energy. Every thing requisite for the business was conveyed thither
and got in readiness. A store of corn was collected at Casilinum; at
the mouth of the Vulturnus, where a town now stands, a strong post was
fortified; and a garrison was stationed in Puteoli, which Fabius had
formerly fortified, in order to have the command of the neighbouring
sea and the river. Into these two maritime forts, the corn recently
sent from Sicily, with that which Marcus Junius, the praetor, had
bought up in Etruria, was conveyed from Ostia, to supply the army
during the winter. But, in addition to the disaster sustained in
Lucania, the army also of volunteer slaves, who had served during the
life of Gracchus with the greatest fidelity, as if discharged from
service by the death of their general, left their standards. Hannibal
was not willing that Capua should be neglected, or his allies
deserted, at so critical a juncture; but, having obtained such success
from the temerity of one Roman general, his attention was fixed on the
opportunity which presented itself of crushing the other general and
his army. Ambassadors from Apulia reported that Cneius Fulvius, the
praetor, had at first conducted his measures with caution, while
engaged in besieging certain towns of Apulia, which had revolted to
Hannibal; but that afterwards, in consequence of extraordinary
success, both himself and his soldiers, being glutted with booty, had
so given themselves up to licentiousness and indolence, that all
military discipline was disregarded. Having frequently on other
occasions, as well as but a few days ago, experienced what an army was
good for, when conducted by an unskilful commander, he moved his camp
into Apulia.
21. The Roman legions, and the praetor, Fulvius, were in the
neighbourhood of Herdonia, where, receiving intelligence of the
approach of the enemy, they had nearly torn up the standards and gone
out to battle without the praetor's orders; nor did any thing tend
more to prevent it than the assured hope they entertained that they
could do so whenever they pleased, consulting only their own will. The
following night, Hannibal having obtained information that the camp
was in a state of tumult, and that most of the troops were in a
disorderly manner urging the general to give the signal, and calling
out to arms, and therefore feeling convinced that an opportunity
presented itself for a successful battle, distributed three thousand
light troops in the houses in the neighbourhood, and among the thorns
and woods. These, on a signal being given, were to rise up from their
lurking-place with one accord; and Mago, with about two thousand
horse, was ordered to occupy all the roads in the direction in which
he supposed their flight would be directed. Having made these
preparations during the night, he led his troops into the field at
break of day. Nor did Fulvius decline the challenge; not so much from
any hope of success entertained by himself, as drawn by the blind
impetuosity of his soldiers. Accordingly, the line itself was formed
with the same want of caution with which they entered the field,
agreeably to the whim of the soldiers, who came up as chance directed,
and took their stations just where they pleased; which they afterwards
abandoned, as fear or caprice suggested. The first legion and the left
wing of the allied troops were drawn up in front. The line was
extended to a great length, the tribunes remonstrating, that there was
no strength in it, and that wherever the enemy made the charge they
would break through it: but no salutary advice reached their minds,
nor even their ears. Hannibal was now come up, a general of a totally
different character, with an army neither similar in its nature, nor
similarly marshalled. The consequence was, that the Romans did not so
much as sustain their shout and first attack. Their general, equal to
Centenius in folly and temerity, but by no means to be compared with
him in courage, when he saw things going against him, and his troops
in confusion, hastily mounting his horse, fled from the field with
about two hundred horsemen. The rest of the troops, beaten in front,
and surrounded on the flank and rear, were slaughtered to such a
degree, that out of eighteen thousand men, not more than two thousand
escaped. The enemy got possession of the camp.
22. When these disastrous defeats, happening one upon another, were
reported at Rome, great grief and consternation seized the city. But
still, as the consuls had been hitherto successful when it was most
important, they were the less affected by these disasters. Caius
Lastorius and Marcus Metilius were sent as ambassadors to the consuls,
with directions carefully to collect the remains of the two armies,
and use every endeavour to prevent their surrendering themselves to
the enemy, through fear or despair, (which was the case after the
battle of Cannae,) and to search for the deserters from the army of
volunteer slaves. Publius Cornelius was charged with the same
business; to him also the levy was intrusted. He caused an order to be
issued throughout the market and smaller towns, that search should be
made for the volunteer slaves, and that they should be brought back to
their standards. All these things were executed with the most vigilant
care. The consul, Appius Claudius, having placed Decius Junius in
command at the mouth of the Vulturnus, and Marcus Aurelius Cotta at
Puteoli, with directions to send off the corn immediately to the camp,
as each of the ships from Etruria and Sardinia arrived with it,
returned himself to Capua, and found his colleague Quintus Fulvius at
Casilinum, conveying every requisite thence, and making every
preparation for the siege of Capua. Both of them then joined in
besieging the city, summoning Claudius Nero, the praetor, from the
Claudian camp at Suessula; who, leaving a small garrison there,
marched down to Capua with all the rest of his forces. Thus there were
three generals' tents erected round Capua; and three armies, applying
themselves to the work in different parts, proceeded to surround the
city with a ditch and rampart, erecting forts at moderate intervals.
The Campanians attempting to obstruct the work, a battle was fought in
several places at once; the consequence of which was, that at length
the Campanians confined themselves within their gates and walls.
Before, however, these works were carried quite round, ambassadors
were sent to Hannibal to complain that Capua was abandoned, and almost
given up to the Romans, and to implore him, that he would now, at
least, bring them assistance, when they were not only besieged, but
surrounded by a rampart. A letter was sent to the consuls from Publius
Cornelius, the praetor, directing that before they completely enclosed
Capua with their works, they should grant permission to such of the
Campanians as chose to quit Capua, and take their property with them.
That those should retain their liberty, and all their possessions, who
quitted it before the ides of March, but that those who quitted it
after that day, as well as those who continued there, would be
considered as enemies. Proclamation was made to the Campanians to this
effect, but it was received with such scorn, that they spontaneously
used insulting language and menaces. Hannibal had marched his legions
from Herdonea to Tarentum, with the hope of getting possession of the
citadel of that place, by force or stratagem. But not succeeding
there, he turned his course to Brundusium, thinking that town would be
betrayed to him, but, while fruitlessly spending time there also, the
Campanian ambassadors came to him with complaints and entreaties.
Hannibal answered them in a proud manner, that he had before raised
the siege of Capua, and that now the consuls would not sustain his
approach. The ambassadors, dismissed with these hopes, with difficulty
effected their return to Capua, which was by this time surrounded by a
double trench and rampart.
23. At the time when the circumvallation of Capua was carrying on with
the greatest activity, the siege of Syracuse, which had been forwarded
by intestine treachery, in addition to the efforts and bravery of the
general and his army, was brought to a conclusion. For in the
beginning of spring, Marcellus being in doubt whether he should direct
the operations of the war against Himilco and Hippocrates at
Agrigentum, or press the siege of Syracuse, though he saw that it was
impossible to take the city by force, which, from its situation, both
with respect to sea and land, was impregnable, nor by famine, as it
was supported by an uninterrupted supply of provisions from Carthage,
yet that he might leave no course untried, directed the Syracusan
deserters (and there were in the Roman camp some men in this situation
of the highest rank, who had been driven out of the city during the
defection from the Romans, because they were averse to a change of
measures) to sound the feelings of those who were of the same party in
conferences, and to promise them, that if Syracuse was delivered up,
they should have their liberty, and be governed by their own laws.
There was no opportunity however, of having a conference; for as many
were suspected of disaffection, the attention and observation of all
were exerted, lest any thing of the kind should occur unknown to them.
