PART III.

_Of the Advantages which Europe has derived from the Discovery of

America, and from that of a Passage to the East Indies by the Cape of

Good Hope._

Such are the advantages which the colonies of America have derived from

the policy of Europe.

What are these which Europe has derived from the discovery and

colonization of America?

Those advantages may be divided, first, into the general advantages

which Europe, considered as one great country, has derived from those

great events; and, secondly, into the particular advantages which each

colonizing country has derived from the colonies which particularly

belong to it, in consequence of the authority or dominion which it

exercises over them.

The general advantages which Europe, considered as one great country,

has derived from the discovery and colonization of America, consist,

first, in the increase of its enjoyments; and, secondly, in the

augmentation of its industry.

The surplus produce of America imported into Europe, furnishes the

inhabitants of this great continent with a variety of commodities which

they could not otherwise have possessed; some for conveniency and use,

some for pleasure, and some for ornament; and thereby contributes to

increase their enjoyments.

The discovery and colonization of America, it will readily be allowed,

have contributed to augment the industry, first, of all the countries

which trade to it directly, such as Spain, Portugal, France, and

England; and, secondly, of all those which, without trading to it

directly, send, through the medium of other countries, goods to it of

their own produce, such as Austrian Flanders, and some provinces of

Germany, which, through the medium of the countries before mentioned,

send to it a considerable quantity of linen and other goods. All such

countries have evidently gained a more extensive market for their

surplus produce, and must consequently have been encouraged to increase

its quantity.

But that those great events should likewise have contributed to

encourage the industry of countries such as Hungary and Poland, which

may never, perhaps, have sent a single commodity of their own produce to

America, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident. That those events have

done so, however, cannot be doubted. Some part of the produce of America

is consumed in Hungary and Poland, and there in some demand there for

the sugar, chocolate, and tobacco, of that new quarter of the world. But

those commodities must be purchased with something which is either the

produce of the industry of Hungary and Poland, or with something which

had been purchased with some part of that produce. Those commodities of

America are new values, new equivalents, introduced into Hungary and

Poland, to be exchanged there for the surplus produce of these

countries. By being carried thither, they create a new and more

extensive market for that surplus produce. They raise its value, and

thereby contribute to encourage its increase. Though no part of it may

ever be carried to America, it may be carried to other countries, which

purchase it with a part of their share of the surplus produce of

America, and it may find a market by means of the circulation of that

trade which was originally put into motion by the surplus produce of

America.

Those great events may even have contributed to increase the enjoyments,

and to augment the industry, of countries which not only never sent any

commodities to America, but never received any from it. Even such

countries may have received a greater abundance of other commodities

from countries, of which the surplus produce had been augmented by means

of the American trade. This greater abundance, as it must necessarily

have increased their enjoyments, so it must likewise have augmented

their industry. A greater number of new equivalents, of some kind or

other, must have been presented to them to be exchanged for the surplus

produce of that industry. A more extensive market must have been created

for that surplus produce, so as to raise its value, and thereby

encourage its increase. The mass of commodities annually thrown into the

great circle of European commerce, and by its various revolutions

annually distributed among all the different nations comprehended within

it, must have been augmented by the whole surplus produce of America. A

greater share of this greater mass, therefore, is likely to have fallen

to each of those nations, to have increased their enjoyments, and

augmented their industry.

The exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to diminish, or at

least to keep down below what they would otherwise rise to, both the

enjoyments and industry of all those nations in general, and of the

American colonies in particular. It is a dead weight upon the action of

one of the great springs which puts into motion a great part of the

business of mankind. By rendering the colony produce dearer in all other

countries, it lessens its consumption, and thereby cramps the industry

of the colonies, and both the enjoyments and the industry or all other

countries, which both enjoy less when they pay more for what they enjoy,

and produce less when they get less for what they produce. By rendering

the produce of all other countries dearer in the colonies, it cramps in

the same manner the industry of all other colonies, and both the

enjoyments and the industry of the colonies. It is a clog which, for the

supposed benefit of some particular countries, embarrasses the pleasures

and encumbers the industry of all other countries, but of the colonies

more than of any other. It not only excludes as much as possible all

other countries from one particular market, but it confines as much as

possible the colonies to one particular market; and the difference is

very great between being excluded from one particular market when all

others are open, and being confined to one particular market when all

others are shut up. The surplus produce of the colonies, however, is the

original source of all that increase of enjoyments and industry which

Europe derives from the discovery and colonization of America, and the

exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to render this source much

less abundant than it otherwise would be.

The particular advantages which each colonizing country derives from the

colonies which particularly belong to it, are of two different kinds;

first, those common advantages which every empire derives from the

provinces subject to its dominion; and, secondly, those peculiar

advantages which are supposed to result from provinces of so very

peculiar a nature as the European colonies of America.

The common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces

subject to its dominion consist, first, in the military force which they

furnish for its defence; and, secondly, in the revenue which they

furnish for the support of its civil government. The Roman colonies

furnished occasionally both the one and the other. The Greek colonies

sometimes furnished a military force, but seldom any revenue. They

seldom acknowledged themselves subject to the dominion of the mother

city. They were generally her allies in war, but very seldom her

subjects in peace.

The European colonies of America have never yet furnished any military

force for the defence of the mother country. The military force has

never yet been sufficient for their own defence; and in the different

wars in which the mother countries have been engaged, the defence of

their colonies has generally occasioned a very considerable distraction

of the military force of those countries. In this respect, therefore,

all the European colonies have, without exception, been a cause rather

of weakness than of strength to their respective mother countries.

The colonies of Spain and Portugal only have contributed any revenue

towards the defence of the mother country, or the support of her civil

government. The taxes which have been levied upon those of other

European nations, upon those of England in particular, have seldom been

equal to the expense laid out upon them in time of peace, and never

sufficient to defray that which they occasioned in time of war. Such

colonies, therefore, have been a source of expense, and not of revenue,

to their respective mother countries.

The advantages of such colonies to their respective mother countries,

consist altogether in those peculiar advantages which are supposed to

result from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the European

colonies of America; and the exclusive trade, it is acknowledged, is the

sole source of all those peculiar advantages.

In consequence of this exclusive trade, all that part of the surplus

produce of the English colonies, for example, which consists in what are

called enumerated commodities, can be sent to no other country but

England. Other countries must afterwards buy it of her. It must be

cheaper, therefore, in England than it can be in any other country, and

must contribute more to increase the enjoyments of England than those of

any other country. It must likewise contribute more to encourage her

industry. For all those parts of her own surplus produce which England

exchanges for those enumerated commodities, she must get a better price

than any other countries can get for the like parts of theirs, when they

exchange them for the same commodities. The manufactures of England, for

example, will purchase a greater quantity of the sugar and tobacco of

her own colonies than the like manufactures of other countries can

purchase of that sugar and tobacco. So far, therefore, as the

manufactures of England and those of other countries are both to be

exchanged for the sugar and tobacco of the English colonies, this

superiority of price gives an encouragement to the former beyond what

the latter can, in these circumstances, enjoy. The exclusive trade of

the colonies, therefore, as it diminishes, or at least keeps down below

what they would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments and the industry

of the countries which do not possess it, so it gives an evident

advantage to the countries which do possess it over those other

countries.

This advantage, however, will, perhaps, be found to be rather what may

be called a relative than an absolute advantage, and to give a

superiority to the country which enjoys it, rather by depressing the

industry and produce of other countries, than by raising those of that

particular country above what they would naturally rise to in the case

of a free trade.

The tobacco of Maryland and Virginia, for example, by means of the

monopoly which England enjoys of it, certainly comes cheaper to England

than it can do to France, to whom England commonly sells a considerable

part of it. But had France and all other European countries been at all

times allowed a free trade to Maryland and Virginia, the tobacco of

those colonies might by this time have come cheaper than it actually

does, not only to all those other countries, but likewise to England.

