advance of the position which was occupied by the allies; a detachment
from the corps of Marshal Ney next made an attack upon a village in
front of the light division, which was ceded with little opposition;
this village, although of importance to the allied army, was without the
position in which Lord Wellington had determined to receive the enemy’s
attack; he therefore abandoned it, choosing rather to suffer some
annoyance from its possession by the enemy, than risk the chance of an
action to maintain it, in less advantageous ground than the position he
had fixed upon. Marshal Massena was now convinced that he must fight
Lord Wellington upon his own ground; he therefore directed General
Regnier to advance to the assault of the position in his front, while
the 1st division of Marshal Ney’s corps, supported by the other two, and
a great proportion of artillery, was ordered to establish itself upon
the heights occupied by the light division. General Regnier first
brought his corps into action; the British regiments opposed to him had
not reached the positions that were assigned to them; and, for a moment,
a considerable column of French possessed itself of a point within our
line. Major General Picton instantly marched against this column with a
few companies which he had collected; Major General Lightburne’s
brigade, directed by Lord Wellington, moved upon its right, while the
88th, 45th, and Colonel Douglass’s Regiment of Portuguese, attempted to
gain its left; the troops with Major General Picton, however, first
dislodged the enemy by a most brilliant attack with the bayonet, driving
him, though infinitely superior in numbers, from the strong ground he
had got possession of; the other regiments came up in time to harass him
in his retreat; and the arrival of Major General Leith’s division, which
took place at this moment, convinced General Regnier that he had better
discontinue a contest, in which he had so little prospect of success. He
withdrew his divisions, therefore, and formed upon the ground from which
he had originally moved. During this attack, Marshal Ney formed a part
of his corps in column of mass, and directed it to ascend the height
upon the right of the village, of which he had before obtained
possession. The ground was extremely steep, and the column was but
little annoyed in its ascent; as soon, however, as it had gained the
summit, the guns attached to the light division opened a most
destructive fire upon it, and the division charged it with the bayonet.
The column was overthrown in an instant; the riflemen charged its flanks
while Major General Crawford pursued it down the hill; the foremost
regiments of the column were almost totally destroyed, General Simon
wounded and taken and the whole division completely routed. The
expression of a French soldier engaged in this attack, who was
afterwards taken, “Qu’il se laissa rouler du haut en bas de la montagne,
sans savoir comment il échappa,” best explains the mode in which the
remnants of this column escaped. The allies pursued it across the
valley, and thus put an end to the sanguine expectations of the enemy,
and to their boasted promise, of driving us like sheep from our
position. The rest of the day was occupied by an incessant fire between
the light troops of the two armies; Marshal Massena had placed a
considerable number of battalions in the road, which extended along the
ravine, at the foot of the ridge on which we were formed; and he had
hoped to induce Lord Wellington to reinforce the troops that were
engaged with these battalions, and by that means to get him into an
action of some consequence, out of the position which he occupied. This
system had frequently been successful to the French; the commanders who
have been opposed to them have been unwilling to allow their too near
approach to their army, and have continued to reinforce the advanced
posts, till the greater part of their troops had been drawn into an
action, away from the ground on which they had decided to accept a
battle; but Lord Wellington was not thus to be imposed upon; he directed
the light troops, when pressed, to retire, and to give the enemy an
opportunity of attacking his position, if he could persuade himself to
do so. At the approach of night, Marshal Massena having lost all hopes
of succeeding against the allies, withdrew his troops from the advanced
positions he occupied, and placed them at some distance in the rear,
near the ground which was occupied by General Junot. Major General
Crawford then sent to the officer who commanded in the village, which
had been ceded in the morning, telling him that the possession of it was
necessary to his corps, and therefore directing him to abandon it. The
officer refused, with a declaration that he would die in defence of the
post he was intrusted with. Major General Crawford immediately ordered
six guns to open upon him, and some companies of the 43d and Rifle Corps
to charge the village. The French were instantly driven out of it, and
the advanced post of the light division put in possession of it.
The battle of Busaco was thus terminated. The French lost 10,000 men
killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the course of the day; and Marshal
Massena was first enabled to form an estimate of the talents of the
General, and the bravery of the troops which he was directed to drive
headlong into the sea.