One of the exiles, who was a servant, having been allowed to enter the
city in the character of a deserter, assembled a few persons, and
opened a conversation upon the subject. After this, certain persons,
covering themselves with nets in a fishing smack, were in this way
conveyed round to the Roman camp, and conferred with the fugitives.
The same was frequently repeated by different parties, one after
another; and at last they amounted to eighty. But after every thing
had been concerted for betraying the city, the plot was reported to
Epicydes, by one Attalus, who felt hurt that he had not been intrusted
with the secret; and they were all put to death with torture. This
attempt having miscarried, another hope was immediately raised. One
Damippus, a Lacedaemonian, who had been sent from Syracuse to king
Philip, had been taken prisoner by the Roman fleet. Epicydes was
particularly anxious to ransom this man above any other; nor was
Marcellus disinclined to grant it; the Romans, even at this time,
being desirous of gaining the friendship of the Aetolians, with whom
the Lacedaemonians were in alliance. Some persons having been sent to
treat respecting his ransom, the most central and convenient place to
both parties for this purpose appeared to be at the Trogilian port,
near the tower called Galeagra. As they went there several times, one
of the Romans, having a near view of the wall, and having determined
its height, as nearly as it could be done by conjecture, from counting
the stones, and by forming an estimate, in his own mind, what was the
height of each stone in the face of the work; and having come to the
conclusion that it was considerably lower than he himself and all the
rest had supposed it, and that it was capable of being scaled with
ladders of moderate size, laid the matter before Marcellus. It
appeared a thing not to be neglected; but as the spot could not be
approached, being on this very account guarded with extraordinary
care, a favourable opportunity of doing it was sought for. This a
deserter suggested, who brought intelligence that the Syracusans were
celebrating the festival of Diana; that it was to last three days, and
that as there was a deficiency of other things during the siege, the
feasts would be more profusely celebrated with wine, which was
furnished by Epicydes to the people in general, and distributed
through the tribes by persons of distinction. When Marcellus had
received this intelligence, he communicated it to a few of the
military tribunes; then having selected, through their means, such
centurions and soldiers as had courage and energy enough for so
important an enterprise, and having privately gotten together a number
of scaling-ladders, he directed that a signal should be given to the
rest of the troops to take their refreshment, and go to rest early,
for they were to go upon an expedition that night. Then the time, as
it was supposed, having arrived, when, after having feasted from the
middle of the day, they would have had their fill of wine, and have
begun to sleep, he ordered the soldiers of one company to proceed with
the ladders, while about a thousand armed men were in silence marched
to the spot in a slender column. The foremost having mounted the wall,
without noise or confusion, the others followed in order; the boldness
of the former inspiring even the irresolute with courage.
24. The thousand armed men had now taken a part of the city, when the
rest, applying a greater number of ladders, mounted the wall on a
signal given from the Hexapylos. To this place the former party had
arrived in entire solitude; as the greater part of them, having
feasted in the towers, were either asleep from the effects of wine, or
else, half asleep, were still drinking. A few of them, however, they
surprised in their beds, and put to the sword. They began then to
break open a postern gate near the Hexapylos, which required great
force; and a signal was given from the wall by sounding a trumpet, as
had been agreed upon. After this, the attack was carried on in every
quarter, not secretly, but by open force; for they had now reached
Epipolae, a place protected by numerous guards, where the business was
to terrify the enemy, and not to escape their notice. In effect they
were terrified; for as soon as the sound of the trumpets was heard,
and the shouts of the men who had got possession of the walls and a
part of the city, the guards concluded that every part was taken, and
some of them fled along the wall, others leaped down from it, or were
thrown down headlong by a crowd of the terrified townsmen. A great
part of the inhabitants, however, were ignorant of this disastrous
event, all of them being overpowered with wine and sleep; and because,
in a city of so wide extent, what was perceived in one quarter was not
readily made known through the whole city. A little before day,
Marcellus having entered the city with all his forces, through the
Hexapylos, which was forced open roused all the townsmen; who ran to
arms, in order, if possible, by their efforts, to afford succour to
the city, which was now almost taken. Epicydes advanced with a body of
troops at a rapid pace from the Insula, which the Syracusans
themselves call Nasos, not doubting but that he should be able to
drive out what he supposed a small party, which had got over the wall
through the negligence of the guards. He earnestly represented to the
terrified inhabitants who met him, that they were increasing the
confusion, and that in their accounts they made things greater and
more important than they really were. But when he perceived that every
place around Epipolae was filled with armed men, after just teasing
the enemy with the discharge of a few missiles, he marched back to the
Achradina, not so much through fear of the number and strength of the
enemy, as that some intestine treachery might show itself, taking
advantage of the opportunity, and he might find the gates of the
Achradina and island closed upon him in the confusion. When Marcellus,
having entered the walls, beheld this city as it lay subjected to his
view from the high ground on which he stood, a city the most
beautiful, perhaps, of any at that time, he is said to have shed tears
over it; partly from the inward satisfaction he felt at having
accomplished so important an enterprise, and partly in consideration
of its ancient renown. The fleets of the Athenians sunk there, and two
vast armies destroyed, with two generals of the highest reputation, as
well as the many wars waged with the Carthaginians with so much peril
arose before his mind; the many and powerful tyrants and kings; but
above all Hiero, a king who was not only fresh in his memory, but who
was distinguished for the signal services he had rendered the Roman
people, and more than all by the endowments which his own virtues and
good fortune had conferred. All these considerations presenting
themselves at once to his recollection, and reflecting, that in an
instant every thing before him would be in flames, and reduced to
ashes; before he marched his troops to the Achradina, he sent before
him some Syracusans, who, as was before observed, were among the Roman
troops, to induce the enemy, by a persuasive address, to surrender the
city.
25. The gates and walls of the Achradina were occupied principally by
deserters, who had no hopes of pardon in case of capitulation. These
men would neither suffer those who were sent to approach the walls,
nor to address them. Marcellus, therefore, on the failure of this
attempt, gave orders to retire to the Euryalus, which is an eminence
at the extremity of the city, at the farthest point from the sea, and
commanding the road leading into the fields and the interior of the
island, and is conveniently situated for the introduction of supplies.
This fort was commanded by Philodemus, an Argive, who was placed in
this situation by Epicydes. Marcellus sent Sosis, one of the
regicides, to him. After a long conversation, being put off for the
purpose of frustrating him, he brought back word to Marcellus, that
Philodemus had taken time to deliberate. This man postponing his
answer day after day, till Hippocrates and Himilco should quit their
present position, and come up with their legions; not doubting but
that if he should receive them into the fort, the Roman army, shut up
as it was within the walls, might be annihilated, Marcellus, who saw
that the Euryalus would neither be delivered up to him, nor could be
taken by force, pitched his camp between Neapolis and Tycha, which are
names of divisions of the city, and are in themselves like cities;
fearful lest if he entered populous parts of the city, he should not
be able to restrain his soldiers, greedy of plunder, from running up
and down after it. When three ambassadors came to him from Tycha and
Neapolis with fillets and other badges of supplicants, imploring him
to abstain from fire and slaughter, Marcellus, having held a council
respecting these entreaties, for so they were, rather than demands,
ordered his soldiers, according to the unanimous opinion of the
council, not to offer violence to any free person, but told them that
every thing else might be their booty. The walls of the houses forming
a protection for his camp, he posted guards and parties of troops at
the gates, which were exposed, as they faced the streets, lest any
attack should be made upon his camp while the soldiers were dispersed
in pursuit of plunder. After these arrangements, on a signal given,
the soldiers dispersed for that purpose; and though they broke open
doors and every place resounded in consequence of the alarm and
confusion created, they nevertheless refrained from blood. They did
not desist from plunder till they had gutted the houses of all the
property which had been accumulated during a long period of
prosperity. Meanwhile, Philodemus also, who despaired of obtaining
assistance, having received a pledge that he might return to Epicydes
in safety, withdrew the garrison, and delivered up the fortress to the
Romans. While the attention of all was engaged by the tumult
occasioned in that part of the city which was captured, Bomilcar,
taking advantage of the night, when, from the violence of the weather
the Roman fleet was unable to ride at anchor in the deep, set out from
the bay of Syracuse, with thirty-five ships, and sailed away into the
main without interruption; leaving fifty-five ships for Epicydes and
the Syracusans; and having informed the Carthaginians in what a
critical situation Syracuse was placed, returned, after a few days,
with a hundred ships; having, as report says, received many presents
from Epicydes out of the treasure of Hiero.
