unexpectedly favorable. He had left that city blocked up partially
by sea and with a victorious enemy encamped near it; so that
supplies found admission with difficulty. In this condition,
Hamilkar, commander of the Carthaginian army, received from
Carthage the messengers announcing their recent defeat in Africa;
yet also bringing the brazen prow ornaments taken from the ships
of Agathokles. He ordered the envoys to conceal the real truth,
and to spread abroad news that Agathokles had been destroyed with
his armament; in proof of which he produced the prow ornaments,—an
undoubted evidence that the ships had really been destroyed. Sending
envoys with these evidences into Syracuse, to be exhibited to
Antander, and the ether authorities, Hamilkar demanded from them
the surrender of the city, under promise of safety and favorable
terms; at the same time marching his army close up to it, with
the view of making an attack. Antander with others, believing the
information and despairing of successful resistance, were disposed
to comply; but Erymnon the Ætolian insisted on holding out until
they had fuller certainty. This resolution Antander adopted. At the
same time, mistrusting those citizens of Syracuse who were relatives
or friends of the exiles without, he ordered them all to leave the
city immediately, with their wives and families. No less than 8000
persons were expelled under this mandate. They were consigned to the
mercy of Hamilkar, and his army without; who not only suffered them
to pass, but treated them with kindness. Syracuse was now a scene
of aggravated wretchedness and despondency; not less from this late
calamitous expulsion, than from the grief of those who believed that
their relatives in Africa had perished with Agathokles. Hamilkar had
brought up his battering-engines, and was preparing to assault the
town, when Nearchus, the messenger from Agathokles, arrived from
Africa after a voyage of five days, having under favor of darkness
escaped, though only just escaped, the blockading squadron. From him
the Syracusan government learnt the real truth, and the victorious
position of Agathokles. There was no farther talk of capitulation;
Hamilkar—having tried a partial assault, which was vigorously
repulsed,—withdrew his army, and detached from it a reinforcement of
5000 men to the aid of his countrymen in Africa.[969]
[969] Diodor. xx. 15, 16.
During some months, he seems to have employed himself in partial
operations for extending the Carthaginian dominion throughout
Sicily. But at length he concerted measures with the Syracusan exile
Deinokrates, who was at the head of a numerous body of his exiled
countrymen, for a renewed attack upon Syracuse. His fleet already
blockaded the harbor, and he now with his army, stated as 120,000
men, destroyed the neighboring lands, hoping to starve out the
inhabitants. Approaching close to the walls of the city, he occupied
the Olympieion, or temple of Zeus Olympius, near the river Anapus and
the interior coast of the Great Harbor. From hence—probably under the
conduct of Deinokrates and the other exiles, well-acquainted with
the ground—he undertook by a night-march to ascend the circuitous
and difficult mountain track, for the purpose of surprising the
fort called Euryalus, at the highest point of Epipolæ, and the
western apex of the Syracusan lines of fortification. This was
the same enterprise, at the same hour, and with the same main
purpose, as that of Demosthenes during the Athenian siege, after
he had brought the second armament from Athens to the relief of
Nikias.[970] Even Demosthenes, though conducting his march with
greater precaution than Hamilkar, and successful in surprising the
fort of Euryalus, had been driven down again with disastrous loss.
Moreover, since his time, this fort Euryalus, instead of being left
detached, had been embodied by the elder Dionysius as an integral
portion of the fortifications of the city. It formed the apex or
point of junction for the two converging walls—one skirting the
northern cliff, the other the southern cliff, of Epipolæ.[971]
The surprise intended by Hamilkar—difficult in the extreme, if at
all practicable—seems to have been unskilfully conducted. It was
attempted with a confused multitude, incapable of that steady order
requisite for night-movements. His troops, losing their way in the
darkness, straggled, and even mistook each other for enemies; while
the Syracusan guards from Euryalus, alarmed by the noise, attacked
them vigorously and put them to the rout. Their loss, in trying
to escape down the steep declivity, was prodigious; and Hamilkar
himself, making brave efforts to rally them, became prisoner to the
Syracusans. What lent peculiar interest to this incident, in the
eyes of a pious Greek, was that it served to illustrate and confirm
the truth of prophecy. Hamilkar had been assured by a prophet that
he would sup that night in Syracuse; and this assurance had in part
emboldened him to the attack, since he naturally calculated on
entering the city as a conqueror.[972] He did indeed take his evening
meal in Syracuse, literally fulfilling the augury. Immediately after
it, he was handed over to the relatives of the slain, who first
paraded him through the city in chains, then inflicted on him the
worst tortures, and lastly killed him. His head was cut off and sent
to Africa.[973]
[970] See Vol. VII. Ch. lx. p. 304 of this History.
[971] For a description of the fortifications added to Syracuse
by the elder Dionysius, see Vol. X. Ch. lxxxii. p. 499 of this
History.
[972] Diodor. xx. 29, 30. Cicero (Divinat. i. 24) notices this
prophecy and its manner of fulfilment; but he gives a somewhat
different version of the events preceding the capture of Hamilkar.
[973] Diodor. xx. 30. τὸν δ᾽ οὖν Ἁμίλκαν οἱ τῶν ἀπολωλότων
συγγενεῖς δεδεμένον ἀγαγόντες διὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ δειναῖς αἰκίαις
κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ χρησάμενοι, μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕβρεως ἀνεῖλον.
