The 10th Army (General Mangin), from the Aisne to the Ourcq, comprising
the 1st, 20th, 30th, and 11th French Corps, 1st and 2nd American
Divisions, and the 15th Scottish Division.
[Illustration: THE OPPOSING FORCES DURING THE ALLIES’ COUNTER-OFFENSIVE
OF JULY 18.]
The 6th Army (General Degoutte), from the Ourcq to Château-Thierry,
comprising the 2nd and 7th French Corps, and the 14th and 26th American
Divisions.
This gave, in all, the equivalent of about twenty-one divisions (one
American division being numerically equal to about two French
divisions).
At dawn, on July 18, without preliminary bombardment, and preceded by
hundreds of tanks and a formidable creeping barrage, the attack was
loosed along a twenty-seven-mile front. The surprise was complete and
the effect crushing. The enemy front was pierced, strongholds reduced
and organised woods and farms captured, their garrisons surrendering in
hundreds, while the agricultural detachments were taken at work in the
fields.
[Illustration: THE ALLIES’ ADVANCE ON JULY 18 AND 19 (18/7 AND 19/7).]
North of the Ourcq, General Mangin’s Army progressed rapidly on the
great Soissonnais Plateaux, the average advance being more than four
miles, and at the end of the day the line reached was as follows: The
high ground north of Fontenoy, Mercin, western outskirts of the
Montagne-de-Paris, the heights west of the Crise Valley, Vierzy,
Villers-Hélon, Louâtre, Ancienville, and Noroy-sur-Ourcq. Its left was
less than two miles from Soissons, while mounted patrols pushed forward
to the outskirts of that city.
South of the Ourcq, over rough, difficult ground, General Degoutte’s
Army advanced, on an average, three miles, and reached the following
line: East of Marizy-St.-Mard, the western outskirts of
Neuilly-St.-Front, Cointicourt, Courchamps, Licy-Ceignon, Givry and
Belleau.
Along the whole front, more than 10,000 prisoners, numerous batteries of
artillery, and huge quantities of material had been captured. The
unexpectedness of the attack prevented the enemy from organising serious
resistance, although they engaged four fresh divisions in the centre
and, towards 6 p.m., succeeded in retaking Vierzy, which, however, they
were unable to hold.
In the meantime, French and Italian forces continued their
counter-attacks on the other side of the “pocket” without, however,
making appreciable progress.
At 4 a.m. on the 19th the infantry and tanks attacked again. The enemy
was in a critical position as, were Soissons to fall and Mangin’s Army
to slip in along the Aisne, Von Boehn’s communications would be cut and
his army taken in the rear. The Germans engaged their last available
reserves (four divisions), and, clinging desperately to their positions
on the River Crise in front of Soissons, counter-attacked furiously.
They succeeded in advancing slightly along the Soissons-Villers-Cotterets
Road to a point east of Chaudun (the Moroccan Division was heavily
engaged there, and also at Chazelles), but were driven back everywhere
else, in spite of their frantic efforts to push forward. Mangin’s Army
reached Courmelles, the western outskirts of Villemontoire, Parcy-Tigny,
the western outskirts of Plessier Huleu and Rozet-St.-Albin.
[Illustration: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF JOHN J. PERSHING.]
Degoutte’s Army captured Neuilly-St.-Front, the plateau east of Monnes,
and the heights north-east of Courchamps, progressing beyond the
Priez-Givry line. In two days about 17,000 prisoners and 360 guns were
captured.
The situation of the German Army was becoming more and more critical. In
the neighbourhood of Parcy-Tigny, the Allies were only about a mile from
the Soissons-Château-Thierry Road, and within nine miles of the
Fére-en-Tardenois Railway Station. The Germans were consequently no
longer able to use their main north-south road of communication, and
their only railway was within range of the Allies’ guns.
On the other hand, the activity of General Berthelot’s Army on the
Marne, which had recaptured Montvoisin, gained a footing in Oeuilly
south of the river, and advanced a kilometre northwards in the Roi and
Courton Woods, was causing the enemy great anxiety. The situation of the
Germans south of the Marne appeared particularly precarious.