(because men at that time of life pursue not what is pleasurable but
what is profitable); and in such, of men in their prime and of the
young, as are given to the pursuit of profit. They that are such have
no intimate intercourse with one another; for sometimes they are not
even pleasurable to one another; nor, in fact, do they desire such
intercourse unless their friends are profitable to them, because they
are pleasurable only in so far as they have hopes of advantage. With
these Friendships is commonly ranked that of hospitality.
But the Friendship of the young is thought to be based on the motive of
pleasure: because they live at the beck and call of passion and
generally pursue what is pleasurable to themselves and the object of
the present moment: and as their age changes so likewise do their
pleasures.
This is the reason why they form and dissolve Friendships rapidly:
since the Friendship changes with the pleasurable object and such
pleasure changes quickly.
The young are also much given up to Love; this passion being, in great
measure, a matter of impulse and based on pleasure: for which cause
they conceive Friendships and quickly drop them, changing often in the
same day: but these wish for society and intimate intercourse with
their friends, since they thus attain the object of their Friendship.
Chapter V.
That then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who are
good and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men
wish one another’s good in similar ways; in so far as they are good
(and good they are in themselves); and those are specially friends who
wish good to their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus
towards them on their own account and not as a mere matter of result;
so the Friendship between these men continues to subsist so long as
they are good; and goodness, we know, has in it a principle of
permanence.
Moreover, each party is good abstractedly and also relatively to his
friend, for all good men are not only abstractedly good but also useful
to one another. Such friends are also mutually pleasurable because all
good men are so abstractedly, and also relatively to one another,
inasmuch as to each individual those actions are pleasurable which
correspond to his nature, and all such as are like them. Now when men
are good these will be always the same, or at least similar.
Friendship then under these circumstances is permanent, as we should
reasonably expect, since it combines in itself all the requisite
qualifications of friends. I mean, that Friendship of whatever kind is
based upon good or pleasure (either abstractedly or relatively to the
person entertaining the sentiment of Friendship), and results from a
similarity of some sort; and to this kind belong all the aforementioned
requisites in the parties themselves, because in this the parties are
similar, and so on:[4] moreover, in it there is the abstractedly good
and the abstractedly pleasant, and as these are specially the
object-matter of Friendship so the feeling and the state of Friendship
is found most intense and most excellent in men thus qualified.
Rare it is probable Friendships of this kind will be, because men of
this kind are rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications being
presupposed, there is further required time and intimacy: for, as the
proverb says, men cannot know one another “till they have eaten the
requisite quantity of salt together;” nor can they in fact admit one
another to intimacy, much less be friends, till each has appeared to
the other and been proved to be a fit object of Friendship. They who
speedily commence an interchange of friendly actions may be said to
wish to be friends, but they are not so unless they are also proper
objects of Friendship and mutually known to be such: that is to say, a
desire for Friendship may arise quickly but not Friendship itself.
Well, this Friendship is perfect both in respect of the time and in all
other points; and exactly the same and similar results accrue to each
party from the other; which ought to be the case between friends.
The friendship based upon the pleasurable is, so to say, a copy of
this, since the good are sources of pleasure to one another: and that
based on utility likewise, the good being also useful to one another.
Between men thus connected Friendships are most permanent when the same
result accrues to both from one another, pleasure, for instance; and
not merely so but from the same source, as in the case of two men of
easy pleasantry; and not as it is in that of a lover and the object of
his affection, these not deriving their pleasure from the same causes,
but the former from seeing the latter and the latter from receiving the
attentions of the former: and when the bloom of youth fades the
Friendship sometimes ceases also, because then the lover derives no
pleasure from seeing and the object of his affection ceases to receive
the attentions which were paid before: in many cases, however, people
so connected continue friends, if being of similar tempers they have
come from custom to like one another’s disposition.
Where people do not interchange pleasure but profit in matters of Love,
the Friendship is both less intense in degree and also less permanent:
in fact, they who are friends because of advantage commonly part when
the advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never were friends of one
another but of the advantage.
So then it appears that from motives of pleasure or profit bad men may
be friends to one another, or good men to bad men or men of neutral
character to one of any character whatever: but disinterestedly, for
the sake of one another, plainly the good alone can be friends; because
bad men have no pleasure even in themselves unless in so far as some
advantage arises.
And further, the Friendship of the good is alone superior to calumny;
it not being easy for men to believe a third person respecting one whom
they have long tried and proved: there is between good men mutual
confidence, and the feeling that one’s friend would never have done one
wrong, and all other such things as are expected in Friendship really
worthy the name; but in the other kinds there is nothing to prevent all
such suspicions.
I call them Friendships, because since men commonly give the name of
friends to those who are connected from motives of profit (which is
justified by political language, for alliances between states are
thought to be contracted with a view to advantage), and to those who
are attached to one another by the motive of pleasure (as children
are), we may perhaps also be allowed to call such persons friends, and
say there are several species of Friendship; primarily and specially
that of the good, in that they are good, and the rest only in the way
of resemblance: I mean, people connected otherwise are friends in that
way in which there arises to them somewhat good and some mutual
resemblance (because, we must remember the pleasurable is good to those
who are fond of it).
These secondary Friendships, however, do not combine very well; that is
to say, the same persons do not become friends by reason of advantage
and by reason of the pleasurable, for these matters of result are not
often combined. And Friendship having been divided into these kinds,
bad men will be friends by reason of pleasure or profit, this being
their point of resemblance; while the good are friends for one
another’s sake, that is, in so far as they are good.
These last may be termed abstractedly and simply friends, the former as
a matter of result and termed friends from their resemblance to these
last.
Chapter VI.
Further; just as in respect of the different virtues some men are
termed good in respect of a certain inward state, others in respect of
acts of working, so is it in respect of Friendship: I mean, they who
live together take pleasure in, and impart good to, one another: but
they who are asleep or are locally separated do not perform acts, but
only are in such a state as to act in a friendly way if they acted at
all: distance has in itself no direct effect upon Friendship, but only
prevents the acting it out: yet, if the absence be protracted, it is
thought to cause a forgetfulness even of the Friendship: and hence it
has been said, “many and many a Friendship doth want of intercourse
destroy.”
Accordingly, neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated for
Friendship, because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one
can spend his days in company with that which is positively painful or
even not pleasurable; since to avoid the painful and aim at the
pleasurable is one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature. They
who get on with one another very fairly, but are not in habits of
intimacy, are rather like people having kindly feelings towards one
another than friends; nothing being so characteristic of friends as the
living with one another, because the necessitous desire assistance, and
the happy companionship, they being the last persons in the world for
solitary existence: but people cannot spend their time together unless
they are mutually pleasurable and take pleasure in the same objects, a
quality which is thought to appertain to the Friendship of
companionship.
Chapter VII.
The connection then subsisting between the good is Friendship _par
excellence_, as has already been frequently said: since that which is
abstractedly good or pleasant is thought to be an object of Friendship
and choice-worthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him; and
the good man to the good man for both these reasons.
(Now the entertaining the sentiment is like a feeling, but Friendship
itself like a state: because the former may have for its object even
things inanimate, but requital of Friendship is attended with moral
choice which proceeds from a moral state: and again, men wish good to
the objects of their Friendship for their sakes, not in the way of a
mere feeling but of moral state.)
And the good, in loving their friend, love their own good (inasmuch as
the good man, when brought into that relation, becomes a good to him
with whom he is so connected), so that either party loves his own good,
and repays his friend equally both in wishing well and in the
pleasurable: for equality is said to be a tie of Friendship. Well,
these points belong most to the Friendship between good men.
But between morose or elderly men Friendship is less apt to arise,
because they are somewhat awkward-tempered, and take less pleasure in
intercourse and society; these being thought to be specially friendly
and productive of Friendship: and so young men become friends quickly,
old men not so (because people do not become friends with any, unless
they take pleasure in them); and in like manner neither do the morose.
Yet men of these classes entertain kindly feelings towards one another:
they wish good to one another and render mutual assistance in respect
of their needs, but they are not quite friends, because they neither
spend their time together nor take pleasure in one another, which
circumstances are thought specially to belong to Friendship.
To be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friendship, is
not possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is,
so to speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object; and
besides, it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleased
with many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really
good. Again, a man needs experience, and to be in habits of close
intimacy, which is very difficult.
But it _is_ possible to please many on the score of advantage and
pleasure: because there are many men of the kind, and the services may
be rendered in a very short time.
Of the two imperfect kinds that which most resembles the perfect is the
Friendship based upon pleasure, in which the same results accrue from
both and they take pleasure in one another or in the same objects; such
as are the Friendships of the young, because a generous spirit is most
found in these. The Friendship because of advantage is the connecting
link of shopkeepers.
Then again, the very happy have no need of persons who are profitable,
but of pleasant ones they have because they wish to have people to live
intimately with; and what is painful they bear for a short time indeed,
but continuously no one could support it, nay, not even the Chief Good
itself, if it were painful to him individually: and so they look out
for pleasant friends: perhaps they ought to require such to be good
also; and good moreover to themselves individually, because then they
will have all the proper requisites of Friendship.
Men in power are often seen to make use of several distinct friends:
for some are useful to them and others pleasurable, but the two are not
often united: because they do not, in fact, seek such as shall combine
pleasantness and goodness, nor such as shall be useful for honourable
purposes: but with a view to attain what is pleasant they look out for
men of easy-pleasantry; and again, for men who are clever at executing
any business put into their hands: and these qualifications are not
commonly found united in the same man.
It has been already stated that the good man unites the qualities of
pleasantness and usefulness: but then such a one will not be a friend
to a superior unless he be also his superior in goodness: for if this
be not the case, he cannot, being surpassed in one point, make things
equal by a proportionate degree of Friendship.[5] And characters who
unite superiority of station and goodness are not common.
Chapter VIII.
Now all the kinds of Friendship which have been already mentioned exist
in a state of equality, inasmuch as either the same results accrue to
both and they wish the same things to one another, or else they barter
one thing against another; pleasure, for instance, against profit: it
has been said already that Friendships of this latter kind are less
intense in degree and less permanent.
And it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing which
makes them to be thought to be and not to be Friendships: they show
like Friendships in right of their likeness to that which is based on
virtue (the one kind having the pleasurable, the other the profitable,
both of which belong also to the other); and again, they do not show
like Friendships by reason of their unlikeness to that true kind; which
unlikeness consists herein, that while that is above calumny and so
permanent these quickly change and differ in many other points.