The loss and humiliation sustained in this repulse—together with the
death of Hamilkar, and the discord ensuing between the exiles under
Deinokrates and the Carthaginian soldiers—completely broke up the
besieging army. At the same time, the Agrigentines, profiting by the
depression both of Carthaginians and exiles, stood forward publicly,
proclaiming themselves as champions of the cause of autonomous city
government throughout Sicily, under their own presidency, against
both the Carthaginians on one side, and the despot Agathokles on
the other. They chose for their general a citizen named Xenodokus,
who set himself with vigor to the task of expelling everywhere the
mercenary garrisons which held the cities in subjection. He began
first with Gela, the city immediately adjoining Agrigentum, found
a party of the citizens disposed to aid him, and in conjunction
with them, overthrew the Agathoklean garrison. The Geloans, thus
liberated, seconded cordially his efforts to extend the like benefits
to others. The popular banner proclaimed by Agrigentum proved so
welcome, that many cities eagerly invited her aid to shake off the
yoke of the soldiery in their respective citadels, and regain their
free governments.[974] Enna, Erbessus, Echetla,[975] Leontini, and
Kamarina, were all thus relieved from the dominion of Agathokles;
while other cities were in like manner emancipated from the sway
of the Carthaginians; and joined the Agrigentine confederacy.
The Agathoklean government at Syracuse was not strong enough to
resist such spirited manifestations. Syracuse still continued to be
blocked up by the Carthaginian fleet; though the blockade was less
efficacious, and supplies were now introduced more abundantly than
before.[976]
[974] Diodor. xx. 31. διαβοηθείσης δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων
ἐπιβολῆς κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν νῆσον, ἐνέπεσεν ὁρμὴ ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τὴν
ἐλευθερίαν.
[975] Enna is nearly in the centre of Sicily; Erbessus is not far
to the north-east of Agrigentum; Echetla is placed by Polybius
(i. 15) midway between the domain of Syracuse and that of
Carthage.
[976] Diodor. xx. 32.
The ascendency of Agathokles was thus rather on the wane in Sicily:
but in Africa, he had become more powerful than ever—not without
perilous hazards which brought him occasionally to the brink of ruin.
On receiving from Syracuse the head of the captive Hamilkar, he rode
forth close to the camp of the Carthaginians, and held it up to their
view in triumph; they made respectful prostration before it, but the
sight was astounding and mournful to them.[977] While they were thus
in despondency, however, a strange vicissitude was on the point of
putting their enemy into their hands. A violent mutiny broke out in
the camp of Agathokles at Tunês, arising out of a drunken altercation
between his son Archagathus and an Ætolian officer named Lykiskus;
which ended in the murder of the latter by the former. The comrades
of Lykiskus rose in arms with fury to avenge him, calling for the
head of Archagathus. They found sympathy with the whole army; who
seized the opportunity of demanding their arrears of outstanding
pay, chose new generals, and took regular possession of Tunês with
its defensive works. The Carthaginians, informed of this outbreak,
immediately sent envoys to treat with the mutineers, offering to them
large presents and double pay in the service of Carthage. Their offer
was at first so favorably entertained, that the envoys returned with
confident hopes of success; when Agathokles, as a last resource,
clothed himself in mean garb, and threw himself on the mercy of the
soldiers. He addressed them in a pathetic appeal, imploring them not
to desert him, and even drew his sword to kill himself before their
faces. With such art did he manage this scene, that the feelings of
the soldiers underwent a sudden and complete revolution. They not
only became reconciled to him, but even greeted him with enthusiasm,
calling on him to resume the dress and functions of general, and
promising unabated obedience for the future.[978] Agathokles gladly
obeyed the call, and took advantage of their renewed ardor to attack
forthwith the Carthaginians; who, expecting nothing less, were
defeated with considerable loss.[979]
[977] Diodor. xx. 33. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, περιαλγεῖς γενόμενοι,
καὶ βαρβαρικῶς προσκυνήσαντες, etc.
[978] Compare the description in Tacitus, Hist. ii. 29, of the
mutiny in the Vitellian army commanded by Fabius Valens, at
Ticinum.
“Postquam immissis lictoribus, Valens coercere seditionem
cœptabat, ipsum invadunt (milites), saxa jaciunt, fugientem
sequuntur.—Valens, servili veste, apud decurionem equitum
tegebatur.” (Presently the feeling changes, by the adroit
management of Alphenus Varus, prefect of the camp)—then,
“silentio, patientia, postremo precibus et lacrymis, veniam
quærebant. Ut vero deformis et flens, et præter spem incolumis
Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor: versi in lætitiam
(ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque
circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt.”
[979] Diodor. xx. 34.
In spite of this check, the Carthaginians presently sent a
considerable force into the interior, for the purpose of reconquering
or regaining the disaffected Numidian tribes. They met with good
success in this enterprise; but the Numidians were in the main
faithless and indifferent to both the belligerents, seeking only
to turn the war to their own profit. Agathokles, leaving his son
in command at Tunês, followed the Carthaginians into the interior
with a large portion of his army. The Carthaginian generals were
cautious, and kept themselves in strong position. Nevertheless
Agathokles felt confident enough to assail them in their camp; and
after great effort, with severe loss on his own side, he gained an
indecisive victory. This advantage however was countervailed by the
fact, that during the action the Numidians assailed his camp, slew
all the defenders, and carried off nearly all the slaves and baggage.
