The central point of the former was at Offenbourg;

where were some emigrants, some English agents, and

the Baroness de Reich, so noted for her political

intrigues:

The central point of the latter was given out to be

at the castle of Ettenheim, where the Duke

d'Enghien, Dumourier, an English colonel, and

several agents of the Bourbons, resided.

The hundred and twenty thousand francs given by the

minister Drake to the Sieur Rosey, chef de

bataillon, to excite an insurrection,

The declarations of Mehee;

And the reports of M. Sh***, prefect of Strasbourg,

and brother-in-law of the Duke de Fel....; leave no

doubt of the existence of the intrigues at

Offenbourg and Ettenheim, to which M. Sh***

ascribes in particular the agitation, and symptoms

of discontent, that prevail at Weissembourg, and in

several parts of Alsace.

On the other hand, the conspiracy of the 3d of

Nivose had just broken out. The discoveries made by

the servant of Georges, and by other individuals,

led to the belief, that the Duke d'Enghien had been

sent by England to the borders of the Rhine, in

order to place himself at the head of the

insurrection, as soon as Napoleon was made away

with.

The necessity of putting an end to these plots, and

strike terror into their instigators by a grand act

of reprisal, squared in an incredible degree with

the political considerations, that led Napoleon to

attempt a bold stroke, in order to give the

revolution, and the revolutionists, those

guaranties, which circumstances demanded:

Napoleon, named consul for life (I borrow here the

language of the Manuscript from St. Helena), felt

the weakness of his situation, the ridiculousness

of his consulship. It was necessary to establish

something solid, to serve as a support to the

revolution. The republicans were alarmed at the

height, on which circumstances had placed him: they

were suspicious of the use he might make of his

power: they dreaded his renewing an antiquated

royalty by the help of his army. The royalists

fomented this rumour, and took a delight in

representing him as an ape of the ancient monarchs:

other royalists, more adroit, whispered about, that

he was enamoured of the part of Monk, and that he

would take the pains to restore the power, only to

make a present of it to the Bourbons, when it

should be in a proper state to be offered them.

Ordinary minds, unacquainted with his powers,

credited these reports; they sanctioned the tales

of the royalist party, and decried him to the

people, and to the army; for they began to suspect

him, and his attachment to their cause. He could

not allow such an opinion to pass current, because

it tended to unhinge every thing. It was necessary,

at all events, to undeceive France, the royalists,

and Europe at large, in order that they might know,

what they had to reckon upon in him. A persecution

of reports in detail never produces any thing but a

bad effect, for it does not attack the root of the

evil.

The death of the Duke d'Enghien would decide the

question, that agitated France; it would decide the

character of Napoleon beyond return; in fine, it

might intimidate and punish the authors of the

plots incessantly contriving against his life, and

against the state: accordingly he determined on it.

He sent for Marshal Berthier, and this minister

directed General Ord**, by an order which the

Emperor dictated, and which I have _seen_, to set

off post for Strasbourg; to cause General Lev** to

place under his orders fifteen boatmen, three

hundred dragoons from the garrison of Schelstadt,

and thirty gendarmes; to pass the Rhine at Rheinan,

to proceed to Ettenheim, to surround the town, and

_to carry off the Duke d'Enghien, Dumourier, an

English colonel, and all the persons in their

suite_.

The Duke d'Enghien,

General Thumery,

Colonel de Grunstein,

Lieutenant Schmidt,

Abbe Weinburn, and five other inferior persons,

were arrested by a chef d'escadron of the

gendarmerie, named Ch**, who was charged with this

part of the expedition.

Then, and then only, it became certain, that

Dumourier was not at Ettenheim. General Thumery had

been mistaken for him. This mistake, occasioned by

the similarity of their rank, and some likeness of

sound between their names, which the Germans

pronounced nearly alike, had heightened the

importance and criminality of the pretended plots

at Ettenheim in the mind of Napoleon, and had the

most fatal influence on his determination.

The Duke d'Enghien was brought from Strasbourg to

Paris, and carried before a military commission.

