ON THE LEASH
Russia gave the world to understand by an official declaration, issued
on Friday, July 24th, 1914, that she was not an indifferent, but a
keenly interested spectator to the Austro-Serbian conflict. On the
following day Russia's declaration was published in almost the entire
German Press, and from that moment the same Press was flooded with all
kinds of attacks directed against the Eastern neighbour. Russia was
frankly told to mind her own business--the quarrel did not concern her.
The German public immediately accepted this point of view, so that every
subsequent move on Russia's part appeared in the light of an
unwarrantable offensive. Undoubtedly the Bismarckian tactics of
publishing inspired articles in all parts of Germany were employed, and
their colouring left no doubt on the public mind that the much-talked-of
Slavonic danger had assumed an acute form.
A request on Russia's part, made on July 25th, that the space of time
(forty-eight hours) allowed to Serbia for an answer should be extended,
only increased popular irritation in the Germanic Empires. This
irritation was accompanied by an unmistakable bellicose spirit which
called forth its natural counterpart in Petrograd.
Nevertheless the fact remains that up till July 25th Russia had only
asked for time, and the reply given by the Berlin mob (?) during the
following night, was echoed throughout Germany. The view that Russia had
no right to interest herself on behalf of Serbia (passing over Russia's
right to preserve the newly-established balance of power in the Balkans)
is untenable. If Canada had a quarrel--just or unjust--with the United
States, it would be ridiculous to assert that England had no right to
intervene.
This was, however, not the first occasion on which Germany had advanced
so preposterous a claim. During the tariff conflict between Germany and
Canada some years ago, a wave of indignant anger went over the whole
Fatherland, because England ventured to interfere.
In any case, during the last week before war broke out, the German
Government succeeded in imposing upon public opinion the feeling that
the quarrel was a racial one; together with the conviction that Russia
was interfering in order to protect a band of murderers from just
punishment, and had neither rights nor interests at stake in the
quarrel. This conspiracy succeeded, but the whole German nation must
still be held responsible for the outbreak of war, because, as has been
shown in the preceding chapter, the nation had already been warned by
newspapers of various political parties. They had been plainly told that
Austria had exceeded the limits of all diplomatic dealings between two
sovereign States, and that Austria's provocation could easily kindle a
world war.
Warnings and truths were alike forgotten, and the voices which uttered
them were now raising another hue and cry.[1] Racial hatred was ablaze;
the warlike instincts of a military people were calling for action, and
a diseased conception of national honour was asking why Berlin did not
act against the Russian barbarians. In one paper the author remembers
reading a violent demand for action against Russia before the national
ardour had time to cool down.
[Footnote 1: The last mention of Austria as the guilty party is the
account of the Social Democratic demonstrations in Berlin on July 28th;
reported in the papers of the following day.]
On July 26th Austrian mobilization was in full swing, and Russia
admittedly took precautions of a similar nature soon after that date. We
may be sure that Russia understands her neighbours better than the
inhabitants of the British Isles understand them. In 1909 she had
suffered a severe diplomatic defeat and corresponding loss of prestige,
because she could only use words in dealing with Germany and Austria.[2]
Now she was faced with the alternative of withdrawing from her declared
attitude (July 24th) or taking measures of a military character. In
order not to sacrifice her position as a European power and her special
position as the leader of the Slavonic peoples, Russia chose the latter
course, the only honourable one open to her. German papers and public
speakers retorted that Russia is the patron and protector of
assassins--a calculated distortion of the facts intended to have due
effect on public opinion. On all sides it was said that Russia had given
Serbia secret assurances of help which caused her to become stiff-backed
and unrepentant. Fortunately, it is possible to refute the accusation
through the pen of a German journalist, who described Belgrade's
desperate position on July 25th, the day when the ultimatum expired.
[Footnote 2: "The interests of Russian and German imperialism have
continually clashed during the last ten years, and more than once Russia
has had to beat a retreat before Germany's threats." Dr. Paul Lensch,
member of the Reichstag, in his "German Social Democracy and the World
War," p. 35. Published by "Vorwärts Co." Berlin, 1915.]
