Book VI., chapter IV, page 383._]

“At about nine A.M. the chiefs of the pass and of the country towards

Soorkhab arrived, when we all sat down to discuss matters. The

chiefs were most bitter in their expressions of hatred against us;

and declared that nothing would satisfy them and their men but our

extermination, and money they would not receive. The Sirdar, as far as

words went, tried all in his power to conciliate them, and when other

arguments failed, put them in mind of his father and the whole of his

family being in the power of the British Government at Loodhianah, and

that vengeance would be taken by the latter in the event of mercy

not being shown to us. Mahomed Shah Khan offered them 60,000 rupees

on condition of our not being molested. After some time they took

their departure, to consult with their followers; and Mahomed Shah

Khan mentioned to me that he feared the chiefs would not, without some

great inducement, resist the temptation of plunder and murder that now

offered itself, and wound up by asking if we would give them two lakhs

of rupees on condition of being allowed a free passage. I mentioned

this to General Elphinstone, obtained his consent, and made known the

same to Mahomed Shah, who went away and promised to return quickly.

The General again begged of the Sirdar to permit him to return to his

troops; but without avail.”

“Until twelve o’clock crowds of Ghilzyes with their respective chiefs

continued to pour in from the surrounding country to make their salaam

to Mahomed Akbar; to participate in the plunder of our unfortunate

people; and to revel in the delights of massacring the Europeans.

From their expressions of hatred towards the whole race of us (whilst

conversing in Persian, which they frequently did, until from a hint of

the Sirdar they began to talk in Pushtoo, which I did not understand),

they appeared to anticipate much more delight in cutting our throats

than even in the expected booty. The Sirdar, to all appearance, but

possibly only as a blind to his real feelings, whilst sitting with me

endeavoured as much as possible to conciliate them. The reply in two

instances was, ‘When Burnes came into this country, was not your father

entreated by us to kill him; or he would go back to Hindostan, and on

some future day return with an army and take our country from us. He

would not listen to our advice, and what is the consequence? Let us,

now that we have the opportunity, take advantage of it and kill these

infidel dogs.’”

“I must not omit to mention, that Mahomed Akbar Khan told me in the

morning, after Mahomed Shah Khan had gone to consult with the chiefs

of the pass, that the latter were dogs, and no faith to be placed

in them; and begged that I would send for three or four of my most

intimate friends, that their lives might be saved in the event of

treachery to the troops. My reply was that I would gladly do so, could

my request be acceded to; but that the commanding-officer would never

consent, and that the feelings of my friends would also be opposed to

such a proceeding at a time of so imminent peril to their comrades. The

Sirdar also proposed that in the event of the Ghilzyes not acceding to

our terms, he would himself, with his party of horsemen, proceed at

dusk to the foot of the hill, where our troops were bivouacked; and

previous orders having been given by the commanding-officer that they

should be held ready, he would bring away in safety every European, by

desiring each of his horsemen to take up a man behind him; that the

Ghilzyes would not fire on the Europeans for fear of hitting him or his

men: but that he could not allow a single Hindostanee to follow, as it

was impossible for him to protect 2000 people (our computed number).

I mentioned this to the General; but it was deemed impracticable, as,

from past experience, we had seen how impossible it was to separate the

non-combatants from the fighting men. Four or five times during the day

we heard the report of musketry, which appeared in the direction of our

troops, but were always told, on making inquiry, that all fighting had

ceased.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Journal._]

END OF VOL. II.

LONDON: PRINTED BY WM. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING

CROSS.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Mackeson, after doing good service at Bahwulpore, to facilitate

the march of the Bengal column of the Army of the Indus, had made his

way to Peshawur, where he had joined Colonel Wade. He was, therefore,

engaged both in the eastern and western operations.

[2] Under Lieutenant Barr, of the Bengal Artillery, who has written

a Narrative of Colonel Wade’s Operations, to which I would refer the

reader for authentic details, conveyed in a pleasant, soldierly manner.

[3] See Shahamat Ali’s “Sikhs and Afghans”; also Mohun Lal’s Life of

Dost Mahomed. The authority of the former, who must have translated the

letters into Persian, is all-sufficient on such a point as this.

[4] Mackeson, Lord, and Cunningham.

[5] These were the prices fetched at the sale of the effects of

Brigadier Arnold, who died at Caubul in the month of September.