26. Marcellus, by gaining possession of the Euryalus, and placing a
garrison in it, was freed from one cause of anxiety; which was, lest
any hostile force received into that fortress on his rear might annoy
his troops, shut up and confined as they were within the walls. He
next invested the Achradina, erecting three camps in convenient
situations, with the hope of reducing those enclosed within it to the
want of every necessary. The outposts of both sides had remained
inactive for several days, when the arrival of Hippocrates and Himilco
suddenly caused the Romans to be attacked aggressively on all sides;
for Hippocrates, having fortified a camp at the great harbour, and
given a signal to those who occupied the Achradina, attacked the old
camp of the Romans, in which Crispinus had the command; and Epicydes
sallied out against the outposts of Marcellus, the Carthaginian fleet
coming up to that part of the shore which lay between the city and the
Roman camp, so that no succour could be sent by Marcellus to
Crispinus. The enemy, however, produced more tumult than conflict; for
Crispinus not only drove back Hippocrates from his works, but pursued
him as he fled with precipitation, while Marcellus drove Epicydes into
the city; and it was considered that enough was now done even to
prevent any danger arising in future from their sudden sallies. They
were visited too by a plague; a calamity extending to both sides, and
one which might well divert their attention from schemes of war. For
as the season of the year was autumn, and the situation naturally
unwholesome, though this was much more the case without than within
the city, the intolerable intensity of the heat had an effect upon the
constitution of almost every man in both the camps. At first they
sickened and died from the unhealthiness of the season and climate;
but afterwards the disease was spread merely by attending upon, and
coming in contact with, those affected; so that those who were seized
with it either perished neglected and deserted, or else drew with them
those who sat by them and attended them, by infecting them with the
same violence of disease. Daily funerals and death were before the
eye; and lamentations were heard from all sides, day and night. At
last, their feelings had become so completely brutalized by being
habituated to these miseries, that they not only did not follow their
dead with tears and decent lamentations, but they did not even carry
them out and bury them; so that the bodies of the dead lay strewed
about, exposed to the view of those who were awaiting a similar fate;
and thus the dead were the means of destroying the sick, and the sick
those who were in health, both by fear and by the filthy state and the
noisome stench of their bodies. Some preferring to die by the sword,
even rushed alone upon the outposts of the enemy. The violence of the
plague, however, was much greater in the Carthaginian than the Roman
army; for the latter, from having been a long time before Syracuse,
had become more habituated to the climate and the water. Of the army
of the enemy, the Sicilians, as soon as they perceived that diseases
had become very common from the unwholesomeness of the situation,
dispersed to their respective cities in the neighbourhood; but the
Carthaginians, who had no place to retire to, perished, together with
their generals, Hippocrates and Himilco, to a man. Marcellus, on
seeing the violence with which the disease was raging, had removed his
troops into the city, where their debilitated frames were recruited in
houses and shade. Many however, of the Roman army were cut off by this
pestilence.
27. The land forces of the Carthaginians being thus destroyed, the
Sicilians, who had served under Hippocrates retired to two towns of no
great size, but well secured by natural situation and fortifications;
one was three miles, the other fifteen, from Syracuse. Here they
collected a store of provisions from their own states, and sent for
reinforcements. Meanwhile, Bomilcar, who had gone a second time to
Carthage, by so stating the condition of their allies as to inspire a
hope that they might not only render them effectual aid, but also that
the Romans might in a manner be made prisoners in the city which they
had captured, induced the Carthaginians to send with him as many ships
of burden as possible, laden with every kind of provisions, and to
augment the number of his ships. Setting sail, therefore, from
Carthage with a hundred and thirty men of war and seven hundred
transports, he had tolerably fair winds for crossing over to Sicily,
but was prevented by the same wind from doubling Cape Pachynum. The
news of the approach of Bomilcar, and afterwards his unexpected delay,
excited alternate fear and joy in the Romans and Syracusans. Epicydes,
apprehensive lest if the same wind which now detained him should
continue to blow from the east for several days, the Carthaginian
fleet would return to Africa, put the Achradina in the hands of the
generals of the mercenary troops, and sailed to Bomilcar; whom he at
length prevailed upon to try the issue of a naval battle, though he
found him with his fleet stationed in the direction of Africa, and
afraid of fighting, not so much because he was unequal in the strength
or the number of his ships, for he had more than the Romans, as
because the wind was more favourable to the Roman fleet than to his
own. Marcellus also seeing that an army of Sicilians was assembling
from every part of the island, and that the Carthaginian fleet was
approaching with a great want of supplies, though inferior in the
number of his ships, resolved to prevent Bomilcar from coming to
Syracuse, lest, blocked up in the city of his enemies, he should be
pressed both by sea and land. The two hostile fleets were stationed
near the promontory of Pachynum, ready to engage as soon as the sea
should become calm enough to admit of their sailing out into the deep.
Accordingly, the east wind, which had blown violently for several
days, now subsiding, Bomilcar got under sail first, his van seeming to
make for the main sea, in order to double the promontory with greater
ease; but seeing the Roman ships bearing down upon him, terrified by
some unexpected occurrence, it is not known what, he sailed away into
the main sea; and sending messengers to Heraclea, to order the
transports to return to Africa, he passed along the coast of Sicily
and made for Tarentum. Epicydes, thus suddenly disappointed in such
great expectations, to avoid returning to endeavour to raise the siege
of a city, a great part of which was already in the hands of the
enemy, sailed to Agrigentum, intending to wait the issue of the
contest, rather than take any new measures when there.
