I. Plight of a Commander-in-Chief without an aeroplane corps—The work of
cavalry reconnaissance.
What can be achieved by aeroplane reconnaissance, when skilfully carried
out, and conducted upon an adequate scale, it will be the purpose of
this section of our book to show.
In order to appreciate the services which an efficient air-corps will be
able to render, the position of a Commander-in-Chief who has no
aeroplanes to help him should first be understood.
In modern warfare, operations are extended over a very wide area.
Sometimes, for example, a fighting line will stretch over a frontage of
many miles. This makes it increasingly difficult for a
Commander-in-Chief to obtain precise and speedy information concerning
the movements of his enemy.
[Illustration: BUILDING WAR AEROPLANES.
In this picture—taken in the Bristol works—skilled artizans are seen
busy with the building of the bodies of a consignment of military-type
monoplanes. Although apparently frail, these frameworks are—owing to
their method of construction—immensely strong.]
Cavalry scouts are, of course, sent out. They move cautiously forward,
until they come into contact with the outposts which the enemy has
thrown forward with the deliberate intention of concealing his
intentions. The cavalry scouts are able to report the position of these
outposts; but as to what general strategic movement is taking place
behind this screen they can, as a rule, provide only meagre information,
if any at all.
How difficult it is to glean anything like reliable news of an enemy’s
movements has been indicated by that great military genius, Napoleon.
Dealing with this very question, and clearly emphasising the need for
such a scouting medium as the aeroplane, he wrote:—
"Nothing is more contradictory, nothing is more bewildering,
than the multitude reports of spies, or of officers sent out to
reconnoitre; some locate army corps where they have seen only
detachments; others see only detachments where they ought to
have seen army corps.
"Often they have not themselves seen the facts they report, and
they have only gathered the hearsay evidence of alarmed,
surprised, or bewildered people. ... If a former preoccupation
exists, if there is a tendency to believe that the enemy will
come from one direction rather than from another, the gathered
evidence is interpreted in one sense, however little it lends
itself to being so interpreted. It is thus that great mistakes
are made, which are sometimes the ruin of armies and of
Empires."
Nothing could more definitely indicate the importance of accurate
reconnoitring than the emphatic statement of this great soldier.
Napoleon recognised that reliable information, concerning the doings of
his antagonists, was all-important. A misunderstanding of some scouting
report was, he knew, sufficient to lose the Commander-in-Chief a great
action.
In any battle a Commander seeks, as has been truly said, to see what is
going on "upon the other side of the hill."
The two armies are spread out, approaching each other. Each Commander
has thrown forward a screen of men. These act, so to speak, as
"feelers," seeking to come into touch with the enemy. Behind this screen
of outposts comes the real strength of the army. Neither Commander knows
how, when, or at what point, his opponent will develop his main attack.
So they grope towards each other, any authentic news of a definite
movement of troops being eagerly awaited.
If, as the result of any information brought him, one Commander-in-Chief
can anticipate his opponent’s chief move, he may—by that stroke
alone—succeed in winning the battle which ensues.
Thus it is that a Commander-in-Chief sits at his Headquarters, with maps
in front of him, asking himself one vital question: "At what point,
behind the wide-flung screen of his outposts, is my enemy developing his
main attack?"
The cavalry scouts, and the scouts on foot, do their work as best they
can. They strive, as far as is practicable, to pierce the barrier of men
which the enemy has thrown forward.
The task of these scouts is dangerous; it is laborious; and it is slow.
It is also haphazard. But, from the fragmentary news that is brought
back to him, a Commander-in-Chief has to act as best he can.
Some of his scouts succeed; others return with nothing at all. There are
serious gaps in the intelligence; much of it may be contradictory. Yet
upon such intelligence as this a Commander-in-Chief has acted in the
past, and will have to act in the future, unless he has the aeroplane
scout placed at his disposal.
II. Work of a squadron of air-scouts described—Tasks of the pilot and
observer—Combined reconnaissance by many machines—Effect of aeroplanes
upon tactics.
Having indicated the difficulties of the Commander-in-Chief, who has no
aeroplane service at his disposal, it is now legitimate to show what can
be accomplished with the aid of this new "arm."
We will imagine, for the sake of argument, that an action is imminent,
and that the Commander-in-Chief is anxious to know, without delay, from
what direction he may expect the enemy to mass his troops for a main
attack. So he calls into consultation the Commander of the aeroplane
depot. This depot—as has been explained in a previous section—will
probably be established at a suitable point near the main body of the
troops, and will be maintained at the spot chosen, until a move on the
part of the army necessitates a change of quarters.
To the Commander of the aeroplane depot the Commander-in-Chief will
explain the points, in regard to the general plan of campaign, upon
which he requires enlightenment.
The Commander of the aeroplanes will make a note of what the
Commander-in-Chief desires; then he will return to the aeroplane camp,
and get to work. It is probable, in the ordinary course of affairs, that
organised reconnoitring flights will be made, in wartime, either in the
early hours of the morning, or during the evening. This will suit the
convenience of the airmen by giving them the best weather conditions to
work in; and it will also be satisfactory for the Commander-in-Chief to
know at the beginning, and again at the end of a day’s fighting, what
the dispositions of his enemy are.