The Empress Josephine, the Princess Hortense, fell

at Napoleon's feet in tears, and conjured him to

spare the life of the Duke d'Enghien. Prince

Cambaceres and the Prince of Neufchatel strongly

remonstrated to him on the horrible inutility of

the blow he was about to strike. He appeared to

hesitate, when the information was brought him,

that the prince was no more.

Napoleon had not expected so speedy a catastrophe.

He had even given orders to M. Real, to repair to

Vincennes, to interrogate the Duke d'Enghien: but

his trial and execution had been hastened by Murat;

who, urged by some regicides, at the head of whom

was M. Fou***, thought he should render a service

to Napoleon, to his family, and to France, by

insuring the death of a Bourbon.

The Prince de T***, whom the Emperor often publicly

reproached with having advised the seizure and

death of the Duke d'Enghien, was directed to pacify

the court of Baden, and to justify the violation of

its territory in the eyes of Europe. M. de

Caulincourt being at Strasbourg, the Emperor

thought him more proper than any other person, to

follow up a negotiation, if the turn of affairs

should require it; and he was directed to send to

the minister of Baden the despatch of the Prince de

T***. But there was no need of having recourse to

negotiations: the court, far from complaining of

the violation of its territory, expressed itself

well contented, that the step taken had saved it

the disgrace of consenting, or the embarrassment of

a refusal.

This is an exact and true recital of the

circumstances, that preceded, followed, and

accompanied, the carrying off and death of the last

of the house of Conde.

The seizure of the Duke d'Enghien was long imputed

to M. de Caulincourt, and is still imputed to him

by persons uninformed of the truth.

Some assert, that he arrested him with his own

hands:

Others, that he gave orders for the seizure of his

person: both these imputations are equally false.

He did not arrest the Duke d'Enghien, for his

seizure was executed and consummated by chef

d'escadron Ch***.

Neither directly, nor indirectly, did he give

orders for seizing the prince: for the particular

mission, to carry him off, was confided to General

Ord**, and this general had no orders to receive

from M. de Caulincourt his equal, perhaps even his

inferior.

What made it be supposed, at a time when it was not

possible to explain the facts, that M. de

Caulincourt had been employed to seize the Duke

d'Enghien, or cause him to be seized, was, that M.

de Caulincourt received, at the same moment as

General Ord**, orders to repair to Strasbourg, to

cause the emigrants and English agents, who had

fixed the seat of their intrigues at Offenbourg, to

be carried off. But this mission, for which it

would be requisite to take measures in concert with

General Ord**, and perhaps even to assist him in

case of need; for a simultaneous proceeding was

necessary, that one expedition might not cause the

failure of the other; this mission, I say, though

analogous to that of General Ord**, had no real

connexion with it.

Their objects were different:

That of one was to carry off the Duke d'Enghien

from Ettenheim;

That of the other, to seize the conspirators at

Offenbourg, which was eight or ten leagues distant.

Perhaps it will be objected, that M. de Caulincourt

was not ignorant of General Ord**'s being directed,

to seize the Duke d'Enghien. Be it so: I cannot

perceive the consequence, attempted to be drawn

from this. But what I have _seen_ in the cabinet,

and what I attest, is, that the order given to M.

de Caulincourt said nothing of Ettenheim, and that

the name of the Duke d'Enghien was not even

mentioned in it: it related solely, in the first

place, to the construction of a flotilla, that was

preparing on the Rhine; and, secondly, to the

expedition of Offenbourg; an expedition that

terminated, as no doubt is still remembered, in the

laughable flight of the minister Drake and his

agents.

I have thought it my duty as a Frenchman and an

historian, to enter into these details, and destroy

for ever an error, which malevolence and the spirit

of party have laid hold of, in order to tarnish the

political life of one of the men, who do the

greatest honour to the imperial government and to

France.

M. de Caulincourt would not have been less

irreproachable, had he committed the fatal seizure

ascribed to him: he would have done his duty, as

General Ord** did his. A soldier is not the judge

of the orders he is to execute. The great Conde,

covered with the laurels of Rocroy, Fribourg,

Norlinguen, and Lenz, was arrested, in spite of the

faith pledged to him, in the apartments of the

King; yet neither his contemporaries, nor

posterity, have charged Marshal d'Albret with this

arrest as a crime.]

