It is a remark of the President Heynaut, that we now read with pleasure

the account of many little transactions of the Ligue, which, when they

happened, were not, perhaps, considered as very important pieces of

news. But every man then, says he, fancied himself of some importance;

and the innumerable memoirs which have come down to us from those times,

were the greater part of them written by people who took pleasure in

recording and magnifying events, in which they flattered themselves

they had been considerable actors. How obstinately the city of Paris,

upon that occasion, defended itself, what a dreadful famine it

supported, rather than submit to the best, and afterwards the most

beloved of all the French kings, is well known. The greater part of the

citizens, or those who governed the greater part of them, fought in

defence of their own importance, which, they foresaw, was to be at an

end whenever the ancient government should be re-established. Our

colonies, unless they can be induced to consent to a union, are very

likely to defend themselves, against the best of all mother countries,

as obstinately as the city of Paris did against one of the best of

kings.

The idea of representation was unknown in ancient times. When the people

of one state were admitted to the right of citizenship in another, they

had no other means of exercising that right, but by coming in a body to

vote and deliberate with the people of that other state. The admission

of the greater part of the inhabitants of Italy to the privileges of

Roman citizens, completely ruined the Roman republic. It was no longer

possible to distinguish between who was, and who was not, a Roman

citizen. No tribe could know its own members. A rabble of any kind could

be introduced into the assemblies of the people, could drive out the

real citizens, and decide upon the affairs of the republic, as if they

themselves had been such. But though America were to send fifty or sixty

new representatives to parliament, the door-keeper of the house of

commons could not find any great difficulty in distinguishing between

who was and who was not a member. Though the Roman constitution,

therefore, was necessarily ruined by the union of Rome with the allied

states of Italy, there is not the least probability that the British

constitution would be hurt by the union of Great Britain with her

colonies. That constitution, on the contrary, would be completed by it,

and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which deliberates and

decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in order to

be properly informed, ought certainly to have representatives from every

part of it. That this union, however, could be easily effectuated, or

that difficulties, and great difficulties, might not occur in the

execution, I do not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which

appear insurmountable. The principal, perhaps, arise, not from the

nature of things, but from the prejudices and opinions of the people,

both on this and on the other side of the Atlantic.

We on this side of the water are afraid lest the multitude of American

representatives should overturn the balance of the constitution, and

increase too much either the influence of the crown on the one hand, or

the force of the democracy on the other. But if the number of American

representatives were to be in proportion to the produce of American

taxation, the number of people to be managed would increase exactly in

proportion to the means of managing them, and the means of managing to

the number of people to be managed. The monarchical and democratical

parts of the constitution would, after the union, stand exactly in the

same degree of relative force with regard to one another as they had

done before.

The people on the other side of the water are afraid lest their distance

from the seat of government might expose them to many oppressions; but

their representatives in parliament, of which the number ought from the

first to be considerable, would easily be able to protect them from all

oppression. The distance could not much weaken the dependency of the

representative upon the constituent, and the former would still feel

that he owed his seat in parliament, and all the consequence which he

derived from it, to the good-will of the latter. It would be the

interest of the former, therefore, to cultivate that good-will, by

complaining, with all the authority of a member of the legislature, of

every outrage which any civil or military officer might be guilty of in

those remote parts of the empire. The distance of America from the seat

of government, besides, the natives of that country might flatter

themselves, with some appearance of reason too, would not be of very

long continuance. Such has hitherto been the rapid progress of that

country in wealth, population, and improvement, that in the course of

little more than a century, perhaps, the produce of the American might

exceed that of the British taxation. The seat of the empire would then

naturally remove itself to that part of the empire which contributed

most to the general defence and support of the whole.

The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by

the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events

recorded in the history of mankind. Their consequences have already been

great; but, in the short period of between two and three centuries which

has elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the

whole extent of their consequences can have been seen. What benefits or

what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result from those great

events, no human wisdom can foresee. By uniting in some measure the most

distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another's

wants, to increase one another's enjoyments, and to encourage one

another's industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial.

To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, all the

commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been

sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned.

These misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen rather from accident

than from any thing in the nature of those events themselves. At the

particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of

force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans, that they

were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those

remote countries. Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may

grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker; and the inhabitants

of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality

of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe

the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the

rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this

equality of force, than that mutual communication of knowledge, and of

all sorts of improvements, which an extensive commerce from all

countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries

along with it.

In the mean time, one of the principal effects of those discoveries has

been, to raise the mercantile system to a degree of splendour and glory

which it could never otherwise have attained to. It is the object of

that system to enrich a great nation, rather by trade and manufactures

than by the improvement and cultivation of land, rather by the industry

of the towns than by that of the country. But in consequence of those

discoveries, the commercial towns of Europe, instead of being the

manufacturers and carriers for but a very small part of the world (that

part of Europe which is washed by the Atlantic ocean, and the countries

which lie round the Baltic and Mediterranean seas), have now become the

manufacturers for the numerous and thriving cultivators of America, and

the carriers, and in some respects the manufacturers too, for almost all

the different nations of Asia, Africa, and America. Two new worlds have

been opened to their industry, each of them much greater and more

extensive than the old one, and the market of one of them growing still

greater and greater every day.

The countries which possess the colonies of America, and which trade

directly to the East Indies, enjoy indeed the whole show and splendour

of this great commerce. Other countries, however, notwithstanding all

the invidious restraints by which it is meant to exclude them,

frequently enjoy a greater share of the real benefit of it. The colonies

of Spain and Portugal, for example, give more real encouragement to the

industry of other countries than to that of Spain and Portugal. In the

single article of linen alone, the consumption of those colonies

amounts, it is said (but I do not pretend to warrant the quantity), to

more than three millions sterling a-year. But this great consumption is

almost entirely supplied by France, Flanders, Holland, and Germany.

Spain and Portugal furnish but a small part of it. The capital which

supplies the colonies with this great quantity of linen, is annually

distributed among, and furnishes a revenue to, the inhabitants of those

other countries. The profits of it only are spent in Spain and Portugal,

where they help to support the sumptuous profusion of the merchants of

Cadiz and Lisbon.

Even the regulations by which each nation endeavours to secure to itself

the exclusive trade of its own colonies, are frequently more hurtful to

the countries in favour of which they are established, than to those

against which they are established. The unjust oppression of the

industry of other countries falls back, if I may say so, upon the heads

of the oppressors, and crushes their industry more than it does that of

those other countries. By those regulations, for example, the merchant

of Hamburg must send the linen which he destines for the American market

to London, and he must bring back from thence the tobacco which he

destines for the German market; because he can neither send the one

directly to America, nor bring the other directly from thence. By this

restraint he is probably obliged to sell the one somewhat cheaper, and

to buy the other somewhat dearer, than he otherwise might have done; and

his profits are probably somewhat abridged by means of it. In this

trade, however, between Hamburg and London, he certainly receives the

returns of his capital much more quickly than he could possibly have

done in the direct trade to America, even though we should suppose, what

is by no means the case, that the payments of America were as punctual

as those of London. In the trade, therefore, to which those regulations

confine the merchant of Hamburg, his capital can keep in constant

employment a much greater quantity of German industry than he possibly

could have done in the trade from which he is excluded. Though the one

employment, therefore, may to him perhaps be less profitable than the

other, it cannot be less advantageous to his country. It is quite

otherwise with the employment into which the monopoly naturally

attracts, if I may say so, the capital of the London merchant. That

employment may, perhaps, be more profitable to him than the greater part

of other employments; but on account of the slowness of the returns, it

cannot be more advantageous to his country.