28. Intelligence of these events having been carried into the camp of
the Sicilians, that Epicydes had departed from Syracuse, that the
island was deserted by the Carthaginians, and almost again delivered
up to the Romans; after sounding the inclinations of the besieged in
conferences, they sent ambassadors to Marcellus, to treat about terms
of capitulation. They had not much difficulty in coming to an
agreement, that all the parts of the island which had been under the
dominion of their kings should be ceded to the Romans; that the rest,
with their liberty and their own laws, should be preserved to the
Sicilians. They then invited to a conference the persons who had been
intrusted with the management of affairs by Epicydes; to whom they
said, that they were sent from the army of the Sicilians, at once to
Marcellus and to them, that both those who were besieged and those who
were not might share the same fortune; and that neither of them might
stipulate any thing for themselves separately. They were then allowed
to enter, in order to converse with their relations and friends; when,
laying before them the terms which they had made with Marcellus, and
holding out to them a hope of safety, they induced them to join with
them in an attack upon the prefects of Epicydes, Polyclitus,
Philistion, and Epicydes, surnamed Sindon. Having put them to death,
they summoned the multitude to an assembly; and after complaining of
the famine, at which they had been accustomed to express their
dissatisfaction to each other in secret, they said, that "although
they were pressed by so many calamities, they had no right to accuse
Fortune, because it was at their own option how long they should
continue to suffer them. That the motive which the Romans had in
besieging Syracuse was affection for the Syracusans, and not hatred;
for when they heard that the government was usurped by Hippocrates and
Epicydes, the creatures first of Hannibal and then of Hieronymus, they
took arms and began to besiege the city, in order to reduce not the
city itself, but its cruel tyrants. But now that Hippocrates is slain,
Epicydes shut out of Syracuse, his praefects put to death, and the
Carthaginians driven from the entire possession of Sicily by sea and
land, what reason can the Romans have left why they should not desire
the preservation of Syracuse, in the same manner as they would if
Hiero were still lining, who cultivated the friendship of Rome with
unequalled fidelity? That, therefore, neither the city nor its
inhabitants were in any danger, except from themselves, if they
neglected an opportunity of restoring themselves to the favour of the
Romans; and that no so favourable a one would ever occur as that which
presented itself at the present instant, immediately upon its
appearing that they were delivered from their insolent tyrants."
29. This speech was received with the most unqualified approbation of
all present. It was resolved, however, that praetors should be elected
before the nomination of deputies; which being done, some of the
praetors themselves were sent as deputies to Marcellus, the chief of
whom thus addressed him: "Neither in the first instance did we
Syracusans revolt from you, but Hieronymus, whose impiety towards you
was by no means so great as towards us; nor afterwards was it any
Syracusan who disturbed the peace established by the death of the
tyrant, but Hippocrates and Epicydes, creatures of the tyrant; while
we were overpowered, on the one hand by fear, and on the other by
treachery. Nor can any one say that there ever was a time when we were
in possession of our liberty, when we were not also at peace with you.
In the present instance, manifestly, as soon as ever we became our own
masters, by the death of those persons who held Syracuse in
subjection, we lost no time in coming to deliver up our arms, to
surrender ourselves, our city, and our walls, and to refuse no
conditions which you shall impose upon us. To you, Marcellus, the gods
have given the glory of having captured the most renowned and
beautiful of the Grecian cities. Every memorable exploit which we have
at any time achieved by land or sea accrues to the splendour of your
triumph. Would you wish that it should be known only by fame, how
great a city has been captured by you, rather than that she should
stand as a monument even to posterity; so that to every one who visits
her by sea or land, she may point out at one time our trophies gained
from the Athenians and Carthaginians, at another time those which you
have gained from us; and that you should transmit Syracuse unimpaired
to your family, to be kept under the protection and patronage of the
race of the Marcelli? Let not the memory of Hieronymus have greater
weight with you than that of Hiero. The latter was your friend for a
much longer period than the former was your enemy. From the latter you
have realized even benefits, while the frenzy of Hieronymus only
brought ruin upon himself." At the hands of the Romans all things were
obtainable and secure. There was a greater disposition to war, and
more danger to be apprehended among themselves; for the deserters,
thinking that they were delivered up to the Romans, induced the
mercenary auxiliaries to entertain the same apprehension; and hastily
seizing their arms, they first put the praetors to death, and then ran
through the city to massacre the Syracusans. In their rage they slew
all whom chance threw in their way, and plundered every thing which
presented itself; and then, lest they should have no leaders, they
elected six praetors, so that three might have the command in the
Achradina, and three in the island. At length, the tumult having
subsided, and the mercenary troops having ascertained, by inquiry,
what had been negotiated with the Romans, it began to appear, as was
really the case, that their cause and that of the deserters were
different.
30. The ambassadors returned from Marcellus very opportunely. They
informed them that they had been influenced by groundless suspicions,
and that the Romans saw no reason why they should inflict punishment
upon them. Of the three praefects of the Achradina one was a Spaniard,
named Mericus. To him one of the Spanish auxiliaries was designedly
sent, among those who accompanied the ambassadors. Having obtained an
interview with Mericus in the absence of witnesses, he first explained
to him the state in which he had left Spain, from which he had lately
returned: "That there every thing was in subjection to the Roman arms;
that it was in his power, by doing the Romans a service, to become the
first man among his countrymen, whether he might be inclined to serve
with the Romans, or to return to his country. On the other hand, if he
persisted in preferring to hold out against the siege, what hope could
he have, shut up as he was by sea and land?" Mericus was moved by
these suggestions, and when it was resolved upon to send ambassadors
to Marcellus, he sent his brother among them; who, being brought into
the presence of Marcellus, apart from the rest, by means of the same
Spaniard, after receiving an assurance of protection, arranged the
method of carrying their object into effect, and then returned to the
Achradina. Mericus then, in order to prevent any one from conceiving a
suspicion of treachery, declared, that he did not like that deputies
should be passing to and fro; he thought that they should neither
admit nor send any; and in order that the guards might be kept more
strictly, that such parts as were most exposed should be distributed
among the prefects, each being made responsible for the safety of his
own quarter. All approved of the distribution of the posts. The
district which fell to the lot of Mericus himself extended from the
fountain Arethusa to the mouth of the large harbour, of which he
caused the Romans to be informed. Accordingly, Marcellus ordered a
transport with armed men to be towed by a quadrireme to the Achradina
during the night, and the soldiers to be landed in the vicinity of
that gate which is near the fountain of Arethusa. This order having
been executed at the fourth watch, and Mericus having received the
soldiers when landed at the gate, according to the agreement,
Marcellus assaulted the walls of the Achradina with all his forces at
break of day, so that he not only engaged the attention of those who
occupied the Achradina, but also bands of armed men, quitting their
own posts ran to the spot from the island, in order to repel the
furious attack of the Romans. During this confusion, some light ships
which had been prepared beforehand, and had sailed round, landed a
body of armed men at the island; these suddenly attacking the
half-manned stations and the opened door of the gate at which the
troops had a little before run out, got possession of the island
without much opposition, abandoned as it was, in consequence of the
flight and trepidation of its guards. Nor were there any who rendered
less service, or showed less firmness in maintaining their posts, than
the deserters; for as they did not repose much confidence even in
those of their own party, they fled in the middle of the contest. When
Marcellus learnt that the island was taken, one quarter of the
Achradina in the hands of his troops, and that Mericus, with the men
under his command, had joined them, he sounded a retreat, lest the
royal treasure, the fame of which was greater than the reality, should
be plundered.
31. The impetuosity of the soldiers having been checked, time and
opportunity to escape were given to the deserters in the Achradina;
and the Syracusans, at length delivered from their fears, threw open
the gates of the Achradina, and sent deputies to Marcellus, requesting
only safety for themselves and children. Having summoned a council, to
which the Syracusans were invited who were among the Roman troops,
having been driven from home during the disturbances, Marcellus
replied, "that the services rendered by Hiero through a period of
fifty years, were not more in number than the injuries committed
against the Roman people in these few years by those who had had
possession of Syracuse; but that most of these injuries had justly
recoiled upon their authors, and that they had inflicted much more
severe punishment upon themselves for the violation of treaties, than
the Roman people desired. That he was indeed now besieging Syracuse
for the third year, but not that the Romans might hold that state in a
condition of slavery, but that the ringleaders of the deserters might
not keep it in a state of thraldom and oppression. What the Syracusans
could do was exemplified, either by the conduct of those Syracusans
who were among the Roman troops, or that of the Spanish general,
Mericus, who had delivered up the post which he was appointed to
command, or, lastly, by the late but bold measure adopted by the
Syracusans themselves. That the greatest possible recompence for all
the evils and dangers which he had for so long a time undergone, both
by sea and land, around the walls of Syracuse, was the reflection,
that he had been able to take that city." The quaestor was then sent
with a guard to the island, to receive and protect the royal treasure.