Will it be said, that Pichegru was strangled by his orders? The

designs of Pichegru were so clearly substantiated, and the laws so

clear, that he could not escape the scaffold: why, then, should he

cause him to be murdered? The greatest criminals themselves do not

commit useless crimes. Were apprehensions entertained of the

disclosures he might make?... What could he disclose to the French

people? That Napoleon aspired to the throne? Of this no one was

ignorant.

A man, that Napoleon had reason to dread, was Moreau: was his life

attempted? Yet it was less dangerous, to assassinate him, than to send

to a tribunal, where guilt presided, a warrior at that time so dear to

France and to the army.

No, Napoleon was not cruel, he was not sanguinary. If he were

sometimes inexorable, it was because there are circumstances, in which

the monarch must shut his heart to compassion, and leave the law free

to act: but, if he knew how to punish, he was also capable of

pardoning; and, at the moment when he gave up Georges[103] to the

sword of justice, he spared the lives of Messrs. de Polignac and the

Marquis de Riviere, whose courage and zeal he respected.

[Footnote 103: I have been assured, that Georges

was three times offered his pardon by Napoleon, if

he would promise, not to engage in any conspiracy

again; and that it was not till after his third

refusal, that his sentence was ordered to be

carried into execution.]

The Emperor did not stop at the rigorous trial, to which he had

delivered over the person of M. de Lascours: by a decree, dated the

18th of March, and published the 9th of April, he ordered the

condemnation, and the sequestration of the property of

The Prince of Benevento,

The Duke of Ragusa,

The Duke of Alberg,

The Abbe de Montesquiou,

The Count de Jaucourt,

The Count de Bournonville, and

The Sieurs Lynch,

Vitrolles,

Alexis de Noailles,

Bourienne,

Bellard,

La Roche-Jaquelin, and

Sostene de la Rochefoucault[104];

[Footnote 104: Marshal Augereau, Duke de

Castiglione, was also in this list. His name was

struck out at the request of the duchess, and in

consideration of the proclamation, which he

published on the 23d of March.]

All of whom, as members of the provisional government, or agents of

the royal party, had concurred in the subversion of the imperial

government, previous to the abdication of Napoleon.

This decree, though supposed to have originated at Lyons, first saw

the light at Paris; and was, as I have just said, the result of the

ill humour, into which the plots of the royalists had thrown Napoleon.

The terms, in which it was originally couched, too clearly attested

its source: the first article said; "are declared traitors to their

country, and shall be punished as such, &c."

It was I, who wrote this decree, from the dictation of the Emperor.

When I had finished it, he ordered me, to go and get it signed by

Count Bertrand, who had countersigned the decrees of Lyons. I went to

the marshal. He read the decree, and returned it to me, saying: "I

will never sign it: this is not what the Emperor promised us; they who

advise him, to take such measures, are his bitterest enemies; I will

speak to him about it." I related this firm and courageous answer to

Napoleon word for word. He ordered me, to return to the grand Marshal,

to endeavour to overcome his repugnance, and, if he still persisted,

to bring him to him. Count Bertrand instantly followed me, with head

erect, into the Emperor's closet. "I am astonished," said Napoleon to

him in a dry tone, "that you make such difficulties about it to me.