"At last the inhabitants of Belgrade have become aware of their serious
situation. 'We are lost! Russia has left us in the lurch!' is being
shouted in the streets. Journalists, who at 2.30 p.m. had assured me
that Russia had intervened in Vienna with success, succumbed now to the
general depression. The people believe that they have been betrayed and
sold; rumours of assassination pass from mouth to mouth. The ministerial
council has been characterized by violent recriminations, ending in
blows. Others asserted that the Crown Prince Alexander had been stabbed
by a leader of the war-party. Another whispers that King Peter is dying
from an apoplectic fit or as the result of an _attentat_. The reports
become wilder, and each increases the dread of some unutterable,
imminent catastrophe.
"The streets are crowded with terror-stricken citizens. Curses resound
on all sides. Certainly a most unusual struggle is going on between the
two parties for peace and war. Shortly after three o'clock it seems to
be settled that Austria's demands will be fulfilled. It is true the
mobilization decree has been posted up on all public buildings, but that
means nothing. We still have nearly three hours in which all can be
righted. How will this gallows-respite be employed?
"It is four o'clock. Messengers rush from one Embassy to the other. In
the coffee-houses the rumour goes round: 'Italy is our saviour in
distress.' Cries of 'shame!' against Russia are raised, while the
'_vivas_!' for Italy sound louder and louder. The crowd marches to the
Italian Embassy, but are received with long and astonished faces. No!
there is nothing to hope for from Italy. Next they go to the French
Embassy; now there are about two thousand of us. Another disappointment!
A young diplomat receives the thronging masses and talks empty nothings,
including a great deal about France's sympathy for Serbia. But in this
dark hour sympathy is of no avail. Downcast and silent, the people go
next to the representative of Albion--who declines to appear.
"The confusion in the minds of the masses caused by the Government's
indecision increases from minute to minute; indescribable scenes are
witnessed before the General Post Office. It is alleged that thousands
and thousands of telegrams have arrived from Russia, begging the members
of Serbia's royal family not to give way to Austria. It may easily be
possible that the Russian telegrams all emanate from one person and have
been forged, in order to counteract the disposition to yield on the part
of the royal family. Without doubt both the King and Crown Prince have
lost all personal influence on the final decision. They are being slowly
carried along by the conflagration-party which obtained the upper hand
soon after four o'clock."[3]
[Footnote 3: _München-Augsburger Abendzeitung_, July 28th.]
This picture gives no support to Germany's accusation that Russia had
stiffened Serbia into resisting Austria's unacceptable demands. It
rather leads one to consider that an action which drives a weak nation
to arrive at a decision on so awful an issue in so short a time, is an
action discreditable to a stronger, and impossible on the part of a
morally great, power. If Serbia chose wrongly in refusing to bite the
dust, then the guilt is still chargeable to Austria for forcing her
little neighbour to take a choice in haste. Sir Edward Grey emphasized
in his speech of July 27th the shortness of the time which all the
Powers had had at their disposal to formulate a plan, by which the
conflict could be restricted to the East, or amicably settled.
The leaders of the Germanic States had purposely willed it so. Several
unsuccessful attempts had been made to break up the Triple Entente, the
only barrier to the Germanization, _i.e._, Prussianization, of Europe,
and in the tragedy of Serajewo the Central Powers (or, at least, the
dominating factor of the two) believed they had found a lever with which
to break down the opposition by diplomacy. If that failed an immediate
appeal to the sword should follow. The diplomatic forty-eight hours'
_coup-de-main_ failed, and the programme contained no other item except
war. In a few words this means that the dastardly crime of Princip and
his fellow conspirators was exploited by Germany, acting through
Austria, to disturb the European balance of power under the guise of a
just vengeance.
Sir Edward Grey formulated and circulated his conference proposal on the
next day, July 26th. Some persons to whom I spoke at the time welcomed
the idea; they belonged principally to the lower middle classes. One
well-known Pan-Germanist (Dr. Beckmann, professor of history in Erlangen
University) said that the proposal was an admission of a diplomatic
defeat and a sign that the Entente Powers were afraid to draw the sword.
