The work of the aeroplane, when co-operating with land forces, is
all-important, as has been shown; and another field, just as useful,
lies in the utilisation of air-scouts in naval warfare.
The possibilities of the aeroplane in this direction are, however, only
just being realised. To the credit of France goes the first definite
steps. At Toulon, the French naval authorities are keenly alive to the
value of aerial scouting over the sea. Plans have been made for
dispatching aeroplanes from the decks of cruisers; and reconnoitring
flights from the land, over the sea, are now being undertaken.
During the present year France will spend £40,000 upon naval aviation,
quite apart from her disbursement in other respects.
Germany is training naval airmen, and experimenting with aeroplanes for
use at sea. Austria has established an experimental station. In
England—since Lieutenant (now Commander) Samson rose from the deck of a
warship at Sheerness—the Admiralty is credited with an ambitious
programme. In America, highly-practical work has been done in the way of
building aircraft to rise from the water; and, in France, the Voisins
have built a machine that lifts itself from the surface of the Seine.
Farman, too, is building successful hydro-aeroplanes.
From the point of view of their work in naval warfare, a very important
future lies before the aeroplane. So far as can be judged at the present
time, it is possible to divide naval aeroplanes into two categories: I,
coastal aeroplanes; and 2, aeroplanes for use on the high seas.
The former should be stationed at harbours and other sea-coast points of
strategetic importance. The latter would be carried to sea with a fleet,
and sent up, when desired, from the deck of a ship.
The coastal aeroplane would be invaluable in locating the approach of
some attacking fleet. A machine would be sent up from a harbour and,
flying high and at a great pace, would be able to scour a wide area of
water in a surprisingly short space of time. Upon sighting an enemy’s
fleet, the air-scout would be able to gauge its strength, and then dash
back to its Headquarters at astonishing speed.
A fast-flying monoplane, acting as an observing craft, would be able to
perform the work which would otherwise need the services of several
cruisers, or a number of torpedo-boat destroyers.
As regards the aeroplane for work on the high seas, this should operate
in conjunction with a specially-built fast steamer, or an auxiliary
cruiser. Such a vessel, with one or more aeroplanes on board, would
accompany a fleet. When an air-scout was wanted, it would be brought on
deck and assembled, and would then be launched into the air from a
special platform on the vessel’s deck.
After making a reconnoitring flight, the machine would return to the
parent ship, and alight upon the deck. By means of such air-scouts, the
position of an enemy’s fleet could first be detected, and then a careful
watch kept upon its subsequent movements.
The results gleaned would be more trustworthy than those obtained from
the look-out of a warship; and the field of vision would, also, be
infinitely wider. What would be of great importance, of course, in
connection with such aerial observations, would be for the pilot of the
machine to report what he saw by means of wireless telegraphy. There is
no reason why this should not be done. A well-organised service of naval
aeroplanes, fitted with long-distance wireless, should, indeed, prove of
vital importance.
The point has been made, by critics of the aeroplane for naval use, that
the high winds often encountered at sea would limit the uses of
aircraft. But, in reply to that, experienced airmen point out that,
although winds at sea are high, they are also steady—far steadier, in
fact, than those which blow over the land, and are broken up into eddies
by passing over uneven ground.
A thirty-mile-an-hour wind, over the land, represents to-day quite as
much as any airman would care to contend against, in the ordinary way;
but it should be possible, with a high-speed monoplane of existing type,
to carry out reconnoitring work, over the sea, in a wind blowing at the
rate of forty miles an hour. The even force of the sea wind would make
all the difference.
It may be anticipated, also, that this wind-flying capacity of the
aeroplane, for work at sea, will rise from, say, forty to fifty miles an
hour, as the speed of machines is increased. There is, indeed, every
chance that a naval aeroplane will be able to give a good account of
itself—even under adverse weather conditions.
II. Interesting tests—Machines for rising from water, and landing on a
ship’s deck.
In America a number of interesting tests have been made with aeroplanes
for naval use. It was in this country that Mr Eugene Ely, a skilled
airman—who has since, unfortunately, met with his death—first
demonstrated the practicability of alighting upon, and rising from, the
deck of a battleship.
