Orient, therefore, I am not willing to call "impersonality"; for it is
a very defective description, a real misnomer. I think no single term
can truly describe the characteristic under consideration. As regards
the general social order, the so-called impersonal characteristic is
its communal nature; as regards the popular religious thought, whether
of Shintoism or Buddhism, its so-called impersonality is its simple,
artless objectivity; as regards philosophic Buddhism its so-called
impersonality is its morbid introspective self-consciousness, leading
to the desire and effort to annihilate the separateness of the self.
These are different characteristics and cannot be described by any
single term. So far as there are in Japan genuine altruism, real
suppression of selfish desires, and real possession of kindly feelings
for others and desires to help them, and so far as these qualities
arise through a sense of the essential unity of the human race and of
the unity of the human with the divine soul, this is not
"impersonality"--but a form of highly developed personality--not
infra-personality, but true personality.
We have noted that although esoteric Buddhism developed a highly
accentuated consciousness of self, it attributed no value to that
self. This failure will not appear strange if we consider the
historical reasons for it. Indeed, the failure was inevitable. Neither
the social order nor the method of introspective thought suggested it.
Both served, on the contrary, absolutely to preclude the idea.
When introspective thought began in India the social order was already
far beyond the undifferentiated communal life of the tribal stage.
Castes were universal and fixed. The warp and woof of daily life and
of thought were filled with the distinctions of castes and ranks.
Man's worth was conceived to be not in himself, but in his rank or
caste. The actual life of the people, therefore, did not furnish to
speculative thought the slightest suggestion of the worth of man as
man. It was a positive hindrance to the rise of such an idea.
Equally opposed to the rise of this idea was the method of that
introspective thought which discovered the fact of the self. It was a
method of abstraction; it denied as part of the real self everything
that could be thought of as separate; every changing phase or
expression of the self could not be the real self, it was argued,
because, if a part of the real self, how could it sometimes be and
again not be? Feeling cannot be a part of the real self, for sometimes
I feel and sometimes I do not. Any particular desire cannot be a part
of my real self, for sometimes I have it and sometimes I do not. A
similar argument was applied to every objective thing. In the famous
"Questions of King Melinda," the argument as to the real chariot is
expanded at length; the wheels are not the chariot; the spokes are not
the chariot; the seat is not the chariot; the tongue is not the
chariot; the axle is not the chariot; and so, taking up each
individual part of the chariot, the assertion is made that it is not
the chariot. But if the chariot is not in any of its parts, then they
are not essential parts of the chariot. So of the soul--the self; it
does not consist of its various qualities or attributes or powers;
hence they are not essential elements of the self. The real self
exists apart from them.
Now is it not evident that such a method of introspection deprives the
conception of self of all possible value? It is nothing but a bare
intellectual abstraction. To say that this self is a part of the
universal self is no relief,--brings no possible worth to the separate
self,--for the conception of the universal soul has been arrived at by
a similar process of thought. It, too, is nothing but a bare
abstraction, deprived of all qualities and attributes and powers. I
can see no distinction between the absolute universal soul of
Brahmanism and Buddhism, and the Absolute Nothing of Hegel.[CX]
Both are the farthest possible abstraction that the mind can make. The
Absolute Soul of Buddhism, the Atman of Brahmanism, and Hegel's
Nothing are the farthest possible remove from the Christian's
conception of God. The former is the utter emptiness of being; the
latter the perfect fullness of being and completeness of quality. The
finite emptiness receives and can receive no richness of life or
increase in value by its consciousness of unity with the infinite
emptiness; whereas the finite limited soul receives in the Christian
view an infinite wealth and value by reason of the consciousness of
its unity with the divine infinite fullness. The usual method of
stating the difference between the Christian conception of God and the
Hindu conception of the root of all being is that the one is personal
and the other impersonal. But these terms are inadequate. Rather say
the one is perfectly personal and the other perfectly abstract.
