"In war there is little use for anything unless it can be
applied with some certainty that it would do what we want it to
do, and unless you have some exactness in results. Now that
stage (referring to aeroplanes) has not been reached."
That, as has been said, was in 1909. At this time, certainly, aeroplanes
were unreliable, although the promise of their practicability was such
that there was no excuse for ignoring them, from the military point of
view.
But now let us turn to matters as they stand today. The modern
aeroplane, with its engine as reliable as that in a motor-car, can be
used with the greatest certainty for military work, and can fly long
distances—heavily laden—without descending, besides attaining a speed
through the air exceeding that of an express train.
III. The financial aspect—Money England is spending—The airship
policy—Insufficient provision for aeroplanes.
In the year ending 31st March, 1912, a sum of £113,000 will have been
expended by our authorities upon military aeronautics. Of this sum, an
appreciable amount is devoted to establishment charges, and such items;
and a sum of £28,000 was earmarked for building a new dirigible balloon
shed at Farnborough, and in making improvements to the one at Wormwood
Scrubs.
This leaves £85,000; and this sum of money, quite inadequate as it is,
is free to be spent upon airships and aeroplanes. Quite an active
airship policy is pursued, and a large percentage of this money
remaining is dribbled away upon these costly machines—in building new
ones, and in repairing old ones.
[Illustration: THE ENGINE-IN-FRONT BIPLANE.
With the above machine—a type increasingly used for Service work—the
Naval officers now experimenting at Eastchurch, Isle of Sheppy, have
been carrying out recent tests. It was designed, and built, by Messrs.
Short Brothers, who are now constructing special aeroplanes for Naval
use.]
Criticising this policy trenchantly, soon after the announcement of the
manner in which the War Office proposed to spend its money, Mr Arthur du
Cros, M.P., the Hon. Secretary of the Parliamentary Aerial Defence
Committee, remarked: "We, almost alone among nations, are developing the
lighter-than-air type of machine to the exclusion of aeroplanes. France
and Germany, formerly two of the staunchest advocates of the dirigible
balloon, have almost ceased its development, in favour of the aeroplane.
"In a year, in regard to these two machines, the tables have been
turned," added Mr du Cros. "Now the aeroplane, which costs so much less
than the dirigible, is infinitely its superior. One aeroplane, costing
say £1000, would, in the case of actual aerial warfare, have completely
at its mercy a dirigible balloon costing perhaps £50,000."
Defending their policy, soon after Mr du Cros’ attacks, and responding
to the definite statement that "aeroplanes have become immeasurably
superior to airships for military purposes," War Office experts advanced
the argument: "There would be work in war-time, such as very detailed
reconnaissance, that an airship could perform better than an aeroplane.
Both types should, therefore, be developed."
It may be agreed, in this connection, that the airship would, in a
number of cases, allow of a more detailed reconnaissance being made than
from an aeroplane; its slower speed, and the fact that it could hover
over one spot, would give it this advantage. But, to set against this,
there is one very obvious disadvantage. The size of the airship, and the
fact that it is moving slowly, makes it an admirable target for
artillery. In actual warfare, it would, without doubt, very soon be hit.
In this connection, too, the fact must be remembered that, whereas a
wrecked aeroplane would represent a comparatively small financial loss,
the destruction of a dirigible would be as great a calamity as the loss
of a whole aeroplane fleet.
The expenses entailed in organising a dirigible balloon fleet are
enormous, and altogether out of proportion to the useful work which
these vessels could accomplish in time of war.
If an airship service is to be of practical value, monster sheds must be
erected all over the country, so that a vessel may be able to run to one
or other of them for shelter, when caught in a high wind. Apart from the
expenditure which these sheds entail, the need arises to spend other
large amounts upon the crews of trained men necessary to handle the
aircraft when they leave the ground, or return from a flight.
There is another formidable item—the cost of the hydrogen gas necessary
to inflate the huge envelopes; and, added to this, there is constant
expenditure in effecting repairs, caused by the trifling accidents which
are always occurring in handling these aerial monsters. Thus, a ruinous
bill of cost is quickly arrived at.
And, as against all these disadvantages, the airship, as has been shown,
has few, if any, definite advantages over the aeroplane. It can remain
in the air longer, it is true; and it can, at the moment at any rate,
carry heavier loads. But the great size of its envelope has, so far,
made it the plaything of any high wind; and its bulk, in addition,
renders it apparently impossible to force it through the air at anything
like the speed attained by the aeroplane. Under favourable conditions,
airship speeds of from thirty to thirty-five miles an hour seem to
represent the best results yet attained.
Practical comparisons, between dirigible balloons and aeroplanes, were
possible in the famous French manœuvres, in the autumn of 1910, which
have been previously referred to. On this occasion, the aeroplanes were
out, and at work in gusty winds, when the dirigibles were compelled to
remain in their sheds.
And, when the airships did emerge, it was a subject of comment that, in
comparison with the aeroplanes, they offered quite an easy mark for
gun-fire.