At the time the test was made, the American cruiser _Pennsylvania_ was
lying about twelve miles off San Francisco. For the purpose of the
experiment, a wooden platform was erected at the cruiser’s stern, upon
which the airman expressed his intention of descending.
Ely, flying a Curtiss biplane, left the shore in a slight mist, being
guided as he approached his destination by the syren blasts of the
_Pennsylvania_. When sighted by those on the cruiser, he was flying low,
quite close to the surface of the water.
The airman steered past the _Pennsylvania’s_ bow. Then he rose a little,
and made a half-circle in the air. Smoothly approaching the vessel’s
stern, he stopped his engine, and settled with absolute precision upon
the platform.
After a short rest, Ely added to the practical interest of his
performance by rising from the cruiser’s deck, and flying back to his
starting-point, a field on the outskirts of San Francisco.
American naval men were naturally impressed by this performance, and
also by a series of experiments which were carried out by Mr Glen H.
Curtiss, the builder of the biplane which bears his name.
Mr Curtiss designed a biplane which would float upon the water on
pontoons, and also rise from the surface of the water when it moved
forward at a certain speed.
Considerable ingenuity was exercised in the construction of this
machine. The pontoons upon which it was mounted, and which took the
place of ordinary land wheels, were hollow boxes with pointed ends, made
out of wood, and sheathed with thin steel.
A large pontoon, under the centre of the biplane, bore the greater part
of the weight, and a smaller pontoon was set under the front of the
machine; while a third pontoon, smaller still, was placed at the extreme
forward end of the aeroplane, to tilt it upward when it began to move
across the water.
First tests with this machine were entirely successful. When forced
forward by its propeller, at a speed of thirty miles an hour, the
hydro-aeroplane skimmed along with only its main pontoon on the water.
Then, at a slight acceleration, it rose easily into the air, and flew
off. Descents upon the surface of the water were made with equal
facility.
[Illustration: MOTOR TRANSPORT.
Photo, M. Branger.
This picture shows how a Breguet military biplane, with its main-planes
folded by the sides of its body, can be towed from point to point behind
a motor-lorry.]
After satisfying himself that his machine answered expectations, Curtiss
carried out an instructive test in conjunction with an American
battleship. Flying from a point on shore, he made a successful descent
upon the water close beside the vessel. Then his machine was hoisted on
board, by means of special tackle.
To complete the test, the biplane was subsequently lowered into the
water again; and Curtiss rose without difficulty, flying back to the
shore.
The objection to such a scheme as this, of course, would lie in the
probable roughness of the sea under many conditions of work. Were a high
sea running, it is generally admitted that an aeroplane could not
possibly rise from, or land upon, the surface of the water. Therefore,
the sound plan, at any rate on the high seas, would seem to be for an
air-scout to be launched from the deck of a ship.
An aeroplane on pontoons should, however, find many uses for coastal
work. It could, for example, be housed in a shed on the water. It could
then leave harbour on a reconnoitring flight, and return again, when
alighting, to the smooth water inside the harbour. An involuntary
descent, when over the water, would not cause it injury.
Apart from the work which it could perform as a scout, using wireless
telegraphy to flash back its news to a parent ship, there are also the
destructive possibilities of a naval aeroplane to be considered. In this
regard, however, many experts do not consider that the potentialities of
a naval aircraft would be so important as those of a machine operating
with land forces.
An attack upon a warship by aeroplane would not, it is held, do much
damage to the sea-craft, the contention being that the aeroplane would
not be able to carry bombs sufficiently powerful to effect any
appreciable damage. Another point made is that it would be exceedingly
difficult for an aeroplanist to make good practice with his bombs, from
the height at which he would have to fly in order to be comparatively
safe from gun-fire, and also in view of the fact that both he, and his
target, would be moving.
In this connection, however, there is much to be learned. It is not
known, as yet, how powerful a bomb may be devised for the use of a
destructive aeroplane; and, from the point of view of marksmanship with
such missiles, types of releasing apparatus are now being devised which
may ensure greater accuracy of aim than is at present considered
possible.