Impersonality, even in its strictest meaning, _i.e._, without
"conscious separate existence as an intelligent and voluntary being,"
only partially expresses the conception of Buddhism. The full
conception rejects not only personality, but also every other quality;
the ultimate and the absolute of Buddhism--we may not even call it
being--is the absolutely abstract.
With regard, then, to the conception of the separate self and of the
supreme self, the Buddhistic view may be called "impersonal," not in
the sense that it lacks the consciousness of a separate self; not in
the sense that it emphasizes the universal unity--nay, the identity of
all the separate abstract selves and the infinite abstract self; but
in the sense that all the qualities and characteristics of human
beings, such as consciousness, thought, emotion, volition, and even
being itself, are rejected as unreal. The view is certainly
"impersonal," but it is much more. My objection to the description of
Buddhism as "impersonal," then, is not because the word is too strong,
but because it is too weak; it does not sufficiently characterize its
real nature. It is as much below materialism, as materialism is below
monotheism. Such a scheme of thought concerning the universe
necessarily reacts on those whom it possesses, to destroy what sense
they may have of the value of human personality; that which we hold to
be man's glory is broken into fragments and thrown away.
But this does not constitute the whole of the difficulty. This method
of introspective thought necessarily resulted in the doctrine of
Illusion. Nothing is what it seems to be. The reality of the chariot
is other than it appears. So too with the self and everything we see
or think. The ignoant are perfectly under the spell of the illusion
and cannot escape it. The deluded mind creates for itself the world of
being, with all its woes and evils. The great enlightenment is the
discovery of this fact and the power it gives to escape the illusion
and to see that the world is nothing but illusion. To see that the
illusion is an illusion destroys it as such. It is then no longer an
illusion, but only a passing shadow. We cannot now stop to see how
pessimism, the doctrine of self-salvation, and the nature of that
salvation through contemplation and asceticism and withdrawal from
active life, all inevitably follow from such a course of thought. That
which here needs emphasis is that all this thinking renders it still
more impossible to think of the self as having any intrinsic worth.
On-the contrary, the self is the source of evil, of illusion. The
great aim of Buddhism is necessarily to get rid of the self, with all
its illusions and pains and disappointments.
Is it now clear why Buddhism failed to reach the idea of the worth of
the individual self? It was due to the nature of the social order, and
the nature of its introspective and speculative thinking. Lacking,
therefore, the conception of individual worth, we see clearly why it
failed, even after centuries of opportunity, to secure individualism
in the social order and a general development of personality either as
an idea or as a fact among any of the peoples to which it has gone. It
is not only a fact of history, but we have seen that it could not have
been otherwise. The very nature of its conception of self and, in
consequence, the nature of its conception of salvation absolutely
prohibited it.[CY]
We have thus far confined our view entirely to philosophic Buddhism.
It is important, therefore, to state again that very few of the
Japanese people outside of the priesthood have any such ideas with
regard to the abstract nature of the individual, of the absolute self,
and of their mutual relations as I have just described. These ideas
are a part of esoteric Buddhism, the secret truth, which is an
essential part of the great enlightenment, but far too profound for
the vulgar multitudes. The vast majority, even of the priesthood, I am
told, do not get far enough to be taught these views. The sweep of
such conceptions, therefore, is very limited. That they are held,
however, by the leaders, that they are the views of the most learned
expounders and the most advanced students of Buddhism serves to
explain why Buddhism has never been, and can never become, a power in
reorganizing society in the direction of individualism.
Popular Buddhism contains many elements alien to philosophic Buddhism.
For a full study of the subject of this chapter we need to ask whether
popular Buddhism tended to produce "impersonality," and if so, in what
sense. The doctrine of "ingwa,"[CZ] with its consequences on
character, demands fresh attention at this point. According to this
doctrine every event of this life, even the minutest, is the result of
one's conduct in a previous life, and is unalterably fixed by
inflexible law. "Ingwa" is the crude idea of fate held by all
primitive peoples, stated in somewhat philosophic and scientific form.
