which the French army was placed. Massena, when he entered Portugal,
commanded a force of 72,000 effective men. The plan of operations he
adopted was to break in at once upon Lord Wellington’s defences; to
pursue him till he forced him to a battle; to allow no circumstances to
arrest this decision, and finish thus at one blow the campaign intrusted
to his conduct. In pursuance of his system, he marched, with all the
corps of his army concentrated, into the heart of Portugal, taking his
line direct upon Coimbra, at which place, by turning Lord Wellington’s
left, he hoped to have arrived almost without resistance. In effecting
this movement, he left no garrisons behind him; he occupied no posts to
secure even his communication with Spain, or to ensure him any supplies
or protection from the rear of his army. Such considerations were all
sacrificed to preserve his greater numerical force for the battle by
which he hoped at once to decide the fate of Portugal. The first
interruption to this arrangement of the campaign, was the assembling of
the whole British army at Busaco, and the subsequent defeat of the
French. On the day on which this took place, Massena’s communication
with Spain was cut off by a force of Portuguese militia, upon the
frontiers near Pinhel and Celorico. He determined, however, to continue
his original movement; and, hoping to conceal his march through the
Sierra of Caramula, expected again to turn Lord Wellington, and fight a
battle to advantage in the open country, between Busaco and Coimbra.
These hopes were frustrated. Perceiving the difficulties into which the
enemy was plunging, Lord Wellington retired through Coimbra, and
abandoned to him that deserted town and country. Arrived at this point,
Marshal Massena must have begun to feel the difficulties of his
situation. He was encumbered with 5,000 wounded from the battle of
Busaco; he was without the security of any supply of provisions, in the
midst of a most inimical and exasperated population; he was without the
means of communicating with Spain. If he remained where he was, the
boasted conquest of Portugal in a campaign was at an end; the
difficulties to which he must have exposed himself, by the extension of
his army to procure provisions, must also have had weight with him; and
the uncertainty as to our real object in so rapid a retreat, must have
induced him to expect some great result from the bolder measure of
pursuing the allied army. In conformity to this feeling, without leaving
any protection for his rear, or even for his wounded, Marshal Massena
conducted his army to Sobral. His progress here was totally arrested.
The strength of the position occupied by us was such, as, with the
recollection of Busaco fresh upon him, Massena dared not attack; he was,
therefore, reduced at once to the defensive; his mighty vengeance was
conducted harmless to this unpromising position.
The first news, which must have been unpleasant to Marshal Massena, was
the capture of Coimbra, with all the French wounded, by a corps of
Portuguese militia, under Colonel Trant. The loss of the troops was not
alone to be lamented in this case; it brought with it the disastrous
conviction, that the French army was insulated on the ground on which it
stood; no line of communication, no extent of country in subjection,
from which to draw resources, remained to it. Wherever a Frenchman
stood, for the moment, he commanded and desolated the spot; removed from
it, all was in hostility against him. The march of the French, through
Portugal to the lines, was most singular. The troops seldom saw an
inhabitant; they could procure no guides; deserters from them, or
prisoners, could never state the towns or villages from whence they
came, though, in some instances, they had been weeks in the same places;
they had seen no native to instruct them in their names. In this state
of things, the French army began early to suffer from privations of
every sort; its foraging parties were scouring the country in the rear,
and upon their success depended chiefly the provisioning of the troops.