But there is another form of Friendship, that, namely, in which the one
party is superior to the other; as between father and son, elder and
younger, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. These also differ one from
another: I mean, the Friendship between parents and children is not the
same as between ruler and the ruled, nor has the father the same
towards the son as the son towards the father, nor the husband towards
the wife as she towards him; because the work, and therefore the
excellence, of each of these is different, and different therefore are
the causes of their feeling Friendship; distinct and different
therefore are their feelings and states of Friendship.
And the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in fact
ought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parents
what they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their
sons what they ought to their offspring, the Friendship between such
parties will be permanent and equitable.
Further; the feeling of Friendship should be in a due proportion in all
Friendships which are between superior and inferior; I mean, the better
man, or the more profitable, and so forth, should be the object of a
stronger feeling than he himself entertains, because when the feeling
of Friendship comes to be after a certain rate then equality in a
certain sense is produced, which is thought to be a requisite in
Friendship.
(It must be remembered, however, that the equal is not in the same case
as regards Justice and Friendship: for in strict Justice the exactly
proportioned equal ranks first, and the actual numerically equal ranks
second, while in Friendship this is exactly reversed.)
And that equality is thus requisite is plainly shown by the occurrence
of a great difference of goodness or badness, or prosperity, or
something else: for in this case, people are not any longer friends,
nay they do not even feel that they ought to be. The clearest
illustration is perhaps the case of the gods, because they are most
superior in all good things. It is obvious too, in the case of kings,
for they who are greatly their inferiors do not feel entitled to be
friends to them; nor do people very insignificant to be friends to
those of very high excellence or wisdom. Of course, in such cases it is
out of the question to attempt to define up to what point they may
continue friends: for you may remove many points of agreement and the
Friendship last nevertheless; but when one of the parties is very far
separated (as a god from men), it cannot continue any longer.
This has given room for a doubt, whether friends do really wish to
their friends the very highest goods, as that they may be gods:
because, in case the wish were accomplished, they would no longer have
them for friends, nor in fact would they have the good things they had,
because friends are good things. If then it has been rightly said that
a friend wishes to his friend good things for that friend’s sake, it
must be understood that he is to remain such as he now is: that is to
say, he will wish the greatest good to him of which as man he is
capable: yet perhaps not all, because each man desires good for himself
most of all.
It is thought that desire for honour makes the mass of men wish rather
to be the objects of the feeling of Friendship than to entertain it
themselves (and for this reason they are fond of flatterers, a
flatterer being a friend inferior or at least pretending to be such and
rather to entertain towards another the feeling of Friendship than to
be himself the object of it), since the former is thought to be nearly
the same as being honoured, which the mass of men desire. And yet men
seem to choose honour, not for its own sake, but incidentally:[6] I
mean, the common run of men delight to be honoured by those in power
because of the hope it raises; that is they think they shall get from
them anything they may happen to be in want of, so they delight in
honour as an earnest of future benefit. They again who grasp at honour
at the hands of the good and those who are really acquainted with their
merits desire to confirm their own opinion about themselves: so they
take pleasure in the conviction that they are good, which is based on
the sentence of those who assert it. But in being the objects of
Friendship men delight for its own sake, and so this may be judged to
be higher than being honoured and Friendship to be in itself
choice-worthy. Friendship, moreover, is thought to consist in feeling,
rather than being the object of, the sentiment of Friendship, which is
proved by the delight mothers have in the feeling: some there are who
give their children to be adopted and brought up by others, and knowing
them bear this feeling towards them never seeking to have it returned,
if both are not possible; but seeming to be content with seeing them
well off and bearing this feeling themselves towards them, even though
they, by reason of ignorance, never render to them any filial regard or
love.
Since then Friendship stands rather in the entertaining, than in being
the object of, the sentiment, and they are praised who are fond of
their friends, it seems that entertaining the sentiment is the
Excellence of friends; and so, in whomsoever this exists in due
proportion these are stable friends and their Friendship is permanent.
And in this way may they who are unequal best be friends, because they
may thus be made equal.
Equality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friendship, and specially
the similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable in
themselves, are also stable as regards others, and neither ask
degrading services nor render them, but, so to say, rather prevent
them: for it is the part of the good neither to do wrong themselves nor
to allow their friends in so doing.
The bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, they
do not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends for
a short time from taking delight in one another’s wickedness. Those
connected by motives of profit, or pleasure, hold together somewhat
longer: so long, that is to say, as they can give pleasure or profit
mutually.
The Friendship based on motives of profit is thought to be most of all
formed out of contrary elements: the poor man, for instance, is thus a
friend of the rich, and the ignorant of the man of information; that is
to say, a man desiring that of which he is, as it happens, in want,
gives something else in exchange for it. To this same class we may
refer the lover and beloved, the beautiful and the ill-favoured. For
this reason lovers sometimes show in a ridiculous light by claiming to
be the objects of as intense a feeling as they themselves entertain: of
course if they are equally fit objects of Friendship they are perhaps
entitled to claim this, but if they have nothing of the kind it is
ridiculous.
Perhaps, moreover, the contrary does not aim at its contrary for its
own sake but incidentally: the mean is really what is grasped at; it
being good for the dry, for instance, not to become wet but to attain
the mean, and so of the hot, etc.
However, let us drop these questions, because they are in fact somewhat
foreign to our purpose.
Chapter IX.
It seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship and
Justice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the same
persons: I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be some
principle of Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends,
for instance, those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and in
like manner also those who are brought into Communion with them in
other ways: and the Friendship, because also the Justice, is
co-extensive with the Communion, This justifies the common proverb,
“the goods of friends are common,” since Friendship rests upon
Communion.
Now brothers and intimate companions have all in common, but other
people have their property separate, and some have more in common and
others less, because the Friendships likewise differ in degree. So too
do the various principles of Justice involved, not being the same
between parents and children as between brothers, nor between
companions as between fellow-citizens merely, and so on of all the
other conceivable Friendships. Different also are the principles of
Injustice as regards these different grades, and the acts become
intensified by being done to friends; for instance, it is worse to rob
your companion than one who is merely a fellow-citizen; to refuse help
to a brother than to a stranger; and to strike your father than any one
else. So then the Justice naturally increases with the degree of
Friendship, as being between the same parties and of equal extent.
All cases of Communion are parts, so to say, of the great Social one,
since in them men associate with a view to some advantage and to
procure some of those things which are needful for life; and the great
Social Communion is thought originally to have been associated and to
continue for the sake of some advantage: this being the point at which
legislators aim, affirming that to be just which is generally
expedient.
All the other cases of Communion aim at advantage in particular points;
the crew of a vessel at that which is to result from the voyage which
is undertaken with a view to making money, or some such object;
comrades in war at that which is to result from the war, grasping
either at wealth or victory, or it may be a political position; and
those of the same tribe, or Demus, in like manner.
Some of them are thought to be formed for pleasure’s sake, those, for
instance, of bacchanals or club-fellows, which are with a view to
Sacrifice or merely company. But all these seem to be ranged under the
great Social one, inasmuch as the aim of this is, not merely the
expediency of the moment but, for life and at all times; with a view to
which the members of it institute sacrifices and their attendant
assemblies, to render honour to the gods and procure for themselves
respite from toil combined with pleasure. For it appears that
sacrifices and religious assemblies in old times were made as a kind of
first-fruits after the ingathering of the crops, because at such
seasons they had most leisure.
So then it appears that all the instances of Communion are parts of the
great Social one: and corresponding Friendships will follow upon such
Communions.
Chapter X.
Of Political Constitutions there are three kinds; and equal in number
are the deflections from them, being, so to say, corruptions of them.
The former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and that which recognises the
principle of wealth, which it seems appropriate to call Timocracy (I
give to it the name of a political constitution because people commonly
do so). Of these the best is Monarchy, and Timocracy the worst.
From Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both being Monarchies but
widely differing from each other; for the Despot looks to his own
advantage, but the King to that of his subjects: for he is in fact no
King who is not thoroughly independent and superior to the rest in all
good things, and he that is this has no further wants: he will not then
have to look to his own advantage but to that of his subjects, for he
that is not in such a position is a mere King elected by lot for the
nonce.
But Despotism is on a contrary footing to this Kingship, because the
Despot pursues his own good: and in the case of this its inferiority is
most evident, and what is worse is contrary to what is best. The
Transition to Despotism is made from Kingship, Despotism being a
corrupt form of Monarchy, that is to say, the bad King comes to be a
Despot.
From Aristocracy to Oligarchy the transition is made by the fault of
the Rulers in distributing the public property contrary to right
proportion; and giving either all that is good, or the greatest share,
to themselves; and the offices to the same persons always, making
wealth their idol; thus a few bear rule and they bad men in the place
of the best.
From Timocracy the transition is to Democracy, they being contiguous:
for it is the nature of Timocracy to be in the hands of a multitude,
and all in the same grade of property are equal. Democracy is the least
vicious of all, since herein the form of the constitution undergoes
least change.
Well, these are generally the changes to which the various
Constitutions are liable, being the least in degree and the easiest to
make.
Likenesses, and, as it were, models of them, one may find even in
Domestic life: for instance, the Communion between a Father and his
Sons presents the figure of Kingship, because the children are the
Father’s care: and hence Homer names Jupiter Father because Kingship is
intended to be a paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the
Father’s rule is Despotic, for they treat their Sons as slaves. (The
relation of Master to Slaves is of the nature of Despotism because the
point regarded herein is the Master’s interest): this now strikes me to
be as it ought, but the Persian custom to be mistaken; because for
different persons there should be different rules.
Between Husband and Wife the relation takes the form of Aristocracy,
because he rules by right and in such points only as the Husband
should, and gives to the Wife all that befits her to have. Where the
Husband lords it in everything he changes the relation into an
Oligarchy; because he does it contrary to right and not as being the
better of the two. In some instances the Wives take the reins of
government, being heiresses: here the rule is carried on not in right
of goodness but by reason of wealth and power, as it is in Oligarchies.
Timocracy finds its type in the relation of Brothers: they being equal
except as to such differences as age introduces: for which reason, if
they are very different in age, the Friendship comes to be no longer a
fraternal one: while Democracy is represented specially by families
which have no head (all being there equal), or in which the proper head
is weak and so every member does that which is right in his own eyes.
Chapter XI.
Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly is
Friendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; that
between a King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority
of benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being assumed that
he is a good king and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tends
his flock; whence Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, “shepherd
of the people.” And of this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, only
that it exceeds the former in the greatness of the benefits done;
because the father is the author of being (which is esteemed the
greatest benefit) and of maintenance and education (these things are
also, by the way, ascribed to ancestors generally): and by the law of
nature the father has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors over
their descendants, and the king over his subjects.
These friendships are also between superiors and inferiors, for which
reason parents are not merely loved but also honoured. The principle of
Justice also between these parties is not exactly the same but
according to proportiton, because so also is the Friendship.