A use for the naval aeroplane would be to cooperate with warships in
attack upon land defences. A number of machines could be launched from
the deck of the parent ship, and fly over docks and harbours, dropping
incendiary and explosive bombs, and effecting considerable damage.
Another effective field for the use of naval aeroplanes should be in
detecting the approach of submarines; but, in this regard, more data is
certainly required.
Primarily for scouting, both from the land, and from a ship at sea, and
also as a weapon of offence—if used in sufficient numbers—the aeroplane
merits the careful attention of all naval authorities. In England, at
the time of writing, very little has been done. A few naval officers
have had an opportunity of learning to fly, owing to private generosity,
and unimportant experiments have been made.
A very large sum of money has, however, been expended by the Admiralty
upon a huge dirigible balloon, 500 feet long, which, after undergoing a
tedious period of construction and alteration at Barrow, met with the
untimely end of being wrecked by wind-gusts before it had ever taken the
air.
In January, however, it was stated, more or less officially, that the
Admiralty intended to devote serious attention, during 1912, to the
question of naval airmanship; but, beyond arranging for another party of
officers to learn to fly at Eastchurch, Isle of Sheppey, nothing
definite has, at the time of writing, been done—save that it is
understood that the Admiralty has committed itself to the construction
of a smaller, rigid-type airship.
For naval work, beyond doubt, the powerful, high-speed aeroplane,
capable of making progress against very strong winds, and sufficiently
portable to be carried in appreciable numbers upon a specially-designed
parent ship, is the ideal—with another type of aircraft, larger, and
with a greater radius of action, to act as a scout from land defences.
_NOTE_
_Since the above was written, our Naval authorities have decided to
train forty airmen and to purchase a dozen experimental machines,
including hydro-aeroplanes of various makes._
SIXTEENTH SECTION AERIAL WORK IN THE FRENCH AND GERMAN AUTUMN
MANOEUVRES, 1911
I. French successes—Proof of the value of organisation—Flights in high
winds.
Previously we have dealt with the remarkable results obtained, from the
first use of aeroplanes, in the autumn manœuvres in France, in 1910. Now
we have an opportunity of describing the fruits of a year’s progress, as
shown in the triumphs achieved during the autumn operations in 1911.
Nothing could, indeed, be more encouraging to the French authorities
than this one year’s work.
By the time the autumn manœuvres of 1911 came along, there were eighteen
military air-stations in various parts of France, and a preliminary
organisation of much interest had been created. It was decided,
therefore, to make a far more thorough and drastic test of the value of
the aeroplanes in war than had been attempted in 1910. Thirty machines,
comprising biplanes and monoplanes, and representing aircraft of the
principal makes, were detailed to co-operate with the manoeuvring
forces. They were divided into equal corps, and were instructed to
operate with the Commanders-in-Chief of the two forces.
The importance of the results obtained lay, very largely, in the
successful use of the adjuncts to the air service, which had been
organised during the flying season of 1911. The military aeroplanists
established their camps near the Headquarters of the troops they were
serving, and collapsible sheds, for their machines, were brought up on
special motor-lorries.
A striking feature of the organisation, also, was the travelling
"atelier," or workshop. These vehicles, huge motor-vans, with a skilled
staff in attendance, were here, there, and everywhere. Their equipment
included tools capable of dealing with any break-down, large or small.
All the practice work carried out during the summer, at the various
military schools, bore fruit. The airmen knew their work and their
machines; the observers had made themselves thoroughly proficient in
their duties; and the mechanics were quick and competent. And it is such
details as these, as has been said, that spell success in aerial work.
Naturally the question arises, "What did the air-men do?" The answer
may, truthfully, be made comprehensive. They did everything—everything,
that is, that was asked of them. The officers of both manoeuvring forces
were amazed at the accuracy of the reconnoitring reports brought in.
