"Such a resolution seems to require more than human strength of mind:

yet Napoleon was capable of taking it, if the peace and happiness of

France could have been purchased by this new sacrifice. He would again

have devoted himself for the French people, from whom, as he wishes

to declare in the face of all Europe, he makes it his glory to hold

every thing, to whom he refers every thing, and to whom alone he will

hold himself responsible for his actions and devote his life.

"It was for France alone, and to save her from the calamities of an

intestine war, that he abdicated the crown in 1814. He restored to the

French people the rights he held from them; he left them free to

choose a new master, and to found their liberty and happiness on

institutions, that would protect both.

"He hoped, that the nation would preserve all it had acquired by five

and twenty years of glorious fighting; and the exercise of its

sovereignty in the choice of a dynasty, and in stipulating the

conditions, on which it should be called to the throne.

"He expected from the new government respect for the glory of the

armies, and for the rights of the brave; the guaranty of all the new

interests, interests generated and maintained during a quarter of a

century, resulting from all the civil and political laws, observed and

revered during that time, because they are identified with the

manners, habits, and wants of the nation.

"Far from all this, every idea of the sovereignty of the people has

been discarded.

"The principle, on which all public and civil legislation has been

founded since the revolution, has been equally discarded.

"France has been treated as a revolted country, reconquered by the

armies of its ancient masters, and subjugated anew to a feudal

domination.

"A constitutional law has been imposed on France, as easy to be eluded

as revoked; and in the form of royal ordinances simply, without

consulting the nation, without even hearing those bodies, become

illegal, the phantoms of national representation.

"The violation of this charter has been checked only by the timidity

of the government; the extent of the abuses of its authority has been

limited only by its weakness.

"The disjointing of the army, the dispersion of its officers, the

exile of several, the debasement of the soldiers, the suppression of

their endowments, the privation of their pay or pensions; the

reduction of the pay of the legionaries, the despoiling them of their

honours, the pre-eminence given to the decorations of the feudal

monarchy, the contempt of the citizens, designated anew under the name

of _tiers-etat_ (third estate); the spoliation of the purchasers of

national property, prepared and already begun, the actual diminution

of value of such as was obliged to be sold; the return of the feudal

system in its titles, privileges, and useful rights, the

re-establishment of tramontane principles, the abolition of the

liberties of the Gallican church, the annihilation of the Concordat,

the re-establishment of tithes, the reviving intolerance of an

exclusive form of worship; the domination of a handful of nobles over

a people accustomed to equality: are what the ministers of the

Bourbons have done, or wished to do, for the people of France.

"It was under such circumstances, that the Emperor Napoleon quitted

the island of Elba: such were the motives of the resolution he took,

and not the consideration of his own personal interests, so trivial in

his opinion compared with the interests of the nation, to which he has

devoted his existence.

"He has not brought war into the bosom of France: on the contrary, he

has extinguished the war, which the possessors of national property,

constituting four fifths of the landholders throughout France, would

have been compelled to make upon their despoilers; the war, which the

citizens, oppressed, degraded, humiliated by the nobles, would have

been forced to declare against their oppressors; the war, which the

Protestants, the Jews, and the people of different sects, would have

been obliged to maintain against their persecutors.

"He came to deliver France; and as a deliverer he has been received.

"He arrived almost alone; he travelled two hundred and twenty leagues,

without meeting any obstacle, without a battle; and has resumed

without resistance, in the midst of the capital, and of the

acclamations of an immense majority of the citizens, the throne

relinquished by the Bourbons; who, from among the army, their own

household, the national guards, or the people, could not raise a

single person in arms, to endeavour to maintain them in it.

"Yet, replaced at the head of the nation, which had already chosen him

three times, and has just elected him a fourth time by the reception

it gave him on his march, and his triumphant arrival; of that nation,

by which, and for the interest of which, he wishes to reign;

"What is the desire of Napoleon? What the French people desire, the

independence of France, peace within, peace with all nations, the

execution of the treaty of Paris, of the 30th of May, 1814.