If the three Powers in question were prepared to pocket this smack in
the face, then Germany would be satisfied, because such a defeat would
mean that the Triple Entente would never be able to work together again.
It is interesting to compare with this opinion those of two leading
newspapers:
(1.) "We understand that the German Government is not absolutely hostile
to England's endeavours to bring about a mediation between the
contending Powers by those not directly interested in the conflict. But
the German Government makes its participation in the mediation dependent
upon whether Austria-Hungary would accept this procedure, and in which
respect Austria wishes the mediation to follow. The German Government
cannot support any action which Austria-Hungary does not desire, as that
would mean exercising pressure.
"From Sir Edward Grey's declaration in the House of Commons it is clear
that he was not thinking of mediation between Austria and Serbia, but
between Austria and Russia. This shade of meaning requires attention. We
think that any attempt at mediation between Austria and Serbia would
have no prospect of success, because in Vienna they do not seem inclined
to accept such an action. Diplomatic relations have not been broken off;
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs confers still with the Austrian
Ambassador, and it is not easy to see why the other Powers Should not
further this discussion in a mediative sense.
"But then Sir Edward Grey gave his idea more exact form and proposed a
conference between the German, Italian and French ambassadors and
himself. This conference of ambassadors is to seek a basis for an
agreement and then submit the result to the cabinets in Vienna and St.
Petersburg. In his yesterday's speech he emphasized the point that no
hostilities may take place till the conference has concluded its work.
"Here, of course, is the difficulty which mars his plan, for it is
questionable whether Austria will consent to a postponement of her
military operations. Negotiations concerning Sir Edward Grey's proposal
are at present occupying the cabinets, and it is to be hoped that a
means will be found to make it acceptable to the Powers most interested
in the conflict."[4]
[Footnote 4: _Berliner Tagtblatt_, July 28th.]
(2.) "Germany not only cherishes, in a platonic manner, the desire of
the Western Powers to prevent the conflict between Austria and Serbia
spreading to the great Powers, but the Berlin cabinet has already been
active in more than one European capital in favour of a mediation which
will secure European peace. In this respect we are pleased (_Man
begrüsst es hier_) that, in consequence of Sir Edward Grey's initiative,
the mediation idea has assumed an official form and is open for public
discussion. There is, however, reason to doubt whether a conference
between four great Powers as an organ for the mediation is the most
suitable way out of the difficulty. Everyone is quite agreed that the
details of the Austro-Serbian conflict, which concerns these two States
alone, cannot be brought before the forum of a conference; but as
regards the removal in good time of any difficulties which may arise
between Austria and Russia, the question must be raised as to whether
the Governments of these States are willing to entrust an official
mediation to a conference of four other great Powers. For the success of
the mediation proposal it would be more practical if the means to this
end were made as simple as possible, and that use was made of the
current diplomatic discussions, in immediate communication with the
capitals of the Empires in question, in order to carry through a
mediatory action to the result desired on all sides.
"In the employment of these means Germany would not fail to support the
Western Powers as she has already done up to the present."[5]
[Footnote 5: _Kölnische Zeitung_, July 28th.]
I have carefully searched the official publications of the Central
Powers (Germany's White Book; Austria's Orange Book), and can find no
record in them of any pacific action on Germany's part in either of the
European capitals; hence the claims made in the above article seem to be
an exaggeration.
It appears incredible that these Powers should have omitted to give
proof of such action when making their case public for the sole purpose
of proving their innocence before the world. On the other hand, the
impression given by these books is that Germany and Austria's attitude
was:
To SERBIA: The conditions must be accepted _ad hoc_ to the smallest
tittle and comma. Alternative, war.
To RUSSIA: What we have determined upon is unalterable and inevitable,
and you must submit to this decision. Alternative, war.
