MASTER-SPIES AND THEIR CUNNING
We shall probably never be able to realise a hundredth part of what
Germany has done by her spy system, but we know enough to realise
that, for years, no country and no walks of life--from the highest to
the lowest--have been free from the presence of her ubiquitous and
unscrupulous secret agents. Nothing in the way of espionage has been
too large, or too small, for attention.
Her spies have swarmed in all cities, and in every village; her agents
have ranked among the leaders of social and commercial life, and
among the sweepings and outcasts of great communities. The wealthiest
of commercial men have not shrunk from acting as her secret agents.
She has not been above employing beside them the very dregs of the
community. No such a system has ever been seen in the world; I hope it
is safe to say that no such system will ever be seen again. Indeed,
so despicable is this German spy system that even the leader of the
Opposition in the Reichstag, Herr Richter, one day rose from his
seat and protested against "the more than doubtful morality of the
individuals employed." This protest was made because it was known that
the Secret Service of Germany countenanced rank immorality and vice,
the suborning of high officials, and the shameless engagement of women
of ill-fame in the search for information. The official feeling in
Germany concerning such debased methods was well illustrated by the
reply of Herr Von Puttkamer, the Minister for the Interior, who said:--
"It is the right and duty of the State to employ special and
extraordinary methods, and even if that honest and estimable
functionary, Police-Councillor Rumpff, has employed the methods of
which he is accused, in order to secure for the State the benefits of
useful intelligence, I here publicly express to him my satisfaction
and thanks."
That statement is certainly informing. It reveals to us the low, vile
methods of our enemies.
The German spy system, as we know it to-day, is the creation of one
Carl Stieber, and it dates back to about the year 1850.
Stieber, who was an obscure Saxon, began his career of espionage by
betraying the revolutionary Socialists, with whom he pretended to
sympathise, and so successful was he in this respect that he very
soon obtained employment among the regular police, and was afterwards
created head of a department which finally worked quite independently,
and was beyond police control.
Stieber could never have achieved the success he did but for the luck
or good management which, during his work among the revolutionaries,
brought him to the notice of Frederick William, the King of Prussia.
Under the royal patronage he was secure against counter-plotters among
the military and the police, both of whom hated him beyond measure
as an interloper who was seen to be dangerous to their interests.
Up to this time, it should be remembered, the game of espionage, so
far as military matters were concerned, had been a matter solely
for the military authorities, and they did not fail to resent
the new influence, which very speedily threatened to make itself
all-powerful--as, indeed, it ultimately did--in this particular field
of Prussian activity.
It must not be supposed that Stieber--upon whose model the Russian
Secret Police was afterwards established--confined his activities to
either the enemies or the criminals of Prussia. He established a close
watch on persons even of high rank, and many a tit-bit of information
went to regale the mind of his royal master. In a sense, Frederick
William was, like the modern Kaiser, the master-spy, for without his
confidence Stieber could never have achieved the success he did,
against both the military and the police, influences which, even in
those days, were almost, but not quite, all-powerful in Germany.
Stieber's greatest achievement in the field of actual spying was his
work which led to the crushing of Austria at Sadowa in 1866. At this he
laboured for years, and it is not too much to say that his work assured
the success of the campaign. By the time the Prussian armies were on
the move, Stieber had established such an army of spies and agents
throughout Bohemia, that it was a matter of absolute impossibility for
the unfortunate Austrians to make a single move without information
being promptly carried to their enemies.
So successful was Stieber's method found, that it was only natural that
it should be tried in other countries. France was the next victim, and
the campaign of 1870-71 is so recent that it is hardly necessary to do
more than remind the reader how thoroughly the Germans were served by
their spy system.
As in the present war, the advancing Germans found, in every town
and village, swarms of agents who were ready to provide them with
information and guidance, and it was even said that the German invaders
were better acquainted with the country they were attacking than
were the officers entrusted with its defence. We have seen the same
thing in the present war, when time after time the Germans have been
led into towns and districts by men who have lived there for years
and, in many cases, had even become naturalised Frenchmen the better
to carry on their work. It speaks volumes for the perfection of the
German military machine that, on the outbreak of hostilities, these men
should have been able, without the slightest difficulty, to join the
corps operating in the districts with which they had become perfectly
familiar by years of residence.