In the French manœuvres, and also in other experiments made, it has been
shown that information, concerning an enemy’s movements, is generally
required in the morning and in the evening; and this applies,
particularly, to news gleaned in the early morning, soon after it is
light. It is then, before the movements of the day, that an enemy’s
dispositions may best be noted.
A good deal of interest has been aroused, lately, in the suggestion
that, in war-time, machines would be required to reconnoitre at night.
It has been pointed out, in this connection, that large movements of
troops are often made under cover of darkness.
That night reconnoitring is practical there is no doubt. How much an
observer would be able to report, without the use of a searchlight,
experience must prove. There seems little doubt but that an air-scout
could descend low enough, at night, to detect the movements of large
bodies of men.
When he has returned to the aeroplane camp, after his consultation with
the Commander-in-Chief, the officer who is in charge of the aviation
depot will seek an interview with the officer who is directly in control
of the military pilots and observers. Maps will be consulted, and a
general plan of reconnoitring drawn up; and, at this stage of the
proceedings, the time will come to decide how many machines are to be
sent out upon the scouting expedition.
This decision will be governed, very largely, by the extent of the area
to be traversed, and also by the urgency of the mission. Although all
news obtained will naturally be needed at Headquarters as quickly as
possible, there will be occasions when the need for haste is very great.
In such instances, more machines will be sent out than at ordinary
times.
If he has a complete and rapid reconnaissance of an enemy’s position to
make, covering the entire area of operations, and not any one section of
the battle-front, the Commander of aeroplanes will probably order a
large number of machines to go upon the trip.
The value of numbers is self-evident. One machine, acting upon
instructions, can be piloted over a narrow and previously-indicated
route. It reports all that is seen, but its observations are necessarily
restricted to what lies in its path.
It would be impossible, with one machine making one flight, to obtain
anything like a comprehensive report as to an enemy’s doings—at least
not in reasonable time.
This is why, when a large area has to be covered, the Commander of
aeroplanes will order out a regular squadron of machines. After a
conversation with his immediate superior, the officer who is in charge
of the airmen and observers will discuss with them the area which each
machine shall cover.
Again maps will be consulted, and aerial routes will be laid down. It
will be the aim of the officer instructing the airmen to spread out his
scouts so as to present a complete report, when the reconnaissance is
effected.
When the whole of the ground to be reconnoitred has thus been marked out
upon the maps, each observer—who will be equipped with his own personal
map of the fighting area—will be instructed as to the course he shall
steer. He will duly note this, and return to his machine.
Whereupon, the pilots will soar into the air from their camp, and speed
away upon their missions. The pilot of the aeroplane will be concerned
with nothing save the control of his machine. He will not need to
trouble himself about the route taken, or about what is seen below.
This work will fall upon the observer, who will be placed in the machine
with an uninterrupted view of the country below him, and who will
instruct the pilot as to the course he shall steer, and the elevation he
shall maintain.
The observer, indeed, will be in charge of the aeroplane. Upon him will
rest the responsibility of the success of the expedition, from the point
of view of the information to be obtained. But the work of the pilot
will be important, also. Upon his skill, in manipulating the machine,
will depend the carrying out of the flight, and the safe return of the
aeroplane to Headquarters.
Thus the fleet of air-scouts will start upon their errand of
observation. Each machine will mount steadily, until an altitude, under
ordinary conditions, of between 3000 and 4000 feet has been reached.
Then, at this height, they will sweep out over the enemy’s lines. The
altitude mentioned is generally regarded as a good height for
reconnoitring work because it permits the observer a fairly-detailed
view of the ground below, and places him, also, at what is considered a
safe elevation, so far as artillery fire is concerned. The important
question of the vulnerability of aircraft, in regard to artillery fire,
will be dealt with fully in a later section.
As the reconnoitring machine moves out over the enemy, the pilot will be
busy with the control of his machine. If the weather proves very
favourable, his task will be a comparatively light one. All that he will
need to do is to see that he is steering accurately upon the course laid
down by the observer, and that his altitude remains at the level chosen.
He will also listen attentively to the running of his engine, and
occasionally note the number of revolutions it is making, as recorded by
an indicator placed before him.
If a reconnoitring flight has to be undertaken in adverse conditions,
say with a gusty, treacherous wind blowing, the task of the pilot will
be an extremely arduous one. Apart from the difficulty of keeping his
craft upon a proper course, he will be faced with the nerve-racking task
of preventing it from "side-slipping," under the onslaught of vicious
gusts of wind.
The "side-slip" which an aeroplane may make in a gusty wind is, indeed,
a very unpleasant experience for those who are on board it. What happens
is this: under the influence of a sudden gust, the machine heels over
until it reaches an angle when forward motion is replaced by a swift,
sickening slide sideways. A machine may "side-slip" in this fashion, for
an appreciable distance, before the pilot is able to regain control of
it.
An example may be cited of an airman who slid down from an altitude of
more than 800 feet, until he was within a couple of hundred feet of the
ground. There is only one thing to do when a machine begins to
"side-slip" in this way. The pilot must alter the angle of his elevating
planes, so that the aeroplane dives forward as well as slips sideways.