Now between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship as in
Aristocracy: for the relation is determined by relative excellence, and
the better person has the greater good and each has what befits: so too
also is the principle of Justice between them.
The Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions, because brothers
are equal and much of an age, and such persons have generally like
feelings and like dispositions. Like to this also is the Friendship of
a Timocracy, because the citizens are intended to be equal and
equitable: rule, therefore, passes from hand to hand, and is
distributed on equal terms: so too is the Friendship accordingly.
In the deflections from the constitutional forms, just as the principle
of Justice is but small so is the Friendship also: and least of all in
the most perverted form: in Despotism there is little or no Friendship.
For generally wherever the ruler and the ruled have nothing in common
there is no Friendship because there is no Justice; but the case is as
between an artisan and his tool, or between soul and body, and master
and slave; all these are benefited by those who use them, but towards
things inanimate there is neither Friendship nor Justice: nor even
towards a horse or an ox, or a slave _quâ_ slave, because there is
nothing in common: a slave as such is an animate tool, a tool an
inanimate slave. _Quâ_ slave, then, there is no Friendship towards him,
only _quâ_ man: for it is thought that there is some principle of
Justice between every man, and every other who can share in law and be
a party to an agreement; and so somewhat of Friendship, in so far as he
is man. So in Despotisms the Friendships and the principle of Justice
are inconsiderable in extent, but in Democracies they are most
considerable because they who are equal have much in common.
Chapter XII.
Now of course all Friendship is based upon Communion, as has been
already stated: but one would be inclined to separate off from the rest
the Friendship of Kindred, and that of Companions: whereas those of men
of the same city, or tribe, or crew, and all such, are more peculiarly,
it would seem, based upon Communion, inasmuch as they plainly exist in
right of some agreement expressed or implied: among these one may rank
also the Friendship of Hospitality,
The Friendship of Kindred is likewise of many kinds, and appears in all
its varieties to depend on the Parental: parents, I mean, love their
children as being a part of themselves, children love their parents as
being themselves somewhat derived from them. But parents know their
offspring more than these know that they are from the parents, and the
source is more closely bound to that which is produced than that which
is produced is to that which formed it: of course, whatever is derived
from one’s self is proper to that from which it is so derived (as, for
instance, a tooth or a hair, or any other thing whatever to him that
has it): but the source to it is in no degree proper, or in an inferior
degree at least.
Then again the greater length of time comes in: the parents love their
offspring from the first moment of their being, but their offspring
them only after a lapse of time when they have attained intelligence or
instinct. These considerations serve also to show why mothers have
greater strength of affection than fathers.
Now parents love their children as themselves (since what is derived
from themselves becomes a kind of other Self by the fact of
separation), but children their parents as being sprung from them. And
brothers love one another from being sprung from the same; that is,
their sameness with the common stock creates a sameness with one
another;[7] whence come the phrases, “same blood,” “root,” and so on.
In fact they are the same, in a sense, even in the separate distinct
individuals.
Then again the being brought up together, and the nearness of age, are
a great help towards Friendship, for a man likes one of his own age and
persons who are used to one another are companions, which accounts for
the resemblance between the Friendship of Brothers and that of
Companions.
And cousins and all other relatives derive their bond of union from
these, that is to say, from their community of origin: and the strength
of this bond varies according to their respective distances from the
common ancestor.
Further: the Friendship felt by children towards parents, and by men
towards the gods, is as towards something good and above them; because
these have conferred the greatest possible benefits, in that they are
the causes of their being and being nourished, and of their having been
educated after they were brought into being.
And Friendship of this kind has also the pleasurable and the profitable
more than that between persons unconnected by blood, in proportion as
their life is also more shared in common. Then again in the Fraternal
Friendship there is all that there is in that of Companions, and more
in the good, and generally in those who are alike; in proportion as
they are more closely tied and from their very birth have a feeling of
affection for one another to begin with, and as they are more like in
disposition who spring from the same stock and have grown up together
and been educated alike: and besides this they have the greatest
opportunities in respect of time for proving one another, and can
therefore depend most securely upon the trial.
Between Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law of
nature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate in
Communities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time and
more absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is more
common to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communion
thus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of
procreation but also with a view to life in general::[8] because in
this connection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to
the man, others to the woman: thus they help one the other, putting
what is peculiar to each into the common stock.
And for these reasons this Friendship is thought to combine the
profitable and the pleasurable: it will be also based upon virtue if
they are good people; because each has goodness and they may take
delight in this quality in each other. Children too are thought to be a
tie: accordingly the childless sooner separate, for the children are a
good common to both and anything in common is a bond of union.
The question how a man is to live with his wife, or (more generally)
one friend with another, appears to be no other than this, how it is
just that they should: because plainly there is not the same principle
of Justice between a friend and friend, as between strangers, or
companions, or mere chance fellow-travellers.
Chapter XIII.
There are then, as was stated at the commencement of this book, three
kinds of Friendship, and in each there may be friends on a footing of
equality and friends in the relation of superior and inferior; we find,
I mean, that people who are alike in goodness, become friends, and
better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again, because of
advantage people are friends, either balancing exactly their mutual
profitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then, those
who are equal should in right of this equality be equalised also by the
degree of their Friendship and the other points, and those who are on a
footing of inequality by rendering Friendship in proportion to the
superiority of the other party.
Fault-finding and blame arises, either solely or most naturally, in
Friendship of which utility is the motive: for they who are friends by
reason of goodness, are eager to do kindnesses to one another because
this is a natural result of goodness and Friendship; and when men are
vying with each other for this End there can be no fault-finding nor
contention: since no one is annoyed at one who entertains for him the
sentiment of Friendship and does kindnesses to him, but if of a refined
mind he requites him with kind actions. And suppose that one of the two
exceeds the other, yet as he is attaining his object he will not find
fault with his friend, for good is the object of each party.
Neither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends for
pleasure’s sake: because supposing them to delight in living together
then both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in a
ridiculous light who should find fault with another for not pleasing
him, since it is in his power to forbear intercourse with him. But the
Friendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding;
because, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, the
requirements are continually enlarging, and they think they have less
than of right belongs to them, and find fault because though justly
entitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do the
kindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom they
are being done.
It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the
legal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may be
called the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of
complaints is that parties contract obligations and discharge them not
in the same line of Friendship. The Legal is upon specified conditions,
either purely tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat more
gentlemanly as regards time but still by agreement a _quid pro quo_.
In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute,
the friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for
this reason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for
the recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on
the footing of credit must be content to abide the issue.
That which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specified
conditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still he
expects to receive an equivalent, or even more, as though he had not
given but lent: he also will find fault, because he does not get the
obligation discharged in the same way as it was contracted.
Now this results from the fact, that all men, or the generality at
least, _wish_ what is honourable, but, when tested, _choose_ what is
profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly is honourable
while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one should, if
able, make a return proportionate to the good received, and do so
willingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend[9] of a
man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a
mistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one ought
not to have received it, he being not a friend nor doing the act
disinterestedly; one should therefore discharge one’s self of the
obligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if
able a man would engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable
even the doer of it would not expect it of him: so that if he is able
he ought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whom
one is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that same
understanding one may accept it or not.
A question admitting of dispute is whether one is to measure a kindness
by the good done to the receiver of it, and make this the standard by
which to requite, or by the kind intention of the doer?
For they who have received kindnesses frequently plead in depreciation
that they have received from their benefactors such things as were
small for them to give, or such as they themselves could have got from
others: while the doers of the kindnesses affirm that they gave the
best they had, and what could not have been got from others, and under
danger, or in such-like straits.
May we not say, that as utility is the motive of the Friendship the
advantage conferred on the receiver must be the standard? because he it
is who requests the kindness and the other serves him in his need on
the understanding that he is to get an equivalent: the assistance
rendered is then exactly proportionate to the advantage which the
receiver has obtained, and he should therefore repay as much as he
gained by it, or even more, this being more creditable.
In Friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, is never
raised, but herein the motive of the doer seems to be the proper
standard, since virtue and moral character depend principally on
motive.
Chapter XIV.
Quarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties are
unequal because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater
share, and of course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up.
The man who is better than the other thinks that having the greater
share pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to the
good man: and similarly the man who is more profitable to another than
that other to him: “one who is useless,” they say, “ought not to share
equally, for it comes to a tax, and not a Friendship, unless the fruits
of the Friendship are reaped in proportion to the works done:” their
notion being, that as in a money partnership they who contribute more
receive more so should it be in Friendship likewise.
On the other hand, the needy man and the less virtuous advance the
opposite claim: they urge that “it is the very business of a good
friend to help those who are in need, else what is the use of having a
good or powerful friend if one is not to reap the advantage at all?”
Now each seems to advance a right claim and to be entitled to get more
out of the connection than the other, only _not more of the same
thing_: but the superior man should receive more respect, the needy man
more profit: respect being the reward of goodness and beneficence,
profit being the aid of need.
This is plainly the principle acted upon in Political Communities: he
receives no honour who gives no good to the common stock: for the
property of the Public is given to him who does good to the Public, and
honour is the property of the Public; it is not possible both to make
money out of the Public and receive honour likewise; because no one
will put up with the less in every respect: so to him who suffers loss
as regards money they award honour, but money to him who can be paid by
gifts: since, as has been stated before, the observing due proportion
equalises and preserves Friendship.
Like rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends who
are unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, or
goodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according to
his power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what is
strictly due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honours
paid to the gods and to parents: no man could ever make the due return
in these cases, and so he is thought to be a good man who pays respect
according to his ability.
For this reason it may be judged never to be allowable for a son to
disown his father, whereas a father may his son: because he that owes
is bound to pay; now a son can never, by anything he has done, fully
requite the benefits first conferred on him by his father, and so is
always a debtor. But they to whom anything is owed may cast off their
debtors: therefore the father may his son. But at the same time it must
perhaps be admitted, that it seems no father ever _would_ sever himself
utterly from a son, except in a case of exceeding depravity: because,
independently of the natural Friendship, it is like human nature not to
put away from one’s self the assistance which a son might render. But
to the son, if depraved, assisting his father is a thing to be avoided,
or at least one which he will not be very anxious to do; most men being
willing enough to receive kindness, but averse to doing it as
unprofitable.
Let thus much suffice on these points.
BOOK IX
Chapter I.