And they were able, not merely to give topographical information, but
even to indicate where stores of food and petrol could be found, and
to point out to their comrades where the best prospects of loot and
plunder existed.
All this was merely a natural development of the system which Carl
Stieber established, and which his successors have developed to the
highest pitch of unscrupulous perfection.
After the war of 1870-71, the system which Stieber invented found
its place in German administration, and it has continued ever since
as a separate and highly-organised department, spending vast sums of
money--about £720,000 a year--and extending its ramifications to an
incredible extent. It may be mentioned, incidentally, that its workings
and methods have been copied by the German commercial world, and many
a British employer has, during the past few years, paid dearly through
his closest commercial secrets being given away to his keenest German
rivals by the patient, diligent and hard-working German clerk, who
was willing to work for a mere pittance for the advantage of "learning
English" and studying British methods.
There cannot now be the slightest doubt that thousands of these German
employees were, before the war, really in the pay of German firms, and
were busily engaged in sending to Germany all the information they
could possibly pick up which would tend to help the German and injure
the British merchant and manufacturer.
I hope they have over-reached themselves, and that when the war is over
we shall see a great deal less of the English worker being supplanted
by spying Germans, whose apparent cheapness has been the costliest
labour Englishmen have ever employed.
"Never trust or employ a German, and always make him pay cash" ought to
be the British commercial motto for the future.
Stieber died in the early nineties, but he was succeeded by others
quite as clever, and even more unscrupulous than himself, some
of whom--though by no means all--have become faintly known to us
through the revelations made in the too few cases of espionage where
prosecution has been undertaken by our sleepy authorities. I say "very
few," of course, in the comparative meaning of the phrase. Actually,
there have been a fair number of cases, but when we consider the
slyness of German methods we must come to the conclusion that not a
fraction of the whole have been dealt with, in spite of the amusing
claim of Mr. McKenna that he has succeeded in smashing the German spy
organisation in this country. Our leniency in this respect is a matter
of amazement to people in France, and other countries where, from
bitter experience, the German spy-peril is better understood, and it is
also a matter of some resentment. Every blow at England, it is argued,
injures the cause of the Allies as a whole, and the worst blows are
likely enough to be struck by the undetected and unpunished spy.
In almost every case of espionage in England in recent years, the name
of Steinhauer, "of Potsdam," has figured prominently. He is, at the
moment, the chief of the Kaiser's spy-system, and there is no doubt
that he fully enjoys the confidence and friendship of his royal master.
Steinhauer--as he is known to our Secret Service--is an officer in
the Prussian Guard, and is about forty years of age. Personally, he
is a man of charming manners, of splendid education, and of excellent
presence, capable of taking his place--as he has frequently done--in
the very best society. Steinhauer--the man of a hundred aliases--acting
under the direct instructions of the Kaiser, and with the closest
support and co-operation of the German military authorities,
established in England such a network of naval and military spies as,
when it was tardily discovered, fairly made our authorities aghast.
The allegations I have made in these pages are borne out by Mr.
McKenna's own admission, that hardly anything was done in the matter
until about the year 1911; yet, as I have indicated, long before this
the Germans were actually plotting war against England, and were
preparing for it and looking forward to the day when they might hope to
wage it with every prospect of success.
The following extract from a public statement by the Home Secretary
is worth quoting. It will be noticed that Steinhauer's name is
not mentioned, but there is no doubt that he was the head of the
organisation of which the Home Secretary speaks.
Mr. McKenna stated in his remarkable and somewhat ludicrous communiqué
of October 9th, 1914:--
"The Special Intelligence Department ... was able in three years,
from 1911 to 1913, to discover the ramifications of the German
Secret Service in England. In spite of enormous effort and lavish
expenditure by the enemy, little valuable information fell into their
hands.... There is good reason to believe that the spy organisation,
crushed at the outbreak of the war, has not been re-established....
