THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND GERMANY'S ANNEXATION PROPAGANDA
"Afterthoughts" is the term which would perhaps designate most concisely
the section of German war literature treating of Belgium's violated
neutrality. Should that designation appear unfitting, then the author
has only one other to suggest--"whitewash."
In order to apprehend clearly the method and aims concealed beneath the
"afterthoughts," readers must bear in mind that every attempt to protest
against the annexation of Belgium by Germany is prohibited by the German
censor. The Social Democratic organs emphasize the fact almost daily
that they are not permitted to print anything contrary to the principle
of annexation.
On the other hand, numerous writers are allowed to make a most extensive
propaganda by suggesting that annexation is necessary in the interests
of their racial-brothers the Flemings. By order of the German Government
a geographical description of the country has been published,[132] in
which every detail of Belgium's wealth in minerals, agriculture, and so
on, is described, with no other possible purpose than the desire to whet
German Michael's appetite.
[Footnote 132: "Belgien, Land und Leute," Berlin, 1915.]
All at once Germany has become suspiciously interested in Belgian
history, in the domestic quarrels between Walloons and Flemings, in the
alleged oppression of the latter (Low Germans) by the former, and
propose for themselves the part of liberator and saviour for Flemish
culture. They have discovered, among other things, that Belgium was
merely a paper State, a diplomatic invention, an experiment, and that no
"Belgian" people has ever existed, but rather two hostile elements were
packed under the same roof against their will by the Conference of
London--the said roof bears the name Belgium!
According to a good German-Swiss[133] the Belgians have no national
feelings, no patriotism, and have never had a Fatherland. If a serious
writer can make such statements after the Belgians have defended their
native country so heroically, one naturally wonders whether Herr Blocher
is sane, or merely a paid agent of the German authorities. In his work
he denies every and any intention to justify or condemn either Germany
or Belgium, and then proceeds to blacken the latter's character by
quoting every Belgian utterance which may be interpreted as anti-German.
These expressions lead him to the remarkable conclusion that Belgians
had already violated their own neutrality!
[Footnote 133: "Belgische Neutralität," by Eduard Blocher. Zurich,
1915.]
Blocher states that his work is only intended to prove that Switzerland
has nothing to fear from Germany's precedent in invading Belgium. But he
never mentions Belgium's maritime interests, Antwerp and the extensive
seacoast on the North Sea. He is oblivious to the fact that Germany's
desire to possess these was the sole motive for precipitating war and
invading Belgium. To Germany the coast of Belgium is the door to the
world and world domination. Switzerland does not possess such a door,
and therefore had nothing to fear from her powerful neighbour; but if
the Allies are unable to bar this door to Germany's aggressive schemes,
then the time is not far distant when Germany would remember that she
has "brothers" within Swiss frontiers and insist upon their entrance
into the great Teutonic sheepfold--just as her most earnest desire at
present is to drive the "lost" Flemings back to their parent race.
Among the many phrases which Germans have coined to describe Belgium the
following occur: bastard, eunuch and hermaphrodite. According to the
German conception of a "State," Belgium is an unnatural monstrosity,
from which one draws the natural conclusion that Germany intends to
remove it from the domain of earthly affairs.
On the whole, German writers admit the existence of Belgian neutrality,
and also Germany's pledge to respect it. The three most serious writers
on the subject are, Dr. Reinhard Frank,[134] professor of jurisprudence
in Munich University; Dr. Karl Hampe,[135] professor in Heidelberg; and
Dr. Walter Schoenborn,[136] also a professor in Heidelberg University.
[Footnote 134: Reinhard Frank: "Die belgische Neutralität." Tubingen,
1915.]
[Footnote 135: Karl Hampe: "Belgien's Vergangenheit und Gegenwart."
Berlin, 1915.]
[Footnote 136: Walther Schoenborn: "Die Neutralität Belgien's." This is
an appendix to a large work written by twenty university professors,
entitled "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," published by B.G. Teubner,
Leipzig and Berlin, 1915.]
The nearer examination of these three works must be premised by two
important considerations. Firstly, the three professors ignore the fact
that Germany was a menace to Belgium, and make no mention of German
aspirations for a coastline on or near the English Channel. Holland and
Belgium form a twentieth century "Naboth's vineyard," on which the
German Ahab has cast avaricious glances for upwards of forty years.
A casual acquaintance with Pan-German and German naval and military
literature during the same period, affords overwhelming proof of this
powerful current in German nationalism. If Naboth consulted strong
neighbours as to necessary precautions against Ahab's plans for
obtaining the vineyard, then Naboth acted as a wise man, and the only
regret to-day is that the "strong neighbours" only offered Naboth
assurances and words, instead of deeds. In other words Great Britain did
nothing because, as Lord Haldane expressed it, the Liberal Cabinet was
"afraid" (!) to offend Germany and precipitate a crisis.
Secondly, the three professors, like all others of their class in the
Fatherland, have sworn an oath on taking office not to do anything,
either by word or deed, detrimental to the interests of the German State
of which they are _official_ members. An ordinary German in writing on
Germany may be under the subjective influences of his national feelings,
but a German who has taken the "Staatseid" (oath to the State) cannot be
objective in national questions and interests--his oath leaves only one
course open to him, and any departure from that course may mean the loss
of his daily bread.