Well, in all the Friendships the parties to which are dissimilar it is
the proportionate which equalises and preserves the Friendship, as has
been already stated: I mean, in the Social Friendship the cobbler, for
instance, gets an equivalent for his shoes after a certain rate; and
the weaver, and all others in like manner. Now in this case a common
measure has been provided in money, and to this accordingly all things
are referred and by this are measured: but in the Friendship of Love
the complaint is sometimes from the lover that, though he loves
exceedingly, his love is not requited; he having perhaps all the time
nothing that can be the object of Friendship: again, oftentimes from
the object of love that he who as a suitor promised any and every thing
now performs nothing. These cases occur because the Friendship of the
lover for the beloved object is based upon pleasure, that of the other
for him upon utility, and in one of the parties the requisite quality
is not found: for, as these are respectively the grounds of the
Friendship, the Friendship comes to be broken up because the motives to
it cease to exist: the parties loved not one another but qualities in
one another which are not permanent, and so neither are the
Friendships: whereas the Friendship based upon the moral character of
the parties, being independent and disinterested, is permanent, as we
have already stated.
Quarrels arise also when the parties realise different results and not
those which they desire; for the not attaining one’s special object is
all one, in this case, with getting nothing at all: as in the
well-known case where a man made promises to a musician, rising in
proportion to the excellence of his music; but when, the next morning,
the musician claimed the performance of his promises, he said that he
had given him pleasure for pleasure: of course, if each party had
intended this, it would have been all right: but if the one desires
amusement and the other gain, and the one gets his object but the other
not, the dealing cannot be fair: because a man fixes his mind upon what
he happens to want, and will give so and so for that specific thing.
The question then arises, who is to fix the rate? the man who first
gives, or the man who first takes? because, _primâ facie_, the man who
first gives seems to leave the rate to be fixed by the other party.
This, they say, was in fact the practice of Protagoras: when he taught
a man anything he would bid the learner estimate the worth of the
knowledge gained by his own private opinion; and then he used to take
so much from him. In such cases some people adopt the rule,
“With specified reward a friend should be content.”
They are certainly fairly found fault with who take the money in
advance and then do nothing of what they said they would do, their
promises having been so far beyond their ability; for such men do not
perform what they agreed, The Sophists, however, are perhaps obliged to
take this course, because no one would give a sixpence for their
knowledge. These then, I say, are fairly found fault with, because they
do not what they have already taken money for doing.
In cases where no stipulation as to the respective services is made
they who disinterestedly do the first service will not raise the
question (as we have said before), because it is the nature of
Friendship, based on mutual goodness to be reference to the intention
of the other, the intention being characteristic of the true friend and
of goodness.
And it would seem the same rule should be laid down for those who are
connected with one another as teachers and learners of philosophy; for
here the value of the commodity cannot be measured by money, and, in
fact, an exactly equivalent price cannot be set upon it, but perhaps it
is sufficient to do what one can, as in the case of the gods or one’s
parents.
But where the original giving is not upon these terms but avowedly for
some return, the most proper course is perhaps for the requital to be
such as _both_ shall allow to be proportionate, and, where this cannot
be, then for the receiver to fix the value would seem to be not only
necessary but also fair: because when the first giver gets that which
is equivalent to the advantage received by the other, or to what he
would have given to secure the pleasure he has had, then he has the
value from him: for not only is this seen to be the course adopted in
matters of buying and selling but also in some places the law does not
allow of actions upon voluntary dealings; on the principle that when
one man has trusted another he must be content to have the obligation
discharged in the same spirit as he originally contracted it: that is
to say, it is thought fairer for the trusted, than for the trusting,
party, to fix the value. For, in general, those who have and those who
wish to get things do not set the same value on them: what is their
own, and what they give in each case, appears to them worth a great
deal: but yet the return is made according to the estimate of those who
have received first, it should perhaps be added that the receiver
should estimate what he has received, not by the value he sets upon it
now that he has it, but by that which he set upon it before he obtained
it.
Chapter II.
Questions also arise upon such points as the following: Whether one’s
father has an unlimited claim on one’s services and obedience, or
whether the sick man is to obey his physician? or, in an election of a
general, the warlike qualities of the candidates should be alone
regarded?
In like manner whether one should do a service rather to one’s friend
or to a good man? whether one should rather requite a benefactor or
give to one’s companion, supposing that both are not within one’s
power?
Is not the true answer that it is no easy task to determine all such
questions accurately, inasmuch as they involve numerous differences of
all kinds, in respect of amount and what is honourable and what is
necessary? It is obvious, of course, that no one person can unite in
himself all claims. Again, the requital of benefits is, in general, a
higher duty than doing unsolicited kindnesses to one’s companion; in
other words, the discharging of a debt is more obligatory upon one than
the duty of giving to a companion. And yet this rule may admit of
exceptions; for instance, which is the higher duty? for one who has
been ransomed out of the hands of robbers to ransom in return his
ransomer, be he who he may, or to repay him on his demand though he has
not been taken by robbers, or to ransom his own father? for it would
seem that a man ought to ransom his father even in preference to
himself.
Well then, as has been said already, as a general rule the debt should
be discharged, but if in a particular case the giving greatly
preponderates as being either honourable or necessary, we must be
swayed by these considerations: I mean, in some cases the requital of
the obligation previously existing may not be equal; suppose, for
instance, that the original benefactor has conferred a kindness on a
good man, knowing him to be such, whereas this said good man has to
repay it believing him to be a scoundrel.
And again, in certain cases no obligation lies on a man to lend to one
who has lent to him; suppose, for instance, that a bad man lent to him,
as being a good man, under the notion that he should get repaid,
whereas the said good man has no hope of repayment from him being a bad
man. Either then the case is really as we have supposed it and then the
claim is not equal, or it is not so but supposed to be; and still in so
acting people are not to be thought to act wrongly. In short, as has
been oftentimes stated before, all statements regarding feelings and
actions can be definite only in proportion as their object-matter is
so; it is of course quite obvious that all people have not the same
claim upon one, nor are the claims of one’s father unlimited; just as
Jupiter does not claim all kinds of sacrifice without distinction: and
since the claims of parents, brothers, companions, and benefactors, are
all different, we must give to each what belongs to and befits each.
And this is seen to be the course commonly pursued: to marriages men
commonly invite their relatives, because these are from a common stock
and therefore all the actions in any way pertaining thereto are common
also: and to funerals men think that relatives ought to assemble in
preference to other people, for the same reason.
And it would seem that in respect of maintenance it is our duty to
assist our parents in preference to all others, as being their debtors,
and because it is more honourable to succour in these respects the
authors of our existence than ourselves. Honour likewise we ought to
pay to our parents just as to the gods, but then, not all kinds of
honour: not the same, for instance, to a father as to a mother: nor
again to a father the honour due to a scientific man or to a general
but that which is a father’s due, and in like manner to a mother that
which is a mother’s.
To all our elders also the honour befitting their age, by rising up in
their presence, turning out of the way for them, and all similar marks
of respect: to our companions again, or brothers, frankness and free
participation in all we have. And to those of the same family, or
tribe, or city, with ourselves, and all similarly connected with us, we
should constantly try to render their due, and to discriminate what
belongs to each in respect of nearness of connection, or goodness, or
intimacy: of course in the case of those of the same class the
discrimination is easier; in that of those who are in different classes
it is a matter of more trouble. This, however, should not be a reason
for giving up the attempt, but we must observe the distinctions so far
as it is practicable to do so.
Chapter III.
A question is also raised as to the propriety of dissolving or not
dissolving those Friendships the parties to which do not remain what
they were when the connection was formed.
Now surely in respect of those whose motive to Friendship is utility or
pleasure there can be nothing wrong in breaking up the connection when
they no longer have those qualities; because they were friends [not of
one another, but] of those qualities: and, these having failed, it is
only reasonable to expect that they should cease to entertain the
sentiment.
But a man has reason to find fault if the other party, being really
attached to him because of advantage or pleasure, pretended to be so
because of his moral character: in fact, as we said at the
commencement, the most common source of quarrels between friends is
their not being friends on the same grounds as they suppose themselves
to be.
Now when a man has been deceived in having supposed himself to excite
the sentiment of Friendship by reason of his moral character, the other
party doing nothing to indicate he has but himself to blame: but when
he has been deceived by the pretence of the other he has a right to
find fault with the man who has so deceived him, aye even more than
with utterers of false coin, in proportion to the greater preciousness
of that which is the object-matter of the villany.
But suppose a man takes up another as being a good man, who turns out,
and is found by him, to be a scoundrel, is he bound still to entertain
Friendship for him? or may we not say at once it is impossible? since
it is not everything which is the object-matter of Friendship, but only
that which is good; and so there is no obligation to be a bad man’s
friend, nor, in fact, ought one to be such: for one ought not to be a
lover of evil, nor to be assimilated to what is base; which would be
implied, because we have said before, like is friendly to like.
Are we then to break with him instantly? not in all cases; only where
our friends are incurably depraved; when there is a chance of amendment
we are bound to aid in repairing the moral character of our friends
even more than their substance, in proportion as it is better and more
closely related to Friendship. Still he who should break off the
connection is not to be judged to act wrongly, for he never was a
friend to such a character as the other now is, and therefore, since
the man is changed and he cannot reduce him to his original state, he
backs out of the connection.
To put another case: suppose that one party remains what he was when
the Friendship was formed, while the other becomes morally improved and
widely different from his friend in goodness; is the improved character
to treat the other as a friend?
May we not say it is impossible? The case of course is clearest where
there is a great difference, as in the Friendships of boys: for suppose
that of two boyish friends the one still continues a boy in mind and
the other becomes a man of the highest character, how can they be
friends? since they neither are pleased with the same objects nor like
and dislike the same things: for these points will not belong to them
as regards one another, and without them it was assumed they cannot be
friends because they cannot live in intimacy: and of the case of those
who cannot do so we have spoken before.
Well then, is the improved party to bear himself towards his former
friend in no way differently to what he would have done had the
connection never existed?
Surely he ought to bear in mind the intimacy of past times, and just as
we think ourselves bound to do favours for our friends in preference to
strangers, so to those who have been friends and are so no longer we
should allow somewhat on the score of previous Friendship, whenever the
cause of severance is not excessive depravity on their part.
Chapter IV.
Now the friendly feelings which are exhibited towards our friends, and
by which Friendships are characterised, seem to have sprung out of
those which we entertain toward ourselves.
I mean, people define a friend to be “one who intends and does what is
good (or what he believes to be good) to another for that other’s
sake,” or “one who wishes his friend to be and to live for that
friend’s own sake” (which is the feeling of mothers towards their
children, and of friends who have come into collision). Others again,
“one who lives with another and chooses the same objects,” or “one who
sympathises with his friend in his sorrows and in his joys” (this too
is especially the case with mothers).
Well, by some one of these marks people generally characterise
Friendship: and each of these the good man has towards himself, and all
others have them in so far as they suppose themselves to be good. (For,
as has been said before, goodness, that is the good man, seems to be a
measure to every one else.)