The produce of tobacco, in consequence of a market so much more

extensive than any which it has hitherto enjoyed, might, and probably

would, by this time have been so much increased as to reduce the profits

of a tobacco plantation to their natural level with those of a corn

plantation, which it is supposed they are still somewhat above. The

price of tobacco might, and probably would, by this time have fallen

somewhat lower than it is at present. An equal quantity of the

commodities, either of England or of those other countries, might have

purchased in Maryland and Virginia a greater quantity of tobacco than it

can do at present, and consequently have been sold there for so much a

better price. So far as that weed, therefore, can, by its cheapness and

abundance, increase the enjoyments, or augment the industry, either of

England or of any other country, it would probably, in the case of a

free trade, have produced both these effects in somewhat a greater

degree than it can do at present. England, indeed, would not, in this

case, have had any advantage over other countries. She might have bought

the tobacco of her colonies somewhat cheaper, and consequently have sold

some of her own commodities somewhat dearer, than she actually does; but

she could neither have bought the one cheaper, nor sold the other

dearer, than any other country might have done. She might, perhaps, have

gained an absolute, but she would certainly have lost a relative

advantage.

In order, however, to obtain this relative advantage in the colony

trade, in order to execute the invidious and malignant project of

excluding, as much as possible, other nations from any share in it,

England, there are very probable reasons for believing, has not only

sacrificed a part of the absolute advantage which she, as well as every

other nation, might have derived from that trade, but has subjected

herself both to an absolute and to a relative disadvantage in almost

every other branch of trade.

When, by the act of navigation, England assumed to herself the monopoly

of the colony trade, the foreign capitals which had before been employed

in it, were necessarily withdrawn from it. The English capital, which

had before carried on but a part of it, was now to carry on the whole.

The capital which had before supplied the colonies with but a part of

the goods which they wanted from Europe, was now all that was employed

to supply them with the whole. But it could not supply them with the

whole; and the goods with which it did supply them were necessarily sold

very dear. The capital which had before bought but a part of the surplus

produce of the colonies, was now all that was employed to buy the whole.

But it could not buy the whole at anything near the old price; and

therefore, whatever it did buy, it necessarily bought very cheap. But in

an employment of capital, in which the merchant sold very dear, and

bought very cheap, the profit must have been very great, and much above

the ordinary level of profit in other branches of trade. This

superiority of profit in the colony trade could not fail to draw from

other branches of trade a part of the capital which had before been

employed in them. But this revulsion of capital, as it must have

gradually increased the competition of capitals in the colony trade, so

it must have gradually diminished that competition in all those other

branches of trade; as it must have gradually lowered the profits of the

one, so it must have gradually raised those of the other, till the

profits of all came to a new level, different from, and somewhat higher,

than that at which they had been before.

This double effect of drawing capital from all other trades, and of

raising the rate of profit somewhat higher than it otherwise would have

been in all trades, was not only produced by this monopoly upon its

first establishment, but has continued to be produced by it ever since.

_First_, This monopoly has been continually drawing capital from all

other trades, to be employed in that of the colonies.

Though the wealth of Great Britain has increased very much since the

establishment of the act of navigation, it certainly has not increased

in the same proportion as that of the colonies. But the foreign trade of

every country naturally increases in proportion to its wealth, its

surplus produce in proportion to its whole produce; and Great Britain

having engrossed to herself almost the whole of what may be called the

foreign trade of the colonies, and her capital not having increased in

the same proportion as the extent of that trade, she could not carry it

on without continually withdrawing from other branches of trade some

part of the capital which had before been employed in them, as well as

withholding from them a great deal more which would otherwise have gone

to them. Since the establishment of the act of navigation, accordingly,

the colony trade has been continually increasing, while many other

branches of foreign trade, particularly of that to other parts of

Europe, have been continually decaying. Our manufactures for foreign

sale, instead of being suited, as before the act of navigation, to the

neighbouring market of Europe, or to the more distant one of the

countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea, have, the greater part

of them, been accommodated to the still more distant one of the

colonies; to the market in which they have the monopoly, rather than to

that in which they have many competitors. The causes of decay in other

branches of foreign trade, which, by Sir Matthew Decker and other

writers, have been sought for in the excess and improper made of

taxation, in the high price of labour, in the increase of luxury, &c.

may all be found in the overgrowth of the colony trade. The mercantile

capital of Great Britain, though very great, yet not being infinite, and

though greatly increased since the act of navigation, yet not being

increased in the same proportion as the colony trade, that trade could

not possibly be carried on without withdrawing some part of that capital

from other branches of trade, nor consequently without some decay of

those other branches.

England, it must be observed, was a great trading country, her

mercantile capital was very great, and likely to become still greater

and greater every day, not only before the act of navigation had

established the monopoly of the corn trade, but before that trade was

very considerable. In the Dutch war, during the government of Cromwell,

her navy was superior to that of Holland; and in that which broke out in

the beginning of the reign of Charles II., it was at least equal,

perhaps superior to the united navies of France and Holland. Its

superiority, perhaps, would scarce appear greater in the present times,

at least if the Dutch navy were to bear the same proportion to the Dutch

commerce now which it did then. But this great naval power could not, in

either of those wars, be owing to the act of navigation. During the

first of them, the plan of that act had been but just formed; and

though, before the breaking out of the second, it had been fully enacted

by legal authority, yet no part of it could have had time to produce any

considerable effect, and least of all that part which established the

exclusive trade to the colonies. Both the colonies and their trade were

inconsiderable then, in comparison of what they are now. The island of

Jamaica was an unwholesome desert, little inhabited, and less

cultivated. New York and New Jersey were in the possession of the Dutch,

the half of St. Christopher's in that of the French. The island of

Antigua, the two Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Nova Scotia, were

not planted. Virginia, Maryland, and New England were planted; and

though they were very thriving colonies, yet there was not perhaps at

that time, either in Europe or America, a single person who foresaw, or

even suspected, the rapid progress which they have since made in wealth,

population, and improvement. The island of Barbadoes, in short, was the

only British colony of any consequence, of which the condition at that

time bore any resemblance to what it is at present. The trade of the

colonies, of which England, even for some time after the act of

navigation, enjoyed but a part (for the act of navigation was not very

strictly executed till several years after it was enacted), could not at

that time be the cause of the great trade of England, nor of the great

naval power which was supported by that trade. The trade which at that

time supported that great naval power was the trade of Europe, and of

the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea. But the share which

Great Britain at present enjoys of that trade could not support any such

great naval power. Had the growing trade of the colonies been left free

to all nations, whatever share of it might have fallen to Great Britain,

and a very considerable share would probably have fallen to her, must

have been all an addition to this great trade of which she was before in

possession. In consequence of the monopoly, the increase of the colony

trade has not so much occasioned an addition to the trade which Great

Britain had before, as a total change in its direction.

_Secondly_, This monopoly has necessarily contributed to keep up the

rate of profit, in all the different branches of British trade, higher

than it naturally would have been, had all nations been allowed a free

trade to the British colonies.

The monopoly of the colony trade, as it necessarily drew towards that

trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what

would have gone to it of its own accord, so, by the expulsion of all

foreign capitals, it necessarily reduced the whole quantity of capital

employed in that trade below what it naturally would have been in the

case of a free trade. But, by lessening the competition of capitals in

that branch of trade, it necessarily raised the rate of profit in that

branch. By lessening, too, the competition of British capitals in all

other branches of trade, it necessarily raised the rate of British

profit in all those other branches. Whatever may have been, at any

particular period since the establishment of the act of navigation, the

state or extent of the mercantile capital of Great Britain, the monopoly

of the colony trade must, during the continuance of that state, have

raised the ordinary rate of British profit higher than it otherwise

would have been, both in that and in all the other branches of British

trade. If, since the establishment of the act of navigation, the

ordinary rate of British profit has fallen considerably, as it certainly

has, it must have fallen still lower, had not the monopoly established

by that act contributed to keep it up.

