_Individual losses_ may be estimated with reasonable accuracy. Ships
burnt or sunk with their cargoes may be counted, and their value
determined; but this leaves without recognition the vaster damage to
commerce driven from the ocean, and that other damage, immense and
infinite, caused by the prolongation of the war, all of which may be
called _national_ in contradistinction to _individual_.
Our _national losses_ have been frankly conceded by eminent Englishmen.
I have already quoted Mr. Cobden, who did not hesitate to call them
“cruel losses.” During the same debate in which he let drop this
testimony, he used other words, which show how justly he comprehended
the case. “_You have been_,” said he, “_carrying on hostilities from
these shores against the people of the United States_, and have been
inflicting an amount of damage on that country greater than would
be produced by many ordinary wars. It is estimated that the loss
sustained by the capture and burning of American vessels has been
about $15,000,000, or nearly £3,000,000 sterling. _But that is a small
part of the injury which has been inflicted on the American marine._
We have rendered the rest of her vast mercantile property for the
present valueless.”[74] Thus, by the testimony of Mr. Cobden, were
those individual losses which are alone recognized by the pending
treaty only “a small part of the injury inflicted.” After confessing
his fears with regard to “the heaping up of a _gigantic material
grievance_” such as was then accumulating, he adds, in memorable
words:--
“You have already done your worst towards the American
mercantile marine. What with the high rate of insurance,
what with these captures, and what with the rapid transfer
of tonnage to British capitalists, you have virtually made
valueless that vast property. Why, if you had gone and helped
the Confederates by bombarding all the accessible seaport towns
of America, a few lives might have been lost, which, as it is,
have not been sacrificed; but you could hardly have done more
injury in the way of destroying property than you have done by
these few cruisers.”[75]
With that clearness of vision which he possessed in such rare degree,
this statesman saw that England had “virtually made valueless a vast
property,” as much as if this power had “bombarded all the accessible
seaport towns of America.”
So strong and complete is this statement, that any further citation
seems superfluous; but I cannot forbear adducing a pointed remark in
the same debate, by that able gentleman, Mr. William E. Forster:--
“There could not,” said he, “be a stronger illustration of
the damage which had been done to the American trade by these
cruisers than the fact, that, so completely was the American
flag driven from the ocean, the Georgia, on her second cruise,
did not meet a single American vessel in six weeks, though she
saw no less than seventy vessels in a very few days.”[76]
This is most suggestive. So entirely was our commerce driven from the
ocean, that for six weeks not an American vessel was seen!
Another Englishman, in an elaborate pamphlet, bears similar testimony.
I refer to the pamphlet of Mr. Edge, published in London by Ridgway in
1863, and entitled “The Destruction of the American Carrying-Trade.”
After setting forth at length the destruction of our commerce by
British pirates, this writer thus foreshadows the damages:--
“Were we,” says he, “the sufferers, we should certainly
demand compensation for the loss of the property captured or
destroyed, for the interest of the capital invested in the
vessels and their cargoes, and, maybe, a fair compensation
in addition for all and any injury accruing to our business
interests from the depredations upon our shipping. _The
remuneration may reach a high figure in the present case; but
it would be a simple act of justice_, and might prevent an
incomparably greater loss in the future.”[77]
Here we have the damages assessed by an Englishman, who, while
contemplating remuneration at a high figure, recognizes it as “a simple
act of justice.”
Such is the candid and explicit testimony of Englishmen, pointing the
way to the proper rule of damages. How to authenticate the extent of
national loss with reasonable certainty is not without difficulty; but
it cannot be doubted that such a loss occurred. It is folly to question
it. The loss may be seen in various circumstances: as, in the rise of
insurance on all American vessels; the fate of the carrying-trade,
which was one of the great resources of our country; the diminution
of our tonnage, with the corresponding increase of British tonnage;
the falling off in our exports and imports, with due allowance for
our abnormal currency and the diversion of war. These are some of the
elements; and here again we have British testimony. Mr. W. E. Forster,
in the speech already quoted, announces that “the carrying-trade of
the United States was transferred to British merchants”;[78] and Mr.