Another feature of the military airmen’s work was represented by the
adverse weather conditions in which they flew. Here was a distinct and
unmistakable evidence of progress. In 1910, at the autumn manœuvres, a
wind of from twenty to twenty-five miles an hour had been the limit in
which pilots had cared to ascend. But, in the 1911 manœuvres,
reconnoitring machines were boldly taken up in winds of as great a
velocity as thirty and thirty-five miles an hour; and, in one or two
cases, machines were reported to have weathered winds blowing at the
rate of forty miles an hour.
From the military point of view, the actual demonstration of this
wind-flying capacity of the modern aeroplane was of the utmost value. It
meant that there was practically no delay in carrying out instructions.
Instead of waiting, as he would have been obliged to do, occasionally,
the previous year, before carrying out a reconnoitring flight, the
airman was promptly in his machine, and away—despite the fact that a
strong and gusty wind might be blowing.
Another point demonstrated, beyond question, was the reliability of
aeroplane engines. Pilot after pilot returned from aerial journeys
without any mechanical trouble whatever; engine failure, at first so
common a fault, was proved to have been almost eliminated.
It was not merely a case of engine improvement; the careful work of the
mechanics, in "tuning up" the motors, had a great deal to do with this
immunity from breakdown. Such a proof of reliability was, as may be
imagined, of great significance to those who were gauging the work of
the aeroplane purely from, the military point of view.
Practice, as has been said, permitted the observers in the reconnoitring
aeroplanes to obtain significant results. A test which was carried out,
purely to determine the accuracy of aerial observation, is worth
describing. In this case, a fortified position, some little distance
away from one of the aeroplane camps, had been largely redesigned. The
officer in charge of the aeroplanes decided to call upon three
observers, who knew nothing of the alterations to the position which had
been carried out, to make a reconnoitring flight over the spot, and
prepare rough maps showing the location of the defences. This, he
thought, would provide a severe test of the accuracy of each officer’s
observation.
Previous to sending away the three machines upon their errand, the
officer had obtained, from the Commander of the fortifications, an exact
plan of the new defences; he was, therefore, in a position to check,
even in details, the maps furnished by the air-scouts.
The three airmen who set out upon this special reconnoitring mission,
each carrying an observer with him, approached their destination by
different routes. Each, as he came near the fortified position he was to
reconnoitre, flew at an altitude of more than 3000 feet—the height
specified as being fairly safe from artillery-fire.
All three observers did their work, making brief notes, and rough maps,
as they flew over the fortifications. One of them, using a special
camera with a telephoto lens, secured a series of photographs from a
height of 4000 feet.
But the point of the test was this: when the three observers had
returned safely to their starting-point, their reports and maps were
compared with the exact details of the fortifications, which were in the
hands of the Commander of the air-corps.
The result was instructive. Without any previous knowledge of the
changes which had been made in the fortifications reconnoitred, the
three observers had been able to indicate, with clearness, the position
of all the defences. From their material, indeed, it was found possible
to prepare a map which corresponded with that previously provided by the
officer in charge of the fortifications.
The test was considered a very effective one. It showed that an aerial
observer could—even when at a considerable altitude—carry out a
reconnaissance with accuracy, and prepare maps which could compare
favourably with those drawn up at leisure, and as a result of detailed
survey work carried out on the spot.
As regards the reconnoitring flights carried out by the officer-airmen
during the manœuvres, there is not a great deal to be said, for the
reason that they were uniformly successful. The Commanders-in-Chief
stated what they required, and the airmen carried out their orders.
With the information thus provided for them, both Commanders-in-Chief
found it necessary, more than once, to alter their plans.
Not one day, but practically every day, the airmen were able to carry
out their appointed tasks, and their work of reconnaissance became an
adjunct which could be definitely relied upon.
II. Work in the German manœuvres—An instance of the utility of
air-scouts—Reconnoitring from high altitudes.
In the German autumn manœuvres, 1911, the aeroplane may be said to have
made its first practical appearance in connection with military
operations in this country; and, here again, complete success marked the
tests. One instance, regarding these German manœuvres, is forthcoming of
the manner in which vitally-important information may be obtained by
reconnoitring airmen.
