Since then the proper and peculiar Pleasure gives accuracy to the

Workings and makes them more enduring and better of their kind, while

those Pleasures which are foreign to them mar them, it is plain there

is a wide difference between them: in fact, Pleasures foreign to any

Working have pretty much the same effect as the Pains proper to it,[12]

which, in fact, destroy the Workings; I mean, if one man dislikes

writing, or another calculation, the one does not write, the other does

not calculate; because, in each case, the Working is attended with some

Pain: so then contrary effects are produced upon the Workings by the

Pleasures and Pains proper to them, by which I mean those which arise

upon the Working, in itself, independently of any other circumstances.

As for the Pleasures foreign to a Working, we have said already that

they produce a similar effect to the Pain proper to it; that is they

destroy the Working, only not in like way.

Well then, as Workings differ from one another in goodness and badness,

some being fit objects of choice, others of avoidance, and others in

their nature indifferent, Pleasures are similarly related; since its

own proper Pleasure attends or each Working: of course that proper to a

good Working is good, that proper to a bad, bad: for even the desires

for what is noble are praiseworthy, and for what is base blameworthy.

Furthermore, the Pleasures attendant on Workings are more closely

connected with them even than the desires after them: for these last

are separate both in time and nature, but the former are close to the

Workings, and so indivisible from them as to raise a question whether

the Working and the Pleasure are identical; but Pleasure does not seem

to be an Intellectual Operation nor a Faculty of Perception, because

that is absurd; but yet it gives some the impression of being the same

from not being separated from these.

As then the Workings are different so are their Pleasures; now Sight

differs from Touch in purity, and Hearing and Smelling from Taste;

therefore, in like manner, do their Pleasures; and again, Intellectual

Pleasures from these Sensual, and the different kinds both of

Intellectual and Sensual from one another.

It is thought, moreover, that each animal has a Pleasure proper to

itself, as it has a proper Work; that Pleasure of course which is

attendant on the Working. And the soundness of this will appear upon

particular inspection: for horse, dog, and man have different

Pleasures; as Heraclitus says, an ass would sooner have hay than gold;

in other words, provender is pleasanter to asses than gold. So then the

Pleasures of animals specifically different are also specifically

different, but those of the same, we may reasonably suppose, are

without difference.

Yet in the case of human creatures they differ not a little: for the

very same things please some and pain others: and what are painful and

hateful to some are pleasant to and liked by others. The same is the

case with sweet things: the same will not seem so to the man in a fever

as to him who is in health: nor will the invalid and the person in

robust health have the same notion of warmth. The same is the case with

other things also.

Now in all such cases that is held to _be_ which impresses the good man

with the notion of being such and such; and if this is a second maxim

(as it is usually held to be), and Virtue, that is, the Good man, in

that he is such, is the measure of everything, then those must be real

Pleasures which gave him the impression of being so and those things

pleasant in which he takes Pleasure. Nor is it at all astonishing that

what are to him unpleasant should give another person the impression of

being pleasant, for men are liable to many corruptions and marrings;

and the things in question are not pleasant really, only to these

particular persons, and to them only as being thus disposed.

Well of course, you may say, it is obvious that we must assert those

which are confessedly disgraceful to be real Pleasures, except to

depraved tastes: but of those which are thought to be good what kind,

or which, must we say is _The Pleasure of Man?_ is not the answer plain

from considering the Workings, because the Pleasures follow upon these?

If then there be one or several Workings which belong to the perfect

and blessed man, the Pleasures which perfect these Workings must be

said to be specially and properly _The Pleasures of Man;_ and all the

rest in a secondary sense, and in various degrees according as the

Workings are related to those highest and best ones.

Chapter V.

Now that we have spoken about the Excellences of both kinds, and

Friendship in its varieties, and Pleasures, it remains to sketch out

Happiness, since we assume that to be the one End of all human things:

and we shall save time and trouble by recapitulating what was stated

before.

Well then, we said that it is not a State merely; because, if it were,

it might belong to one who slept all his life through and merely

vegetated, or to one who fell into very great calamities: and so, if

these possibilities displease us and we would rather put it into the

rank of some kind of Working (as was also said before), and Workings

are of different kinds (some being necessary and choice-worthy with a

view to other things, while others are so in themselves), it is plain

we must rank Happiness among those choice-worthy for their own sakes

and not among those which are so with a view to something further:

because Happiness has no lack of anything but is self-sufficient.

By choice-worthy in themselves are meant those from which nothing is

sought beyond the act of Working: and of this kind are thought to be

the actions according to Virtue, because doing what is noble and

excellent is one of those things which are choice-worthy for their own

sake alone.

And again, such amusements as are pleasant; because people do not

choose them with any further purpose: in fact they receive more harm

than profit from them, neglecting their persons and their property.

Still the common run of those who are judged happy take refuge in such

pastimes, which is the reason why they who have varied talent in such

are highly esteemed among despots; because they make themselves

pleasant in those things which these aim at, and these accordingly want

such men.

Now these things are thought to be appurtenances of Happiness because

men in power spend their leisure herein: yet, it may be, we cannot

argue from the example of such men: because there is neither Virtue nor

Intellect necessarily involved in having power, and yet these are the

only sources of good Workings: nor does it follow that because these

men, never having tasted pure and generous Pleasure, take refuge in

bodily ones, we are therefore to believe them to be more choice-worthy:

for children too believe that those things are most excellent which are

precious in their eyes.

We may well believe that as children and men have different ideas as to

what is precious so too have the bad and the good: therefore, as we

have many times said, those things are really precious and pleasant

which seem so to the good man: and as to each individual that Working

is most choice-worthy which is in accordance with his own state to the

good man that is so which is in accordance with Virtue.

Happiness then stands not in amusement; in fact the very notion is

absurd of the End being amusement, and of one’s toiling and enduring

hardness all one’s life long with a view to amusement: for everything

in the world, so to speak, we choose with some further End in view,

except Happiness, for that is the End comprehending all others. Now to

take pains and to labour with a view to amusement is plainly foolish

and very childish: but to amuse one’s self with a view to steady

employment afterwards, as Anacharsis says, is thought to be right: for

amusement is like rest, and men want rest because unable to labour

continuously.

Rest, therefore, is not an End, because it is adopted with a view to

Working afterwards.

Again, it is held that the Happy Life must be one in the way of

Excellence, and this is accompanied by earnestness,[13] and stands not

in amusement. Moreover those things which are done in earnest, we say,

are better than things merely ludicrous and joined with amusement: and

we say that the Working of the better part, or the better man, is more

earnest; and the Working of the better is at once better and more

capable of Happiness.

Then, again, as for bodily Pleasures, any ordinary person, or even a

slave, might enjoy them, just as well as the best man living but

Happiness no one supposes a slave to share except so far as it is

implied in life: because Happiness stands not in such pastimes but in

the Workings in the way of Excellence, as has also been stated before.

Chapter VI.

Now if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence of course that

Excellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of the

best Principle. Whether then this best Principle is Intellect or some

other which is thought naturally to rule and to lead and to conceive of

noble and divine things, whether being in its own nature divine or the

most divine of all our internal Principles, the Working of this in

accordance with its own proper Excellence must be the perfect

Happiness.

That it is Contemplative has been already stated: and this would seem

to be consistent with what we said before and with truth: for, in the

first place, this Working is of the highest kind, since the Intellect

is the highest of our internal Principles and the subjects with which

it is conversant the highest of all which fall within the range of our

knowledge.

Next, it is also most Continuous: for we are better able to contemplate

than to do anything else whatever, continuously.