This fact must be remembered, also. In actual warfare, the dirigible
balloon would, inevitably, fall a prey to an attack by aeroplane. Aided
by their greater speed, and by the fact that they could probably
approach quite near to a dirigible without being seen, aeroplanes would
be able to rise above its gas-containing envelope, and wreck the craft
by dropping a destructive bomb.
Such points as these have, of course, weighed with the experts of
Germany and France. Neither country has abandoned research work in
regard to dirigibles. It is quite likely, in fact, that further
improvements may be made with these machines, which will better fit them
for use in warfare. But, at the present time, when any contrast of
utility is made, the aeroplane is immeasurably the more practical
weapon; and, whereas a limited expenditure upon experimental work with
lighter-than-air machines is not to be questioned, it is to the
aeroplane corps that any War Department must look for reliable, everyday
service in war-time.
IV. Dangers of a policy of "drift"—Experience which money cannot
buy—Trained men, not so much as machines, the criterion of strength.
In connection with military airmanship, there is no policy more
dangerous than that which may be summed up in the word, "drift."
It must be admitted that, until quite recently, the official policy in
England, as regards the war aeroplane, could thus be summarised:
There is no danger in shirking the responsibility of a definite aerial
programme—despite the strides made abroad—because a fleet of war
aeroplanes can be bought or constructed at any time, should urgent need
arise.
It was not a policy such as this that the Admiralty pursued in
connection with submarines. Here was a new and untried addition to naval
armament Without hesitating, or waiting while some other country proved
its value in actual tests, the Admiralty used common sense, and spent
money willingly upon a fleet of submarines. A full test of their use, in
actual naval warfare, has yet to be made; but the experimental nature of
the machines has not deterred the Admiralty from making definite
advancement with them.
Had the War Office pursued such a policy as this in regard to
aeroplanes, we should now have a fleet of aircraft as large as that of
any other nation.
It is an undignified attitude to watch other nations at work upon the
aeroplane problem, without spending money, and then to step in at the
last moment, and profit by their experience.
From the point of view of strict economy, and setting all other
considerations aside, such a policy might find acceptance, were it not
for circumstances over which those who advocate it have no control.
At any moment, for instance, while one country is waiting for another to
evolve an ideal aeroplane, a war may break out. In such an event, a
cheese-paring policy would place its advocates in an awkward position.
Even granting that they were using experimental machines, the nation
which actually possessed a well-equipped aerial fleet, at the outbreak
of hostilities, would have an immense advantage over the country which
did not.
Wars, when they do break out, generally come quickly. There would be
little opportunity for a laggard nation to rush together an aerial fleet
at the last moment; or, even if it could do so, lack of organisation
would render such an air-force practically inoperative.
Even setting aside the danger of war suddenly arising, and assuming that
a waiting policy has no immediate risks, the negative programme has
another fatal drawback. Even if, at the last moment, large sums of money
were expended upon an air-fleet, and there was time to provide both
machines and men, the nation which had neglected aviation would still be
lacking in the one essential for success.
That essential is experience. No money, however lavishly spent, can buy
the experience which France and Germany are obtaining, day by day, in
their pioneer work in handling war aeroplanes.
Any form of aerial work is new to man; and at first, when he attempts
it, he is a fumbler. He has no confidence in himself, and so he makes
mistakes. But, if he is given an opportunity of being in the air a good
deal, and has a chance of handling aircraft, not once or twice, but
practically all day long, for months on end, he becomes, gradually,
quite accustomed to his work.
Instead of being anxious, and inclined to get into trouble through an
excess of caution, he acquires a cool, firm judgment, and soon
astonishes even himself by his feeling of security when in the air.
This is the opinion of all skilled airmen; an ounce of practice is worth
a ton of theory. How was it that the quiet, unassuming French naval
officer, Lieutenant Conneau, was able to win all the great flying prizes
during the season of 1911? There is only one answer: he was more
experienced than his rivals.
With absolute thoroughness, this man began at the very beginning. He
studied the laws of the air first of all; then he made himself
acquainted with the construction of machines, and of motors. Afterwards
he began to fly. He progressed from stage to stage, with no impatience,
or haste.
He undertook cross-country flights to note exactly what climatic
conditions prevailed. He studied maps very closely, and tested
compasses. He grew accustomed to being in the air; and he learned how to
combat adverse winds. He acquired the skill necessary to steer a
straight course across country, and to make landings upon all sorts of
ground.
And then, so equipped, he entered for the principal long-distance races.
Because he was absolutely competent in every way, he astonished everyone
by the perfection of his flying. He made no mistakes. He flew correctly
from one control to another. He did not fear gusty winds. He did not
damage his machine. And so he won.
There are, in the air service of France, many such men as this. Neither
France nor Germany, for the matter of that, are content with buying and
building machines. These they regard as being experimental, and likely
to be superseded by faster, stronger aircraft. What they do consider of
vital importance is the steady, irresistible growth in the number of
their airmen, and the fact that, every day, these men are becoming more
expert in the handling of their machines, and in the carrying out of
their duties as pilots and observers.