The author has the greatest respect for the achievements of German
professors in the domains of science and abstract thought; by those
achievements they have deservedly become famous, but in all judgments
where Germany's interests are concerned they are bound hand and
foot.[137]
[Footnote 137: Towards the close of 1913 I had a conversation with half
a dozen Germans (average age twenty-five) in Erlangen Gymnasium (State
Secondary School); they were candidates in training for the teaching
profession, all university men. I listened patiently to their diatribes
concerning the perfidy of English Statesmen, and then pointed out,
giving chapter and verse in German biographies, that Bismarck's record
was exceedingly tortuous; the forgery of the Ems telegram was given as
an instance.
A few weeks later I met the vice-principal of the school at a private
party; this gentleman was a good friend of mine. He reminded me of the
above conversation, and gave me a friendly warning never again to make
such statements to my pupils. The candidates had talked it over, and
although they had provoked the discussion, proposed to have me reported
to the Minister for Education for uttering such opinions. The
vice-principal had intervened and prevented the _Denunziation_.
If a professor of history in a German university expressed any opinion
in his academic lectures unfavourable to modern Germany, he would be
immediately _denunziert_ to the State authorities by his own students.
Should he publish such opinions in book form, of course the process of
cashiering him would be simpler. Germans do not desire the truth so far
as their own country is concerned; they do not will the truth; they will
_Deutschland über alles_, and all information, knowledge, or propaganda
contrary to their will is prohibited. If space permitted I could mention
numerous cases in which famous professors have been treated like
schoolboys by the German State--their stern father and master.]
When a German conscript enters the army he takes the _Fahneneid_ (oath
on, and to, the flag), which binds him to defend the Fatherland with
bayonet and bullet. In like manner it may be said that German professors
are bound by the _Staatseid_ either to discreet silence, or to employ
their intellectual pop-guns in defending Germany. That these pop-guns
fire colossal untruths, innuendoes, word-twistings, and such like
missiles, giving out gases calculated to stupefy and blind honest
judgments, will become painfully evident in the course of our
considerations.
That any and every German obeys the impulse to defend his country is
just and praiseworthy; but in our search for truth we are compelled to
note the fact that German professors are merely intellectual soldiers
fighting for Germany. Without departing from the truth by one jot or
tittle, readers may even call them "outside clerks" of the German
Foreign Office, or the "ink-slingers" under the command of the German
State.
These premises have been laid down _in extenso_ because some fifty books
will be discussed in this work, which emanate from German universities.
A neutral reader may retort: You also are not impartial, for you are an
Englishman! Having anticipated the question, the author ventures to give
an answer. If he could make a destructive attack on Britain's
policy--the attack would be made without the least hesitation. Such an
attack, if proved to the hilt, would bring any man renown, and in the
worst case no harm. But if a German professor launched an attack, based
upon incontrovertible facts, against Bethmann-Hollweg and Germany's
policy, that professor would be ruined in time of peace and in all
probability imprisoned, or sent to penal servitude in time of war.
Nothing which the present author could write would ever tarnish the
reputation of German professors as men of science, but in the narrower
limits as historians of the Fatherland and propagandists of the
_Deutschland-über-alles_ gospel they are tied with fetters for the like
of which we should seek in vain at the universities of Great Britain or
America. It would be in the interests of truth and impartiality if every
German professor who writes on the "Causes of the World War," "England's
Conspiracy against Germany," "The Non-Existence of Belgian Neutrality,"
and similar themes, would print the German _Staatseid_ on the front page
of his book. The text of that oath would materially assist his readers
in forming an opinion regarding the trustworthiness and impartiality of
the professor's conclusions.
Professor Frank commences his historical sketch of Belgian neutrality
with the year 1632, when Cardinal Richelieu proposed that Belgium should
be converted into an independent republic. Doubtless the desire to found
a buffer State inspired Richelieu, just as it did the representatives of
Prussia, Russia, France, Austria and England when they drew up the
treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality in perpetuity, at the
Conference of London, 1839.
But an additional motive actuated the diplomatists of 1839, viz.,
Belgium was henceforth to be the corner-stone supporting the structure
commonly designated "the balance of power in Europe."
An objection has been made to the validity of the treaty signed in
London, viz., England herself did not consider it reliable and binding,
or she would not have asked for, and obtained, pledges from both Prussia
and France to respect Belgian neutrality in 1870. Another objection is
the claim that the German Empire, founded in 1870, was not bound by the
Prussian signature attached to a treaty in 1839. Other writers have
endeavoured to show that the addition of African territory (Congo Free
State) to Belgium changed the political status of that country, exposed
it to colonial conflicts with two great colonial Powers, and thus
tacitly ended the state of neutrality.
Each of the professors in question overrides these objections, and Frank
remarks, p. 13: "Lawyers and diplomatists refuse, and rightly so, to
accept this view." Again, p. 14.: "There is no international document in
existence which has cancelled Belgian neutrality."
