I. Activity in France—Two hundred machines at the end of 1911; a
thousand promised by the year 1914.
Practically all leading nations, with the exception of Great Britain,
are now equipping themselves, on an adequate scale, with the war
aeroplane.
At the time of the autumn manœuvres in 1910, France possessed about a
dozen aeroplanes. But she soon increased this number, being full of
enthusiasm, and determined upon a strong aerial policy.
Thus, an official report, which was presented at the end of 1910, showed
that the French authorities had increased their fleet of machines, in
two or three months, from a dozen to thirty-two. The list of the French
war aeroplanes at this time was, it is interesting to note, made up as
follows:—
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Wright biplanes 5
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Blériot monoplanes 4
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
H. Farman biplanes 11
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
M. Farman biplanes 4
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Breguet biplanes 2
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Sommer biplanes 4
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Antoinette monoplanes 2
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
To pilot these thirty-two aeroplanes, there were, at this time,
thirty-four fully-qualified military airmen.
The activity which prevailed, at the end of 1910, among the aeroplane
manufacturers in France, is revealed in the report of one well-known
maker, Mr Henry Farman.
He stated, on 6th December, 1910, that he had received orders for
military machines as follows:—
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
French Government 35 aeroplanes
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Russian " 20 "
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Spanish " 3 "
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Italian " 2 "
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Belgian " 1 "
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Japanese " 1 "
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
British " 1 "
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
The commanding position of France, in this one list, as compared with
the single order of Great Britain, forms an illustration of the attitude
of the two countries, at this time, towards military airmanship.
At M. Blériot’s flying school at Pau, early in February, 1911, the
French Government had more than twenty officers learning to become
airmen. No more striking indication could be found of the determination
of this country to be in the forefront in aviation.
Early in the summer of 1911, the French War Minister authorised the
purchase of close upon a hundred and fifty aeroplanes. Of these machines
nearly a hundred were, at this time, actually in the possession of the
military authorities. Among the orders placed with French manufacturers
was one for eighty monoplanes. This was secured by M. Louis Blériot. Two
types of machine were resented in this large commission, one being a
two-seated machine, and the other a single-seated craft, capable of high
speed.
To Mr Henry Farman, whose biplane had performed so meritoriously in the
1910 Picardy manœuvres, an order was placed for forty war machines; and
the French Government’s large order was made up of a number of other
machines.
With her energetic method of sending officers in squads to learn flying
at the various schools, it was not long before France found herself in
possession of a corps of at least a hundred fully-qualified airmen.
These, as a matter of fact, she possessed quite early in the summer of
1911.
The business-like way in which she set herself the task of becoming the
premier nation in the development of flying was especially notable at
this time. Military commissions were appointed to visit the various
aerodromes throughout France, and inspect all aeroplanes built. In the
case where a machine had been purchased, one of these military
commissions came to the flying ground on a specified date, and passed
the aircraft through a series of tests, These experiments had to be
carried out by the constructor of the aeroplane before the Government
would take delivery of his machine.
One instance of this excellent policy is sufficient. In April, 1911, a
military commission of several officers made a journey to the Brayelle
aerodrome. Here, awaiting their inspection, were a couple of Breguet
biplanes which the French authorities had decided to buy.
After the officers had examined the machines, the professional pilots of
the flying school carried out a series of manœuvres. The officers noted,
for example, how long it took a machine to ascend to an altitude of 1000
feet. A specified load had to be lifted by each aeroplane. It was also
necessary that it should attain a stipulated speed. When these
conditions were fulfilled, and not before, the officers formally took
over the aeroplanes on behalf of their Government.
With what determination this task of increasing the aerial armament of
France was pressed forward may be gauged by the work of one of these
military commissions, which visited the Pau aerodrome during the summer
of 1911. No fewer than eight two-seated war monoplanes were waiting for
their inspection; and all eight machines were tested and passed in the
course of a day’s flying.