The loss on the Carthaginian side fell most severely upon the Greek
soldiers in their pay; most of them exiles under Klinon, and some
Syracusan exiles. These men behaved with signal gallantry, and were
nearly all slain, either during the battle or after the battle, by
Agathokles.[980]
[980] Diodor. xx. 39.
It had now become manifest, however, to this daring invader that
the force of resistance possessed by Carthage was more than he
could overcome—that though humbling and impoverishing her for the
moment, he could not bring the war to a triumphant close; since
the city itself, occupying the isthmus of a peninsula from sea to
sea, and surrounded with the strongest fortifications, could not
be besieged except by means far superior to his.[981] We have
already seen, that though he had gained victories and seized rich
plunder, he had not been able to provide even regular pay for his
soldiers, whose fidelity was consequently precarious. Nor could he
expect reinforcements from Sicily; where his power was on the whole
declining, though Syracuse itself was in less danger than before.
He therefore resolved to invoke aid from Ophellas at Kyrênê and
despatched Orthon as envoy for that purpose.[982]
[981] Diodor. xx. 59. Ὁ δὲ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἦν κίνδυνος, ἀπροσίτου
τῆς πόλεως οὔσης διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης
ὀχυρότητα.
[982] Diodor. xx. 40.
To Kyrênê and what was afterwards called its Pentapolis (i. e. the
five neighboring Grecian towns, Kyrênê, its port Apollonia, Barka,
Teucheira, and Hesperides), an earlier chapter of this history has
already been devoted.[983] Unfortunately information respecting
them, for a century and more anterior to Alexander the Great, is
almost wholly wanting. Established among a Libyan population, many
of whom were domiciliated with the Greeks as fellow-residents, these
Kyreneans had imbibed many Libyan habits in war, in peace, and in
religion; of which their fine breed of horses, employed both for
the festival chariot-matches and in battle, was one example. The
Libyan tribes, useful as neighbors, servants, and customers,[984]
were frequently also troublesome as enemies. In 413 B. C.
we hear accidentally that Hesperides was besieged by Libyan tribes,
and rescued by some Peloponnesian hoplites on their way to Syracuse
during the Athenian siege.[985] About 401 B. C. (shortly
after the close of the Peloponnesian war), the same city was again
so hard pressed by the same enemies, that she threw open her
citizenship to any Greek new-comer who would aid in repelling them.
This invitation was accepted by several of the Messenians, just then
expelled from Peloponnesus, and proscribed by the Spartans; they
went to Africa, but, becoming involved in intestine warfare among
the citizens of Kyrênê, a large proportion of them perished.[986]
Except these scanty notices, we hear nothing about the Greco-Libyan
Pentapolis in relation to Grecian affairs, before the time of
Alexander. It would appear that the trade with the native African
tribes, between the Gulfs called the Greater and Lesser Syrtis,
was divided between Kyrênê (meaning the Kyrenaic Pentapolis) and
Carthage—at a boundary point called the Altars of the Philæni,
ennobled by a commemorative legend; immediately east of these Altars
was Automala, the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[987] We cannot doubt
that the relations, commercial and otherwise, between Kyrênê and
Carthage, the two great emporia on the coast of Africa, were constant
and often lucrative—though not always friendly.
[983] See Vol. IV. Ch. xxvii. p. 29-49.
[984] See Isokrates, Or. iv. (Philipp.) s. 6, where he speaks of
Kyrênê as a spot judiciously chosen for colonization; the natives
near it being not dangerous, but suited for obedient neighbors
and slaves.
[985] Thucyd. vii. 50.
[986] Pausan. iv. 26; Diodor. xiv. 34.
[987] Strabo, xvii. p. 836; Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. p. 126.
In the year 331 B. C., when the victorious Alexander overran Egypt,
the inhabitants of Kyrênê sent to tender presents and submission
to him, and became enrolled among his subjects.[988] We hear
nothing more about them until the last year of Alexander’s life
(324 B. C. to 323 B. C.). About that time, the exiles from Kyrênê
and Barka, probably enough emboldened by the rescript of Alexander
(proclaimed at the Olympic festival of 324 B. C., and directing
that all Grecian exiles, except those guilty of sacrilege, should
be recalled forthwith), determined to accomplish their return by
force. To this end they invited from Krete an officer named Thimbron;
who, having slain Harpalus after his flight from Athens (recounted
in a previous chapter), had quartered himself in Krete, with the
treasure, the ships, and the 6000 mercenaries, brought over from
Asia by that satrap.[989] Thimbron willingly carried over his army
to their assistance, intending to conquer for himself a principality
in Libya. He landed near Kyrênê, defeated the Kyrenean forces with
great slaughter, and made himself master of Apollonia, the fortified
port of that city, distant from it nearly ten miles. The towns of
Barka and Hesperides sided with him; so that he was strong enough to
force the Kyreneans to a disadvantageous treaty. They covenanted to
pay 500 talents,—to surrender to him half of their war-chariots for
his ulterior projects—and to leave him in possession of Apollonia.