The Commander of the Red forces, suspecting some definite move on the
part of his enemy on a certain morning, sent out several aerial
observers. They performed a successful flight, and returned quickly with
the information that a large body of the Blue troops was beginning to
advance against the Red right.
Taking instant action, upon the receipt of this intelligence, the Red
Commander pushed forward a very large body of men to a point of
strategic importance, and so was able to checkmate, very neatly, the
advance of the Blue troops.
The German military authorities, although led to expect much from
scouting aeroplanes, were surprised by the results which were, in actual
practice, obtained. One after another, in fact, the military experts who
were following the manœuvres were forced to declare that it would be
almost hopeless, in future operations, to hide the movements of troops
from the air-scouts of an enemy.
It was, of course, recognised that this only applied to fairly clear
weather, in which the observers could obtain their bird’s-eye view of
the land below them. In thick mist, or fog, it would admittedly be
useless to send out air-scouts. But such weather conditions, although
encountered with some frequency, do not, as a rule, last for long. After
a few hours’ delay, while waiting for a fog or mist to clear, the airmen
should be able to carry out their work.
What actually happened, in the German manœuvres, was this: by 8 a.m. on
the morning of the first day of the operations, each side had sent up
its observing aeroplanes, and had obtained a concise report as to the
position of the enemy’s forces. This result was, naturally, claimed to
be a complete triumph for the aeroplane, particularly seeing that such
traps as sham entrenchments had been prepared to deceive the airmen—but
without succeeding in their object.
Here, indeed, lay another illustration of the growing skill of aerial
observers. In the manœuvres of 1910, when observation officers were new
to their work, they had been deceived, on several occasions, by dummy
entrenchments; but in 1911—a year later—they made no mistakes of this
kind. Their observation powers had been perfected by innumerable
practice flights—proof of the value of constant work at the flying
schools.
Another feature of the work achieved in these autumn manœuvres of 1911
was particularly worthy of note, also. This was the altitudes at which
the reconnoitring aeroplanes carried out their observations. In 1910,
the criticism had been freely passed that the machines would have been
blown to pieces, in actual war, had they passed over troops while flying
so near the ground.
As a matter of fact, being so new to their work, and not having great
experience in the difficult duties of aerial reconnaissance, some of the
airmen in the 1910 manœuvres were, undoubtedly, flying too near the
ground. A height of a little over 1000 feet, which they maintained,
would, almost surely, be perilous in times of war.
But, in the 1911 operations, this was changed. The minimum height at
which any of the scouting aircraft flew, when near the enemy, either in
the French or German manœuvres, was 2000 feet. Generally speaking, the
altitudes maintained were from 2500 to 3000 feet; and, in some cases,
the airmen flew even higher than this.
This increase in altitude, so necessary in escaping an enemy’s gun-fire,
did not in any way affect the accuracy of the news obtained by the
air-scouts. It was, indeed, proved beyond question that reports of
complete reliability might be obtained from the altitudes mentioned.
Opinion was naturally divided as to the question of the vulnerability of
the aeroplanes to gun-fire. But unbiased observers, noting the height at
which the aeroplanes flew, and the speed at which they came into range
and disappeared again, were found to declare that special artillery,
however cleverly handled, would have its work cut out to make anything
like effective practice.
The destructive possibilities of the aeroplane were not demonstrated in
these manœuvres of 1911. That, perhaps, will be left to the operations
to be held in the autumn of 1912. And, still remaining unsolved, of
course, is the question of war in the air between rival air-fleets.
In the case of the 1911 German manœuvres, for instance, this problem of
offensive work has particular interest. Both manoeuvring forces sent out
their scouts, and each side obtained detailed reports concerning the
doings of the other side. The two Commanders-in-Chief were, therefore,
upon an equality, so far as their aerial observations were concerned.
In actual warfare, probably, this would not have been the case. The two
air-fleets would have come into contact; and it is probable that one of
them would have suffered more severely than the other, with the result
that its subsequent reconnoitring work would have become inferior to
that of the squadron which had triumphed in the fighting.