"What is there, then, changed in the future state of Europe, and in

the hope of repose promised it? What voice is raised, to demand those

succours, which, according to the declaration, are to be granted only

when claimed?

"There is nothing changed, if the allied powers recur, as we have a

right to expect from them, to just and temperate sentiments; if they

acknowledge, that the existence of France in a respectable and

independent state, as far from conquering as from being conquered,

from domineering as from being held in subjection, is necessary to the

balance of great realms, as well as to the guaranty of smaller states.

"There is nothing changed, if, not attempting to compel France to

resume with a dynasty, which she can no longer desire, the feudal

chains she has broken, and to submit to the seigneurial or

ecclesiastical pretensions, from which it has emancipated itself,

those powers do not attempt to impose on her laws, to interfere in her

internal concerns, to assign her a particular form of government, to

give her masters suited to the interests and passions of her

neighbours.

"There is nothing changed, if, while France is occupied in preparing

the new social compact, that shall guaranty the liberty of her

citizens, and the triumph of those generous ideas, that prevail in

Europe, and can no longer be stifled; she be not compelled, to call

off her attention from these pacific ideas, and from the means of

domestic prosperity, to which the people and their chief are desirous

of devoting themselves in happy concord, in order to prepare for

battle.

"There is nothing changed, if, while the French nation demands

nothing, but to remain at peace with all Europe, an unjust coalition

do not oblige her to defend, as it did in 1792, her will, and her

rights, and her independence, and the sovereign of her choice."

This eloquent refutation, full of irrefragable facts, and reasonings

not to be refuted, was no longer necessary. French honour had judged

and condemned the Congress of Vienna and its Declaration.

When this declaration appeared, France grew pale: she was astonished,

affrighted at the calamities, which the future boded; and groaned at

the idea of being exposed to a war for the sake of one single man.

This first impression over, her pride, her virtue, felt indignant,

that the allies should dare to conceive the thought, that she would

yield to their menaces, and cowardly consent, to give Napoleon up to

them.

Had Napoleon been no more than a simple citizen, the attempt to

violate by authority the rights of men and nations in his person would

have been sufficient, to induce the French, or at least all worthy of

the name, to think themselves obliged to protect and defend him.

But Napoleon was not merely a simple citizen, he was the head of the

French nation: it was for having aggrandized it by his conquests, and

ennobled it by his victories, that he was proscribed by foreigners;

and the most timid as well as the most generous made it their sacred

duty to place him under the safeguard of the nation, and of French

honour.

Thus the declaration of the Congress, instead of intimidating France,

heightened its courage; instead of separating Napoleon from the

French, drew still more close the bands that united them; instead of

calling down on his head the public vengeance, rendered him more

estimable and more dear in the eyes of the people.

If Napoleon, availing himself of these generous sentiments, had said

to the French: "You have restored to me the crown, foreigners are

desirous of tearing it from me; I am ready, either to defend it, or to

lay it down; say which I shall do:" the whole nation would have

understood Napoleon, and would have risen in a body, to cause the

sovereign of its heart and its choice to be respected.

But Napoleon had other ideas: he considered the declaration of the

Congress merely as a paper adapted to the circumstances of the day,

the object of which was, at the time when it was subscribed by the

allies, to support the courage of the royalists, and to restore to the

Bourbons the confidence and moral strength they had lost.

He thought, that his entrance into Paris, and the entire pacification

of the South, would have completely changed the state of things; and

he hoped, that foreign nations would ultimately acknowledge him, when

they were convinced, that he had been re-established on the throne by

the unanimous consent of the French, and that his ideas of conquest

and dominion had given place to the real desire of respecting the

tranquillity and independence of his neighbours, and of living in

harmony with them.

In fine, he considered, that prudence would induce the allies, as it

was their interest, not to engage in a war, the results of which could

not be favourable to them: "They will feel, that they will not this

time have to do with the France of 1814; and that their successes, if

they gain any, will be no longer decisive, but will merely serve to

render the war more obstinate and bloody; while, if victory favour me,

I may become as formidable as ever. I have for me Belgium and the

Rhenish provinces, and with a tricoloured flag and a proclamation I

could revolutionize them in four-and-twenty hours."

