THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE WAR
Mention has already been made that a large number of Germany's war books
has emanated from the universities. Not the least important of these
efforts is "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg" ("Germany and the World
War.")[187] Twenty well-known university professors have contributed to
the work; the fact being emphasized that special facilities have been
accorded to them by the German foreign office. For British readers the
chapters by Professors Marcks and Oncken are the most interesting, viz.,
"England's Policy of Might" by the former, and "Events leading up to the
War" and "The Outbreak of War" by the latter. They take up a fifth of
the 686 pages of which the entire work consists.
[Footnote 187: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," herausgegeben von Otto
Hintze, Friedrich Meinecke, Hermann Oncken und Hermann Schumacher.
Leipzig und Berlin, 1915.]
The purpose of Professor Marcks' essay is to prove on historical and
scientific lines the lessons which have been taught in German schools
for nearly half a century, _i.e._, England is an astute but ruthless
robber who respects no right, and no nation which stands in her way.
"England's modern history begins with the Tudors and her world policy
with Elizabeth. First of all, England had to liberate herself,
economically and politically, from a position of dependence on the other
Powers; then she took up her particular attitude to the world. Her
separation from the Roman Catholic Church was exceedingly rich in
consequences; this step assigned to her a peculiar place in the camp of
the nations, and exercised a deep influence upon her intellectual
development. It gave her an impetus towards internal and external
independence.
"But the determining factor for England's future was her insular
position; this has been the case from the time Europe entered the
ocean-period. Since the year 1600 England, by her commerce and politics,
has influenced Europe from without, while she has maintained for herself
a position of independence, and directed her energies across the ocean
into the wide world. Successively she seized upon the Baltic, North Sea,
and Atlantic Ocean; gradually she became the merchant and shipbuilder
for most of the European nations.
"The sea has given her everything--independence, security and
prosperity--both in treasure and lands. The sea protected her and spared
her the unpleasantness of mighty neighbours. It was the ocean which
permitted free development to her internal life, parliament, government
and administration, and saved her from the continental form of
Government--a strong, armed monarchy.
"The sea has allowed the English to develop, undisturbed, the
peculiarities of their race--personal energy, trained by contact with
the ocean; personal freedom, favoured but not oppressed by the living
organism of the State. The sea afforded them liberty of action in every
direction without fear of attack from behind. Freed from the chains
which bound Europe, England went out into the wide world.
"Yet she remained constantly associated with the continent, not only
because Europe was her field of action. English statesmen have always
seized upon every opportunity to influence European policy; at first
this was from motives of defence, but afterwards from an ever-increasing
spirit of aggression. The balance of power on the continent has always
been one of the premises for England's security and existence.
"She is indebted to her insular position for the supreme advantage of
being able to exercise her influence in Europe without allowing her
forces to be tied to the continent; European countries were bound by
their own conflicts and differences, enabling England to exert her
influence upon them without active participation. England has become
thoroughly accustomed to a state of affairs under which she has no
neighbours and never permits any--not even on the sea. She has come to
consider this her God-given prerogative.
"The barriers of geographical position which hampered other lands,
nature did not impose upon England; the security afforded by her girdle
of waves seemed as it were to impel her to strike out into the
unbounded, and to look upon every obstacle as a wrong. There is a thread
of daring lawlessness running through all England's world-struggles,
through all periods of her history, right down to the present day.
"When England speaks of humanity she means herself; her cosmopolitan
utterances refer to her own nationality. She forgets too easily that
other nations have arisen on the earth who esteem their own
distinguishing traits and are inspired by the ardent desire to uphold
their own institutions, forms of Government and culture. England
believes all too easily that the world's map should be all one colour.
But the soul of the modern world demands variety."[188]
[Footnote 188: Ibid., 297 _et seq_.]
There is no important objection to raise against Professor Marcks'
statement of English history and Britain's favoured position on the
surface of the globe. Germany did not choose her own geographical
situation in the world--it is hers by nature and the right of historical
succession. Britain has never envied her or endeavoured to deprive her
of the advantages consequent upon her "place in the sun."
Neither did the British select their island home; destiny and history
were again the determining factors. But it would be a travesty of the
truth to assert that Germany has not envied her that position, together
with the advantages arising from it. Yet in the same degree as the
inhabitants of these islands have used the "talents" entrusted to them
through their favourable position, Germany's jealousy seems to have
become more bitterly angry. By right of birth and national necessity
Germany demands the domination of the Rhine, but she fails to recognize
that right of birth and the demands of national existence compel Britain
to claim the domination of the seas.
The remainder of Professor Marcks' essay is devoted to proving that "the
freedom of our world requires that it shall not be so in future."
Whatever motives actuated Germany in precipitating the war, this much is
now evident--it is her supreme desire and the aim of her highest
endeavour to destroy Britain's favoured situation and every advantage
accruing to her from it.
