SOME METHODS OF SECRET AGENTS
Some of the cases of espionage within my own knowledge--and into
many of them I have myself made discreet inquiry--may not prove
uninteresting. Foreign governesses, usually a hard-worked and
poorly-paid class, are often in a position to furnish important
information, and very serious cases have recently been proved against
them. These young women have lived in the intimacy of the homes
of men of every grade, Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament,
financiers, officers of both Services, and officials of every class.
By the very nature of their duties, and their extreme intimacy with
their employers, they are, naturally, in a position to gather much
valuable information, and often even to get sight of their employers'
correspondence, which can easily be noted and handed over to the proper
quarter for transmission to Berlin.
Here is a case already reported by me. Not very long ago, in the
service of a very well-known Member of Parliament living in Essex,
lived a clever, good-looking, and intensely musical young German
governess, who was regarded by the Member's wife as "a perfect
treasure," and who took the greatest interest in her two little
charges. For over two years Fräulein had been in the service of this
pleasant household, being, of course, regarded as "one of the family."
In the grounds of the big country house in question was a secluded
summer-house, and here Fräulein was in the habit of reading alone, and
writing her letters. One hot summer's afternoon she had gone there as
usual, when about an hour later one of the under-gardeners, in passing,
saw her lying back in her chair unconscious. She had been seized with
a fit. He raised the alarm, she was carried back to the house, and the
doctor was at once telephoned for.
Meanwhile her mistress, greatly alarmed, went out to the summer-house
in order to see whether her unconsciousness could be accounted for.
Upon the table she noticed a number of documents which did not appear
to be letters which a governess might receive, and, on examination,
she found to her dismay that, not only were they carefully-written
reports of conversations between her husband and a certain Cabinet
Minister who had been their guest during the previous week-end, but
there were also copies of several confidential letters from one of the
Government departments to her husband. That the girl was a clever and
most dangerous spy was at once proved, yet, rather than there should be
any unpleasant publicity, the girl was, that same night, packed off
unceremoniously across to the Hook of Holland.
In another instance a German governess in the employ of an officer's
wife at Chatham was discovered endeavouring to obtain confidential
information; and in a third, at Plymouth, a charming young lady was
caught red-handed.
These three glaring cases are within my own knowledge; therefore,
there probably have been many others where, after detection, the girls
have been summarily dismissed by their employers, who, naturally, have
hesitated to court publicity by prosecution.
It therefore behoves everyone employing a foreign governess--and more
especially anyone occupying an official position--to be alert and
wary. Many of these young ladies are known to have been trained for
the dastardly work which they have been so successfully carrying out,
and, while posing as loyal and dutiful servants of their employers, and
eating at their tables, they have been listening attentively to their
secrets.
We have, of late, been told a good deal of the danger of secret agents
among the alien staffs of hotels, and, in deference to public opinion,
the authorities have cleared our hotels of all Germans and Austrians.
Though holding no brief for the alien servant, I must say, at once,
that I have never known one single instance of a hotel servant of
lower grade being actually proved to be a secret agent. It is a fact,
however, that among the hall-porters of some of the principal hotels
were, until the outbreak of war, several well-known spies. The class of
person who is much more dangerous is the so-called "naturalised" alien.
Among these are, no doubt, spies, men who have long ago taken out
naturalisation papers for the sole purpose of blinding us, and of being
afforded opportunities to pursue their nefarious calling. To-day, while
thousands of men who have for years worked hard for a living are in
idleness in detention camps, these gentry are free to move about where
they will because they are so-called British subjects.
Surely the heart of a German is always German, just as the heart of
a true-born Briton is always British, whatever papers he may sign. I
contend that every German who has been "naturalised" during the last
seven years should be treated as other aliens are treated, and we
should then be nearer the end of the spy-peril.
"Naturalised" foreign baronets, financiers, merchants, ship-owners,
and persons of both sexes of high social standing, constitute a very
grave peril in our midst, though Mr. McKenna has not yet appeared to
have awakened to it, even though the Press and the public are, happily,
no longer blind to the German preparations. In the month of November,
while spies were being reported in hundreds by the public themselves,
the Home Office was actually engaged in holding an inquiry _into
whether there had really been any atrocities committed by the German
soldiery in Belgium_! And I was officially asked to assist in this!