The treaty of the 25th of March, by which the great powers, renewing

the arrangements of the treaty of Chaumont, engaged themselves anew

not to lay down their arms, as long as Napoleon should be on the

throne, appeared to him merely the natural consequence of the act of

the 13th of March, and of the erroneous opinions the allies had formed

of France. He thought, that it would not alter the state of the

question; and resolved, notwithstanding this treaty, and the

affronting manner in which his first overtures were received, to

endeavour repeatedly to make the voice of truth, of reason, and of

peace, heard at Vienna.

Baron de Stassart, late auditor to the council of state and prefect,

had been made chamberlain of Austria, or of Bavaria, since the

restoration. He was at Paris. The Emperor, hoping he might be able to

reach Vienna under favour of his quality of chamberlain, charged him

with a mission for the Empress Marie Louise, and fresh despatches for

the Emperor of Austria. Napoleon at the same time had recourse to

other means: he was aware of the intimacy and connexions of MM. D. de

St. L** and de Mont** with Prince Talleyrand; and persuaded, that M.

de Talleyrand would procure for them authority to repair to Vienna, he

resolved, to send them thither. He did not deceive himself with the

idea, that they would accept their mission for any other purpose than

that of more easily serving the royal cause; but he paid little regard

to their intrigues with the King, provided they delivered and brought

back with exactness the despatches, that should be entrusted to

them[95].

[Footnote 95: It was a laughable singularity, that,

of all the double-faced men employed by the

Emperor, there was no one, in whom he had more

confidence, than he had in M. de Mont**. He had

formerly ill-treated, persecuted, and banished him:

he knew, that he detested him, and was the most

intimate, the most devoted friend of M. de

Talleyrand: but he knew also the bent of M. de

Mont**'s mind; and he thought, that he would feel

an infinite pleasure, in executing his mission

well, and _humming_ [_rouer_] M. de Talleyrand, who

flattered himself, that he had never been hummed by

any person. I know not whether M. de Mont** found

it pleasant, or not, to take in M. de Talleyrand;

what I know is, that he justified the expectations

of Napoleon, and brought back to him intact the

letters, that were delivered to him by M. de

Mont**.]

About the King, however, and what passed at Ghent, he took little

concern: his anxious eyes were turned to Vienna; and convinced of the

influence, that M. de Talleyrand might exert there, he particularly

directed M. ****, to offer him his favour, and money also, if he would

abandon the Bourbons, and employ his talents and experience for the

benefit of the imperial cause.

The Emperor, who did not cease to hope, that his exertions, time, and

reflection, might effect some changes in the resolutions of the

allies, heard with extreme displeasure, that the King of Naples had

commenced hostilities.

This prince had long been dissatisfied with the complaisance, with

which the allied sovereigns listened to the protests of France, Savoy,

and Spain: and, though his crown had been guarantied to him by a

solemn compact with Austria, and by the formal declarations of Russia

and England, he foresaw, that the doctrine of legitimacy would carry

the point against the faith of treaties, and that Austria, though

interested in not allowing another crown to be transferred to the

house of Bourbon, would be obliged to submit to the unanimous will of

the other powers.

Thus the fear of being driven from the throne, and the resolution to

maintain himself in it, possessed Joachim, when the news of the

successful landing of Napoleon reached Naples.

The horror with which the Austrian sway inspired the Italians, the

attachment they retained to Napoleon, and the joy they displayed on

hearing of his departure from the island of Elba, persuaded the King,

that he should find no difficulty in raising Italy; and he flattered

himself with bringing the allies, either by force of arms, or by way

of negotiation, to guaranty to him irrevocably the possession of his

kingdom.

Desirous on the other hand of securing the protection of Napoleon, in

case of failure of success, he secretly despatched an emissary to

congratulate him; and announce, that, with a view of seconding his

operations, he was about to attack the Austrians, and, if his wishes

were answered by victory, he would soon join him with a formidable

army: "in fine," he wrote, "the moment of atoning for the wrong I have

done your Majesty, and of proving my attachment, is now arrived; I

will not let it escape."