How completely that system had been suppressed in the early days of
the war is clear from the fact disclosed in a German Army Order--that
on 21st August the German military commanders were ignorant of the
dispatch and movements of the British Expeditionary Force, although
these had been known for many days to a large number of people in
this country."
Such an attempt as this to lull us into a false sense of security was
little short of criminal.
If not from spies, asked a correspondent of the _Globe_, from whom did
Germany obtain, in 1912, the very valuable information that oil was
to be the sole source of motive power for the "Queen Elizabeth" (v.
_Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten_, January, 1913)? Certainly not from
any English official source; for we were kept entirely in the dark as
to this momentous change until the _Morning Post_ announced in July,
1913, that the battleship in question would consume liquid fuel only.
Even minor details did not escape the notice of German spies during the
period specified by Mr. McKenna. For instance, the _Taschenbuch_ for
1914 contains this statement:--
"'Hermes,' at present tender to air-craft, and as such only carries
eight 6in. guns."
Yet it was not until the "Hermes" had been sunk in the Channel by a
German submarine, that any official statement was made as to how she
had been employed and her armament reduced!
Again, there is irrefutable evidence to show that German agents were
ready waiting in France for the disembarkation of at least some details
of the British Expeditionary Force, and the whole world knows that the
German Emperor's insolent reference to Sir John French's Army was made
_before August 21st_.
Further evidence of the activity of German spies before and since
the outbreak of the war is to be found in the following extract from
a letter written by an English naval officer, and published in the
_Times_ of November 20th under the heading, "In the North Sea":--
"Their (_i.e._, the Germans') submarines are outside even now, and it
seems funny where they get their information. But, at any rate, they
are well served, as they knew where the Fleet was when we were at
Devonport, and we did not know ourselves."
Taking all these facts into consideration, it is evident that the
German spy system is more than a match for the Intelligence Division of
the Admiralty War Staff.
Steinhauer--the chief of German Espionage--was the author and
inspiration of these "enormous efforts," and of the lavish expenditure
of money.
With unlimited means at his disposal from the German Secret Service
funds, a close personal friend of the Kaiser, a man of undoubted
ability, great charm of manner and unquestionable daring, the man
known as Steinhauer must be ranked as one of the most dangerous of our
enemies. I have met him more than once. He speaks English practically
like an Englishman, and, out of uniform, might well pass for an
Englishman in any cosmopolitan gathering. About eight years ago he
was appointed to look after the German Secret Service, with special
instructions from the Emperor to particularly devote himself to England.
He made frequent visits to this country; he got to know many German
residents here of the better class, whose efforts might be of value to
him, and within twelve months--while our red-tape-tangled Government
Departments closed their eyes and dreamed--had actively at work a swarm
of agents in every dockyard town and garrison where the picking up of
information of value would be possible or likely. How he must have
smiled! Every important town and city, many villages on the coast,
every naval base had its agent or agents, and there can be no doubt
that it was the result of Steinhauer's wonderful activities that at
last aroused even the supine British Home Office, which for years had
jeered at me and reassured the public with official denials that there
were no spies in England, and had laughed at the numerous warnings to
them to "sit up and take notice."
And all this in face of a great and terrible national peril!
I would here like to pay a tribute to the thoroughness with which the
Confidential Department have all along done their work. Up to the
limits to which the staff were allowed to go, they did magnificently.
There can be no doubt that a good many of the most active German spies
were detected and accounted for. The trouble is that the Intelligence
officers were not allowed to go far enough--indeed, since the war the
director, who knew many of the spies personally, has actually been
relieved of his post. Why, we may well ask. Do not let us inquire,
however, but let us realise that after six months at war we still have
at large amongst us some 27,000 alien enemies who would, in any other
country, be safely under lock and key. This spy peril means the loss
of our sons and our loved ones, and a blow at our Empire. Even the
Department is subject to ordinary human limitations, and we shall never
be free from the spy-peril until we recognise with Sherman that during
war the military authority is superior to the civil; until we insist
with Sir Oliver Lodge that all foreign spies must be shot, and all
native ones hanged.