[6] I may as well append the most important portion of it:

“_G. O. October 2._—The whole of the 1st (Bengal) Division of

Infantry, the 2nd (Bengal) Cavalry, and No. 6 Light Field Battery,

will continue in Afghanistan, and a detachment of 30 Sappers, under

an Engineer officer. Major-General Sir W. Cotton will command the

troops in Afghanistan, and all reports to be made to him after the 10th

instant.

“The 2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade Bengal Horse Artillery, her Majesty’s 16th

Lancers, the 3rd Light Cavalry, 4th Local Horse, the remainder of the

Sappers and Miners, a Company of 20th N.I., with Captain Farmer’s

Company 21st N.I., and the detachment now in progress to head-quarters,

under Captain Hopkins, 27th N.I., will move towards Hindostan on such

day and order as will be hereafter issued.”

[7] “_G. O. October 9._—Her Majesty’s 13th Light Infantry, three guns

of No. 6 Light Field Battery, and the 35th N.I., to remain at Caubul,

and to be accommodated in the Balla Hissar.

“The 48th N.I., the 4th Brigade, and detachment of Sappers and Miners

and 2nd Cavalry, with a Ressalah of Skinner’s Horse, to be cantoned at

Jellalabad.

“Ghuznee to be garrisoned by the 16th N.I., a Ressalah of Skinner’s

Horse, and such details of his Majesty Shah Soojah’s as are available.

The whole to be under the command of Major M’Laren.

“Candahar will have for its garrison the 42nd, 43rd N.I., 4th Company

2nd Battalion Artillery, a Ressalah of the 4th Local Horse, and such

details of his Majesty Shah Soojah’s troops as may be available.

Major-General Nott will command.”

[8] The Envoy said, that as Dost Mahomed had sent guns over the same

road to Bameean, there was no reason why our guns should not go. The

Doctor-General Harlan boasted that he had crossed the Hindoo-Koosh with

artillery. But Macnaghten had not considered that the guns which Dost

Mahomed sent along these roads were three-pounders, whilst ours were

six-pounders. The troop came along the wheel-track of the Ameer’s guns,

and reported “the breadth between the wheels less than half of that of

ours.”

[9] The importance of this subject is so great, when viewed in

connexion with the melancholy history of our subsequent disasters,

that I cannot do better than give, in the Appendix, an account, which

originally appeared in the _Calcutta Review_, of the difficulties

thrown in the way of the engineers—an account, the authenticity of

which is not to be questioned.

[10] The picturesque aspects of Caubul are well described by

Lieutenant Rattray: “It is well-built and handsome, and is one mass

of bazaars. Every street has a double row of houses of different

heights, flat-roofed, and composed of mud in wooden frames. Here and

there a larch porch of carved wood intervenes, giving entrance to the

court-yard of the residences of the nobles, in the centre of which

is a raised platform of mud, planted with fruit trees, and spread

with carpets. A fountain plays near; and here, during the heat of the

day, loll the chiefs at ease, listening, as they smoke their pipes,

to the sound of the ‘saccringhi,’ or guitar, the falling water, or

the wonderful tales of the Persian story-teller. The houses overhang

the narrow streets; their windows have no glass, but consist of

lattice-work wooden shutters, which push up and down, and are often

richly carved and otherwise ornamented. The shop windows are open

to the sun, and the immense display of merchandise, fruits, game,

armour, and cutlery defies description. These articles are arranged

in prodigious piles from floor to ceiling; in the front of each sits

the artificer engaged in his calling, or from amidst the heaped-up

profusion peeps out the trader at his visitors. The grand bazaar (Char

Chouk, or Chutta) has a substantial roof, built in four arcades,

which are decorated with painted panels, now nearly indistinct, and

originally watered by cisterns and fountains which are neglected and

dried up.”

[11] A passage in Lord Auckland’s unpublished minute of August 20,

1839, to which allusion has already been made, contains a summary of

the efforts of the Supreme Government to supply Macnaghten with funds.

It exhibits the fearful manner in which already the war was beginning

to tell upon the finances of India.

[12] Moollah Shikore came through the Khybur with Prince Timour and

Colonel Wade.

[13] “So completely is this poor man’s memory gone, that he never

recognises a man he has once seen; that the commonest business

requires half a dozen notes.”—[_Burnes to Macnaghten: August 7, 1840.