The _Görlitzer Nachrichten_ published the following paragraph on July
30th: "Vienna, July 29th. After having made inquiries in official
circles, the morning papers make this announcement: Count Berchtold has
informed the English Ambassador that the Austro-Hungarian Government is
grateful for Grey's mediation proposal, and appreciates the good
intentions of the British Government. A peaceful solution of the
conflict with Serbia is, however, no longer possible, as the declaration
of war had already been signed."
Before leaving this all-important episode, it is instructive to compare
three other versions of the reason for refusing a conference. Sir Edward
Grey mooted the proposal for a conference to the ambassadors in London
on Friday, July 24th. On the afternoon he requested the British
Ambassador in Berlin to propose the conference to the German Government.
In spite of this, document No. 12 in the German White Book, a telegram
from the German Chancellor to Prince Lichnowsky in London runs: "We know
nothing here of a proposal from Sir Edward Grey to hold a conference of
four in London, etc." Another telegram, document No. 15, bearing the
same date and likewise from Bethmann-Hollweg to Lichnowsky is as
follows: "We have immediately commenced the mediatory action in Vienna
in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey. Furthermore, we have informed
Count Berchtold of M. Sasonow's desire to communicate with him
direct."[6]
[Footnote 6: This message leads to the assumption that direct
communications between Vienna and Petrograd had already ceased, although
the _Kölnische Zeitung_ told the German public on the following day that
they had not.]
The next document in the German White Book is dated July 28th. It is a
telegram from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the German Chancellor
in Berlin. "Count Berchtold begs me to express his thanks to you for
communicating the English mediation proposal. He replies, however, that
in consequence of the commencement of hostilities by Serbia and after
the declaration of war which has meanwhile been made he must look upon
England's step as being too late."
In the Austrian Orange Book, p. 122, we find this passage in a telegram
from Count Berchtold to the Austrian representative in London: "When Sir
Edward Grey speaks of the possibility of avoiding an outbreak of
hostilities he is too late, for yesterday Serbians shot at our frontier
guards, and to-day we have declared war on Serbia."
There are two points in these telegrams which require explanation.
Firstly, why should Sir Edward Grey's proposal take so long to reach
Vienna. Apparently it took from Monday to Wednesday to go by telegram
from London via Berlin to Vienna. Two German newspapers (already quoted)
knew of this conference idea on the 27th of July and commented upon it
in their morning editions of the following day.
The other point is the Austrian statement that Serbia commenced
hostilities. If this were the case, one would expect that
Austria-Hungary, in declaring war subsequently to the alleged shooting
by Serbians at frontier guards, would make mention of the acts as a
_casus belli_. On p. 117 of the Red Book the text of the declaration of
war is given in full, but there is no mention of any resort to arms on
the part of Serbia.
We are forced to the conclusion that Germany and Austria are mutually
responsible for preventing the conference; they desired war, and a
conference might have preserved peace. During the present summer (1915)
an important work has been published in Germany from which the following
passage is taken:
"Grey thought the time had now arrived to formulate a mediation
proposal. This idea was from the very beginning unacceptable to Austria,
because that would indirectly be a recognition of Russia as an
interested Power in the Austro-Serbian conflict. Only those who have
followed the development of mutual obligations between the Entente
Powers are able to understand the role which Russia's two comrades
(France and England)--to say nothing at all of Italy--would have played
in this conference. During its sittings Russia would have continued her
military preparations, while Germany would have been pledged not to
mobilize. Finally, nobody could assert that the man (Sir Edward Grey)
who would have presided over these negotiations, could have been
impartial. The more one thinks about this mediation proposal the more
clearly one recognizes that it would have made for a diplomatic victory
of the Triple Entente."[7]
[Footnote 7: Professor Hermann Oncken: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg,"
pp. 545-6.]
