The Allies’ Counter-Offensive of July 18.
It has been seen that, from the end of June to July 15, the French, by a
series of local operations, had secured excellent positions of attack,
by clearing the Villers-Cotterets Wood and re-occupying the eastern bank
of the Savières. Moreover, the crisis due to the shortage of men had
been overcome. In a prodigious effort Great Britain had re-constituted
her armies; from eight to ten thousand American soldiers had been
landing daily in France since March; the victory on the Piave enabled
the Allies to retain a number of excellent Italian divisions in France,
so that Marshal Foch was at last in a position to assume the initiative
of manœuvre and offensive which until then had been impossible.
The French armies, representing 80 per cent. of the Allied forces
engaged in the battle, were as high-mettled as ever, the enemy’s push
having been powerless either to wear them down or to break their
spirit. They were, moreover, fully equipped with up-to-date armament,
including large numbers of the all-important tank, by now a supreme
weapon of attack. Their use on a large scale in support of the infantry
counter-balanced the effect of the enemy’s asphyxiating gas and storm
battalions.
Signs of apprehension began to manifest themselves in the enemy camp,
where several commanders of divisions on the Ourcq front in vain called
attention to the precursory signs of the coming big attack. The German
High Command, repeating Von Klück’s blunder of 1914 with regard to
General Maunoury’s Army, misjudged the Allies’ strength and, so far from
re-inforcing this sector, withdrew a number of reserve divisions in
favour of the Marne and Champagne fronts.
On July 12, Foch ordered a counter-attack to be made on the western
flank of the Château-Thierry salient. Leaving to General Gouraud in
Champagne, and to General Berthelot between the Marne and Rheims, the
heavy task of holding up the enemy “peace offensive,” Pétain organised
the concentration of the armies of Generals Mangin and Degoutte, which
were placed under the orders of General Fayolle. Thus, at the time the
Germans were concentrating towards the eastern flank of the salient, the
Allies were executing a similar manœuvre in the direction of the
western flank. These two moves explain the whole battle, for while every
enemy move was being closely observed and the bare minimum of troops
used to hold up their attack, the Allies’ powerful concentration in the
Villers-Cotterets Woods entirely escaped the enemy’s notice.
This admirably camouflaged concentration was completed in three nights.
To make the surprise still more effective, it was decided to attack
without artillery preparation, it being left to the tanks to make good
the deficiency.
[Illustration: GENERAL MANGIN.]
The objective was the Fére-en-Tardenois Railway, the only line of
communication of the hundreds of thousands of Germans massed in the
Château-Thierry “pocket.” Should this railway be captured or cut by
gun-fire, the German armies would no longer be able to maintain
themselves south of the Vesle.
From the Aisne to the Marne, the German front was held by part of the
7th Army (Von Boehn), _i.e._ twelve divisions in echelons and eight
divisions in reserve.