To-day the issue is clear and simple for Germany--the annihilation of
British power and influence in the world. Literally hundreds of German
war books echo that cry, and, above all else, it is the hope of
attaining this aim which has aroused the bitterest war fury in the
entire German nation--man, woman and child. Reduced to first principles,
this difference of geographical position and the varying advantages
arising therefrom are the prime causes--if not _the_ cause--of the
present world-struggle.
It was solely the fear of perpetuating British supremacy[189] which has
led Germany consistently to reject the extended hand of friendship.
Standing side by side with Great Britain, either in friendship or
alliance, Germany would have given her approval to Britain's historical
position in the world. When this country departed from the policy of
"splendid isolation" repeated attempts were made to establish more
intimate relations with Germany (1898-1902).
[Footnote 189: Graf Ernst zu Reventlow: "Der Vampir des Festlandes
("England, the Vampire of the Continent"). Berlin, 1915, p. 117.
"England's withdrawal from the policy which sought to establish a mutual
plan of procedure in world politics between Germany and Britain dates
from the time when Britain recognized that Germany would not allow
herself to be employed against Russia. In Germany to-day, voices may be
heard proclaiming that von Bülow chose wrongly in refusing England's
offer, especially as Russia has repaid our loyalty and friendship with
iniquitous ingratitude. The latter represents the truth.
"But in judging the policy of that period two factors must be borne in
mind. The acceptance of Great Britain's offer would have placed a tie
upon the German Empire which would have been unendurable. Germany would
have become the strong but stupid Power, whose duty would have been to
fight British battles on the continent. Besides which the choice
concerned Germany's world future, above all the development of the
German war fleet."]
But as Professor Marcks (p. 315) observes: "Germany refused the hand
extended to her." Count Reventlow and a host of other writers have
chronicled the fact too, yet on September 2nd, 1914, the German
Chancellor dared to say to representative American journalists: "When
the archives are opened then the world will learn how often Germany has
offered the hand of friendship to England."
It is only one more confirmation that the "law of necessity" is
incompatible with the truth. The truth is that Germany preferred to
drive Britain into another and hostile camp rather than have her
friendship. Germany preferred British hostility rather than relinquish
her plans for unlimited naval expansion--which she believed to be the
only means of destroying Britain's position, and with that resolution
already taken the Kaiser presented his photograph to a distinguished
Englishman with this significant remark written on it with his own hand:
"I bide my time!"
Although Britain drew the sword to defend Belgium, the supreme
issue--and the only one which occupies the German mind to-day--is
whether this country shall continue to hold the position allotted to her
by destiny and confirmed by history, or whether she is to be supplanted
by Germany. That is the one political thought which permeates German
intelligence at this moment, and no other considerations must be allowed
to darken this issue.
Professor Oncken reviews the events of the period 1900-1914 in
considerable detail, and to him the policy of _ententes_ appears to be
the main cause leading up to the world war. From this alone it is
obvious that, consciously or unconsciously, he is wrong; the _ententes_
in themselves are results, not prime causes. The prime causes leading to
these political agreements are to be found in Germany's attitude to the
rest of Europe. In a word they were defensive actions taken by the
Powers concerned, as a precaution against German aggression.
German aggression consisted in committing herself to unlimited
armaments, cherishing the irreconcilable determination to be the
strongest European power. According to her doctrine of might, everything
can be attained by the mightiest. British advances she answered with
battleships, simultaneously provoking France and Russia by increasing
her army corps. The balance of power in Europe, Germany declares to be
an out-of-date British fad, invented solely in the interests of these
islands.
In secret Germany has long been an apostate to the balance-of-power
theory; the war has caused her to drop the mask, and it was without
doubt her resolve never to submit to the chains of the balance in
Europe, which forced three other States to waive their differences and
form the Triple Entente. Simply stated this is cause and result. But
Professor Oncken maintains--and in doing so he voices German national
opinion--that the entire _entente_ policy was a huge scheme to bring
about Germany's downfall.
He goes further and proclaims that the Hague Conference (1907) was a
British trick to place the guilt of armaments on Germany's shoulders.
"England filled the world with disarmament projects so that afterwards,
full of unction, she could denounce Germany as the disturber of the
peace. At that time the Imperial Chancellor answered justly: 'Pressure
cannot be brought to bear on Germany, not even moral pressure!'"[190]
And in that sentence German obstinacy and sullen irreconcilability is
most admirably expressed.
[Footnote 190: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 495.]
Having seen that Professor Oncken has failed to recognize the prime
causes which provoked the _entente_ policy, it is not surprising to find
him equally in error when discussing the diplomatic clashes between the
rival camps. The professor calls them _Machtproben_ ("tests of power");
but how he can dare to state that these diplomatic trials of strength
were engineered by Great Britain--remains his own secret.
"King Edward's meeting with the Czar at Reval in June, 1908, was
followed by a far-reaching Macedonian reform programme, the commencement
of the division of European Turkey. What Britain had failed to induce
Germany to help her in executing, was to be attained with the sword's
point directed against Germany. And Britain proceeded in cold blood to
conjure up an era of might-struggles, which, in the island language, is
called preserving the balance of power."[191]
[Footnote 191: Ibid., p. 297.]