For he is at unity in himself, and with every part of his soul he
desires the same objects; and he wishes for himself both what is, and
what he believes to be, good; and he does it (it being characteristic
of the good man to work at what is good), and for the sake of himself,
inasmuch as he does it for the sake of his Intellectual Principle which
is generally thought to be a man’s Self. Again, he wishes himself And
specially this Principle whereby he is an intelligent being, to live
and be preserved in life, because existence is a good to him that is a
good man.
But it is to himself that each individual wishes what is good, and no
man, conceiving the possibility of his becoming other than he now is,
chooses that that New Self should have all things indiscriminately: a
god, for instance, has at the present moment the Chief Good, but he has
it in right of being whatever he actually now is: and the Intelligent
Principle must be judged to be each man’s Self, or at least eminently
so [though other Principles help, of course, to constitute him the man
he is].
Furthermore, the good man wishes to continue to live with himself; for
he can do it with pleasure, in that his memories of past actions are
full of delight and his anticipations of the future are good and such
are pleasurable. Then, again, he has good store of matter for his
Intellect to contemplate, and he most especially sympathises with his
Self in its griefs and joys, because the objects which give him pain
and pleasure are at all times the same, not one thing to-day and a
different one to-morrow: because he is not given to repentance,[1] if
one may so speak. It is then because each of these feelings are
entertained by the good man towards his own Self and a friend feels
towards a friend as towards himself (a friend being in fact another
Self), that Friendship is thought to be some one of these things and
they are accounted friends in whom they are found. Whether or no there
can really be Friendship between a man and his Self is a question we
will not at present entertain: there may be thought to be Friendship,
in so far as there are two or more of the aforesaid requisites, and
because the highest degree of Friendship, in the usual acceptation of
that term, resembles the feeling entertained by a man towards himself.
But it may be urged that the aforesaid requisites are to all appearance
found in the common run of men, though they are men of a low stamp.
May it not be answered, that they share in them only in so far as they
please themselves, and conceive themselves to be good? for certainly,
they are not either really, or even apparently, found in any one of
those who are very depraved and villainous; we may almost say not even
in those who are bad men at all: for they are at variance with
themselves and lust after different things from those which in cool
reason they wish for, just as men who fail of Self-Control: I mean,
they choose things which, though hurtful, are pleasurable, in
preference to those which in their own minds they believe to be good:
others again, from cowardice and indolence, decline to do what still
they are convinced is best for them: while they who from their
depravity have actually done many dreadful actions hate and avoid life,
and accordingly kill themselves: and the wicked seek others in whose
company to spend their time, but fly from themselves because they have
many unpleasant subjects of memory, and can only look forward to others
like them when in solitude but drown their remorse in the company of
others: and as they have nothing to raise the sentiment of Friendship
so they never feel it towards themselves.
Neither, in fact, can they who are of this character sympathise with
their Selves in their joys and sorrows, because their soul is, as it
were, rent by faction, and the one principle, by reason of the
depravity in them, is grieved at abstaining from certain things, while
the other and better principle is pleased thereat; and the one drags
them this way and the other that way, as though actually tearing them
asunder.[2] And though it is impossible actually to have at the same
time the sensations of pain and pleasure; yet after a little time the
man is sorry for having been pleased, and he could wish that those
objects had not given him pleasure; for the wicked are full of remorse.
It is plain then that the wicked man cannot be in the position of a
friend even towards himself, because he has in himself nothing which
can excite the sentiment of Friendship. If then to be thus is
exceedingly wretched it is a man’s duty to flee from wickedness with
all his might and to strive to be good, because thus may he be friends
with himself and may come to be a friend to another.
Chapter V.
Kindly Feeling, though resembling Friendship, is not identical with it,
because it may exist in reference to those whom we do not know and
without the object of it being aware of its existence, which Friendship
cannot. (This, by the way, has also been said before.) And further, it
is not even Affection because it does not imply intensity nor yearning,
which are both consequences of Affection. Again Affection requires
intimacy but Kindly Feeling may arise quite suddenly, as happens
sometimes in respect of men against whom people are matched in any way,
I mean they come to be kindly disposed to them and sympathise in their
wishes, but still they would not join them in any action, because, as
we said, they conceive this feeling of kindness suddenly and so have
but a superficial liking.
What it does seem to be is the starting point of a Friendship; just as
pleasure, received through the sight, is the commencement of Love: for
no one falls in love without being first pleased with the personal
appearance of the beloved object, and yet he who takes pleasure in it
does not therefore necessarily love, but when he wearies for the object
in its absence and desires its presence. Exactly in the same way men
cannot be friends without having passed through the stage of Kindly
Feeling, and yet they who are in that stage do not necessarily advance
to Friendship: they merely have an inert wish for the good of those
toward whom they entertain the feeling, but would not join them in any
action, nor put themselves out of the way for them. So that, in a
metaphorical way of speaking, one might say that it is dormant
Friendship, and when it has endured for a space and ripened into
intimacy comes to be real Friendship; but not that whose object is
advantage or pleasure, because such motives cannot produce even Kindly
Feeling.
I mean, he who has received a kindness requites it by Kindly Feeling
towards his benefactor, and is right in so doing: but he who wishes
another to be prosperous, because he has hope of advantage through his
instrumentality, does not seem to be kindly disposed to that person but
rather to himself; just as neither is he his friend if he pays court to
him for any interested purpose.
Kindly Feeling always arises by reason of goodness and a certain
amiability, when one man gives another the notion of being a fine
fellow, or brave man, etc., as we said was the case sometimes with
those matched against one another.
Chapter VI.
Unity of Sentiment is also plainly connected with Friendship, and
therefore is not the same as Unity of Opinion, because this might exist
even between people unacquainted with one another.
Nor do men usually say people are united in sentiment merely because
they agree in opinion on _any_ point, as, for instance, on points of
astronomical science (Unity of Sentiment herein not having any
connection with Friendship), but they say that Communities have Unity
of Sentiment when they agree respecting points of expediency and take
the same line and carry out what has been determined in common
consultation.
Thus we see that Unity of Sentiment has for its object matters of
action, and such of these as are of importance, and of mutual, or, in
the case of single States, common, interest: when, for instance, all
agree in the choice of magistrates, or forming alliance with the
Lacedæmonians, or appointing Pittacus ruler (that is to say, supposing
he himself was willing). But when each wishes himself to be in power
(as the brothers in the Phœnissæ), they quarrel and form parties: for,
plainly, Unity of Sentiment does not merely imply that each entertains
the same idea be it what it may, but that they do so in respect of the
same object, as when both the populace and the sensible men of a State
desire that the best men should be in office, because then all attain
their object.
Thus Unity of Sentiment is plainly a social Friendship, as it is also
said to be: since it has for its object-matter things expedient and
relating to life.
And this Unity exists among the good: for they have it towards
themselves and towards one another, being, if I may be allowed the
expression, in the same position: I mean, the wishes of such men are
steady and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus, and they wish what is
just and expedient and aim at these things in common.
The bad, on the contrary, can as little have Unity of Sentiment as they
can be real friends, except to a very slight extent, desiring as they
do unfair advantage in things profitable while they shirk labour and
service for the common good: and while each man wishes for these things
for himself he is jealous of and hinders his neighbour: and as they do
not watch over the common good it is lost. The result is that they
quarrel while they are for keeping one another to work but are not
willing to perform their just share.
Chapter VII.
Benefactors are commonly held to have more Friendship for the objects
of their kindness than these for them: and the fact is made a subject
of discussion and enquiry, as being contrary to reasonable expectation.
The account of the matter which satisfies most persons is that the one
are debtors and the others creditors: and therefore that, as in the
case of actual loans the debtors wish their creditors out of the way
while the creditors are anxious for the preservation of their debtors,
so those who have done kindnesses desire the continued existence of the
people they have done them to, under the notion of getting a return of
their good offices, while these are not particularly anxious about
requital.
Epicharmus, I suspect, would very probably say that they who give this
solution judge from their own baseness; yet it certainly is like human
nature, for the generality of men have short memories on these points,
and aim rather at receiving than conferring benefits.
But the real cause, it would seem, rests upon nature, and the case is
not parallel to that of creditors; because in this there is no
affection to the persons, but merely a wish for their preservation with
a view to the return: whereas, in point of fact, they who have done
kindnesses feel friendship and love for those to whom they have done
them, even though they neither are, nor can by possibility hereafter
be, in a position to serve their benefactors.
And this is the case also with artisans; every one, I mean, feels more
affection for his own work than that work possibly could for him if it
were animate. It is perhaps specially the case with poets: for these
entertain very great affection for their poems, loving them as their
own children. It is to this kind of thing I should be inclined to
compare the case of benefactors: for the object of their kindness is
their own work, and so they love this more than this loves its creator.
And the account of this is that existence is to all a thing
choice-worthy and an object of affection; now we exist by acts of
working, that is, by living and acting; he then that has created a
given work exists, it may be said, by his act of working: therefore he
loves his work because he loves existence. And this is natural, for the
work produced displays in act what existed before potentially.
Then again, the benefactor has a sense of honour in right of his
action, so that he may well take pleasure in him in whom this resides;
but to him who has received the benefit there is nothing honourable in
respect of his benefactor, only something advantageous which is both
less pleasant and less the object of Friendship.
Again, pleasure is derived from the actual working out of a present
action, from the anticipation of a future one, and from the
recollection of a past one: but the highest pleasure and special object
of affection is that which attends on the actual working. Now the
benefactor’s work abides (for the honourable is enduring), but the
advantage of him who has received the kindness passes away.
Again, there is pleasure in recollecting honourable actions, but in
recollecting advantageous ones there is none at all or much less (by
the way though, the contrary is true of the expectation of advantage).
Further, the entertaining the feeling of Friendship is like acting on
another; but being the object of the feeling is like being acted upon.
So then, entertaining the sentiment of Friendship, and all feelings
connected with it, attend on those who, in the given case of a
benefaction, are the superior party.
Once more: all people value most what has cost them much labour in the
production; for instance, people who have themselves made their money
are fonder of it than those who have inherited it: and receiving
kindness is, it seems, unlaborious, but doing it is laborious. And this
is the reason why the female parents are most fond of their offspring;
for their part in producing them is attended with most labour, and they
know more certainly that they are theirs. This feeling would seem also
to belong to benefactors.
Chapter VIII.
A question is also raised as to whether it is right to love one’s Self
best, or some one else: because men find fault with those who love
themselves best, and call them in a disparaging way lovers of Self; and
the bad man is thought to do everything he does for his own sake
merely, and the more so the more depraved he is; accordingly men
reproach him with never doing anything unselfish: whereas the good man
acts from a sense of honour (and the more so the better man he is), and
for his friend’s sake, and is careless of his own interest.