Unpublished Correspondence._] “He had lost his memory to such an extent

that he could not recognise a person whom he had well known before,

if he had not seen him even for a day.”—[_Mohun Lal’s Life of Dost

Mahomed._]

[14] “Every day complaints were made to us, and we permitted ourselves

to interfere, by giving notes to the complainants, requesting the

Moollah to settle their cases; but this did no good, for, instead of

having redress to their grievances, they were beaten, and sometimes

confined, for coming and complaining to us against the Shah’s

authority. All the chiefs or heads of tribes received their allowances

from certain villages, by obtaining an order from Moollah Shikore.

If there was any man among them known to us, and whom we would wish

to favour, the Moollah took care to annoy and vex him, by giving him

an order to a distant village for such sums which he would likely

spend during his journey; or else to poor villages, where there was

very little chance of gaining anything.”—[_Mohun Lal’s Life of Dost

Mahomed._]

[15] “Immediately consequent on his Majesty’s accession, certain

feelings began to take root among the Douranees, in connexion with

the presence of British troops, which promised ill for the future

tranquillity of the country. Several of the most influential chiefs

accompanied the Court from Candahar to Caubul and Jellalabad; and

although it must have been with feelings of gratified pride that they

beheld the leader of their order—their _Shah Baba_, or Father King,

as he was familiarly named—seated upon the throne of his ancestors,

yet it is also not unreasonable to suppose that their mortification

must have been great at finding that they no longer possessed a

dominant voice in the royal councils, or the ability, as formerly,

to render the sovereign the victim of their intrigues, and that this

conviction of their political influence being for ever superseded,

must have led them to value the many personal advantages they had

gained by the restoration, and to regard with peculiar hostility the

intruders upon their fancied rights. At Candahar the progress of events

had the same tendency to render the Douranees discontented, if not

actually inimical. The chiefs who had remained with the tribes were

of inconsiderable influence; but they still looked, under the revived

Suddozye monarchy, to be admitted to the share of power which they

deemed their right, and from which they had been jealously excluded by

the Sirdars. No such participation whatever was extended to them. The

present governor of the province, being altogether disqualified by his

youth and inexperience to take an active part in the administration,

the executive power was vested almost entirely in the hands of Wullee

Mahomed Khan, the revenue manager, and the direction of the government

was to the same extent dependent upon British guidance.”—[_Major

Rawlinson’s Report on the Assessment of the Douranee Tribes.—MS.

Records._] I have met with no abler official paper than this in the

whole course of my enquiries.

[16] The Supreme Government were desirous to place Burnes at Candahar,

with Leech as his assistant; but Burnes was disinclined to leave

Caubul; and the charge of the agency was entrusted to Leech. In the

August minute already mentioned, Lord Auckland thus sketches the

proposed political arrangements:—“Mr. Macnaghten will himself be,

of course, as much as possible near to the King. * * * * I think a

political agency, subordinate to the Mission at Caubul, should be

maintained at Candahar, and that it cannot be better entrusted than

to the approved zeal and ability of Sir Alexander Burnes. * * * I

would not disturb Lieutenant Pottinger at Herat. His name is attached

to the establishment of British influence in that city. He has had a

most difficult task to execute, and I would suspend all opinion on the

instructions with which it may be determined to furnish him, until I

have a report of the result of the mission of Major Todd. I think,

also, that Captain Bean should certainly remain in charge of the

political functions which have been committed to him at Quettah. * * *

Under these general arrangements, Major Leech will render assistance

at Candahar to Sir A. Burnes, and perhaps Dr. Login to Lieutenant

Pottinger at Herat; and Mr. Macnaghten will report in detail upon the

number of officers whose aid will be indispensably necessary, under

his own personal superintendence. He will have with him Major Todd,

Lieutenant Macgregor, and presently Messrs. Lord, Leech, and Arthur

Conolly. I am aware that the duties of his office will be complicated

and extensive. He may have missions to send to Bokhara and Koondooz,

and to other neighbouring states, and I would not stint him in

assistance.”—[_Minute of Lord Auckland: Simlah, August 20, 1839. MS.

Records._]

[17] Keane, immediately before his departure, remarked to an officer

who was to accompany him: “I wished you to remain in Afghanistan for

the good of the public service; but since circumstances have rendered

that impossible, I cannot but congratulate you on quitting the country;

for, mark my words, it will not be long before there is here some

signal catastrophe.”—[_Calcutta Review._]

[18] Some of these parties were detachments of Sikh troops.

[19] The Khyburees fell upon them in their stockaded position before

attacking Jellalabad. The Nujeebs were suffering severely from sickness

at the time. One half of them, it is said, were ineffective when the

Khyburees fell upon them.