On the morning of the 28th, the two armies maintained their respective
positions; towards the middle of the day, however, the French were
observed to be retiring; they set fire to the woods to conceal their
movement, but the height of Busaco so commanded the whole country, that
their march was distinctly seen. Lord Wellington had been extremely
anxious for the arrival of the corps of militia, under Colonel Trant,
upon the Sierra of Caramula, the road over which communicated from Viseu
to the great road from Oporto to Coimbra, near Sardao, Bamfiela and
Avelans. This was the only pass by which the positions of the Sierra of
Busaco could be turned, and there were parts of it so extremely
difficult, that if this corps of militia had had the necessary time to
destroy the bridges, and to avail itself of the positions afforded by
the ravines which intersect the road, it might have opposed a most
decisive resistance to the advance of the enemy. Lord Wellington did not
choose to detach any part of the force which he considered as his
effective army, to execute his object in this Sierra; such a corps might
be cut off from him, or might have great difficulty in rejoining him;
and he was resolved never to depart from his determination, that the
great contest for the possession of Portugal should be fought by his
whole army, and in a position which should leave the event as little
doubtful as was possible in military operations. The corps of Colonel
Trant did not form a part of the force which Lord Wellington had decided
to keep with him; he intended it for the defence of Oporto, to which
place its retreat was not likely to be interrupted from the Sierra of
Caramula; it had therefore been ordered to occupy the latter position;
but Lord Wellington would not supply its absence by any other
detachment.
As soon as Lord Wellington perceived the retreat of the enemy, he
suspected that his object was to pass by the road just described.
Colonel Trant had arrived upon the Vouga, late on the 28th; Lord
Wellington was already aware, that a considerable corps of the enemy was
by that time in possession of the Sierra; he therefore gave up the hope
of seeing it occupied, and in the same night withdrew his whole army
from Busaco, moving with his own corps into Coimbra, and directing
Lieut.-General Hill to move by Thomar to Santarem. The cavalry was
placed in observation of the enemy, and was directed to cover Lord
Wellington’s movement to the rear. Colonel Trant was ordered to post his
corps along the north bank of the Vouga; and a part of the militia from
Lamego was ordered to enter Viseu in the enemy’s rear.
The situation of the French army began at this time to wear a less
promising appearance; its communication with Spain was totally cut off;
its supply of provisions was nearly exhausted; it had no means of
obtaining subsistence but from the country; and the total evacuation of
it by the inhabitants, of which, according to the French accounts, they
had not seen twenty since their entry into Portugal, made this last
resource extremely precarious. The allies, on the contrary, had beat the
whole French army; they had gained confidence in themselves; the
Portuguese troops had behaved with great bravery; the army relied with
implicit faith on its commander; and it felt that, notwithstanding his
movement to the rear, he was not afraid of encountering the enemy, but
was leading it to stronger positions than the one in which he had
already beaten him.
Marshal Massena appears at this time to have felt the difficulty of his
situation: he had two lines of conduct open to him; either to rest
satisfied with the progress he had made, and to endeavour to
re-establish his communications with Spain, or to push forward in
pursuit of the allies. The first would have been extremely difficult; he
would have weakened his army by detaching to his rear; he would have
suffered considerably from want of provisions, till the supplies should
have reached him; and he would have exposed himself to an attack from
Lord Wellington, while reduced in numbers. He was, besides, assured that
there were no positions which the allies could take up in the vicinity
of Lisbon; and he hoped, by a vigorous pursuit, to put into execution
the orders of his master. He decided upon this operation.