After all the unjust attempts, therefore, of every country in Europe to

engross to itself the whole advantage of the trade of its own colonies,

no country has yet been able to engross to itself any thing but the

expense of supporting in time of peace, and of defending in time of war,

the oppressive authority which it assumes over them. The

inconveniencies resulting from the possession of its colonies, every

country has engrossed to itself completely. The advantages resulting

from their trade, it has been obliged to share with many other

countries.

At first sight, no doubt, the monopoly of the great commerce of America

naturally seems to be an acquisition of the highest value. To the

undiscerning eye of giddy ambition it naturally presents itself, amidst

the confused scramble of politics and war, as a very dazzling object to

fight for. The dazzling splendour of the object, however, the immense

greatness of the commerce, is the very quality which renders the

monopoly of it hurtful, or which makes one employment, in its own nature

necessarily less advantageous to the country than the greater part of

other employments, absorb a much greater proportion of the capital of

the country than what would otherwise have gone to it.

The mercantile stock of every country, it has been shown in the second

book, naturally seeks, if one may say so, the employment most

advantageous to that country. If it is employed in the carrying trade,

the country to which it belongs becomes the emporium of the goods of all

the countries whose trade that stock carries on. But the owner of that

stock necessarily wishes to dispose of as great a part of those goods as

he can at home. He thereby saves himself the trouble, risk, and expense

of exportation; and he will upon that account be glad to sell them at

home, not only for a much smaller price, but with somewhat a smaller

profit, than he might expect to make by sending them abroad. He

naturally, therefore, endeavours as much as he can to turn his carrying

trade into a foreign trade of consumption. If his stock, again, is

employed in a foreign trade of consumption, he will, for the same

reason, be glad to dispose of, at home, as great a part as he can of the

home goods which he collects in order to export to some foreign market,

and he will thus endeavour, as much as he can, to turn his foreign trade

of consumption into a home trade. The mercantile stock of every country

naturally courts in this manner the near, and shuns the distant

employment; naturally courts the employment in which the returns are

frequent, and shuns that in which they are distant and slow; naturally

courts the employment in which it can maintain the greatest quantity of

productive labour in the country to which it belongs, or in which its

owner resides, and shuns that in which it can maintain there the

smallest quantity. It naturally courts the employment which in ordinary

cases is most advantageous, and shuns that which in ordinary cases is

least advantageous to that country.

But if, in any one of these distant employments, which in ordinary cases

are less advantageous to the country, the profit should happen to rise

somewhat higher than what is sufficient to balance the natural

preference which is given to nearer employments, this superiority of

profit will draw stock from those nearer employments, till the profits

of all return to their proper level. This superiority of profit,

however, is a proof that, in the actual circumstances of the society,

those distant employments are somewhat understocked in proportion to

other employments, and that the stock of the society is not distributed

in the properest manner among all the different employments carried on

in it. It is a proof that something is either bought cheaper or sold

dearer than it ought to be, and that some particular class of citizens

is more or less oppressed, either by paying more, or by getting less

than what is suitable to that equality which ought to take place, and

which naturally does take place, among all the different classes of

them. Though the same capital never will maintain the same quantity of

productive labour in a distant as in a near employment, yet a distant

employment may be as necessary for the welfare of the society as a near

one; the goods which the distant employment deals in being necessary,

perhaps, for carrying on many of the nearer employments. But if the

profits of those who deal in such goods are above their proper level,

those goods will be sold dearer than they ought to be, or somewhat above

their natural price, and all those engaged in the nearer employments

will be more or less oppressed by this high price. Their interest,

therefore, in this case, requires, that some stock should be withdrawn

from those nearer employments, and turned towards that distant one, in

order to reduce its profits to their proper level, and the price of the

goods which it deals in to their natural price. In this extraordinary

case, the public interest requires that some stock should be withdrawn

from those employments which, in ordinary cases, are more advantageous,

and turned towards one which, in ordinary cases, is less advantageous to

the public; and, in this extraordinary case, the natural interests and

inclinations of men coincide as exactly with the public interests as in

all other ordinary cases, and lead them to withdraw stock from the near,

and to turn it towards the distant employments.

It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals

naturally dispose them to turn their stock towards the employments which

in ordinary cases, are most advantageous to the society. But if from

this natural preference they should turn too much of it towards those

employments, the fall of profit in them, and the rise of it in all

others, immediately dispose them to alter this faulty distribution.

Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private interests and

passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock

of every society among all the different employments carried on in it,

as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the

interest of the whole society.

All the different regulations of the mercantile system necessarily

derange more or less this natural and most advantageous distribution of

stock. But those which concern the trade to America and the East Indies

derange it, perhaps, more than any other; because the trade to those two

great continents absorbs a greater quantity of stock than any two other

branches of trade. The regulations, however, by which this derangement

is effected in those two different branches of trade, are not altogether

the same. Monopoly is the great engine of both; but it is a different

sort of monopoly. Monopoly of one kind or another, indeed, seems to be

the sole engine of the mercantile system.

In the trade to America, every nation endeavours to engross as much as

possible the whole market of its own colonies, by fairly excluding all

other nations from any direct trade to them. During the greater part of

the sixteenth century, the Portuguese endeavoured to manage the trade to

the East Indies in the same manner, by claiming the sole right of

sailing in the Indian seas, on account of the merit of having first

found out the road to them. The Dutch still continue to exclude all

other European nations from any direct trade to their spice islands.

Monopolies of this kind are evidently established against all other

European nations, who are thereby not only excluded from a trade to

which it might be convenient for them to turn some part of their stock,

but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in, somewhat

dearer than if they could import them themselves directly from the

countries which produced them.

But since the fall of the power of Portugal, no European nation has

claimed the exclusive right of sailing in the Indian seas, of which the

principal ports are now open to the ships of all European nations.

Except in Portugal, however, and within these few years in France, the

trade to the East Indies has, in every European country, been subjected

to an exclusive company. Monopolies of this kind are properly

established against the very nation which erects them. The greater part

of that nation are thereby not only excluded from a trade to which it

might be convenient for them to turn some part of their stock, but are

obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in somewhat dearer than

if it was open and free to all their countrymen. Since the establishment

of the English East India company, for example, the other inhabitants of

England, over and above being excluded from the trade, must have paid,

in the price of the East India goods which they have consumed, not only

for all the extraordinary profits which the company may have made upon

those goods in consequence of their monopoly, but for all the

extraordinary waste which the fraud and abuse inseparable from the

management of the affairs of so great a company must necessarily have

occasioned. The absurdity of this second kind of monopoly, therefore, is

much more manifest than that of the first.

Both these kinds of monopolies derange more or less the natural

distribution of the stock of the society; but they do not always derange

it in the same way.

Monopolies of the first kind always attract to the particular trade in

which they are established a greater proportion of the stock of the

society than what would go to that trade of its own accord.

Monopolies of the second kind may sometimes attract stock towards the

particular trade in which they are established, and sometimes repel it

from that trade, according to different circumstances. In poor

countries, they naturally attract towards the trade more stock than

would otherwise go to it. In rich countries, they naturally repel from

it a good deal of stock which would otherwise go to it.

Such poor countries as Sweden and Denmark, for example, would probably

have never sent a single ship to the East Indies, had not the trade been

subjected to an exclusive company. The establishment of such a company

necessarily encourages adventurers. Their monopoly secures them against

all competitors in the home market, and they have the same chance for

foreign markets with the traders of other nations. Their monopoly shows

them the certainty of a great profit upon a considerable quantity of

goods, and the chance of a considerable profit upon a great quantity.

Without such extraordinary encouragement, the poor traders of such poor

countries would probably never have thought of hazarding their small

capitals in so very distant and uncertain an adventure as the trade to

the East Indies must naturally have appeared to them.