While he plundered the merchants in the harbor, he proclaimed
his intention of subjugating the independent Libyan tribes, and
probably of stretching his conquests to Carthage.[990] His schemes
were however frustrated by one of his own officers, a Kretan named
Mnasikles; who deserted to the Kyreneans, and encouraged them to set
aside the recent convention. Thimbron, after seizing such citizens of
Kyrênê as happened to be at Apollonia, attacked Kyrênê itself, but
was repulsed; and the Kyreneans were then bold enough to invade the
territory of Barka and Hesperides. To aid them, Thimbron moved his
quarters from Apollonia; but during his absence, Mnasikles contrived
to surprise that valuable port; thus mastering at once his base of
operations, the station for his fleet, and all the baggage of his
soldiers. Thimbron’s fleet could not be long maintained without a
harbor. The seamen, landing here and there for victuals and water,
were cut off by the native Libyans, while the vessels were dispersed
by storms.[991]
[988] Arrian, vii. 9, 12; Curtius, iv. 7, 9; Diodor. xvii. 49.
It is said that the inhabitants of Kyrênê (exact date unknown)
applied to Plato to make laws for them, but that he declined. See
Thrige, Histor. Cyrênês, p. 191. We should be glad to have this
statement better avouched.
[989] Diodor. xvii. 108, xviii. 19; Arrian, De Rebus; post
Alexandr. vi. apud Photium, Cod. 92; Strabo, xvii. p. 837.
[990] Diodor. xviii. 19.
[991] Diodor. xvii. 20.
The Kyreneans, now full of hope, encountered Thimbron in the field,
and defeated him. Yet though reduced to distress, he contrived
to obtain possession of Teucheira; to which port he invoked as
auxiliaries 2500 fresh soldiers, out of the loose mercenary bands
dispersed near Cape Tænarus in Peloponnesus. This reinforcement
again put him in a condition for battle. The Kyreneans on their
side also thought it necessary to obtain succor, partly from the
neighboring Libyans, partly from Carthage. They got together a force
stated as 30,000 men, with which they met him in the field. But, on
this occasion they were totally routed, with the loss of all their
generals and much of their army. Thimbron was now in the full tide of
success; he pressed both Kyrênê and the harbor so vigorously, that
famine began to prevail, and sedition broke out among the citizens.
The oligarchical men, expelled by the more popular party, sought
shelter, some in the camp of Thimbron; some at the court of Ptolemy
in Egypt.[992]
[992] Diodor. xviii. 21.
I have already mentioned, that in the partition after the decease
of Alexander, Egypt had been assigned to Ptolemy. Seizing with
eagerness the opportunity of annexing to it so valuable a possession
as the Kyrenaic Pentapolis, this chief sent an adequate force under
Ophellas to put down Thimbron and restore the exiles. His success was
complete. All the cities in the Pentapolis were reduced; Thimbron,
worsted and pursued as a fugitive, was seized in his flight by
some Libyans, and brought prisoner to Teucheira; the citizens of
which place (by permission of the Olynthian Epikydes, governor for
Ptolemy), first tortured him, and then conveyed him to Apollonia to
be hanged. A final visit from Ptolemy himself regulated the affairs
of the Pentapolis, which were incorporated with his dominions and
placed under the government of Ophellas.[993]
[993] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92; Diodor.
xviii. 21; Justin, xiii. 6, 20.
It was thus that the rich and flourishing Kyrênê, an interesting
portion of the once autonomous Hellenic world, passed like the rest
under one of the Macedonian Diadochi. As the proof and guarantee of
this new sovereignty, we find erected within the walls of the city,
a strong and completely detached citadel, occupied by a Macedonian
or Egyptian garrison (like Munychia at Athens), and forming the
stronghold of the viceroy. Ten years afterwards (B. C. 312)
the Kyreneans made an attempt to emancipate themselves, and besieged
this citadel; but being again put down by an army and fleet which
Ptolemy despatched under Agis from Egypt,[994] Kyrênê passed once
more under the vice-royalty of Ophellas.[995]
[994] Diodor. xix. 79. Οἱ Κυρηναῖοι ... τὴν ἄκραν
περιεστρατοπέδευσαν, ὡς αὔτικα μάλα τὴν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλοῦντες, etc.
[995] Justin (xxii. 7, 4) calls Ophellas “rex Cyrenarum;” but it
is noway probable that he had become independent of Ptolemy—as
Thrige (Hist. Cyrênês, p. 214) supposes. The expression in
Plutarch (Demetrius, 14), Ὀφέλλᾳ τῷ ἄρξαντι Κυρήνης, does not
necessarily imply an independent authority.
To this viceroy Agathokles now sent envoys, invoking his aid against
Carthage. Ophellas was an officer of consideration and experience.
He had served under Alexander, and had married an Athenian wife,
Euthydikê,—a lineal descendant from Miltiades the victor of
Marathon, and belonging to a family still distinguished at Athens.
In inviting Ophellas to undertake jointly the conquest of Carthage,
the envoys proposed that he should himself hold it when conquered.
Agathokles (they said) wished only to overthrow the Carthaginian
dominion in Sicily, being well aware that he could not hold that
island in conjunction with an African dominion. To Ophellas,[996]
such an invitation proved extremely seducing. He was already on
the look out for aggrandizement towards the west, and had sent an
exploring nautical expedition along the northern coast of Africa,
even to some distance round and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar.[997]
Moreover, to all military adventurers, both on sea and on land, the
season was one of boundless speculative promise. They had before
them not only the prodigious career of Alexander himself, but the
successful encroachments of the great officers his successors. In
the second distribution, made at Triparadeisus, of the Alexandrine
empire, Antipater had assigned to Ptolemy not merely Egypt and
Libya, but also an undefined amount of territory west of Libya, to
be afterwards acquired;[998] the conquest of which was known to
have been among the projects of Alexander, had he lived longer.