This letter, which I deciphered, reached the Emperor at Auxerre; and

he immediately enjoined the King, to continue his preparations, but

wait for his giving him the signal, before he commenced hostilities.

The natural impetuosity and impatience of this Prince did not allow

him, to wait for the answer of Napoleon, and when his despatches

arrived, the gauntlet had been thrown down.

The better to disguise his intentions, Joachim had summoned the

ambassadors of Austria and England, immediately on hearing of the

landing of Napoleon, and had assured them, that he would remain

faithful to his engagements. When he had assembled his army (put in

motion under pretence of reinforcing his troops in the March of

Ancona), he fell unexpectedly on the Austrians; and announced to the

Italians, by a proclamation dated at Rimini the 31st of March, that he

had taken up arms to liberate Italy from a foreign yoke, and restore

its ancient freedom and independence.

"Italians," said he to them, "the moment is arrived, when the great

decrees of destiny are to be fulfilled. Providence at length calls

you, to become an independent people: one cry resounds from the Alps

to the straits of Scylla, the independence of Italy. By what right

would foreigners rob you of your independence, the first right, and

the first good, of all nations?

"Formerly masters of the world, you have expiated this fatal glory by

an oppression of twenty centuries. Let your glory now be, to have no

more masters.

"Fourscore thousand Italians hasten to you under the command of their

king. They swear not to rest, till Italy is free. Italians of all

countries, second their magnanimous efforts ... let those, who have

borne arms, resume them, let the unpractised youth exercise themselves

in the use of them, let all the friends of their country raise up one

generous voice for liberty.

"Can England refuse you her suffrages, she whose noblest claim to

glory is to spend her blood and treasure for the independence and

freedom of nations?

"I call on all the brave, to come and fight with me; I call on all men

of enlightened understandings, to prepare, while the passions are

silent, the constitution and laws, that ought henceforward to govern

happy and independent Italy."

This proclamation, to the great astonishment of Italy and France, did

not once mention the name of Napoleon. It kept the most profound

silence respecting his return, his intercourse with Joachim, and the

hopes their combined efforts must inspire.

Joachim however was not ignorant of the ascendancy, which the name of

Napoleon had on the spirit and courage of the Italians. But he knew

also, that this name was odious to the English, and dared not invoke

it, for fear of displeasing them. He thought he was sufficiently

powerful of himself, to act independently of the Emperor; and that it

would be enough, if he showed himself in arms to the Italian nation,

and offered it independence, to raise it at his pleasure. He deceived

himself: all his strength was borrowed from Napoleon: personally he

enjoyed no weight, no influence, in Italy. The Italians could not

forgive him for having betrayed his brother-in-law and benefactor in

1814, or for having revealed to Austria the patriotic conspiracy of

Milan in 1815[96].

[Footnote 96: I know not whether the fact be true:

but, true or false, it had the same effect on the

minds of the Italians.]

Thus prejudiced, they durst not confide in him; his intentions

appeared doubtful, his promises vague, his resources uncertain; and

they remained quiet spectators of the combat.

It is not, in fact, by concealments, that people are reduced or

hurried away: to subjugate them, it is necessary, to convince their

hearts and their understandings; and the heart and the understanding

comprehend no language but the straight forward voice of truth.

Unhappily this language was no longer known to Murat. Since his

accession to the throne, he had adopted the system of dissimulation

and duplicity, which pretty generally characterise Italian politics.

These narrow politics, which support themselves by cunning and

temporizing, were incompatible with the French blood, that circulated

in his veins; and the continual conflicts, that arose between his

novel inclinations and his natural petulance, were incessantly

rendering his words and actions at variance, and leading him into

devious paths, where he could not fail, to go astray and meet his

ruin.