The severity I wish to display is necessary for the good of the

state."--"I do not think so, Sire."--"I do, I tell you: and it is my

business alone to judge of it. I did not ask your advice, but your

signature, which is only a matter of form, and cannot in any way

compromise you."--"Sire, a minister, who countersigns the act of a

sovereign, is morally responsible for that act; and I should think

myself wanting in my duty to your Majesty, and perhaps to myself, if I

were weak enough to set my hand to such measures. If your Majesty

choose to reign by the laws, you have no right, arbitrarily to

pronounce, by a simple decree, sentence of death, and forfeiture of

property, against your subjects. If you choose to act as a dictator,

and to have no law but your own will, you have no need of the addition

of my signature. Your Majesty has declared, by your proclamations,

that you would grant a general amnesty. I countersigned them most

cordially; and I will not countersign the decree, that revokes

them."--"But you well know, I always told you, that I never would

pardon Marmont, Talleyrand, and Augereau; and that I promised only to

overlook, what had passed since my abdication. I know better than you,

what I ought to do, to keep my promises, and ensure the tranquillity

of the state. I begun with being indulgent, even to weakness and the

royalists, instead of appreciating my moderation, have abused it: they

bestir themselves, they conspire, and I ought and will bring them to

their senses. I would rather have my blows fall on traitors, than on

men who are misled. Besides, all those who are on the list, Augereau

excepted, are out of France, or in concealment. I shall not seek for

them: my intention is to terrify them more than harm them. You see,

therefore," continued the Emperor, softening his voice, "you have not

rightly considered the business: sign this for me, my dear Bertrand:

you must."--"I cannot, Sire. I request your Majesty's permission, to

submit my observations to you in writing."--"All that, my dear sir,

will make us lose time: you are startled, I assure you, without any

reason; sign, I tell you; I request you, you will do me

pleasure."--"Permit me, Sire, to wait, till your Majesty has seen my

observations." The marshal went away. This noble resistance did not

offend the Emperor: the language of truth and honour never displeased

him, when it issued from a pure heart.

General Bertrand delivered to Napoleon a statement of his reasons. It

did not alter his resolution; it only determined him, to give it a

legal form.

The Emperor, persuaded that General Bertrand would equally retain his

opinion, would not have this new decree presented to him, and it

appeared without being countersigned.

The effect it produced justified the apprehensions of the grand

Marshal. It was considered as an act of despotism and vengeance; as

the first infraction of the promises made to the nation. The murmurs

of the public were echoed even within the walls of the imperial

palace. Labedoyere, at a moment when Napoleon was passing by, said

loud enough to be heard, "If the system of proscriptions and

sequestrations begin again, all will soon be over."

The Emperor, according to his custom on such occasions, affected to be

perfectly satisfied with himself, and appeared no way apprehensive of

the storm. Being at table with several personages and ladies of

distinction belonging to the court, he asked the Countess Duchatel, if

her husband, who was director-general of the domains, had executed the

order for sequestrating the estates of Talleyrand and company. "There

is no hurry for that," answered she drily. He made no reply, and

changed the conversation.

The persons about him are incessantly reproached, with having basely

crouched to his will and opinions: this anecdote, and many others that

I might relate, prove, that all of them at least did not deserve this

reproach. But, supposing it to be just with regard to some, is it as

easy, as is commonly thought, to overcome the will of a sovereign?

From pride, and perhaps from a conviction of superiority, Napoleon did

not readily endure counsel.

In affairs of state, he imposed upon himself the law of consulting his

counsellors, and his ministers. Endowed by nature with the faculty of

knowing every thing, or of divining every thing, he almost always took

an active part in the discussion: and I must say, to the honour of the

Emperor, his ministers, and his counsellors, in common, an

inexpressible degree of confidence, frankness, and independence,

prevailed in these discussions, highly animated as for the most part

they were. The Emperor, far from being shocked when any one

contradicted him, endured, nay provoked contradiction and adopted

without resistance the advice of his opponents, when he thought it

preferable to his own opinion.

When the question concerned those grand decisions, that influence the

fate of empires, the case was different. He listened for a certain

time to the objections of his ministers: but, when his attention had

reached its bounds, he interrupted them, and supported his own opinion

with so much fire, force, and perseverance, that he reduced them to

silence.

This silence was less the effect of their passive obedience to the

intentions of the monarch, than the result of the lessons taught by

experience. They had seen, that the most rash, the most

incomprehensible, I had almost said the most senseless, enterprises of

Napoleon were invariably crowned with success; and they were

convinced, that reason could not contend against the inspirations of

genius, and the favours of fortune.

In fine, Napoleon often consulted only his own will; and his ministers

then knew nothing of his resolves, till they received orders, to carry

them into execution.

Such was, and such always will be the situation of ministers, in a

monarchy, where the Prince governs for himself; and more especially

when this Prince, like Napoleon, owes his throne merely to the

ascendancy of his genius and his sword.