To this conquest Ophellas was now specially called, either as the
viceroy or the independent equal of Ptolemy, by the invitation
of Agathokles. Having learnt in the service of Alexander not to
fear long marches, he embraced the proposition with eagerness. He
undertook an expedition from Kyrênê on the largest scale. Through
his wife’s relatives, he was enabled to make known his projects at
Athens, where, as well as in other parts of Greece, they found much
favor. At this season, the Kassandrian oligarchies were paramount
not only at Athens, but generally throughout Greece. Under the
prevalent degradation and suffering, there was ample ground for
discontent, and no liberty of expressing it; many persons therefore
were found disposed either to accept army-service with Ophellas,
or to enrol themselves in a foreign colony under his auspices. To
set out under the military protection of this powerful chief—to
colonize the mighty Carthage, supposed to be already enfeebled by the
victories of Agathokles—to appropriate the wealth, the fertile landed
possessions, and the maritime position, of her citizens—was a prize
well calculated to seduce men dissatisfied with their homes, and not
well informed of the intervening difficulties.[999]
[996] Diodor. xx. 40.
[997] From an incidental allusion in Strabo (xvii. p. 826), we
learn this fact—that Ophellas had surveyed the whole coast of
Northern Africa, to the straits of Gibraltar, and round the old
Phenician settlements on the western coast of modern Morocco.
Some eminent critics (Grosskurd among them) reject the reading in
Strabo—ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀφέλα (or Ὀφέλλα) περιπλοῦ, which is sustained by
a very great preponderance of MSS. But I do not feel the force of
their reasons; and the reading which they would substitute has
nothing to recommend it. In my judgment, Ophellas, ruling in the
Kyrenaica and indulging aspirations towards conquest westward,
was a man both likely to order, and competent to bring about, an
examination of the North African coast. The knowledge of this
fact may have induced Agathokles to apply to him.
[998] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. ap. Photium, Cod. 92. Αἴγυπτον
μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λιβύην, καὶ τὴν ἐπέκεινα ταύτης τὴν πολλὴν, καὶ ὅ,τι
περ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις δ᾽ ὅριον ἐπικτήσηται πρὸς δυομένου ἡλίου,
Πτολεμαίου εἶναι.
[999] Diodor. xx. 40. πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προθύμως ὑπήκουσαν εἰς
τὴν στρατείαν· οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, ἔσπευδον
κοινωνῆσαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἐλπίζοντες τήν τε κρατίστην τῆς Λιβύης
κατακληρουχήσειν, καὶ τὸν ἐν Καρχηδόνι διαρπάσειν πλοῦτον.
As to the great encouragement held out to settlers, when a new
colony was about to be founded by a powerful state, see Thucyd.
iii. 93, about Herakleia Trachinia—πᾶς γάρ τίς, Λακεδαιμονίων
οἰκιζόντων, θαρσαλέως ᾔει, βέβαιαν νομίζων τὴν πόλιν.
Under such hopes, many Grecian colonists joined Ophellas at Kyrênê,
some even with wives and children. The total number is stated at
10,000. Ophellas conducted them forth at the head of a well appointed
army of 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 100 war-chariots; each
chariot carrying the driver and two fighting men. Marching with this
miscellaneous body of soldiers and colonists, he reached in eighteen
days the post of Automalæ—the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[1000]
From thence he proceeded westward along the shore between the two
Syrtes, in many parts a sandy, trackless desert, without wood and
almost without water (with the exception of particular points of
fertility), and infested by serpents many and venomous. At one time,
all his provisions were exhausted; he passed through the territory
of the natives called Lotophagi, near the lesser Syrtis; where the
army had nothing to eat except the fruit of the lotus, which there
abounded.[1001] Ophellas met with no enemies; but the sufferings
of every kind endured by his soldiers—still more of course by the
less hardy colonists and their families—were most distressing. After
miseries endured for more than two months, he joined Agathokles in
the Carthaginian territory; With what abatement of number, we do not
know, but his loss must have been considerable.[1002]
[1000] Diodor. xx. 41.
[1001] Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iv. 3. p. 127, ed. Schneider.
The philosopher would hear this fact from some of the Athenians
concerned in the expedition.
[1002] Diodor. xx. 42. See the striking description of the
miseries of this same march, made by Cato and his Roman troops
after the death of Pompey, in Lucan, Pharsalia, ix. 382-940:—
“Vadimus in campos steriles, exustaque mundi.
Quà nimius Titan, et raræ in fontibus undæ,
Siccaque letiferis squalent serpentibus arva,
Durum iter.”
The entire march of Ophellas must (I think) have lasted longer
than two months; probably Diodorus speaks only of the more
distressing or middle portion of it when he says—κατὰ τὴν
ὁδοιπορίαν πλεῖον ἢ δύο μῆνας κακοπαθήσαντες, etc. (xx. 42).