Germany's alleged violation of her promise to regard Belgium as a
neutral country is justified on quite other grounds. Belgium had herself
violated her neutrality by a secret alliance with France and England.
Frank argues that a neutral State has certain duties imposed upon it in
peace time, and in support of his contention quotes Professor Arendt
(Louvain University, 1845), who wrote: "A neutral State may not conclude
an alliance of defence and offence, by which in case of war between two
other States it is pledged to help one of them. Yet it is free and
possesses the right to form alliances to protect its neutrality and in
its own defence, but such defensive alliances can only be concluded
after the outbreak of war."
Another authority quoted to support his point is Professor Hilty
(University of Bern, 1889). "A neutral State may not conclude a treaty
_in advance_ to protect its own neutrality, because by this means a
protectorate relationship would be created."
Frank continues (p. 21): "Hence Belgian neutrality was guaranteed in the
interests of the balance of power in Europe, and I have already pointed
out that the same idea prevailed when the barrier-systems of 1815 and
1818 were established.
"Considering the matter from this point of view, the falsity of modern
Belgium's interpretation at once becomes apparent. According to Belgian
official opinion her neutrality obligations only came into force in the
event of war, and therefore could not be violated during peace. But this
balance of power was to be maintained, above all in time of peace, and
might not be disturbed by any peaceful negotiations whatever, especially
if these were calculated to manifest themselves in either advantageous
or prejudicial form, in the event of war.
"In this category we may place the surrender of territory. No impartial
thinker can deny that the cession of Antwerp to England would have been
a breach of neutrality on the part of Belgium, even if it had occurred
in peace time. The same is true for the granting of occupation rights,
and landing places for troops, or for the establishment of a harbour
which might serve as a basis for the military or naval operations of
another State.
"Moreover, it is unnecessary to exert one's imagination in order to
discover 'peaceful negotiations' which are incompatible with permanent
neutrality, for history offers us two exceedingly instructive examples.
When a tariff union between France and Belgium was proposed in 1840,
England objected because the plan was not in accord with Belgian
neutrality. Again in 1868, when the Eastern Railway Company of France
sought to obtain railway concessions in Belgium, it was the latter
country which refused its consent, and in the subsequent parliamentary
debate the step was designated an act of neutrality."
From this extract it is evident that Professor Frank has undermined his
own case. Belgian neutrality was intended by the great powers to be the
corner-stone of the European balance of power. During the last forty
years Germany's carefully meditated increase of armaments on land and
sea threatened to dislodge the corner-stone. When the Conference of
London declared Belgium to be a permanently neutral country, there was
apparent equality of power on each side of the stone. In 1870 the
Franco-German war showed that the balance of power was already disturbed
at this corner of the European edifice. Still Germany's pledged word was
considered sufficient guarantee of the _status quo_.
Since 1870 the potential energy on the German side of the corner-stone
has increased in an unprecedented degree, and this huge energy has been
consistently converted into concrete military and naval forces. This
alteration in the potential _status quo ante_ has been partly the result
of natural growth, but in a still greater degree, to Germany's doctrine
that it is only might which counts.
Another German professor[138] had defined the position in a sentence:
"Germany is a boiler charged to danger-point with potential energy. In
such a case is it a sound policy to try to avert the possibility of an
explosion by screwing down all its safety-valves?" Recognizing that
Belgian neutrality has existed for many years past solely on Germany's
good-will, it became the right and urgent duty of the other signatory
powers to endeavour to strengthen the corner-stone. Germany absolutely
refused to relax in any way the pressure which her "potential energy"
was exercising at this point, therefore it was necessary above all for
France and Great Britain to bolster up the threatened corner.
[Footnote 138: Hermann Oncken (Heidelberg), in the _Quarterly Review_,
October, 1913. The author of the article charges Great Britain with
screwing down the valves, which is a deliberate distortion of the truth.
Britain has always opened her markets free to German goods and admitted
the same privileges to her rival--so far as these did not run contrary
to established rights--in all parts of the world. With regard to
territorial expansion a treaty had been drawn up between the two Powers
and was ready to be signed just when war broke out. That treaty would
have afforded Germany immense opportunities for expansion, but not at
the expense of Europe. Germany, however, desired European expansion, and
according to her accepted teaching, the fate of extra-European
territories will be decided on the battlefields of Europe.]
The former Power could have achieved this purpose by building a chain of
huge fortresses along her Belgian frontier. Why this precautionary
measure was never taken is difficult to surmise, but had it been taken,
Germany would have ascribed to her neighbour plans of aggression--and
declared war.
Great Britain could have restored the balance by creating an army of
several millions. Lord Haldane has announced that the late Liberal
Government was "afraid" to do this, although the fear of losing office
may have been greater than their fear for Germany.
The measures which England did take were merely non-binding
conversations with the military authorities of France and Belgium; the
making of plans for putting a British garrison of defence on Belgian
territory in the event of the latter's neutrality being violated or
threatened; and the printing of books describing the means of
communication in Belgium.[139]
[Footnote 139: "Belgium, Road and River Reports," prepared by the
General Staff, Vol. I., 1912; II., 1913; III. & IV., 1914. Copies of
this work have been seized by the Germans in Belgium, and capital is
being made of the incident to prove a violation of Belgian neutrality.