But with these theories facts are at variance, and not unnaturally: for
it is commonly said also that a man is to love most him who is most his
friend, and he is most a friend who wishes good to him to whom he
wishes it for that man’s sake even though no one knows. Now these
conditions, and in fact all the rest by which a friend is
characterised, belong specially to each individual in respect of his
Self: for we have said before that all the friendly feelings are
derived to others from those which have Self primarily for their
object. And all the current proverbs support this view; for instance,
“one soul,” “the goods of friends are common,” “equality is a tie of
Friendship,” “the knee is nearer than the shin.” For all these things
exist specially with reference to a man’s own Self: he is specially a
friend to himself and so he is bound to love himself the most.
It is with good reason questioned which of the two parties one should
follow, both having plausibility on their side. Perhaps then, in
respect of theories of this kind, the proper course is to distinguish
and define how far each is true, and in what way. If we could ascertain
the sense in which each uses the term “Self-loving,” this point might
be cleared up.
Well now, they who use it disparagingly give the name to those who, in
respect of wealth, and honours, and pleasures of the body, give to
themselves the larger share: because the mass of mankind grasp after
these and are earnest about them as being the best things; which is the
reason why they are matters of contention. They who are covetous in
regard to these gratify their lusts and passions in general, that is to
say the irrational part of their soul: now the mass of mankind are so
disposed, for which reason the appellation has taken its rise from that
mass which is low and bad. Of course they are justly reproached who are
Self-loving in this sense.
And that the generality of men are accustomed to apply the term to
denominate those who do give such things to themselves is quite plain:
suppose, for instance, that a man were anxious to do, more than other
men, acts of justice, or self-mastery, or any other virtuous acts, and,
in general, were to secure to himself that which is abstractedly noble
and honourable, no one would call him Self-loving, nor blame him.
Yet might such an one be judged to be more truly Self-loving: certainly
he gives to himself the things which are most noble and most good, and
gratifies that Principle of his nature which is most rightfully
authoritative, and obeys it in everything: and just as that which
possesses the highest authority is thought to constitute a Community or
any other system, so also in the case of Man: and so he is most truly
Self-loving who loves and gratifies this Principle.
Again, men are said to have, or to fail of having, self-control,
according as the Intellect controls or not, it being plainly implied
thereby that this Principle constitutes each individual; and people are
thought to have done of themselves, and voluntarily, those things
specially which are done with Reason.
It is plain, therefore, that this Principle does, either entirely or
specially constitute the individual man, and that the good man
specially loves this. For this reason then he must be specially
Self-loving, in a kind other than that which is reproached, and as far
superior to it as living in accordance with Reason is to living at the
beck and call of passion, and aiming at the truly noble to aiming at
apparent advantage.
Now all approve and commend those who are eminently earnest about
honourable actions, and if all would vie with one another in respect of
the καλὸν, and be intent upon doing what is most truly noble and
honourable, society at large would have all that is proper while each
individual in particular would have the greatest of goods, Virtue being
assumed to be such.
And so the good man ought to be Self-loving: because by doing what is
noble he will have advantage himself and will do good to others: but
the bad man ought not to be, because he will harm himself and his
neighbours by following low and evil passions. In the case of the bad
man, what he ought to do and what he does are at variance, but the good
man does what he ought to do, because all Intellect chooses what is
best for itself and the good man puts himself under the direction of
Intellect.
Of the good man it is true likewise that he does many things for the
sake of his friends and his country, even to the extent of dying for
them, if need be: for money and honours, and, in short, all the good
things which others fight for, he will throw away while eager to secure
to himself the καλὸν: he will prefer a brief and great joy to a tame
and enduring one, and to live nobly for one year rather than ordinarily
for many, and one great and noble action to many trifling ones. And
this is perhaps that which befals men who die for their country and
friends; they choose great glory for themselves: and they will lavish
their own money that their friends may receive more, for hereby the
friend gets the money but the man himself the καλὸν; so, in fact he
gives to himself the greater good. It is the same with honours and
offices; all these things he will give up to his friend, because this
reflects honour and praise on himself: and so with good reason is he
esteemed a fine character since he chooses the honourable before all
things else. It is possible also to give up the opportunities of action
to a friend; and to have caused a friend’s doing a thing may be more
noble than having done it one’s self.
In short, in all praiseworthy things the good man does plainly give to
himself a larger share of the honourable. In this sense it is right to
be Self-loving, in the vulgar acceptation of the term it is not.
Chapter IX.
A question is raised also respecting the Happy man, whether he will
want Friends, or no?
Some say that they who are blessed and independent have no need of
Friends, for they already have all that is good, and so, as being
independent, want nothing further: whereas the notion of a friend’s
office is to be as it were a second Self and procure for a man what he
cannot get by himself: hence the saying,
“When Fortune gives us good, what need we Friends?”
On the other hand, it looks absurd, while we are assigning to the Happy
man all other good things, not to give him Friends, which are, after
all, thought to be the greatest of external goods.
Again, if it is more characteristic of a friend to confer than to
receive kindnesses, and if to be beneficent belongs to the good man and
to the character of virtue, and if it is more noble to confer
kindnesses on friends than strangers, the good man will need objects
for his benefactions. And out of this last consideration springs a
question whether the need of Friends be greater in prosperity or
adversity, since the unfortunate man wants people to do him kindnesses
and they who are fortunate want objects for their kind acts.
Again, it is perhaps absurd to make our Happy man a solitary, because
no man would choose the possession of all goods in the world on the
condition of solitariness, man being a social animal and formed by
nature for living with others: of course the Happy man has this
qualification since he has all those things which are good by nature:
and it is obvious that the society of friends and good men must be
preferable to that of strangers and ordinary people, and we conclude,
therefore, that the Happy man does need Friends.
But then, what do they mean whom we quoted first, and how are they
right? Is it not that the mass of mankind mean by Friends those who are
useful? and of course the Happy man will not need such because he has
all good things already; neither will he need such as are Friends with
a view to the pleasurable, or at least only to a slight extent; because
his life, being already pleasurable, does not want pleasure imported
from without; and so, since the Happy man does not need Friends of
these kinds, he is thought not to need any at all.
But it may be, this is not true: for it was stated originally, that
Happiness is a kind of Working; now Working plainly is something that
must come into being, not be already there like a mere piece of
property.
If then the being happy consists in living and working, and the good
man’s working is in itself excellent and pleasurable (as we said at the
commencement of the treatise), and if what is our own reckons among
things pleasurable, and if we can view our neighbours better than
ourselves and their actions better than we can our own, then the
actions of their Friends who are good men are pleasurable to the good;
inasmuch as they have both the requisites which are naturally pleasant.
So the man in the highest state of happiness will need Friends of this
kind, since he desires to contemplate good actions, and actions of his
own, which those of his friend, being a good man, are.
Again, common opinion requires that the Happy man live with pleasure to
himself: now life is burthensome to a man in solitude, for it is not
easy to work continuously by one’s self, but in company with, and in
regard to others, it is easier, and therefore the working, being
pleasurable in itself will be more continuous (a thing which should be
in respect of the Happy man); for the good man, in that he is good
takes pleasure in the actions which accord with Virtue and is annoyed
at those which spring from Vice, just as a musical man is pleased with
beautiful music and annoyed by bad. And besides, as Theognis says,
Virtue itself may be improved by practice, from living with the good.
And, upon the following considerations more purely metaphysical, it
will probably appear that the good friend is naturally choice-worthy to
the good man. We have said before, that whatever is naturally good is
also in itself good and pleasant to the good man; now the fact of
living, so far as animals are concerned, is characterised generally by
the power of sentience, in man it is characterised by that of
sentience, or of rationality (the faculty of course being referred to
the actual operation of the faculty, certainly the main point is the
actual operation of it); so that living seems mainly to consist in the
act of sentience or exerting rationality: now the fact of living is in
itself one of the things that are good and pleasant (for it is a
definite totality, and whatever is such belongs to the nature of good),
but what is naturally good is good to the good man: for which reason it
seems to be pleasant to all. (Of course one must not suppose a life
which is depraved and corrupted, nor one spent in pain, for that which
is such is indefinite as are its inherent qualities: however, what is
to be said of pain will be clearer in what is to follow.)
If then the fact of living is in itself good and pleasant (and this
appears from the fact that all desire it, and specially those who are
good and in high happiness; their course of life being most
choice-worthy and their existence most choice-worthy likewise), then
also he that sees perceives that he sees; and he that hears perceives
that he hears; and he that walks perceives that he walks; and in all
the other instances in like manner there is a faculty which reflects
upon and perceives the fact that we are working, so that we can
perceive that we perceive and intellectually know that we
intellectually know: but to perceive that we perceive or that we
intellectually know is to perceive that we exist, since existence was
defined to be perceiving or intellectually knowing. Now to perceive
that one lives is a thing pleasant in itself, life being a thing
naturally good, and the perceiving of the presence in ourselves of
things naturally good being pleasant.
Therefore the fact of living is choice-worthy, and to the good
specially so since existence is good and pleasant to them: for they
receive pleasure from the internal consciousness of that which in
itself is good.
But the good man is to his friend as to himself, friend being but a
name for a second Self; therefore as his own existence is choice-worthy
to each so too, or similarly at least, is his friend’s existence. But
the ground of one’s own existence being choice-worthy is the perceiving
of one’s self being good, any such perception being in itself pleasant.
Therefore one ought to be thoroughly conscious of one’s friend’s
existence, which will result from living with him, that is sharing in
his words and thoughts: for this is the meaning of the term as applied
to the human species, not mere feeding together as in the case of
brutes.
If then to the man in a high state of happiness existence is in itself
choice-worthy, being naturally good and pleasant, and so too a friend’s
existence, then the friend also must be among things choice-worthy. But
whatever is choice-worthy to a man he should have or else he will be in
this point deficient. The man therefore who is to come up to our notion
“Happy” will need good Friends.
Chapter X.
Are we then to make our friends as numerous as possible? or, as in
respect of acquaintance it is thought to have been well said “have not
thou many acquaintances yet be not without;” so too in respect of
Friendship may we adopt the precept, and say that a man should not be
without friends, nor again have exceeding many friends?
Now as for friends who are intended for use, the maxim I have quoted
will, it seems, fit in exceedingly well, because to requite the
services of many is a matter of labour, and a whole life would not be
long enough to do this for them. So that, if more numerous than what
will suffice for one’s own life, they become officious, and are
hindrances in respect of living well: and so we do not want them. And
again of those who are to be for pleasure a few are quite enough, just
like sweetening in our food.
