In view of the most recent tests which may be described, the war
aeroplane stands in the following position: for scouting work it has,
both in 1910, and again with far greater force in 1911, proved its value
in a way that cannot be denied. Its destructive potentialities, although
clearly apparent, have not yet been demonstrated in a practical way.
That, as has been said, should remain a matter for definite experiment
in 1912.
There remain two problems which may be said to be outstanding. One of
them is the effect which gun-fire will have upon the aeroplane; and the
other concerns the result of the actual fighting which must inevitably
take place, between hostile aircraft, when they meet under conditions of
war.
As to the former, a reader may be able to judge, more or less, from what
has been written in previous sections. Experiments, for what they are
worth, have been in favour of the aeroplane. In the future, too, it will
have increasing speed to help it. That it can fly 3000 feet high, and
carry out its reconnoitring work efficiently, has been demonstrated.
The wise view to take of this question, in consideration of the most
recent data, is that a certain percentage of war aeroplanes will fall
victims to gunfire, but that this percentage will be a very small one,
and that it will be in no way sufficient to mar the success of the work
that a squadron of air-scouts will be able to undertake.
The suggestion is now made that, in order to secure some conclusive
results, power-driver aeroplanes, without occupants, should be made to
ascend, and be directed on a pre-arranged course, while subjected to
artillery-fire. Such a method would be costly, however; but it might
certainly yield remarkably interesting data.
Then there is the question of hostilities between aircraft, to which
several references have been made. Here, again, theory has to take the
place of practice. It is perfectly certain that, as machines cross from
their own lines to those of the enemy, engagements will take place
between them and hostile craft—which will seek to check them in their
aerial spying.
[Illustration: TRAVELLING WORKSHOP.
Photo, M. Branger.
In the French manœuvres, a completely-equipped aeroplane repair shop, in
the form of a motor-wagon, followed the military airmen as they moved
from point to point. One of these invaluable "ateliers" is pictured
above.]
That special fighting machines will be built is practically certain,
also; and it is probable that, in wars of the future, engagements
between these aerial opponents will precede reconnoitring work. How such
flights in the air will end it is, however, difficult to predict. If
some form of light explosive shell is fired, one well-placed shot will
probably wreck a machine, or render it unmanageable. An aerial duel
promises to be over quickly. The skill will, no doubt, lie in getting in
the first shot, and in making that an accurate one.
Although, in some respects, the future is obscure, there is, upon one
important point, most definite data to proceed upon. This is that the
aeroplane is an instrument which will entirely change military
reconnaissance.
"We are in the presence of a new and formidable science that will
revolutionise warfare." So spoke Colonel Seely, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for War, at a special gathering of the
Aeronautical Society on 18th December, 1911.
At the moment, all other problems are subservient to this: whatever its
destructive powers may prove to be, and whatever may be the result of
well-directed artillery-fire upon aerial scouts, no great nation can
afford to neglect this new weapon.
If any country dare to do so, and others go ahead, then the nation which
lags behind will stand in imminent peril in war-time. It may have a fine
army, or a great fleet, but if it does not possess aeroplanes, and its
opponent has them, it will be at a very serious disadvantage.
This point is no longer a matter of any supposition. It has been proved,
beyond all question. It was, as a matter of fact, proved in 1910, and it
was proved again in 1911. It needs no further proof. The aeroplane has
shown what it can do, not in easy experiments, but under rigorous test
conditions.
If our War Office buys a few more foreign machines, and makes a small
stir at our military school on Salisbury Plain, that cannot be regarded
as any serious step towards making up our leeway. The whole problem
needs taking in hand in a way that England has not yet done.
Military flying is not a thing to be trifled with, or played at; France
and Germany realise this. In 1912 they will be spending far more money
upon aviation than they did in 1911. Germany, as an instance of
determined purpose, intends to amplify, to the extent of £100,000, the
grant for military aviation. They will be increasing their air-fleets,
gaining in experience, and preparing themselves for that use of
aircraft, on a very large scale, which so many experts are ready to
predict will be the ultimate development.
So, with each improvement that the aeroplane makes, the peril of
inactivity grows. Not only the action of foreign nations, but the
warnings of far-seeing military experts in our own country, have pointed
to the danger of a policy of "wait and see."
Aeroplanes, and men constantly using them—that is what we need. Money
must be spent, not extravagantly, but ungrudgingly. There must be
practical encouragement.
Both in the Army and Navy it has been shown that we have men, ready and
eager for air work, who win compare favourably, in point of skill and
resource, with the pick of the air-corps of foreign countries.
We spend millions, willingly, upon other forms of armament. All that is
required is that we should spend thousands—in the right way—upon
aeroplanes.
Finally, it is possible to summarise, briefly, such points and
suggestions, concerning the use of war aeroplanes, as represent the most
recent pronouncements of international experts upon this difficult
problem.
It is now urged that machines would need to reconnoitre at night, seeing
that important movements of troops are made under cover of darkness. In
this regard, although it is probable that an airman would be able even
at night, by flying low, to detect large bodies of men, further data is
necessary in the way of practical tests.
For a scouting expedition of unusual importance—in which the safe return
of the aeroplane is a point subservient to all others—it is held that a
machine equipped with a dual engine-plant ought to be used, so that,
should one motor fail, the pilot could fly on with the power of the
other. Experiments with machines so equipped have already been
undertaken.
A subsidiary, but practical use of a weight-carrying machine, during the
course of an action, is suggested in the carrying of ammunition, when
urgently required, from point to point.
The silencing of engines—previously referred to—and the fitting of all
machines with dual control, so that, should the pilot be wounded, the
observer can instantly assume control of the machine, are points now
urged as being essential.
Protecting the vital parts of a fighting machine, with some form of
light armour, is advocated; and it is emphasised that, for a scouting
craft, flexibility of speed would be invaluable, seeing that, with an
aeroplane capable of reducing its pace, the scouting officer should be
able to amplify the detail of his observations.
By way of a final word, this much may be said: the flying season of 1912
will, beyond all doubt, yield results of the utmost significance in the
further development of aircraft for military and naval use.