If the British General Staff had nothing better to do than to compile
guide-books to Belgium for a non-existent British army, it appears
merely amusing. But if the late Liberal Government believed that
Germany's potential energy could be prevented from breaking through into
Belgian territory by a barricade of guide-books--it was a lamentable
error of judgment. On the whole we are forced to call it a tragical
irony, that the only defences which Belgium possessed against the _furor
teutonicus_--excepting the Belgian army--were a "scrap of paper" and a
barricade of the same material.]
As a result of these measures, Belgium stands charged by Germany with
having broken her own neutrality, and German writers are naively asking
why Belgium did not give the same confidence to Germany which she gave
to England. The German mind knows quite well, that in building strategic
railways to the Belgian frontier she betrayed the line of direction
which the potential energy was intended to take, when the burst came.
Unofficially Germany has long since proclaimed her intention to invade
Belgium; it was an "open secret."
The _denouement_ of August 4th, 1914, when Belgian neutrality was
declared a "scrap of paper,"[140] was not the inspiration of a moment,
nor a decision arrived at under the pressure of necessity, but the
result of years of military preparation and planning. It had been
carefully arranged that the boiler should pour forth its energy through
the Belgian valve.
[Footnote 140: This famous phrase was employed as far back as 1855 by a
Belgian Minister in the House of Deputies, Brussels. M. Lebeau in
pleading for greater military preparation used these words: "History has
shown what becomes of neutralities which were guaranteed, by what may be
termed a 'scrap of paper.'"]
Or to draw another comparison, it is a modern variety of the wolf and
the lamb fable, with this difference: the wolf has first of all
swallowed the lamb, and now excuses himself by asserting that the
traitorous wretch had muddied the stream.
Belgians were painfully aware of the danger threatening them, and would
have made greater efforts to protect themselves, had not their own
Social Democrats resisted every military proposal. As the matter stands
to-day, however, all the efforts which Belgium did make, are classed by
Germany as intrigues of the Triple Entente, threatening her (Germany's)
existence, and all the horrors which have fallen upon this gallant
"neutral" country the German Pecksniff designates "Belgium's
Atonement."[141] It is to be feared that sooner or later, unless
Germany's military pride and unbounded greed of her neighbour's goods
can be checked, German professors will be engaged in the scientific task
of proving that the waters of the upper Rhine are unpalatable because
the lamb residing in Holland has stirred up mud in the lower reaches of
the same river!
[Footnote 141: _Belgien's Sübne_, the title of a chapter describing the
desolation and havoc of war, in a book entitled "Mit dem Hauptquartier
nach Westen," by Heinrich Binder. Berlin, 1915.]
Belgium knew that England and France had no other interest than the
maintenance of her neutrality. Belgium saw and felt, where the storm
clouds lowered, and probably sought or accepted advice from those Powers
who wished to perpetuate both the territorial integrity and neutrality
of Belgium. Germany's afterthought on the point is: "It was Belgium's
duty to protect her neutrality, and she owed this duty to all States
alike in the interests of the balance of power--a conception to which
she owes her existence.
"She was bound to treat all the signatory Powers in the same manner, but
she failed to do so, in that she permitted one or two of them to gain an
insight into her system of defence. By this means she afforded the
States admitted to her confidence, certain advantages which they could
employ for their own ends at any moment.
"By allowing certain of the great Powers to see her cards, Belgium was
not supporting the European balance, but seriously disturbing it. Even
Belgium's Legation Secretary in Berlin had warned his Government
concerning the political dangers arising out of intimacy with England.
By revealing her system of defence to England, Belgium destroyed its
intrinsic value and still more--she violated her international
obligations."[142]
[Footnote 142: Professor Frank's work, pp. 29-30.]
Considering that the British army at that time was small, that Britain
had no idea of annexing Belgian territory, one naturally wonders how the
value of Belgium's defence system had been depreciated by conversations
with British officers. In effect, Germany maintains that Belgium should
have behaved as a nonentity, which is contrary to all reason.
The Berlin Government has always treated her small neighbour as a
sovereign State, equal in quality, though not in power, to any State in
the world. If Germany recognized Belgium's sovereignty, why should not
England do the same, and, above all, why had Belgium no right to think
of her self-preservation, when she knew the danger on her eastern
frontier grew more menacing month by month?
Frank concludes his dissertation with his opinion of England and quotes
Thucydides, V., 105, as the best applicable characterization of the
British with which he is acquainted. "Among themselves, indeed, and out
of respect for their traditional constitution, they prove to be quite
decent. As regards their treatment of foreigners, a great deal might be
said, yet we will try to express it in brief. Among all whom we know
they are the most brazen in declaring what is good to be agreeable, and
what is profitable to be just."