Again, we think Pleasure must be in some way an ingredient in

Happiness, and of all Workings in accordance with Excellence that in

the way of Science is confessedly most pleasant: at least the pursuit

of Science is thought to contain Pleasures admirable for purity and

permanence; and it is reasonable to suppose that the employment is more

pleasant to those who have mastered, than to those who are yet seeking

for, it.[14]

And the Self-Sufficiency which people speak of will attach chiefly to

the Contemplative Working: of course the actual necessaries of life are

needed alike by the man of science, and the just man, and all the other

characters; but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, the

just man needs people towards whom, and in concert with whom, to

practise his justice; and in like manner the man of perfected

self-mastery, and the brave man, and so on of the rest; whereas the man

of science can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and the

more entirely he deserves the appellation the more able is he to do so:

it may be he can do better for having fellow-workers but still he is

certainly most Self-Sufficient.

Again, this alone would seem to be rested in for its own sake, since

nothing results from it beyond the fact of having contemplated; whereas

from all things which are objects of moral action we do mean to get

something beside the doing them, be the same more or less.

Also, Happiness is thought to stand in perfect rest;[15] for we toil

that we may rest, and war that we may be at peace. Now all the

Practical Virtues require either society or war for their Working, and

the actions regarding these are thought to exclude rest; those of war

entirely, because no one chooses war, nor prepares for war, for war’s

sake: he would indeed be thought a bloodthirsty villain who should make

enemies of his friends to secure the existence of fighting and

bloodshed. The Working also of the statesman excludes the idea of rest,

and, beside the actual work of government, seeks for power and

dignities or at least Happiness for the man himself and his

fellow-citizens: a Happiness distinct[16] from the national Happiness,

which we evidently seek as being different and distinct.

If then of all the actions in accordance with the various virtues those

of policy and war are pre-eminent in honour and greatness, and these

are restless, and aim at some further End and are not choice-worthy for

their own sakes, but the Working of the Intellect, being apt for

contemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no End

beyond itself and to have Pleasure of its own which helps to increase

the Working, and if the attributes of Self-Sufficiency, and capacity of

rest, and unweariedness (as far as is compatible with the infirmity of

human nature), and all other attributes of the highest Happiness,

plainly belong to this Working, this must be perfect Happiness, if

attaining a complete duration of life, which condition is added because

none of the points of Happiness is incomplete.

But such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man

will live thus, not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is in

him a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels his

composite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in

accordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure

Intellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the

life in accordance with it be divine compared with man’s ordinary life.

Yet must we not give ear to those who bid one as man to mind only man’s

affairs, or as mortal only mortal things; but, so far as we can, make

ourselves like immortals and do all with a view to living in accordance

with the highest Principle in us, for small as it may be in bulk yet in

power and preciousness it far more excels all the others.

In fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man’s “Self,”

since it is supreme and above all others in goodness it _would_ be

absurd then for a man not to choose his own life but that of some

other.

And here will apply an observation made before, that whatever is proper

to each is naturally best and pleasantest to him: such then is to Man

the life in accordance with pure Intellect (since this Principle is

most truly Man), and if so, then it is also the happiest.

And second in degree of Happiness will be that Life which is in

accordance with the other kind of Excellence, for the Workings in

accordance with this are proper to Man: I mean, we do actions of

justice, courage, and the other virtues, towards one another, in

contracts, services of different kinds, and in all kinds of actions and

feelings too, by observing what is befitting for each: and all these

plainly are proper to man. Further, the Excellence of the Moral

character is thought to result in some points from physical

circumstances, and to be, in many, very closely connected with the

passions.

Again, Practical Wisdom[17] and Excellence of the Moral character are

very closely united; since the Principles of Practical Wisdom are in

accordance with the Moral Virtues and these are right when they accord

with Practical Wisdom.

These moreover, as bound up with the passions, must belong to the

composite nature, and the Excellences or Virtues of the composite

nature are proper to man: therefore so too will be the life and

Happiness which is in accordance with them. But that of the Pure

Intellect is separate and distinct: and let this suffice upon the

subject, since great exactness is beyond our purpose,

It would seem, moreover, to require supply of external goods to a small

degree, or certainly less than the Moral Happiness: for, as far as

necessaries of life are concerned, we will suppose both characters to

need them equally (though, in point of fact, the man who lives in

society does take more pains about his person and all that kind of

thing; there will really be some little difference), but when we come

to consider their Workings there will be found a great difference.

I mean, the liberal man must have money to do his liberal actions with,

and the just man to meet his engagements (for mere intentions are

uncertain, and even those who are unjust make a pretence of _wishing_

to do justly), and the brave man must have power, if he is to perform

any of the actions which appertain to his particular Virtue, and the

man of perfected self-mastery must have opportunity of temptation, else

how shall he or any of the others display his real character?

(By the way, a question is sometimes raised, whether the moral choice

or the actions have most to do with Virtue, since it consists in both:

it is plain that the perfection of virtuous action requires both: but

for the actions many things are required, and the greater and more

numerous they are the more.) But as for the man engaged in

Contemplative Speculation, not only are such things unnecessary for his

Working, but, so to speak, they are even hindrances: as regards the

Contemplation at least; because of course in so far as he is Man and

lives in society he chooses to do what Virtue requires, and so he will

need such things for maintaining his character as Man though not as a

speculative philosopher.

And that the perfect Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Working

may appear also from the following consideration: our conception of the

gods is that they are above all blessed and happy: now what kind of

Moral actions are we to attribute to them? those of justice? nay, will

they not be set in a ridiculous light if represented as forming

contracts, and restoring deposits, and so on? well then, shall we

picture them performing brave actions, withstanding objects of fear and

meeting dangers, because it is noble to do so? or liberal ones? but to

whom shall they be giving? and further, it is absurd to think they have

money or anything of the kind. And as for actions of perfected

self-mastery, what can theirs be? would it not be a degrading praise

that they have no bad desires? In short, if one followed the subject

into all details all the circumstances connected with Moral actions

would appear trivial and unworthy of Gods.

Still, every one believes that they live, and therefore that they Work

because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like

Endymion: now if from a living being you take away Action, still more

if Creation, what remains but Contemplation? So then the Working of the

Gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for Contemplative

Speculation; and of all human Workings that will have the greatest

capacity for Happiness which is nearest akin to this.

A corroboration of which position is the fact that the other animals do

not partake of Happiness, being completely shut out from any such

Working.

To the Gods then all their life is blessed; and to men in so far as

there is in it some copy of such Working, but of the other animals none

is happy because it in no way shares in Contemplative Speculation.

Happiness then is co-extensive with this Contemplative Speculation, and

in proportion as people have the act of Contemplation so far have they

also the being happy, not incidentally, but in the way of Contemplative

Speculation because it is in itself precious.

Chapter VII.

So Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since it

is Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity,

because his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, but

there must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all

kinds.

However, it must not be thought, because without external goods a man

cannot enjoy high Happiness, that therefore he will require many and

great goods in order to be happy: for neither Self-sufficiency, nor

Action, stand in Excess, and it is quite possible to act nobly without

being ruler of sea and land, since even with moderate means a man may

act in accordance with Virtue.

And this may be clearly seen in that men in private stations are

thought to act justly, not merely no less than men in power but even

more: it will be quite enough that just so much should belong to a man

as is necessary, for his life will be happy who works in accordance

with Virtue.

Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy, when he said that they

are men moderately supplied with external goods, and who have achieved

the most noble deeds, as he thought, and who have lived with perfect

self-mastery: for it is quite possible for men of moderate means to act

as they ought.

Anaxagoras also seems to have conceived of the Happy man not as either

rich or powerful, saying that he should not wonder if he were accounted

a strange man in the judgment of the multitude: for they judge by

outward circumstances of which alone they have any perception.

And thus the opinions of the Wise seem to be accordant with our account

of the matter: of course such things carry some weight, but truth, in

matters of moral action, is judged from facts and from actual life, for

herein rests the decision. So what we should do is to examine the

preceding statements by referring them to facts and to actual life, and

when they harmonise with facts we may accept them, when they are at

variance with them conceive of them as mere theories.