Cobden, with his characteristic mastery of details, shows, that,
according to an official document laid on the table of Parliament,
American shipping had been transferred to English capitalists as
follows: in 1858, 33 vessels, 12,684 tons; 1859, 49 vessels, 21,308
tons; 1860, 41 vessels, 13,638 tons; 1861, 126 vessels, 71,673 tons;
1862, 135 vessels, 64,578 tons; and 1863, 348 vessels, 252,579 tons;
and he adds, “I am told that this operation is now going on as fast
as ever”; and this circumstance he declares to be “the _most serious
aspect_ of the question of our relations with America.”[79] But this
“most serious aspect” is left untouched by the pending treaty.
Our own official documents are in harmony with these English
authorities. For instance, I have before me now the Report of the
Secretary of the Treasury for 1868, with an appendix by Mr. Nimmo, on
shipbuilding in our country. From this Report it appears that in the
New England States, during the year 1855, the most prosperous year
of American shipbuilding, 305 ships and barks and 173 schooners were
built, with an aggregate tonnage of 326,429 tons, while during the last
year only 58 ships and barks and 213 schooners were built, with an
aggregate tonnage of 98,697 tons.[80] I add a further statement from
the same Report:--
“During the ten years from 1852 to 1862 the aggregate tonnage
of American vessels entered at seaports of the United States
from foreign countries was 30,225,475 tons, and the aggregate
tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 14,699,192 tons, while
during the five years from 1863 to 1868 the aggregate tonnage
of American vessels entered was 9,299,877 tons, and the
aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 14,116,427
tons,--showing that American tonnage in our foreign trade
had fallen from two hundred and five to sixty-six per cent.
of foreign tonnage in the same trade. Stated in other terms,
during the decade from 1852 to 1862 sixty-seven per cent.
of the total tonnage entered from foreign countries was in
American vessels, and during the five years from 1863 to 1868
only thirty-nine per cent. of the aggregate tonnage entered
from foreign countries was in American vessels,--a relative
falling off of nearly one half.”[81]
It is not easy to say how much of this change, which has become
chronic, may be referred to British pirates; but it cannot be doubted
that they contributed largely to produce it. They began the influences
under which this change has continued.
There is another document which bears directly upon the present
question. I refer to the interesting Report of Mr. Morse, our consul at
London, made during the last year, and published by the Secretary of
State. After a minute inquiry, the Report shows that on the breaking
out of the Rebellion in 1861 the entire tonnage of the United States,
coasting and registered, was 5,539,813 tons, of which 2,642,628 tons
were registered and employed in foreign trade, and that at the close of
the Rebellion in 1865, notwithstanding an increase in coasting tonnage,
our registered tonnage had fallen to 1,602,528 tons, being a loss
during the four years of more than a million tons, amounting to about
forty per cent. of our foreign commerce. During the same four years
the total tonnage of the British empire rose from 5,895,369 tons to
7,322,604 tons, the increase being especially in the foreign trade. The
Report proceeds to say that as to the cause of the decrease in America
and the corresponding increase in the British empire “there can be no
room for question or doubt.” Here is the precise testimony from one
who at his official post in London watched this unprecedented drama,
with the outstretched ocean as a theatre, and British pirates as the
performers:--
“Conceding to the Rebels the belligerent rights of the sea,
when they had not a solitary war-ship afloat, in dock, or in
the process of construction, and when they had no power to
protect or dispose of prizes, made their sea-rovers, when
they appeared, the instruments of terror and destruction to
our commerce. From the appearance of the first corsair in
pursuit of their ships, American merchants had to pay not only
the marine, but the war risk also, on their ships. After the
burning of one or two ships with their neutral cargoes, the
ship-owner had to pay the war risk on the cargo his ship had
on freight, as well as on the ship. Even then, for safety, the
preference was, as a matter of course, always given to neutral
vessels, and American ships could rarely find employment on
these hard terms as long as there were good neutral ships in
the freight markets. Under such circumstances there was no
course left for our merchant ship-owners but to take such
profitless business as was occasionally offered them, let their
ships lie idle at their moorings or in dock with large expense
and deterioration constantly going on, to sell them outright
when they could do so without ruinous sacrifice, or put them
under foreign flags for protection.”[82]
Beyond the actual loss in the national tonnage, there was a further
loss in the arrest of our natural increase in this branch of industry,
which an intelligent statistician puts at five per cent. annually,
making in 1866 a total loss on this account of 1,384,953 tons,
which must be added to 1,229,035 tons actually lost.[83] The same
statistician, after estimating the value of a ton at forty dollars
gold, and making allowance for old and new ships, puts the sum-total of
national loss on this account at $110,000,000. Of course this is only
an item in our bill.