This Steinhauer's crowning act of daring and cool "cheek" came in
1911, when it is stated upon the best authority that he actually paid
a visit to King George at Buckingham Palace, as a member of the German
Emperor's personal suite! In that year I met him. The Kaiser visited
London to attend the unveiling by the King of the Queen Victoria
Memorial. Steinhauer, the spy, was actually a member of his suite!
Of the action of our false friend the Kaiser in this matter it
is difficult to speak with patience. At this time, it should be
remembered, he was professing the firmest friendship for England,
and more than one Cabinet Minister was full of his praise; yet this
pinchbeck Napoleon could find it within his notions of honour to
introduce to England the one man of all others who was most active in
the perfidious campaign against her. Can it be wondered that with such
an example of treachery to lead them, German diplomatists made small
ado about tearing up the solemn treaty which guaranteed the neutrality
of Belgium!
At this time, of course, Steinhauer's real mission was unknown to our
Home Office, and, of course, Steinhauer is not his real name. It was
not until later in the year that the Confidential Department fixed his
identity and ascertained his true character. One sighs to realise the
farce of it all.
Then began a campaign in which the Germans were badly outwitted.
Without giving the slightest indication that anything unusual was
on foot, or had been discovered, the Special Department--under the
director who is, alas! no longer there--set to work.
One branch of their activities was revealed in a recent case, when they
calmly produced, in court, tracings of letters posted in London by
Steinhauer's agents. For once the spy had been met and beaten at his
own game. In the meantime, some of Steinhauer's chief agents had been
identified, and were kept under the closest but most unostentatious
surveillance.
Arrests were made in a number of cases, and in many others information
was secured which bore prompt fruit when war was declared, and over two
hundred of the "master-spy's" tools were captured in different parts of
the country and interned.
It is, however, beyond doubt that many of this man's agents, of greater
or less influence or ability, are to-day still at liberty, and there
is no doubt either that many have come over in the guise of Belgian
refugees; that, indeed, has been officially admitted. Of course, they
are now working under enormously greater difficulties in getting
information, owing to the increased severity of the watch kept at all
places of importance. And even to send it away when they have got it is
not easy, though no doubt it is arranged, through Italy, Denmark, or
Scandinavia.
Here is an instance reported by me to the authorities, as I considered
it full of suspicion. Among the thousands of Belgian refugees arriving
in England just before the fall of Antwerp--a city infested by German
spies--there came among us a certain priest, with four other male
companions. The priest explained to the Relief Committee which received
him, that he was head of a certain college in Belgium. He and his
companions were, at their own request, passed on to a provincial Relief
Committee. There the priest's penurious position naturally aroused
much sympathy, and he and his companions were put into a good-sized
house, given money for their maintenance, and petted by many charitable
persons.
The five were free to take observations in and around the place where
they were domiciled. That our enemy would be glad of any details
regarding it there can be no doubt. Then, of a sudden--in the first
days of January--the priest, to the surprise of the Committee,
announced the fact that as he had received a letter from the Cardinal
Archbishop of his diocese, stating that many of his old pupils had
returned, he must leave at once for home with two of his companions.
One of the latter declared that he had to go to "look after his
cows"--as though the Germans would have left him any cows! When
questioned, the priest admitted that he held monies of the college
which he must hand over. To say the least, their behaviour was highly
suspicious.
By some persons who became acquainted with this curious request the
matter was viewed with considerable suspicion. There seemed no urgent
reason why the refugees in question should return, for their excuses,
when challenged, were of the flimsiest character. However, they were
able to obtain a sum of money, which went towards their travelling
expenses.
I at once went to the proper authorities--with the usual result.
Officials "got busy" scribbling reports and writing polite
"acknowledgments," but nothing was done, and the priest and his
friends were allowed to cross to Flushing unmolested on January 5th.
But while it may be true that the main spy organisation has been
partially broken up--as Mr. McKenna would have us believe--it should
not be supposed, by any means, that the peril is at an end. Letters
can still be smuggled out of the country. To test this, I myself have
communicated with friends in Germany since the war by sending my
letters to Italy, where they were re-addressed, and replies have come
by the same means. Signals can, and are still, undoubtedly being made
to German submarines lying within easy distance of our East Coast.