The city was given up to be plundered by the soldiery, after guards
had been placed at each of the houses of those who had been with the
Roman troops. While many acts exhibited horrid examples of rage and
rapacity, it is recorded that Archimedes, while intent on some figures
which he had described in the dust, although the confusion was as
great as could possibly exist in a captured city, in which soldiers
were running up and down in search of plunder, was put to death by a
soldier, who did not know who he was; that Marcellus was grieved at
this event, and that pains were taken about his funeral, while his
relations also for whom diligent inquiry was made, derived honour and
protection from his name and memory. Such, for the most part, was the
manner in which Syracuse was captured. The quantity of booty was so
great, that had Carthage itself, which was carrying on a contest on
equal terms, been captured, it would scarcely have afforded so much. A
few days before the taking of Syracuse, Titus Otacilius passed over
from Lilybaeum to Utica with eighty quinqueremes, and entering the
harbour before it was light, took some transports laden with corn;
then landing, he laid waste a considerable portion of the country
around Utica, and brought back to his ships booty of every
description. He returned to Lilybaeum, the third day after he set out,
with a hundred and thirty transports laden with corn and booty. The
corn he sent immediately to Syracuse; and had it not been for the very
seasonable arrival of this supply, a destructive famine threatened
alike the victors and the vanquished.
32. Nothing very memorable had been done in Spain for about two years,
the operations of the war consisting more in laying plans than in
fighting; but during the same summer in which the events above
recorded took place, the Roman generals, quitting their winter
quarters, united their forces; then a council was summoned; and the
opinions of all accorded, that since their only object hitherto had
been to prevent Hasdrubal from pursuing his march into Italy, it was
now time that an effort should be made to bring the war in Spain to a
termination; and they thought that the twenty thousand Celtiberians,
who had been induced to take arms that winter, formed a sufficient
accession to their strength. There were three armies of the enemy.
Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, and Mago, who had united their forces, were
about a five days' journey from the Romans. Hasdrubal, son of
Hamilcar, who was the old commander in Spain, was nearer to them: he
was with his army near the city Anitorgis. The Roman generals were
desirous that he should be overpowered first; and they hoped that they
had enough and more than enough strength for the purpose. Their only
source of anxiety was, lest the other Hasdrubal and Mago, terrified at
his discomfiture, should protract the war by withdrawing into
trackless forests and mountains. Thinking it, therefore, the wisest
course to divide their forces and embrace the whole Spanish war, they
arranged it so that Publius Cornelius should lead two-thirds of the
Roman and allied troops against Mago and Hasdrubal, and that Cneius
Cornelius, with the remaining third of the original army, and with the
Celtiberians added to them, should carry on the war with the Barcine
Hasdrubal. The two generals and their armies, setting out together,
preceded by the Celtiberians, pitched their camp near the city
Anitorgis, within sight of the enemy, the river only separating them.
Here Cneius Scipio, with the forces above mentioned, halted, but
Publius Scipio proceeded to the portion of the war assigned to him.
33. Hasdrubal perceiving that there were but few Roman troops in the
camp, and that their whole dependence was on the Celtiberian
auxiliaries; and having had experience of the perfidy of the barbarian
nations in general, and particularly of all those nations among which
he had served for so many years; as there was every facility of
intercourse, for both camps were full of Spaniards, by secret
conferences with the chiefs of the Celtiberians, he agreed with them,
for a large consideration, to take their forces away. Nor did they
conceive it to be any great crime; for the object was not that they
should turn their arms against the Romans, while the reward which they
were to receive to abstain from the war was large enough to remunerate
them for their service in it. At the same time the mere rest from
labour, the return to their homes, with the pleasure of seeing their
friends and property, were pleasing to the generality. Accordingly,
the multitude were prevailed upon as easily as their leaders. They
had, moreover, nothing to fear from the Romans, in consequence of the
smallness of their numbers, should they endeavour to detain them by
force. It will indeed be the duty of all Roman generals to take care,
and the instances here recorded should be considered as strong
arguments, never to place so much confidence in foreign auxiliaries,
as not to retain in their camps a preponderance of their own strength
and of that force which is properly their own. The Celtiberians,
suddenly taking up their standards, marched away, replying only to the
Romans, who asked the cause of their departure and entreated them to
stay, that they were called away by a war at home. Scipio seeing that
his allies could be detained neither by prayers nor force, and that he
was neither a match for his enemy without them, nor could again effect
a junction with his brother, no other course which promised safety
offering itself, resolved to retire as far as possible, carefully
using every caution not to encounter the enemy any where on level
ground. On his departing, the enemy, crossing the river, pursued him
almost in his footsteps.
34. During the same period an equal terror and a greater danger
pressed upon Publius Scipio. Masinissa was a young man at that time an
ally of the Carthaginians, whom afterwards the friendship of the
Romans rendered illustrious and powerful. He not only opposed himself
with his Numidian cavalry to Scipio on his approach, but afterwards
harassed him incessantly day and night, so as both to cut off his
stragglers, who had gone out to a distance from the camp in search of
wood and forage, and riding up to the very gates of his camp, and
charging into the midst of his advanced guards, to fill every quarter
with the utmost confusion. By night also alarm was frequently
occasioned in the gates and rampart by his sudden attacks. Nor was
there any time or place at which the Romans were exempt from fear and
anxiety; and driven within their rampart, and deprived of every
necessary, they suffered in a manner a regular siege; and it appeared
that it would have been still straiter, if Indibilis, who it was
reported was approaching with seven thousand five hundred Suessetani,
should form a junction with the Carthaginians. Scipio, though a wary
and provident general, overpowered by difficulties, adopted the rash
measure of going to meet Indibilis by night, with the intention of
fighting him wherever he should meet him. Leaving, therefore, a small
force in his camp, under the command of Titus Fonteius,
lieutenant-general, he set out at midnight, and meeting with the
enemy, came to battle with him. The troops fought in the order of
march rather than of battle. The Romans, however, had the advantage,
though in an irregular fight; but the Numidian cavalry, whose
observation the general supposed that he had escaped, suddenly
spreading themselves round his flanks, occasioned great terror. After
a new contest had been entered into with the Numidians, a third enemy
came up in addition to the rest, the Carthaginian generals having come
up with their rear when they were now engaged in fighting. Thus the
Romans were surrounded on every side by enemies; nor could they make
up their minds which they should attack first, or in what part,
forming themselves into a close body, they should force their way
through. The general, while fighting and encouraging his men, exposing
himself wherever the strife was the hottest, was run through the right
side with a lance; and when the party of the enemy, which, formed into
a wedge, had charged the troops collected round the general, perceived
Scipio falling lifeless from his horse, elated with joy, they ran
shouting through the whole line with the news that the Roman general
had fallen. These words spreading in every direction, caused the enemy
to be considered as victors, and the Romans as vanquished. On the loss
of the general the troops immediately began to fly from the field; but
though it was not difficult to force their way through the Numidians
and the other light-armed auxiliaries, yet it was scarcely possible
for them to escape so large a body of cavalry, and infantry equal to
horses in speed. Almost more were slain in the flight than in the
battle; nor would a man have survived, had not night put a stop to the
carnage, the day by this time rapidly drawing to a close.