But whatever raises, in any country, the ordinary rate of profit higher

than it otherwise would be, necessarily subjects that country both to

an absolute, and to a relative disadvantage in every branch of trade of

which she has not the monopoly.

It subjects her to an absolute disadvantage; because, in such branches

of trade, her merchants cannot get this greater profit without selling

dearer than they otherwise would do, both the goods of foreign countries

which they import into their own, and the goods of their own country

which they export to foreign countries. Their own country must both buy

dearer and sell dearer; must both buy less, and sell less; must both

enjoy less and produce less, than she otherwise would do.

It subjects her to a relative disadvantage; because, in such branches of

trade, it sets other countries, which are not subject to the same

absolute disadvantage, either more above her or less below her, than

they otherwise would be. It enables them both to enjoy more and to

produce more, in proportion to what she enjoys and produces. It renders

their superiority greater, or their inferiority less, than it otherwise

would be. By raising the price of her produce above what it otherwise

would be, it enables the merchants of other countries to undersell her

in foreign markets, and thereby to justle her out of almost all those

branches of trade, of which she has not the monopoly.

Our merchants frequently complain of the high wages of British labour,

as the cause of their manufactures being undersold in foreign markets;

but they are silent about the high profits of stock. They complain of

the extravagant gain of other people; but they say nothing of their own.

The high profits of British stock, however, may contribute towards

raising the price of British manufactures, in many cases, as much, and

in some perhaps more, than the high wages of British labour.

It is in this manner that the capital of Great Britain, one may justly

say, has partly been drawn and partly been driven from the greater part

of the different branches of trade of which she has not the monopoly;

from the trade of Europe, in particular, and from that of the countries

which lie round the Mediterranean sea.

It has partly been drawn from those branches of trade, by the attraction

of superior profit in the colony trade, in consequence of the continual

increase of that trade, and of the continual insufficiency of the

capital which had carried it on one year to carry it on the next.

It has partly been driven from them, by the advantage which the high

rate of profit established in Great Britain gives to other countries, in

all the different branches of trade of which Great Britain has not the

monopoly.

As the monopoly of the colony trade has drawn from those other branches

a part of the British capital, which would otherwise have been employed

in them, so it has forced into them many foreign capitals which would

never have gone to them, had they not been expelled from the colony

trade. In those other branches of trade, it has diminished the

competition of British capitals, and thereby raised the rate of British

profit higher than it otherwise would have been. On the contrary, it has

increased the competition of foreign capitals, and thereby sunk the rate

of foreign profit lower than it otherwise would have been. Both in the

one way and in the other, it must evidently have subjected Great Britain

to a relative disadvantage in all those other branches of trade.

The colony trade, however, it may perhaps be said, is more advantageous

to Great Britain than any other; and the monopoly, by forcing into that

trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what

would otherwise have gone to it, has turned that capital into an

employment, more advantageous to the country than any other which it

could have found.

The most advantageous employment of any capital to the country to which

it belongs, is that which maintains there the greatest quantity of

productive labour, and increases the most the annual produce of the land

and labour of that country. But the quantity of productive labour which

any capital employed in the foreign trade of consumption can maintain,

is exactly in proportion, it has been shown in the second book, to the

frequency of its returns. A capital of a thousand pounds, for example,

employed in a foreign trade of consumption, of which the returns are

made regularly once in the year, can keep in constant employment, in the

country to which it belongs, a quantity of productive labour, equal to

what a thousand pounds can maintain there for a year. If the returns are

made twice or thrice in the year, it can keep in constant employment a

quantity of productive labour, equal to what two or three thousand

pounds can maintain there for a year. A foreign trade of consumption

carried on with a neighbouring, is, upon that account, in general, more

advantageous than one carried on with a distant country; and, for the

same reason, a direct foreign trade of consumption, as it has likewise

been shown in the second book, is in general more advantageous than a

round-about one.

But the monopoly of the colony trade, so far as it has operated upon the

employment of the capital of Great Britain, has, in all cases, forced

some part of it from a foreign trade of consumption carried on with a

neighbouring, to one carried on with a more distant country, and in many

cases from a direct foreign trade of consumption to a round-about one.

_First_, The monopoly of the colony trade has, in all cases, forced some

part of the capital of Great Britain from a foreign trade of

consumption carried on with a neighbouring, to one carried on with a

more distant country.

It has, in all cases, forced some part of that capital from the trade

with Europe, and with the countries which lie round the Mediterranean

sea, to that with the more distant regions of America and the West

Indies; from which the returns are necessarily less frequent, not only

on account of the greater distance, but on account of the peculiar

circumstances of those countries. New colonies, it has already been

observed, are always understocked. Their capital in always much less

than what they could employ with great profit and advantage in the

improvement and cultivation of their land. They have a constant demand,

therefore, for more capital than they have of their own; and, in order

to supply the deficiency of their own, they endeavour to borrow as much

as they can of the mother country, to whom they are, therefore, always

in debt. The most common way in which the colonies contract this debt,

is not by borrowing upon bond of the rich people of the mother country,

though they sometimes do this too, but by running as much in arrear to

their correspondents, who supply them with goods from Europe, as those

correspondents will allow them. Their annual returns frequently do not

amount to more than a third, and sometimes not to so great a proportion

of what they owe. The whole capital, therefore, which their

correspondents advance to them, is seldom returned to Britain in less

than three, and sometimes not in less than four or five years. But a

British capital of a thousand pounds, for example, which is returned to

Great Britain only once in five years, can keep in constant employment

only one-fifth part of the British industry which it could maintain, if

the whole was returned once in the year; and, instead of the quantity of

industry which a thousand pounds could maintain for a year, can keep in

constant employment the quantity only which two hundred pounds can

maintain for a year. The planter, no doubt, by the high price which he

pays for the goods from Europe, by the interest upon the bills which he

grants at distant dates, and by the commission upon the renewal of those

which he grants at near dates, makes up, and probably more than makes

up, all the loss which his correspondent can sustain by this delay. But,

though he make up the loss of his correspondent, he cannot make up that

of Great Britain. In a trade of which the returns are very distant, the

profit of the merchant may be as great or greater than in one in which

they are very frequent and near; but the advantage of the country in

which he resides, the quantity of productive labour constantly

maintained there, the annual produce of the land and labour, must always

be much less. That the returns of the trade to America, and still more

those of that to the West Indies, are, in general, not only more

distant, but more irregular and more uncertain, too, than those of the

trade to any part of Europe, or even of the countries which lie round

the Mediterranean sea, will readily be allowed, I imagine, by every body

who has any experience of these different branches of trade.

_Secondly_, The monopoly of the colony trade, has, in many cases, forced

some part of the capital of Great Britain from a direct foreign trade of

consumption, into a round-about one.