Lord Wellington evacuated Coimbra on the approach of the enemy, upon the
1st of October; the town had generally been quitted by the higher
classes of inhabitants during the preceding days; a considerable
proportion, however, still remained, hoping that the enemy might yet be
prevented from getting possession of it. But about ten o’clock on the
morning of the first, there was suddenly an alarm that the enemy was
approaching; the report was soon magnified into his having entered; and
at one burst the whole of the remaining inhabitants ran shrieking from
the town. The bridge, which is very long and narrow, was at once choked
by the crowds which were pouring upon it; and the unhappy fugitives, who
found their flight impeded, threw themselves into the river, and waded
through it. The Mondego was fortunately not deep at this time, the dry
season had kept it shallow; but there were three or four feet of water
in many of the places where the unfortunate inhabitants passed it. In
the midst of all the horrors of this scene; of the cries of the wretched
people who were separated from their families; of those who were leaving
their homes, their property, their only means of subsistence, without
the prospect of procuring wherewithal to live for the next day, and of
those who believed the enemy (with his train of unheard-of cruelties) at
their heels; the ear was most powerfully arrested by the screams of
despair which issued from the gaol; where the miserable captives, who
saw their countrymen escaping, believed that they should be left victims
to the ferocity of the French.
The shrieks of these unhappy people were fortunately heard by Lord
Wellington; who sent his aide-de-camp, Lord March, to relieve them from
their situation; and thus the last of the inhabitants of Coimbra escaped
from the enemy.
It is not in the nature of this work to dwell upon scenes of misery,
such as have been now described; but the recollection of them will last
long on the minds of those who witnessed them. The cruelties of the
French had made an impression upon the Portuguese, that nothing could
efface; it seemed to be beyond the power of man to await the enemy’s
approach. The whole country fled before him; and if any of the unhappy
fugitives were discovered and chased by a French soldier, they abandoned
every thing to which the human mind is devoted, to escape from what they
looked upon as more than death, the grasp of their merciless
invaders.—Innumerable instances of these melancholy truths might be
detailed; but it would waste the time of the reader, and the relations
of the horrid acts committed by the French would be too shocking to
dwell upon.
When Lord Wellington retired to Coimbra, he passed his divisions to the
rear, and placed them in echellons upon the road to Leyria. As soon as
he was convinced of Massena’s approach, he directed each division to
move one march in retreat, and he fixed his head-quarters at Redinha.
The cavalry which covered the army skirmished with the French in the
plains of the Mondego, and obtained some advantages over those who
attempted to pass the river. The following day, Lord Wellington moved to
Leyria, where he remained till the enemy marched upon him. Massena had
hoped to have overtaken some part of Lord Wellington’s infantry, when he
advanced to Coimbra; but having failed, he pushed forward on the evening
of that day to Condeixa; still he was deceived; Lord Wellington’s
columns were not to be overtaken; and he was obliged to halt for three
days. His army was fatigued with the severe marches it had made; his
provisions were exhausted; he was obliged to sack the town of Coimbra,
to collect what the inhabitants had left; and he was constrained to make
some arrangement for his sick and wounded, who amounted to 5,000 men,
and who were too numerous to be carried with him. Massena’s intercepted
despatch to Buonaparte, proves how strongly he felt the difficulty of
his situation: he says, that he is unable to leave a guard of any
strength to protect his wounded, as it would weaken his army; and that
the best security he can afford them, is by pursuing the allies with the
whole of his force, and driving them from the country. It is surprising,
that the French officers should still have entertained this hope. In a
letter from Marshal Ney to his wife, he says, that every thing is going
on better than could be expected; that the English are flying before the
French army, and that they appear to have no other object in view than
to escape to their transports, and to carry away as great a number of
the youth of Portugal as they can entrap, by way of _dédommagement_, for
the great expenses of the war.
On the 4th of October Massena closed his divisions to his advanced guard
at Pombal, and early on the 5th pushed forward with great rapidity on
Leyria, hoping to reach some part of the allied army, but he was again
deceived; Lord Wellington had placed his troops in echellons to the
rear, and as soon as he was apprized of the movement of the French, he
directed them to fall back; the advanced guard of the British cavalry
had a sharp rencontre with the enemy, where three French officers and a
considerable number of dragoons were taken; this was the only reward
Marshal Massena derived from the rapidity of his advance.