35. After this, the Carthaginian generals, who were not slow in
following up their victory, immediately after the battle, scarcely
giving their soldiers necessary rest, hurry their army to Hasdrubal,
son of Hamilcar; confidently hoping, that after uniting their forces
with his, the war might be brought to a conclusion. On their arrival,
the warmest congratulations passed between the troops and their
generals, who were delighted with their recent victory; for they had
not only destroyed one distinguished general and all his men, but
looked forward to another victory of equal magnitude as a matter of
certainty. The intelligence of this great disaster had not yet reached
the Romans; but there prevailed a kind of melancholy silence and mute
foreboding, such as is usually found in minds which have a
presentiment of impending calamity. The general himself, besides
feeling that he was deserted by his allies, and that the forces of the
enemy were so much augmented, was disposed from conjecture and
reasoning rather to a suspicion that some defeat had been sustained,
than to any favourable hopes. "For how could Hasdrubal and Mago bring
up their troops without opposition, unless they had terminated their
part of the war? How was it that his brother had not opposed his
progress or followed on his rear? in order that if he could not
prevent the armies and generals of the enemy from forming a junction,
he might himself join his forces with his brother's." Disturbed with
these cares, he believed that the only safe policy for the present was
to retire as far as possible; and, accordingly, he marched a
considerable distance thence in one night, the enemy not being aware
of it, and on that account continuing quiet. At dawn, perceiving that
their enemy had decamped, they sent the Numidians in advance, and
began to pursue them as rapidly as possible. The Numidians overtook
them before night, and charged; sometimes their rear, at other times
their flanks. They then began to halt and defend themselves as well as
they could; but Scipio exhorted them at once to fight so as not to
expose themselves, and march at the same time, lest the infantry
should overtake them.
36. But having made but little progress for a long time, in
consequence of his making his troops sometimes advance and at others
halt, and night now drawing on, Scipio recalled his troops from the
battle, and collecting them, withdrew to a certain eminence, not very
safe, indeed, particularly for dispirited troops, but higher than any
of the surrounding places. There, at first, his infantry, drawn up
around his baggage and cavalry, which were placed in their centre, had
no difficulty in repelling the attacks of the charging Numidians; but
afterwards, when three generals with three regular armies marched up
in one entire body, and it was evident that his men would not be able
to do much by arms in defending the position without fortifications,
the general began to look about, and consider whether he could by any
means throw a rampart around; but the hill was so bare, and the soil
so rough, that neither could a bush be found for cutting a palisade,
nor earth for making a mound, nor the requisites for making a trench
or any other work; nor was the place naturally steep or abrupt enough
to render the approach and ascent difficult to the enemy, as it rose
on every side with a gentle acclivity. However, that they might raise
up against them some semblance of a rampart, they placed around them
the panniers tied to the burdens, building them up as it were to the
usual height, and when there was a deficiency of panniers for raising
it, they presented against the enemy a heap of baggage of every kind.
The Carthaginian armies coming up, very easily marched up the
eminence, but were stopped by the novel appearance of the
fortification, as by something miraculous, when their leaders called
out from all sides, asking "what they stopped at? and why they did not
tear down and demolish that mockery, which was scarcely strong enough
to impede the progress of women and children; that the enemy, who were
skulking behind their baggage, were, in fact, captured and in their
hands." Such were the contemptuous reproofs of their leaders. But it
was not an easy task either to leap over or remove the burdens raised
up against them, or to cut through the panniers, closely packed
together and covered completely with baggage. When the removal of the
burdens had opened a way to the troops, who were detained by them for
a long time, and the same had been done in several quarters, the camp
was now captured on all sides; the Romans were cut to pieces on all
hands, the few by the many, the dispirited by the victorious. A great
number of the men, however, having fled for refuge into the
neighbouring woods, effected their escape to the camp of Publius
Scipio, which Titus Fonteius commanded. Some authors relate that
Cneius Scipio was slain on the eminence on the first assault of the
enemy; others that he escaped with a few attendants to a castle near
the camp; this, they say, was surrounded with fire, by which means the
doors which they could not force were consumed; that it was thus
taken, and all within, together with the general himself, put to
death. Cneius Scipio was slain in the eighth year after his arrival in
Spain, and on the twenty-ninth day after the death of his brother. At
Rome the grief occasioned by their death was not more intense than
that which was felt throughout Spain. The sorrow of the citizens,
however, was partly distracted by the loss of the armies, the
alienation of the province, and the public disaster, while in Spain
they mourned and regretted the generals themselves, Cneius, however,
the more, because he had been longer in command of them, had first
engaged their affections, and first exhibited a specimen of Roman
justice and forbearance.
37. When it seemed that the Roman armies were annihilated, and Spain
lost, one man recovered this desperate state of affairs. There was in
the army one Lucius Marcius, the son of Septimus, a Roman knight, an
enterprising youth, and possessing a mind and genius far superior to
the condition in which he had been born. To his high talents had been
added the discipline of Cneius Scipio, under which he had been
thoroughly instructed during a course of so many years in all the
qualifications of a soldier. This man, having collected the troops
which had been dispersed in the flight, and drafted some from the
garrisons, had formed an army not to be despised, and united it with
Titus Tonteius, the lieutenant-general of Publius Scipio. But so
transcendent was the Roman knight in authority and honour among the
troops, that when, after fortifying a camp on this side of the Iberus,
it had been resolved that a general of the two armies should be
elected in an assembly of the soldiers, relieving each other in the
guard of the rampart, and in keeping the outposts until every one had
given his vote, they unanimously conferred the supreme command upon
Lucius Marcius. All the intervening time, which was but short, was
occupied in fortifying their camp and collecting provisions, and the
soldiers executed every order not only with vigour, but with feelings
by no means depressed. But when intelligence was brought them that
Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, who was coming to put the finishing stroke to
the war, had crossed the Iberus and was drawing near, and when they
saw the signal for battle displayed by a new commander, then calling
to mind whom they had had for their leaders a little while ago,
relying on what leaders and what forces they used to go out to fight,
they all suddenly burst into tears and beat their heads, some raising
their hands to heaven and arraigning the gods, others prostrating
themselves upon the ground and invoking by name each his own former
commander. Nor could their lamentations be restrained, though the
centurions endeavoured to animate their companies, and though Marcius
himself soothed and remonstrated with them, asking them "why they had
given themselves up to womanish and unavailing lamentations rather
than summon up all their courage to protect themselves and the
commonwealth together, and not suffer their generals to lie
unavenged?" But suddenly a shout and the sound of trumpets were heard;
for by this time the enemy were near the rampart. Upon this, their
grief being suddenly converted into rage, they hastily ran to arms,
and, as it were, burning with fury, rushed to the gates and charged
the enemy, while advancing in a careless and disorderly manner. This
unexpected event instantly struck terror into the Carthaginians, who
wondering whence so many enemies could have sprung up so suddenly, as
the army had been almost annihilated; what could have inspired men who
had been vanquished and routed with such boldness and confidence in
themselves; what general could have arisen now that the two Scipios
were slain; who could command the camp, and who had given the signal
for battle; in consequence of these so many and so unexpected
circumstances, at first, being in a state of complete uncertainty and
amazement, they gave ground; but afterwards, discomfited by the
violence of the charge, they turned their backs; and either there
would have been a dreadful slaughter of the flying enemy, or a rash
and dangerous effort on the part of the pursuers, had not Marcius
promptly given the signal for retreat, and by throwing himself in the
way of the front rank, and even holding some back with his own hands,
repressed the infuriated troops. He then led them back to the camp,
still eager for blood and slaughter. When the Carthaginians, who were
at first compelled to fly with precipitation from the rampart of their
enemy, saw that no one pursued them, concluding that they had stopped
from fear, now on the other hand went away to their camp at an easy
pace, with feelings of contempt for the enemy. There was a
corresponding want of care in guarding their camp; for though the
enemy were near, yet it seemed that they were but the remains of the
two armies which had been cut to pieces a few days before. As in
consequence of this all things were neglected in the enemy's camp,
Marcius having ascertained this, addressed his mind to a measure which
on the first view of it might appear rather rash than bold: it was,
aggressively to assault the enemy's camp, concluding that the camp of
Hasdrubal, while alone, might be carried with less difficulty than his
own could be defended, if the three armies and as many generals should
again unite; taking into consideration also that either if he
succeeded he would retrieve their prostrate fortune, or if repulsed,
still, by making the attack himself, he would rescue himself from
contempt.