The lead which France and Germany have obtained in military airmanship
should not, indeed, be reckoned so much in machines, as in men; and
England’s backwardness should be gauged in a similar way.
In considering the danger of a laggard position in regard to men, rather
than machines, a point of great importance arises. It concerns the
length of time required to make a military airman thoroughly proficient.
The experience of France and Germany has now proved, fairly definitely,
that a completely competent military flyer can only be produced after an
arduous period of tuition, and practical tests. It has been laid down,
in fact, that to produce a military airman who thoroughly understands
his work, a year or eighteen months’ hard training is required. The
importance of this point is self-evident. Apathy may place a nation
years behind.
A great deal, when the international relations of Europe are concerned,
can happen in a year; and it is a perilous thing for any country to be
far behind in regard to what is, admittedly, a vitally-important weapon.
Thus it is clear that England cannot hope to make up for a laggard
policy even by the expensive method of acquiring aeroplanes, post-haste,
at the last moment. We might buy machines, it is true, but we could not
buy airmen of the type that France and Germany are rapidly training, in
well-organised squadrons.
It has been assumed that machines might be bought in a hurry; but there
is some doubt even on this score. Little encouragement has been given to
home manufacturers. They would scarcely have facilities for producing
machines in large numbers, even if it were a matter of urgency. On the
other hand, the makers in France and Germany, always well supported by
Government orders, have most complete workshops.
It might easily happen, in a case of urgent need, that we should be
compelled to go abroad in an endeavour to obtain machines. In such a
case, we might obtain them; or, on the other hand, we might not.
Whatever the result, it would be highly unsatisfactory for a country to
be dependent upon foreign makers for its war aeroplanes.
In the matter of aeroplane engines, the fact that we have no motor in
England to equal the "Gnome" is because no financial support has been
forthcoming, in this country, for aviation. To construct a successful
engine, means the laying down of a large sum of money in preliminary
tests. A number of experimental motors have to be made, and then
"scrapped" again. As much as £10,000 may be spent, before success is
attained.
In France, with a Government eager to encourage progress, by the
practical method of buying machines, men with capital have been found to
finance the constructor who has ideas. This is why France has the best
motors and the best aeroplanes, and why we have to buy French-built
engines and machines.
Instances such as this throw into clear relief the fact that Government
apathy, concerning such a new industry as that of building aeroplanes
and engines, has an evil effect which is widespread, and lasting.
V. England’s official awakening—The training of 100 airmen—The
forthcoming trials of military machines.
Having dealt with England’s backwardness, it is now only fair that the
authorities should be given credit for their recent promise of a changed
programme.
In the first place, attention may be directed to the official scheme for
training a corps of 100 military airmen. This, announced towards the end
of last year by Colonel Seely, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for War, has already been put into operation in a limited degree.
The officers chosen for aerial work are picked from various regiments.
They are allowed to attend any flying school they select, and the
authorities pay their tuition fees. When they have passed the tests for
their certificates as airmen, they are taken in hand at the military
flying school on Salisbury Plain, and are given instruction as military
pilots or observers.
When they have attained proficiency in this direction, they return to
their regiments, and are afterwards called upon, from time to time, to
undergo "refresher" courses of military flying.
The criticism which is levelled against this scheme is that officers
should be permanently attached to the air-corps, and should never be
allowed to relinquish their flying duties. Experts who hold this view
affirm that "refresher" courses are not sufficient to keep a man
thoroughly _au fait_ with such special work as military aviation.
As a matter of fact, the relief which has been expressed at the taking
up by the War Office of any definite programme, has had the effect of
robbing such criticisms as these of their sting. If the plan described
were to be adopted as a permanent policy there would, indeed, be grave
cause for complaint. French and German military pilots are placed once
and for all in the air-corps, and are not withdrawn.
But the scheme of our authorities must only be regarded as a beginning.
Directly any really definite work is done, the value of a well-equipped
air-corps will be so strikingly demonstrated that there should be little
difficulty in extending the Government programme.
The ideal, undoubtedly, is a large and extremely skilful corps of pilots
and observers, who do nothing save perfect themselves in their aerial
duties. An airman cannot have too much actual flying practice; in every
aerial voyage he makes, he learns some useful lesson. The French policy
is: once a military airman, always a military airman.
Naturally, with the avowed policy of training these 100 military pilots,
the War Office has found it necessary to acquire more machines. From
time to time, therefore, since the announcement of this scheme, machines
have been bought from famous French firms—notably a Breguet biplane, a
Nieuport monoplane, and a Deperdussin monoplane.
But such purchases have only been made to meet the most pressing needs
of the flying school. What will precede any large orders for war
aeroplanes is a carefully-conducted and stringent test of military
machines, which will be thrown open to the world.
The conditions for these trials, which will be held in England under the
auspices of the War Office, probably some time in July this year, were
issued in December last. Critical comment has granted their
practicability, and it is agreed that the successful machines will
represent all that is best in military aviation.