As far as can be gathered from Mr. McKenna's reply in November to the
Parliamentary attack on the methods of dealing with the spy peril,
the position was still a most unsatisfactory one. Though he admitted
that we still have 27,000 enemy aliens at large among us, nobody is
assumed to be a spy unless he is an unnaturalised German. Even if he
fulfils this condition, he is then to be caught "in the act" of spying,
or if really strong suspicion be aroused, some evidence against him
may be "looked for." But until this is "found," and so long as he
complies with the posted-up registration orders, etc., he may continue
unmolested. In short, after the steed is stolen, our stable door may be
shut.
One sighs in despair. Could anything be more hopeless? If the matter
were not so very serious, the position would be Gilbertian in its
comedy.
Though we are at war, our sons being shot down and our national
existence threatened, yet there is yet another very strong factor in
favour of the German spy. According to Mr. McKenna, he himself is
only responsible for the London district, while elsewhere the County
Constabulary, under the Chief Constables of Counties, are "to pay every
attention to representations of the naval and military authorities,"
in the matter of hostile espionage.[2]
This strikes me as one of the finest examples of "how not to do it"
that we have heard of for some time, and it must indeed be a source of
delight to the secret "enemy within our gates." Fancy such a ridiculous
regulation in Germany!
Of some of the hundreds of cases of undoubted espionage which have been
brought to my notice since the outbreak of war, I will enumerate a few.
One was that of two Germans who--posing as Poles--rented a large
country house at £150 a year, bought a quantity of furniture, and
settled down to a quiet life. The house in question was situated at a
very important point on the main London and North Western Railway, and
the grounds ran down to a viaduct which, if destroyed, would cut off
a most important line of communication. The suspicion of a neighbour
was aroused. He informed the police, and a constable _in full uniform_
began to make inquiries of the neighbours, the result being that the
interesting pair left the house one night, and have not since been
seen.
Outside London, the county constabulary are making praiseworthy efforts
to find spies, but when men in uniform set out to make inquiries--as
they unfortunately do in so many cases--then the system becomes
hopeless.
The same thing happened in a small coast town in Norfolk where
signalling at night had been noticed. Indeed, in two instances in the
same town, and again in Dunbar, the appearance of the police inspector
caused the flight of the spies--as undoubtedly they were.
As regards the county of Norfolk, it has long received the most careful
attention of German secret agents. At the outbreak of war the Chief
Constable, Major Egbert Napier, with commendable patriotism, devoted
all his energies to the ferreting out of suspicious characters, spies
who were no doubt settled near and on the coast in readiness to assist
the enemy in case of an attempted landing. By Major Napier's untiring
efforts a very large area has been cleared, more especially from Cromer
along by Sheringham, Weybourne--a particularly vulnerable point--and
from Cley-next-the-Sea to Wells and King's Lynn.
Major Napier engaged, at my instigation, a well-known detective-officer
who, for some years, had been engaged at the Criminal Investigation
Department at New Scotland Yard, specially attached to deal with
German criminals for extradition back to Germany. He was a Russian,
naturalised English, and spoke German perfectly, being born in
Riga--and an ideal officer to inquire into the whole German spy system
in Norfolk.
Well, after Major Napier had asked him to go forth on his mission, I
saw him and wished him all success. Within a fortnight this shrewd
officer returned to me with a hopeless story. Wherever he went the
Coastguard refused to tell him anything, or any of their suspicions,
as they said they were sworn to secrecy, while the superintendents
and inspectors of the Norfolk Constabulary--with few exceptions--even
though he bore proper credentials signed by the Chief Constable
himself, actually _refused to give him any assistance or information
whatsoever_!
This keen and clever detective-officer returned to the Chief Constable
of Norfolk and told him that he was certain spies still existed along
the coast, but expressed regret at the hopeless state of affairs.
If any Government authority would like to question the officer upon his
experiences, I shall be pleased to furnish that department with his
private address.
I had a curious experience myself in Norfolk.