38. Lest, however, the suddenness of the affair, and the fear of
night, should frustrate a measure which was in itself ill adapted to
his condition, he thought it right that his soldiers should be
addressed and exhorted; and having called an assembly, he discoursed
as follows: "Soldiers, either my veneration for our late commanders,
both living and dead, or our present situation, may impress on every
one the belief that this command, as it is highly honourable to me,
conferred by your suffrages, so is it in its nature a heavy and
anxious charge. For at a time when I should be scarcely so far master
of myself as to be able to find any solace for my afflicted mind, did
not fear deaden the sense of sorrow, I am compelled to take upon
myself alone the task of consulting for the good of you all; a task of
the greatest difficulty when under the influence of grief. And not
even at that critical moment, when I ought to be considering in what
manner I may be enabled to keep together for my country these remains
of two armies, can I divert my mind from the affliction which
incessantly preys upon me. For bitter recollection is ever present,
and the Scipios ever disturb me with anxious cares by day and dreams
by night, frequently rousing me from my sleep, and imploring me not to
suffer themselves nor their soldiers, your companions in war, who had
been victorious in this country for eight years, nor the commonwealth
to remain unrevenged; enjoining me also to follow their discipline and
their plans; and desiring that as there was no one more obedient to
their commands while they were alive than I, so after their death I
would consider that conduct as best, which I might have the strongest
reason for believing they would have adopted in each case. I could
wish also that you, my soldiers, should not show your respect for them
by lamentations and tears, as if they were dead; (for they still live
and flourish in the fame of their achievements;) but that whenever the
memory of those men shall occur to you, you would go into battle as
though you saw them encouraging you and giving you the signal. Nor
certainly could anything else than their image presenting itself
yesterday to your eyes and minds, have enabled you to fight that
memorable battle, in which you proved to the enemy that the Roman name
had not become extinct with the Scipios; and that the energy and
valour of that people, which had not been overwhelmed by the disaster
at Cannae, would, doubtlessly, emerge from the severest storms of
fortune. Now since you have dared so much of your own accord, I have a
mind to try how much you will dare when authorized by your general:
for yesterday, when I gave the signal for retreat while you were
pursuing the routed enemy with precipitation, I did not wish to break
your spirit, but to reserve it for greater glory and more advantageous
opportunities; that you might afterwards, when prepared and armed,
seize an occasion of attacking your enemy while off their guard,
unarmed, and even buried in sleep. Nor do I entertain the hope of
gaining an opportunity of this kind rashly, but from the actual state
of things. Doubtless, if any one should ask even himself, by what
means, though few in number and disheartened by defeat, you defended
your camp against troops superior in number and victorious, you would
give no other answer than that, as this was the very thing you were
afraid of, you had kept every place secured by works and yourselves
ready and equipped. And so it generally happens: men are least secure
against that which fortune causes not to be feared; because you leave
unguarded and exposed what you think is not necessary to be cared
about. There is nothing whatever which the enemy fear less at the
present time, than lest we, who were a little while ago besieged and
assaulted, should aggressively assault their camp ourselves. Let us
dare, then, to do that which it is incredible we should have the
courage to attempt; it will be most easy from the very fact of its
appearing most difficult. At the third watch of the night I will lead
you thither in silence. I have ascertained by means of scouts that
they have no regular succession of watches, no proper outposts. Our
shout at their gates, when heard, and the first assault, will carry
their camp. Then let that carnage be made among men, torpid with
sleep, terrified at the unexpected tumult, and overpowered while lying
defenceless in their beds, from which you were so grieved to be
recalled yesterday. I know that the measure appears to you a daring
one; but in difficult and almost desperate circumstances the boldest
counsels are always the safest. For if when the critical moment has
arrived, the opportunity of seizing which is of a fleeting nature, you
delay ever so little, in vain do you seek for it afterwards when it
has been neglected. One army is near us; two more are not far off. We
have some hopes if we make an attack now; and you have already made
trial of your own and their strength. If we postpone the time and
cease to be despised in consequence of the fame of yesterday's
irruption, there is danger lest all the generals and all the forces
should unite. Shall we be able then to withstand three generals and
three armies, whom Cneius Scipio with his army unimpaired could not
withstand? As our generals have perished by dividing their forces, so
the enemy may be overpowered while separated and divided. There is no
other mode of maintaining the war; let us, therefore, wait for nothing
but the opportunity of the ensuing night. Now depart, with the favour
of the gods, and refresh yourselves, that, unfatigued and vigorous,
you may burst into the enemy's camp with the same spirit with which
you have defended your own." This new enterprise, proposed by their
new general, they received with joy; and the more daring it was the
more it pleased them. The remainder of the day was spent in getting
their arms in readiness and recruiting their strength, the greater
part of the night was given to rest, and at the fourth watch they were
in motion.
39. At a distance of six miles beyond their nearest camp lay other
forces of the Carthaginians. A deep valley, thickly planted with
trees, intervened. Near about the middle of this wood a Roman cohort
and some cavalry were placed in concealment with Punic craft. The
communication between the two armies being thus cut off, the rest of
the forces were marched in silence to the nearest body of the enemy;
and as there were no outposts before the gates, and no guards on the
rampart, they entered quite into the camp, as though it had been their
own, no one any where opposing them. The signals were then sounded and
a shout raised. Some put the enemy to the sword when half asleep;
others threw fire upon the huts, which were covered in with dry straw;
others blocked up the gates to intercept their escape. The enemy, who
were assailed at once with fire, shouting, and the sword, were in a
manner bereaved of their senses, and could neither hear each other,
nor take any measures for their security. Unarmed, they fell into the
midst of troops of armed men: some hastened to the gates; others, as
the passes were flocked up, leaped over the rampart, and as each
escaped they fled directly towards the other camp, where they were cut
off by the cohort and cavalry rushing forward from their concealment,
and were all slain to a man. And even had any escaped from that
carnage, the Romans, after taking the nearer camp, ran over to the
other with such rapidity, that no one could have arrived before them
with news of the disaster. In this camp, as they were far distant from
the enemy, and as some had gone off just before daylight for forage,
wood, and plunder, they found every thing in a still more neglected
and careless state. Their arms only were placed at the outposts, the
men being unarmed, and either sitting and reclining upon the ground,
or else walking up and down before the rampart and the gates. On these
men, thus at their ease and unguarded, the Romans, still hot from the
recent battle, and flushed with victory, commenced an attack; no
effectual opposition therefore could be made to them in the gates.