Such a rich country as Holland, on the contrary, would probably, in the

case of a free trade, send many more ships to the East Indies than it

actually does. The limited stock of the Dutch East India company

probably repels from that trade many great mercantile capitals which

would otherwise go to it. The mercantile capital of Holland is so great,

that it is, as it were, continually overflowing, sometimes into the

public funds of foreign countries, sometimes into loans to private

traders and adventurers of foreign countries, sometimes into the most

round-about foreign trades consumption, and sometimes into the carrying

trade. All near employments being completely filled up, all the capital

which can be placed in them with any tolerable profit being already

placed in them, the capital of Holland necessarily flows towards the

most distant employments. The trade to the East Indies, if it were

altogether free, would probably absorb the greater part of this

redundant capital. The East Indies offer a market both for the

manufactures of Europe, and for the gold and silver, as well as for the

several other productions of America, greater and more extensive than

both Europe and America put together.

Every derangement of the natural distribution of stock is necessarily

hurtful to the society in which it takes place; whether it be by

repelling from a particular trade the stock which would otherwise go to

it, or by attracting towards a particular trade that which would not

otherwise come to it. If, without any exclusive company, the trade of

Holland to the East Indies would be greater than it actually is, that

country must suffer a considerable loss, by part of its capital being

excluded from the employment most convenient for that port. And, in the

same manner, if, without an exclusive company, the trade of Sweden and

Denmark to the East Indies would be less than it actually is, or, what

perhaps is more probable, would not exist at all, those two countries

must likewise suffer a considerable loss, by part of their capital being

drawn into an employment which must be more or less unsuitable to their

present circumstances. Better for them, perhaps, in the present

circumstances, to buy East India goods of other nations, even though

they should pay somewhat dearer, than to turn so great a part of their

small capital to so very distant a trade, in which the returns are so

very slow, in which that capital can maintain so small a quantity of

productive labour at home, where productive labour is so much wanted,

where so little is done, and where so much is to do.

Though without an exclusive company, therefore, a particular country

should not be able to carry on any direct trade to the East Indies, it

will not from thence follow, that such a company ought to be established

there, but only that such a country ought not, in these circumstances,

to trade directly to the East Indies. That such companies are not in

general necessary for carrying on the East India trade, is sufficiently

demonstrated by the experience of the Portuguese, who enjoyed almost the

whole of it for more than a century together, without any exclusive

company.

No private merchant, it has been said, could well have capital

sufficient to maintain factors and agents in the different ports of the

East Indies, in order to provide goods for the ships which he might

occasionally send thither; and yet, unless he was able to do this, the

difficulty of finding a cargo might frequently make his ships lose the

season for returning; and the expense of so long a delay would not only

eat up the whole profit of the adventure, but frequently occasion a very

considerable loss. This argument, however, if it proved any thing at

all, would prove that no one great branch of trade could be carried on

without an exclusive company, which is contrary to the experience of all

nations. There is no great branch of trade, in which the capital of any

one private merchant is sufficient for carrying on all the subordinate

branches which must be carried on, in order to carry on the principal

one. But when a nation is ripe for any great branch of trade, some

merchants naturally turn their capitals towards some principal, and some

towards the subordinate branches of it; and though all the different

branches of it are in this manner carried on, yet it very seldom happens

that they are all carried on by the capital of one private merchant. If

a nation, therefore, is ripe for the East India trade, a certain portion

of its capital will naturally divide itself among all the different

branches of that trade. Some of its merchants will find it for their

interest to reside in the East Indies, and to employ their capitals

there in providing goods for the ships which are to be sent out by other

merchants who reside in Europe. The settlements which different European

nations have obtained in the East Indies, if they were taken from the

exclusive companies to which they at present belong, and put under the

immediate protection of the sovereign, would render this residence both

safe and easy, at least to the merchants of the particular nations to

whom those settlements belong. If, at any particular time, that part of

the capital of any country which of its own accord tended and inclined,

if I may say so, towards the East India trade, was not sufficient for

carrying on all those different branches of it, it would be a proof

that, at that particular time, that country was not ripe for that trade,

and that it would do better to buy for some time, even at a higher

price, from other European nations, the East India goods it had occasion

for, than to import them itself directly from the East Indies. What it

might lose by the high price of those goods, could seldom be equal to

the loss which it would sustain by the distraction of a large portion of

its capital from other employments more necessary, or more useful, or

more suitable to its circumstances and situation, than a direct trade to

the East Indies.

Though the Europeans possess many considerable settlements both upon the

coast of Africa and in the East Indies, they have not yet established,

in either of those countries, such numerous and thriving colonies as

those in the islands and continent of America. Africa, however, as well

as several of the countries comprehended under the general name of the

East Indies, is inhabited by barbarous nations. But those nations were

by no means so weak and defenceless as the miserable and helpless

Americans; and in proportion to the natural fertility of the countries

which they inhabited, they were, besides, much more populous. The most

barbarous nations, either of Africa or of the East Indies, were

shepherds; even the Hottentots were so. But the natives of every part of

America, except Mexico and Peru, were only hunters; and the difference

is very great between the number of shepherds and that of hunters, whom

the same extent of equally fertile territory can maintain. In Africa and

the East Indies, therefore, it was more difficult to displace the

natives, and to extend the European plantations over the greater part of

the lands of the original inhabitants. The genius of exclusive

companies, besides, is unfavourable, it has already been observed, to

the growth of new colonies, and has probably been the principal cause of

the little progress which they have made in the East Indies. The

Portuguese carried on the trade both to Africa and the East Indies,

without any exclusive companies; and their settlements at Congo, Angola,

and Benguela, on the coast of Africa, and at Goa in the East Indies,

though much depressed by superstition and every sort of bad government,

yet bear some resemblance to the colonies of America, and are partly

inhabited by Portuguese who have been established there for several

generations. The Dutch settlements at the Cape of Good Hope and at

Batavia, are at present the most considerable colonies which the

Europeans have established, either in Africa or in the East Indies; and

both those settlements are peculiarly fortunate in their situation. The

Cape of Good Hope was inhabited by a race of people almost as barbarous,

and quite as incapable of defending themselves, as the natives of

America. It is, besides, the half-way house, if one may say so, between

Europe and the East Indies, at which almost every European ship makes

some stay, both in going and returning. The supplying of those ships

with every sort of fresh provisions, with fruit, and sometimes with

wine, affords alone a very extensive market for the surplus produce of

the colonies. What the Cape of Good Hope is between Europe and every

part of the East Indies, Batavia is between the principal countries of

the East Indies. It lies upon the most frequented road from Indostan to

China and Japan, and is nearly about mid-way upon that road. Almost all

the ships too, that sail between Europe and China, touch at Batavia; and

it is, over and above all this, the centre and principal mart of what is

called the country trade of the East Indies; not only of that part of it

which is carried on by Europeans, but of that which is carried on by the

native Indians; and vessels navigated by the inhabitants of China and

Japan, of Tonquin, Malacca, Cochin-China, and the island of Celebes, are

frequently to be seen in its port. Such advantageous situations have

enabled those two colonies to surmount all the obstacles which the

oppressive genius of an exclusive company may have occasionally opposed

to their growth. They have enabled Batavia to surmount the additional

disadvantage of perhaps the most unwholesome climate in the world.