The spirit which animated France, in regard to this question of military
aviation, is evidenced by the words of M. Clementel, when placing an
official report before the French Chamber. He declared: "The aeroplane
has proved that it is a marvellous instrument of war—a new arm in our
military organisation. We now possess an incontestable superiority in
aviation, and this we hope to continue for a long period. We must
maintain this advance. The sacrifices imposed on us in this matter are
as useful as they are necessary."
This, indeed, supplies the keynote to the enthusiasm of the French for
war aeroplanes. By the end of the year 1911 the War Minister possessed a
fleet of more than 200 war aeroplanes and a corps of officers fully
trained to pilot them, and act as observers.
After French tests of military aeroplanes in October, 1911—which will be
described in the next section—there was a generous distribution of
orders for machines.
Early in 1912, the French military authorities had 234 war aeroplanes at
their disposal; and the financial grant for the year placed £920,000 for
the purposes of military flying. In addition, there was a scheme on foot
to augment the number of war machines. By the aid of public subscription
this, quite soon, approached a sum of £100,000.
The latest plan of the French Government is to form a large regiment of
military airmen, and in this connection more than 300 new aeroplanes
have been ordered for delivery before the end of 1912. Sheds, to
accommodate machines, are springing up all over the country. Quite early
in 1912, nearly 300 officers had obtained pilot’s certificates from the
French Aero Club.
So far as can be ascertained, the military aeroplanes in France will
number appreciably more than 400 at the end of this year; and it must be
remembered that, in time of war, this country could call upon nearly a
thousand privately-owned machines.
The policy in France may be summarised in the statement that the
Government aim to create an air-fleet of at least 1000 machines by the
end of the year 1914. In 1917, it is anticipated, the French air-fleet
will approach, in numbers, several thousand machines. Eventualities, of
course, govern such a programme. It may, for example—should any
remarkable development of aviation take place—be appreciably augmented.
What the limit of utility of an air-fleet may be, only the practical
work of war will show. For reconnoitring, it is clear that very large
squadrons of machines, divided amongst the various sections of an army,
will be employed.
Then there is the question of using aeroplanes for dispatch-carrying,
and for directing artillery fire, to say nothing of their probable
employment for destructive work, and perhaps in the transport of troops.
Another crucial point must also be borne in mind, to which detailed
reference will be made later. If, as is practically certain, a conflict
takes place between the aerial forces of two armies, it is likely to be
the larger of two fleets of machines—other things being equal—which will
emerge victorious.
Therefore, it is impossible at present to lay down any rule as to
limiting the number of war aeroplanes. No country can stay its hand. The
wise policy, surely, is to be well armed in view of eventualities. If a
great war comes—then, and only then, can the strength of an air-fleet be
tested adequately.
II. The great French tests of military aeroplanes—Striking results
obtained—Era of fast, "air-worthy," weight-carrying machines.
Any account of the splendid progress in military flying, which has been
made in France, would not be complete without a reference to the trials
of war aeroplanes which were carried out at Rheims in October, 1911.
In prizes, and prospective orders for machines, more than £50,000 had
been set aside; and an astonishingly large number of French
makers—bearing striking testimony to the progress of aviation in that
country—brought their machines together. Despite bad weather, a series
of tests which were highly instructive and important were carried out.
One of the French aims, in the organisation of these contests, was to
encourage the construction of a speedy, "air-worthy" machine, capable of
carrying a pilot and passenger, and flying long distances when fully
loaded.
The tests were most interesting, as showing the high state of efficiency
to which aeroplanes had attained. Quite a number of machines, for
example, were able to effect a regular series of non-stop flights of 300
kilometres (187.5 miles), when carrying a pilot and observer.
A surprising number, also, were able to ascend to a height of 1640 feet
in fifteen minutes—a remarkable indication of the reserve of power they
possessed.
One difficult feat was set the competing machines. This was that they
should rise, when fully loaded, from a ploughed field. Hitherto, of
course, only smooth ground had been considered suitable for the ascent
of a machine. An appreciable number passed even this test successfully.
Their ability to do so was due to the fitting of exceptionally-strong
landing devices of the wheel and skid type, and to ample engine-power.