Nevertheless, such is the magic power of the sacred words of liberty

and our country, that Murat did not utter them in vain. Bologna and a

few cities declared for him; and a number of young Italians ran to

enlist under his standards. Victory favoured their first steps; but

Napoleon did not deceive himself: the moment had been ill-chosen, he

foresaw the defection or ruin of Murat, and what passed beyond the

Alps no longer inspired him with any thing but disgust. From that time

he turned his attention with more ardor than ever to the means of

struggling alone against his adversaries, whose proceedings began to

assume a threatening appearance.

The royal government, partly through fear, partly from economy, had

disorganized the army, reduced the regiments one half, changed their

denominations, and dispersed the soldiers among new battalions.

Napoleon re-established the regiments on their ancient footing;

restored to them their glorious surnames of Invincible, Incomparable,

Terrible, One to Ten, &c. &c., which they had acquired and merited in

the field of battle. He recalled to their standards the brave men who

had been banished from them; and the army, which was scarcely

fourscore thousand strong, soon reckoned on its lists near two hundred

thousand fighting men.

The marines[97] and guards of the coasts, who so brilliantly

signalized their courage in the plains of Lutzen and Bautzen, were

united under the command of their officers, and formed a body of

fifteen or eighteen thousand men, who were appointed to protect our

maritime establishments, or, in case of necessity, reinforce the

active army.

[Footnote 97: _Les marins._ Properly, perhaps, the

seamen, whom Napoleon took from the ships of war,

and converted into soldiers.--_Tr._]

The cavalry of the imperial guard and the old grenadiers opened their

ranks to ten thousand soldiers selected from the flank companies; the

light artillery was re-organized; and the young guard received an

addition of several regiments.

But it was not sufficient to restore to the army the forces, of which

it had been deprived; it was equally necessary, to repair its

destitution: the foot wanted arms and clothing, the cavalry had

neither saddles nor horses.

The Emperor looked to all these things.

Levies and purchases of horses were made at once in all the

departments.

The gendarmerie, by giving up the ten thousand horses belonging to it,

which it replaced immediately, supplied the heavy cavalry with so many

horses already trained, which in ten days rendered its numerous

squadrons complete.

Spacious manufactories of clothing, arms, and equipage, were opened at

once in all parts.

The Emperor caused an account of the number of workmen, and the

produce of their labour, to be delivered to him every morning. He knew

how long it took a tailor to finish a soldier's dress, a wheelwright

to construct a carriage, or an armourer to fit up a musket. He knew

the quantity of arms, in a good or bad state, contained in the

arsenals. "You will find," he wrote to the minister at war, "in such

an arsenal, so many old muskets, and so many broken up. Set a hundred

men at work there, and arm me five hundred men a week." Such was the

extent and variety of Napoleon's genius, that he soared without effort

to the loftiest abstractions of the art of governing, and descended

with the same facility to the minutest details of management.

Extraordinary commissioners were employed at the same time to direct

the repairing and fortifying of the frontier towns. They employed

themselves day and night on this important business. But the slightest

delay appeared to the Emperor an age of expectation, and frequently he

put his hand to the work himself. He was perfectly acquainted with the

nature of the fortifications of every place, the number of men it

ought to contain, and the approaches necessary to be defended; and in

a few hours he settled what the most experienced engineer would have

found it difficult to conceive and determine in several days. And let

it not be supposed, that the works he thus ordered bore any marks of

precipitancy. At the head of his topographical cabinet he had one of

the first engineer officers in France, General Bernard; and this

general, too brave, too loyal, to be a flatterer, could never enough

admire the profound knowledge the Emperor possessed of the art of

fortification, and his happy and prompt application of it.

The zeal and joint efforts of these committees, and of the Emperor,

produced, in a short time, effects truly miraculous. All France seemed

an intrenched camp. Napoleon, in the articles he wrote[98],

frequently gave an account of the progress of his armament, of the

fortified places, and of the works of defence. I will transcribe here

one of these articles, which, exclusive of the merit of depicting the

aspect of France at that period, in a better manner than I could,

appears to me well adapted to convey an idea of the fervid activity of

Napoleon, and the immensity of the objects his eye embraced.

[Footnote 98: For the Moniteur, I presume.--_Tr._]

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