Within the gates, the troops having rushed together from every part of
the camp at the first shout and alarm, a furious conflict arose; which
would have continued for a long time, had not the bloody appearance of
the Roman shields discovered to the Carthaginians the defeat of the
other forces, and consequently struck them with dismay. This alarm
produced a general flight; and all except those who were overtaken
with the sword, rushing out precipitately wherever they could find a
passage, abandoned their camp. Thus, in a night and a day, two camps
of the enemy were carried, under the conduct of Lucius Marcius.
Claudius, who translated the annals of Acilius out of Greek into
Latin, states that as many as thirty-seven thousand men were slain,
one thousand eight hundred and thirty made prisoners, and a great
booty obtained; among which was a silver shield of a hundred and
thirty-eight pounds' weight, with an image upon it of the Barcine
Hasdrubal. Valerius Antias states, that the camp Of Mago only was
captured, and seven thousand of the enemy slain; and that in the other
battle, when the Romans sallied out and fought with Hasdrubal, ten
thousand were slain, and four thousand three hundred captured. Piso
writes, that five thousand were slain in an ambuscade when Mago
incautiously pursued our troops who retired. With all, the name of the
general, Marcius, is mentioned with great honour, and to his real
glory they add even miracles. They say, that while he was haranguing
his men a stream of fire poured from his head without his perceiving
it, to the great terror of the surrounding soldiers; and that a
shield, called the Marcian, with an image of Hasdrubal upon it,
remained in the temple up to the time of the burning of the Capitol, a
monument of his victory over the Carthaginians. After this, affairs
continued for a considerable time in a tranquil state in Spain, as
both parties, after giving and receiving such important defeats,
hesitated to run the hazard of a general battle.
40. During these transactions in Spain, Marcellus, after the capture
of Syracuse, having settled the other affairs in Sicily with so much
honour and integrity as not only to add to his own renown, but also to
the majesty of the Roman people, conveyed to Rome the ornaments of the
city, together with the statues and pictures with which Syracuse
abounded. These were certainly spoils taken from enemies, and acquired
according to the laws of war; but hence was the origin of the
admiration of the products of Grecian art, and to that freedom with
which at present all places, both sacred and profane, are despoiled;
which at last recoiled upon the Roman gods, and first upon that very
temple which was so choicely adorned by Marcellus. For foreigners were
in the habit of visiting the temples dedicated by Marcellus near the
Capuan gate, on account of their splendid ornaments of this
description, of which a very small portion can be found. Embassies
from almost all the states of Sicily came to him. As their cases were
different, so were also the terms granted to them. Those who had
either not revolted or had returned to the alliance before the capture
of Syracuse, were received and honoured as faithful allies. Those who
had been induced to submit through fear after the capture of Syracuse,
as vanquished, received laws from the conqueror. The Romans, however,
had still remaining a war of no small magnitude at Agrigentum, headed
by Epicydes and Hanno, generals in the late war, and a third new one
sent by Hannibal in the room of Hippocrates, a Libyphoenician by
nation, and a native of Hippo, called by his countrymen Mutines; an
energetic man, and thoroughly instructed in all the arts of war under
the tuition of Hannibal. To this man the Numidian auxiliaries were
assigned by Epicydes and Hanno. With these he so thoroughly overran
the lands of his enemies, and visited his allies with such activity,
in order to retain them in their allegiance, and for the purpose of
bringing them seasonable aid as each required it, that in a short time
he filled all Sicily with his fame, nor was greater confidence placed
in any one else by those who favoured the Carthaginian interest.
Accordingly the Carthaginian and Syracusan generals, who had been
hitherto compelled to keep within the walls of Agrigentum, not more at
the advice of Mutines than from the confidence they reposed in him,
had the courage to go out from the walls, and pitched a camp near the
river Himera. When this was announced to Marcellus, he immediately
advanced and sat down at a distance of about four miles from the
enemy, with the intention of waiting to see what steps they took, and
what they meditated. But Mutines allowed no room or time for delay or
deliberation, but crossed the river, and, charging the outposts of his
enemy, created the greatest terror and confusion. The next day, in an
engagement which might almost be called regular, he compelled his
enemy to retire within their works. Being called away by a mutiny of
the Numidians, which had broken out in the camp, and in which about
three hundred of them had retired to Heraclea Minoa, he set out to
appease them and bring them back; and is said to have earnestly warned
the generals not to engage with the enemy during his absence. Both the
generals were indignant at this conduct, but particularly Hanno, who
was before disturbed at his reputation. "Is it to be borne," said he,
"that a mongrel African should impose restraints upon me, a
Carthaginian general, commissioned by the senate and people?"
Epicydes, who wished to wait, was prevailed upon by him to agree to
their crossing the river and offering battle; for, said he, if they
should wait for Mutines, and the battle should terminate successfully,
Mutines would certainly have the credit of it.
41. But Marcellus, highly indignant that he who had repulsed Hannibal
from Nola, when rendered confident by his victory at Cannae, should
succumb to enemies whom he had vanquished by sea and land, ordered his
soldiers immediately to take arms and raise the standards. While
marshalling his army, ten Numidians rode up rapidly from the enemy's
line with information that their countrymen, first induced by the same
causes which brought on the mutiny, in which three hundred of their
number retired to Heraclea, and secondly, because they saw their
commander, just on the approach of a battle, sent out of the way by
generals who wished to detract from his glory, would not take any part
in the battle. This deceitful nation made good their promise in this
instance. Accordingly the spirits of the Romans were increased by the
intelligence, which was speedily conveyed through the lines, that the
enemy were abandoned by the cavalry, which the Romans principally
feared; while at the same time the enemy were dispirited, not only
because they were deprived of the principal part of their strength,
but further, because they were afraid lest they should themselves be
attacked by their own cavalry. Accordingly, there was no great
resistance made: the first shout and onset determined the business.
The Numidians who stood quiet in the wings during the action, when
they saw their party turning their backs, accompanied them in their
flight only for a short time; but when they perceived that they were
all making for Agrigentum with the most violent haste, they turned off
to the neighbouring towns round about, through fear of a siege. Many
thousand men were slain and captured, together with eight elephants.
This was the last battle which Marcellus fought in Sicily, after which
he returned victorious to Syracuse. The year was now about closing;
the senate therefore decreed that Publius Cornelius, the praetor,
should send a letter to Capua to the consuls, with directions that
while Hannibal was at a distance, and nothing of any great importance
was going on at Capua, one of them, if they thought fit, should come
to Rome to elect new magistrates. On the receipt of the letter, the
consuls arranged it between themselves, that Claudius should hold the
election, and Fulvius remain at Capua. The consuls created by Claudius
were Cneius Fulvius Centumalus, and Publius Sulpicius Galba, the son
of Servius, who had never exercised any curule magistracy. After this
Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, Caius Sulpicius,
and Caius Calpurnius Piso, were created praetors. Piso had the city
jurisdiction; Sulpicius, Sicily; Cethegus, Apulia; Lentulus, Sardinia.
The consuls were continued in command for a year longer.