Now he that works in accordance with, and pays observance to, Pure

Intellect, and tends this, seems likely to be both in the best frame of

mind and dearest to the Gods: because if, as is thought, any care is

bestowed on human things by the Gods then it must be reasonable to

think that they take pleasure in what is best and most akin to

themselves (and this must be the Pure Intellect); and that they requite

with kindness those who love and honour this most, as paying observance

to what is dear to them, and as acting rightly and nobly. And it is

quite obvious that the man of Science chiefly combines all these: he is

therefore dearest to the Gods, and it is probable that he is at the

same time most Happy.

Thus then on this view also the man of Science will be most Happy.

Chapter VIII.

Now then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind of way on these

subjects; I mean, on the Virtues, and also on Friendship and Pleasure;

are we to suppose that our original purpose is completed? Must we not

rather acknowledge, what is commonly said, that in matters of moral

action mere Speculation and Knowledge is not the real End but rather

Practice: and if so, then neither in respect of Virtue is Knowledge

enough; we must further strive to have and exert it, and take whatever

other means there are of becoming good.

Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make men

good, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous and

great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but in

point of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulate

the generous among the young and to base upon true virtuous principle

any noble and truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly are

powerless to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it

is not their nature to be amenable to a sense of shame but only to

fear; nor to abstain from what is low and mean because it is

disgraceful to do it but because of the punishment attached to it: in

fact, as they live at the beck and call of passion, they pursue their

own proper pleasures and the means of securing them, and they avoid the

contrary pains; but as for what is noble and truly pleasurable they

have not an idea of it, inasmuch as they have never tasted of it.

Men such as these then what mere words can transform? No, indeed! it is

either actually impossible, or a task of no mean difficulty, to alter

by words what has been of old taken into men’s very dispositions: and,

it may be, it is a ground for contentment if with all the means and

appliances for goodness in our hands we can attain to Virtue.

The formation of a virtuous character some ascribe to Nature, some to

Custom, and some to Teaching. Now Nature’s part, be it what it may,

obviously does not rest with us, but belongs to those who in the truest

sense are fortunate, by reason of certain divine agency,

Then, as for Words and Precept, they, it is to be feared, will not

avail with all; but it may be necessary for the mind of the disciple to

have been previously prepared for liking and disliking as he ought;

just as the soil must, to nourish the seed sown. For he that lives in

obedience to passion cannot hear any advice that would dissuade him,

nor, if he heard, understand: now him that is thus how can one reform?

in fact, generally, passion is not thought to yield to Reason but to

brute force. So then there must be, to begin with, a kind of affinity

to Virtue in the disposition; which must cleave to what is honourable

and loath what is disgraceful. But to get right guidance towards Virtue

from the earliest youth is not easy unless one is brought up under laws

of such kind; because living with self-mastery and endurance is not

pleasant to the mass of men, and specially not to the young. For this

reason the food, and manner of living generally, ought to be the

subject of legal regulation, because things when become habitual will

not be disagreeable.

Yet perhaps it is not sufficient that men while young should get right

food and tendance, but, inasmuch as they will have to practise and

become accustomed to certain things even after they have attained to

man’s estate, we shall want laws on these points as well, and, in fine,

respecting one’s whole life, since the mass of men are amenable to

compulsion rather than Reason, and to punishment rather than to a sense

of honour.

And therefore some men hold that while lawgivers should employ the

sense of honour to exhort and guide men to Virtue, under the notion

that they will then obey who have been well trained in habits; they

should impose chastisement and penalties on those who disobey and are

of less promising nature; and the incurable expel entirely: because the

good man and he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to

reason; and the baser sort, who grasp at pleasure, will be kept in

check, like beasts of burthen by pain. Therefore also they say that the

pains should be such as are most contrary to the pleasures which are

liked.

As has been said already, he who is to be good must have been brought

up and habituated well, and then live accordingly under good

institutions, and never do what is low and mean, either against or with

his will. Now these objects can be attained only by men living in

accordance with some guiding Intellect and right order, with power to

back them.

As for the Paternal Rule, it possesses neither strength nor compulsory

power, nor in fact does the Rule of any one man, unless he is a king or

some one in like case: but the Law has power to compel, since it is a

declaration emanating from Practical Wisdom and Intellect. And people

feel enmity towards their fellow-men who oppose their impulses, however

rightly they may do so: the Law, on the contrary, is not the object of

hatred, though enforcing right rules.

The Lacedæmonian is nearly the only State in which the framer of the

Constitution has made any provision, it would seem, respecting the food

and manner of living of the people: in most States these points are

entirely neglected, and each man lives just as he likes, ruling his

wife and children Cyclops-Fashion.

Of course, the best thing would be that there should be a right Public

System and that we should be able to carry it out: but, since as a

public matter those points are neglected, the duty would seem to

devolve upon each individual to contribute to the cause of Virtue with

his own children and friends, or at least to make this his aim and

purpose: and this, it would seem, from what has been said, he will be

best able to do by making a Legislator of himself: since all public

systems, it is plain, are formed by the instrumentality of laws and

those are good which are formed by that of good laws: whether they are

written or unwritten, whether they are applied to the training of one

or many, will not, it seems, make any difference, just as it does not

in music, gymnastics, or any other such accomplishments, which are

gained by practice.

For just as in Communities laws and customs prevail, so too in families

the express commands of the Head, and customs also: and even more in

the latter, because of blood-relationship and the benefits conferred:

for there you have, to begin with, people who have affection and are

naturally obedient to the authority which controls them.

Then, furthermore, Private training has advantages over Public, as in

the case of the healing art: for instance, as a general rule, a man who

is in a fever should keep quiet, and starve; but in a particular case,

perhaps, this may not hold good; or, to take a different illustration,

the boxer will not use the same way of fighting with all antagonists.

It would seem then that the individual will be most exactly attended to

under Private care, because so each will be more likely to obtain what

is expedient for him. Of course, whether in the art of healing, or

gymnastics, or any other, a man will treat individual cases the better

for being acquainted with general rules; as, “that so and so is good

for all, or for men in such and such cases:” because general maxims are

not only said to be but are the object-matter of sciences: still this

is no reason against the possibility of a man’s taking excellent care

of some _one_ case, though he possesses no scientific knowledge but

from experience is exactly acquainted with what happens in each point;

just as some people are thought to doctor themselves best though they

would be wholly unable to administer relief to others. Yet it may seem

to be necessary nevertheless, for one who wishes to become a real

artist and well acquainted with the theory of his profession, to have

recourse to general principles and ascertain all their capacities: for

we have already stated that these are the object-matter of sciences.

If then it appears that we may become good through the instrumentality

of laws, of course whoso wishes to make men better by a system of care

and training must try to make a Legislator of himself; for to treat

skilfully just any one who may be put before you is not what any

ordinary person can do, but, if any one, he who has knowledge; as in

the healing art, and all others which involve careful practice and

skill.

Will not then our next business be to enquire from what sources, or how

one may acquire this faculty of Legislation; or shall we say, that, as

in similar cases, Statesmen are the people to learn from, since this

faculty was thought to be a part of the Social Science? Must we not

admit that the Political Science plainly does not stand on a similar

footing to that of other sciences and faculties? I mean, that while in

all other cases those who impart the faculties and themselves exert

them are identical (physicians and painters for instance) matters of

Statesmanship the Sophists profess to teach, but not one of them

practises it, that being left to those actually engaged in it: and

these might really very well be thought to do it by some singular knack

and by mere practice rather than by any intellectual process: for they

neither write nor speak on these matters (though it might be more to

their credit than composing speeches for the courts or the assembly),

nor again have they made Statesmen of their own sons or their friends.