Among the enumerated commodities which can be sent to no other market

but Great Britain, there are several of which the quantity exceeds very

much the consumption of Great Britain, and of which, a part, therefore,

must be exported to other countries. But this cannot be done without

forcing some part of the capital of Great Britain into a round-about

foreign trade of consumption. Maryland, and Virginia, for example, send

annually to Great Britain upwards of ninety-six thousand hogsheads of

tobacco, and the consumption of Great Britain is said not to exceed

fourteen thousand. Upwards of eighty-two thousand hogsheads, therefore,

must be exported to other countries, to France, to Holland, and, to the

countries which lie round the Baltic and Mediterranean seas. But that

part of the capital of Great Britain which brings those eighty-two

thousand hogsheads to Great Britain, which re-exports them from thence

to those other countries, and which brings back from those countries to

Great Britain either goods or money in return, is employed in a

round-about foreign trade of consumption; and is necessarily forced into

this employment, in order to dispose of this great surplus. If we would

compute in how many years the whole of this capital is likely to come

back to Great Britain, we must add to the distance of the American

returns that of the returns from those other countries. If, in the

direct foreign trade of consumption which we carry on with America, the

whole capital employed frequently does not come back in less than three

or four years, the whole capital employed in this round-about one is not

likely to come back in less than four or five. If the one can keep in

constant employment but a third or a fourth part of the domestic

industry which could be maintained by a capital returned once in the

year, the other can keep in constant employment but a fourth or a fifth

part of that industry. At some of the out-ports a credit is commonly

given to those foreign correspondents to whom they export their tobacco.

At the port of London, indeed, it is commonly sold for ready money: the

rule is Weigh and pay. At the port of London, therefore, the final

returns of the whole round-about trade are more distant than the

returns from America, by the time only which the goods may lie unsold in

the warehouse; where, however, they may sometimes lie long enough. But,

had not the colonies been confined to the market of Great Britain for

the sale of their tobacco, very little more of it would probably have

come to us than what was necessary for the home consumption. The goods

which Great Britain purchases at present for her own consumption with

the great surplus of tobacco which she exports to other countries, she

would, in this case, probably have purchased with the immediate produce

of her own industry, or with some part of her own manufactures. That

produce, those manufactures, instead of being almost entirely suited to

one great market, as at present, would probably have been fitted to a

great number of smaller markets. Instead of one great round-about

foreign trade of consumption, Great Britain would probably have carried

on a great number of small direct foreign trades of the same kind. On

account of the frequency of the returns, a part, and probably but a

small part, perhaps not above a third or a fourth of the capital which

at present carries on this great round-about trade, might have been

sufficient to carry on all those small direct ones; might have kept in

constant employment an equal quantity of British industry; and have

equally supported the annual produce of the land and labour of Great

Britain. All the purposes of this trade being, in this manner, answered

by a much smaller capital, there would have been a large spare capital

to apply to other purposes; to improve the lands, to increase the

manufactures, and to extend the commerce of Great Britain; to come into

competition at least with the other British capitals employed in all

those different ways, to reduce the rate of profit in them all, and

thereby to give to Great Britain, in all of them, a superiority over

other countries, still greater than what she at present enjoys.

The monopoly of the colony trade, too, has forced some part of the

capital of Great Britain from all foreign trade of consumption to a

carrying trade; and, consequently from supporting more or less the

industry of Great Britain, to be employed altogether in supporting

partly that of the colonies, and partly that of some other countries.

The goods, for example, which are annually purchased with the great

surplus of eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco annually re-exported

from Great Britain, are not all consumed in Great Britain. Part of them,

linen from Germany and Holland, for example, is returned to the colonies

for their particular consumption. But that part of the capital of Great

Britain which buys the tobacco with which this linen is afterwards

bought, is necessarily withdrawn from supporting the industry of Great

Britain, to be employed altogether in supporting, partly that of the

colonies, and partly that of the particular countries who pay for this

tobacco with the produce of their own industry.

The monopoly of the colony trade, besides, by forcing towards it a much

greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would

naturally have gone to it, seems to have broken altogether that natural

balance which would otherwise have taken place among all the different

branches of British industry. The industry of Great Britain, instead of

being accommodated to a great number of small markets, has been

principally suited to one great market. Her commerce, instead of running

in a great number of small channels, has been taught to run principally

in one great channel. But the whole system of her industry and commerce

has thereby been rendered less secure; the whole state of her body

politic less healthful than it otherwise would have been. In her present

condition, Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in

which some of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, upon that

account, are liable to many dangerous disorders, scarce incident to

those in which all the parts are more properly proportioned. A small

stop in that great blood-vessel, which has been artificially swelled

beyond its natural dimensions, and through which an unnatural proportion

of the industry and commerce of the country has been forced to

circulate, is very likely to bring on the most dangerous disorders upon

the whole body politic. The expectation of a rupture with the colonies,

accordingly, has struck the people of Great Britain with more terror

than they ever felt for a Spanish armada, or a French invasion. It was

this terror, whether well or ill grounded, which rendered the repeal of

the stamp act, among the merchants at least, a popular measure. In the

total exclusion from the colony market, was it to last only for a few

years, the greater part of our merchants used to fancy that they foresaw

an entire stop to their trade; the greater part of our master

manufacturers, the entire ruin of their business; and the greater part

of our workmen, an end of their employment. A rupture with any of our

neighbours upon the continent, though likely, too, to occasion some stop

or interruption in the employments of some of all these different orders

of people, is foreseen, however, without any such general emotion. The

blood, of which the circulation is stopt in some of the smaller vessels,

easily disgorges itself into the greater, without occasioning any

dangerous disorder; but, when it is stopt in any of the greater vessels,

convulsions, apoplexy, or death, are the immediate and unavoidable

consequences. If but one of those overgrown manufactures, which, by

means either of bounties or of the monopoly of the home and colony

markets, have been artificially raised up to any unnatural height, finds

some small stop or interruption in its employment, it frequently

occasions a mutiny and disorder alarming to government, and embarrassing

even to the deliberations of the legislature. How great, therefore,

would be the disorder and confusion, it was thought, which must

necessarily be occasioned by a sudden and entire stop in the employment

of so great a proportion of our principal manufacturers?

Some moderate and gradual relaxation of the laws which give to Great

Britain the exclusive trade to the colonies, till it is rendered in a

great measure free, seems to be the only expedient which can, in all

future times, deliver her from this danger; which can enable her, or

even force her, to withdraw some part of her capital from this overgrown

employment, and to turn it, though with less profit, towards other

employments; and which, by gradually diminishing one branch of her

industry, and gradually increasing all the rest, can, by degrees,

restore all the different branches of it to that natural, healthful, and

proper proportion, which perfect liberty necessarily establishes, and

which perfect liberty can alone preserve. To open the colony trade all

at once to all nations, might not only occasion some transitory

inconveniency, but a great permanent loss, to the greater part of those

whose industry or capital is at present engaged in it. The sudden loss

of the employment, even of the ships which import the eighty-two

thousand hogsheads of tobacco, which are over and above the consumption

of Great Britain, might alone be felt very sensibly. Such are the

unfortunate effects of all the regulations of the mercantile system.

They not only introduce very dangerous disorders into the state of the

body politic, but disorders which it is often difficult to remedy,

without occasioning, for a time at least, still greater disorders. In

what manner, therefore, the colony trade ought gradually to be opened;

what are the restraints which ought first, and what are those which

ought last, to be taken away; or in what manner the natural system of

perfect liberty and justice ought gradually to be restored, we must

leave to the wisdom of future statesmen and legislators to determine.

Five different events, unforeseen and unthought of, have very

fortunately concurred to hinder Great Britain from feeling, so sensibly

as it was generally expected she would, the total exclusion which has

now taken place for more than a year (from the first of December 1774)

from a very important branch of the colony trade, that of the twelve

associated provinces of North America. First, those colonies, in

preparing themselves for their non-importation agreement, drained Great

Britain completely of all the commodities which were fit for their

market; secondly, the extraordinary demand of the Spanish flota has,

this year, drained Germany and the north of many commodities, linen in

particular, which used to come into competition, even in the British

market, with the manufactures of Great Britain; thirdly, the peace

between Russia and Turkey has occasioned an extraordinary demand from

the Turkey market, which, during the distress of the country, and while

a Russian fleet was cruising in the Archipelago, had been very poorly

supplied; fourthly, the demand of the north of Europe for the

manufactures of Great Britain has been increasing from year to year, for

some time past; and, fifthly, the late partition, and consequential

pacification of Poland, by opening the market of that great country,

have, this year, added an extraordinary demand from thence to the

increasing demand of the north. These events are all, except the fourth,

in their nature transitory and accidental; and the exclusion from so

important a branch of the colony trade, if unfortunately it should

continue much longer, may still occasion some degree of distress. This

distress, however, as it will come on gradually, will be felt much less

severely than if it had come on all at once; and, in the mean time, the

industry and capital of the country may find a new employment and

direction, so as to prevent this distress from ever rising to any

considerable height.