In all, seven aeroplanes emerged triumphantly from all the trials
imposed. The winning machine, which owed its final triumph to its high
speed, was the Nieuport monoplane. Even when heavily laden with pilot,
passenger, and fuel, it flew across country at the rate of more than
seventy miles an hour.
One of the most impressive features of the trials was the reliability
shown by the competing machines. They made voyage after voyage with the
regularity of express trains. The striking aspect of the tests, indeed,
was the practical demonstration of the fact that not one French builder,
but dozens, could make a thoroughly-efficient war aeroplane.
It was shown conclusively, also, that it is no longer necessary to wait
for calm weather before embarking upon aeroplane flights. In
astonishingly high winds—blowing, in some cases, at a velocity of
approximately forty miles an hour—the large military machines went out
and, ascending 1000 or 1500 feet, battled triumphantly against vicious
gusts.
A striking point in connection with the competition was the big
horse-power of the engines employed. There was a vivid contrast, indeed,
between the motors now used and the little three-cylindered, twenty-five
horse-power engine with which Blériot crossed the Channel in 1909.
Many of the machines taking part in the contest were fitted with
fourteen-cylinder hundred horsepower "Gnome" motors; and some employed
even higher power than this, being equipped with engines developing a
hundred and forty horse-power. Such big power was, of course, necessary
in view of the loads which were carried, and the arduous nature of some
of the tests.
To indicate the weights raised, it may be mentioned that the Breguet
biplane, which was driven by a hundred and forty horse-power "Gnome,"
weighed, with pilot, two passengers, and fuel aboard, 2420 lb.
Representatives from all the great countries in the world, including
Great Britain, visited Rheims to witness these military tests, and the
French manufacturers who produced successful machines were quickly
supplied with sufficient orders to keep their factories busy for a long
time to come.
The value of the flying work accomplished in these trials, and the
obvious practicability of military machines, stimulated interest not
only in France, but in Russia, Germany, and other countries. It was,
undoubtedly, the means of determining our War Office to make a move. In
view of what was achieved at Rheims, in fact, there no longer remained
any possible excuse for refraining from a constructive policy in
military aviation.
III. Germany’s aerial policy—Secret energies in creating a fleet of war
aeroplanes—Rivalry with France.
Leaving France for the moment, we may now turn to a consideration of
Germany’s advance in the matter of military flying. Here, first of all,
we shall need to consider an interesting question. It concerns the
relative merits of the dirigible balloon and the aeroplane. Although, in
this book, we are concerned exclusively with the heavier-than-air
machine, it is certainly necessary to mention the dirigible at this
point, in explanation of the fact that Germany almost abandoned her
airship policy, after the French manœuvres in the autumn of 1910, in
favour of the aeroplane.
She was not led to take this step, after spending many thousands of
pounds upon dirigibles, without mature consideration. Among her advisers
in matters of aviation, Germany possessed many particularly-staunch and
even obstinate supporters of the airship. These refused at first to
admit the enormous strides which the aeroplane was making. But soon it
was impossible to turn a blind eye towards them; and so came a reversal
of German policy.
The facts of the case could not, indeed, be controverted. While the
aeroplane leaped to the front during 1910, the airship made practically
no forward strides at all. In comparison with the aeroplane, it was
ruinously costly. It required large crews of men to handle it. It needed
huge garages dotted about the country at all strategic points. It was
slow-flying, as compared with the aeroplane. It offered a far easier
target to artillery fire from below. The advantages which were claimed
for it, over the aeroplane, were that it could remain in the air longer,
and that observations could be carried out from it in a more leisurely
fashion than from the heavier-than-air machine.
But the German War Office is notoriously shrewd in all matters
appertaining to modern warfare. When it was seen that a mistaken policy
was being pursued in spending large sums upon unwieldy dirigibles, a new
plan was quickly evolved—and that was to overtake France in the creation
of a fleet of war aeroplanes.