One criticism, however, is that the sum of money which will be expended
in prizes, £11,000, is not sufficiently generous. In connection with the
1911 French military trials, a sum of more than £50,000 was earmarked by
the Government to be expended in prizes, and in orders for successful
machines.
But, in the forthcoming English contests, there is no definite financial
offer save the £11,000 mentioned. It is stipulated, as a matter of fact,
that the War Office shall have the option of purchasing successful
machines for a sum of £1000; but there is no guarantee expressed that
such purchases shall be made. Of course, it is expected that winning
machines will be ordered in certain quantities, and no doubt such will
be the policy adopted. But makers cannot count, definitely, upon this
being done.
However, moderate though the financial inducements are, there is little
doubt but that a satisfactory number of machines will be entered for the
tests. English manufacturers, whose inducements to spend money have, in
the past, been so few, are determined to make a good show. Both in
connection with the main prize, and also in a subsidiary contest for
British-built machines, in which the principal award is £1500, the home
manufacturers are keen to demonstrate what their machines can do.
Already, it has been proved that English workmanship has nothing to fear
from foreign competition. All that the industry in this country lacks is
the steady, regular production which is maintained in France. The
building of machines teaches lessons which are invaluable. What English
manufacturers have not yet been able to acquire, is the confidence, and
intimate knowledge of their business, which only come from a healthy
state of demand and supply.
The details of the War Office contest have already been so fully
discussed that it is only necessary, here, to refer to their principal
features. One of the most important requirements is that the aeroplanes
should be able to carry a live load of 350 lb., in addition to their
equipment of instruments, and raise this weight, as well as sufficient
fuel for a four-and-a-half hour’s flight.
A three-hour’s non-stop flight, fully loaded, will be required. Machines
will also be called upon to maintain, for an hour’s voyage, a height of
4500 feet. They will, in addition, have to ascend to an altitude of 1000
feet, at the rate of 200 feet a minute.
These requirements are certainly hard to fulfil. A machine, very greatly
in advance of anything yet produced, will be needed to pass through such
ordeals successfully.
As regards speed, the competing aeroplanes will need to attain a rate of
fifty-five miles an hour, when fully loaded. Another requirement is that
they should plane down to the ground, in a calm, from a height of not
more than 1000 feet, and traverse a horizontal distance of not less than
6000 feet before touching ground. They will be called upon to rise from
long grass, clover, or harrowed land in a distance of 100 yards, when
fully loaded.
The silencing of engines is to be regarded—and quite rightly—as an
important advantage. Minor points are that machines must be easily
dismantled; that parts must be interchangeable; and that the observer’s
view, from a machine, must be as unobstructed as possible.
The importance of this interesting contest, to be held in England,
cannot be over-estimated. It will be a revelation, to all concerned, as
to the capabilities of the modern-type, war machine, and should open up
a new and satisfactory era in military flying in this country.
_NOTE_
_The aerial programme of the War Office, for the year 1912-13, is dealt
with on pages 181-187._
SIXTH SECTION WAR AEROPLANES AT THE PARIS AERONAUTICAL EXHIBITION,
DECEMBER, 1911
I. Latest-type military monoplanes—Two-seated, reconnoitring
machines—Single-seated, high-speed aircraft.
At the Paris aeroplane _salon_, which marked the close of the
aeronautical season of 1911, a striking display of war machines was
made. The year, as has been indicated, was full of progress; and the
result of all the experience gained was clearly seen in the aircraft
exhibited, and particularly in the military monoplanes staged.
As a type, the two-seated scouting machine, capable of high-speed flight
for several hours, when carrying pilot and observer, was most
interestingly represented. Many difficulties had been overcome in
connection with this machine—primarily that of affording the observer a
fairly-unobstructed view of the land below. In early-type military
monoplanes, the spread of the wings had curtailed seriously the
reconnoitring officer’s scope of vision. But, in the monoplanes seen at
the Paris show, the wings had been so set back, and the observer’s seat
so arranged, that it was possible for him to secure, when in flight, a
thoroughly practical, bird’s-eye view of the country below him.
Another problem solved, was in regard to engine-power. In the first
instance, with fifty horse-power "Gnomes," two-seated monoplanes had
been underengined; and their flying capabilities had suffered in
consequence. But the machines built towards the end of 1911 were
equipped with seventy horse-power "Gnomes," and—in some instances—with
motors of a hundred horse-power. The result was that a reserve of power
was obtained, to say nothing of a very desirable increase in speed.
As regards the landing-chassis, a somewhat weak point with early-type,
two-seated monoplanes, an improvement was observable in the machines
constructed towards the close of the flying season of 1911. Not only had
the landing gear been strengthened, but—in many cases—simplified as
well, which meant a commendable lessening of head resistance, when in
rapid flight. But, in this regard, military critics did not admit that
they were altogether satisfied—even by the machines seen at the Paris
show. A stronger, more rough-and-ready chassis is demanded; but it must
be remembered, in fairness to existing military monoplanes, that they
succeeded, in the French trials, in landing upon, and rising from,
ground which was fairly rough.