The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, so far as it has turned

towards that trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain

than what would otherwise have gone to it, has in all cases turned it,

from a foreign trade of consumption with a neighbouring, into one with a

more distant country; in many cases from a direct foreign trade of

consumption into a round-about one; and, in some cases, from all foreign

trade of consumption into a carrying trade. It has, in all cases,

therefore, turned it from a direction in which it would have maintained

a greater quantity of productive labour, into one in which it can

maintain a much smaller quantity. By suiting, besides, to one particular

market only, so great a part of the industry and commerce of Great

Britain, it has rendered the whole state of that industry and commerce

more precarious and less secure, than if their produce had been

accommodated to a greater variety of markets.

We must carefully distinguish between the effects of the colony trade

and those of the monopoly of that trade. The former are always and

necessarily beneficial; the latter always and necessarily hurtful. But

the former are so beneficial, that the colony trade, though subject to a

monopoly, and, notwithstanding the hurtful effects of that monopoly, is

still, upon the whole, beneficial, and greatly beneficial, though a good

deal less so than it otherwise would be.

The effect of the colony trade, in its natural and free state, is to

open a great though distant market, for such parts of the produce of

British industry as may exceed the demand of the markets nearer home, of

those of Europe, and of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean

sea. In its natural and free state, the colony trade, without drawing

from those markets any part of the produce which had ever been sent to

them, encourages Great Britain to increase the surplus continually, by

continually presenting new equivalents to be exchanged for it. In its

natural and free state, the colony trade tends to increase the quantity

of productive labour in Great Britain, but without altering in any

respect the direction of that which had been employed there before. In

the natural and free state of the colony trade, the competition of all

other nations would hinder the rate of profit from rising above the

common level, either in the new market, or in the new employment. The

new market, without drawing any thing from the old one, would create, if

one may say so, a new produce for its own supply; and that new produce

would constitute a new capital for carrying on the new employment,

which, in the same manner, would draw nothing from the old one.

The monopoly of the colony trade, on the contrary, by excluding the

competition of other nations, and thereby raising the rate of profit,

both in the new market and in the new employment, draws produce from the

old market, and capital from the old employment. To augment our share of

the colony trade beyond what it otherwise would be, is the avowed

purpose of the monopoly. If our share of that trade were to be no

greater with, than it would have been without the monopoly, there could

have been no reason for establishing the monopoly. But whatever forces

into a branch of trade, of which the returns are slower and more distant

than those of the greater part of other trades, a greater proportion of

the capital of any country, than what of its own accord would go to that

branch, necessarily renders the whole quantity of productive labour

annually maintained there, the whole annual produce of the land and

labour of that country, less than they otherwise would be. It keeps down

the revenue of the inhabitants of that country below what it would

naturally rise to, and thereby diminishes their power of accumulation.

It not only hinders, at all times, their capital from maintaining so

great a quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise maintain,

but it hinders it from increasing so fast as it would otherwise

increase, and, consequently, from maintaining a still greater quantity

of productive labour.

The natural good effects of the colony trade, however, more than

counterbalance to Great Britain the bad effects of the monopoly; so

that, monopoly and altogether, that trade, even as it is carried on at

present, is not only advantageous, but greatly advantageous. The new

market and the new employment which are opened by the colony trade, are

of much greater extent than that portion of the old market and of the

old employment which is lost by the monopoly. The new produce and the

new capital which has been created, if one may say so, by the colony

trade, maintain in Great Britain a greater quantity of productive labour

than what can have been thrown out of employment by the revulsion of

capital from other trades of which the returns are more frequent. If the

colony trade, however, even as it is carried on at present, is

advantageous to Great Britain, it is not by means of the monopoly, but

in spite of the monopoly.

It is rather for the manufactured than for the rude produce of Europe,

that the colony trade opens a new market. Agriculture is the proper

business of all new colonies; a business which the cheapness of land

renders more advantageous than any other. They abound, therefore, in the

rude produce of land; and instead of importing it from other countries,

they have generally a large surplus to export. In new colonies,

agriculture either draws hands from all other employments, or keeps them

from going to any other employment. There are few hands to spare for the

necessary, and none for the ornamental manufactures. The greater part of

the manufactures of both kinds they find it cheaper to purchase of other

countries than to make for themselves. It is chiefly by encouraging the

manufactures of Europe, that the colony trade indirectly encourages its

agriculture. The manufacturers of Europe, to whom that trade gives

employment, constitute a new market for the produce of the land, and the

most advantageous of all markets; the home market for the corn and

cattle, for the bread and butcher's meat of Europe, is thus greatly

extended by means of the trade to America.

But that the monopoly of the trade of populous and thriving colonies is

not alone sufficient to establish, or even to maintain, manufactures in

any country, the examples of Spain and Portugal sufficiently

demonstrate. Spain and Portugal were manufacturing countries before they

had any considerable colonies. Since they had the richest and most

fertile in the world, they have both ceased to be so.

In Spain and Portugal, the bad effects of the monopoly, aggravated by

other causes, have, perhaps, nearly overbalanced the natural good

effects of the colony trade. These causes seem to be other monopolies of

different kinds: the degradation of the value of gold and silver below

what it is in most other countries; the exclusion from foreign markets

by improper taxes upon exportation, and the narrowing of the home

market, by still more improper taxes upon the transportation of goods

from one part of the country to another; but above all, that irregular

and partial administration of justice which often protects the rich and

powerful debtor from the pursuit of his injured creditor, and which

makes the industrious part of the nation afraid to prepare goods for the

consumption of those haughty and great men, to whom they dare not refuse

to sell upon credit, and from whom they are altogether uncertain of

repayment.

In England, on the contrary, the natural good effects of the colony

trade, assisted by other causes, have in a great measure conquered the

bad effects of the monopoly. These causes seem to be, the general

liberty of trade, which, notwithstanding some restraints, is at least

equal, perhaps superior, to what it is in any other country; the liberty

of exporting, duty free, almost all sorts of goods which are the produce

of domestic industry, to almost any foreign country; and what, perhaps,

is of still greater importance, the unbounded liberty of transporting

them from one part of our own country to any other, without being

obliged to give any account to any public office, without being liable

to question or examination of any kind; but, above all, that equal and

impartial administration of justice, which renders the rights of the

meanest British subject respectable to the greatest, and which, by

securing to every man the fruits of his own industry, gives the greatest

and most effectual encouragement to every sort of industry.

If the manufactures of Great Britain, however, have been advanced, as

they certainly have, by the colony trade, it has not been by means of

the monopoly of that trade, but in spite of the monopoly. The effect of

the monopoly has been, not to augment the quantity, but to alter the

quality and shape of a part of the manufactures of Great Britain, and to

accommodate to a market, from which the returns are slow and distant,

what would otherwise have been accommodated to one from which the

returns are frequent and near. Its effect has consequently been, to turn

a part of the capital of Great Britain from an employment in which it

would have maintained a greater quantity of manufacturing industry, to

one in which it maintains a much smaller, and thereby to diminish,

instead of increasing, the whole quantity of manufacturing industry

maintained in Great Britain.