In a field, high upon the cliff between Cromer and Runton, I last
year established a high-power wireless installation. When in working
order--with a receiving range of 1,500 miles or more, according to
atmospheric conditions--I allowed visitors to inspect it. There came
along certain inquisitive persons with a slight accent in their speech,
and of these I believe no fewer than eight are now interned. It formed
quite an interesting trap for spies!
From the great mass of authentic reports of German spies lying before
me as I write, it is difficult to single out one case more illuminating
than another.
It may perhaps be of interest, however, to know that I was the first to
report to the authorities a secret store of German arms and ammunition
in London, afterwards removed, and subsequently seized after the
outbreak of war. Other stores have, it is said, been found in various
parts of the country, the secrets of which, of course, have never been
allowed to leak out to the public, for fear of creating alarm.
That secret stores of petrol, in readiness for that raid upon us by
Zeppelins which Germany has so long promised, have been thought to
exist in Scotland, is shown by the reward of £100, offered by the
Commander-in-Chief in Scotland for any information leading to the
discovery of any such bases.
But in connection with this, the situation is really most ludicrous.
Though, on November 8th, 1914, a London newspaper reproduced a copy of
the poster offering the reward--a poster exhibited upon hoardings all
over Scotland--yet the Press Censor actually issued to the London Press
orders to suppress all fact or comment concerning it! We may surely ask
why? If Scotland is told the truth, why may not England know it?
Between Rye and Winchelsea of late, on four occasions, people have been
detected flashing lights from the most seaward point between those
places to German submarines. In fact, two of the spies actually had
the audacity to build a shanty from which they signalled! This matter
was promptly reported by certain residents in the locality to the
Dover military authorities, but they replied that it was "out of their
division." Then they reported to the Admiralty, but only received the
usual typewritten "thanks" in these terms:--
"The Director of the Intelligence Division presents to Mr. ---- his
compliments, and begs to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of his
letter of ----.
"Admiralty War Staff: Intelligence Division."
Now what happened?
Early in the morning of December 10th, in the midst of a thick hazy
rain, half-a-dozen German submarines are reported to have made a daring
dash for the western entrance of Dover Harbour, where several of our
warships were lying at anchor. Fortunately they were discovered by
men working the searchlights, heavy guns were turned upon them, and
one submarine, if not more, was sunk. We have to thank spies in the
vicinity for this attempt, in which we so narrowly escaped disaster.
If not through spies, how could the enemy have known that, just at the
time the attack was made, Dover was without its boom-defence? And the
question arises whether the spies were those detected near Rye?
In all probability there exists somewhere in the neighbourhood a secret
wireless station sufficiently powerful to send intelligence say five
miles to sea by day, and double that distance at night. By this means
the enemy's submarines could easily learn the truth. Therefore the
authorities should lose no time in making domiciliary visits to any
house where a suspect may be living.
And if secret wireless exists near Dover, then there may be--as there
probably are, since small wireless stations are not costly to fit up,
and could, till the outbreak of war, be purchased without arousing the
least suspicion--other stations in the vicinity of other of our naval
bases, the peril of which will easily be recognised.
The replies by the Admiralty to persons who give information are curt
and unsatisfactory enough, yet if a resident in the Metropolitan area
writes to the Chief Commissioner of Police upon a serious matter
concerning espionage--he will _not even receive the courtesy of a
reply_! At least, that has been my own experience. It is appalling to
think that the authorities are so utterly incapable of dealing with the
situation to-day, even though our men are laying down their lives for
us, and fighting as only Britons can fight.
Existence of carefully-prepared concrete emplacements, in readiness
for the huge German Krupp guns, has been reported to me from a dozen
different quarters--sometimes they are concealed in the form of a
concrete carriage-drive, in others as a tennis-court, or a yard
enclosed by stables. Workmen who have actually been employed in
laying them down, and have given me the enormous thicknesses of the
concrete used, have communicated with me, and indicated where these
long-considered preparations of the enemy are to-day to be found.
But as it is nobody's business, and as Mr. McKenna has assured us that
we are quite safe, and that the spy-peril has been snuffed-out, the
position is here again hopeless, and we are compelled to live daily
upon the edge of a volcano.
Oh! when will England rub her eyes and awaken?