And there can be no doubt that the stream of secret German gold, part
of the £720,000 a year, has, alas! done its work all too well in
inducing at least a few renegade Englishmen to betray their country.
This thought leaves a nasty taste in one's mouth, but there are
black sheep in all nations, and the black sheep of this kind are the
master-spy's most precious instruments. Very few of them, fortunately
or unfortunately, as we may choose to think, have been discovered; but
an example was made of one--the ex-naval gunner, Parrott--who, perhaps,
was one of the worst examples.
Much organising of the actual work of espionage in England is believed
to have been carried on by Count von der Schulenberg, who was recently
appointed Governor of Liége. A very interesting account of his clever
methods was published by the _Daily Mail_ soon after his appointment
was announced. Von der Schulenberg belongs to what is, unquestionably,
the most dangerous type of spy--the monied man of good family, of a
certain culture, enjoying the friendship of people in the better ranks
of life, and above all, able to plead many hobbies to account for his
presence in this country. We have many of a similar sort in our midst,
posing as naturalised persons.
It was in 1909 that Schulenberg--whom I met at the Hotel Cecil, where
I was living--first settled in England. He took a flat in Jermyn
Street, where he spent a considerable time, probably in the work of
familiarising himself with the ramifications of the German spy system
in this country. He became well known among the German colony in the
West End, and he was in the habit of spending considerable periods on
some mysterious errands; at any rate he often disappeared for days from
his favourite haunts.
About two years ago this Schulenberg left Jermyn Street--and the
Hotel Cecil, where he often came in to see his friends--and went to
live in Borough Green, Kent, a quiet village within easy reach of
Chatham Dockyard. Here he posed, of all things in the world, as a
poultry fancier! Here he spent a good deal of time, sparing no pains
to ingratiate himself with everybody in the district, and, to a great
extent, succeeding.
We next hear of him as a "breeder of bulldogs" in the little village of
Hemley-on-Deben, in Suffolk, not far from Harwich. This was about the
middle of 1913. The amusing part of his pose here is that it was quite
obvious to everyone that he knew nothing whatever about the subject
which he made his hobby! He was utterly ignorant of bulldogs, and
everything pertaining to them. However, they served as the excuse he
wanted to cover his real operations.
It is not thought that this Schulenberg did any actual spying; it is
more probable that he was merely an agent and a "cover" for the work of
others. That he may have been an organiser under Steinhauer is probable
enough, and it is known that he received visits from mysterious
Germans, to one of whom, in particular, he paid considerable deference.
After his departure, a very significant statement is said to have been
made by a young man who is now serving in our army at the front. This
man asserted that if he had been willing to do what von Schulenberg
asked him, he would, by this time, "have been a rich man, able to drive
his own motor-car." We can make a pretty good guess as to the class of
service that was sought.
Many other cases of a similar nature that have come to light make
it plain that Great Britain was systematically divided out into
territories, for the purpose of espionage, each territory having a
head spy, or agent, to whom all others under him were responsible, and
to whom they gave their reports for transmission to the headquarters
of the German spy system in Brussels. These cases are too numerous to
mention individually, and it will be sufficient to quote one as an
example, that of Captain X----, of Manchester.
The captain was originally arrested for having--needless to say he
was a German--travelled more than five miles from the city without
permission. When the case came on the magistrates took the view that
the offence was a mere oversight, and inflicted a small fine. Later,
however, certain facts came to light, and the captain was re-arrested
at the instance of the military authorities. Great importance was
attached to the case, as the authorities believed that through it they
would be able to lay their hands upon centres, not only in the North of
England, but also in London, through which the Germans were in receipt
of important information.
Captain X---- was a man of the type who have done excellent service for
Germany among the too trustful English. Of charming manners, apparently
a rich man, and very "English" in his ways, he was able to move in
good society, and numbered among his friends many prominent Manchester
people. But there was another side to his character of which his
Manchester friends were not aware.