One can hardly suppose but that they would have done so if they could,

seeing that they could have bequeathed no more precious legacy to their

communities, nor would they have preferred, for themselves or their

dearest friends, the possession of any faculty rather than this.

Practice, however, seems to contribute no little to its acquisition;

merely breathing the atmosphere of politics would never have made

Statesmen of them, and therefore we may conclude that they who would

acquire a knowledge of Statesmanship must have in addition practice.

But of the Sophists they who profess to teach it are plainly a long way

off from doing so: in fact, they have no knowledge at all of its nature

and objects; if they had, they would never have put it on the same

footing with Rhetoric or even on a lower: neither would they have

conceived it to be “an easy matter to legislate by simply collecting

such laws as are famous because of course one could select the best,”

as though the selection were not a matter of skill, and the judging

aright a very great matter, as in Music: for they alone, who have

practical knowledge of a thing, can judge the performances rightly or

understand with what means and in what way they are accomplished, and

what harmonises with what: the unlearned must be content with being

able to discover whether the result is good or bad, as in painting.

Now laws may be called the performances or tangible results of

Political Science; how then can a man acquire from these the faculty of

Legislation, or choose the best? we do not see men made physicians by

compilations: and yet in these treatises men endeavour to give not only

the cases but also how they may be cured, and the proper treatment in

each case, dividing the various bodily habits. Well, these are thought

to be useful to professional men, but to the unprofessional useless. In

like manner it may be that collections of laws and Constitutions would

be exceedingly useful to such as are able to speculate on them, and

judge what is well, and what ill, and what kind of things fit in with

what others: but they who without this qualification should go through

such matters cannot have right judgment, unless they have it by

instinct, though they may become more intelligent in such matters.

Since then those who have preceded us have left uninvestigated the

subject of Legislation, it will be better perhaps for us to investigate

it ourselves, and, in fact, the whole subject of Polity, that thus what

we may call Human Philosophy may be completed as far as in us lies.

First then, let us endeavour to get whatever fragments of good there

may be in the statements of our predecessors, next, from the Polities

we have collected, ascertain what kind of things preserve or destroy

Communities, and what, particular Constitutions; and the cause why some

are well and others ill managed, for after such enquiry, we shall be

the better able to take a concentrated view as to what kind of

Constitution is best, what kind of regulations are best for each, and

what laws and customs.

NOTES

BOOK I

[1] For this term, as here employed, our language contains no

equivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.

There are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (in

which it is here employed) is its strict etymological signfication “The

science of Society,” and this includes everything which can bear at all

upon the well-being of Man in his social capacity, “Quicquid agunt

homines nostri est farrago libelli.” It is in this view that it is

fairly denominated most commanding and inclusive.

The second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is “Moral

Philosophy.” Aristotle explains the term in this sense in the Rhetoric

(1 2) [Greek: hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen dikaion esti

prosagoreuen politikaen]. He has principally in view in this treatise

the moral training of the Individual, the branch of the Science of

Society which we call Ethics Proper, bearing the same relation to the

larger Science as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the building

of the Temple, or the drill of the Recruit to the manoeuvres of the

field. Greek Philosophy viewed men principally as constituent parts of

a [Greek: polis], considering this function to be the real End of each,

and this state as that in which the Individual attained his highest and

most complete development.

The third sense is “The detail of Civil Government,” which Aristotle

expressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.

[2] Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to some

definite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is the

best judge who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, in

the latter, the man whose powers have been developed and matured by

education. A lame horse one would show to a farmer, not to the best and

wisest man of one’s acquaintance; to the latter, one would apply in a

difficult case of conduct.

Experience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.

[3] In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it

is said of the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only

insatiable, but indiscriminate in its objects, πανταχόθεν.

[4] Ἀρχὴ is a word used in this treatise in various significations. The

primary one is “beginning or first cause,” and this runs through all

its various uses.

“Rule,” and sometimes “Rulers,” are denoted by this term the initiative

being a property of Rule.

“Principle” is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most

characteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means

“starting-point.” Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve οὗ

ἕνεκα, and that of Action (ὅθεν ἡ κινήσις). I desire praise of men this

then is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be

attained, I resolve upon some course and this Resolve is the beginning

of Action.

The beginnings of Resolve, Ἀρχὶ or Motives, when formally stated, are

the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the συλλογίσμοι τῶν

πρακτῶν, i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be analysed.

Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the

Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.

Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:

Whatever gains human praise is to be done;

Public praying and almsgiving gave human praise:

[ergo] Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.

The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action,

and this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.

[5] The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the

signification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima

aplos]

I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as

denoting respectively what _is_ and what _may_ be known. All truth is

[Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we

individually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek:

gnorima aemin] which _we have received as true_. From this appears

immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study

of Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either work

principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as

soon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can

do. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have

heard the fifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his

nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally

true and right the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for

which he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove

its truth if he should ask.

But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect.

10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so

denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have

existed before the instances of their operation. Justice must have

existed before just actions, Redness before red things, but since what

we meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the

principles and laws), the particulars are said to be [Greek:

gnorimotera aemin]

Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage,

which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume

principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, “We

must begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes

either particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with

particulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training in

habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for

a fact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there

will be no want of the reason for the fact in addition”

The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai]

occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of “principles.”

Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.

[6] Or “prove themselves good,” as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25,

[Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supported

by a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d’ upo ton epieikon kai

eidoton oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai peri

auton chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legonton

krisei]

[7] [Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statement by any

philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to mean any

dialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.

[8] A lost work, supposed to have been so called, because

containing miscellaneous questions.

[9] It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotle refers

to this, and allows that [Greek: theoria] constitutes the highest

happiness because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man the

reason of thus deferring the statement being that till the lower, that

is the moral, nature has been reduced to perfect order, [Greek:

theoria] cannot have place, though, had it been held out from the

first, men would have been for making the experiment at once, without

the trouble of self-discipline.

[10] Or, as some think, “many theories have been founded on them.”

[11] The ἰδέα is the archetype, the εἶδος the concrete embodying the

resemblance of it; hence Aristotle alludes to the theory under both

names, and this is the reason for retaining the Greek terms.

[12] The list ran thus—

[Greek:

to peras to apeiron | to euthu

to perisson to artion | to phos

to en to plethos | to tetragonon

to dexion to aristeron | to aeremoun

to arren to thelu | to agathon

]

[13] Plato’s sister’s son.

[14] This is the capital defect in Aristotle’s eyes, who being

eminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did not

necessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by

enabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way

of stating facts, and leads to no action.

[15] _i.e._ the identification of Happiness with the Chief Good.

[16] _i.e._ without the capability of addition.

[17] And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the Chief

Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the Chief

Good. See Book X. chap. 11. [Greek: delon os oud allo ouden tagathon an

eiae o meta tenos ton kath’ auto agathon airetoteron ginetai.]

[18] Compare Bishop Butler’s account of “Human Nature as a System” in

the Preface to his Sermons.

[19] _i.e._ as working or as quiescent.

[20] The mere translation of this term would convey no idea of its

meaning, I have therefore retained the Greek term. It is afterwards

explained to include space of time and external appliances requisite

for the full development of Man’s energies; here the time only is

alluded to.

[21] This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations,

in the Topics, I. chap. ix.

[22] Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral senses.

“Fire burns,” is an instance of the former, “Treason is odious,” of the

latter.

[23] I have thought it worthwhile to vary the interpretation of this

word, because though “habitus” may be equivalent to all the senses of

[Greek: exis], “habit” is not, at least according to our colloquial

usage we commonly denote by “habit” a state formed by habituation.