The trials of strength recounted by Oncken are the Bosnian crisis, the
Morocco question, and the Austro-Serbian quarrel which led to the
present war. It seems banal to have to point out that Bosnia was
unlawfully annexed by Germany's vassal--Austria; that Germany, herself,
brought Europe to the verge of war by sending the _Panther_ to Agadir;
and that the final catastrophic _Machtprobe_ was likewise provoked by
Germany's eastern vassal.
For good or evil Germany has been convinced for nearly two decades that
the balance of power in Europe was an obstacle to her world future.
Furthermore, she believed that the balance imposed fetters upon her
which only mighty armaments could break. All Germany's energies in the
domain of diplomacy have been set in motion to make the balance of power
a mere figment of the imagination.
In pursuing this end it has suited her purpose to declare all attempts
at maintaining the outward appearances of equality between the Powers of
Europe to be Machiavellian schemes against her existence; or to cite the
Kaiser's own words, "to deprive Germany of her place in the sun."
Britain's _entente_ policy was the only one calculated to preserve our
own existence, and to restrain Germany from establishing a hegemony in
Europe. She was completely convinced that the domination of Europe
belonged to her by right of mental, moral and military superiority over
her neighbours. Not in vain have Germany's educational institutions
inculcated the belief in her population that the British Empire is an
effete monstrosity with feet of clay; France a rotten, decaying empire,
and Russia a barbarian Power with no new _Kultur_ to offer Europe except
the knout.
Inspired by such conceptions, together with an astoundingly exaggerated
idea of Germany's peerlessness in order, discipline, obedience,
morality, genius and other ethical values, as well as an unshaken belief
in Germany's invincibility by land and sea--the entire nation, from
Kaiser to cobbler, has long since held that by right of these
virtues--by right of her absolute superiority over all other
nations--Germany could and must claim other rights and powers than those
which fell to her under an antiquated balance of European power.
In few words that is the gospel of _Deutschland, Deutschland, über
alles_. These are the motives which inspired Germany's naval expansion
and forbade her to accept a compromise. The same ideals led to her
endeavours to shatter the _ententes_, and it is alone the general
acceptance of this gospel, which explains the remarkable unanimity with
which the German nation has stood behind the Kaiser's Government in each
trial of strength. They have learned to consider all attempts of the
lesser peoples (Britain, France and Russia included) to maintain
themselves against the Teutonic onset as impudent attacks on sacred
Germany, which also illuminates the fact that Germans call the present
struggle--"Germany's holy, sacred war."
German statesmen were quite clear as to the national course at least
fifteen years ago. Hence they have persistently pursued a policy of no
compromise and no agreements. A compromise recognizes and perpetuates,
in part at least, the very thing which stands in the way. An agreement
with Britain in regard to naval armaments would have perpetuated British
naval supremacy, as well as recognized its necessity. Likewise an
agreement, or the shadow of an understanding with France on the question
of Alsace-Lorraine would have been a recognition of French claims. Hence
on these two questions--which are merely given as examples illustrative
of German mentality--every attempt at an agreement has been a failure.
A cardinal point in Germany's programme has been the consistent manner
in which she has tried to separate her European neighbours from Britain
in order to deal with them separately or alone. That her endeavours
ended in failure is due to the instinct of self-preservation which has
drawn Germany's opponents closer together, in exact proportion to the
increasing force of her efforts. Both in peace and war, Germany desired
and endeavoured to switch off Britain's influence in Europe.
The diplomatic battles of 1905, 1908 and 1911 were a few of the efforts
to dislodge Great Britain from her _ententes_, while her repeated
attempts to buy this country's neutrality, down to the eve of war, are
proof that Germany wanted a free hand in Europe.[192] If she had
succeeded in her purpose, it is exceedingly doubtful whether any Power
could have prevented her from exercising a free hand in the whole world.
[Footnote 192: Professor Schiemann: "Wie England eine Verständigung mit
Deutschland verhinderte" ("How England prevented an Understanding with
Germany"). Berlin, 1915; pp. 20-21: "From the very commencement Berlin
was convinced that the probability of a combined Franco-Russian attack
was exceedingly small, if England's entrance to this Germanophobe
combination could be prevented. Therefore we endeavoured to secure
England's neutrality in case of war (1909), that is, if an Anglo-German
alliance could not be achieved--an alliance which would have guaranteed
the world's peace." (Schiemann's insinuation that Germany desired an
alliance is an instance of _suggestio falsi_. Germany had decided in
1902 never to conclude an alliance with this country.--Author.)]
Coming down to the last trial of diplomatic power, we are confronted by
the immovable fact, that it too was a challenge on the part of the
Central Empires. The conditions seemed peculiarly favourable to them,
for the British Ambassador declared to the Russian Government on July
24th, 1914, that Britain would never draw the sword on a purely Serbian
question. Moreover, in the preceding year, a British minister, says
Professor Schiemann, had given what we may style a remarkable
semi-official promise that Great Britain would never go to war with
Germany.