One of his favourite haunts was a certain German club in the city. Here
he was seen almost nightly, and it was noticed that he seemed to have a
great friendship for certain hotel-waiters of German nationality, who,
like himself, were members. These club waiters, who evidently possessed
an amount of cash which is not common among men participating in the
"tronc," were constantly occupied with the captain in a private room.
They "did themselves well," and in course of time they attracted the
attention of certain Englishmen who were also members of the club. It
could not escape notice that German waiters were rather curious friends
for an apparently wealthy man moving in the best society in Manchester,
and there is only one explanation of their common activities. Of the
captain's ultimate fate I am ignorant, but we may assume that by this
time he is beyond the capacity of doing us further harm, at any rate
for a considerable time.
"_Place aux dames!_" Among the "master spies" of the Kaiser we must
certainly include a proportion of the fair sex--those women of lax
morals discussed in the Reichstag. And of all the perplexing problems
with which our authorities have had to deal of late, there is none more
difficult than that of women who have been acting as agents of German
espionage.
It is a popular jibe that a woman cannot keep a secret. Never was
a popular opinion worse founded. To the spy no quality is more
essential than the ability to hold his tongue--a casual word may be
enough to betray him under circumstances in which he might think
himself absolutely safe. And if some women, at any rate, could not be
trusted to set a very rigid seal on their lips, the Kaiser and other
spy-masters would be robbed of some of their most able and desperate
agents.
History has shown us that the woman-spy is, if anything, far more
dangerous than the man, once she gives herself heart and soul to
the business. And the reason is obvious: she brings to bear subtle
influences--especially if she is of the half-world--which are far
beyond the capacity of the male spy. More often than not, she simply
works on a man's passions, and there are endless cases of men who have
given away important secrets not for mere sordid motives, but through
the wiles of a pretty little woman by whom they have been temporarily
enslaved. The woman-spy, as a rule, must be possessed of great personal
charm of manner, and more than a share of good looks--often they
are minor actresses or ladies of no profession. They are, indeed,
the aristocrats of the spy profession, for they can work with good
prospects of success in cases where the ordinary lure of money would
be rejected with scorn, and, probably, personal violence if it were
proffered.
Now, it is absolutely foreign to the British character to take
any steps against women of whatever class unless there are very
clear grounds upon which to act. We may be quite sure that this
fact is fully recognised by the authorities at Potsdam. There are
to-day, in London--many around Piccadilly Circus, and practically
uncontrolled--hundreds of German women, clever and capable, who are
an unmistakable danger to our country. What to do with them is,
admittedly, not a problem easy of solution. We, as Britons, do not want
to inflict on women the unavoidable hardships of the concentration
camps if it can be avoided, but we certainly do want to protect
ourselves. The suggestion has been made that these women should be
compulsorily repatriated, and it seems as good a way of dealing with
the difficulty as any.
One of the most notorious of the German woman agents is believed to
have come over to this country immediately after the fall of Brussels.
She is said to be an exceedingly accomplished woman, very good-looking,
and widely travelled, and speaking seven languages. The Confidential
Department are to-day keeping her under observation. A woman of this
kind is especially dangerous owing to her ability to pass in any class
of society, and it is to be hoped that the Department has been able to
curtail her opportunities for mischief.
As I have, over and over again, stated in the course of these past few
years of Britain's slumber, the tremendous extent of the German spy
system cannot be over-estimated, nor can it be too strongly impressed
upon the public. Nothing is too large, or too small, for the net of
German espionage; no agent can be too highly, or too lowly, placed.
From the few chiefs who really control the dastardly work, designed
for our undoing, radiate channels which stretch into every department
of life, pouring in a constant stream of facts of greater or less
importance, but all having their proper place when correlated and
arranged by the keen brains in Berlin devoted to the work.
Never let it be forgotten that an apparently trivial incident may
be the key for which the spy is patiently seeking, and that even a
seemingly baseless rumour transmitted by the humble German, as the
result of eavesdropping during his employment, may set the master-brain
at work upon some matter of overwhelming importance.