Lord Wellington moved to Alcobaça, the next day to Rio Mayor, the next
to Alemquer, and on the 8th of October he entered a part of his lines at
Arruda. The French army pressed forward during these days with very
great exertion, but by the able arrangements of Lord Wellington it was
unable to overtake any part of his troops; several skirmishes took place
between the cavalry of the two armies; they were universally in favour
of the British, who closed their operations by bringing in a squadron of
French. The rains set in on the 8th; the allied army did not suffer from
them, as it entered its positions on the 9th, and was generally placed
in villages and under cover; the French were materially annoyed by them;
the roads became extremely bad; their horses, which had been short of
forage, and had made some most distressing marches, were in many
instances unable to get forward with the artillery; great numbers of
them perished, and the troops who were without cover, suffered most
severely from the inclemency of the weather.
We have thus conducted the British army to the termination of one of the
most extraordinary operations which was ever carried into effect; the
boldness of the original conception, as well as the perseverance and
success with which it was executed, will command the admiration of all
military men. The ascendency which the character and talents of Lord
Wellington had obtained over the minds of all those who were within his
guidance or control, could alone have enabled him to effect a plan which
involved in it such fearful consequences. To have persuaded a foreign
government and army, but lately subjected to his direction, to abandon
the greater proportion of their country almost without a struggle, to
the ravages of an invader; to see his approach to the capital without
fear or hesitation, speaks of itself a confidence in the talents of the
commander which is without example. Not less extraordinary was the mode
in which a movement in retreat was executed from Almeida to Torres
Vedras, a distance of 150 miles, in presence of a superior army, whose
object was, by every exertion in its power, to harass the corps opposed
to it; yet not a straggler was overtaken; no article of baggage
captured; no corps of infantry, except where the invaders were routed at
Busaco, was ever seen or molested. Of all the retreats which have ever
been executed, this deserves most to be admired. The steady principle on
which it was carried into effect could alone have secured its success.
Lord Wellington never swerved from his purpose; the various changes
which every day occur in war, made no impression on his determination.
The great event of a battle, such as that of Busaco, won over an enemy
who was surrounded by an hostile nation, never induced him to change the
plan of operations which he was convinced would in the end produce the
most decisive advantages. Guided by such a principle, Lord Wellington
was enabled triumphantly to execute his plan; the successes which have
since attended his career are the best evidences of its wisdom. It is a
singular circumstance, that when in his turn Massena had to conduct his
army in retreat over nearly the same ground to the frontiers of Spain,
although he had the advantages of making his preparations in secret, and
of disguising the moment of putting it into execution, yet he was
constantly overtaken; the corps of his army beaten and harassed; and in
every action which he was compelled to fight, he was driven with loss
and disaster from his positions.
Lord Wellington placed his army on the ground marked out for it in the
course of the 8th, 9th, and 10th of October. The lines, as they have
been termed, extended from Alhandra to the mouth of the Zizandra; the
whole distance may be computed at about twenty-five miles from right to
left. The term of lines was but little applicable to them; the defences
procured by art were confined to closed redoubts placed upon the most
essential points, and calculated to resist, although the enemy’s troops
might have established themselves in their rear. They were thus enabled
to protect the formation of the army upon any point attacked, before the
enemy could bring cannon in operation with the troops which he might
have pushed forward between them.
These forts were occupied, (with very few exceptions), not by the
regular army destined to act in the field, but by the militia, of which
that of Lisbon formed a part, mixed up with a certain number of troops
of the line. Their defence was thus intrusted to a description of force,
capable of the service imposed upon it, but which would have been of
trifling assistance in a field of battle. Each redoubt was provisioned
for a certain time, and was supplied with the ammunition, _&c._,
necessary for its protracted defence. The post of Alhandra, which formed
the right of the whole position, was strong by nature, and was, besides,
fortified by several redoubts; its defence was assisted by the gun-boats
in the Tagus. The corps under the orders of Lieutenant General Hill
occupied this part of the position. It defended the great approach to
Lisbon, and its possession was of the greatest importance. Lieutenant
General Hill communicated by his left, which was placed on the ground at
the back of Arruda, on the Sierra de Monte Agraça, with the corps of the
centre, which occupied the heights above Sobral. These heights, over
which passed the second great road to Lisbon, having been fortified as
much as the nature of the ground would admit, formed the principal point
of defence on this part of the line. From this place towards the left,
and in the vicinity of Ribaldiera, there were several passes into the
main position, all of which were fortified; and the principal force of
the army was concentrated in rear of them. The next points of importance
were Runa and Undesquiera, supported by the line of heights in their
rear; they were upon the road leading from Sobral to Torres Vedras, and
were of the most essential consequence, since they commanded the only
pass to the latter place within the Monte Junto; an advantage important
to the strength of the whole position, and which never could with safety
be abandoned. These posts were well fortified; were occupied by a
considerable corps, and supported by the force under Major General
Picton at Torres Vedras.