It was in November, 1910, that the German military authorities began to
purchase machines. They then placed orders for five or six aeroplanes,
mostly biplanes. This was quickly followed, a month later, by an order
for nearly twenty Etrich monoplanes—strongly-built, extremely-efficient
machines, constructed in Austria.
Military experts in Germany had, by this time, arrived at an approximate
estimate of what should be the salient features of an aeroplane for war
purposes. They stated that machines should be of as simple a
construction as possible, and very strong. They declared high speed to
be an essential, and they demanded, also, that machines should be able
to carry appreciable weights.
It was characteristic of Germany that she should make steady progress,
once a decision had been arrived at to develop the aeroplane. Thus, in
February, 1911, it became known that seven military airmen had, in one
week, obtained their certificates of proficiency at the Johannisthal and
Bork aerodromes. Three of these pilots were using Wright biplanes. It
was just about this time, too, that Germany placed an order in France
for several Farman biplanes.
By the spring of 1911, the German War Office had assembled a fleet of
close upon fifty aeroplanes. Nearly half of them were Etrich monoplanes,
of the type previously mentioned. Metal now entered very largely into
the framework of these machines. They were heavily-engined, and fast in
flight, and could easily raise a reconnoitring officer, in addition to
the pilot, and an engineer to attend to the motor as well.
In March, 1911, so as to hasten forward the work of training officers to
fly, the German Minister of War sent fifty or sixty unmarried
lieutenants to the Doebritz military aviation camp. Here, while they
were learning to fly, these officers received a special allowance. The
military authorities also came to the conclusion, at this time, that it
would be wise to arrange for an aviation section at all the garrisons in
Germany which had suitable parade-grounds attached to them.
It was decided in May, 1911, to spend large sums of money upon the
purchase of new types of military aeroplanes; and the officers who had
already learned to fly were encouraged to design machines, embodying
ideas formed during their period of tuition. At the same time, in order
to encourage a general study of flying in Germany, the War Office made
up its mind to contribute special prizes to the various cross-country
contests then in process of arrangement.
Going ahead with such determination, it was not surprising to find that,
in August, 1911, Germany had established a fleet of nearly eighty
aeroplanes; and the total of her officer-airmen, a month later,
approached the same figure.
The Kaiser himself had, by this time, become greatly interested in the
development of heavier-than-air machines for war purposes, and he
thoroughly approved of the forward policy which had been initiated. At
the end of the summer of 1911 Germany had quite a hundred aeroplanes
either on hand, or in order; and her list of army airmen had grown
appreciably.
Recently, however, development in Germany, so far as aeroplanes are
concerned, has been kept more or less secret. Information regarding
tests which have been carried out has been carefully withheld. The
results of several carefully-organised reconnoitring flights have not,
for instance, been allowed to leak out.
But this much is known. During 191 2, Germany will spend a sum of
£640,000 upon the development of her aeroplane service. The Kaiser
himself now offers a prize of £2500 for the best aeroplane motor of
German construction.
It seems fairly clear, indeed, that Germany has now set herself the task
of keeping pace with France in the development of military airmanship. A
great point is made by the German War Office of encouraging the
production of entirely German-built aeroplanes, and much experimental
work is now being conducted.
This much is certain: there is the greatest activity in Germany in
regard to military aeroplaning. No stone is being left unturned, indeed,
to produce a thoroughly-efficient military machine; and the training of
army airmen is steadily pursued.
Many estimates have recently been made as to the strength of the German
air-fleet. One credits Germany with 300 war aeroplanes; another with
nearly 200. The most reliable figure would appear to be a little in
excess of 100 machines.
Dirigible balloon work, also, still continues. It has been reported, in
fact, that German military experts have overcome some of the
difficulties of the rigid type, and that heights of over 6000 feet are
now attained with them. It was, indeed, only in January that France was
warned, by a well-known advocate of dirigible balloons, to beware of the
secret development of lighter-than-air craft in Germany. The destructive
possibilities of a fleet of hostile dirigibles, sailing across the
German frontier into France, and raining down missiles, were pictured;
but, in this regard, it is certainly pertinent to inquire what the
French fleet of aeroplanes would be doing while such an attack was in
progress.