It became a central element in the thought of Oriental peoples. Each
man is born into his caste and class by a law over which neither he
nor his parents have any control, and for which they are without
responsibility. The misfortunes of life, and the good fortunes as
well, come by the same impartial, inflexible laws. By this system of
thought moral responsibility is practically removed from the
individual's shoulders. This doctrine is held in Japan far more widely
than the philosophic doctrine of the self, and is correspondingly
baleful.
This system of thought, when applied to the details of life, means
that individual choice and will, and their effect in determining both
external life and internal character have been practically lost sight
of. As a sociological fact the origin of this conception is not
difficult to understand. The primitive freedom of the individual in
the early communal order of the tribe became increasingly restricted
with the multiplication and development of the Hindu peoples; each
class of society became increasingly specialized. Finally the
individual had no choice whatever left him, because of the extreme
rigidity of the communal order. As a matter of fact, the individual
choice and will was allowed no play whatever in any important matter.
Good sense saw that where no freedom is, there moral responsibility
cannot be. All one's life is predetermined by the powers that be. Thus
we again see how vital a relation the social order bears to the
innermost thinking and belief of a people.
Still further. Once let the idea be firmly grounded in an individual
that he has no freedom of belief, of choice, or of act, and in the
vast majority of cases, as a matter of fact, he will have none. "As a
man thinketh in his heart, so is he." "According to your faith be it
unto you." This doctrine of individual freedom is one of those that
cannot be forced on a man who does not choose to believe it. In a true
sense, it is my belief that I am free that makes me free. As Prof.
James well says, the doctrine of the freedom of the will cannot be
rammed down any man's intellectual throat, for that very act would
abridge his real freedom. Man's real freedom is proved by his freedom
to reject even the doctrine of his freedom. But so long as he rejects
it, his freedom is only potential. Because of his belief in his
bondage he is in bondage. Now this doctrine of fate has been the warp
and woof of the thinking of the bulk of the Japanese people in their
efforts to explain all the vicissitudes of life. Not only, therefore,
has it failed to stimulate the volitional element of the psychic
nature, but in the psychology of the Orient little if any attention
has been given to this faculty. Oriental psychology practically knows
nothing of personality because it has failed to note one of its
central elements, the freedom of the will. The individual, therefore,
has not been appealed to to exercise his free moral choice, one of
the highest prerogatives of his nature. Moral responsibility has not
been laid on his individual shoulders. A method of moral appeal fitted
to develop the deepest element of his personality has thus been
precluded.
It thus resulted that although philosophic Buddhism developed a high
degree of self-consciousness, yet because it failed to discover
personal freedom it did not deliver popular Buddhism from its grinding
doctrine of fate, rather it fastened this incubus of social progress
more firmly upon it. Philosophic and popular Buddhism alike thus threw
athwart the course of human and social evolution the tremendous
obstacle of fatalism, which the Orient has never discovered a way
either to surmount or evade. Buddhism teaches the impotence of the
individual will; it destroys the sense of moral responsibility; it
thus fails to understand the real nature of man, his glory and power
and even his divinity, which the West sums up in the term personality.
In this sense, then, the influence of Buddhism and the condition of
the Orient may be called "impersonal," but it is the impersonality of
a defective religious psychology, and of communalism in the social
order. Whether it is right to call this feature of Japan
"impersonality," I leave with the reader to judge.
We draw this chapter to a close with a renewed conception of the
inadequacy of the "impersonal" theory to explain Japanese religious
and social phenomena. Further considerations, however, still merit
attention ere we leave this subject.
XXXIII
TRACES OF PERSONALITY IN SHINTOISM, BUDDHISM, AND CONFUCIANISM
Regret as we sometimes must the illogicalness of the human mind, yet
it is a providential characteristic of our as yet defective nature;
for thanks to it few men or nations carry out to their complete
logical results erroneous opinions and metaphysical speculations.
Common sense in Japan has served more or less as an antidote for
Buddhistic poison. The blighting curse of logical Buddhism has been
considerably relieved by various circumstances. Let us now consider
some of the ways in which the personality-destroying characteristics
of Buddhism have been lessened by other ideas and influences.