The very offence which Germany accuses England of having premeditated,
she committed herself many years before. When France seemed to threaten
Belgium's existence, King Leopold I. concluded a secret treaty[143] with
the king of Prussia, whereby the latter was empowered to enter Belgium
and occupy fortresses in case of France becoming dangerous. The French
danger passed away, and its place was taken by a more awful menace--the
pressure of German potential energy; and when Belgium in turn opened her
heart (this is the unproved accusation which Germany makes
to-day--Author) to England, then she has violated her neutrality and
undermined the balance of power.[144] There is even a suspicion that
Leopold II. renewed this treaty with Germany in 1890, in spite of the
fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince de Chimay, in an
official speech denied its existence.
[Footnote 143: Germans love anything which is "secret."
"Geheimniskrämerei" ("affectation of mysteriousness and secrecy") is a
national and individual characteristic of the German people.--Author.]
[Footnote 144: Karl Hampe: "Belgiens Vergangenheit und Gegenwart"
("Belgium Past and Present"), p. 49.]
Professor Schoenborn's essay on Belgian neutrality is the least
satisfactory exposition of the three professorial effusions; it is no
credit to a man of learning, and is merely the work of an incapable
partisan trying to make a bad cause into a good one. Schoenborn
commences[145] with the customary German tactics by stating that
Bethmann-Hollweg's "scrap-of-paper" speech, and von Jagow's (German
Secretary of State) explanations to the Belgian representative in Berlin
on August 3rd, 1914, are of no importance in deciding the justice of
Germany's violation of her pledged word. One is led to inquire, When is
a German utterance--whether given in the Reichstag by the Chancellor or
on paper in the form of a treaty--final and binding?
[Footnote 145: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg" ("Germany and the World
War"), pp. 566-8.]
Subterfuges, insinuations, distortions, even brazen falsehoods, are
scattered throughout German war literature, thicker "than Autumnal
leaves in Vallombrosa's brook." It is to be feared that just as Germans
have lied for a century to prove that the English were annihilated at
the battle of Waterloo, and for over forty years to show that Bismarck
was not a forger, so they will lie for centuries to come in order to
prove that the invasion of Belgium was not what Bethmann-Hollweg called
it, a "breach of international law."
Like his _confrères_, Herr Schoenborn admits that Germany was pledged to
respect the neutrality of Belgium, but the said neutrality was
non-existent, which appears somewhat paradoxical. Yet this is not the
least logical part of his case. "The passage of German troops through
Belgium was indispensable in the interests of the preservation of the
German Empire. A successful resistance to the annihilation-plans which
our enemies had wrought for our downfall seemed possible only by this
means. The Government regretted that, by so doing, we should commit a
formal infringement of the rights of a third State (Belgium), and
promised to make all possible compensation for the transgression.
"The judicial point of view which influenced the decision of the German
Government is perhaps, best illustrated by a parallel taken from the
ordinary laws of the country: A forester (game-keeper) is attacked by a
poacher, and in that same moment perceives a second poacher bearing a
gun at full-cock, creeping into a strange house in order to obtain a
better shot at the forester. Just as he is about to enter the house the
forester breaks the door open and thus forestalls him--in order to
surprise and overcome him. The forester is justified in taking this
step, but must make good all damage resulting to the householder."[146]
[Footnote 146: Ibid., p. 575.]
The instance holds good in the land of _Kultur_, where law and order
affords so little protection to a civilian and his property; but in
countries where laws are based upon culture the author believes that the
forester would receive condign punishment for breaking into another
man's house, no matter under what pretext. Unconsciously the learned
professor is humorous when he compares Germany to a gamekeeper and
Russia and France to poachers; but he is naïve to a degree of stupidity,
when he makes France carry a weapon fully prepared to shoot the
forester.
We will consult another German authority to show that France's weapons
were not at full-cock.
"During the last ten years France has given special attention to the
fortresses on the German frontier. But those facing Belgium have been so
carelessly equipped that we see clearly to what a degree she relied upon
her neighbour. The forts are in the same condition as they were twenty
or thirty years ago. As some of these fortifications were built fifty
years ago, various points on the frontier are strategically, absolutely
useless.
"A typical example of this, is Fort les Ayvelles, which is intended to
protect the bridges and Meuse crossings south of Mézières-Charleville;
the fort was levelled to the ground by 300 shots from our 21-centimetre
howitzers. It was built in 1878 and armed with forty cannon; of these
the principal weapons consisted of two batteries each containing six
9-centimetre cannon, which, however, were cast in the years 1878-1880,
and in the best case could only carry 4,000 yards. Then there were some
12-centimetre bronze pieces cast in 1884, and a few five-barrelled
revolver cannon.
"Besides these there were old howitzers from the year 1842;
muzzle-loaders with the characteristic pyramids of cannon ball by the
side, such as are often used in Germany at village festivals or to fire
a salute. The fort itself was a perfect picture of the obsolete and
out-of-date. Apart from the crude, primitive equipment, the organization
must have been faulty indeed.
"On the road leading up to the fort we saw some tree-branches which had
been hurriedly placed as obstacles, and higher up wire entanglements had
been commenced at the last moment. At least one battery was useless, for
the field of fire was cut off by high trees, and at the last minute the
garrison had tried to place the guns in a better position.