III. Aeroplanes in actual warfare—What Italian airmen accomplished in
Tripoli—Scouting and bomb-dropping under service conditions.
While referring to the operations carried out during the autumn of 1911,
it is certainly necessary to refer to the first war test—made by the
Italians in their Tripoli campaign—of the aeroplane as a reconnoitring
instrument.
What was done in Tripoli, although not on a large scale, was, none the
less, instructive; and there is little doubt but that the success
achieved by the Italian military airmen, under arduous service
conditions, had much to do with the decision of the authorities in
England to make a definite move with regard to airmanship.
The circumstances in Tripoli were these: the Italians held the town,
with their troops in a sort of half-moon formation, and with unknown
forces of Turks and Arabs moving about on the desert, inland, and
threatening unexpected attacks at all points.
Obviously, the business of the air-scouts was to reconnoitre as wide a
tract of desert as possible, and endeavour to obtain news as to the
movements, and particularly the numbers, of the enemy which menaced the
Italian position.
Several Blériot monoplanes, and an Etrich monoplane, were, at first, at
the disposal of the Italian Commander-in-Chief. Later on, quite a large
number of machines, many of them handled by civilian volunteers, were on
the scene. The scouting machines were employed to the best possible
advantage. Trouble, it is interesting to note, was at first experienced
in connection with the engines. Sand from the desert worked into valves
and bearings. This was one of those little practical difficulties which
are only encountered under actual service conditions.
The courage of the officer-airmen, in carrying out scouting flights, was
marked. They flew over the Turkish and Arab lines. Had their engines
failed them at a critical moment, and they had descended among a horde
of wild Arabs, there is little doubt but that their plight would have
been uncommonly awkward.
Working, generally, soon after dawn, the airmen made wide, sweeping
half-circles over the enemy’s positions, and brought back detailed and
practical reports concerning the disposition, and movements, of all the
bodies of men they saw. More than once they were able to provide the
Italian Commander with accurate and very valuable information regarding
the sudden moving up, and massing, of large bodies of the enemy. The
Italians were, in consequence, ready for an attack when it was
delivered.
Hurriedly sent to the front, and working under a good many difficulties,
it was, indeed, remarkable what the military pilots were able to do.
They made a large number of flights without any untoward incident—beyond
that of being fired on, spasmodically, by Turkish and Arab foemen.
The effect of this fire was, it is interesting to note, practically nil.
The wings of the monoplanes were, it was reported, pierced more than
once by bullets, but this had no adverse effect upon the machines;
although, in one instance, an observer was reported to have been
slightly wounded.
There was, of course, no artillery, with special guns, to test its
ability in bringing down the scouting machines. Practical data,
concerning what a specially-made aerial gun can do, will only be
forthcoming when an army with more up-to-date equipment than that of
Turkey is circled over by reconnoitring machines.
In connection with the Etrich monoplane used in Tripoli a test was made,
on one occasion, with bombs. A number of small explosive bombs were
carried up in the machine, and the officer-pilot dropped them over some
parties of the enemy. The report, regarding these tests, was that damage
had been done by the bombs; but exact details are wanting. The
experiment cannot be regarded as a conclusive one, or as one
illustrating in any striking way the destructive capabilities of the
aeroplane.
The value of the lesson taught by the Tripoli operations cannot,
however, be overestimated. Sent out to the front like any other part of
the army’s equipment, the aeroplanes were assembled quickly, and flown
successfully by their pilots—amply justifying their inclusion in the
scheme of affairs by the extremely valuable work they were able to
accomplish.
What the Tripoli flying certainly demonstrated was the value of the
scouting aeroplane when used in difficult, or inaccessible country. In
the future, when a force has to penetrate some awkward and hostile
region, in which land scouting is almost impossible, and a lurking enemy
has to be located, the work of an aerial reconnoitring officer will be
of outstanding importance.
Rather more from this point of view, than from that of any lesson as to
the value of aeroplanes in operations between two scientifically-armed
European nations, should the use of machines in the Tripoli campaign be
regarded.