So far as personal comfort is concerned, a point certainly worth
consideration in long flights, the latest-type reconnoitring machine
reveals interesting features. Pilot and observer are, for example,
screened so far as is possible from the rush of wind. Their seats are
comfortably placed. Map-holder, compass, engine-revolution indicator,
and other fitments are neatly arranged. Dual control has become almost a
standard device, thus enabling either occupant of the machine to take
charge, while in flight, without change of seats.
Of two-seated, military monoplanes at the Paris exhibition, it is
probable that the Nieuport, Blériot, and Deperdussin attracted most
serious attention; and genuine interest was also aroused by the lonely
prominence of one British exhibit—that of the Bristol passenger
monoplane. As definite evidence of the capabilities of this machine, Mr
James Valentine had, a day or so prior to the exhibition, piloted, in a
flight over Paris, a sister monoplane to that which was shown.
Military authorities, who visited the Paris salon, directed very serious
attention to the single-seated, high-speed war monoplanes which were on
view. Here is to be found the emergence of a machine of a very definite
and important type.
It was with great interest, and some surprise, during the progress of
the French military trials, in October, 1911, that those interested in
airmanship read of the ordering, by the French authorities, of a large
number of single-seated monoplanes. The surprise, it should be
mentioned, was occasioned by the fact that single-seated machines should
have been purchased just at a time when passenger monoplanes were
arousing most interest.
But the French military experts knew their own needs. They had mapped
out, for the single-seated, almost racing-type machine, an important
field of activity in war-time. They saw that, under actual service
conditions, there would be definite demand for a scouting aeroplane
which would make a very rapid, general survey of the position of the
enemy’s troops.
[Illustration: MILITARY BIPLANE WITH TWO ENGINES.
This exceedingly interesting machine, which possesses especial
significance from the military point of view, is equipped with two Gnome
motors. One drives two propellers placed in front of the main-planes,
and the other actuates a single rear propeller. Normally, both engines
run at easy speed; but, should one fail in flight, the other, by being
accelerated, will maintain the machine in the air. Its designers and
builders are Messrs. Short Brothers.]
In such a machine, they decided, speed would be the all-important
requirement; and, seeing that the survey to be made would be
comprehensive, and not detailed, it was reckoned that the pilot would be
able to do all that was required, thereby saving the carrying of a
passenger, and enabling greater pace to be obtained.
In several of the single-seated, high-speed monoplanes, as seen at the
Paris show, it is possible to attain a flying rate of approximately
eighty miles an hour. In such a machine, it is intended that the
officer-pilot should, in war-time, effect a swift dash over the enemy’s
lines, and fly back, without an instant’s delay, with whatever
observations he has been able to make. Apart from being able to return
very rapidly to Headquarters, the airman’s high speed would, of course,
be an appreciable factor in his favour, when subjected to artillery
fire.
Such quick reconnoitring, carried out by the pilot of a fast-flying
monoplane, will only be efficacious in detecting the movements of
considerable bodies of troops. For detailed reconnaissance, without
doubt, the two-seated monoplane, carrying its highly-skilled observer,
will be relied upon—as, also, will the weight-carrying biplane, to which
reference will be made in our next section.
It may now, perhaps, be permissible to summarise some of the advantages
of the latest-type military monoplanes. Primarily, of course, their
value lies in their speed. In war-time, some reconnoitring flights will
be more urgent than others; but it may be taken for granted that, in
practically all circumstances, the speedy completion of a reconnaissance
will be greatly to be desired. Thus, in the eyes of a
Commander-in-Chief, the fast-flying monoplane will find the highest
possible favour.
A definite advantage of the monoplane’s speed will lie in its ability to
fly in high, gusty winds. It will, indeed, require very adverse
conditions to prevent the flight of a bold and expert airman, piloting
an eighty-mile-an-hour machine. This point, naturally, will have
especial significance during the progress of an actual campaign.
In the forthcoming trials of military aeroplanes, to be conducted by the
War Office, it is certain that powerful, two-seated monoplanes,
propelled by seventy and hundred horse-power engines, will play an
important part.
II. Latest developments in biplane construction—The engine-in-front,
weight-carrying machine.
The varied experience of the year 1911, so far as the use of military
biplanes was concerned, revealed very definite results at the Paris
aeroplane exhibition in December.
The influence of monoplane construction, upon the design of many of the
biplanes shown, was marked. Clearly revealed, for example, was the
comparatively new school—initiated by the Breguet—in which the engine is
fixed in the bow of the biplane, as in monoplane practice, and a form of
body almost identical with that of a monoplane is adopted.
Such machines, seeing that they employ rear elevating planes, as do
monoplanes, are biplanes only in the sense that they are fitted with two
main-planes, set one above another. As a matter of fact, in regard to
the Breguet—a notable representative of this type—the description
"biplane" is occasionally dropped, and the machine called a
"double-monoplane."