"Our artillery which fired from a north-westerly position displayed a
precision of aim which is rare. One battery had had nearly every gun put
out of action by clean hits. In several cases we saw the barrel of the
gun yards away from its carriage, and only a heap of wheels, earth,
stones, etc., marked the place where it had stood.
"Another proof of the excellent work done by the artillery, was the fact
that hardly a shell had struck the earth in the 500 yards from the
battery to the fort. After the former had been disposed of, the
artillery fire was concentrated on the fort, which was reduced to a heap
of rubbish. The stonework and the high walls--yards thick--had tumbled
to pieces like a child's box of bricks.
"A garrison of 900 men had been placed in this useless cage, and they
had fled almost at the first shot. Instead of putting these men in
trenches, their superiors had put them at this 'lost post' and allowed
them to suffer the moral effects of a complete, inevitable defeat.
"Near the fort I saw the grave of its commander, the unfortunate man who
had witnessed the hopeless struggle. He lived to see his men save their
lives in wild flight--and then ended his own."[147]
[Footnote 147: Heinrich Binder: "Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen," pp.
107-9.]
Here we have a sorry picture of the poacher whom Germany feared so much.
The world knows now that neither Britain, France nor Russia were
prepared for war, which excludes the probability that they desired or
provoked a conflict. But Germany knew that, and much more, in the month
of July, 1914. Bethmann-Hollweg when addressing the Reichstag drew a
terrifying picture of French armies[148] standing ready to invade
Belgium, but he knew full well that the necessary base-fortresses were
lacking on the Franco-Belgian frontier.
[Footnote 148: Richard Grasshoff in his work "Belgien's Schuld"
("Belgium's Guilt"), p. 14 _et seq_., reproduces several confessions
alleged to have been made by French soldiers, prisoners of war in
Germany, stating that they entered Belgian territory on July 31st, 1914.
At present it is impossible to test the value of this evidence. Cf. p.
151.]
As regards the alleged plans which Germany's enemies had made to
annihilate Germany, it will be necessary for Professor Schoenborn to
prove that the Entente Powers had: (1.) Caused the murder in Serajewo;
(2.) Despatched the ultimatum to Serbia; (3.) Prepared themselves for
war. Until he proves these three points the world will continue to
believe that it was Germany alone who cherished "annihilation-plans."
Schoenborn mentions too, Britain's refusal to promise her neutrality
even if Germany respected the neutrality of Belgium. This offer was made
to Sir Edward Grey, who declined it. According to Professor Schoenborn
Germany's final decision to invade Belgium was only taken after that
refusal. It is a striking example of the immorality which prevails both
in Germany's business and political life. She gave her solemn pledge in
1839, yet endeavoured to sell the same pledge in 1914--for Britain's
neutrality!
The author once made an agreement with a German, but soon found that the
arrangement was ignored and wrote to the person in question: "You have
employed our arrangement merely as a means for making further incursions
into my rights."
That summarizes the Teutonic conception of a treaty, either private or
national. It is only a wedge with which to broaden the way for a further
advance. Usually a man signs an agreement with an idea of finality, and
looks forward to freedom from further worry in the matter. Not so the
German; with him it is an instrument to obtain, or blackmail, further
concessions; and as individuals, instead of occupying their thoughts and
energies in the faithful fulfilment of its terms, they plot and plan in
the pursuit of ulterior advantages.
Heidelberg's great scholar seems to have had doubts concerning his
simile of the gamekeeper; hence in his last footnote he makes the
innocuous remark: "Because the house-breaking gamekeeper fired the first
shot, it is not usual to draw the conclusion that the poacher had only
defensive intentions" (p. 590).
All in all, Professor Schoenborn's attempt at partisanship is a
miserable failure, and as an academic thesis it is doubtful whether the
faculty of law in any German university would grant a student a degree
for such a crude effort.
Various facts indicate Germany's intention to annex Belgium, if not the
entire country, then those districts in which Flemish is spoken. Germany
has suddenly remembered that the Flemings are a Low German people and
that they have been "oppressed" by the Walloons. The hypocrisy of the
plea becomes evident when we recall German (including Austrian)
oppression of the Poles, Slavs and Hungarians.
One writer[149] has even endeavoured to prove that the House of Hesse
has a legitimate historical claim to the province of Brabant. But as the
following extracts will show, there is method in this madness. No pains
are being spared to stir up racial feeling between the two peoples
(Flemings and Walloons) who form King Albert's subjects. All the
internal differences are being dished up to convince the inhabitants of
Flanders that they will be much better off under the German heel.[150]
[Footnote 149: Dr. Karl Knetsch: "Des Hauses Hessen Ansprüche auf
Brabant" ("The House of Hesse's Claims to Brabant"). Marburg, 1915.]