"On February 18th, 1913, Mr. Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit,
and assured me with the greatest certainty that England would under no
circumstances wage war on Germany. A ministry which made preparations
for war, would be immediately overthrown."[193]
[Footnote 193: Ibid., p. 27. In the light of this revelation it would be
interesting to know what was the real motive which induced Mr. Trevelyan
to resign his office when war broke out. Either he was conscious of
having seriously compromised his position as a Minister of the Crown, or
he conscientiously believed that Britain was drawing the sword in an
unjust cause. Unfortunately a section of the British public accepted the
latter interpretation. In any case, Mr. Trevelyan's indiscretion affords
overwhelming proof that he had an utterly false conception of
Germany.--Author.]
Professor Schiemann affirms that his good impression was strengthened by
a visit to London during March and April, 1914, and reports a
conversation which he had with Lord Haldane when dining privately with
the latter in London. After returning to Berlin, he says he received a
letter from Lord Haldane dated April 17th, 1914, but from Schiemann's
quotation it is not evident whether the following is an extract or the
entire letter:
"It was a great pleasure to see you and to have had the full and
unreserved talk we had together. My ambition is like yours, to bring
Germany and Great Britain into relations of ever-closer intimacy and
friendship. Our two countries have a common work to do for the world as
well as for themselves, and each of them can bring to bear on this work
special endowments and qualities. May the co-operation which I believe
is now beginning become closer and closer.[194]
[Footnote 194: Lord Haldane has stated during the war that his visit to
Berlin in 1912 had filled his mind with doubt and suspicion in regard to
Germany.--Author.]
"Of this I am sure, the more wide and unselfish the nations and the
groups questions make her supreme purposes of their policies, the more
will frictions disappear, and the sooner will the relations that are
normal and healthy reappear.[195] Something of this good work has now
come into existence between our two peoples. We must see to it that the
chance of growth is given."[196]
[Footnote 195: A word or phrase appears to have been dropped in this
sentence.--Author.]
[Footnote 196: Professor Schiemann's book, pp. 27-8.]
It is not difficult to conceive that such utterances, on the part of two
British ministers, would raise hopes in the German mind, for it would be
useless to imagine that Professor Schiemann would keep them secret for
his own private edification. And it is possible that they led the German
Government into a false reckoning as to what this country would do under
certain circumstances, and so encouraged Germany into taking up an
irreconcilable attitude in the crisis of July, 1914.
Whatever Germany expected must, however, for the present, remain a
matter of conjecture. Schiemann's comment on the above letter leaves no
doubt that he expected Lord Haldane[197] to resign. "When one remembers
that Lord Haldane belonged to the inner circle of the Cabinet, and was
therefore privy to all the secret moves of Sir Edward Grey, it is hard
to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments expressed in this letter.
Besides, he did not resign like three other members of the Cabinet (Lord
Morley, Burns and Charles Trevelyan) when Sir Edward's foul play lay
open to the world on August 4th."
[Footnote 197: Lord Haldane seems to have injured his reputation both in
Great Britain and Germany. Professor Oncken designates him: "the
one-time friend of Germany, the decoy-bird of the British cabinet."
_Vide_ "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 561.]
The most regrettable side of the whole incident is that the resignation
of the above gentlemen has been proclaimed by innumerable German writers
as proof of Sir Edward Grey's double dealing, and proof that Britain is
waging an unjust war. Still, it may console these gentlemen to know that
the nation which wages war on women and children acclaims them to-day
"all honourable men," and doubtless without the Shakespearian
intonation.
By reason of the above incidents, and more of a similar nature, Germans
accuse the late Liberal Government with perfidy of the basest kind. The
author is not in the least inclined to admit the charge, but thinks,
rather, that the Government in question--individually and
collectively--was astonishingly ignorant of European conditions and
problems, especially those prevailing in the Germanic Empires.
To what a degree Germany was obsessed by the idea that Britain was
trying to strangle her by an encircling policy, is apparent in a
diplomatic document quoted by Professor Oncken. Its author's name is not
given, and it was doubtless a secret report sent to the German Foreign
Office in 1912; its freedom from bias is also questionable. Moreover, it
is probable that it belongs to the same category of documents as those
quoted in the French Yellow Book--reports intended to exercise due
influence on the mind of the Emperor.
"French diplomacy is succeeding more and more in entangling England in
the meshes of her net. The encouragement which England gives, directly
or indirectly, to French chauvinism may one day end in a catastrophe in
which English and French soldiers must pay with their blood on French
battlefields for England's encircling policy. The seeds sown by King
Edward are springing up."
Another link in the chain of proof of Britain's guilt, is found in the
documents seized by the Germans in Brussels. The enemy seems to attach
great importance to them, for they are being employed in much the same
way that parliamentary candidates use pamphlets during an election. Yet
they do not contain a particle of proof that Britain had hostile
intentions against Germany, but only confirm the presence of the German
menace.