One of the practical advantages of the engine-in-front system is in
regard to the possibility of a bad descent. In the event of an abrupt
dive to the ground, with a machine of this construction, the engine, and
strengthened forepart of the body, take the brunt of the shock. In
machines where the power-plant is fixed behind the main-planes, a danger
has revealed itself of the motor being wrenched from its wooden bed, and
falling forward upon the pilot—with disastrous results.
Two notable exceptions to this new method of construction are those of
Henry and Maurice Farman. They still maintain the system of placing
engines behind the main-planes, and of setting pilots in front of them.
But the Henry Farman military biplane, as seen at the end of 1911, was a
very different machine from that, for example, upon which Louis Paulhan
made his flight from London to Manchester in April, 1910.
Probably the most obvious of the new features introduced was that of
placing both pilot and observer in seats set upon a wooden framework,
which projected in front of the main-planes. The object of this
innovation was to provide a pilot, or reconnoitring officer, with the
most unobstructed view possible of the ground below him. The objection
to the scheme was that the exposed position made it highly probable that
the occupants of the machine would bear the full brunt of the impact, in
the case of a bad descent.
Another feature of the Henry Farman military biplane, which is under
review, was the "staggering" of the planes. Farman adopted the plan of
setting his upper main-plane appreciably in advance of the lower one.
The "staggering" of planes is seriously criticised, by technical
experts, on many grounds. But, in this case, Farman seems to have
decided upon the system, in regard to his military machine, in order to
facilitate a descent on rough ground, and also to assist the
heavily-laden aircraft in getting away from the ground, and in
"climbing." The biplane certainly performed meritoriously in the French
military trials.
At first operating individually, but now in partnership with his brother
Henry, Maurice Farman constructed, towards the end of 1911, an
interesting type of military biplane. The Maurice Farman machine may be
said to have come first into definite prominence when Tabutean flew for
more than eight hours in it in 1910, securing the Michelin Cup.
A large machine, with extensions to its main-planes, capable of carrying
a very heavy load, and of remaining in the air for a long time, but
being an awkward craft in a high wind, save for the most expert pilot—in
such terms, one may describe the Maurice Farman. What a skilled airman
can do with such a big, slow-flying machine, has been shown by Renaux,
who piloted his Maurice Farman right round the 1030-miles course of the
Circuit of Europe; but there were, of course, times when the monoplanes
flew in a wind which kept him in his shed. It should be stated, to the
credit of the Maurice Farman, that it achieved excellent results in the
French trials.
Reference has been made to the Breguet. This is a biplane of a most
progressive type. Steel enters largely into its construction. It has a
tapering body, with controlling planes at the tail, such as the
monoplane possesses; and, in addition, it is equipped with two main
supporting planes, such as characterise the biplane. These are fitted
above and below the body of the machine.
Constructionally, its outstanding feature is its simplicity. Instead of
a number of wooden supports between the main-planes, held in place by
much wiring, the Breguet biplane dispenses with all save four struts;
and these are maintained in position by a minimum of wiring.
The result, from the point of view of portability, is that a great
stride forward is effected. The main-planes of the machine, which
represent its bulky feature, can be unshipped in a few minutes. Nor is
this all; by an ingenious system of hinging the main-planes to the body
of the biplane, these planes may be turned back, after they are
un-wired, and folded beside the body of the machine.
A result is thus achieved which would not have been considered possible,
in the early stages of aeroplane construction. When the planes are
folded at the sides of the machine, it can be made to move down a road
like a motor-car, with its engine running, and its propeller drawing it
forward. The steering-wheel, used when the machine is in flight, is
connected with a small front running-wheel. When he is on the ground,
therefore, the pilot sits in his driving-seat, and controls his craft
like a motorist.
Such features as this commend themselves, as may be imagined, to
military experts. The Breguet biplane possesses other original features
also. The main-planes, being constructed with thin metal ribs, are
flexible; and this flexibility gives the machine stability when assailed
by wind-gusts.
There are several military types of the Breguet biplane. There is, for
example a machine built to carry a pilot and an observer; and another
type, more powerful, which raises a "crew" of three into the air.
The latter is called by its makers the "cruiser" biplane; and it is
interesting to describe how the "crew" is disposed upon it. First comes
the engineer; his task is to attend to the motor. He is given a seat
right up in the bows of the machine, and just behind the engine. The
idea of having a man to look after the engine is, of course, an
excellent one; he is able to "nurse" the motor, give it every attention,
and detect at once whether it is developing any troubles.
Behind the engineer, in the long, boat-shaped body of the biplane, is
seated the observer. He is free from all duties save the carrying out of
his observation work. He has his maps and notebook—shielded from the
rush of wind—in the body of the machine before him.
Behind the reconnoitring officer comes the pilot of the machine, with
the controlling wheels placed in front of him. His attention is devoted
exclusively to steering, and preserving the lateral stability of the
biplane.