But of the good are we to make as many as ever we can, or is there any
measure of the number of friends, as there is of the number to
constitute a Political Community? I mean, you cannot make one out of
ten men, and if you increase the number to one hundred thousand it is
not any longer a Community. However, the number is not perhaps some one
definite number but any between certain extreme limits.
Well, of friends likewise there is a limited number, which perhaps may
be laid down to be the greatest number with whom it would be possible
to keep up intimacy; this being thought to be one of the greatest marks
of Friendship, and it being quite obvious that it is not possible to be
intimate with many, in other words, to part one’s self among many. And
besides it must be remembered that they also are to be friends to one
another if they are all to live together: but it is a matter of
difficulty to find this in many men at once.
It comes likewise to be difficult to bring home to one’s self the joys
and sorrows of many: because in all probability one would have to
sympathise at the same time with the joys of this one and the sorrows
of that other.
Perhaps then it is well not to endeavour to have very many friends but
so many as are enough for intimacy: because, in fact, it would seem not
to be possible to be very much a friend to many at the same time: and,
for the same reason, not to be in love with many objects at the same
time: love being a kind of excessive Friendship which implies but one
object: and all strong emotions must be limited in the number towards
whom they are felt.
And if we look to facts this seems to be so: for not many at a time
become friends in the way of companionship, all the famous Friendships
of the kind are between _two_ persons: whereas they who have many
friends, and meet everybody on the footing of intimacy, seem to be
friends really to no one except in the way of general society; I mean
the characters denominated as over-complaisant.
To be sure, in the way merely of society, a man may be a friend to many
without being necessarily over-complaisant, but being truly good: but
one cannot be a friend to many because of their virtue, and for the
persons’ own sake; in fact, it is a matter for contentment to find even
a few such.
Chapter XI.
Again: are friends most needed in prosperity or in adversity? they are
required, we know, in both states, because the unfortunate need help
and the prosperous want people to live with and to do kindnesses to:
for they have a desire to act kindly to some one.
To have friends is more necessary in adversity, and therefore in this
case useful ones are wanted; and to have them in prosperity is more
honourable, and this is why the prosperous want good men for friends,
it being preferable to confer benefits on, and to live with, these. For
the very presence of friends is pleasant even in adversity: since men
when grieved are comforted by the sympathy of their friends.
And from this, by the way, the question might be raised, whether it is
that they do in a manner take part of the weight of calamities, or only
that their presence, being pleasurable, and the consciousness of their
sympathy, make the pain of the sufferer less.
However, we will not further discuss whether these which have been
suggested or some other causes produce the relief, at least the effect
we speak of is a matter of plain fact.
But their presence has probably a mixed effect: I mean, not only is the
very seeing friends pleasant, especially to one in misfortune, and
actual help towards lessening the grief is afforded (the natural
tendency of a friend, if he is gifted with tact, being to comfort by
look and word, because he is well acquainted with the sufferer’s temper
and disposition and therefore knows what things give him pleasure and
pain), but also the perceiving a friend to be grieved at his
misfortunes causes the sufferer pain, because every one avoids being
cause of pain to his friends. And for this reason they who are of a
manly nature are cautious not to implicate their friends in their pain;
and unless a man is exceedingly callous to the pain of others he cannot
bear the pain which is thus caused to his friends: in short, he does
not admit men to wail with him, not being given to wail at all: women,
it is true, and men who resemble women, like to have others to groan
with them, and love such as friends and sympathisers. But it is plain
that it is our duty in all things to imitate the highest character.
On the other hand, the advantages of friends in our prosperity are the
pleasurable intercourse and the consciousness that they are pleased at
our good fortune.
It would seem, therefore, that we ought to call in friends readily on
occasion of good fortune, because it is noble to be ready to do good to
others: but on occasion of bad fortune, we should do so with
reluctance; for we should as little as possible make others share in
our ills; on which principle goes the saying, “I am unfortunate, let
that suffice.” The most proper occasion for calling them in is when
with small trouble or annoyance to themselves they can be of very great
use to the person who needs them.
But, on the contrary, it is fitting perhaps to go to one’s friends in
their misfortunes unasked and with alacrity (because kindness is the
friend’s office and specially towards those who are in need and who do
not demand it as a right, this being more creditable and more pleasant
to both); and on occasion of their good fortune to go readily, if we
can forward it in any way (because men need their friends for this
likewise), but to be backward in sharing it, any great eagerness to
receive advantage not being creditable.
One should perhaps be cautious not to present the appearance of
sullenness in declining the sympathy or help of friends, for this
happens occasionally.
It appears then that the presence of friends is, under all
circumstances, choice-worthy.
Chapter XII.
May we not say then that, as seeing the beloved object is most prized
by lovers and they choose this sense rather than any of the others
because Love
“Is engendered in the eyes,
With gazing fed,”
in like manner intimacy is to friends most choice-worthy, Friendship
being communion? Again, as a man is to himself so is he to his friend;
now with respect to himself the perception of his own existence is
choice-worthy, therefore is it also in respect of his friend.
And besides, their Friendship is acted out in intimacy, and so with
good reason they desire this. And whatever in each man’s opinion
constitutes existence, or whatsoever it is for the sake of which they
choose life, herein they wish their friends to join with them; and so
some men drink together, others gamble, others join in gymnastic
exercises or hunting, others study philosophy together: in each case
spending their days together in that which they like best of all things
in life, for since they wish to be intimate with their friends they do
and partake in those things whereby they think to attain this object.
Therefore the Friendship of the wicked comes to be depraved; for, being
unstable, they share in what is bad and become depraved in being made
like to one another: but the Friendship of the good is good, growing
with their intercourse; they improve also, as it seems, by repeated
acts, and by mutual correction, for they receive impress from one
another in the points which give them pleasure; whence says the Poet,
“Thou from the good, good things shalt surely learn.”
Here then we will terminate our discourse of Friendship. The next thing
is to go into the subject of Pleasure.
BOOK X
Chapter I.
Next, it would seem, follows a discussion respecting Pleasure, for it
is thought to be most closely bound up with our kind: and so men train
the young, guiding them on their course by the rudders of Pleasure and
Pain. And to like and dislike what one ought is judged to be most
important for the formation of good moral character: because these
feelings extend all one’s life through, giving a bias towards and
exerting an influence on the side of Virtue and Happiness, since men
choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.
Subjects such as these then, it would seem, we ought by no means to
pass by, and specially since they involve much difference of opinion.
There are those who call Pleasure the Chief Good; there are others who
on the contrary maintain that it is exceedingly bad;[1] some perhaps
from a real conviction that such is the case, others from a notion that
it is better, in reference to our life and conduct, to show up Pleasure
as bad, even if it is not so really; arguing that, as the mass of men
have a bias towards it and are the slaves of their pleasures, it is
right to draw them to the contrary, for that so they may possibly
arrive at the mean.[2]
I confess I suspect the soundness of this policy; in matters respecting
men’s feelings and actions theories are less convincing than facts:
whenever, therefore, they are found conflicting with actual experience,
they not only are despised but involve the truth in their fall: he, for
instance, who deprecates Pleasure, if once seen to aim at it, gets the
credit of backsliding to it as being universally such as he said it
was, the mass of men being incapable of nice distinctions.
Real accounts, therefore, of such matters seem to be most expedient,
not with a view to knowledge merely but to life and conduct: for they
are believed as being in harm with facts, and so they prevail with the
wise to live in accordance with them.
But of such considerations enough: let us now proceed to the current
maxims respecting Pleasure.
Chapter II.
Now Eudoxus thought Pleasure to be the Chief Good because he saw all,
rational and irrational alike, aiming at it: and he argued that, since
in all what was the object of choice must be good and what most so the
best, the fact of all being drawn to the same thing proved this thing
to be the best for all: “For each,” he said, “finds what is good for
itself just as it does its proper nourishment, and so that which is
good for all, and the object of the aim of all, is their Chief Good.”
(And his theories were received, not so much for their own sake, as
because of his excellent moral character; for he was thought to be
eminently possessed of perfect self-mastery, and therefore it was not
thought that he said these things because he was a lover of Pleasure
but that he really was so convinced.)
And he thought his position was not less proved by the argument from
the contrary: that is, since Pain was in itself an object of avoidance
to all the contrary must be in like manner an object of choice.
Again he urged that that is most choice-worthy which we choose, not by
reason of, or with a view to, anything further; and that Pleasure is
confessedly of this kind because no one ever goes on to ask to what
purpose he is pleased, feeling that Pleasure is in itself
choice-worthy.
Again, that when added to any other good it makes it more
choice-worthy; as, for instance, to actions of justice, or perfected
self-mastery; and good can only be increased by itself.
However, this argument at least seems to prove only that it belongs to
the class of goods, and not that it does so more than anything else:
for every good is more choicewortby in combination with some other than
when taken quite alone. In fact, it is by just such an argument that
Plato proves that Pleasure is not the Chief Good:[3] “For,” says he,
“the life of Pleasure is more choice-worthy in combination with
Practical Wisdom than apart from it; but, if the compound better then
simple Pleasure cannot be the Chief Good; because the very Chief Good
cannot by any addition become choice-worthy than it is already:” and it
is obvious that nothing else can be the Chief Good, which by
combination with any of the things in themselves good comes to be more
choice-worthy.
What is there then of such a nature? (meaning, of course, whereof we
can partake; because that which we are in search of must be such).
As for those who object that “what all aim at is not necessarily good,”
I confess I cannot see much in what they say, because what all _think_
we say _is_. And he who would cut away this ground from under us will
not bring forward things more dependable: because if the argument had
rested on the desires of irrational creatures there might have been
something in what he says, but, since the rational also desire
Pleasure, how can his objection be allowed any weight? and it may be
that, even in the lower animals, there is some natural good principle
above themselves which aims at the good peculiar to them.
Nor does that seem to be sound which is urged respecting the argument
from the contrary: I mean, some people say “it does not follow that
Pleasure must be good because Pain is evil, since evil may be opposed
to evil, and both evil and good to what is indifferent:” now what they
say is right enough in itself but does not hold in the present
instance. If both Pleasure and Pain were bad both would have been
objects of avoidance; or if neither then neither would have been, at
all events they must have fared alike: but now men do plainly avoid the
one as bad and choose the other as good, and so there is a complete
opposition.
Nor again is Pleasure therefore excluded from being good because it
does not belong to the class of qualities:[4] the acts of Virtue are
not qualities, neither is Happiness [yet surely both are goods].
Again, they say the Chief Good is limited but Pleasure unlimited, in
that it admits of degrees.