[24] Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this passage

is to apply [Greek: kalon kagathon] to things, and let them depend

grammatically on [Greek: epaeboli]. It is to be remembered, however,

that [Greek: kalos kagathos] bore a special and well-known meaning also

the comparison is in the text more complete, and the point of the

passage seems more completely brought out.

[25] “Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affection to

goodness.” (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii ) Aristotle describes pleasure

in the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of

perception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure

being as truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness

then implies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its

object present, and pleasure continually result.

[26] In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact that external

circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness not that

Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to be

identical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have a

fair field; in fact, the other side of [Greek: bios teleios].

[27] It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he

considers an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct

gift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to

self-discipline and moral improvement would vanish He shows therefore

that it is no depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it to

come partly at least from ourselves, and he then goes on with other

reasons why we should think with him.

[28] This term is important, what has been maimed was once perfect; he

does not contemplate as possible the case of a man being born incapable

of virtue, and so of happiness.

[29] [Greek] Plato. Phædon. xlvi.

[30] But why give materials and instruments, if there is no work to do?

[31] The supposed pair of ancestors.

[32] Solon says, “Call no man happy till he is dead.” He must mean

either, The man when dead _is_ happy (a), or, The man when dead _may be

said to have been happy_ (b). If the former, does he mean positive

happiness (a)? or only freedom from unhappiness (β)? _We_ cannot allow

(a), Men’s opinions disallow (β), We revert now to the consideration of

(b).

[33] The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notion commonly

held, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceive that

Happiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune is

changeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because we

have therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause.

[34] I have taken τούτον αὐτῶν to refer to ἐπιστημῶν, against Magirus

and the Paraphrase of Andronicus Rhodius. I would refer to Aristotle’s

account of θεωρία in the Tenth Book, chap. vii. where he expressly says

of the working of νοῦς or pure intelect, that it is “most continuous.”

[35] The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, of

course, dressed his actors _for their parts;_ not according to their

fancies or his own.

Hooker has (E. P. v. ixxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirable

paraphrase on this.

“Again, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken by

proportion with that which every man’s estate in this present life

requireth. External abilities are instruments of action. It contenteth

wise artificers to have their instruments proportionable to their work,

rather fit for use than huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing then

the actions of a servant do not need that which may be necessary for

men of calling and place in the world, neither men of inferior

condition many things which greater personages can hardly want; surely

they are blessed in worldly respects who have wherewith to perform what

their station and place asketh, though they have no more.”

[36] Always bearing in mind that man “never continueth in one stay.”

[37] The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, must be in

certain weight and number to affect our own happiness, this will be

true, of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends:

and these are the only ones to which the dead are supposed to be

liable? add then the difference of sensibility which it is fair to

presume, and there is a very small residuum of joy or sorrow.

[38] This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, which are

either so _in esse_ or _in posse_.

If _in esse_, they are either above praise, or subjects of praise.

Those _in posse_, here called faculties, are good only when rightly

used. Thus Rhetoric is a faculty which may be used to promote justice

or abused to support villainy. Money in like way.

[39] The doubt is, whether [Greek] or [Greek] is the subject of the

sentence. It is translated as above, not merely with reference to the

sense of this passage, but on a comparison with a similar one in Book

X. chap 8. [Greek].

[40] Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwards adopted by

Epicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies in the Tenth

Book) of irreproachable character.

[41] See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap ix.

[42] The unseen is at least as real as the seen.

[43] The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book and are here used in

their strict philosophical meaning. The [Greek: enkrates] is he who has

bad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough to keep them

under. The [Greek: akrates] is he whose appetites constantly prevail

over his reason and previous good resolutions.

By the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a state

in which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called [Greek:

sophrosyne], and the man in it [Greek: sophron]. By the same law the

remonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till

they are silenced for ever. This state is called [Greek: akolasia], and

the man in it [Greek: akolastos].

[44] This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, [Greek: echein logon

tinos], really denotes substituting that person’s [Greek: logos] for

one’s own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-control or

perfected self-mastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its own

impulses. The other phrase means the actual possession of mathematical

truths as part of the mental furniture, _i.e._ knowing them.

[45] [Greek: xin] may be taken as opposed to [Greek: energeian], and

the meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral and

Intellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having the

latter, but only for exerting and using the former.

BOOK II

[1] Which we call simply virtue.

[2] For nature must of course supply the capacity.

[3] Or “as a simple result of nature.”

[4] This is done in the Sixth Book.

[5] It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular details

of practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rule can be

so framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon

on the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit.

[6] The words ἀκόλαστος and δειλὸς are not used here in their strict

significations to denote confirmed states of vice: the ἐγκρατὴς

necessarily feels pain, because he must always be thwarting passions

which are a real part of his nature; though this pain will grow less

and less as he nears the point of σωφροσύνη or perfected Self-Mastery,

which being attained the pain will then and then only cease entirely.

So a certain degree of fear is necessary to the _formation_ of true

courage. All that is meant here is, that no habit of courage or

self-mastery can be said to be matured, until pain altogether vanishes.

[7] Virtue consists in the due regulation of _all_ the parts of our

nature our passions are a real part of that nature, and as such have

their proper office, it is an error then to aim at their extirpation.

It is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will be rare, but then

this will have been gained by regular process, being the legitimate

result of the law that “passive impressions weaken as active habits are

strengthened, by repetition.” If musical instruments are making

discord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony in either case

I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positive enjoyment

of music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted out, Aristotle

would have them cultivated to use an apt figure (whose I know not),

They would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it to fall in

due course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might truly say,

_Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant_. See on this point Bishop

Butler’s fifth Sermon, and sect. 11. of the chapter on Moral Discipline

in the first part of his Analogy.

[8] I have adopted this word from our old writers, because our word

_act_ is so commonly interchanged with _action_. [Greek: Praxis]

(action) properly denotes the whole process from the conception to the

performance. [Greek: Pragma] (fact) only the result. The latter may be

right when the former is wrong if, for example, a murderer was killed

by his accomplices. Again, the [Greek: praxis] may be _good_ though the

[Greek: pragma] be wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions does

what would have been right if his impressions had been true (subject of

course to the question how far he is guiltless of his original error),

but in this case we could not call the [Greek: praxis] _right_. No

repetition of [Greek: pragmata] goes to form a habit. See Bishop Butler

on the Theory of Habits m the chapter on Moral Discipline, quoted

above, sect. 11. “And in like manner as habits belonging to the body,”

etc.

[9] Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue,

Aristotle ascertains first what is its genus [Greek: ti estin].

[10] That is, not for _merely having_ them, because we did not make

ourselves.

See Bishop Butler’s account of our nature as containing “particular

propensions,” in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and in

the Preface to the Sermons.

[11] This refers to the division of quantity ([Greek: poson]) in the

Categories. Those Quantities are called by Aristotle Continuous whose

parts have position relatively to one another, as a line, surface, or

solid, those discrete, whose parts have no such relation, as numbers

themselves, or any string of words grammatically unconnected.

[12] Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usually called

progression), when they increase or decrease by a common difference

thus, 2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 + 4 = 6, 6 + 4= 10, or _vice versa_,

10 - 4 = 6, 6 - 4 = 2.

[13] If the mina be taken at 15 oz. avoirdupois, (Dict. of G. and R.

Antiquities, article _Talentum_,) we must be sadly degenerate in our

gastric capacity.

[14] The two are necessary, because since the reason itself may be

perverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard; we may

suppose his [Greek: logos] originally to have been a sufficient guide,

but when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must go

out of himself for direction.

[15] This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply that this

treatise is rather a collection of notes of a _vivâ voce_ lecture than

a set formal treatise. “The table” of virtues and vices probably was

sketched out and exhibited to the audience.

[16] Afterwards defined as “All things whose value is measured by

money.”