This division of duties upon an aeroplane is especially useful in
military work; and it will, undoubtedly, become more and more a feature
of war aircraft. A crew of three, upon a reconnoitring machine,
represents an ideal distribution of duties. An engineer, to look after
the motor when in flight, will probably become more and more of a
necessity, as engines increase in power.
A machine with ample engine-power is essential from the military point
of view. It not only means ability to withstand wind-gusts, but it
spells, also, the power to rise swiftly.
This power of quick-rising, combined with high speed, may frequently
save an aeroplane from destruction, when it is reconnoitring over a
hostile force. The ability to "climb" speedily is, indeed, insisted upon
by those who frame the rules for military contests.
Unknown to the crew of a war machine, they may approach within range of
a concealed battery. In such a case, a shell bursting near them will
probably be their first indication of peril.
Instantly, the pilot will seek to put as great a distance as possible
between himself and the battery; and, as he darts off, he will "climb"
as quickly as he can. In such circumstances as these a quick, handy
machine would probably escape unscathed, whereas a slow-moving craft
might run grave risk of being hit. In the matter of speed, a machine
like the Breguet shows a very distinct improvement, as compared with
early-type biplanes. Thirty-five miles an hour represented the speed of
some of the first biplanes flown in France; but this was increased,
before long, to forty miles an hour.
Then came specially-built biplanes, really racing craft, which caused
speeds to increase from forty to forty-five, and fifty miles an hour.
Now, in reference to the Breguet, a speed of sixty miles an hour is
attained.
In regard to the speed of biplanes when amply engined, it may be
mentioned that Mr Cody, using a 120 horse-power Austrian-Daimler motor,
has been credited with a pace of seventy miles an hour at Farnborough.
Concerning the development of big, weight-carrying biplanes, the French
military authorities are now definitely credited with the intention of
using such machines, in war-time, for destructive purposes. No official
announcement of policy, in this connection, has been made; but the
statement is current, and finds general acceptance that, in the case of
a war with Germany, large biplanes would be used by France along the
German frontier, for the purpose of dropping bombs upon fortifications,
and frustrating any punitive flights of German airships.
In this direction, and possibly also for transport purposes, the future
of the weight-carrying biplane seems certainly to lie.
Those now available for military purposes are designed to possess a
maximum of lifting power, with reasonable speed, and a large measure of
portability. They possess strong, workmanlike features, which specially
suit them for rough service.
From the point of view of an observer, in obtaining a maximum of
unimpeded vision for his work, the military biplane offers distinct
advantages. But the relative value of biplanes and monoplanes in
war-time, can only be established, definitely, by the carefully-noted
experiences of a campaign.
III. Healthy position of the French industry—What England has
lacked—Danger of neglecting home builders.
The competitive element in France, so far as aeroplane construction is
concerned, has been fully aroused.
There is, indeed, every encouragement for a maker to invest his money in
the production of a machine. He knows that, if he achieves a result that
is satisfactory from the military point of view, he will receive
definite Government support, in the shape of an order for one or more
machines.
This, of course, makes all the difference between development and
stagnation. From the point of view of the military authorities, the
encouragement of construction has another important effect, also. It
directs building into the channel which they desire it to follow—that is
to say, towards the steady improvement of machines suitable for purposes
of war.
By this process of placing every facility in the way of her home
manufacturers, France ensures the maintenance of her lead, so far as
military aeroplanes are concerned. The most talented men as designers,
and the most practical men as builders, are always busy in France,
seeking to improve the machines which are at present in use.
An unfortunate position, so far as England is concerned, was revealed in
connection with the preliminary announcement of the intention of the War
Office to hold a military aeroplane contest. Starved for lack of any
official recognition or support, representatives of the British industry
pleaded for conditional orders for machines.
In the general advancement of the science, and particularly so far as
costly experiments with aeroplane engines are concerned. Government
apathy, in the past, has brought about stagnation—and the use, on
English flying-grounds, of foreign-built machines. Will this forthcoming
season show a change? It is sincerely to be hoped that it will.
France possesses the best machines to-day; and she intends to have the
best machines to-morrow. She is in the best position, also, to profit by
any revolutionary discovery, as applied to aeroplaning—should any such
discovery be made.
The country which obtained first use of any revolutionary discovery
would, naturally, be in a commanding position; and, if any such
discovery is made, there is little doubt but that it will be made in
France. This is what a country secures by a pioneer policy in any new
science: it obtains the best there is at the moment, and practically
ensures, also, obtaining the best that the future can bring forth.
The lack of anything like official encouragement has, hitherto, thrown a
definite blight over aerial constructional work in this country. Clever
engineers have interested themselves in the problems arising; but
experimental work, in regard to aeroplaning, is notoriously expensive.
With little scope for selling machines, when they have built them,
British manufacturers have had no stimulus to compete with the makers in
France.
Of course, there have been private orders for English builders. But
these have not been certain. A series of definite orders from the
Government—given just when the industry needed stimulating—would have
made all the difference.