This dive adds to the machine’s speed, and so checks the sideway fall;
and, if his altitude is sufficient, the airman is able to regain control
of his machine, and bring it back again upon an even keel, before there
is danger of contact with the ground.
In bad weather, as may be imagined, a reconnoitring trip may be a
serious ordeal for the man at the levers. The responsibility for
undertaking a flight, in unsuitable weather conditions, will fall upon
the officer in command of the aviation depot. If, for example, the wind
is too high for flying, it will be his duty to tell the
Commander-in-Chief so, and delay the intended reconnaissance until
conditions improve.
The work of the pilot of the aeroplane, during a reconnoitring flight,
has only been described so far; now we may deal with the task of the
observer. He will, probably, have a busier time than the man at the
levers. From the moment of leaving the ground, until the flight is
finished, he will need to be on the alert.
As the aeroplane approaches the enemy’s lines, he will pore over the map
fixed in a frame before him. In addition to this map, he will be
provided with pencil and notebook.
Thus, when any portion of the enemy’s troops appear below him, his task
will be perfectly clear.
He will first need to identify them. That is to say, he must be able to
determine whether he is looking at infantry, cavalry, or artillery; and
then he must be able to decide as to the strength of the forces that are
in view.
These points determined, he will turn again to his map, so as to make
sure of the actual point, on the battle line, where the troops he sees
are stationed. This done, he will make notes in his book.
And so, throughout the flight, will the observation officer be busy,
peering downwards; consulting his map; afterwards scribbling hastily in
his notebook. If he is not quite sure what anything is that he sees
below him, he will ask the pilot to circle back, so that he can make
another inspection.
If the weather is perfectly clear, he may be able to instruct the airman
to soar higher, and so be safer from any gun-fire from below. On the
other hand, if the morning or evening is misty, he may have to take the
risk of descending lower.
Each unit on the squadron of observing aeroplanes will be carrying out
the same routine. Wide-spread, the air-scouts will sweep over the
enemy’s position. In an hour, each air-scout will be able to traverse a
distance of more than fifty miles, and nothing of importance below him
should pass undetected.
In a little more than an hour, from the time of their starting away, the
squadron of machines should be returning to their camp. One by one they
will come gliding down, and the observation officer in each machine will
present a written report to his immediate chief. This officer, when all
these reports are in his possession, will seek the Commander of the
aviation depot. These two officers will speedily sift out the
information brought in by air-scouts, and prepare, for the consideration
of the Commander-in-Chief, a summary of the whole reconnaissance.
This the Commander of aeroplanes will take with him to Headquarters, and
the Commander-in-Chief, with the members of his staff, will bend over
their maps, tracing the enemy’s dispositions, noting his weak points,
and also the positions where he may be in force.
In regard to observing the actual movements of troops, as apart from the
positions of stationary forces, the work of the war aeroplane should be
wonderfully effective. An air-scout may, for example, report that a
section of the enemy is on the march between two points at a given time.
This news may be considered, by the Commander-in-Chief, to have a very
important bearing upon the development of the enemy’s plan of campaign.
Is this body of troops still moving in the same direction, say an hour
later? This may, quite likely, be the question upon which the
Commander-in-Chief may want information.
Upon hearing this, the Commander of aeroplanes will soon have two or
three scouting machines on the move. There will be no difficulty about
such individual work as this; and very soon the Commander-in-Chief
should be supplied with the news that he requires.
Thus it is possible to outline, in a general way, the reconnoitring work
of the war aeroplane. It is not necessary to emphasise again the value
of information which can be borne so quickly to a Commander-in-Chief;
the importance of the news which will be gleaned by the air-scouts is,
indeed, self-evident.
As the result of an aerial reconnaissance by many machines,
well-organised and successfully carried out, the Commander-in-Chief
should be supplied with information which could not possibly be acquired
in any other way, and which should tell him where the enemy was, and
what they were doing, only an hour before the news is put before him.
On such information, also, he can act with confidence. He need not
hesitate, questioning its authenticity. On the maps before him, set
forth in a manner beyond dispute, he will have the position of his foe,
and the direction in which the chief bodies of troops are being moved.
Nor is this all that the aeroplane can do, as has been shown. If a
Commander-in-Chief is in doubt about any movement of the enemy, during
the course of an action, he still has the aeroplane at his immediate
service.
There is no reason, indeed, why constant reconnaissances should not be
made during the course of a battle. Suppose, for example, that a heavy
attack has been made upon the enemy. It is sought to know whether such
onslaught has had its full effect. Is the enemy falling back? This may
become a question of great urgency, as it may govern a
Commander-in-Chiefs next offensive move. Here is a task in which the
air-scout can reveal his worth.
Rising high, and flying over the enemy, he should be able to determine
whether a retreat has begun, and should bring back this information to
Headquarters with a minimum of delay. A definite instance of the use of
the aeroplane in this connection was, it may be remembered, given in the
French manœuvres in Picardy, when Lieutenant Sido was able to inform his
Headquarters that the enemy was in retreat, after an important action.