[17] We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustrated by

Horace’s use of the term _hiatus_:

“Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?” Opening the mouth wide

gives a promise of something great to come, if nothing great does come,

this is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] or fruitless and unmeaning

_hiatus_; the transference to the present subject is easy.

[18] In like manner _we_ talk of laudable ambition, implying of course

there may be that which is not laudable.

[19] An expression of Bishop Butler’s, which corresponds exactly to the

definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric.

[20] That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must be

generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to

auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.

[21] “[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb,” says the Scholiast on the

Phaedo, “used of those who do anything safely and cautiously inasmuch

as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about then:

preparations for the second cautiously,” and he then alludes to this

passage.

[22] That is, you must allow for the _recoil_. “Naturam expellas furca

tamen usque recurret.”

P. 43, l. 2. This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines

entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics

regarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.

The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen

comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have

no difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred

such suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go,

that she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.

This exactly represents Aristotle’s relation to Pleasure he does not,

with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as

Paris would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it

wholly evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused

had “banished all the beauty from her cheek,” but, with the aged

counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness

resolves to deny himself, he “feels her sweetness, yet defies her

thrall.”

[24] Αἴσθησις is here used as an analogous noun, to denote the faculty

which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same function that

bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth while to

notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same analogy. We

say of a transaction, that it “looks ugly,” “sounds oddly,” is a “nasty

job,” “stinks in our nostrils,” is a “hard dealing.”

BOOK III

[1] A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because

“particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the

objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all,

or not with the allowance of the moral principle.” But he is

responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed,

he “might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure

state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the

moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus

withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily

arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his

integrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by

being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his

security against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral

principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things

are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.” (From the chapter on

Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this

disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the

third chapter of this Book.

[2] Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral

Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in

Bishop Butler’s manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two

principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest,

and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon

II.)

[3] Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of the

[Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance of _i.e._

incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution to have

been depraved, _i.e._ shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of

Self-love to be impaired.

[4] [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and effect

all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are

[Greek: eneka] that result.

From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from

present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce,

these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely,

but _designed_ causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive,

or final cause.

It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a

contradiction in terms to speak of a man’s being ignorant of his own

Motive of action.

When the man “drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel

between the joints of the harnesss” (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek:

eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of

[Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King’s death was _in fact the

result_, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the

King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.

[5] Bishop Butler would agree to this: he says of settled deliberate

anger, “It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and

vice, of moral good and evil.” See the whole Sermon on Resentment.

[6] Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using

[Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no following

his argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our

word lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, “What man is he

that lusteth to live?”

[7] The meaning is, that the _onus probandi_ is thrown upon the person

who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a _prima facie_ case. The

whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage

from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker’s seems to intend

al 81 ir/jd£eis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be

a mere _petitio principii_. I have adopted Cardwell’s reading in part,

but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last

four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell’s

reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.

[8] _i.e._ on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the

same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute

character, opinions are in general _signs_ of character, but when they

begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral

Choice.

“Treason doth never prosper, what’s the reason?

When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.”

[9] The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere

useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to

[Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that

the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished

or systematic one.

[10] Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the

three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his

choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object

of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so

distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one

chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta],

the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].

[11] Compare Bishop Butler’s “System of Human Nature,” in the Preface

to the Sermons.

[12] These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai—bouleusin], contain the

account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is

a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it

has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter

means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is

Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the

mental hand towards the object thus selected, the two last constitute

[Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means

literally “a grasping at or after” now as this physically may be either

vague or definite, so too may the mental act, consequently the term as

transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first

wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its

strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric

(I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into [Greek: alogos] and

[Greek: logistikae].

The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as

the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for

acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided

on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which

then proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an

action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival

at land is naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain

loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question

being debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to

the Will, which causes the owner’s hands to throw overboard his goods:

the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but

in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was

obtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage

of Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless,

consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no

Choice.

[13] Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d hae

men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho

einai agathon)]

[14] A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then

placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled

or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which

gravitation operates irretrievably, “there is a certain bound to

imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no

place for repentance in the natural course of things.” Bishop Butler’s

Analogy, First Part, chap 11.

[15] Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain

circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what circumstances

we will have to act under.

[16] “_Moral_ Courage” is our phrase.

[17] The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a

paraphrase.

“The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with

the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of

bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords

with Courage, _i.e._ Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which

implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are

denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of

each separate act of bravery is honour.”

[18] For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger. 2.

A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be

found to fail in one or other, or both.

[19] This may merely mean, “who give strict orders” not to flinch,

which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of

the sense given above, which seems more forcible.

[20] See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen oun

logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]

[21] Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion

which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says

of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in _vanos_ tumultus gens.

[22]In Coronea in Bœotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed

to some Phocians. “The regulars” were Boeotian troops, the [Greek:

politika] Coroneans.

[23] By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two

things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried

into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to

imitate.

[24] The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as here used,

in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia todi

aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata

sumbebaekos de to proteron].

BOOK V

[1] Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men

must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.

[2] But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, “to

love” and “to kiss,” [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap. XIII. 5.

[3] _Things_ are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name in

common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is

_close_ therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There

is no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], “equivocal” being

applied to a term and not to its various significates.

[4] See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen echei kai

tagatha k.t.l.]

[5] A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as confining

his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to touch

him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue to

his own person.

[6] See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.

[7] Cardwell’s text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon], yields a much

easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but only the

particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the unlawful : the

unequal :: universal Injustice the particular _i.e._ as whole to part.

There is a reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis,

but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.

[8] There are two reasons why the characters are not necessarily

coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out the

[Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so

therefore _pro tanto_ is he.

Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he

does the _facts_ of a good man but for the perfection of his own

individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move

rightly in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.

The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the

distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III.

chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler’s first Sermon.

[9] Terms used for persons.

[10] By [Greek:——] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50, etc, by

[Greek:——] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.

[11] The profits of a mercantile transaction (say £1000) are to be

divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real

point to be settled); then,

A : B :: 400 : 600.

A : 400 :: B : 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as

to make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).

A+400 : B+600 :: A : B. This represents the actual distribution; its

fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.

[12] _i.e._ where the ratio is that of equality, thus 2 : 2 :: 40 : 40

[13] Her Majesty’s “Justices.”

[14] I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of

place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being

likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at

liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that

he put them where they made the best sense.

[15] This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not pretend

to be able to get it out of the words.

[16] This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not

really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck

wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and

in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two

offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and

another against the office.

[17] χάρις denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act

of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous

mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.

[18] The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only had (say)

one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have.

Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most

valuable, and _vice versa_.

Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:——] at

[Greek:——], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before

Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the

wares as between the persons, _i.e._ the ratio of equality.

If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring

into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai

ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.

Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be

the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will

carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both

[Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr.

shoes = 1 house.

Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes : 1 house—_wrong_.

—— —— 100 pr. shoes : 1 house—_right_

—— —— 10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house—_wrong_.

[19] [Greek] Compare a similar use of [Greek]. De Interpretatione, II.

2. [Greek].

[20] Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a violation

of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the

former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of

injury.

[21] This passage certainly occurs awkwardly here. If attached to the

close of the preceding Chapter it would leave that Chapter incomplete,

for the question is not gone into, but only stated. As the commencement

of this Chapter it is yet more out of place; I should propose to insert

it at the commencement of the following Chapter, to which it forms an

appropriate introduction.

[22] In a pure democracy men are absolutely, _i.e._ numerically, equal,

in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British

subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is

as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.

[23] Or, according to Cardwell’s reading ([Greek: kineton ou mentoi

pan]) “but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally

variable, but certainly all Just is not such.” The sense of the passage

is not affected by the reading. In Bekker’s text we must take [Greek:

kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], _i.e._ “we admit

there is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still,” etc.