Ophellas little knew the man whose invitation and alliance he
had accepted. Agathokles at first received him with the warmest
protestations of attachment, welcoming the new-comers with profuse
hospitality, and supplying to them full means of refreshment and
renovation after their past sufferings. Having thus gained the
confidence and favorable sympathies of all, he proceeded to turn it
to his own purposes. Convening suddenly the most devoted among his
own soldiers, he denounced Ophellas as guilty of plotting against
his life. They listened to him with the same feelings of credulous
rage as the Macedonian soldiers exhibited when Alexander denounced
Philotas before them. Agathokles then at once called them to arms,
set upon Ophellas unawares, and slew him with his more immediate
defenders. Among the soldiers of Ophellas, this act excited horror
and indignation, no less than surprise; but Agathokles at length
succeeded in bringing them to terms, partly by deceitful pretexts,
partly by intimidation: for this unfortunate army, left without any
commander of fixed purpose, had no resource except to enter into
his service.[1003] He thus found himself (like Antipater after the
death of Leonnatus) master of a double army, and relieved from a
troublesome rival. The colonists of Ophellas—more unfortunate still,
since they could be of no service to Agathokles—were put by him on
board some merchant vessels, which he was sending to Syracuse with
spoil. The weather becoming stormy, many of these vessels foundered
at sea,—some were driven off and wrecked on the coast of Italy—and a
few only reached Syracuse.[1004] Thus miserably perished the Kyrenean
expedition of Ophellas; one of the most commanding and powerful
schemes, for joint conquest and colonization, that ever set out from
any Grecian city.
[1003] Diodor. xx. 42; Justin. xxii. 7.
[1004] Diodor. xx. 44.
It would have fared ill with Agathokles, had the Carthaginians
been at hand, and ready to attack him in the confusion immediately
succeeding the death of Ophellas. It would also have fared yet
worse with Carthage, had Agathokles been in a position to attack
her during the terrible sedition excited, nearly at the same time,
within her walls by the general Bomilkar.[1005] This traitor (as
has been already stated) had long cherished the design to render
himself despot, and had been watching for a favorable opportunity.
Having purposely caused the loss of the first battle—fought in
conjunction with his brave colleague Hanno, against Agathokles—he
had since carried on the war with a view to his own project (which
explains in part the continued reverses of the Carthaginians); he
now thought that the time was come for openly raising his standard.
Availing himself of a military muster in the quarter of the city
called Neapolis, he first dismissed the general body of the soldiers,
retaining near him only a trusty band of 500 citizens, and 4000
mercenaries. At the head of these, he then fell upon the unsuspecting
city: dividing them into five detachments, and slaughtering
indiscriminately the unarmed citizens in the streets, as well as in
the great market-place. At first the Carthaginians were astounded
and paralyzed. Gradually however they took courage, stood upon their
defence against the assailants, combatted them in the streets and
poured upon them missiles from the house-tops. After a prolonged
conflict, the partisans of Bomilkar found themselves worsted, and
were glad to avail themselves of the mediation of some elder
citizens. They laid down their arms on promise of pardon. The promise
was faithfully kept by the victors, except in regard to Bomilkar
himself; who was hanged in the market-place, having first undergone
severe tortures.[1006]
[1005] Diodor. xx. 43.
[1006] Diodor. xx. 44; Justin, xxii. 7. Compare the description
given by Appian (Punic. 128), of the desperate defence made by
the Carthaginians in the last siege of the city, against the
assault of the Romans, from the house-tops and in the streets.
Though the Carthaginians had thus escaped from an extreme peril, yet
the effects of so formidable a conspiracy weakened them for some time
against their enemy without; while Agathokles on the other hand,
reinforced by the army from Kyrênê, was stronger than ever. So elate
did he feel, that he assumed the title of King;[1007] following
herein the example of the great Macedonian officers, Antigonus,
Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander; the memory of Alexander
being now discarded, as his heirs had been already put to death.
Agathokles, already master of nearly all the dependent towns east and
south-east of Carthage, proceeded to carry his arms to the north-west
of the city. He attacked Utica,—the second city next to Carthage
in importance, and older indeed than Carthage itself—situated
on the western or opposite shore of the Carthaginian Gulf, and
visible from Carthage, though distant from it twenty-seven miles
around the Gulf on land.[1008] The Uticans had hitherto remained
faithful to Carthage, in spite of her reverses, and of defection
elsewhere.[1009] Agathokles marched into their territory with such
unexpected rapidity (he had hitherto been on the south-east of
Carthage, and he now suddenly moved to the north-west of that city),
that he seized the persons of three hundred leading citizens, who
had not yet taken the precaution of retiring within the city. Having
vainly tried to prevail on the Uticans to surrender, he assailed
their walls, attaching in front of his battering engines the three
hundred Utican prisoners; so that the citizens, in hurling missiles
of defence, were constrained to inflict death on their own comrades
and relatives. They nevertheless resisted the assault with unshaken
resolution; but Agathokles found means to force an entrance through a
weak part of the walls, and thus became master of the city. He made
it a scene of indiscriminate slaughter, massacring the inhabitants,
armed and unarmed, and hanging up the prisoners. He further captured
the town of Hippu-Akra, about thirty miles north-west of Utica,
which had also remained faithful to Carthage—and which now, after a
brave defence, experienced the like pitiless treatment.[1010] The
Carthaginians, seemingly not yet recovered from their recent shock,
did not interfere, even to rescue these two important places; so that
Agathokles, firmly established in Tunês as a centre of operations,
extended his African dominion more widely than ever all round
Carthage, both on the coast and in the interior; while he interrupted
the supplies of Carthage itself, and reduced the inhabitants to great
privations.[1011] He even occupied and fortified strongly a place
called Hippagreta, between Utica and Carthage; thus pushing his posts
within a short distance both east and west of her gates.[1012]
[1007] There are yet remaining coins—Ἀγαθοκλέος Βασιλέως—the
earliest Sicilian coins that bear the name of a prince
(Humphreys, Ancient Coins and Medals, p. 50).