If his aeroplane service is efficient, and there is no delay in
obtaining news, a Commander-in-Chief should be receiving constant
intelligence, concerning the movements of the enemy, during the progress
of a battle. It may be extremely important, for example, to know that
the enemy is bringing up batteries to a certain point; or that a hill,
or other point of vantage, is to be abandoned. From first to last,
indeed, the aeroplane should be of the greatest use.
But, as has been shown before, it will not be so much a case of the
number of aeroplanes used, as of the organisation behind them. In this
lies the crux of the situation. Unless pilots and observers are
absolutely competent, and ready for their work, the results obtained
cannot be satisfactory.
The influence of the aeroplane scout upon military tactics will,
undoubtedly, be marked. The German school, for example, advocates a
strong, determined advance—not caring so much what the precise
dispositions of an enemy are, but seeking to envelop him, and deliver
one quick and crushing blow.
French military tactics, on the other hand, are more strategical—more
prone to play a waiting, watching game, and make a master-move after the
battle scheme has, to a certain extent, revealed itself.
What has been called "the fog of war"—that is to say, the meagre
information regarding an enemy’s movements, which is all that is
available if aeroplanes are not used—suits the German method of blunt,
dogged, hit-or-miss advance. Lack of information is not advantageous, on
the other hand, to the carefully thought-out French strategy.
What the advent of the air-scout does is to help the Commander-in-Chief,
who is able to make subtle, deeply-planned moves, in which precise
information is essential, and to discount a blind, crushing use of
numbers.
III. Other uses of the war
aeroplane—Surveying—Dispatch-carrying—Directing gun-fire—Transport of
staff officers.
The duties so far mentioned do not, by any means, exhaust the
possibilities of the war aeroplane. So far, only military reconnaissance
has been touched upon. This work is, of course, of outstanding
importance; but an air-corps could, during a campaign, be put to many
other tasks, all of them of genuine utility.
Take, for example, the work of discovering the nature of the country
over which an army is about to operate. This is a task which is
extremely important. But, hitherto, the process of obtaining such
information has been painfully slow—painfully slow, that is, when
compared with the way the aeroplane will be able to carry out the work.
Here, indeed, will be an ideal opportunity for a long-distance flight.
In a three-hour, non-stop journey, a machine should be able to survey at
least 150 miles of country, and return with reports of the utmost value.
How important this aerial survey-work will be is instanced by Major J.
N. C. Kennedy, who, from his experience in the South African war, states
that such disasters as Spion Kop could not have happened, if there had
been aeroplanes to fly over and observe the country beforehand.
Here, then, is another practical use for the aeroplane. A squadron of
machines, flying ahead of an army on the march, will be able to return
with accurate news as to the position of roads, railways, rivers, and
bridges. Such information, received in good time, may prove of
exceptional value to a Commander-in-Chief.
Apart from general survey work, also, the air-corps will be able to
execute highly-important orders in locating the position of an enemy’s
supply trains, magazines, and depots.
Thus it can be seen that there will be practically constant use for war
aeroplanes during a campaign—apart from their potentialities as weapons
of destruction, concerning which notes will be written later.
So highly does he rate the work of aircraft in wartime, for
reconnoitring purposes, that the director of the military aviation
service of the French army has declared: "Aeroplanes, carrying a
steersman, observer, and combatant, will eventually supersede cavalry
for scouting purposes."
In this regard, it is interesting to note the opinion of a famous German
military expert, who says:—
"They (aeroplanes) will collect much information which would
never be accessible to cavalry, and, above all, they will do it
over long distances, and in a much shorter time. It is a defect
of cavalry reconnaissance that the knowledge which it yields has
necessarily, in the great majority of eases, been long overtaken
by events. No small gifts, on the part of the General, are
necessary to infer, from what was ascertained many hours
previously, what is actually the existing situation. The
possibilities of error are very great."
Here is another striking tribute to the value of the war aeroplane. What
this German expert was particularly impressed by, after observing a
series of tests of aeroplanes for reconnoitring, was their wonderful
speed, as compared with any other means of obtaining information.
The point he makes, in this connection, is highly important. Not only
will the aeroplane scout bring back news which it would be impossible to
obtain by the use of cavalry, but he will place this news in the hands
of a Commander-in-Chief while it is fresh, and of the fullest
importance, and not many hours old—as the intelligence brought in by
other methods of reconnaissance generally is.
Another extremely useful function of the aeroplane, during a campaign,
must not be forgotten. This is its use as a dispatch-carrier. In this
regard, a light, swift machine will be found of utility. No ordinary
obstacle will hamper it. The fact that the country is mountainous, or
that there are awkward rivers to negotiate, present serious problems for
the dispatch-rider, who sets out to carry a communication from point to
point on horseback. In many cases, indeed, it becomes impossible to send
a dispatch across country.
But the aeroplane dispatch-carrier will think nothing of such
difficulties as these. Over precipitous country, and across mountains,
he will fly without hindrance; and he will be faced with no problems
concerning the fording of rivers. As straight as an arrow, from point to
point, he will carry his message, and at a pace in excess of that of the
express train.