First of all there is the distinction, so often noted, between
esoteric and popular Buddhism. Esoteric Buddhism was content to allow
popular Buddhism a place and even to invent ways for the salvation of
the ignorant multitudes who could not see the real nature of the self.
Resort was had to the use of magic prayers and symbols and idols.
These were bad enough, but they did not bear so hard on the
development of personality as did esoteric Buddhism.
The doctrine of the transmigration of the soul was likewise a relief
from the pressure of philosophic Buddhism, for, according to this
doctrine, the individual soul continues to live its separate life, to
maintain its independent identity through infinite ages, while passing
through the ten worlds of existence, from nethermost hell to highest
heaven; and the particular world into which it is born after each
death is determined by the moral character of its life in the
immediately preceding stage. By this doctrine, then, a practical
appeal is made to the common man to exert his will, to assert his
personality, and so far forth it was calculated to undo a part of the
mischief done by the paralyzing doctrine of fate and illusion.
But a more important relief from the blight of Buddhistic doctrine was
afforded by its own practice. At the very time that it declared the
worthlessness of the self and the impotence of the will, it declared
that salvation can come only from the self, by the most determined
exercise of the will. What more convincing evidence of powerful,
though distorted, wills could be asked than that furnished by Oriental
asceticism? Nothing in the West exceeds it. As an _idea_, then,
Buddhism interfered with the development of the conception of
personality; but by its _practice_ it helped powerfully to develop it
as a fact in certain phases of activity. The stoicism of the Japanese
is one phase of developed personality. It shows the presence of a
powerful, disciplined will keeping the body in control, so that it
gives no sign of the thoughts and emotions going on in the mind,
however fierce they may be.
That in Japan, however, which has interfered most powerfully with the
spread and dominance of Buddhism has been the practical and prosaic
Confucian ethics. Apparently, Confucius never speculated. Metaphysics
and introspection alike had no charm for him. He was concerned with
conduct. His developed doctrine demanded of all men obedience to the
law of the five relations. In spite, therefore, of the fact that he
said nothing about individuality and personality, his system laid real
emphasis on personality and demanded its continuous activity. In all
of his teachings the idea of personality in the full and proper sense
of this word is always implicit, and sometimes is quite distinct.
The many strong and noble characters which glorify the feudal era are
the product of Japonicized Confucianism, "Bushido," and bear powerful
witness to its practical emphasis on personality. The loyalty, filial
piety, courage, rectitude, honor, self-control, and suicide which it
taught, defective though we must pronounce them from certain points of
view, were yet very lofty and noble, and depended for their
realization on the development of personality.
Advocates of the "impersonal" interpretation of the Orient have much
to say about pantheism. They assert the difficulty of conveying to the
Oriental mind the idea of the personality of the Supreme Being.
Although some form of pantheism is doubtless the belief of the
learned, the evidence that a personal conception of deity is
widespread among the people seems so manifest that I need hardly do
more than call attention to it. This belief has helped to neutralize
the paralyzing tendency of Buddhist fatalistic pantheism.
Shinto is personal from first to last. Every one of its myriads of
gods is a personal being, many of them deified men.
The most popular are the souls of men who became famous for some
particularly noble, brave, or admirable deed. Hero-worship is nothing
if not personal. Furthermore, in its doctrine of "San-shin-ittai,"
"three gods, one body," it curiously suggests the doctrine of the
Trinity.
Popular Buddhism holds an equally personal conception of deity. The
objects of its worship are personifications of various qualities.
"Kwannon," the goddess of mercy; "Jizo," the guardian of travelers and
children; "Emma O," "King of Hell," who punishes sinners; "Fudo Sama,"
"The Immovable One," are all personifications of the various
attributes of deity and are worshiped as separate gods, each being
represented by a uniform type of idol. It is a curious fact that
Buddhism, which started out with such a lofty rejection of deity,
finally fell to the worship of idols, whereas Shinto, which is
peculiarly the worship of personality, has never stooped to its
representation in wood or stone.