Even the claim that Austria showed some inclination to permit mediation
on the points in her ultimatum to Serbia which were incompatible with
Serbia's sovereignty, has been categorically denied. The Vienna
_Fremdenblatt_ for September 24th, 1914, contains this official
announcement:
"Vienna, September 24th. In a report of the late British Ambassador
published by the British Government, there is a passage which maintains
that Austria-Hungary's Ambassador, Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg had
informed Monsieur Sasonow, Russia's Minister for Foreign Affairs, that
Austria-Hungary 'was willing to submit the points in her Note to Serbia
which seemed incompatible with Serbian independence, to mediation.'
"We have been informed officially that this statement is absolutely
untrue; according to the nature of the step taken by the monarchy in
Belgrade, it would have been absolutely unthinkable. The passage cited
from the British Ambassador's report, as well as some other phrases in
the same, are evidently inspired by a certain bias. They are intended to
prove, by asserting that Austria-Hungary was prepared to yield on some
points at issue, that German diplomacy was really responsible for the
outbreak of war.
"Such attempts cannot obscure the truth, that Austria-Hungary and
Germany concurred in the wish to preserve European peace. If this wish
has not been fulfilled, and a European conflict has arisen out of a
local settlement, it can only be ascribed to the circumstance that
Russia first threatened Austria-Hungary and then Germany by an
unjustifiable mobilization. By this she forced war upon the Central
Powers and thus kindled a general conflagration."
In dealing with Germany's endeavours for peace Professor Oncken writes
on p. 546 of "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg" ("Germany and the World
War"): "The work of German diplomacy took the form of giving warnings
and peaceful explanations." On July 26th she pointed out to the Russian
Government that "preparatory military measures on Russia's part would
compel Germany to take corresponding steps, viz., the mobilization of
the army. Mobilization means war." Oncken does not quote any of the
"peaceful explanations" (_friedliche Erklärungen_), and much as the
present writer would like to fill up this gap in his work, he must admit
his utter inability, because in the diplomatic correspondence he can
only find exasperating threats, thrown out to Russia by the two Germanic
Empires.
The whole problem allows of a very simple digest: On July 23rd,
Austria-Hungary handed her ultimatum to Serbia, therein stating her
demands, and on the following day informed all the European powers of
her attitude. The neutral Press of the world and an unusually large
section of the German Press, immediately pronounced Austria's position
to be indefensible and untenable. The German Government, in spite of
these facts, gave its official and unreserved support to Austria's
attitude on July 26th. After eight weeks of war (on September 25th),
Austria officially declared that she had never swerved from her original
claims, nor ever felt any inclination to do so.
It is true that the usages of everyday life do not always hold good in
diplomatic dealings, but it is instructive to state the case in the
terms of everyday affairs. Mr. A. (Austria) informs Mr. B. (Serbia) that
he has a quarrel to settle with him and states his demands. Mr. C.
(Russia) who is a relation, patron and friend of B.'s, interferes to see
fair play. Whereupon Mr. D. (Germany), a friend and relation of A.'s,
informs C. in unmistakable fashion that he must neither speak nor act in
the affair or he will be immediately thrashed. Messrs. A. and D. are
unanimous in this view and repeat the threat in mutual form. Meanwhile
A. attacks B. Mr. C, seeing that they will not accord him a hearing,
takes steps to compel them to hear him, at which point Mr. D. fulfils
his threat and falls upon C.
It is not yet clear whether Austria would have permitted Russia to take
over the rôle of adviser and second to Serbia in her unequal struggle
with Austria. But from the moment Germany appeared on the scene the
situation becomes perfectly simple: Russia has absolutely no right
either to speak or move in the matter. On this rock of immovable
Germanic obstinacy the Russian ship of State, was intended to meet with
diplomatic shipwreck. Should Russia attempt to avoid this fate, then the
German sword could be trusted to arrange matters in the way desired by
Germany.
The German language contains a very expressive phrase,
_Stimmungsmacherei_, which means creating or preparing a certain frame
of mind. How Germany's public opinion was tuned to the war melody is
seen by a study of the German newspapers published between July 25th and
August 1st. A great part of the German nation had welcomed Austria's
expressed determination to compel Serbia "to lick her shoes," as a
London paper put it at the time. Only the Social Democratic Party
persisted in asserting that Austria was the provocative and guilty party
down to the evening of July 28th.