With Cardwell’s, [Greek: kineton] will mean “which not only _does_ but

naturally _may_ vary.”

[24] Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment.

Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an

unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act _materially_

unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See

the note on page 32, l. 16.

[25] “As distinct from pain or loss.” Bishop Butler’s Sermon on

Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].

[26] This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as quoted in

Cardwell’s Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast

gives it as follows:

“But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels

himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the

aggressor], but the other does not.”

[27] As when a man is “_justified_ at the Grass Market,” _i.e._ hung.

[28] Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes more

than his share some one else must have less than his share; where it is

infinite, or where there is no good at all this cannot happen.

[29] The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law

views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally

equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the

loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but _one_

party.

[30] So in the Politics, 1. 2.

_Hae men gar psuchae tou somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous

taes orexeos politikaen kai despotikaev._

Compare also Bishop Butler’s account of human nature as a system—of the

different authority of certain principles, and specially the supremacy

of Conscience.

BOOK VI

[1] I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of

lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for

instance, in a building.

[2] Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter.

[3] One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common

language, _he has a turn for_ Mathematics, _i e_ something in his

mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the

bump denoting this aptitude.

[4] And therefore the question resolves itself into this, “What is the

work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason.”

See the description of _apetae_ II. 5.

[5] _praxis_ is here used in its strict and proper meaning.

[6] That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the

judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly.

The question at issue always is, _Is this Good?_ because the Will is

only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always

_Aye or No_, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former

case, and retracted in the later.

So far as what must take place in _every_ Moral Action, right or wrong,

the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a

good Moral Choice, _i e._. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye

when it ought.

The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is

perfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or

when the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not

move in accordance with that direction, in other words, when the

Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]—video

meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.

[7] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.

[8] The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to clothe

the feet of someone and the price to be paid, _i.e._ the produce of his

industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his

production is subordinate to Moral Action.

[9] It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied

his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is

founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded

to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action

may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason.

The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in

Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take

place.

Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler

observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral

Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].

But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite

nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves

do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general,

fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler’s

Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.

[10] The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself

([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka

tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]),

non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods

([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to _act_ ([Greek:

phronesis]), or with a view to _make_ ([Greek: techne]).

Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If

necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]),

or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]),

Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell’s notes.)

[11] It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.

[12] Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics

II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major term

in the middle (_i.e._ proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1)

through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure

with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course,

from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by

Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. “If

of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is

coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of

that which is thus coextensive.” The fact of this coextensiveness must

be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive

Faculty. We will take Aldrich’s instance.

All Magnets attract iron

A B C are Magnets

A B C attract iron.

Presupposed Syllogism reasoning from an universal.

A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)

All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive

faculty)

All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by

taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)

Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C

attract iron.

But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with

the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they

attract iron.

Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says

in the same place that for this reason we must _conceive_ ([Greek:

noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above)

as composed of all the Individuals.

If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it

would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of

Simple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the

steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and

again out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity

depends _entirely_ upon the quality of the particular mind which

performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of

Genius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It

may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which

exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss _literally_

false. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction

_as the term is used by Aristotle_, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica

Post. I. 1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.

[13] The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is impossible

to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of

the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the

nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its

conclusions they are to be “true, first principles incapable of any

syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and

causes of it.” (See the appendix to this Book.)

[14] This is the test of correct logical division, that the _membra

dividentia_ shall be opposed, _i.e._ not included the one by the other.

[15] The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal

is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case

of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and

[Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and

so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected to

prove that connection to be “coextensiveness,” we predicate one of the

other and then simply convert the proposition, which is the proper test

of any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics,

1. vi.

[16] See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense

of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho

kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi

viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]—Luke xvi. 8.

[17] Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath’ ekasta pepaideumenos]

of Book I. chap. 1.

[18] The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming

the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of

being truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are

the two Principles of our moral constitution naturally supreme and

“Conscience and Self-Love, _if we understand our true happiness_,

always lead us the same way.” Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.

And again:

“If by _a sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard to what is

upon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the

principle of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea

itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be

improved as really as any principle in our nature. So little cause is

there for Moralists to disclaim this principle.” From the note on sect.

iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I chap. v.

[19] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.

The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the

following—Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d’ exis to

ommati touto k. t. l]—vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.]

vii. 9.—[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]—iii. 7 _ad

finem_. [Greek: ei de tis legoi. k.t.l.]

[20] This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not

admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In

popular language we use the term “wiser man,” as readily as “better

artist” really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation

to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tous

epainous di anaphoras]. I. 12.

[21] He would be a _better Chymist_ who should poison intentionally,

than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that “Epsom Salts

mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum.”

[22]The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old

Testament in the sense first given to [Greek:——] here. “Then wrought

Bezaleel and Ahohab, and every _wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put

wisdom and understanding_ to know how to work all manner of work for

the service of the Sanctuary” Exodus xxxvi. i.

[23] [Greek:——] and [Greek:——], (in the strict sense, for it is used in

many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole

function [Greek:——], [Greek:——] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict

reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: ——] supplies.

It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by

Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek: ——] might exist

independent of [Greek:——], but not this without that. Put the two

together, the head to the trunk, and you form the living being

[Greek:——]. There are three branches of [Greek:——] according to Greek

Philosophy, [Greek:——], [Greek:——], [Greek:——]. Science is perhaps the

nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.

[24][Greek:——] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:——]

would be its chief Instrument.

[25] The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:——].

[26] In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is

employed there will be general principles, and the application of them,

but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the

operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.

Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil

Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular

functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there

are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of

them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when

Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.

[27] [Greek:——], “our mere Operatives in Public business.” (Chalmers.)

[28] Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self, (which is

[Greek:——] proper) or not-Self, _i.e._ either one’s family=[Greek:——],

or one’s community=[Greek:——], but here the supreme and subordinate are

distinguished, the former is [Greek:——], the latter [Greek:——] proper,

whose functions are deliberation and the administration of justice.

[29] But where can this be done, if there be no community? see Horace’s

account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from

the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also

Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.

The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop

Butler’s first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the

coincidence in _fact_ of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence _i.e._

love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this

treatise, chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].

[30] More truly “implied,” namely, that Practical Wisdom results from

experience.

[31] This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested

by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.

[32] An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei]. (Book 1.

chap. viii.)

[33] Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last

arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have

the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one

extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.

[34] I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this sense,

“Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the

other we mentioned is different in kind.” In a passage so utterly

unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while

to take much trouble about such a point.

[35] The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1. xxiv.), “a

happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.”

The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation

the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia]. All

that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun.

The moon receives light from the sun, The moon is bright on the side

next the sun. The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly and correctly

accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side

next to the sun.

[36] Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act.

[37] The End does not sanctify the Means.

[38] The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this

sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there

are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great End

of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to

the subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as being right

means to the Grand End of all.

[39] The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron],

but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and

this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that

[Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].

[40] We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this

word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which

connects it with [Greek: suggnomae].

[41] Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action.

[Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis,

gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).

The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is

[Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness

informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not

actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so

proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.

Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End?

he is then [Greek: euboulos]—is he passing under review the suggestions

of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]—is he judging of the acts of others?

he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness—is he

applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek:

nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]—while in each and all he is

[Greek: phronimos]?

[42] See note, on p. 140.

[43] There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without

proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all

reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are

simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these

cases within the province of [Greek: nous], _i.e._ he calls by this

name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.

[44] _i.e._ of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].

[45] See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact

and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is

wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss

(_i.e._ by [Greek: ethismos]).

All that is pleasant is to be done,

This is pleasant,

This is to be done

By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, _i.e._ on the suggestions of

[Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss.

Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is

firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification

of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein

aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress

towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of

previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to

[Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the

right one. Book VII. 8 and 5.

[46] The _consequentia_ is this:

There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of

reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous].

What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e.

Experience, and _therefore_, etc.

[47] This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika],

he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics,

I. xiii. 10,

{ [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai]

{ [Greek: to de phylaktikon],

{ [Greek: to de sæmantikon].

Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].

[48] Healthiness is the formal cause of health.

Medicine is the efficient cause of health.

See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros

homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].

[49] [Greek: phronæsis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the

Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.

[50] This is another case of an observation being thrown in _obiter_,

not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.

[51] See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.

[52]The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the

abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to

anything” is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too

nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.

[53] See the note on [Greek: Archæ] on page 4, l. 30.

P. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,

“This particular action is———.”

We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein—ti gar

dei prattein hæ mæ, to telos autæs estin] i.e. [Greek: tæs

phronæseos].—(Chap. xi. of this Book.)

[55] “Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio

Medici.

[56] The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the

signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term

to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.

[57] Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de

phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek tæs aretæs].

[58] It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronæsis] is used throughout

this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical

Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of

it.

BOOK VII

[1] The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather

what men _may be_ than what they _are_. In this book we take a

practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day

development.

[2] This illustrates the expression, “_Deceits_ of the Flesh.”

[3] Another reading omits the [Greek:——]; the meaning of the whole

passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had been

convinced of the rightness of what he does, _i.e._ if he were now

acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of

conviction.”

[4] Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:——] [Greek——]

[5]Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.

[6] As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott’s “Red Gauntlet.”

[7] That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premise,

it is true, that “all that is sweet is pleasant,” it is true also, that

“this is sweet,” what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in

this minor to the major _i.e._ the universal maxim, forbidding to

taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his

mind “All excess is to be avoided,” at a certain time his [Greek:——]

tells him “This glass is excess.” As a matter of mere reasoning, he

cannot help receiving the conclusion “This glass is to be avoided,” and

supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But

[Greek:——], being a simple tendency towards indulgence suggests, in

place of the minor premise “This is excess,” its own premise “This is

sweet,” this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle

(‘[Greek:——]), “All that is sweet is to be tasted,” and so, by strict

logical sequence, proves “This glass is to be tasted.”

The solution then of the phænomenon of [Greek:——] is this that

[Greek:——], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the

suggestions of Right Reason.

On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:——] i.e. [Greek:——] easily

defeats [Greek:——]. The [Greek:——], an hour before he is in temptation,

would never deliberately prefer the maxim “All that is sweet is to be

tasted” to “All excess is to be avoided.” The [Greek:——] would.

Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):

Quæ virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo

Discite, _non inter lances mensasque nitentes_

Verum hic _impransi_ mecum disquirite

Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. “Look not thou upon the wine when it

is red,” etc.

[8] As we commonly speak, Metaphysicians. Physiology of course includes

Metaphysics.

[9] [Greek: oron]. Aristotle’s own account of this word (Prior Analyt

ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the

account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself

is really indicated by it.

[10] The Greek would give “avoids excessive pain,” but this is not

true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for

translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below [Greek:

diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].

[11] Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I

chap v sect. iv.

[12] That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.

[14] Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on [Greek:

orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler’s Sermon on

Resentment.

[15] The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of

expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.

Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,

Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,[*]

Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,

Actions of Lust are more unjust

[*] [Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from

which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in

the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.

[16][Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference of opinion

exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation which

substitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes all

difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton mae

proairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker,

because the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side.

I understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek:

malakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not

[Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain.

The [Greek: akolastos] _deliberately_ pursues pleasure and declines

pain if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes

under [Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps

not quite properly.

Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts

caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then

of course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may be

fitly given respectively.

[17] “If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we

should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician

who knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is a

mortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first

symptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish” Sewell, Sermons to

Young Men (Sermon xii.)

[18] Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes his

Moral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, the powerful

strain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will does not act

in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason. His

actions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, and

note on page 128.

[19] Let a man be punctual _on principle_ to any one engagement in the

day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his others in their

due places relatively to this one; and so will often wear an appearance

of being needlessly punctilious in trifles.

[20] Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action, which

are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.

See Bishop Butler’s first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of

note on p. 129.

BOOK VIII

[1] “Owe no man anything, but to _love_ one another for he that loveth

another _hath fulfilled the Law_.” Romans XIII. 8.

[2] [Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from Hesiod,

[Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton].

[3] In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that she

“two stone bottles found,

To hold the liquor that she _loved_,

And keep it safe and sound.”

[4] Cardwell’s reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa] is

here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker’s.

[5]The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship than he

bestows, but the Good man _can_ feel Friendship only for, and in

proportion to, the goodness of the other.

[6] See note on page 68, 1. 8.

[7] See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek: tauton].

[8] “For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one ought to

have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.”

[9] Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise

the obligation to requite the favour or kindness.

BOOK IX

[1] “Neither the Son of man, that He should _repent_.” Numbers xxiii.

19.

“In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment

of a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use.”

Whately, Logic, iii. 10.

[2] “I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is that

Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many

guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall command

him to come to the window, and the other to the table, and another to

the bed, and another to the chimney, and another to come upstairs, and

another to go downstairs, and all in the same instant, how would he be

distracted to please them all? And yet such is the sad condition of nay

soul by nature, not only a servant but a slave unto sin. Pride calls me

to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to the bed, laziness

to the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs, and covetousness

to come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary to themselves as to

Virtue.” (Fuller’s Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix’t Contemplations,

viii.)

BOOK X

[1] See note, p. 43.

[2] See Book II. chap. ix.

[3] See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.

[4] The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: that there is

no real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon], and

therefore whatever is so called is so named in right of its

participation in that.

[5] See note on page 136, 1. 15.

P. 238, 1. 24. Movement is, according to Aristotle, of six kinds:

From not being to being . . . . Generation

From being to not being . . . . Destruction

From being to being more . . . . Increase

From being to being less . . . . Diminution

From being here to being there . . Change of Place

From being in this way to being in that Alteration

[7] _A_ may go to sleep quicker than _B_, but cannot _do more sleep_ in

a given time.

[8] Compare Book III. chap. vi. [Greek: osper kai epi ton somaton, k.

t. l.]

[9] Which is of course a [Greek: genesis].

[10] That is, subordinate Movements are complete before the whole

Movement is.

[11] Pleasure is so instantaneous a sensation, that it cannot be

conceived divisible or incomplete; the longest continued Pleasure is

only a succession of single sparks, so rapid as to give the appearance

of a stream, of light.

[12] A man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk by the [Greek:

allotria haedouae] of reading a novel, as by the [Greek: oikeia lupae]

of gout in the feet.

[13] I have thus rendered [Greek: spoudae (ouk agnoon to

hamartanomenon)]; but, though the English term does not represent the

depth of the Greek one, it is some approximation to the truth to

connect an earnest serious purpose with Happiness.

[14] Bishop Butler, _contra_ (Sermon XV.).

“Knowledge is not our proper Happiness. Whoever will in the least

attend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of

it, which is the entertainment of the mind.” The two statements may

however be reconciled. Aristotle may be well understood only to mean,

that the pursuit of knowledge will be the pleasanter, the freer it is

from the minor hindrances which attend on _learning_.

[15] The clause immediately following indicates that Aristotle felt

this statement to be at first sight startling, Happiness having been

all the way through connected with [Greek: energeia], but the statement

illustrates and confirms what was said in note on page 6, 1. 15.

[16] That is to say, he aims at producing not merely a happy aggregate,

but an aggregate of happy individuals. Compare what is said of

Legislators in the last chapter of Book I and the first of Book II.

[17] See note, page 146, 1. 17.