The English and Dutch companies, though they have established no

considerable colonies, except the two above mentioned, have both made

considerable conquests in the East Indies. But in the manner in which

they both govern their new subjects, the natural genius of an exclusive

company has shewn itself most distinctly. In the spice islands, the

Dutch are said to burn all the spiceries which a fertile season

produces, beyond what they expect to dispose of in Europe with such a

profit as they think sufficient. In the islands where they have no

settlements, they give a premium to those who collect the young blossoms

and green leaves of the clove and nutmeg trees, which naturally grow

there, but which this savage policy has now, it is said, almost

completely extirpated. Even in the islands where they have settlements,

they have very much reduced, it is said, the number of those trees. If

the produce even of their own islands was much greater than what suited

their market, the natives, they suspect, might find means to convey some

part of it to other nations; and the best way, they imagine, to secure

their own monopoly, is to take care that no more shall grow than what

they themselves carry to market. By different arts of oppression, they

have reduced the population of several of the Moluccas nearly to the

number which is sufficient to supply with fresh provisions, and other

necessaries of life, their own insignificant garrisons, and such of

their ships as occasionally come there for a cargo of spices. Under the

government even of the Portuguese, however, those islands are said to

have been tolerably well inhabited. The English company have not yet had

time to establish in Bengal so perfectly destructive a system. The plan

of their government, however, has had exactly the same tendency. It has

not been uncommon, I am well assured, for the chief, that is, the first

clerk of a factory, to order a peasant to plough up a rich field of

poppies, and sow it with rice, or some other grain. The pretence was, to

prevent a scarcity of provisions; but the real reason, to give the chief

an opportunity of selling at a better price a large quantity of opium

which he happened then to have upon hand. Upon other occasions, the

order has been reversed; and a rich field of rice or other grain has

been ploughed up, in order to make room for a plantation of poppies,

when the chief foresaw that extraordinary profit was likely to be made

by opium. The servants of the company have, upon several occasions,

attempted to establish in their own favour the monopoly of some of the

most important branches, not only of the foreign, but of the inland

trade of the country. Had they been allowed to go on, it is impossible

that they should not, at some time or another, have attempted to

restrain the production of the particular articles of which they had

thus usurped the monopoly, not only to the quantity which they

themselves could purchase, but to that which they could expect to sell

with such a profit as they might think sufficient. In the course of a

century or two, the policy of the English company would, in this manner,

have probably proved as completely destructive as that of the Dutch.

Nothing, however, can be more directly contrary to the real interest of

those companies, considered as the sovereigns of the countries which

they have conquered, than this destructive plan. In almost all

countries, the revenue of the sovereign is drawn from that of the

people. The greater the revenue of the people, therefore, the greater

the annual produce of their land and labour, the more they can afford to

the sovereign. It is his interest, therefore, to increase as much as

possible that annual produce. But if this is the interest of every

sovereign, it is peculiarly so of one whose revenue, like that of the

sovereign of Bengal, arises chiefly from a land-rent. That rent must

necessarily be in proportion to the quantity and value of the produce;

and both the one and the other must depend upon the extent of the

market. The quantity will always be suited, with more or less exactness,

to the consumption of those who can afford to pay for it; and the price

which they will pay will always be in proportion to the eagerness of

their competition. It is the interest of such a sovereign, therefore, to

open the most extensive market for the produce of his country, to allow

the most perfect freedom of commerce, in order to increase as much as

possible the number and competition of buyers; and upon this account to

abolish, not only all monopolies, but all restraints upon the

transportation of the home produce from one part of the country to

another, upon its exportation to foreign countries, or upon the

importation of goods of any kind for which it can be exchanged. He is in

this manner most likely to increase both the quantity and value of that

produce, and consequently of his own share of it, or of his own revenue.

But a company of merchants, are, it seems, incapable of considering

themselves as sovereigns, even after they have become such. Trade, or

buying in order to sell again, they still consider as their principal

business, and by a strange absurdity, regard the character of the

sovereign as but an appendix to that of the merchant; as something which

ought to be made subservient to it, or by means of which they may be

enabled to buy cheaper in India, and thereby to sell with a better

profit in Europe. They endeavour, for this purpose, to keep out as much

as possible all competitors from the market of the countries which are

subject to their government, and consequently to reduce, at least, some

part of the surplus produce of those countries to what is barely

sufficient for supplying their own demand, or to what they can expect to

sell in Europe, with such a profit as they may think reasonable. Their

mercantile habits draw them in this manner, almost necessarily, though

perhaps insensibly, to prefer, upon all ordinary occasions, the little

and transitory profit of the monopolist to the great and permanent

revenue of the sovereign; and would gradually lead them to treat the

countries subject to their government nearly as the Dutch treat the

Moluccas. It is the interest of the East India company, considered as

sovereigns, that the European goods which are carried to their Indian

dominions should be sold there as cheap as possible; and that the Indian

goods which are brought from thence should bring there as good a price,

or should be sold there as dear as possible. But the reverse of this is

their interest as merchants. As sovereigns, their interest is exactly

the same with that of the country which they govern. As merchants, their

interest is directly opposite to that interest.

But if the genius of such a government, even as to what concerns its

direction in Europe, is in this manner essentially, and perhaps

incurably faulty, that of its administration in India is still more so.

That administration is necessarily composed of a council of merchants, a

profession no doubt extremely respectable, but which in no country in

the world carries along with it that sort of authority which naturally

overawes the people, and without force commands their willing obedience.

Such a council can command obedience only by the military force with

which they are accompanied; and their government is, therefore,

necessarily military and despotical. Their proper business, however, is

that of merchants. It is to sell, upon their master's account, the

European goods consigned to them, and to buy, in return, Indian goods

for the European market. It is to sell the one as dear, and to buy the

other as cheap as possible, and consequently to exclude, as much as

possible, all rivals from the particular market where they keep their

shop. The genius of the administration, therefore, so far as concerns

the trade of the company, is the same as that of the direction. It tends

to make government subservient to the interest of monopoly, and

consequently to stunt the natural growth of some parts, at least, of the

surplus produce of the country, to what is barely sufficient for

answering the demand of the company.

All the members of the administration, besides, trade more or less upon

their own account; and it is in vain to prohibit them from doing so.

Nothing can be more completely foolish than to expect that the clerks of

a great counting-house, at ten thousand miles distance, and consequently

almost quite out of sight, should, upon a simple order from their

master, give up at once doing any sort of business upon their own

account; abandon for ever all hopes of making a fortune, of which they

have the means in their hands; and content themselves with the moderate

salaries which those masters allow them, and which, moderate as they

are, can seldom be augmented, being commonly as large as the real

profits of the company trade can afford. In such circumstances, to

prohibit the servants of the company from trading upon their own

account, can have scarce any other effect than to enable its superior

servants, under pretence of executing their master's order, to oppress

such of the inferior ones as have had the misfortune to fall under their

displeasure. The servants naturally endeavour to establish the same

monopoly in favour of their own private trade as of the public trade of

the company. If they are suffered to act as they could wish, they will

establish this monopoly openly and directly, by fairly prohibiting all

other people from trading in the articles in which they choose to deal;

and this, perhaps, is the best and least oppressive way of establishing

it. But if, by an order from Europe, they are prohibited from doing

this, they will, notwithstanding, endeavour to establish a monopoly of

the same kind secretly and indirectly, in a way that is much more

destructive to the country. They will employ the whole authority of

government, and pervert the administration of justice, in order to

harass and ruin those who interfere with them in any branch of commerce,

which by means of agents, either concealed, or at least not publicly

avowed, they may choose to carry on. But the private trade of the

servants will naturally extend to a much greater variety of articles

than the public trade of the company. The public trade of the company

extends no further than the trade with Europe, and comprehends a part

only of the foreign trade of the country. But the private trade of the

servants may extend to all the different branches both of its inland and

foreign trade. The monopoly of the company can tend only to stunt the

natural growth of that part of the surplus produce which, in the case of

a free trade, would be exported to Europe. That of the servants tends to

stunt the natural growth of every part of the produce in which they

choose to deal; of what is destined for home consumption, as well as of

what is destined for exportation; and consequently to degrade the

cultivation of the whole country, and to reduce the number of its

inhabitants. It tends to reduce the quantity of every sort of produce,

even that of the necessaries of life, whenever the servants of the

country choose to deal in them, to what those servants can both afford

to buy and expect to sell with such a profit as pleases them.