Confucianism, however, surpasses all in its intimations of the
personality of the Supreme Being. Although it never formulated this
doctrine in a single term, nor definitely stated it as a tenet of
religion, yet the entire ethical and religious thinking of the
classically educated Japanese is shot through with the idea. Consider
the Chinese expression "Jo-Tei," which the Christians of Japan freely
use for God; it means literally "Supreme Emperor," and refers to the
supreme ruler of the universe; he is here conceived in the form of a
human ruler having of course human, that is to say, personal,
attributes. A phrase often heard on the lips of the Japanese is:
"Aoide Ten ni hajizu; fushite Chi ni hajizu."
"Without self-reproach, whether looking up to Heaven, or down to
Earth."
This phrase has reference to the consciousness of one's life and
conduct, such that he is neither ashamed to look up in the face of
Heaven nor to look about him in the presence of man. Paul expressed
this same idea when he wrote "having a conscience void of offense to
God and to man." Or take another phrase:
"Ten-mo kwaikwai so ni shite morasazu."
"Heaven's net is broad as earth; and though its meshes are large, none
can escape it." This is constantly used to illustrate the certainty
that Heaven punishes the wicked.
"Ten ni kuchi ari; kabe ni mimi ari."
"Heaven has a mouth and even the wall has ears," signifies that all
one does is known to the ruler of heaven and earth. Another still more
striking saying ascribing knowledge to Heaven is the "Yoshin no
Shichi," "the four knowings of Yoshin." This sage was a Chinaman of
the second century A.D. Approached with a large bribe and urged to
accept it with the assurance that no one would know it, he replied,
"Heaven knows it; Earth knows it; you know it; and I know it. How say
you that none will know it?" This famous saying condemning bribery is
well known in Japan. The references to "Heaven" as knowing, seeing,
doing, sympathizing, willing, and always identifying the activity of
"Heaven" with the noblest and loftiest ideals of man, are frequent in
Chinese and Japanese literature. The personality of God is thus a
doctrine clearly foreshadowed in the Orient. It is one of those great
truths of religion which the Orient has already received, but which in
a large measure lies dormant because of its incomplete expression. The
advent of the fully expressed teaching of this truth, freed from all
vagueness and ambiguity, is a capital illustration of the way in which
Christianity comes to Japan to fulfill rather than to destroy; it
brings that fructifying element that stirs the older and more or less
imperfectly expressed truths into new life, and gives them adequate
modes of expression. But the point to which I am here calling
attention is the fact that the idea of the personality of the Supreme
Being is not so utterly alien to Oriental thought as some would have
us think. Even though there is no single word with which conveniently
to translate the term, the idea is perfectly distinct to any Japanese
to whom its meaning is explained.
The statement is widely made that because the Japanese language has no
term for "personality" the people are lacking in the idea; that
consequently they have difficulty in grasping it even when presented
to them, and that as a further consequence they are not to be
criticised for their hesitancy in accepting the doctrine of the
"Personality of God." It must be admitted that if "personality" is to
be defined in the various ambiguous and contradictory ways in which we
have seen it defined by advocates of Oriental "impersonality" much can
be said in defense of their hesitancy. Indeed, no thinking Christian
of the Occident for a moment accepts it. But if "personality" is
defined in the way here presented, which I judge to be the usage of
thoughtful Christendom, then their hesitancy cannot be so defended. It
is doubtless true that there is in Japanese no single word
corresponding to our term "personality." But that is likewise true of
multitudes of other terms. The only significance of this fact is that
Oriental philosophy has not followed in exactly the same lines as the
Occidental. As a matter of fact I have not found the idea of
personality to be a difficult one to convey to the Japanese, if clear
definitions are used. The Japanese language has, as we have seen, many
words referring to the individuality, to the self of manhood; it
merely lacks the general abstract term, "personality." This is,
however, in keeping with the general characteristics of the language.
Abstract terms are, compared with English, relatively rare. Yet with
the new civilization they are being coined and introduced.
Furthermore, the English term "personality" is readily used by the
great majority of educated Christians just as they use such words as
"life," "power," "success," "patriotism," and "Christianity."