[1008] Strabo, xvii. p. 832; Polyb. i. 73.
[1009] Polybius (i. 82) expressly states that the inhabitants
of Utica and of Hippu-Akra (a little further to the west than
Utica), remained faithful to Carthage throughout the hostilities
carried on by Agathokles. This enables us to correct the passage
wherein Diodorus describes the attack of Agathokles upon Utica
(xx. 54)—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ~ἀφεστηκότας~, ἄφνω δὲ
αὐτῶν τῇ πόλει προσπεσών, etc. The word ~ἀφεστηκότας~ here is
perplexing. It must mean that the Uticans had revolted _from
Agathokles_; yet Diodorus has not before said a word about the
Uticans, nor reported that they had either joined Agathokles,
or been conquered by him. Everything that Diodorus has reported
hitherto about Agathokles, relates to operations among the towns
east or south-east of Carthage.
It appears to me that the passage ought to stand—ἐπὶ μὲν
Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ~οὐκ ἀφεστηκότας~, _i. e._ from Carthage;
which introduces consistency into the narrative of Diodorus
himself, while it brings him into harmony with Polybius.
[1010] Diodor. xx. 54, 55. In attacking Hippu-Akra (otherwise
called Hippo-Zarytus, near the Promontorium Pulchrum, the
northernmost point of Africa), Agathokles is said to have got the
better in a naval battle—ναυμαχία περιγενόμενος. This implies
that he must have got a fleet superior to the Carthaginians even
in their own gulf; perhaps ships seized at Utica.
[1011] Diodor. xx. 59.
[1012] Appian distinctly mentions this place _Hippagreta_ as
having been fortified by Agathokles—and distinctly describes
it as being between Utica and Carthage (Punic. 110). It cannot
therefore be the same place as Hippu-Akra (or Hippo-Zarytus);
which was considerably further from Carthage than Utica was.
In this prosperous condition of his African affairs, he thought the
opportunity favorable for retrieving his diminished ascendency in
Sicily; to which island he accordingly crossed over, with 2000 men,
leaving the command in Africa to his son Archagathus. That young
man was at first successful, and seemed even in course of enlarging
his father’s conquests. His general Eumachus overran a wide range
of interior Numidia, capturing Tokæ, Phellinê, Meschelæ, Akris, and
another town bearing the same name of Hippu-Akra—and enriching his
soldiers with a considerable plunder. But in a second expedition,
endeavoring to carry his arms yet farther into the interior, he
was worsted in an attack upon a town called Miltinê, and compelled
to retreat. We read that he marched through one mountainous region
abounding in wild cats—and another, in which there were a great
number of apes, who lived in the most tame and familiar manner in
the houses with men—being greatly caressed, and even worshipped as
gods.[1013]
[1013] Diodor. xx. 57, 58. It is vain to attempt to identify
the places mentioned as visited and conquered by Eumachus. Our
topographical knowledge is altogether insufficient. This second
Hippu-Akra is supposed to be the same as Hippo-Regius; Tokæ may
be Tucca Terebinthina, in the south-eastern region or Byzakium.
The Carthaginians however had now regained internal harmony and
power of action. Their senate and their generals were emulous, both
in vigor and in provident combinations, against the common enemy.
They sent forth 30,000 men, a larger force than they had yet had in
the field; forming three distinct camps, under Hanno, Imilkon, and
Adherbal, partly in the interior, partly on the coast. Archagathus,
leaving a sufficient guard at Tunês, marched to meet them,
distributing his army in three divisions also; two, under himself
and Æschrion, besides the corps under Eumachus in the mountainous
region. He was however unsuccessful at all points. Hanno, contriving
to surprise the division of Æschrion, gained a complete victory,
wherein Æschrion himself with more than 4000 men were slain. Imilkon
was yet more fortunate in his operations against Eumachus, whom he
entrapped by simulated flight into an ambuscade, and attacked at such
advantage, that the Grecian army was routed and cut off from all
retreat. A remnant of them defended themselves for some time on a
neighboring hill, but being without water, nearly all soon perished,
from thirst, fatigue, and the sword of the conqueror.[1014]
[1014] Diodor. xx. 59, 60.
By such reverses, destroying two-thirds of the Agathoklean army,
Archagathus was placed in serious peril. He was obliged to
concentrate his force in Tunês, calling in nearly all his outlying
detachments. At the same time, those Liby-Phenician cities, and
rural Libyan tribes, who had before joined Agathokles, now detached
themselves from him when his power was evidently declining, and made
their peace with Carthage. The victorious Carthaginian generals
established fortified camps round Tunês, so as to restrain the
excursions of Archagathus; while with their fleet they blocked up
his harbor. Presently provisions became short, and much despondency
prevailed among the Grecian army. Archagathus transmitted this
discouraging news to his father in Sicily, with urgent entreaties
that he would come to the rescue.[1015]
[1015] Diodor. xx. 61.