[20] Two companies of the 27th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant

Laing—a very gallant officer, who fell honourably at Caubul in the

winter of 1841-42, were sent by Sir John Keane to reinforce Ferris

at Ali-Musjid. Afterwards, two companies of the 21st, with one of

sappers, were despatched to throw provisions into the fort. On their

return they were attacked by the Khyburees in great force, and worsted,

with the loss of their cattle. Another party, sent by Sir John Keane

to throw ammunition into Ali-Musjid, was also attacked; two officers

were severely wounded, and some men killed; but the convoy ultimately

reached its destination. M’Leod, with his sappers, did good service on

this occasion.

[21] The private letters of Lieutenant Loveday (quoted in the _Asiatic

Journal_) throw some light upon the incidents of the capture. “In

one court-yard I saw a heap of their dead, some forty or fifty—some

very fine handsome fellows—their shields shot through, and broken

swords and matchlocks lying about in every direction, telling of the

fierce fight. There was still, however, a small party who obstinately

held out in an inner apartment; there was no going at them except by

a narrow passage, which admitted but of one at a time; three or four

attempted it, and were instantly shot dead. We offered them quarter,

but they would not trust us. At last I was sent up alone, when they

surrendered. * * * * I then went to the mother of Shah Newaz, who is

the new Khan, and who made his escape from prison seven years ago. This

poor creature, with a few old women, had been shut up in a distant

apartment ever since the flight of her son, miserably fed and miserably

clothed. I explained in a few words what had taken place; our capture

of the fort, the death of Mehrab Khan, and the near approach of her

son, whom our government had placed on the _Musnud_. You may readily

fancy the scene: what with surprise and joy, she burst into tears, said

she was my slave, and would have thrown herself at my feet if I had not

prevented her. On the following day a few of Mehrab Khan’s servants

brought the body of their master for burial—a fine looking man. There

was one little hole in his breast, which told of a musket-ball having

passed through. He had no clothes on, except his silk _pyjammahs_.

One of his slaves whispered me for a shawl; alas! I had nothing of

the kind, but luckily remembered a brocade bed-cover, which I had

bought in my days of folly and extravagance at Delhi. I called for it

immediately, and gave it to the Khan’s servants, who were delighted

with this last mark of respect, and wrapping up the body in it, placed

their deceased master on a _charpoy_, and carried him to the grave.”

[22] In his minute of August 20, Lord Auckland wrote on this

subject:—“Mr. Macnaghten has authority, as respects the Khelat

territories, to declare the annexation of the provinces of Shawl,

Moostung, and Cutch Gundaya to the Afghan dominions; and I have but to

add, that it is my strong opinion that no power should be left in the

hands of Mehrab Khan, who has shown himself our bitter and deceitful

enemy, wholly unworthy of our confidence. For this object, it will, I

conceive, be sufficient to occupy Khelat itself, and to hold it and

the districts adjacent, in addition to Moostung and Shawl, under our

provisional management or superintendence, for the very short period

that will elapse, until it may be seen what final arrangement can be

made respecting it, either by bringing it also under the direct rule

of the Shah, or placing the claimant, Shah Newaz Khan (or any other

Beloochee chief), in possession of it.”—[_MS. Records._]

[23] “As to Mehrab Khan himself, he may have claims upon Shah

Soojah-ool-Moolk, arising out of the important succour given to his

Majesty in his expedition in 1834, and Mr. Macnaghten will naturally

not fail to second any proposition of a liberal personal support

to the chief which the Shah may be disposed to make, in generous

acknowledgment of those services.”—[_Lord Auckland’s Minute: August

20, 1839. MS. Records._]

[24] The winter, however, was not wholly unproductive of military

events. A detachment was sent out under Colonel Orchard to reduce the

fort of Pushoot, which lies some fifty miles to the north-east of

Jellalabad, and to expel the “refractory chief” of the surrounding

district. The affair was a successful failure. Repeated attempts

were made by the Engineer, Pigou, to blow in the gate, after the

Ghuznee fashion; but the heavy rains had damaged the powder, which was

naturally bad; and every effort was unsuccessful. As there was no hope

of effecting an entrance in this manner; as Abbott and his artillery

had vainly exhausted their ammunition, and a considerable number of

our men had fallen under the fire of the fort, Orchard drew off the

assailants. Soon after their withdrawal, however, the enemy evacuated

the place.

[25] _MS. Correspondence._

[26] _MS. Correspondence._