The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, like all the other mean and

malignant expedients of the mercantile system, depresses the industry of

all other countries, but chiefly that of the colonies, without in the

least increasing, but on the contrary diminishing, that of the country

in whose favour it is established.

The monopoly hinders the capital of that country, whatever may, at any

particular time, be the extent of that capital, from maintaining so

great a quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise maintain,

and from affording so great a revenue to the industrious inhabitants as

it would otherwise afford. But as capital can be increased only by

savings from revenue, the monopoly, by hindering it from affording so

great a revenue as it would otherwise afford, necessarily hinders it

from increasing so fast as it would otherwise increase, and consequently

from maintaining a still greater quantity of productive labour, and

affording a still greater revenue to the industrious inhabitants of that

country. One great original source of revenue, therefore, the wages of

labour, the monopoly must necessarily have rendered, at all times, less

abundant than it otherwise would have been.

By raising the rate of mercantile profit, the monopoly discourages the

improvement of land. The profit of improvement depends upon the

difference between what the land actually produces, and what, by the

application of a certain capital, it can be made to produce. If this

difference affords a greater profit than what can be drawn from an equal

capital in any mercantile employment, the improvement of land will draw

capital from all mercantile employments. If the profit in less,

mercantile employments will draw capital from the improvement of land.

Whatever, therefore, raises the rate of mercantile profit, either

lessens the superiority, or increases the inferiority of the profit of

improvement: and, in the one case, hinders capital from going to

improvement, and in the other draws capital from it; but by discouraging

improvement, the monopoly necessarily retards the natural increase of

another great original source of revenue, the rent of land. By raising

the rate of profit, too, the monopoly necessarily keeps up the market

rate of interest higher than it otherwise would be. But the price of

land, in proportion to the rent which it affords, the number of years

purchase which is commonly paid for it, necessarily falls as the rate of

interest rises, and rises as the rate of interest falls. The monopoly,

therefore, hurts the interest of the landlord two different ways, by

retarding the natural increase, first, of his rent, and, secondly, of

the price which he would get for his land, in proportion to the rent

which it affords.

The monopoly, indeed, raises the rate of mercantile profit, and thereby

augments somewhat the gain of our merchants. But as it obstructs the

natural increase of capital, it tends rather to diminish than to

increase the sum total of the revenue which the inhabitants of the

country derive from the profits of stock; a small profit upon a great

capital generally affording a greater revenue than a great profit upon a

small one. The monopoly raises the rate of profit, but it hinders the

sum of profit from rising so high as it otherwise would do.

All the original sources of revenue, the wages of labour, the rent of

land, and the profits of stock, the monopoly renders much less abundant

than they otherwise would be. To promote the little interest of one

little order of men in one country, it hurts the interest of all other

orders of men in that country, and of all the men in all other

countries.

It is solely by raising the ordinary rate of profit, that the monopoly

either has proved, or could prove, advantageous to any one particular

order of men. But besides all the bad effects to the country in general,

which have already been mentioned as necessarily resulting from a higher

rate of profit, there is one more fatal, perhaps, than all these put

together, but which, if we may judge from experience, is inseparably

connected with it. The high rate of profit seems everywhere to destroy

that parsimony which, in other circumstances, is natural to the

character of the merchant. When profits are high, that sober virtue

seems to be superfluous, and expensive luxury to suit better the

affluence of his situation. But the owners of the great mercantile

capitals are necessarily the leaders and conductors of the whole

industry of every nation; and their example has a much greater influence

upon the manners of the whole industrious part of it than that of any

other order of men. If his employer is attentive and parsimonious, the

workman is very likely to be so too; but if the master in dissolute and

disorderly, the servant, who shapes his work according to the pattern

which his master prescribes to him, will shape his life, too, according

to the example which he sets him. Accumulation is thus prevented in the

hands of all those who are naturally the most disposed to accumulate;

and the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour, receive

no augmentation from the revenue of those who ought naturally to augment

them the most. The capital of the country, instead of increasing,

gradually dwindles away, and the quantity of productive labour

maintained in it grows every day less and less. Have the exorbitant

profits of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon augmented the capital of

Spain and Portugal? Have they alleviated the poverty, have they promoted

the industry, of those two beggarly countries? Such has been the tone of

mercantile expense in those two trading cities, that those exorbitant

profits, far from augmenting the general capital of the country, seem

scarce to have been sufficient to keep up the capitals upon which they

were made. Foreign capitals are every day intruding themselves, if I may

say so, more and more into the trade of Cadiz and Lisbon. It is to expel

those foreign capitals from a trade which their own grows every day more

and more insufficient for carrying on, that the Spaniards and Portuguese

endeavour every day to straiten more and more the galling bands of their

absurd monopoly. Compare the mercantile manners of Cadiz and Lisbon with

those of Amsterdam, and you will be sensible how differently the conduct

and character of merchants are affected by the high and by the low

profits of stock. The merchants of London, indeed, have not yet

generally become such magnificent lords as those of Cadiz and Lisbon;

but neither are they in general such attentive and parsimonious burghers

as those of Amsterdam. They are supposed, however, many of them, to be a

good deal richer than the greater part of the former, and not quite so

rich as many of the latter: but the rate of their profit is commonly

much lower than that of the former, and a good deal higher than that of

the latter. Light come, light go, says the proverb; and the ordinary

tone of expense seems everywhere to be regulated, not so much according

to the real ability of spending, as to the supposed facility of getting

money to spend.

It is thus that the single advantage which the monopoly procures to a

single order of men, is in many different ways hurtful to the general

interest of the country.

To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of

customers, may at first sight, appear a project fit only for a nation of

shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of

shopkeepers, but extremely fit for a nation whose government is

influenced by shopkeepers. Such statesmen, and such statesmen only, are

capable of fancying that they will find some advantage in employing the

blood and treasure of their fellow-citizens, to found and maintain such

an empire. Say to a shopkeeper, Buy me a good estate, and I shall always

buy my clothes at your shop, even though I should pay somewhat dearer

than what I can have them for at other shops; and you will not find him

very forward to embrace your proposal. But should any other person buy

you such an estate, the shopkeeper will be much obliged to your

benefactor if he would enjoin you to buy all your clothes at his shop.

England purchased for some of her subjects, who found themselves uneasy

at home, a great estate in a distant country. The price, indeed, was

very small, and instead of thirty years purchase, the ordinary price of

land in the present times, it amounted to little more than the expense

of the different equipments which made the first discovery, reconoitered

the coast, and took a fictitious possession of the country. The land was

good, and of great extent; and the cultivators having plenty of good

ground to work upon, and being for some time at liberty to sell their

produce where they pleased, became, in the course of little more than

thirty or forty years (between 1620 and 1660), so numerous and thriving

a people, that the shopkeepers and other traders of England wished to

secure to themselves the monopoly of their custom. Without pretending,

therefore, that they had paid any part, either of the original purchase

money, or of the subsequent expense of improvement, they petitioned the

parliament, that the cultivators of America might for the future be

confined to their shop; first, for buying all the goods which they

wanted from Europe; and, secondly, for selling all such parts of their

own produce as these traders might find it convenient to buy. For they

did not find it convenient to buy every part of it. Some parts of it

imported into England, might have interfered with some of the trades

which they themselves carried on at home. Those particular parts of it,

therefore, they were willing that the colonists should sell where they

could; the farther off the better; and upon that account proposed that

their market should be confined to the countries south of Cape

Finisterre. A clause in the famous act of navigation established this

truly shopkeeper proposal into a law.