The fatigue and sickness, consequent on this mode of living, were
considerable. The French soldiers were generally bivouacked along the
line they occupied, which, without shelter in the rainy season,
increased the misery of their situation. By these causes, their army
gradually diminished; while, on the contrary, that under Lord
Wellington, excellently provided with all that was necessary, and mostly
under cover in the villages within the position, was gaining strength
and improving in discipline every day. The Spanish corps, under the
orders of the Marquis of Romana, had joined the allied army from the
frontiers of Estremadura; so that the force at this time, (the end of
October and beginning of November) within the lines, was considerably
greater than that of the enemy. Under these circumstances, Lord
Wellington saw there was an opportunity of attacking Massena with
advantage. The problem, whether it were wise to do so or not, engaged
his most serious attention. He was persuaded, that if he attacked, he
could secure a victory; to attempt it he was induced by every personal
consideration; the glory which would have accrued to him in success
would at that time have been immense; in England the word of Buonaparte,
that his eagles should be planted on the towers of Lisbon, was generally
looked upon as a decree which no talent or ability could avert; to have
learnt at such a time that our army had defeated the boasted instruments
Of this prophesying emperor, would have carried the man who executed
such a plan to the pinnacle of greatness. Yet this inducement, as well
as the anxious wish of the whole army to attack, had no effect. Lord
Wellington was persuaded that the sounder line of conduct was to wait
with patience, and in safety, the mischief, which he was satisfied would
be brought upon the enemy by want and sickness, and by the continual
hostility of the natives. He therefore decided steadily to pursue that
plan; he was ever watchful to profit by any advantage which should be
afforded; but unless a decided one was given him, he determined to
remain on the defensive.
About the beginning of November, Massena found his sick so fast
increasing, and his means of obtaining provisions so much diminished,
that he was obliged to detach General La Borde’s division of the 6th
corps, to form a garrison at Santarem for the protection of an hospital,
as well as to assist the foraging parties in that quarter. Lord
Wellington made a corresponding movement to prevent the passage of the
Tagus, by detaching Major General Fane with a brigade of cavalry into
the Alemtejo to assemble opposite to La Borde. In this situation the
armies remained in perfect tranquillity till the 15th in the morning,
when it was found that during the night the whole French army had
retreated. This movement had been carried into effect in such silence,
that no suspicion of it had been entertained.
It was the great triumph of Lord Wellington’s skill and foresight, that,
without exposing a single man in action, he had since the 10th of
October retained at first a superior army in inactivity before him; he
had seen it diminish in numbers every day; and, in the end, without its
having effected a single purpose, he had obliged it to retire, oppressed
with fatigue and sickness. Towards reducing the country it occupied, it
had not made the slightest progress; the provisions of the British army
were drawn from the northern provinces in its rear; Coimbra continued
occupied by the Portuguese militia; Abrantes by the Portuguese garrison;
so that it may truly be described as commanding only the ground on which
it stood.
The state of Lisbon during the period when the enemy was hardly twenty
miles distant from it, deserves to be mentioned. Massena had expected
that his near approach would have caused tumult and a revolution; but
far from this, as a proof of the extraordinary confidence entertained of
Lord Wellington, no town was ever in more perfect quiet; there never
appeared in it the slightest symptom of fear or apprehension. The
ordinary occupations were continued, although the enemy was but a single
march from it. Yet total ruin was known to await the town, if Massena,
by succeeding against the allied army, forced an entry into it. The
apprehension of such a catastrophe was, however, at no time entertained;
implicit reliance on the skill of their chief, and the bravery of the
troops, was the universal sentiment of the Portuguese.
The persons whose property had been surrendered to be laid waste by the
enemy, shewed the same feelings; the poor peasants, who had abandoned
every thing they possessed, were alike persuaded that all was done for
the best; and in the whole country there was not a dissenting voice in
giving unlimited confidence to Lord Wellington.
As soon as the retreat of the enemy was known, the allied army was put
in motion to follow him; his movement was, however, so rapid, that he
was not overtaken till within a few miles of Santarem. The rear guard
was pushed over the bridge in front of that place, where it took up a
strong and formidable position.
Lord Wellington had not pursued the enemy with the whole of his force;
suspecting, that it might, in the first instance, be the intention of
Massena to move round Monte Junto, he retained Major General Picton’s
division in its position at Torres Vedras; he afterwards detached
Lieutenant General Hill with the corps under his orders across the Tagus
at Valada, with a view of communicating with Abrantes, which it might be
the intention of the French to attack, and also to protect the Alemtejo
from any offensive operation.