From the nature of their situation, too, the servants must be more

disposed to support with rigourous severity their own interest, against

that of the country which they govern, than their masters can be to

support theirs. The country belongs to their masters, who cannot avoid

having some regard for the interest of what belongs to them; but it does

not belong to the servants. The real interest of their masters, if they

were capable of understanding it, is the same with that of the

country;[42] and it is from ignorance chiefly, and the meanness of

mercantile prejudice, that they ever oppress it. But the real interest

of the servants is by no means the same with that of the country, and

the most perfect information would not necessarily put an end to their

oppressions. The regulations, accordingly, which have been sent out from

Europe, though they have been frequently weak, have upon most occasions

been well meaning. More intelligence, and perhaps less good meaning, has

sometimes appeared in those established by the servants in India. It is

a very singular government in which every member of the administration

wishes to get out of the country, and consequently to have done with the

government, as soon as he can, and to whose interest, the day after he

has left it, and carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly

indifferent though the whole country was swallowed up by an earthquake.

I mean not, however, by any thing which I have here said, to throw any

odious imputation upon the general character of the servants of the East

India company, and much less upon that of any particular persons. It is

the system of government, the situation in which they are placed, that I

mean to censure, not the character of those who have acted in it. They

acted as their situation naturally directed, and they who have clamoured

the loudest against them would probably not have acted better

themselves. In war and negotiation, the councils of Madras and Calcutta,

have upon several occasions, conducted themselves with a resolution and

decisive wisdom, which would have done honour to the senate of Rome in

the best days of that republic. The members of those councils, however,

had been bred to professions very different from war and politics. But

their situation alone, without education, experience, or even example,

seems to have formed in them all at once the great qualities which it

required, and to have inspired them both with abilities and virtues

which they themselves could not well know that they possessed. If upon

some occasions, therefore, it has animated them to actions of

magnanimity which could not well have been expected from them, we should

not wonder if, upon others, it has prompted them to exploits of somewhat

a different nature.

Such exclusive companies, therefore, are nuisances in every respect;

always more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they are

established, and destructive to those which have the misfortune to fall

under their government.

CHAP. VIII.

CONCLUSION OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM.

Though the encouragement of exportation, and the discouragement of

importation, are the two great engines by which the mercantile system

proposes to enrich every country, yet, with regard to some particular

commodities, it seems to follow an opposite plan: to discourage

exportation, and to encourage importation. Its ultimate object, however,

it pretends, is always the same, to enrich the country by an

advantageous balance of trade. It discourages the exportation of the

materials of manufacture, and of the instruments of trade, in order to

give our own workmen an advantage, and to enable them to undersell those

of other nations in all foreign markets; and by restraining, in this

manner, the exportation of a few commodities, of no great price, it

proposes to occasion a much greater and more valuable exportation of

others. It encourages the importation of the materials of manufacture,

in order that our own people may be enabled to work them up more

cheaply, and thereby prevent a greater and more valuable importation of

the manufactured commodities. I do not observe, at least in our statute

book, any encouragement given to the importation of the instruments of

trade. When manufactures have advanced to a certain pitch of greatness,

the fabrication of the instruments of trade becomes itself the object of

a great number of very important manufactures. To give any particular

encouragement to the importation of such instruments, would interfere

too much with the interest of those manufactures. Such importation,

therefore, instead of being encouraged, has frequently been prohibited.

Thus the importation of wool cards, except from Ireland, or when brought

in as wreck or prize goods, was prohibited by the 3d of Edward IV.;

which prohibition was renewed by the 39th of Elizabeth, and has been

continued and rendered perpetual by subsequent laws.

The importation of the materials of manufacture has sometimes been

encouraged by an exemption from the duties to which other goods are

subject, and sometimes by bounties.

The importation of sheep's wool from several different countries, of

cotton wool from all countries, of undressed flax, of the greater part

of dyeing drugs, of the greater part of undressed hides from Ireland, or

the British colonies, of seal skins from the British Greenland fishery,

of pig and bar iron from the British colonies, as well as of several

other materials of manufacture, has been encouraged by an exemption from

all duties, if properly entered at the custom-house. The private

interest of our merchants and manufacturers may, perhaps, have extorted

from the legislature these exemptions, as well as the greater part of

our other commercial regulations. They are, however, perfectly just and

reasonable; and if, consistently with the necessities of the state, they

could be extended to all the other materials of manufacture, the public

would certainly be a gainer.

The avidity of our great manufacturers, however, has in some cases

extended these exemptions a good deal beyond what can justly be

considered as the rude materials of their work. By the 24th Geo. II.

chap. 46, a small duty of only 1d. the pound was imposed upon the

importation of foreign brown linen yarn, instead of much higher duties,

to which it had been subjected before, viz. of 6d. the pound upon

sail yarn, of 1s. the pound upon all French and Dutch yarn, and of

L.2 : 13 : 4 upon the hundred weight of all spruce or Muscovia yarn. But

our manufacturers were not long satisfied with this reduction: by the

29th of the same king, chap. 15, the same law which gave a bounty upon

the exportation of British and Irish linen, of which the price did not

exceed 18d. the yard, even this small duty upon the importation of brown

linen yarn was taken away. In the different operations, however, which

are necessary for the preparation of linen yarn, a good deal more

industry is employed, than in the subsequent operation of preparing

linen cloth from linen yarn. To say nothing of the industry of the

flax-growers and flax-dressers, three or four spinners at least are

necessary in order to keep one weaver in constant employment; and more

than four-fifths of the whole quantity of labour necessary for the

preparation of linen cloth, is employed in that of linen yarn; but our

spinners are poor people; women commonly scattered about in all

different parts of the country, without support or protection. It is not

by the sale of their work, but by that of the complete work of the

weavers, that our great master manufactures make their profits. As it is

their interest to sell the complete manufacture as dear, so it is to buy

the materials as cheap as possible. By extorting from the legislature

bounties upon the exportation of their own linen, high duties upon the

importation of all foreign linen, and a total prohibition of the home

consumption of some sorts of French linen, they endeavour to sell their

own goods as dear as possible. By encouraging the importation of foreign

linen yarn, and thereby bringing it into competition with that which is

made by our own people, they endeavour to buy the work of the poor

spinners as cheap as possible. They are as intent to keep down the wages

of their own weavers, as the earnings of the poor spinners; and it is by

no means for the benefit of the workmen that they endeavour either to

raise the price of the complete work, or to lower that of the rude

materials. It is the industry which is carried on for the benefit of the

rich and the powerful, that is principally encouraged by our mercantile

system. That which is carried on for the benefit of the poor and the

indigent is too often either neglected or oppressed.

Both the bounty upon the exportation of linen, and the exemption from

the duty upon the importation of foreign yarn, which were granted only

for fifteen years, but continued by two different prolongations, expire

with the end of the session of parliament which shall immediately follow

the 24th of June 1786.

The encouragement given to the importation of the materials of

manufacture by bounties, has been principally confined to such as were

imported from our American plantations.

The first bounties of this kind were those granted about the beginning

of the present century, upon the importation of naval stores from

America. Under this denomination were comprehended timber fit for masts,

yards, and bowsprits; hemp, tar, pitch, and turpentine. The bounty,

however, of L.1 the ton upon masting-timber, and that of L.6 the ton

upon hemp, were extended to such as should be imported into England from

Scotland. Both these bounties continued, without any variation, at the

same rate, till they were severally allowed to expire; that upon hemp on

the 1st of January 1741, and that upon masting-timber at the end of the

session of parliament immediately following the 24th June 1781.