With only one or two aeroplanes actually purchased, a maker knows that
certain of his expenses are covered, at all events; and, when he has
disposed of three of four machines, even if his profit is small, he is
encouraged to embark upon fresh experiments.
This is how the manufacturers in France have gone from one triumph to
another. They have built, and sold, machines of a certain type; and, in
the building of them, they have learned a number of lessons, and have
seen where all sorts of improvements might be made.
Then, having transacted some genuine business, and established a factory
on a satisfactory basis, they are ready, and able, to put to a practical
test the ideas they have acquired in building their first machines. This
is how such world-famous makers as Blériot and Farman have been able to
move forward.
What it means to a country to obtain a lead in such a new industry as
that of building flying machines is shown now, almost every day, in
regard to the demand which has sprung up for war aeroplanes. Many other
Governments are, as has been indicated, following the lead of France in
obtaining air-fleets; and, to make a beginning they have, naturally,
been obliged to buy aeroplanes.
The problem has arisen, therefore, as to where they should purchase
their first machines; and they have found themselves forced to go to the
French manufacturers, simply because the French factories have been
producing the best aeroplanes.
Thus England, Germany, Russia, Italy, Spain, and Japan have been obliged
to go to France to buy aeroplanes. This has meant more money for
experimental work in France. Therefore, what other nations have been
doing, really, has been to help France to increase her lead, by giving
her manufacturers the wherewithal to extend their researches. Thus it
can be seen how important it is for a country like France to maintain
her dominant position.
It is true that other nations, having made initial purchases from the
French aeroplane manufacturers, will try to improve upon these machines
themselves, so as to avoid spending any more money out of their own
country. But in this their success is, to a certain extent, doubtful.
They may study French-built machines, and may see where improvements are
possible. Then they may seek to construct machines of their own. But it
must be remembered that France, helped by the money which these other
countries have spent with her, is progressing rapidly all the while.
The other countries, beginners in the construction of aeroplanes, are
sure to make slow progress; but France, with every facility to hand,
will go ahead quickly. Thus, while other countries are seeking to
improve upon the machines which they have bought in France, it is
probable that the French manufacturers will have gone ahead several
stages further, and will be able to maintain a commanding lead.
Not only in the purchase of military machines, but in regard to
aeroplanes for private use, France is reaping the reward of her go-ahead
policy. Large numbers of French-built aeroplanes have been purchased by
airmen in other countries. The reason, of course, is not far to seek.
Patriotism is one thing, the obtaining of the best aeroplane another.
Exceptionally large prizes have been offered for aeroplane contests, and
it has been the desire of all competitors to secure either the fastest
or the most reliable machine, as the case may be. Therefore, following
the example of the military authorities, the airmen of various countries
have gone to France for their machines, and have further swelled the
resources of the French makers.
Some Englishmen of wealth and leisure have, greatly to their credit,
supported and encouraged the home manufacturers in their struggle
against the general apathy prevailing. The effect of their action has
been apparent in the production of more than one aeroplane which has
indicated, clearly, that all the industry in this country requires is
steady development along the right lines.
It is often said in England that we shall, in regard to aeroplanes,
follow the policy which was adopted concerning the motor-car. That is to
say, we shall allow the foreigner to do all the pioneer work, and then
step in, and produce a perfected machine just as well as he can.
But aeroplanes are not in the same category as motor-cars. Besides, it
is not our business here to deal with the commercial aspects of the
case. We are not arguing the cause of the aeroplane from the point of
view of trade. The matter is one of national safety.
And this is the position. It will probably be many years hence before
anyone will be able to say: "Here is the perfected aeroplane. Now we can
equip factories, and standardise our output."
What will more likely eventuate, as we have hinted, is a gradually
improving war aeroplane. During the years that improvements are being
sought in France—and found—we cannot afford to "sit on the fence." In
the matter of some commercial development, it might be possible to
pursue a laggard policy, while another go-ahead country was doing
pioneer work; but such a scheme is perilous in the extreme when a new
and vitally-important weapon of war is concerned.
This summer, in the military trials, British makers will have a chance.
Unfortunately, they have not much time in which to evolve the
exceptionally efficient aeroplane which the tests demand. In this
regard, without doubt, they are greatly handicapped in a contest with
French manufacturers—who have all the experience of the 1911 trials at
Rheims behind them, and practically unlimited resources in the shape of
smoothly-working factories and financial strength.
In the matter of British engines, there will certainly be insufficient
time—before the War Office trials—for any new motors of sufficient power
to be built and tested satisfactorily. This is particularly unfortunate,
as it will mean, in all probability, that British constructors will be
obliged, whether they like it or not, to install machines with foreign
motors.
Six months is not long enough for the home aeroplane industry to lift
itself from its Slough of Despond. The Government’s tardy recognition of
the value of military airmanship cannot cause an immediate making-up of
leeway. As a matter of fact, the industry in this country is bound to
suffer, from its past neglect, for several years to come.