The maintenance of this monopoly has hitherto been the principal, or

more properly, perhaps, the sole end and purpose of the dominion which

Great Britain assumes over her colonies. In the exclusive trade, it is

supposed, consists the great advantage of provinces, which have never

yet afforded either revenue or military force for the support of the

civil government, or the defence of the mother country. The monopoly is

the principal badge of their dependency, and it is the sole fruit which

has hitherto been gathered from that dependency. Whatever expense Great

Britain has hitherto laid out in maintaining this dependency, has really

been laid out in order to support this monopoly. The expense of the

ordinary peace establishment of the colonies amounted, before the

commencement of the present disturbances to the pay of twenty regiments

of foot; to the expense of the artillery, stores, and extraordinary

provisions, with which it was necessary to supply them; and to the

expense of a very considerable naval force, which was constantly kept

up, in order to guard from the smuggling vessels of other nations, the

immense coast of North America, and that of our West Indian islands. The

whole expense of this peace establishment was a charge upon the revenue

of Great Britain, and was, at the same time, the smallest part of what

the dominion of the colonies has cost the mother country. If we would

know the amount of the whole, we must add to the annual expense of this

peace establishment, the interest of the sums which, in consequence of

their considering her colonies as provinces subject to her dominion,

Great Britain has, upon different occasions, laid out upon their

defence. We must add to it, in particular, the whole expense of the late

war, and a great part of that of the war which preceded it. The late war

was altogether a colony quarrel; and the whole expense of it, in

whatever part of the world it might have been laid out, whether in

Germany or the East Indies, ought justly to be stated to the account of

the colonies. It amounted to more than ninety millions sterling,

including not only the new debt which was contracted, but the two

shillings in the pound additional land tax, and the sums which were

every year borrowed from the sinking fund. The Spanish war which began

in 1739 was principally a colony quarrel. Its principal object was to

prevent the search of the colony ships, which carried on a contraband

trade with the Spanish Main. This whole expense is, in reality, a bounty

which has been given in order to support a monopoly. The pretended

purpose of it was to encourage the manufactures, and to increase the

commerce of Great Britain. But its real effect has been to raise the

rate of mercantile profit, and to enable our merchants to turn into a

branch of trade, of which the returns are more slow and distant than

those of the greater part of other trades, a greater proportion of their

capital than they otherwise would have done; two events which, if a

bounty could have prevented, it might perhaps have been very well worth

while to give such a bounty.

Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives

nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies.

To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority

over her colonies, and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to

enact their own laws, and to make peace and war, as they might think

proper, would be to propose such a measure as never was, and never will

be, adopted by any nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave

up the dominion of any province, how troublesome soever it might be to

govern it, and how small soever the revenue which it afforded might be

in proportion to the expense which it occasioned. Such sacrifices,

though they might frequently be agreeable to the interest, are always

mortifying to the pride of every nation; and, what is perhaps of still

greater consequence, they are always contrary to the private interest of

the governing part of it, who would thereby be deprived of the disposal

of many places of trust and profit, of many opportunities of acquiring

wealth and distinction, which the possession of the most turbulent, and,

to the great body of the people, the most unprofitable province, seldom

fails to afford. The most visionary enthusiasts would scarce be capable

of proposing such a measure, with any serious hopes at least of its

ever being adopted. If it was adopted, however, Great Britain would not

only be immediately freed from the whole annual expense of the peace

establishment of the colonies, but might settle with them such a treaty

of commerce as would effectually secure to her a free trade, more

advantageous to the great body of the people, though less so to the

merchants, than the monopoly which she at present enjoys. By thus

parting good friends, the natural affection of the colonies to the

mother country, which, perhaps our late dissensions have well nigh

extinguished, would quickly revive. It might dispose them not only to

respect, for whole centuries together, that treaty of commerce which

they had concluded with us at parting, but to favour us in war as in

trade, and instead of turbulent and factious subjects, to become our

most faithful, affectionate, and generous allies; and the same sort of

parental affection on the one side, and filial respect on the other,

might revive between Great Britain and her colonies, which used to

subsist between those of ancient Greece and the mother city from which

they descended.

In order to render any province advantageous to the empire to which it

belongs, it ought to afford, in time of peace, a revenue to the public,

sufficient not only for defraying the whole expense of its own peace

establishment, but for contributing its proportion to the support of the

general government of the empire. Every province necessarily

contributes, more or less, to increase the expense of that general

government. If any particular province, therefore, does not contribute

its share towards defraying this expense, an unequal burden must be

thrown upon some other part of the empire. The extraordinary revenue,

too, which every province affords to the public in time of war, ought,

from parity of reason, to bear the same proportion to the extraordinary

revenue of the whole empire, which its ordinary revenue does in time of

peace. That neither the ordinary nor extraordinary revenue which Great

Britain derives from her colonies, bears this proportion to the whole

revenue of the British empire, will readily be allowed. The monopoly, it

has been supposed, indeed, by increasing the private revenue of the

people of Great Britain, and thereby enabling them to pay greater taxes,

compensates the deficiency of the public revenue of the colonies. But

this monopoly, I have endeavoured to show, though a very grievous tax

upon the colonies, and though it may increase the revenue of a

particular order of men in Great Britain, diminishes, instead of

increasing, that of the great body of the people, and consequently

diminishes, instead of increasing, the ability of the great body of the

people to pay taxes. The men, too, whose revenue the monopoly increases,

constitute a particular order, which it is both absolutely impossible to

tax beyond the proportion of other orders, and extremely impolitic even

to attempt to tax beyond that proportion, as I shall endeavour to show

in the following book. No particular resource, therefore, can be drawn

from this particular order.

The colonies may be taxed either by their own assemblies, or by the

parliament of Great Britain.

That the colony assemblies can never be so managed as to levy upon their

constituents a public revenue, sufficient, not only to maintain at all

times their own civil and military establishment, but to pay their

proper proportion of the expense of the general government of the

British empire, seems not very probable. It was a long time before even

the parliament of England, though placed immediately under the eye of

the sovereign, could be brought under such a system of management, or

could be rendered sufficiently liberal in their grants for supporting

the civil and military establishments even of their own country. It was

only by distributing among the particular members of parliament a great

part either of the offices, or of the disposal of the offices arising

from this civil and military establishment, that such a system of

management could be established, even with regard to the parliament of

England. But the distance of the colony assemblies from the eye of the

sovereign, their number, their dispersed situation, and their various

constitutions, would render it very difficult to manage them in the same

manner, even though the sovereign had the same means of doing it; and

those means are wanting. It would be absolutely impossible to distribute

among all the leading members of all the colony assemblies such a share,

either of the offices, or of the disposal of the offices, arising from

the general government of the British empire, as to dispose them to give

up their popularity at home, and to tax their constituents for the

support of that general government, of which almost the whole emoluments

were to be divided among people who were strangers to them. The

unavoidable ignorance of administration, besides, concerning the

relative importance of the different members of those different

assemblies, the offences which must frequently be given, the blunders

which must constantly be committed, in attempting to manage them in this

manner, seems to render such a system of management altogether

impracticable with regard to them.

The colony assemblies, besides, cannot be supposed the proper judges of

what is necessary for the defence and support of the whole empire. The

care of that defence and support is not entrusted to them. It is not

their business, and they have no regular means of information concerning

it. The assembly of a province, like the vestry of a parish, may judge

very properly concerning the affairs of its own particular district, but

can have no proper means of judging concerning those of the whole

empire. It cannot even judge properly concerning the proportion which

its own province bears to the whole empire, or concerning the relative

degree of its wealth and importance, compared with the other provinces;

because those other provinces are not under the inspection and

superintendency of the assembly of a particular province. What is

necessary for the defence and support of the whole empire, and in what

proportion each part ought to contribute, can be judged of only by that

assembly which inspects and superintends the affairs of the whole

empire.