Besides, the time of flatterers and flattery was past with Napoleon.

Every one was interested in telling him the truth, and no one was

sparing of it to him.

The security inspired by this rare and valuable veracity was

strengthened by the arrival of Prince Joseph and Prince Lucien. The

moderation of the one, and the patriotism of the other, were well

known; and the care of maintaining the liberal and pacific intentions

of the Emperor was laid on them both.

Prince Lucien had been deeply afflicted in 1814 at the misfortunes of

his brother, and was eager to offer him his fortune and his services.

This, generous offer did not entirely efface from the heart of

Napoleon the remembrance, of their ancient differences, but it

softened the asperity of them; and it might be foreseen, that their

enmity would not be eternal.

As soon as Prince Lucien heard of the entry of Napoleon into Paris, he

wrote him a letter of congratulation. "Your return," said he, "fills

up the measure of your military glory. But there is another glory

still greater, and above all more desirable, civil glory. The

sentiments and intentions, which you have solemnly promulgated,

promise France, that you know how to acquire it," &c.

Prince Lucien, however, notwithstanding his desire of revisiting that

country, the cause of which he pleaded, did not venture to approach

it. But the invasion of the King of Naples having rendered his

services necessary to the Sovereign Pontiff, the gratitude he owed to

the Holy Father triumphed over his apprehensions. He departed under

the title of secretary to the Pope's nuncio, and crossed the Alps

without any obstacle. Arrived in the French territory, he wrote to

Napoleon, to inform him of his mission, and to ask if his coming to

Paris would be agreeable to him. Napoleon's first feeling was that of

hesitating to receive him: his second, that of opening to him his

arms. The intention of the Prince was to return quickly to Home,

whither he was called by the concerns entrusted to him: but the

interruption of the communications did not allow this. Obliged to

return to Paris, he laid aside his incognito. His return was then

publicly announced, and made an advantageous and agreeable impression

on every mind.

A few days before, the Emperor had made the acquisition of another

personage; less illustrious, it is true, but equally renowned for his

patriotism and intelligence: I mean M. Benjamin Constant.

Napoleon, knowing the experience and reputation of this learned

civilian, sent for him, to converse with him "on liberty and the

constitution." Their conversation continued more than two hours. The

Emperor, willing to attach M. Constant to his party, employed all his

means of seduction; and I leave it to those Frenchmen, and those

foreigners, who have had access to him, to say, whether it were

possible to resist him.

When he wished to fix any one in his train, he studied and penetrated

with extreme sagacity his way of thinking, his principles, his

character, his ruling passions; and then with that familiar grace,

that affability, that force and vivacity of expression, which gave so

much value and such a charm to his conversations[105], he insinuated

himself imperceptibly into your heart, made himself master of your

passions, gently excited them, and artfully flattered them: then,

displaying at once the magic resources of his genius, he plunged you

into intoxication, into admiration, and subdued you so rapidly, so

completely, that it seemed the effect of enchantment.

[Footnote 105: These conversations with persons,

whose merit and opinion Napoleon esteemed, were

always pleasing, instructive, interesting, always

marked with strong thoughts, and bold, ingenious,

or sublime expressions. With persons indifferent to

him, or whose nullity he discerned, his phrases,

scarcely begun, were never finished: his ideas

turned only on insignificant, common-place matters,

which, by way of amusing himself, he was apt to

season with biting sarcasm, or jokes more whimsical

than witty.

This explains the contradictions between the

different opinions given of Napoleon's

understanding by foreigners introduced at his

court.]

Thus M. Benjamin Constant was subjugated: he arrived at the Tuileries

with repugnance, he quitted the palace an enthusiast.

The next day he was named counsellor of state: and this favour he owed

to no base submissions, as his enemies have pretended, but to his

learning, and to the desire the Emperor had of giving to public

opinion, and to M. B. Constant himself, a pledge of his having

forgotten the past; a pledge so much the more meritorious, as the

Emperor, independently of the Philippic launched against him by this

writer on the 19th of March, had besides before his eyes a letter in

his own hand to M. de Blacas, the subject and expressions of which

were of a nature, to inspire Napoleon with something more than

aversion for its author.

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