The documents[198] in question are reports sent by the Belgian Legation
Secretaries in London, Paris and Berlin to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs in Brussels. These gentlemen held opinions identical with those
expressed again and again in German newspapers, and even in some British
and French organs. Messieurs Comte de Lalaing (London), Greindl
(Berlin), Leghait (Paris), evidently believed that the activities of the
Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente endangered the peace of Europe.
[Footnote 198: Published by the Berlin Government as supplements to the
_Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, July 29th and 31st; August 4th, 8th
and 12th, 1915.]
Further they believed the latter constellation to be the more aggressive
of the two, and formally reported these convictions to the Belgian
Government. If read as a modern edition of "Pepys' Diary" they form
entertaining literature, but by no stretch of the imagination could they
be classed as historical sources. A gentleman who reports to his
Government that King Edward took breakfast in company with M. Delcassé
and that the Press had neglected to chronicle the incident, can hardly
rank as an historian.
Moreover, it is by no means clear why the German Press should laud M.
Greindl as a gentleman of German origin. If this be true it would
probably explain everything which deserves explanation in the said
documents, and would probably account for the intimate, confidential
treatment which M. Greindl received at the hands of German officials.
German newspapers are gloating over the fact that the British Government
has not deigned to reply to these "revelations." There is really nothing
to which it can reply; three observers expressed their opinion on
contemporaneous happenings during the years 1905-1911. But a brutal
sequence of events in 1914 showed them--if they had not been convinced
during the preceding three years--that they had drawn false conclusions
from their observations.
To return to the last trial of strength between the two groups of
European Powers, it is interesting to note that Professor Oncken denies
German participation in formulating the ultimatum to Serbia, or that
Germany was aware of its contents. Germany merely left Austria a free
hand in the matter. Oncken endeavours to show that Austria's demands
were not excessive, and expresses astonishment that the opposing Powers
found them exorbitant. He does not mention the fact that a large section
of the German nation held the same opinion on July 25th, 1914.
His comment on Sir Edward Grey's efforts for peace is characteristic:
"England claims that she did everything possible to preserve the peace.
It cannot be denied that Grey made a series of mediation proposals. But
mere good-will is not everything. It is much more important to weigh
their practical importance, and the goal at which they aimed: Whether
they were intended to preserve the world's peace under conditions
honourable for all parties, or calculated to obtain for the _Entente_ a
one-sided diplomatic victory which would have established its future
predominance."[199]
[Footnote 199: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 544.]
"Grey considered the moment suitable for a mediation proposal. On the
evening of July 26th, after obtaining Russia's consent, he proposed to
the Governments of France, Germany and Italy that their London
ambassadors should meet in London to confer on a peaceful solution of
the conflict.
"The proposal was unacceptable to Austria, because it would have been an
indirect recognition on her part of Russia's interest in the conflict.
"Only those who had followed the growing intimacy of the mutual
obligations between the Entente Powers, and their organization to a
'London Centre' during the summer of 1914, are able to estimate the
role--to say nothing of Italy--which Russia's two comrades would have
played in the conference. During its course Russia would have continued
her military preparations, while Germany would have had to pledge
herself not to mobilize.
"Finally, no unprejudiced observer would dare assert that the man (Sir
Edward Grey) who was ready to transform himself at a suitable
opportunity into an ally of Russia, would have been an impartial
chairman in a conference held under the pressure of a Russian
mobilization. The more one thinks about this mediation proposal the more
convinced one becomes, that it would at least have worked for a
diplomatic victory for the Entente Powers.
"Grey put the whole machinery of the Triple Entente in motion in order
to force back Germany and Austria-Hungary along the whole line."[200]
[Footnote 200: Ibid., p. 545 _et seq_.]
An analysis of Professor Oncken's theses gives the following results:
First, Britain's efforts to preserve peace are admitted, but he fails to
mention any friendly advances to meet them. Secondly, the fundamental
principle underlying the Germanic attitude is again exposed, viz., that
Russia had no right to intervene in a question affecting the balance of
power in the Balkans and in Europe (_vide_, p. 63). Thirdly, a
diplomatic struggle was in progress along the whole line, between the
two groups of Powers.
In weighing the second point it would be wrong to assume that the
Central Empires were not fully aware of the presence of a far more vital
question behind the Austro-Serbian conflict. They knew it from the very
beginning and had already expressed threats in St. Petersburg, hoping to
achieve the same effect as in the Bosnian crisis. If Austria had been
allowed to destroy Serbia's military power the material forces of Europe
would have been seriously disturbed; the ineffectiveness of the Triple
Entente finally established, and its dissolution the inevitable
consequence.