It has been proposed, accordingly, that the colonies should be taxed by

requisition, the parliament of Great Britain determining the sum which

each colony ought to pay, and the provincial assembly assessing and

levying it in the way that suited best the circumstances of the

province. What concerned the whole empire would in this way be

determined by the assembly which inspects and superintends the affairs

of the whole empire; and the provincial affairs of each colony might

still be regulated by its own assembly. Though the colonies should, in

this case, have no representatives in the British parliament, yet, if we

may judge by experience, there is no probability that the parliamentary

requisition would be unreasonable. The parliament of England has not,

upon any occasion, shewn the smallest disposition to overburden those

parts of the empire which are not represented in parliament. The islands

of Guernsey and Jersey, without any means of resisting the authority of

parliament, are more lightly taxed than any part of Great Britain.

Parliament, in attempting to exercise its supposed right, whether well

or ill grounded, of taxing the colonies, has never hitherto demanded of

them any thing which even approached to a just proportion to what was

paid by their fellow-subjects at home. If the contribution of the

colonies, besides, was to rise or fall in proportion to the rise or fall

of the land-tax, parliament could not tax them without taxing, at the

same time, its own constituents, and the colonies might, in this case,

be considered as virtually represented in parliament.

Examples are not wanting of empires in which all the different provinces

are not taxed, if I may be allowed the expression, in one mass; but in

which the sovereign regulates the sum which each province ought to pay,

and in some provinces assesses and levies it as he thinks proper; while

in others he leaves it to be assessed and levied as the respective

states of each province shall determine. In some provinces of France,

the king not only imposes what taxes he thinks proper, but assesses and

levies them in the way he thinks proper. From others he demands a

certain sum, but leaves it to the states of each province to assess and

levy that sum as they think proper. According to the scheme of taxing by

requisition, the parliament of Great Britain would stand nearly in the

same situation towards the colony assemblies, as the king of France does

towards the states of those provinces which still enjoy the privilege of

having states of their own, the provinces of France which are supposed

to be the best governed.

But though, according to this scheme, the colonies could have no just

reason to fear that their share of the public burdens should ever exceed

the proper proportion to that of their fellow-citizens at home, Great

Britain might have just reason to fear that it never would amount to

that proper proportion. The parliament of Great Britain has not, for

some time past, had the same established authority in the colonies,

which the French king has in those provinces of France which still enjoy

the privilege of having states of their own. The colony assemblies, if

they were not very favourably disposed (and unless more skilfully

managed than they ever have been hitherto, they are not very likely to

be so), might still find many pretences for evading or rejecting the

most reasonable requisitions of parliament. A French war breaks out, we

shall suppose; ten millions must immediately be raised, in order to

defend the seat of the empire. This sum must be borrowed upon the credit

of some parliamentary fund mortgaged for paying the interest. Part of

this fund parliament proposes to raise by a tax to be levied in Great

Britain, and part of it by a requisition to all the different colony

assemblies of America and the West Indies. Would people readily advance

their money upon the credit of a fund which partly depended upon the

good humour of all these assemblies, far distant from the seat of the

war, and sometimes, perhaps, thinking themselves not much concerned in

the event of it? Upon such a fund, no more money would probably be

advanced than what the tax to be levied in Great Britain might be

supposed to answer for. The whole burden of the debt contracted on

account of the war would in this manner fall, as it always has done

hitherto, upon Great Britain; upon a part of the empire, and not upon

the whole empire. Great Britain is, perhaps, since the world began, the

only state which, as it has extended its empire, has only increased its

expense, without once augmenting its resources. Other states have

generally disburdened themselves, upon their subject and subordinate

provinces, of the most considerable part of the expense of defending the

empire. Great Britain has hitherto suffered her subject and subordinate

provinces to disburden themselves upon her of almost this whole expense.

In order to put Great Britain upon a footing of equality with her own

colonies, which the law has hitherto supposed to be subject and

subordinate, it seems necessary, upon the scheme of taxing them by

parliamentary requisition, that parliament should have some means of

rendering its requisitions immediately effectual, in case the colony

assemblies should attempt to evade or reject them; and what those means

are, it is not very easy to conceive, and it has not yet been explained.

Should the parliament of Great Britain, at the same time, be ever fully

established in the right of taxing the colonies, even independent of the

consent of their own assemblies, the importance of those assemblies

would, from that moment, be at an end, and with it, that of all the

leading men of British America. Men desire to have some share in the

management of public affairs, chiefly on account of the importance which

it gives them. Upon the power which the greater part of the leading men,

the natural aristocracy of every country, have of preserving or

defending their respective importance, depends the stability and

duration of every system of free government. In the attacks which those

leading men are continually making upon the importance of one another,

and in the defence of their own, consists the whole play of domestic

faction and ambition. The leading men of America, like those of all

other countries, desire to preserve their own importance. They feel, or

imagine, that if their assemblies, which they are fond of calling

parliaments, and of considering as equal in authority to the parliament

of Great Britain, should be so far degraded as to become the humble

ministers and executive officers of that parliament, the greater part of

their own importance would be at an end. They have rejected, therefore,

the proposal of being taxed by parliamentary requisition, and, like

other ambitious and high-spirited men, have rather chosen to draw the

sword in defence of their own importance.

Towards the declension of the Roman republic, the allies of Rome, who

had borne the principal burden of defending the state and extending the

empire, demanded to be admitted to all the privileges of Roman citizens.

Upon being refused, the social war broke out. During the course of that

war, Rome granted those privileges to the greater part of them, one by

one, and in proportion as they detached themselves from the general

confederacy. The parliament of Great Britain insists upon taxing the

colonies; and they refuse to be taxed by a parliament in which they are

not represented. If to each colony which should detach itself from the

general confederacy, Great Britain should allow such a number of

representatives as suited the proportion of what it contributed to the

public revenue of the empire, in consequence of its being subjected to

the same taxes, and in compensation admitted to the same freedom of

trade with its fellow-subjects at home; the number of its

representatives to be augmented as the proportion of its contribution

might afterwards augment; a new method of acquiring importance, a new

and more dazzling object of ambition, would be presented to the leading

men of each colony. Instead of piddling for the little prizes which are

to be found in what may be called the paltry raffle of colony faction,

they might then hope, from the presumption which men naturally have in

their own ability and good fortune, to draw some of the great prizes

which sometimes come from the wheel of the great state lottery of

British politics. Unless this or some other method is fallen upon, and

there seems to be none more obvious than this, of preserving the

importance and of gratifying the ambition of the leading men of America,

it is not very probable that they will ever voluntarily submit to us;

and we ought to consider, that the blood which must be shed in forcing

them to do so, is, every drop of it, the blood either of those who are,

or of those whom we wish to have for our fellow-citizens. They are very

weak who flatter themselves that, in the state to which things have

come, our colonies will be easily conquered by force alone. The persons

who now govern the resolutions of what they call their continental

congress, feel in themselves at this moment a degree of importance

which, perhaps, the greatest subjects in Europe scarce feel. From

shopkeepers, tradesmen, and attorneys, they are become statesmen and

legislators, and are employed in contriving a new form of government for

an extensive empire, which, they flatter themselves, will become, and

which, indeed, seems very likely to become, one of the greatest and most

formidable that ever was in the world. Five hundred different people,

perhaps, who, in different ways, act immediately under the continental

congress, and five hundred thousand, perhaps, who act under those five

hundred, all feel, in the same manner, a proportionable rise in their

own importance. Almost every individual of the governing party in

America fills, at present, in his own fancy, a station superior, not

only to what he had ever filled before, but to what he had ever expected

to fill; and unless some new object of ambition is presented either to

him or to his leaders, if he has the ordinary spirit of a man, he will

die in defence of that station.