Now if they judge this from the act of feeling Pleasure then the same
thing will apply to justice and all the other virtues,[5] in respect of
which clearly it is said that men are more or less of such and such
characters (according to the different virtues), they are more just or
more brave, or one may practise justice and self-mastery more or less.
If, on the other hand, they judge in respect of the Pleasures
themselves then it may be they miss the true cause, namely that some
are unmixed and others mixed: for just as health being in itself
limited, admits of degrees, why should not Pleasure do so and yet be
limited? in the former case we account for it by the fact that there is
not the same adjustment of parts in all men, nor one and the same
always in the same individual: but health, though relaxed, remains up
to a certain point, and differs in degrees; and of course the same may
be the case with Pleasure.
Again, assuming the Chief Good to be perfect and all Movements[6] and
Generations imperfect, they try to shew that Pleasure is a Movement and
a Generation.
Yet they do not seem warranted in saying even that it is a Movement:
for to every Movement are thought to belong swiftness and slowness, and
if not in itself, as to that of the universe, yet relatively: but to
Pleasure neither of these belongs: for though one may have got quickly
into the state Pleasure, as into that of anger, one cannot be in the
state quickly,[7] nor relatively to the state of any other person; but
we can walk or grow, and so on, quickly or slowly.
Of course it is possible to change into the state of Pleasure quickly
or slowly, but to act in the state (by which, I mean, have the
perception of Pleasure) quickly, is not possible.
And how can it be a Generation? because, according to notions generally
held, not _any_thing is generated from _any_thing, but a thing resolves
itself into that out of which it was generated: whereas of that of
which Pleasure is a Generation Pain is a Destruction.
Again, they say that Pain is a lack of something suitable to nature and
Pleasure a supply of it.
But these are affections of the body: now if Pleasure really is a
supplying of somewhat suitable to nature, that must feel the Pleasure
in which the supply takes place, therefore the body of course: yet this
is not thought to be so: neither then is Pleasure a supplying, only a
person of course will be pleased when a supply takes place just as he
will be pained when he is cut short.
This notion would seem to have arisen out of the Pains and Pleasures
connected with natural nourishment; because, when people have felt a
lack and so have had Pain first, they, of course, are pleased with the
supply of their lack.
But this is not the case with all Pleasures: those attendant on
mathematical studies, for instance, are unconnected with any Pain; and
of such as attend on the senses those which arise through the sense of
Smell; and again, many sounds, and sights, and memories, and hopes: now
of what can these be Generations? because there has been here no lack
of anything to be afterwards supplied.
And to those who bring forward disgraceful Pleasures we may reply that
these are not really pleasant things; for it does not follow because
they are pleasant to the ill-disposed that we are to admit that they
are pleasant except to them; just as we should not say that those
things are really wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which are so to the
sick, or those objects really white which give that impression to
people labouring under ophthalmia.[8]
Or we might say thus, that the Pleasures are choice-worthy but not as
derived from these sources: just as wealth is, but not as the price of
treason; or health, but not on the terms of eating anything however
loathsome.
Or again, may we not say that Pleasures differ in kind? those derived
from honourable objects, for instance are different from those arising
from disgraceful ones; and it is not possible to experience the
Pleasure of the just man without being just, or of the musical man
without being musical; and so on of others.
The distinction commonly drawn between the friend and the flatterer
would seem to show clearly either that Pleasure is not a good, or that
there are different kinds of Pleasure: for the former is thought to
have good as the object of his intercourse, the latter Pleasure only;
and this last is reproached, but the former men praise as having
different objects in his intercourse.
Again, no one would choose to live with a child’s intellect all his
life through, though receiving the highest possible Pleasure from such
objects as children receive it from; or to take Pleasure in doing any
of the most disgraceful things, though sure never to be pained.
There are many things also about which we should be diligent even
though they brought no Pleasure; as seeing, remembering, knowing,
possessing the various Excellences; and the fact that Pleasures do
follow on these naturally makes no difference, because we should
certainly choose them even though no Pleasure resulted from them.
It seems then to be plain that Pleasure is not the Chief Good, nor is
every kind of it choice-worthy: and that there are some choice-worthy
in themselves, differing in kind, _i.e._ in the sources from which they
are derived. Let this then suffice by way of an account of the current
maxims respecting Pleasure and Pain.
Chapter III.
Now what it is, and how characterised, will be more plain if we take up
the subject afresh.
An act of Sight is thought to be complete at any moment; that is to
say, it lacks nothing the accession of which subsequently will complete
its whole nature.
Well, Pleasure resembles this: because it is a whole, as one may say;
and one could not at any moment of time take a Pleasure whose whole
nature would be completed by its lasting for a longer time. And for
this reason it is not a Movement: for all Movement takes place in time
of certain duration and has a certain End to accomplish; for instance,
the Movement of house-building[9] is then only complete when the
builder has produced what he intended, that is, either in the whole
time [necessary to complete the whole design], or in a given
portion.[10] But all the subordinate Movements are incomplete in the
parts of the time, and are different in kind from the whole movement
and from one another (I mean, for instance, that the fitting the stones
together is a Movement different from that of fluting the column, and
both again from the construction of the Temple as a whole: but this
last is complete as lacking nothing to the result proposed; whereas
that of the basement, or of the triglyph, is incomplete, because each
is a Movement of a part merely).
As I said then, they differ in kind, and you cannot at any time you
choose find a Movement complete in its whole nature, but, if at all, in
the whole time requisite.
And so it is with the Movement of walking and all others: for, if
motion be a Movement from one place to another place, then of it too
there are different kinds, flying, walking, leaping, and such-like. And
not only so, but there are different kinds even in walking: the
where-from and where-to are not the same in the whole Course as in a
portion of it; nor in one portion as in another; nor is crossing this
line the same as crossing that: because a man is not merely crossing a
line but a line in a given place, and this is in a different place from
that.
Of Movement I have discoursed exactly in another treatise. I will now
therefore only say that it seems not to be complete at any given
moment; and that most movements are incomplete and specifically
different, since the whence and whither constitute different species.
But of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment: it is
plain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different from one
another, and that Pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and
complete. And this might appear also from the impossibility of moving
except in a definite time, whereas there is none with respect to the
sensation of Pleasure, for what exists at the very present moment is a
kind of “whole.”
From these considerations then it is plain that people are not
warranted in saying that Pleasure is a Movement or a Generation:
because these terms are not applicable to all things, only to such as
are divisible and not “wholes:” I mean that of an act of Sight there is
no Generation, nor is there of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any one
of these a Movement or a Generation: neither then of Pleasure is there
Movement or Generation, because it is, as one may say, “a whole.”[11]
Chapter IV.
Now since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering to
it, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent
of the Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be
much what I have described; and we will not raise any question about
saying “the Faculty” works, instead of, “that subject wherein the
Faculty resides”), in each case the best Working is that of the Faculty
in its best state upon the best of the Objects answering to it. And
this will be, further, most perfect and most pleasant: for Pleasure is
attendant upon every Percipient Faculty, and in like manner on every
intellectual operation and speculation; and that is most pleasant which
is most perfect, and that most perfect which is the Working of the best
Faculty upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range.
And Pleasure perfects the Working. But Pleasure does not perfect it in
the same way as the Faculty and Object of Perception do, being good;
just as health and the physician are not in similar senses causes of a
healthy state.
And that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every Percipient
Faculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds are
pleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when the
Faculty is most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when
both the Object and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will
always exist, supposing of course an agent and a patient.
Furthermore, Pleasure perfects the act of Working not in the way of an
inherent state but as a supervening finish, such as is bloom in people
at their prime. Therefore so long as the Object of intellectual or
sensitive Perception is such as it should be and also the Faculty which
discerns or realises the Object, there will be Pleasure in the Working:
because when that which has the capacity of being acted on and that
which is apt to act are alike and similarly related, the same result
follows naturally.
How is it then that no one feels Pleasure continuously? is it not that
he wearies, because all human faculties are incapable of unintermitting
exertion; and so, of course, Pleasure does not arise either, because
that follows upon the act of Working. But there are some things which
please when new, but afterwards not in the like way, for exactly the
same reason: that at first the mind is roused and works on these
Objects with its powers at full tension; just as they who are gazing
stedfastly at anything; but afterwards the act of Working is not of the
kind it was at first, but careless, and so the Pleasure too is dulled.
Again, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because
all aim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man
works at and with those things which also he best likes; the musical
man, for instance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man
with his intellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure
perfects the acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp. No
wonder then that they aim also at Pleasure, because to each it perfects
Life, which is itself choice-worthy. (We will take leave to omit the
question whether we choose Life for Pleasure’s sake of Pleasure for
Life’s sake; because these two plainly are closely connected and admit
not of separation; since Pleasure comes not into being without Working,
and again, every Working Pleasure perfects.)
And this is one reason why Pleasures are thought to differ in kind,
because we suppose that things which differ in kind must be perfected
by things so differing: it plainly being the case with the productions
of Nature and Art; as animals, and trees, and pictures, and statues,
and houses, and furniture; and so we suppose that in like manner acts
of Working which are different in kind are perfected by things
differing in kind. Now Intellectual Workings differ specifically from
those of the Senses, and these last from one another; therefore so do
the Pleasures which perfect them.
This may be shown also from the intimate connection subsisting between
each Pleasure and the Working which it perfects: I mean, that the
Pleasure proper to any Working increases that Working; for they who
work with Pleasure sift all things more closely and carry them out to a
greater degree of nicety; for instance, those men become geometricians
who take Pleasure in geometry, and they apprehend particular points
more completely: in like manner men who are fond of music, or
architecture, or anything else, improve each on his own pursuit,
because they feel Pleasure in them. Thus the Pleasures aid in
increasing the Workings, and things which do so aid are proper and
peculiar: but the things which are proper and peculiar to others
specifically different are themselves also specifically different.
Yet even more clearly may this be shown from the fact that the
Pleasures arising from one kind of Workings hinder other Workings; for
instance, people who are fond of flute-music cannot keep their
attention to conversation or discourse when they catch the sound of a
flute; because they take more Pleasure in flute-playing than in the
Working they are at the time engaged on; in other words, the Pleasure
attendant on flute-playing destroys the Working of conversation or
discourse.
Much the same kind of thing takes place in other cases, when a person
is engaged in two different Workings at the same time: that is, the
pleasanter of the two keeps pushing out the other, and, if the
disparity in pleasantness be great, then more and more till a man even
ceases altogether to work at the other.
This is the reason why, when we are very much pleased with anything
whatever, we do nothing else, and it is only when we are but moderately
pleased with one occupation that we vary it with another: people, for
instance, who eat sweetmeats in the theatre do so most when the
performance is indifferent.