The fact that skirmishing parties of the enemy are dotted about, between
his starting-point and his objective, will not perplex him either,
although it would prove a serious embarrassment to the dispatch-rider
who used the land when in transit.
Instances of the practical value of dispatch-carrying, in time of war,
are readily forthcoming. A distinguished cavalry-officer, Colonel
Grantham, supplies one, for instance. In the Chinese war, he recalls the
plight of two columns which were advancing, about twenty miles apart, to
deliver a combined attack. The country dividing them was mountainous;
parties of the enemy were also moving about on it. The result was that,
for several days, no message could be got through. This lack of
communication made the scheme of a joint advance very difficult to carry
out. Had an aeroplane dispatch-carrier been available, in such
circumstances as these, he would have linked up the two columns in a
twenty-minute flight, irrespective of all that lay below him.
It is, of course, frequently necessary, during the progress of a battle,
for Generals commanding various sections of an army to report to the
Commander-in-Chief. Here the dispatch-carrying aeroplane, on account of
its speed, will be of the greatest value.
[Illustration: WEIGHT-CARRYING WAR BIPLANE.
By Fitting "extensions" to the upper main-plane of the machine, as seen
above, it is possible to achieve sustained flight with two, or even
three occupants—or, should necessity arise, with a pilot and an
appreciable load of explosives! The actual machine photographed is a
Bristol, flying over the Brooklands aerodrome.]
What can be done, in the way of long-distance dispatch-carrying, has
been demonstrated most effectually by Captain Bellenger, a well-known
French military airman. This officer, while stationed at the Vincennes
air-depot, received instructions to carry a dispatch, as quickly as
possible, to the military flying school at Pau. This represented a
distance of 450 miles. Starting early one morning, Captain Bellenger
reached Pau in seven hours sixteen minutes of actual flying. While _en
route_ he made three halts to replenish his petrol tank.
Recent tests in France show that quickly-assembled, single-seated
monoplanes will be extremely useful, in actual military operations, in
co-operating with artillery, by giving aerial directions as to gun-fire.
Upon occasions when the effect of long-distance fire is unknown to the
gunner, an aerial observer, ascending to an altitude of several thousand
feet, will be able to detect what mischief the shells are doing, and
suggest—either by wireless telegraphy or by messages dropped from his
machine—corrections in the gunner’s aim.
Another field of practical utility for the aeroplane, during an action,
lies in the quick transport, from place to place, of staff officers.
Horses, motor-cars, and motor-cycles have, hitherto, been employed for
this purpose. But the aeroplane is infinitely their superior in the
matter of speed.
Roads may be blocked with troops, or transport waggons, thereby holding
up, temporarily, the passage of any motor-cars or motor-cycles. No such
hindrances affect the aeroplane. With such reliable passenger-carrying
machines as are now available, staff officers will be able to flit from
point to point on a battlefield, with a minimum of delay. This will
prove an extremely valuable addition to what may be termed the
conveniences of war.
It is legitimate, at this juncture, having illustrated the uses of an
aeroplane in time of war, to picture, briefly, the contrast between two
Commanders-in-Chief, one of them possessing an up-to-date fleet of war
aeroplanes, and the other without any such aid. Prior to an action, the
one who has an aeroplane corps sends out his machines upon a general
reconnaissance. As a result he is, in an hour or so, in possession of
all the information he requires concerning the enemy. He is able to
calculate where his antagonist’s main blow is to be struck; and he is
also able to estimate the weak points in his opponent’s fighting line.
The Commander who is without aeroplanes sends out his cavalry scouts, in
the time-honoured fashion, and relies upon news from outposts. What
information he thus obtains is bound to be many hours older than that,
concerning his own movements, which is in the possession of the enemy.
Furthermore, it leaves many questions of urgency altogether unanswered.
But, unsatisfactory though his knowledge of his opponent’s intentions
is, the Commander has to grope forward. A certain blind doggedness
actuates him; it is a case, more or less, of hit-or-miss.
Now, were his opponent in a similarly fumbling state of mind, it would
not matter so much. But, thanks to his aeroplanes, Commander No. 1 has
his opponent’s dispositions and movements carefully marked upon his
maps.
Thus the two armies come into conflict. One Commander-in-Chief knows
everything; the other knows practically nothing. What is the result
likely to be? One strikes swiftly and surely, aware of the precise
strength opposed to him. The other fumbles blindly in the dark.
EIGHTH SECTION WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY AND PHOTOGRAPHY AS AIDS TO AERIAL
RECONNAISSANCE
I. First tests and successes with wireless telegraphy—Difficulty of
equipping an aeroplane with transmitting plant.
In the descriptions of the uses of an aeroplane in war, which have been
set forth in previous sections, nothing has been said concerning an
adjunct which now promises to have an importance quite overwhelming upon
future operations with aircraft.
This has reference to the use of wireless telegraphy. It was thought, at
first, that any employment of this marvel of science, so far as
aeroplanes were concerned, would be hopeless. The fact that the
aeroplane is suspended, so to speak, in mid-air, with no earth
communication, made the problem of equipping it with wireless
particularly difficult.