But three days earlier the process of educating public opinion against
Russia commenced. In fact, it required little tuning to arouse a
national chorus, which was swelled subsequently by the Social Democratic
voices, demanding that Russia too must bite the dust.
At the psychological moment the terms of the alliance between Germany
and Austria were launched in the Press. One paper[8] wrote: "It is
interesting at the present moment to call to mind how the treaty
existing between Germany and Austria regulates the question of mutual
support." Then the various paragraphs are cited, and the article
concludes: "That is to say: (1.) Assuming Austria attacks Serbia, and
Russia as a precautionary measure sends troops to the Austrian frontier
without commencing hostilities against the latter, then Germany is under
no obligation to intervene. (2.) Assuming that Serbia is the attacking
party, and Russia gives her support by military measures which threaten
Austria, then the German Empire must immediately assist the Hapsburg
monarchy with the whole of her military forces.
[Footnote 8: _München-Augsburger Abendzeitung_, July 27th.]
"Hence it all depends upon who attacks; the interpretation of 'attack,'
however, is debatable both in politics and international law. Again and
again it has been asserted that that Power which declares war is not the
attacker, but the one which makes a continuance of peaceful relations
impossible."
Innumerable notices of Russia's alleged mobilization appeared and,
probably with a view to encouraging Germans to stand fast, ghastly
pictures of the weakness and unpreparedness of the Russian army, in a
word Russian rottenness and corruption. Persistent rumours of
revolutions in Russia were current.
A Vienna telegram published in Berlin[9] informed the German public
that: "News received from Warsaw deny the rumours that a revolution has
broken out in Russian-Poland, but it is true that yesterday the entire
citadel in Warsaw was blown up. Official Russian reports endeavour to
prove that the explosion was caused by lightning. The extent of the
damage is not yet known, but in any case it amounts to hundreds of
thousands of roubles. It is also not certain whether any or how many
lives were lost."
[Footnote 9: _Vossische Zeitung_, July 29th.]
A few days later the German official organ _Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung_ and the semi-official _Kölnische Zeitung_ published the
following report of the explosion. "According to the statement of the
Governor of Warsaw it was caused by revolutionaries. No proof of this
was forthcoming, therefore it was ascribed to lightning, and as nobody
believed this explanation--there was not a cloud on the sky at the
time--the guilt remained finally with the revolutionaries.
"Now it has been proved, not to the satisfaction of the Russian
authorities of course, that Russian officers of high rank blew the
magazine up, because they would have to supply the troops with
ammunition after the mobilization--and the ammunition was not there. The
money for the same had found its way into the officers' pockets."
On July 30th the _Vossische Zeitung_ announced: "To-day even more
alarming news has been in the air than in the last few days. The _Lokal
Anzeiger_ stated during the afternoon that an order for the mobilization
of the army and navy had been signed by the Kaiser. On making inquiries
in official quarters, we were informed that the 'news' is false. At
three o'clock Wolff's Bureau issued an official _dementi_: 'We have
received an official statement to the effect that the news published in
an extra edition of the _Berliner Lokal Anzeiger_ that the Kaiser had
ordered the general mobilization is untrue.' Great excitement was caused
by the _Lokal Anzeiger's_ announcement, and the public visibly
disquieted."
The above report refers, of course, to incidents which happened on the
preceding day. The 30th of July was marked by the suppression of three
Berlin papers, including the _Berliner Neuester Nachrichten_, for
divulging the fact that the 1st, 5th and 17th Army Corps had been
mobilized. An account of this _faux pas_ appeared on July 31st in the
_Kreuz Zeitung_ and concluded, after denying the truth of the
mobilization, with the following paragraph: "If bodies of troops have
been moved to various points of our Eastern frontier, then it only means
the so-called frontier protection (_Grenzschutz_), which has been made
necessary by our Eastern neighbour strengthening his customary frontier
guards by troops of the line. Frontier protection is not generally
intended to prevent a serious attack, but means rather a kind of police
action."
