5.56 A.M.—
At Halloy, a cyclist company.
5.59 A.M.—
Thieuloy—Sixteen squadrons of cavalry and six batteries at the
southwest entrance to the village.
6.5 A.M.—
South-west of Rothois—At the north point of Malmifet wood, a
company and two batteries of artillery on the march towards
Marseille-le-Petit.
6.7 A.M.—
Haute-Epine—Northern entrance to the village, one company of
infantry to the right and one to the left of the road. One
company at point 188. One company in the village of Haute-Epine.
6.9 A.M.—
At the cross-road to Lihus, a squadron of dragoons concealed
behind the edge of the wood.
6.14 A.M.—
On the road Cievecoeur-Marseille south of Lihus, a squadron on
the march towards Marseille-le-Petit, and a troop in the village
of Lihus.
6.16 A.M.—
On the Lihus-Potangy road, a squadron and two machine-guns
marching towards Marseille-le-Petit.
6.19 A.M.—
South-west entrance to Cieve-coeur, three regiments of cavalry,
including cuirassiers, and six batteries of artillery, in
assembly formation.
"The value of these two reports," declared one of the chief French
military experts, "cannot be overestimated. Each one exposed the
dispositions of the enemy, and the information was obtained in a
remarkably short space of time."
As regards the second report of the two air-scouts, it provided one
remarkable instance of the practical value of the aeroplane in time of
war. Upon the night before the airmen carried out their reconnaissance,
the troops they were observing had been heavily attacked, and the
Commander-in-Chief for whom they were acting was particularly anxious to
know whether his enemy intended to hold its ground, or was about to fall
back.
The aerial report, when received, threw a clear light upon this point.
Mainly cavalry and rear-guards had been detected during the flight. It
was obvious, therefore, that the enemy was in retreat. Such results as
these convinced the military experts who were studying the manœuvres
that the future of the aeroplane, at any rate from the reconnoitring
point of view, was practically assured.
For the splendid work which he had accomplished, Lieutenant Sido
received promotion, and his pilot, Adjutant Menard, was presented with
the Cross of the Legion of Honour. Lieutenant Sido, explaining
afterwards how he succeeded in setting out such terse and informing
reports, made several interesting observations regarding the work of a
military observer.
At first, he said, the man who attempted aerial scouting could not
distinguish things below him with sufficient clearness. He himself had
found that quite a number of flights were necessary before he could make
anything like satisfactory or accurate observations. But practice, he
added, was everything. Granted plenty of this, and sharp eyesight, he
considered that an aerial observer should make few mistakes in reporting
what he saw when in an aeroplane.
A military correspondent of _The Times_, who went through these
manœuvres in Picardy, and thus had ample opportunity of studying the
work of the air-scouts, declared afterwards: "In my belief the
aeroplane, given a trained pilot, and a skilled observer, must
revolutionise the whole service of reconnaissance." No statement could
be more definite.
This, as has been said, was the first practical revelation of what an
air-scout might accomplish in time of war. France was not slow to profit
by the lesson. Without delay, she began to create an efficient aeroplane
fleet. If feats such as those recorded in the Picardy manœuvres could be
carried out with a few aeroplanes, what could not be achieved with
highly-organised squadrons of machines? This, in effect, was the
question which France asked herself.
[Illustration: READY FOR A SCOUTING FLIGHT.
Here a latest-type reconnoitring monoplane, with its observer in the
front seat and the pilot behind him, is seen just about to start upon an
aerial voyage. The machine is a British-built Bristol, such as will be
used in the forthcoming military trials.]