The rest of the army was brought opposite to Santarem. Lord Wellington
having received a report from Major General Fane, that the baggage of
the French army was retiring towards Thomar, conceived that Massena was
altogether falling back; with this idea he determined to attack what
appeared to be his rear guard, which was placed upon a small river, the
Rio Mayor. A disposition with this view was made; a part of Brigadier
General Pack’s brigade was to have passed, supported by a detachment of
cavalry, on the right of the French position, about a mile beyond it;
Sir William Erskine’s brigade, supported by the Guards, was to have
stormed the bridge; while Major General Crawford, with the light
division, was to have attacked the enemy’s left, and along the Tagus to
have menaced the rear of his advanced position. The rain, which had been
very heavy during the preceding days, had, however, so much swelled the
river where Brigadier General Pack was to have passed, that it was found
impracticable; the enemy also appearing in considerable force, the
operation was given up; Lord Wellington still determining to adhere to
his defensive system, and deciding rather to fall back again upon his
lines than seek the French army, or give it an opportunity of meeting
him upon any thing like equal terms.
Massena continued the succeeding days to strengthen his position at
Santarem; Lord Wellington retained only his light division in front of
it, and placed the rest of his army in echellons to the rear. The
head-quarters were placed at Cartaxo; Sir Brent Spencer, with the Guards
and Major General Cameron’s brigade, in the same place; Lieutenant
General Cole’s division at Azambujo; Major General Leith’s at Alcoentre;
Major General A. Campbell’s at Alemquer; Major General Picton’s at
Torres Vedras, and the Spaniards at Villa-Franca. Massena threw a bridge
over the Zezere at its confluence with the Tagus, as if with the
intention of passing a corps for the siege of Abrantes; he was
contented, however, with reconnoitring that place, which he never after
molested. He placed his army in cantonments stretching as far back as
Thomar, Torres Novas, and Alcanede; and in this situation, protected by
the position at Santarem, remained in quiet, apparently awaiting
reinforcements and orders how to proceed. Lord Wellington saw this with
perfect indifference; he was persuaded that the more the enemy was
reinforced the greater would be his suffering, and the less the general
advantage to his cause in the Peninsula. He determined, therefore, to
undertake no operation to prevent it, nor any other which could either
cause him risk, or could draw him from his general system of defensive
measures.
From this period, the 12th of November 1810, to the 4th of March, 1811,
both armies retained their respective positions; the only events of any
importance, were the arrival of the 9th corps of 10,000 men, commanded
by General Cte. Erlon, which was placed by Massena to protect his right
at Leyria; and the junction of 5,000 men, who were brought by General
Foy upon his return from Paris, where he had been sent by Massena, soon
after his arrival opposite our lines, to render an account of the
operations of the French army, and of its situation. Buonaparte received
the relation of these events with much indifference; and observed upon
the excuses General Foy was directed to make, for the loss of the battle
of Busaco, “Ah bah! les Anglais de tout temps ont battu les Français.”
General Gardane, in attempting to carry a corps of 3,000 men to join
Massena, was driven back by some Portuguese militia. General Claparede
posted himself, with a corps of 8,000 men, in the environs of Guarda;
from whence he had several actions with the irregulars in that part of
the country, by whom the communication of the French army with Spain had
been totally cut off.
During the whole of this period, the French subsisted solely on the
plunder of the country they occupied. The irregular manner in which this
mode of obtaining supplies was conducted, led to the perpetration of the
most revolting atrocities. Torture inflicted upon the inhabitants, to
extract from them the secret of their depôts of provisions and property,
was one of the expedients most common to the French soldiery. The murder
of the peasantry seemed to be committed without remorse; the capture of
the women was converted often into a source of profit. Nothing more
revolting to the mind of civilized man can be produced, than the list of
horrors committed during this lamentable period.
Buonaparte directed Massena to continue his occupation of Portugal, till
he could operate with Marshals Mortier and Soult, (to whom he had given
orders to advance into the Alemtejo,) and thence combine their movements
for an attack on Lord Wellington. In conformity with these views,
Marshal Mortier arrived in the beginning of January in Spanish
Estremadura; he soon after captured Olivenza, and laid siege to Badajos.
Lord Wellington, upon the first notice of these movements, had detached
the Spanish corps which had joined him in the lines, to reinforce the
corps of General Mendizabel, which was already destined to the
protection of these places; he, at the same time, strongly recommended
that officer not to fight a battle, but, by taking up a defensive
position, (which he pointed out to him,) to give every assistance to the
defence of Badajos, and the other fortresses in that quarter.