Two other passages will suffice to illuminate the mobilization question.
"Yesterday Russia gave official notification in Vienna and Berlin of
mobilization against Austria. Is it to be wondered at that a feeling of
disquietude is spreading throughout all classes of the nation. By delay
on our side, valuable military advantages may be lost if the people once
suspect that there is an absence of that firmness and joy of
responsibility (_Verantwortungsfreudigkeit_) which marked the action of
the Austrian Government and was hailed with jubilation by the German
nation.
"_Summa summarum_: The German Government has taken honest pains during
the last week in showing its peace-loving disposition and in seeking a
peaceful solution to the crisis. Nevertheless the political situation on
all sides and in every respect, has become worse from day to day through
the fault and according to the intention of the Triple Entente."[10]
[Footnote 10: _Kreuz Zeitung_, July 31st.]
"The others are mobilizing. We--issue denials. We deny everything which
might mean mobilization or look like preparation for that step. It is
done for the sake of 'peace,' so that Russia, who is gathering her
national strength together in masses, may not be offended. Are we being
led? We look to the Kaiser. The Peace Societies and some of Germany's
enemies are looking to him.
"Can we remain indifferent in our hour of dread need, when the gleaming
promise of a bright future appears in the distance, if the inability to
resolve and dare has made Berlin its headquarters. All efforts are for
'peace' with honour. But in politics one must be able to recognize when
it is impossible to continue at peace; when peace is at the cost of our
friends, our own security, and the future of European peace. In view of
this one must be able to act."[11]
[Footnote 11: _Deutsche Zeitung_, July 31st.]
The internal tactics of the German Government had been successful all
along the line. Insignificant Serbia had dropped out of the reckoning.
Russia must be humbled. The German nation, believing itself entirely
peaceful, and convinced that its leaders had done everything possible
for peace, now demanded in no unmistakable voice--action! mobilization!
war!
Announcements of mobilization on all sides (Switzerland, Holland,
Belgium) doubtless added to the popular belief that Germany desired
above all things--peace. Still, in spite of the warlike spirit of the
nation and the burning desire to settle off Russia once and for all,
there was an undercurrent of overstrained nervousness. A Dresden paper
of July 30th relates that between the hours of two and four on the
preceding afternoon a Berlin newspaper had been asked thirty-seven
different questions on the telephone relating to rumours of
assassinations, mobilization, etc.
The process of inspiring national confidence, however, had by no means
suffered through neglect. France was represented as being unprepared
and, together with England, desiring only peace. As early as July 27th
in the _Tägliche Rundschau_ the public had been told that Italy, had
officially declared herself ready and willing to stand by the Central
Powers as an ally.
Even Japan was used to stiffen Teutonic courage. The _Deutscher Kurier_
told its readers in a telegram from New York (?) that Americans fully
expected Japan to attack Russia in the back and Japanese ministers were
holding conferences all day and night. According to the _Weser Zeitung_,
August 1st, Japan was arming for war, while the _München-Augsburger
Zeitung_ published details of an alliance concluded between Austria and
Japan in Vienna on the afternoon of July 30th. According to this source
Japan had pledged herself to support Austria in case the latter was
attacked by Russia, while Austria declared her absolute
disinterestedness in the Far East. On August 1st the _Berliner
Tageblatt_ repeated this legend; but advised its readers to exercise
reserve in accepting it.
"During the evening (August 2nd) the news spread in the streets of
Berlin that Japan was mobilizing and had already declared war on Russia.
Huge crowds flocked to the Japanese Embassy and spent hours in cheering
Japan, Germany, and the Triple Alliance."[12]
[Footnote 12: _Der Montag_, August 3rd.]
Meanwhile Russia, having failed to get her simple rights recognized and
knowing that Germany had made extensive military preparations, decided
on July 31st to mobilize her entire forces. The German Ambassador
immediately informed his Government of this step, and the Kaiser placed
Germany under martial law. On the same day the Emperor proceeded from
Potsdam to the Imperial Palace in Berlin.