The bounties upon the importation of tar, pitch, and turpentine,

underwent, during their continuance, several alterations. Originally,

that upon tar was L.4 the ton; that upon pitch the same; and that upon

turpentine L.3 the ton. The bounty of L.4 the ton upon tar was

afterwards confined to such as had been prepared in a particular manner;

this upon other good, clean, and merchantable tar was reduced to L.2,

4s. the ton. The bounty upon pitch was likewise reduced to L.1, and that

upon turpentine to L.1 : 10s. the ton.

The second bounty upon the importation of any of the materials of

manufacture, according to the order of time, was that granted by the

21st Geo. II. chap. 30, upon the importation of indigo from the British

plantations. When the plantation indigo was worth three-fourths of the

price of the best French indigo, it was, by this act, entitled to a

bounty of 6d. the pound. This bounty, which, like most others was

granted only for a limited time, was continued by several prolongations,

but was reduced to 4d. the pound. It was allowed to expire with the end

of the session of parliament which followed the 25th March 1781.

The third bounty of this kind was that granted (much about the time that

we were beginning sometimes to court, and sometimes to quarrel with our

American colonies), by the 4th Geo. III. chap. 26, upon the importation

of hemp, or undressed flax, from the British plantations. This bounty

was granted for twenty-one years, from the 24th June 1764 to the 24th

June 1785. For the first seven years, it was to be at the rate of L.8

the ton; for the second at L.6; and for the third at L.4. It was not

extended to Scotland, of which the climate (although hemp is sometimes

times raised there in small quantities, and of an inferior quality) is

not very fit for that produce. Such a bounty upon the importation of

Scotch flax in England would have been too great a discouragement to the

native produce of the southern part of the united kingdom.

The fourth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 5th Geo. III.

chap. 45, upon the importation of wood from America. It was granted for

nine years from the 1st January 1766 to the 1st January 1775. During the

first three years, it was to be for every hundred-and-twenty good deals,

at the rate of L.1, and for every load containing fifty cubic feet of

other square timber, at the rate of 12s. For the second three years, it

was for deals, to be at the rate of 15s., and for other squared timber

at the rate of 8s.; and for the third three years, it was for deals, to

be at the rate of 10s.; and for every other squared timber at the rate

of 5s.

The fifth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 9th Geo. III.

chap. 38, upon the importation of raw silk from the British plantations.

It was granted for twenty-one years, from the 1st January 1770, to the

1st January 1791. For the first seven years, it was to be at the rate of

L.25 for every hundred pounds value; for the second, at L.20; and for

the third, at L.15. The management of the silk-worm, and the preparation

of silk, requires so much hand-labour, and labour is so very dear in

America, that even this great bounty, I have been informed, was not

likely to produce any considerable effect.

The sixth bounty of this kind was that granted by 11th Geo. III. chap.

50, for the importation of pipe, hogshead, and barrel-staves and heading

from the British plantations. It was granted for nine years, from 1st

January 1772 to the 1st January 1781. For the first three years, it was,

for a certain quantity of each, to be at the rate of L.6; for the second

three years at L.4; and for the third three years at L.2.

The seventh and last bounty of this kind was that granted by the 19th

Geo. III. chap. 37, upon the importation of hemp from Ireland. It was

granted in the same manner as that for the importation of hemp and

undressed flax from America, for twenty-one years, from the 24th June

1779 to the 24th June 1800. The term is divided likewise into three

periods, of seven years each; and in each of those periods, the rate of

the Irish bounty is the same with that of the American. It does not,

however, like the American bounty, extend to the importation of

undressed flax. It would have been too great a discouragement to the

cultivation of that plant in Great Britain. When this last bounty was

granted, the British and Irish legislatures were not in much better

humour with one another, than the British and American had been before.

But this boon to Ireland, it is to be hoped, has been granted under more

fortunate auspices than all those to America.

The same commodities, upon which we thus gave bounties, when imported

from America, were subjected to considerable duties when imported from

any other country. The interest of our American colonies was regarded as

the same with that of the mother country. Their wealth was considered as

our wealth. Whatever money was sent out to them, it was said, came all

back to us by the balance of trade, and we could never become a farthing

the poorer by any expense which we could lay out upon them. They were

our own in every respect, and it was an expense laid out upon the

improvement of our own property, and for the profitable employment of

our own people. It is unnecessary, I apprehend, at present to any any

thing further, in order to expose the folly of a system which fatal

experience has now sufficiently exposed. Had our American colonies

really been a part of Great Britain, those bounties might have been

considered as bounties upon production, and would still have been liable

to all the objections to which such bounties are liable, but to no

other.

The exportation of the materials of manufacture is sometimes discouraged

by absolute prohibitions, and sometimes by high duties.

Our woollen manufacturers have been more successful than any other class

of workmen, in persuading the legislature that the prosperity of the

nation depended upon the success and extension of their particular

business. They have not only obtained a monopoly against the consumers,

by an absolute prohibition of importing woollen cloths from any foreign

country; but they have likewise obtained another monopoly against the

sheep farmers and growers of wool, by a similar prohibition of the

exportation of live sheep and wool. The severity of many of the laws

which have been enacted for the security of the revenue is very justly

complained of, as imposing heavy penalties upon actions which,

antecedent to the statutes that declared them to be crimes, had always

been understood to be innocent. But the cruellest of our revenue laws, I

will venture to affirm, are mild and gentle, in comparison to some of

those which the clamour of our merchants and manufacturers has extorted

from the legislature, for the support of their own absurd and oppressive

monopolies. Like the laws of Draco, these laws may be said to be all

written in blood.

By the 8th of Elizabeth, chap. 3, the exporter of sheep, lambs, or rams,

was for the first offence, to forfeit all his goods for ever, to suffer

a year's imprisonment, and then to have his left hand cut off on a

market town, upon a market day, to be there nailed up; and for the

second offence, to be adjudged a felon, and to suffer death accordingly.

To prevent the breed of our sheep from being propagated in foreign

countries, seems to have been the object of this law. By the 13th and

14th of Charles II. chap. 18, the exportation of wool was made felony,

and the exporter subjected to the same penalties and forfeitures as a

felon.

For the honour of the national humanity, it is to be hoped that neither

of these statutes was ever executed. The first of them, however, so far

as I know, has never been directly repealed, and serjeant Hawkins seems

to consider it as still in force. It may, however, perhaps be considered

as virtually repealed by the 12th of Charles II. chap. 32, sect. 3,

which, without expressly taking away the penalties imposed by former

statutes, imposes a new penalty, viz. that of 20s. for every sheep

exported, or attempted to be exported, together with the forfeiture of

the sheep, and of the owner's share of the sheep. The second of them was

expressly repealed by the 7th and 8th of William III. chap. 28, sect. 4,

by which it is declared that 'Whereas the statute of the 13th and 14th

of king Charles II. made against the exportation of wool, among other

things in the said act mentioned, doth enact the same to be deemed

felony, by the severity of which penalty the prosecution of offenders

hath not been so effectually put in execution; be it therefore enacted,

by the authority aforesaid, that so much of the said act, which relates

to the making the said offence felony, be repealed and made void.'