Unfortunately for Spain, for the interests of the allies, and for those
persons who, acquainted with the Marquis of Romana, loved and cherished
him for the virtues which adorned his character, he had expired in the
beginning of January at Cartaxo; less able hands were now intrusted with
the army he had commanded. On the 19th of January, General Mendizabel
was attacked in a position close to Badajos by the French army which was
besieging it, and totally defeated. Mortier, from that moment, pushed on
without interruption the operations of the siege. The place surrendered
on the 11th of March, notwithstanding the governor was informed by
telegraph that a strong corps of the allied army was coming to his
relief, and that Massena was already on his retreat from Santarem. It is
a fact worthy of remark, that, in the articles of capitulation for this
place, it was stipulated that the garrison should march out by the
breach; but when this came to be examined; it was found so far from
practicable, that it was necessary to employ some time to make it fit
for the passage of the troops. The garrison was stronger than the corps
which besieged it; so that taking all the circumstances into
consideration, the giving up this important fortress was as
extraordinary as it was disastrous.
Throughout the month of February, Lord Wellington had been looking out
with great anxiety for a reinforcement from England, which was, coming
to him, and which, by the unfavourable state of the weather, had been
unusually delayed, and did not arrive till the 7th of March. The
distressed state of the French army, as well as the menaced movement of
Soult and Mortier, had determined him, upon the arrival of this
reinforcement, (which amounted to 7,000 English,) to attack; and his
plans for this purpose were already decided upon.
The night of the 4th of March, however, put an end to this project:
Massena broke up from all his positions, and commenced his retreat. The
country he had occupied was totally exhausted; his army could no longer
subsist in it. The sickness and misery the French had suffered, together
with the hostility of the peasants, had considerably reduced their
numbers. Lord Wellington had triumphed in his calculations; without the
loss of a single man, he had obliged the enemy, weakened and
disheartened, to abandon all his objects.
Massena, after having previously moved off his sick and baggage upon the
road to the Peunte de Marcella, directed his effective army upon Pombal,
where it appeared he had intended to fight a battle; some altercation is
stated to have taken place here, between him and the Count Erlon; that
officer having received instructions to act in Spain, insisted upon
being allowed to retire from Portugal, and immediately commenced his
movement to effect that object. Lord Wellington had on the 11th,
concentrated a part of his army opposite Pombal; the enemy was driven
from it, and the next day was attacked at Redinha, from the positions
about which place he was also obliged to retire with considerable loss:
from thence he was pushed upon Condeixa, where, appearing to take up his
ground as if to defend it, Lord Wellington instantly detached a corps to
menace his left, and his communication with Miranda do Corvo. This had
the desired effect; Marshal Ney, who commanded the French rear-guard,
retired upon Miranda, thus abandoning the chance of occupying Coimbra
(which was without defence,) or of retaining any advanced position in
Portugal.
To the activity and vigour with which Lord Wellington pushed the French
army, this advantage was entirely due; Massena conceived that an officer
who, for so long a period, had acted with so much caution, would never
seriously venture to disturb his retreat; he had, therefore, relied upon
being able to conduct it at his own discretion: when he found, on the
contrary, that he was most vigorously attacked, he was obliged to
precipitate his movements. To this alone can be attributed his having
been unable to ascertain that there was no garrison in Coimbra, a
position to which it appears he was anxious to have led his army.
Lord Wellington pursued the enemy, and obliged him precipitately to
abandon Miranda do Corvo, leaving a great part of his baggage, and
destroying, at Foz d’Arouse, a considerable number of his carts and
baggage-horses. Ney took up a position on the Ciera; but having left a
considerable part of his advanced guard on the left bank of that river,
it was vigorously attacked by the allies, and, in complete disorder, and
with great loss, driven into the main position. A French eagle was taken
in the river, into which, in the hurry of defeat, a considerable number
of the enemy had been precipitated, and drowned.
On the 17th, Massena formed his army in a strong position behind the
Alva, occupying the Puente de Marcella, and the heights along the banks
of that river. Believing himself secure in this formidable position, he
had sent out detachments from the different corps, to collect
provisions; but Lord Wellington passed the Alva on the left of the
French army, and obliged it to retire without having reassembled the
parties sent out to forage, a considerable number of which were taken.