To these authorities I add that of the National Board of Trade, which,
in a recent report on American Shipping, after setting forth the
diminution of our sailing tonnage, says that it is nearly all to be
traced to the war on the ocean; and the result is summed up in the
words, that, “while the tonnage of the nation was rapidly disappearing
_by the ravages of the Rebel cruisers_ and by sales abroad, in
addition to the usual loss by the perils of the sea, there was no
construction of new vessels going forward to counteract the decline
even in part.”[84] Such is the various testimony, all tending to one
conclusion.
This is what I have to say for the present on _national losses_ through
the destruction of commerce. These are large enough; but there is
another chapter, where they are larger far: I refer, of course, to the
national losses caused by the prolongation of the war, and traceable
directly to England. Pardon me, if I confess the regret with which
I touch this prodigious item; for I know well the depth of feeling
which it is calculated to stir. But I cannot hesitate. It belongs to
the case. No candid person, who studies this eventful period, can
doubt that the Rebellion was originally encouraged by hope of support
from England,--that it was strengthened at once by the concession
of belligerent rights on the ocean,--that it was fed to the end by
British supplies,--that it was encouraged by every well-stored British
ship that was able to defy our blockade,--that it was quickened into
frantic life with every report from the British pirates, flaming
anew with every burning ship; nor can it be doubted that without
British intervention the Rebellion would have soon succumbed under
the well-directed efforts of the National Government. Not weeks or
months, but years, were added in this way to our war, so full of costly
sacrifice. The subsidies which in other times England contributed to
Continental wars were less effective than the aid and comfort which
she contributed to the Rebellion. It cannot be said too often that the
_naval base_ of the Rebellion was not in America, but in England. The
blockade-runners and the pirate ships were all English. England was the
fruitful parent, and these were the “hell-hounds,” pictured by Milton
in his description of Sin, which, “when they list, would creep into her
womb and kennel there.” Mr. Cobden boldly said in the House of Commons
that England made war from her shores on the United States, with “an
amount of damage to that country greater than would be produced by many
ordinary wars.”[85] According to this testimony, the conduct of England
was war; but it must not be forgotten that this war was carried on at
our sole cost. The United States paid for a war waged by England upon
the National Unity.
There was one form that this war assumed which was incessant, most
vexatious, and costly, besides being in itself a positive alliance with
the Rebellion. It was that of blockade-runners, openly equipped and
supplied by England under the shelter of that baleful Proclamation.
Constantly leaving English ports, they stole across the ocean, and
then broke the blockade. These active agents of the Rebellion could be
counteracted only by a network of vessels stretching along the coast,
at great cost to the country. Here is another distinct item, the amount
of which may be determined at the Navy Department.
The sacrifice of precious life is beyond human compensation; but there
may be an approximate estimate of the national loss in treasure.
Everybody can make the calculation. I content myself with calling
attention to the elements which enter into it. Besides the blockade,
there was the prolongation of the war. The Rebellion was suppressed
at a cost of more than four thousand million dollars, a considerable
portion of which has been already paid, leaving twenty-five hundred
millions as a national debt to burden the people. If, through British
intervention, the war was doubled in duration, or in any way extended,
as cannot be doubted, then is England justly responsible for the
additional expenditure to which our country was doomed; and whatever
may be the final settlement of these great accounts, such must be the
judgment in any chancery which consults the simple equity of the case.
This plain statement, without one word of exaggeration or aggravation,
is enough to exhibit the magnitude of the national losses, whether
from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or
the expense of the blockade. They stand before us mountain-high, with
a base broad as the Nation, and a mass stupendous as the Rebellion
itself. It will be for a wise statesmanship to determine how this
fearful accumulation, like Ossa upon Pelion, shall be removed out of
sight, so that it shall no longer overshadow the two countries.