The penalties, however, which are either imposed by this milder statute,

or which, though imposed by former statutes, are not repealed by this

one, are still sufficiently severe. Besides the forfeiture of the goods,

the exporter incurs the penalty of 3s. for every pound weight of wool,

either exported or attempted to be exported, that is, about four or five

times the value. Any merchant, or other person convicted of this

offence, is disabled from requiring any debt or account belonging to him

from any factor or other person. Let his fortune be what it will,

whether he is or is not able to pay those heavy penalties, the law means

to ruin him completely. But, as the morals of the great body of people

are not yet so corrupt as those of the contrivers of this statute, I

have not heard that any advantage has ever been taken of this clause. If

the person convicted of this offence is not able to pay the penalties

within three months after judgment, he is to be transported for seven

years; and if he returns before the expiration of that time, he is

liable to the pains of felony, without benefit of clergy. The owner of

the ship, knowing this offence, forfeits all his interest in the ship

and furniture. The master and mariners knowing this offence, forfeit all

their goods and chattels, and suffer three months imprisonment. By a

subsequent statute, the master suffers six months imprisonment.

In order to prevent exportation, the whole inland commerce of wool is

laid under very burdensome and oppressive restrictions. It cannot be

packed in any box, barrel, cask, case, chest, or any other package, but

only in packs of leather or pack-cloth, on which must be marked on the

outside the words WOOL or YARN, in large letters, not less than three

inches long, on pain of forfeiting the same and the package, and 3s. for

every pound weight, to be paid by the owner or packer. It cannot be

loaden on any horse or cart, or carried by land within five miles of the

coast, but between sun-rising, and sun-setting, on pain of forfeiting

the same, the horses and carriages. The hundred next adjoining to the

sea coast, out of, or through which the wool is carried or exported,

forfeits L.20, if the wool is under the value of L.10; and if of greater

value, then treble that value, together with treble costs, to be sued

for within the year. The execution to be against any two of the

inhabitants, whom the sessions must reimburse, by an assessment on the

other inhabitants, as in the cases of robbery. And if any person

compounds with the hundred for less than this penalty, he is to be

imprisoned for five years, and any other person may prosecute. These

regulations take place through the whole kingdom.

But in the particular counties of Kent and Sussex, the restrictions are

still more troublesome. Every owner of wool within ten miles of the sea

coast must give an account in writing, three days after shearing, to the

next officer of the customs, of the number of his fleeces, and of the

places where they are lodged. And before he removes any part of them, he

must give the like notice of the number and weight of the fleeces, and

of the name and abode of the person to whom they are sold, and of the

place to which it is intended they should be carried. No person within

fifteen miles of the sea, in the said counties, can buy any wool, before

he enters into bond to the king, that no part of the wool which he shall

so buy shall be sold by him to any other person within fifteen miles of

the sea. If any wool is found carrying towards the sea side in the said

counties, unless it has been entered and security given as aforesaid, it

is forfeited, and the offender also forfeits 3s. for every pound weight.

If any person lay any wool, not entered as aforesaid, within fifteen

miles of the sea, it must be seized and forfeited; and if, after such

seizure, any person shall claim the same, he must give security to the

exchequer, that if he is cast upon trial he shall pay treble costs,

besides all other penalties.

When such restrictions are imposed upon the inland trade, the coasting

trade, we may believe, cannot be left very free. Every owner of wool,

who carrieth, or causeth to be carried, any wool to any part or place on

the sea coast, in order to be from thence transported by sea to any

other place or port on the coast, must first cause an entry thereof to

be made at the port from whence it is intended to be conveyed,

containing the weight, marks, and number, of the packages, before he

brings the same within five miles of that part, on pain of forfeiting

the same, and also the horses, carts, and other carriages; and also of

suffering and forfeiting, as by the other laws in force against the

exportation of wool. This law, however (1st of William III. chap. 32),

is so very indulgent as to declare, that 'this shall not hinder any

person from carrying his wool home from the place of shearing, though it

be within five miles of the sea, provided that in ten days after

shearing, and before he remove the wool, he do under his hand certify to

the next officer of the customs the true number of fleeces, and where it

is housed; and do not remove the same, without certifying to such

officer, under his hand, his intention so to do, three days before.'

Bond must be given that the wool to be carried coast-ways is to be

landed at the particular port for which it is entered outwards; and if

any part of it is landed without the presence of an officer, not only

the forfeiture of the wool is incurred, as in other goods, but the usual

additional penalty of 3s. for every pound weight is likewise incurred.

Our woollen manufacturers, in order to justify their demand of such

extraordinary restrictions and regulations, confidently asserted, that

English wool was of a peculiar quality, superior to that of any other

country; that the wool of other countries could not, without some

mixture of it, be wrought up into any tolerable manufacture; that fine

cloth could not be made without it; that England, therefore, if the

exportation of it could be totally prevented, could monopolize to

herself almost the whole woollen trade of the world; and thus, having no

rivals, could sell at what price she pleased, and in a short time

acquire the most incredible degree of wealth by the most advantageous

balance of trade. This doctrine, like most other doctrines which are

confidently asserted by any considerable number of people, was, and

still continues to be, most implicitly believed by a much greater

number: by almost all those who are either unacquainted with the woollen

trade, or who have not made particular inquiries. It is, however, so

perfectly false, that English wool is in any respect necessary for the

making of fine cloth, that it is altogether unfit for it. Fine cloth is

made altogether of Spanish wool. English wool, cannot be even so mixed

with Spanish wool, as to enter into the composition without spoiling and

degrading, in some degree, the fabric of the cloth.

It has been shown in the foregoing part of this work, that the effect of

these regulations has been to depress the price of English wool, not

only below what it naturally would be in the present times, but very

much below what it actually was in the time of Edward III. The price of

Scotch wool, when, in consequence of the Union, it became subject to the

same regulations, is said to have fallen about one half. It is observed

by the very accurate and intelligent author of the Memoirs of Wool, the

Reverend Mr. John Smith, that the price of the best English wool in

England, is generally below what wool of a very inferior quality

commonly sells for in the market of Amsterdam. To depress the price of

this commodity below what may be called its natural and proper price,

was the avowed purpose of those regulations; and there seems to be no

doubt of their having produced the effect that was expected from them.

This reduction of price, it may perhaps be thought, by discouraging the

growing of wool, must have reduced very much the annual produce of that

commodity, though not below what it formerly was, yet below what, in the

present state of things, it would probably have been, had it, in

consequence of an open and free market, been allowed to rise to the

natural and proper price. I am, however, disposed to believe, that the

quantity of the annual produce cannot have been much, though it may,

perhaps, have been a little affected by these regulations. The growing

of wool is not the chief purpose for which the sheep farmer employs his

industry and stock. He expects his profit, not so much from the price of

the fleece, as from that of the carcase; and the average or ordinary

price of the latter must even, in many cases, make up to him whatever

deficiency there may be in the average or ordinary price of the former.

It has been observed, in the foregoing part of this work, that 'whatever

regulations tend to sink the price, either of wool or of raw hides,

below what it naturally would be, must, in an improved and cultivated

country, have some tendency to raise the price of butcher's meat. The

price, both of the great and small cattle which are fed on improved and

cultivated land, must be sufficient to pay the rent which the landlord,

and the profit which the farmer, has reason to expect from improved and

cultivated land. If it is not, they will soon cease to feed them.

Whatever part of this price, therefore, is not paid by the wool and the

hide, must be paid by the carcase. The less there is paid for the one,

the more must be paid for the other. In what manner this price is to be

divided upon the different parts of the beast, is indifferent to the

landlords and farmers, provided it is all paid to them. In an improved

and cultivated country, therefore, their interest as landlords and

farmers cannot be much affected by such regulations, though their

interest as consumers may, by the rise in the price of provisions.'

According to this reasoning, therefore, this degradation in the price of

wool is not likely, in an improved and cultivated country, to occasion

any diminution in the annual produce of that commodity; except so far

as, by raising the price of mutton, it may somewhat diminish the demand

for, and consequently the production of, that particular species of

butcher's meat. Its effect, however, even in this way, it is probable,

is not very considerable.