[Footnote 150: The _Münchner Neueste Nachrichten_ for September 19th,
1915, contains a long account of a petition which was presented to Herr
von Hissing, General Governor of Belgium, by a branch of the General
Union of the Netherlands. The branch society is in Lierre (a town
occupied by the Germans), and the petition is a statement of Flemish
national and language aspirations. Unfortunately the document in
question "makes a bitter attack on Franco-Belgian endeavours to rob the
Flemings of their rights." It is superfluous to quote more; this
sentence alone shows the origin of the petition to be German.]
Forgetting their tyrannous efforts to stamp out the Polish language and
Polish national feelings, the Germans are now sorrowing over the alleged
attempts of the Walloons to suffocate the Flemish dialect. German war
books breathe hate and contempt for the Walloons, but bestow clumsy
bear-like caresses (no doubt unwelcome to their recipients) on the
Flemings.
In a work[151] already cited the following passages occur, in addition
to three whole chapters intended to supply historical proof that
Flanders is by the very nature of things a part of the German Empire.
[Footnote 151: Wilhelm Kotzde: "Von Lüttich bis Flandern" ("From Liége
into Flanders"). Weimar, 1914.]
"The German people committed a grave crime, when they fought among
themselves and left their race-brothers on the frontier, defenceless and
at the mercy of a foreign Power. Therefore we have no right to scold
these brothers (the Flemings), but should rather fetch them back into
the German fold" (p. 40).
Kotzde reports a conversation which he had with an educated Fleming last
autumn. "'We do not like the French and English,' said the Fleming. 'But
what about Brussels?' I remarked. 'They are a people for themselves. The
Flemish capital is Antwerp' he answered.
"Our paths led in different directions, but we parted with the
consciousness that we are tribal brothers. So much seems certain, that
when the Flemings are freed from the embittering influence of the
Walloons and French, then this Low German tribe will again learn to love
everything German--because they are German. Furthermore, that will make
an end of the French language in Flemish districts" (p. 84).
"German infantry marched with us into Antwerp. How deeply it touched me
to hear them sing the 'Wacht am Rhein' and then 'Deutschland,
Deutschland über alles,' in the very city which was to serve as an
English base for operations against our dear Fatherland. And my Flemish
companion softly hummed this splendid German song of faith.
"In that moment a spasm of pain went through my heart, that the Flemings
should have to fight against us in this great struggle for the existence
of Germany: these, our lost brothers, of whom so many yearn to be with
us again" (p. 86).
"With the fall of Antwerp, Flanders--the land of the German Hanse
period, of Ghent, Ypres and Bruges--became German once more" (p. 147).
Kotzde concludes his work as follows:--
"Holland was compelled to bow before the might of France and consent to
Belgium becoming an independent State. From that moment the Flemings,
cut off in every way from their German brothers, were delivered up to
the Walloons, behind whom stood the French.
"The Germans at that time lacked a Bismarck to unite them and interest
them in the fate of their outlying brother tribe. This war has freed our
hands, which hitherto had been bound by the dictates of conscience. Of
himself the German would never have kindled this world conflagration,
but others have hurled the torch into our abode--and our hands are free!
"We do not yet know what Belgium's fate will be, but we can be perfectly
sure that the Flemings will never again be left to the mercy of the
Walloons and French. They have had a wild and chequered history; and
although they have often shown signs of barbarism in the fight, they
have not waged this war with the devilish cruelty of the Walloons.
"They lack the discipline which alone a well-ordered State can bestow.
The training and education of the German military system and German
administration, will be a blessing to them. Even to-day many Flemings
bless the hour of their return into the German paternal home" (p. 190).
"In a struggle which has lasted for nearly a century, the Flemings have
displayed their unconquerable will to maintain their national
peculiarities. Without outside aid, and with little or no deterioration,
they have maintained their nationalism. Now the horrors of war have
swept over the lands of the Flemings and Walloons. The Belgian army,
consisting of 65 per cent. Flemings, has been decimated by German arms.
North and south of the Meuse a wicked harvest of hate has sprung up. But
the most remarkable point is that this hate is not directed against the
Germans alone; the mutual dislike of Flemings and Walloons has turned
into hatred. The Walloons cherish bitter suspicions of the Flemings;
they scent the racial German, and are promising that after the war they
will wage a life and death feud against the German part of the Flemish
nature."[152]
[Footnote 152: Ulrich Rauscher: "Belgien heute und morgen" ("Belgium
to-day and to-morrow"). Leipzig, 1915; p. 35.]
The same writer claims that the Germans had conquered Antwerp before its
fall, by peaceful penetration. "In 1880 the British share of Antwerp's
trade was 56 per cent., Germany's 9 per cent.; in 1900, British 48 per
cent., German 23-1/2 per cent. Not only had the British flag been beaten
in percentages but also in absolute figures; in the year 1912-1913
German trade to Antwerp increased by 400,000 tons, while that of Great
Britain decreased by 200,000 tons. The commercial future of Antwerp will
be German!"[153]
[Footnote 153: Ibid., p. 64.]
"To-day Antwerp is the second largest port on the Continent, with over
400,000 inhabitants, and now Germany's war banner waves above its
cathedral. Germany's maritime flag has waved during the last twenty
years above Antwerp's commercial progress. Antwerp's progress was German
progress."[154]
[Footnote 154: Ibid., p. 68.]