But the value of a wireless message, from a flying machine, has always
been recognised; and so most careful experiments have been made to
devise an apparatus. In addition to the difficulty of transmitting
messages from an aeroplane, there was the important question of weight
to be considered. It was seen that any apparatus, made to be carried
upon aircraft, must be extremely light; and, at the same time, it was
essential that it should be of a small and convenient size, so that it
could be stowed away somewhere in the proximity of the pilot’s seat.
It was in America, in August, 1910, that the first success was obtained.
An aeroplane ascended with the necessary transmitting mechanism on
board, and with a long aerial wire trailing behind it, weighted with
lead, from which the wireless messages were radiated. The apparatus was
crude, and unsatisfactory from many points of view, but actual signals
were received, from the aeroplane, by a station on the ground.
Only the most simple messages were attempted, and the aeroplane flew
round in fairly close proximity to the receiving station. As a matter of
fact, the best results reported, in connection with this series of
tests, was a message transmitted from the aeroplane when it was 500 feet
high, and which reached the receiving station from a distance of about a
mile.
This result was distinctly encouraging. It showed that wireless
telegraphy, as applied to the aeroplane, was not impossible; and it had
the effect, also, of stimulating interest in other countries, and of
setting many clever brains to work.
It was in the following month (September, 1910) that a series of
experiments were begun in England. Salisbury Plain was the flying ground
chosen, and Mr Robert Loraine, a well-known actor who had become
prominent as an airman, was the pilot of the machine with which the
tests were made.
The aeroplane employed in the experiments was a Bristol biplane, fitted
with a "Gnome" motor; and the designer of the wireless transmitting
mechanism used was Mr Thome Baker, a well-known electrical expert. After
a number of tests, he had produced a transmitter which only weighed
about 14 lb., and which could be fixed, quite conveniently, behind the
pilot’s seat.
Mr Baker was also able to abolish the long trailing wire behind the
machine, which had been used in the American experiments. Such a wire,
it was recognised, was a bad feature of any equipment. Apart from the
obvious clumsiness of such a device, it offered a danger of becoming
entangled with the rapidly-revolving propeller of the machine, and so
causing an accident. Mr Thorne Baker obviated this difficulty, in his
tests, by twining his aerial wire round the wooden supports between the
main-planes of the machine.
Another long wire, the receiver, was stretched between posts on the
ground; and then Mr Loraine ascended, and began to circle round and
round the aerodrome. For transmitting purposes, he had a little key
strapped to his knee, and operated it with his left hand—his right hand
being engaged, of course, with the controlling lever of his machine.
Again, as in the American experiments, only the simplest messages were
attempted. They were, however, quite distinctly heard. At first, the
signals were not received over a distance of more than half a mile, but
it was soon found possible to increase the distance between transmitter
and receiver to approximately one mile. At this distance, the dots and
dashes telegraphed were distinctly read by Mr Thorne Baker, who received
them—as is the custom with wireless telegraphy—through telephone
ear-pieces.
Following these tests, Mr Thorne Baker set himself the task of
perfecting his apparatus; and a very interesting experiment was planned,
in December, 1910, in connection with the De Forest cross-Channel
aeroplane prize.
Lieutenant H. E. Watkins, one of the competitors, consented to take up a
transmitting apparatus with him, on his cross-Channel flight, so that he
might endeavour to keep in touch with a steam-tug, in which his friends
intended to follow him from Folkestone to the French coast.
The transmitter which Mr Baker prepared for this experiment was more
powerful than the one used in the Salisbury Plain tests, and some
conclusive results were expected from this oversea flight.
Unfortunately, however, Lieutenant Watkins was delayed by bad weather,
and a series of trifling accidents, and so was unable to start upon the
flight. The wireless test had, therefore, to be abandoned.
After this, it fell to the lot of America to make the next move of any
interest. Lieutenant Beck, a young officer-airman engaged in military
experiments with aeroplanes, took up a transmitter with him, and was
able to send messages to a special receiving station, over a distance of
quite two and a half miles. This, naturally, was regarded as distinct
progress. The messages were clearly read; and there now seemed no
difficulty, with better transmitting mechanism, in increasing the
distance over which the signals were sent.
II. French triumphs with wireless telegraphy—Messages sent over a
distance of thirty-five miles.
In the meantime, as may be imagined, France had not been lethargic in
dealing with this subject. The French military authorities had, from the
first, recognised that wireless telegraphy, if it could be applied
reliably to the aeroplane, would greatly increase the utility of
aircraft in time of war.
At several of the French military aerodromes, at the beginning of 1911,
experiments were in progress, and clever civilian electricians were
called into conference by the authorities. But only meagre news leaked
out as to what was actually being done.
Before the end of January, 1911, however, definite results had been
obtained. Mr Maurice Farman, a brother of Mr Henry Farman, who had built
an excellent biplane for military use, ascended at the aerodrome at Buc,
and sent a wireless message back to the flying ground, when he was
passing over the countryside quite ten miles away.
This was a highly-important result, and promised to place the wireless
outfit on a practical basis, so far as war purposes were concerned.