If these considerations are correct then the statement attributed by M.
de L'Escaille (see p. 281) to Sir George Buchanan that Britain would
never draw the sword could only have served to strengthen the resolution
of the Germanic Powers in enforcing their point Germany above all
desired that the balance of power theory should be finally smashed, and
it may be safely assumed that an Austro-Serbian conflict seemed to her a
most fitting opportunity to realize her purpose.
The third point suggests two questions. Who provoked the diplomatic
conflict, and who would have benefited most by a diplomatic victory? A
reply to the first question is superfluous, and the answer to the second
is obvious from the preceding line of reasoning. Germany would have
reached the goal towards which she had striven for more than a
decade--the removal of all diplomatic hindrances to the unlimited
assertion of her will in Europe. It may even be doubted whether the Dual
Alliance would have survived the shock.
Another phase of Professor Oncken's work is the open attack on Sir
Edward Grey. Only three years ago this statesman was acclaimed in
Germany as a man of peace--_the_ man who had prevented the Balkan War
from becoming a European conflagration. To-day he is accused by the same
nation of being the originator of the world war.
Oncken[201] goes back to the year 1905 and states that Sir Edward Grey
initiated only two members of the Cabinet--Mr. Asquith and Lord
Haldane--into the details of the agreement with France, and these three
gentlemen he refers to as the "inner circle." King Edward, and
afterwards Sir Edward Grey in continuing the late King's policy,
succeeded in harnessing the _revanche idée_ and the spirit of Russian
aggression to the chariot of British Imperialism. All offers of
friendship made by this country were insincere. (The professorial
pleader does not say so, but he leaves his readers to infer that
sincerity is a German monopoly.) Concerning the British Minister's
declaration in Parliament that no secret treaty existed with France,
Oncken remarks: "The declaration was just as true formally as it was a
lie in essentials."
[Footnote 201: The authorities (?) most frequently cited by Professor
Oncken in making out his case are Messrs. Morel, Macdonald, Hardie, G.
B. Shaw and the _Labour Leader_.--Author.]
Following the development of events after the conference proposal had
been dropped, Oncken writes: "Meanwhile the Russian Government
endeavoured to persuade England's leading statesman that the opinion
prevailed in Germany and Austria, that England would remain neutral in
every case, in consequence of this delusion the Central Powers were
obdurate. England could only dispel the danger of war by destroying this
false conception, _i.e._, openly joining Russia and France.
"It is noteworthy how quickly Grey assimilated this train of thought.
Disregarding the suggestions of the British Ambassador in St.
Petersburg, he did nothing to exercise a moderating influence upon
Russia and thereby further the success of the conversations between
Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the other hand, he proceeded to take steps
which probably in his opinion, were calculated to damp the supposed
desire for war on the part of Germany. Practically, the result of all
his actions was to exercise one-sided pressure upon Germany and Austria
and simultaneously, through unmistakable declarations concerning
England's eventual attitude, to encourage Paris and St. Petersburg to
energetic measures.
"But all hopes for peace were destroyed at a single blow by Russia. On
the evening of July 30th after the conversations with Austria-Hungary
had been resumed, Sasonow increased his demands--and in truth with
England's co-operation--to such a degree that their acceptance would
have meant the complete submission of the Dual Monarchy.
"And as if this were insufficient, a few hours later, before a reply had
been received and while negotiations were proceeding in Vienna, Russia
suddenly broke off the communications with a momentous decision
(mobilization). The certainty which she had gained from the moves of
English diplomacy, that in case of war she was sure of France's support
and with it England's, turned the scale--against peace.
"That this calculation was decisive for Russia's change of front is
confirmed by a witness whose impartiality even our opponents will
admit."[202]
[Footnote 202: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," pp. 553-4.]
Professor Oncken then supports his argument with quotations from a
letter written by the Belgian Legation Secretary in St. Petersburg to
his Government. The letter was doubtless stolen while in transit by the
Berlin postal authorities. Monsieur B. de l'Escaille wrote the letter on
July 30th, despatched it by courier to Berlin, where it was posted on
the following day. The outside envelope was addressed to Madame
Costermans, 107 Rue Froissard, Bruxelles; inside was a letter addressed
to M. Darignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. German writers state that
no letters were forwarded to foreign countries after martial law was
proclaimed on July 31st (a statement which is untrue), thus it fell into
their hands.
Overwhelming importance is attached to this document by German war
writers. The more important passages of the despatch run as follows:
"The last two days have passed in the expectation of events which are
bound to follow[203] upon Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against
Serbia. The most contradictory reports were in circulation, without any
possibility of confirming their truth or falsity.
[Footnote 203: Thus the impartial witness whom Germans quote to prove
their innocence definitely states that Russia had no other course left
open to her by Austria's actions.--Author.]
"One thing is, however, indisputable, viz., that Germany has done
everything possible both here and in Vienna[204] to find a means of
avoiding a general conflict, but has only been met with the
determination of the Vienna cabinet, on the one hand, not to yield a
single step, and on the other hand Russian distrust of Vienna's
declaration that they merely intend a punitive expedition against
Serbia.