After which follows a glowing account of Belgium's mineral wealth. "It
is Belgium's mission to be a gigantic factory for the rest of the
world," and of course this mission will be directed by--Germany!
"Those who had warned us for years past that England is our greatest
enemy were right. To-day every German recognizes who is our principal
opponent in this world war. Against Russia and France we fight, as the
poet expresses it, 'with steel and bronze, and conclude a peace some
time or other.' But against England we wage war with the greatest
bitterness and such an awful rage, as only an entire and great people in
their holy wrath can feel. The words of Lissauer's 'Hymn of Hate' were
spoken out of the innermost depths of every German soul.
"When Hindenburg announces a new victory we are happy; when our front in
the Argonne advances we are satisfied; when our faithful Landsturm beats
back a French attack in the Vosges, it awakes a pleasurable pride in our
breasts. But when progress is announced in Flanders, when a single
square yard of earth is captured by our brave troops in the Ypres
district, then all Germany is beside herself with pure joy. The seventy
millions know only too well, that everything depends upon the
development of events in Flanders, as to when and how, we shall force
England to her knees.
"Hence of all the fields of war, Belgium is the most familiar to us, and
we love best of all to hear news from that quarter. May God grant that
in the peace negotiations we shall hear much more and good tidings about
Flanders."[155]
[Footnote 155: Dr. Fritz Mittelmann: "Kreuz und Quer durch Belgien"
("Round and about Belgium"). Stettin, 1915: p. 8. Dr. Mittelmann is a
personal friend of the Liberal leader, Herr Bassermann, who accompanied
him on some of his journeys.]
Dr. Mittelmann's book is a prose-poem in praise of Germany's ineffable
greatness. He sees in the present war, "a holy struggle for Germany's
might and future," and like all his compatriots, makes no mention of
Austria. If the Central Powers should be victorious, there is no doubt
that Germany would seize the booty. In justifying the destruction of
churches, cathedrals, etc., Herr Mittelmann asserts that "one single
German soldier is of more worth than all the art treasures of our
enemies" (p. 12).
His book deserves to be read by all Britishers who imagine that we can
win Germany's love and respect--by weakness and compromise. "In this war
Germans and English soldiers are opposed to each other for the first
time. All the scorn and hate which had accumulated for years past in the
German nation has now broken loose with volcanic force. Whoever assumes
that the English were ever other than what they are--is wrong. They have
never had ideals, and seek singly and alone their own profit. Whenever
they have fought side by side with another nation against a common foe,
they have done their best to weaken their ally and reap all the glory
and advantage for themselves."[156]
[Footnote 156: Ibid., p. 29.]
Pity for the Belgians suffering through Germany's brutal war of
aggression does not appear to be one of Dr. Mittelmann's weaknesses.
"The principal industrial occupation of the inhabitants seems at present
to be begging. In spite of their hostile glances the crowd did not
hesitate to gather round as we entered our car, and quite a hundred
greedy hands were stretched towards us for alms. But in Liége, without
the shadow of a doubt the best of all was the magnificent Burgundy which
we drank there; perhaps we had never relished wine so much in our
lives."[157] One wonders whether these pioneers of _Kultur_ relished the
wine so much because they knew themselves to be surrounded by thousands
of hungry, "greedy" Belgians.
[Footnote 157: Ibid., p. 44.]
On page 93, Mittelmann relates at length his genuine Prussian joy at
humiliating a Belgian policeman before the latter's compatriots. None
enjoy having their boots licked, so much as those who are accustomed to
perform that service for others.
Our author pays the customary compliments to the Flemings. It must be
remembered that the above incident took place in Liége among the
Walloons, but it would seem that the Germans try to behave with decency
when among their Low German brothers.
"One feels at home in the house of a Flemish peasant; the racial
relationship tends to homeliness. The painful cleanliness of the
white-washed cottages makes a pleasant contrast to the homes of the
Walloons. War and politics are never mentioned, as these delicate
subjects would prevent a friendly understanding."[158]
[Footnote 158: Ibid., p. 90.]
"A dream. An old German dream. A land full of quaintness which the rush
of modern life has left untouched. On all sides cleanliness and order
which makes the heart beat gladly. And this joyful impression is doubly
strong when one comes direct from the dirty, disorderly villages of the
Walloons.
"Just as a mother may give birth to two children with entirely different
natures, so Belgium affords hearth and home to two peoples in whose
language, culture and customs there is neither similarity nor harmony.
The Flemings are absolutely German, and in this war they treat us with
friendly confidence. Their eyes do not glitter with fanatical hate like
those of the Walloons."[159]
[Footnote 159: Heinrich Binder: "Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen," p.
102.]
Herr Binder's meditations on the slaughter in the valley of the Meuse
are not without interest. "A vale which has been won by German blood! In
recent days the waters of the Meuse have often flowed blood-red. Many a
warrior has sunk into these depths. Longing and hope rise in our hearts:
May destiny determine that all these dead, after a triumphant war, shall
sleep at rest in a German valley!"[160]
[Footnote 160: Ibid., p. 122.]