IV. Progress in Russia, America, and other countries-England’s position
in the autumn of 1911.
The country which next merits attention, as a keen, observant student of
the value of the aeroplane for war purposes, is Russia. The Russian
military authorities recognised the importance of this new weapon early
in 1911, and the steps taken to deal with the question were eminently
practical. The Duma Committee of National Defence approved an
expenditure of nearly £1,000,000 upon military aviation.
Since then, Russia has been acquiring aeroplanes, and training airmen,
at a great rate. A sum of £25,000 a year, for three years, was voted
exclusively for the building of experimental machines of a military
type, in order that aircraft on original lines might be evolved. It was
also decided to spend £2500 a year in employing skilled instructors.
Military air-stations were, at the same time, established at Keiff,
Odessa, Sebastopol, and Tiflis.
Having thus made the first move towards creating an efficient air-corps,
the Russian Government sent a commission of military officers on a tour
of the French flying grounds, in order that they might see the best work
being produced by the aeroplane manufacturers.
While in France, this commission purchased a number of machines of
various types. They visited England, also, and after inspecting the
biplanes built by the British and Colonial Aeroplane Company at Bristol,
ordered several military-type machines of this make.
By May, 1911, Russia had acquired forty machines, and was using them to
teach a large number of officers to fly. A determination has been
expressed to have a fleet of several hundred aeroplanes by the
forthcoming flying season.
The activities of other nations also present an interesting study. Take
America, for example. In this country, despite the wonderful example set
by the Wright brothers, military flying languished until towards the end
of 1910. Then came a somewhat tardy vote for the purchase of a few
machines, and general development.
In the beginning of 1911, Mr Dickinson, the United States War Secretary,
returned from a visit to France, where he had seen what the French war
aeroplanes were accomplishing, and had enjoyed a flight upon a military
machine at Chalons. He promptly recommended a more generous money grant,
and the result has been that machines have been bought, while officers
are now learning to fly.
In a recent speech, Brigadier-General James Allen, of the American
Signal Corps—in connection with which the Air Corps is operated—said:
"It is the ultimate intention, I believe, to teach aviation to several
thousand Army men."
For the year ending June, 1912, a sum of 125,000 dollars was voted for
the aeronautical work of the American Army.
Austrian military experts have been very energetic in their study of
flying. In November, 1910, war aeroplanes were ordered, and it was then
specified that each machine must fly for two hours without descending,
at the rate of forty-four miles an hour. It was also stipulated that the
aeroplanes should be dismantled in an hour, and rebuilt in two hours.
During 1911, Austria operated two military air-stations, and now
possesses an excellent fleet of war aeroplanes.
Italian interest in military aviation has been keen from the outset. In
the summer of 1911, at the Centocelle military aerodrome, a number of
officers were training, and a variety of machines were in use. Since
then, also, definite progress has been made, and Italy quickly reaped
the reward of her aeronautical labours in the war with Turkey. A
reference to the work of aeroplanes in Tripoli will, however, be found
in a later section.
In March, 1911, Japan placed orders in France for nearly twenty war
aeroplanes. This was in addition to a previous purchase, in Berlin, of a
number of Wright biplanes. Japanese officers have been learning to fly
in large numbers lately, both in France and Germany.
Spain must not be forgotten. She has bought a number of machines in
France, and is now training a corps of officer-airmen.
[Illustration: TWO-SEATED, BRITISH-BUILT WAR MACHINE.
The Blackburn military-type monoplane, with accomodation for pilot and
observer, has already made many successful flights; and it is expected
to perform meritoriously in the War Office trials. In some respects it
resembles the graceful Antoinette.]
And what about England? It is sufficient to say, for purposes of direct
comparison in this section, that for the autumn manœuvres of 1911—which
were abandoned owing to the drought—the War Office had only half a dozen
qualified army aeroplanists, in comparison with the well-trained
squadrons of France and Germany. As regards machines, we possessed at
this time about a dozen—most of them obsolete—being hopelessly
out-matched by France, Germany, and Russia.