Further tests were made at Buc, and the radius over which messages could
be transmitted was soon increased from ten to fifteen miles.
At this juncture, the French military authorities took the matter in
hand with renewed vigour, and the energies of the scientific staff were
directed towards still further increasing the transmitting power of the
apparatus installed.
An improved transmitting mechanism, weighing about 55 lb., was built and
fitted to a biplane at the beginning of July, 1911; and Captain Brenot,
a prominent French military airman, was given the task of thoroughly
testing this device. He was able to do so with remarkable results.
While flying between St Cyr and Rambouillet, he succeeded in getting
into touch with the wireless installation fixed upon the Eiffel Tower in
Paris. The distance was one of at least thirty-five miles.
Captain Brenot did more, also, than transmit a mere series of dots and
dashes. He spelt out a complete message while flying, and it was
correctly received by an operator of the Eiffel Tower wireless station.
This historic aerial message was as follows:—
"Captain Brenot, conducting experiments in aeroplane with
wireless telegraphy, to the Minister of War.—Flying between St
Cyr and Rambouillet. We beg to present our sincere regards. We
are above the forest of Rambouillet, at a height of 1640 feet."
Nothing could have been more dramatic, in its way, than the receipt of
this message in Paris from an aeroplane, fitted with wireless
telegraphy, thirty miles away; it demonstrated, conclusively, that an
aeroplane, when equipped in this way, was an absolutely-revolutionary
weapon of warfare.
Since then, French tests with wireless have been steadily going ahead,
and improvements have been made. The results obtained are now more
certain; and it has been proved, beyond doubt, that the wireless message
from an air-scout will play a very prominent part in future military
operations.
III. Practical uses of wireless upon aeroplanes—England’s lack of
effort.
How wireless telegraphy will aid the military airman may readily be
seen. It will, in the first instance, be a remarkable time-saver.
Instead of returning to Headquarters with a brief and urgent report, the
observation officer in an aeroplane will be able to transmit it
instantaneously, while still flying on his course. In the case of
machines not equipped with a wireless installation, a reconnoitring
flight will need to be followed by a return journey to the aeroplane
camp. Then the airman’s message will have to be brought along to
Headquarters. Thus there will be some delay, although this can, of
course, be reduced to a minimum by sound organisation.
But the fitting of a wireless apparatus will obviate, at one stroke, all
delay occasioned by a machine flying back from the district over which
it is reconnoitring, by the descent at the military camp, and by the
conveying of the news to Headquarters.
It is not likely, however, that every machine will be fitted with a
wireless outfit. In an aerial reconnaissance under ordinary
conditions—made, say, during the early morning or evening, to show the
general disposition of an enemy at a specified time—it will be
sufficient if the airmen return to their starting-point, and the news is
brought to Headquarters in the ordinary way. There will not, in such
cases, be sufficient urgency to justify the use of wireless messages.
But, under many circumstances which will arise during war, a machine
which can flash back frequent messages, without losing the time of
actually flying back with them, will be of almost inestimable value.
Let us take, for example, the position of a Commander-in-Chief who is in
the act of delivering a heavy attack, and wishes to know, from moment to
moment if possible, how the onslaught is being withstood, and if there
is any tendency on the part of his enemy to retreat. In such a case a
special aeroplane, fitted with wireless, would be dispatched, to fly in
circles over the fighting area; and a portable receiving apparatus would
be moved up close beside the point where the Commander-in-Chief had
stationed himself. In this way, news could be received in the form of a
constant stream of messages.
This is only one instance of the practical utility of wireless
telegraphy from an aeroplane during wartime; many others, naturally,
present themselves. In the course of a battle, the officer commanding
aeroplanes should always have, ready for an emergency, one or two
machines which are equipped with wireless. Thus, immediately any point
arises regarding a movement of the enemy, upon which the
Commander-in-Chief desires speedy enlightenment, a machine can be sent
off without a moment’s delay; and the information, once obtained, can be
flashed back by wireless a second or so after the observation officer
has made his reconnaissance.
During a series of military experiments with wireless telegraphy,
carried out in France during August and September, 1911, the possibility
of directing the fire of artillery, by means of messages from an
aeroplane, was investigated. Ascending from a fortified position, which
was supposed to be besieged, aeroplanes, equipped with wireless
installations, made circuits over the country, in the immediate
neighbourhood, and sent back messages to their Headquarters, describing
with complete accuracy the position of concealed batteries, which were
assumed to be carrying out a bombardment.
Aided by this intelligence, the gunners of the besieged position would,
in actual warfare, have been able to direct a telling fire upon their
hidden enemy. It would be possible, also, in such circumstances, for the
aeroplanist to remain aloft during the firing, and actually direct the
gunners in their aim by means of wireless signals.
Taking into consideration such possibilities as these, an eminent French
military expert has observed: "The aeroplane, without wireless
telegraphy, is a sufficiently wonderful ’arm,’ altering all our
preconceived notions concerning warlike operations. And now comes this
new marvel. It is almost impossible to calculate what the effect of
wireless signals from an aeroplane, during a battle, will be. This much
is certain. The use of machines so equipped will play a revolutionary
part in any action. Upon their skilful handling, of course, much will
depend. Unless a Commander-in-Chief has accustomed himself to their use,
during peace manœuvres, and unless the officers operating the
transmitting mechanism, and those receiving the messages, are
well-trained and thoroughly accustomed to their work, the best results
are not likely to be obtained."