[Footnote 204: How could M. de l'Escaille know what had passed in
Vienna?--Author.]
"One must really believe that everybody wants war, and is only anxious
to postpone the declaration in order to gain time. At first England gave
out, that she would not allow herself to be drawn into a conflict. Sir
George Buchanan said that definitely. But to-day they are firmly
convinced in St. Petersburg, indeed they have received an assurance,
that England will stand by France. This support is of extraordinary
importance, and has contributed not a little to the war-party gaining
the upper hand.
"In the cabinet sitting held yesterday, there were differences of
opinion, and the mobilization order was postponed. This morning at four
o'clock mobilization was ordered.
"The Russian army feels itself strong, and is full of enthusiasm. The
reorganization of the navy is still so incomplete that it would be out
of the count in case of war. For that reason England's assurance of help
was of the greatest consequence."[205]
[Footnote 205: "Kriegs-Depeschen, 1914" ("German War-Telegrams, 1914").
Berlin, 1914; p. 96 _et seq_.]
If Professor Oncken is correct in stating that Sir Edward Grey's
measures were calculated to exercise a pressure on Germany and Austria,
then he merely confirms what this country has hitherto believed--Sir
Edward Grey acted rightly. Where else should he have exerted pressure
except in the quarter from whence a provocative, insolent challenge had
proceeded?
With regard to the assertion that Russia--stiffened by England--took a
"momentous decision" on the evening of July 30th, Professor Oncken is
guilty of distortion. The decision to mobilize had been taken earlier,
and as M. de l'Escaille wrote, was made public at four o'clock on the
morning of July 30th.
Whether Russia had increased her demands ("peremptorily sharpened" are
Oncken's words) the reader can judge for himself by comparing the two
texts.
I II
"If Austria, recognizing "If Austria agrees to
that the Austro-Serbian stay the advance of her
question has troops on Serbian territory,
assumed the character and if, recognizing
of a European question, that the Austro-Serbian
declares herself ready to dispute has assumed the
eliminate from her ultimatum character of a question
the points which of European interest, she
infringe the sovereign admits that the Great
rights of Serbia, Russia Powers shall examine
engages to stop her the satisfaction which
military preparations." Serbia might give to
(Russian Orange Book, the Austro--Hungarian
No. 60.) Government without
affecting her sovereign
rights and independence,
Russia undertakes
to maintain her waiting
attitude." (French
Yellow Book, No. 113.)
Oncken, in making this comparison, comments: "It is most remarkable that
the original formula chosen by Sasonow had been peremptorily sharpened
(_einschneidend verschärft_) on July 31st at the request of the British
Ambassador. This interference by England in the formulation of the
proposal must arouse the gravest doubt regarding the peaceful tendencies
of England's policy. Sasonow had every reason to thank Grey 'for the
firm, amicable tone which he has employed in his pourparlers with
Germany and Austria.'"[206]
[Footnote 206: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 553. Oncken's
quotation in the last lines taken from the Russian Orange Book, No. 69.]
Sir Edward Grey had proposed five days earlier (July 26th) that all
military measures should cease pending a settlement. Hence the
introduction of this clause is not a new demand. Moreover, in the
meantime Russia and Germany--in spite of the latter's denial--had
commenced to mobilize; Austria had mobilized and commenced hostilities
against Serbia. Thus there were far more urgent reasons to include the
cessation of military measures on July 31st than before. Lastly, it was
the only acceptable pledge of Austrian sincerity which Russia could
accept. Whether the formula would have met with Austria's approval
cannot be determined, for Austria was saved from what Oncken terms
"complete submission" by Germany's ultimatum to Russia, despatched on
the same day, July 31st.
It is impossible to get rid of the suspicion that Germany thought
Austria might accept the proposal; in any case, Germany deliberately
shattered the last chance of a settlement by her demand that Russia
should demobilize.
If Germany outwardly worked for peace in St. Petersburg, as M. de
l'Escaille states, it would be quite in harmony with the methods of
German diplomacy. But, as the same gentleman testifies: "Austria would
not yield a step"--the conclusion must be drawn that Germany had ordered
her to stand firm. Austria did not yield a single inch, and so it is a
matter of indifference as to the sincerity or otherwise of Germany's
peace endeavours.
Oncken further mentions Britain's refusal to remain neutral in return
for a promise that French territory should not be annexed, but he omits
the question of French colonies. His analysis of the Belgian question
deserves quotation: "Grey was seeking an excuse for war, and he found
one in the question of Belgian neutrality. It was just such a reason as
he required in order to carry away the Cabinet, Parliament and public
opinion. And since then that reason has been much discussed, accompanied
by appeals to international law and humanity, by England's and the
world's Press.
"But there is more than one irrefutable proof at hand, to show that this
reason for war, was merely a veil covering the real ones. Anticipating
Grey's intentions, before the German Government had finally declared
themselves on the subject,[207] Prince Lichnowsky put the question to
Sir Edward Grey on August 1st, as to whether England would remain
neutral if Germany undertook to respect the neutrality of Belgium.