As events have proved in Belgium and France, so here, in our own
dear country, I fear we have spies in every department of the public
service. I say boldly, without fear of contradiction--that if our
apathetic Home Department continues to close its eyes as it is now
doing, we shall be very rudely stirred up one day when the Zeppelins
come in force--as the authorities fear by the darkening of London. From
the lessons taught us in France, I fear that in every department of our
public services, the post-office, the railways, the docks, the electric
generating-stations, in our arsenals, in our government factories, and
among those executing certain government contracts--everywhere, from
Wick to Walmer--the spy still exists, and he is merely awaiting the
signal of his masters to strike: to blow up bridges and tunnels, to
destroy water-supplies, docks, power-stations and wireless-stations:
to cut telegraphs and telephones, and to create panic--a sudden and
fearful panic--which it would be to the interest of the invaders to
create.
At my suggestion the Postmaster-General, at the outbreak of war,
ordered each letter-carrier in the Kingdom to prepare lists of
foreigners on their "walk," and upon those lists hundreds of
arrests of aliens took place. No doubt many spies were "rounded-up"
by this process, but alas! many still remain, sufficient of the
"naturalised,"--even those "naturalised" after the war,--to form a very
efficient advance-guard to our invading enemy, who hate us with such a
deadly, undying hatred.
If Zeppelins are to raid us successfully they must have secret bases
for the supply of petrol for their return journey. Such bases can only
be established in out-of-the-way places where, on descending, air-craft
would not be fired upon. The moors, those of Yorkshire, Dartmoor, and
certain districts of Scotland and the Lake Country, are admirably
adapted for this purpose, for there are spots which could easily be
recognised from the air--by the direction of the roads, running like
ribbons across the heather--where considerable stores could easily be
secreted without anyone being the wiser.
This is a petrol war, and if any raid is attempted upon the country,
petrol will be wanted in great quantities by the enemy. Is it
not, therefore, with our knowledge of Germany's long-completed
preparations at Maubeuge, Antwerp, along the heights of the Aisne,
and in other places, quite safe to assume that considerable--even
greater--preparations have already been made in our own country--made
in the days when the British public were lulled to sleep by the
Judas-like assurances of the Kaiser and his friendly visits to our
King, and when any honest attempt to lift the veil was met with abuse
and derision. If we assume that preparations have been made, it is,
surely, our duty to now discover them.
Petrol and ammunition are the two things which the enemy will want
if they dare to attempt a dash upon our coast. Therefore it would be
very wise for the authorities to make a house-to-house visitation,
and search from garret to cellar all premises until lately occupied
by aliens in the Eastern Counties, and all houses still occupied by
"naturalised" foreigners, who, if they were honestly "British subjects"
as they declare, could not possibly object.
There are many licensed premises, too, held by the "naturalised,"
and the cellars of these should certainly be searched. Hundreds of
"naturalised" Germans and Austrians are living--immune from even
suspicion. They are of all grades, from watchmakers and hotel-keepers
to wealthy financiers.
If only the Government would deal with the "naturalised," as any sane
system of Government would in these unparalleled circumstances, then
it would give a free hand to the Chief Constables of Lincolnshire,
Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, and Kent to clear out, once and for ever, the
canker-worm of espionage which has, alas! been allowed to eat so very
nearly into Britain's heart.
I am not affected by that disease known as spy-mania. I write only of
what I know, of what I have witnessed with my own eyes and have heard
with my own ears.
I therefore appeal most strongly, with all my patriotism, to the
reader, man or woman, to pause, to reflect, to think, and to demand
that justice shall, at this crisis of our national life, be done.
We want no more attempts to gag the Press, no evasive speeches in the
House--no more pandering to the foreign financier or bestowing upon him
Birthday Honours: no more kid-gloved legislation for our monied enemies
whose sons, in some cases, are fighting against us, but sturdy, honest
and deliberate action--the action with the iron-hand of justice in the
interests of our own beloved Empire.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 2: Even at this moment of our peril, it is doubtful if the
public will find at New Scotland Yard a single detective able to
pass himself off as a German and thus be in a position to make close
investigation. There are, certainly, several who speak German, but
in a dozen words they betray their British nationality. Surely the
police cannot hope for good results without possessing agents competent
to carry out what is a difficult and delicate task. The Extradition
Department is no longer what it was under Chief-Inspector Greenham.]