Naturally, in this connection, the question arises: what is England
doing? The reply cannot be anything but disappointing. The
privately-conducted experiments of Mr Thorne Baker, previously
mentioned, represent practically all that has been done to perfect
wireless telegraphy for aerial use.
So far as the authorities are concerned, civilian suggestions of
co-operation, towards obtaining improved apparatus, have not been
received in an encouraging spirit. From the small army airship, "The
Beta," wireless trials have, it is true, been carried out once or twice;
and some unambitious experiments with biplanes, at the Royal Aircraft
Factory, were reported in April, 1912. But no practical outfit has been
devised.
As a matter of fact, this question of the application of wireless
telegraphy to aeroplanes provides a very striking illustration of the
evils of our backward policy. Immediately there was an opportunity of
using wireless successfully, the French military authorities were able
to take advantage of the situation, and carry out adequate tests. This
was because their organisation was what it should be, and because they
had men and machines ready to be used in any experiments required.
Our backward position told against us inevitably, when this new adjunct
to the aeroplane came along. We had insufficient machines, and not
enough men. It was, as a matter of fact, more than sufficient for us to
make anything like a show in ordinary flying work, without being
required to go a stage further, and experiment with wireless.
Thus the lesson can be forced home. France has taken up this new aid to
aerial reconnoitring—is perfecting herself in it, and accustoming her
officers to its use. We have not begun to work with it yet. We are thus
a definite stage behind, and shall remain so, unless a real effort is
put forth to make up leeway.
By the time we have come to the stage of adopting a wireless
installation upon aeroplanes, France may be busy with some new, and even
more important, phase of flying.
As the military expert quoted above remarks, with perfect truth, it is
essential that adequate and realistic tests should be carried out, with
such an aid as wireless telegraphy, before any really effective use can
be made of it.
IV. Photography from a war aeroplane—The use of special automatic
cameras.
While dealing, in this section, with such an adjunct to reconnoitring as
is afforded by wireless telegraphy, it is permissible, also, to refer to
the use of photography in connection with aeroplanes.
Here, once more, it is necessary to turn to France for an illustration
of recent work. Ascending from the Chalons military camp, quite
recently, Lieutenant Blard, an army airman, succeeded in obtaining some
excellent photographs of Rheims when flying at an altitude of 4000 feet.
He used a special camera.
In America, also, practical attention has been devoted to this phase of
military aeroplaning. An officer, when flying in a biplane, has
succeeded in obtaining good photographs from as great an altitude as
6000 feet.
The utility of photography, as increasing the powers of the aeroplane in
war-time, will be considerable. In an aerial survey of country, for
instance, the camera will play an important part. A series of good
photographs, when pieced together, will reveal the characteristics of
land from the military point of view; and, in taking photographs of
fortifications, the aeroplane with a camera will find another ready use.
It is now held that all scouting aeroplanes should be fitted with a
camera, to be used, during reconnoitring, whenever a favourable
opportunity arises.
In the first tests made with photography from an aeroplane, an ordinary
camera was used, being held, by the passenger in the machine, in the
best position possible to secure a photograph of whatever object it was
desired to snapshot.
But this method was seen to be somewhat clumsy. In many machines, for
example, it was not possible to obtain a picture, when taken in this
fashion, of anything directly below. The business of changing plates,
also, was found to be an awkward one.
So it was seen that there was need for something in the nature of the
automatic camera, specially designed for military work. In Germany,
where great interest has been evinced in aerial photography, a camera
with a special telephoto lens, operating almost like a gun, has been
devised for use in an aeroplane. This machine the observer holds to his
shoulder, "aiming" it at the object which he wishes to photograph, and
making the exposure by the pulling of a trigger.
In England, where private enterprise has outstripped any official
action, Mr Thorne Baker has devised a very ingenious camera. This is
suspended below the aeroplane, in such a position that it points
directly downwards; and the whole operation of the camera is automatic.
The airman or observer puts the machine in action by pressing a button.
This causes a photograph to be taken of whatever the aeroplane is
passing over at the moment. Then, by means of another piece of automatic
machinery, a plate is changed for a fresh exposure. Such a camera as
this will, undoubtedly, prove of very considerable value as an adjunct
to survey work with an aeroplane.
At the end of August, 1911, several military officers in France carried
out special tests with aerial photography. They made flights over
fortresses, for example, and secured excellent pictures. Tracts of
country were also photographed, as were troops on the march.
The result is that photography has joined wireless telegraphy, in the
French air-corps, as a definite aid to aerial reconnoitring.
[Illustration: WAR MONOPLANES "VOL PLANE."
In the above picture, a two-seated, military type Bristol monoplane is
seen descending, with engine stopped and propeller motionless, from a
reconnoitring flight. Pilot and passenger are plainly discernable.]