The whole of these operations were conducted with the most transcendent
skill and ability; whenever the enemy halted to defend himself he was
out-manœuvred, and driven from his ground; he was constantly attacked
and beaten. Besides the loss in battle, his stragglers, his sick and
wounded, and a considerable part of his baggage, became a prey to the
allied army.
Lord Wellington was now obliged, for a moment, to give up the active
pursuit he had hitherto maintained. His army had out-marched its
supplies; he was forced to give time for them to join him; he had
besides been obliged to detach a considerable force into the Alemtejo,
which, having reduced his numbers below those of the enemy, forced him
to proceed with caution.
When Massena commenced his retreat, Lord Wellington had decided to send
the second British division, together with that of General Hamilton of
Portuguese, with the 13th Light Dragoons, and a Portuguese brigade of
cavalry, to protect the Alemtejo, and to oblige Mortier to raise the
siege of Badajos; a part of this corps having, however, passed to the
north of the Tagus at Abrantes, and driven the enemy from the Zezere at
Punhete, its march to the southward was delayed till Lord Wellington,
receiving intelligence of the surrender of Badajos, was obliged to add
to this force the 4th division, under Lieutenant-General Cole, and the
heavy brigade of British cavalry, under Major-General De Grey. This
immense detachment from his army was rendered necessary from the very
great importance of defending the southern frontier of Portugal, while
the remainder of his forces pursued the enemy in the north. It was
intrusted to the command of Marshal Beresford, and began its march
towards Portalegre and Campo Mayor on the 17th. Lord Wellington
considered the possession of Badajos as of the greatest importance to
his future operations; and therefore directed Marshal Beresford, if
possible, to invest it before the enemy should have had time to repair
the fortifications, and provision it. This object was unfortunately not
accomplished; and the recapture of that fortress, at a later period, was
most dearly purchased.
After a few days’ halt upon the Alva, the allied troops continued the
pursuit of Massena’s army; it had taken a position at Guarda, where it
appeared determined to defend itself. The ground about that town is
extremely strong; being at a considerable height, it commands the
country around it, and is most difficult of access. Massena had availed
himself of these advantages, and hoped to maintain his army, protected
by them, within the frontier of Portugal. He had held out this hope to
Buonaparte, and therefore made every disposition within his means to
secure his object; but Lord Wellington, on the 27th, in the morning, had
manœuvred with seven columns, so as to turn him on every side, and
having gained possession of his position, to force him to a precipitate
retreat; a brigade of French infantry, under General Maucune, was near
being taken, and the whole French army was driven across the Coa.
Massena here made a last effort to maintain some footing within the
frontiers of the country, of which he had so triumphantly predicted the
entire conquest; he placed his army along the Coa, and in occupation of
Sabugal; he was attacked, however, on the 2d of April; his hopes were
blasted; he was driven into Spain. Lord Wellington had directed the
light division to pass the Coa on the left, and in rear of General
Regnier’s corps, while two divisions attacked in front; from the badness
of the weather, a battalion of the Rifle Corps, under Colonel Beckwith,
was deceived in the ford at which it was to cross, and got engaged alone
for a considerable time with almost the whole of the French force.
Colonel Beckwith, at the moment of being charged by the French cavalry,
took advantage of a stone enclosure, from whence he defended himself
with the most distinguished gallantry; an opportunity offering, he
charged and took a howitzer, which he maintained; and, after having
caused a severe loss to the enemy, was relieved by the arrival of the
rest of the light division, and afterwards of the other corps which had
been destined to the attack. Regnier was obliged to retire with great
precipitation, leaving a considerable number of killed and wounded, and
losing many prisoners on his march to Alfaiates, where he entered the
Spanish territory.
Thus were the last of Massena’s troops chased from the country, of which
they still maintained the pompous appellation. “The Army of Portugal,”
was yet the title they were distinguished by, though they could boast of
that country but as the scene of disaster and defeat; and out of which,
with the loss of half their numbers, they had been driven headlong,
leaving only the sad remembrance of the atrocities they had committed.