It is necessary to give some description of Monte Junto, which has just
been mentioned; for, although it was without the position, yet it was
one of the main features which contributed to its general strength. This
mountain runs directly north from Runa, for a distance of twelve or
fourteen miles; there are no great roads or communications leading over
it; the valley to the eastward, which divides it from Sobral, is
impassable; it prevents, therefore, all military communication for an
army from that town to Torres Vedras (excepting that stated as being
occupied,) but round its northern point, and thus requiring a march of
at least two days. The difficulty of passing across this mountain was so
great that two corps separated by it could have carried no assistance to
each other, if either had been attacked. There were therefore two
portions of the British position, one that might be assailed from the
east of Monte Junto, the other, (of which Torres Vedras was the right,
and the sea at the mouth of the Zizandra the left) which might be
attacked from the west. Lord Wellington’s communication from one to the
other of these branches of his whole position was perfectly safe and
easy; and in a few hours the greater part of his troops could be
transported to the defence of either; whereas the direct contrary was
the case, as has been shewn, with the enemy. This formed one of the main
features of the strength of the lines.
Torres Vedras and the ground about it was strongly fortified; forts were
continued, at intervals, to the sea; and, although this part of the
position was never menaced, yet it was occupied by garrisons, and was
prepared to resist any attack that should be made upon it.
In rear of this line of positions was a second, extending from the back
of Alverca to Bucellas, thence along the Sierra di Serves and the Sierra
di Barca to Montachique, from whence by the park wall of Mafra to the
rear of Gradel, and along the line of heights to the mouth of the St.
Lorenzo. Betwixt these two lines of positions, there were strong works
at Enxara di Cavalhieros, at Carasquiera, and Mattacores, covering the
communication between them. To the south, and on the other side of the
Tagus, the heights which commanded the town and anchorage of Lisbon were
also fortified, and a corps of 10,000 men, partly marines from the
fleet, were destined to defend them; they extended from Almada to the
fort called Bugia, opposite Fort St. Julian’s. These last defences were
carried into effect with a view to resisting any force the enemy might
bring through the Alemtejo against the capital, which at one time was
menaced by the corps under Marshal Mortier, then assembled on the
frontier of that province.
Massena arrived with the 6th and 8th corps of his army at Sobral on the
10th, 11th, and 12th of October. The 2d corps followed Lieutenant
General Hill upon Alhandra. These troops were considerably fatigued with
the forced marches they had in vain been making to come up with Lord
Wellington’s army; the rain which had fallen since the 8th instant had
rendered the roads extremely bad, particularly about Sobral; so that the
men, and particularly the horses, were almost exhausted when they
arrived in front of our positions.
Massena occupied himself the first days with reconnoitring the ground on
which Lord Wellington had placed his army; the task was difficult; it
was so concealed behind the hills that a very small part of it could be
discovered; enough, however, was perceptible to convince him that an
attack was no easy undertaking. Lord Wellington occupied a redoubt at
the foot of the great height above Sobral; the French established one at
a short distance, and opposite to it. After several reconnoitres,
Massena determined to carry the British redoubt. The troops which
occupied it were commanded by Colonel the Honourable H. Cadogan, of the
73d Regiment. Massena placed himself on a hill to see the success of his
first operation against our lines. He was disappointed, his chosen
troops were repulsed, and in sight of both armies the French redoubt was
carried and maintained. From this moment no event of any consequence
took place for a considerable length of time. Skirmishes in the rear of
the French army, and particularly from the village of Ramalhal, where
the brigade of British cavalry under Major General De Grey was posted,
were almost the only military events which took place. These were
chiefly brought about by parties of the French, who, in search of
provisions, were continually met by Lord Wellington’s patroles, and in
which a number of prisoners were taken.