[Footnote 207: Britain had asked Germany a day or two before, whether
she would respect Belgium's neutrality.--Author.]
"Grey, however, refused to give the pledge with which he could--if he
was really concerned about Belgium--have spared that unhappy land its
terrible fate. But by these means the trump card of Belgian neutrality
had been taken from our opponent's hand in advance. Yet Grey actually
considered it permissible to conceal this offer from the British
Cabinet. Yes, he dared even more.
"After the matter had been mentioned by Ramsay Macdonald in the _Labour
Leader_, Keir Hardie asked a question in the House of Commons on August
27th, as to whether Lichnowsky's proposal had been submitted to the
Cabinet, and why the same had not been made the basis of peaceful
negotiations with Germany. Grey made a weak attempt to discriminate
between official proposals made by a government, and a private question
asked by an ambassador.
"When the inconvenient questioner asked for further information, he was
cried down. The Oxford theologian Conybeare gained the impression from
this Parliamentary incident: 'That all Sir Edward Grey's answers to Mr.
Keir Hardie's questions are examples of _suppressio veri_ and _suggestio
falsi_.' His later revocation of this judgment does not alter its value
as objective evidence.
"After Grey's refusal, Prince Lichnowsky pressed him to formulate
England's conditions for her neutrality. At the same time the Ambassador
increased his offer of July 29th by proposing to guarantee the integrity
of France and her colonies in return for England's neutrality. Grey
suppressed this proposal too before the Cabinet, as any negotiation on
this basis would have thwarted his pre-conceived plans. Only an
immovable determination for war can explain this behaviour.
"Even before he could assume that Belgian neutrality was in danger, he
pledged English policy to the wishes of France. On the afternoon of the
same August 1st, he gave the French Ambassador--who was anxiously
pressing for a decision--reason to believe that he would be able to give
a formal promise on the following day. At the Cabinet meeting on August
2nd--the same in which he suppressed Germany's offer!--he got a motion
accepted empowering him to assure Cambon that if Germany attacked the
French coast, England would intervene."
It is necessary to return to Germany's proposal in regard to Belgian
neutrality. In simple language it means that Germany wanted to sell her
pledged word, given in 1839, for British neutrality in 1914. In view of
the fact that Professor Oncken looked upon this as a legitimate bargain,
one wonders in silence at his standard of morality and honour. Is he not
a scoundrel who first gives his word of honour and afterwards tries to
strike a bargain with the same? Stripped of all verbiage that is
Germany's proposal in its naked immorality, and the author chronicles
with pleasure that the House of Commons cried down even its discussion.
It recalls to his memory the fact, that the Reichstag--Germany's highest
legislative assembly--cheered to the echo Bethmann-Hollweg's
announcement that German armies, in violating the dictates of moral and
international law, by breaking Germany's word of honour, had occupied
Luxembourg and entered Belgium. The two incidents are drastic, concrete
illustrations of the gulf which separates British and German conceptions
of right and wrong.
Furthermore, there are two questions of a disciplinary nature arising
out of this incident which "the man in the street" has a perfect right
to raise. Assuming that Sir Edward Grey exercised his discretion and
concealed the "infamous proposal" from the Cabinet, which of his
colleagues afterwards betrayed the fact and from what source--German or
English--did he obtain his information?
Full knowledge on these points would probably be of great assistance in
destroying the "trail of the serpent" (_i.e._, German influence and
intrigues) in the political and national life of Great Britain.
Professor Oncken praises German disinterestedness in offering to
guarantee the integrity of French continental and colonial territories
in case Germany gained a victory in the war. Sir Edward Grey's refusal
to guarantee British neutrality in return for this promise, the
professor considers supreme and final proof that Britain was bent on
war. The nation has rightly approved of this policy and the point need
not be argued in this place; but Professor Oncken in the seclusion of
his German study would do well to weigh two problems:
If Germany had gained a victory--and in August, 1914, she was absolutely
convinced that France and Russia would succumb if they faced her
alone--then Germany would have obtained the long sought upper and "free
hand" in Europe. What earthly powers could have compelled her in that
moment to respect her promise in regard to French territories? Certainly
Germany's sense of honour could not be counted upon to do so.
The second problem refers to the bull and the china-shop. Presuming that
the bull could talk, would Professor Oncken advise the guardian of the
proverbial china-shop to accept the bull's promise to respect the
_status quo ante_ of his property, before letting him (the bull) run
amock amongst the china?
Lastly, readers are advised when studying the German "case" to remember
that Germany never offered to respect the integrity of French
territories _and_, the neutrality of Belgium. Although German
writers--with malice aforethought--seek to give that impression. Yet,
had this combined offer been made, the author submits that in spite of
such a promise, it would still have been ruinous to British interests to
stand aside and see Germany gain the upper and "free hand" in Europe.
Having obtained that, all else would have followed to the desire of
Germany's heart.