But though its effect upon the quantity of the annual produce may not

have been very considerable, its effect upon the quality, it may perhaps

be thought, must necessarily have been very great. The degradation in

the quality of English wool, if not below what it was in former times,

yet below what it naturally would have been in the present state of

improvement and cultivation, must have been, it may perhaps be supposed,

very nearly in proportion to the degradation of price. As the quality

depends upon the breed, upon the pasture, and upon the management and

cleanliness of the sheep, during the whole progress of the growth of the

fleece, the attention to these circumstances, it may naturally enough be

imagined, can never be greater than in proportion to the recompence

which the price of the fleece is likely to make for the labour and

expense which that attention requires. It happens, however, that the

goodness of the fleece depends, in great measure, upon the health,

growth, and bulk of the animal: the same attention which is necessary

for the improvement of the carcase is, in some respect, sufficient for

that of the fleece. Notwithstanding the degradation of price, English

wool is said to have been improved considerably during the course even

of the present century. The improvement, might, perhaps, have been

greater if the price had been better; but the lowness of price, though

it may have obstructed, yet certainly it has not altogether prevented

that improvement.

The violence of these regulations, therefore, seems to have affected

neither the quantity nor the quality of the annual produce of wool, so

much as it might have been expected to do (though I think it probable

that it may have affected the latter a good deal more than the former);

and the interest of the growers of wool, though it must have been hurt

in some degree, seems upon the whole, to have been much less hurt than

could well have been imagined.

These considerations, however, will not justify the absolute prohibition

of the exportation of wool; but they will fully justify the imposition

of a considerable tax upon that exportation.

To hurt, in any degree, the interest of any one order of citizens, for

no other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently

contrary to that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign

owes to all the different orders of his subjects. But the prohibition

certainly hurts, in some degree, the interest of the growers of wool,

for no other purpose but to promote that of the manufacturers.

Every different order of citizens is bound to contribute to the support

of the sovereign or commonwealth. A tax of five, or even of ten

shillings, upon the exportation of every tod of wool, would produce a

very considerable revenue to the sovereign. It would hurt the interest

of the growers somewhat less than the prohibition, because it would not

probably lower the price of wool quite so much. It would afford a

sufficient advantage to the manufacturer, because, though he might not

buy his wool altogether so cheap as under the prohibition, he would

still buy it at least five or ten shillings cheaper than any foreign

manufacturer could buy it, besides saving the freight and insurance

which the other would be obliged to pay. It is scarce possible to devise

a tax which could produce any considerable revenue to the sovereign, and

at the same time occasion so little inconveniency to any body.

The prohibition, notwithstanding all the penalties which guard it, does

not prevent the exportation of wool. It is exported, it is well known,

in great quantities. The great difference between the price in the home

and that in the foreign market, presents such a temptation to smuggling,

that all the rigour of the law cannot prevent it. This illegal

exportation is advantageous to nobody but the smuggler. A legal

exportation, subject to a tax, by affording a revenue to the sovereign,

and thereby saving the imposition of some other, perhaps more burdensome

and inconvenient taxes, might prove advantageous to all the different

subjects of the state.

The exportation of fuller's earth, or fuller's clay, supposed to be

necessary for preparing and cleansing the woollen manufactures, has been

subjected to nearly the same penalties as the exportation of wool. Even

tobacco-pipe clay, though acknowledged to be different from fuller's

clay, yet, on account of their resemblance, and because fuller's clay

might sometimes be exported as tobacco-pipe clay, has been laid under

the same prohibitions and penalties.

By the 13th and 14th of Charles II. chap. 7, the exportation, not only

of raw hides, but of tanned leather, except in the shape of boots,

shoes, or slippers, was prohibited; and the law gave a monopoly to our

boot-makers and shoe-makers, not only against our graziers, but against

our tanners. By subsequent statutes, our tanners have got themselves

exempted from this monopoly, upon paying a small tax of only one

shilling on the hundred weight of tanned leather, weighing one hundred

and twelve pounds. They have obtained likewise the drawback of

two-thirds of the excise duties imposed upon their commodity, even when

exported without further manufacture. All manufactures of leather may be

exported duty free; and the exporter is besides entitled to the drawback

of the whole duties of excise. Our graziers still continue subject to

the old monopoly. Graziers, separated from one another, and dispersed

through all the different corners of the country, cannot, without great

difficulty, combine together for the purpose either of imposing

monopolies upon their fellow-citizens, or of exempting themselves from

such as may have been imposed upon them by other people. Manufacturers

of all kinds, collected together in numerous bodies in all great cities,

easily can. Even the horns of cattle are prohibited to be exported; and

the two insignificant trades of the horner and comb-maker enjoy, in this

respect, a monopoly against the graziers.

Restraints, either by prohibitions, or by taxes, upon the exportation of

goods which are partially, but not completely manufactured, are not

peculiar to the manufacture of leather. As long as any thing remains to

be done, in order to fit any commodity for immediate use and

consumption, our manufacturers think that they themselves ought to the

doing of it. Woollen yarn and worsted are prohibited to be exported,

under the same penalties as wool. Even white cloths are subject to a

duty upon exportation; and our dyers have so far obtained a monopoly

against our clothiers. Our clothiers would probably have been able to

defend themselves against it; but it happens that the greater part of

our principal clothiers are themselves likewise dyers. Watch-cases,

clock-cases, and dial-plates for clocks and watches, have been

prohibited to be exported. Our clock-makers and watch-makers are, it

seems, unwilling that the price of this sort of workmanship should be

raised upon them by the competition of foreigners.

By some old statutes of Edward III. Henry VIII. and Edward VI. the

exportation of all metals was prohibited. Lead and tin were alone

excepted, probably on account of the great abundance of those metals; in

the exportation of which a considerable part of the trade of the kingdom

in those days consisted. For the encouragement of the mining trade, the

5th of William and Mary, chap. 17, exempted from this prohibition iron,

copper, and mundic metal made from British ore. The exportation of all

sorts of copper bars, foreign as well as British, was afterwards

permitted by the 9th and 10th of William III. chap 26. The exportation

of unmanufactured brass, of what is called gun-metal, bell-metal, and

shroff-metal, still continues to be prohibited. Brass manufactures of

all sorts may be exported duty free.

The exportation of the materials of manufacture, where it is not

altogether prohibited, is, in many cases, subjected to considerable

duties.

By the 8th Geo. I. chap. 15, the exportation of all goods, the produce

or manufacture of Great Britain, upon which any duties had been imposed

by former statutes, was rendered duty free. The following goods,

however, were excepted: alum, lead, lead-ore, tin, tanned leather,

copperas, coals, wool, cards, white woolen cloths, lapis calaminaris,

skins of all sorts, glue, coney hair or wool, hares wool, hair of all

sorts, horses, and litharge of lead. If you expect horses, all these are

either materials of manufacture, or incomplete manufactures (which may

be considered as materials for still further manufacture), or

instruments of trade. This statute leaves them subject to all the old

duties which had ever been imposed upon them, the old subsidy, and one

per cent. outwards.

By the same statute, a great number of foreign drugs for dyers use are

exempted from all duties upon importation. Each of them, however, is

afterwards subjected to a certain duty, not indeed a very heavy one,

upon exportation. Our dyers, it seems, while they thought it for their

interest to encourage the importation of those drugs, by an exemption

from all duties, thought it likewise for their own interest to throw

some small discouragement upon their exportation. The avidity, however,

which suggested this notable piece of mercantile ingenuity, most

probably disappointed itself of its object. It necessarily taught the

importers to be more careful than they might otherwise have been, that

their importation should not exceed what was necessary for the supply of

the home market. The home market was at all times likely to be more

scantily supplied; the commodities were at all times likely to be

somewhat dearer there than they would have been, had the exportation

been rendered as free as the importation.