The career of Agathokles in Sicily, since his departure from Africa,
had been checkered, and on the whole unproductive. Just before his
arrival in the island,[1016] his generals Leptines and Demophilus had
gained an important victory over the Agrigentine forces commanded by
Xenodokus, who were disabled from keeping the field. This disaster
was a fatal discouragement both to the Agrigentines, and to the
cause which they had espoused as champions—free and autonomous
city-government with equal confederacy for self-defence, under the
presidency of Agrigentum.[1017] The outlying cities confederate with
Agrigentum were left without military protection, and exposed to the
attacks of Leptines, animated and fortified by the recent arrival
of his master Agathokles. That despot landed at Selinus—subdued
Herakleia, Therma, and Kephaloidion, on or near the northern coast of
Sicily—then crossed the interior of the island to Syracuse. In his
march he assaulted Kentoripa, having some partisans within, but was
repulsed with loss. At Apollonia,[1018] he was also unsuccessful in
his first attempt; but being stung with mortification, he resumed the
assault next day, and at length, by great efforts, carried the town.
To avenge his loss, which had been severe, he massacred most of the
citizens, and abandoned the town to plunder.[1019]
[1016] Diodor. xx. 56. Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ, τῆς ~μάχης ἄρτι~
γεγενημένης, καταπλεύσας τῆς Σικελίας εἰς Σελινοῦντα, etc.
[1017] Diodor. xx. 56. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀκραγαντῖνοι ταύτῃ τῇ συμφορᾷ
περιπεσόντες, διέλυσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν τὴν καλλίστην ἐπιβολὴν, τῶν δὲ
συμμάχων τὰς τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδας.
[1018] Apollonia was a town in the interior of the island,
somewhat to the north-east of Enna (Cicero, Verr. iii. 43).
[1019] Diodor. xx. 56.
From hence he proceeded to Syracuse, which he now revisited after
an absence of (apparently) more than two years in Africa. During
all this interval, the Syracusan harbor had been watched by a
Carthaginian fleet, obstructing the entry of provisions, and causing
partial scarcity.[1020] But there was no blockading army on land;
nor had the dominion of Agathokles, upheld as it was by his brother
Antander and his mercenary force, been at all shaken. His arrival
inspired his partisans and soldiers with new courage, while it
spread terror throughout most parts of Sicily. To contend with the
Carthaginian blockading squadron, he made efforts to procure maritime
aid from the Tyrrhenian ports in Italy;[1021] while on land, his
forces were now preponderant—owing to the recent defeat, and broken
spirit, of the Agrigentines. But his prospects were suddenly checked
by the enterprising move of his old enemy—the Syracusan exile
Deinokrates; who made profession of taking up that generous policy
which the Agrigentines had tacitly let fall—announcing himself as
the champion of autonomous city-government, and equal confederacy,
throughout Sicily. Deinokrates received ready adhesion from most of
the cities belonging to the Agrigentine confederacy—all of them who
were alarmed by finding that the weakness or fears of their presiding
city had left them unprotected against Agathokles. He was soon at
the head of a powerful army—20,000 foot, and 1500 horse. Moreover a
large proportion of his army were not citizen militia, but practised
soldiers; for the most part exiles, driven from their homes by
the distractions and violences of the Agathoklean æra.[1022] For
military purposes, both he and his soldiers were far more strenuous
and effective than the Agrigentines under Xenodokus had been. He not
only kept the field against Agathokles, but several times offered him
battle, which the despot did not feel confidence enough to accept.
Agathokles could do no more than maintain himself in Syracuse, while
the Sicilian cities generally were put in security against his
aggressions.
[1020] Diodor. xx. 62.
[1021] Diodor. xx. 61.
[1022] Diodor. xx. 57. καὶ πάντων τούτων ἐν φυγαῖς καὶ μελέταις
τοῦ πονεῖν συνεχῶς γεγονότων, etc.
Amidst this unprosperous course of affairs in Sicily, Agathokles
received messengers from his son, reporting the defeats in Africa.
Preparing immediately to revisit that country, he was fortunate
enough to obtain a reinforcement of Tyrrhenian ships of war, which
enabled him to overcome the Carthaginian blockading squadron at
the mouth of the Syracusan harbor. A clear passage to Africa was
thus secured for himself, together with ample supplies of imported
provisions for the Syracusans.[1023] Though still unable to combat
Deinokrates in the field, Agathokles was emboldened by his recent
naval victory to send forth Leptines with a force to invade the
Agrigentines—the jealous rivals, rather than the allies, of
Deinokrates. The Agrigentine army—under the general Xenodokus, whom
Leptines had before defeated—consisted of citizen militia mustered
on the occasion; while the Agathoklean mercenaries, conducted by
Leptines, had made arms a profession, and were used to fighting
as well as to hardships.[1024] Here as elsewhere in Greece, we
find the civic and patriotic energy trampled down by professional
soldiership, and reduced to operate only as an obsequious instrument
for administrative details.
[1023] Diodor. xx. 61, 62.
[1024] Diodor. xx. 62.
Xenodokus, conscious of the inferiority of his Agrigentine force,
was reluctant to hazard a battle. Driven to this imprudence by the
taunts of his soldiers, he was defeated a second time by Leptines,
and became so apprehensive of the wrath of the Agrigentines, that he
thought it expedient to retire to Gela. After a period of rejoicing,
for his recent victories by land as well as by sea, Agathokles passed
over to Africa, where he found his son, with the army at Tunês in
great despondency and privation, and almost mutiny for want of
pay. They still amounted to 6000 Grecian mercenaries, 6000 Gauls,
Samnites, and Tyrrhenians—1500 cavalry—and no less than 6000 (if the
number be correct) Libyan war-chariots. There were also a numerous
body of Libyan allies; faithless time-servers, watching for the
turn of fortune. The Carthaginians, occupying strong camps in the
vicinity of Tunês, and abundantly supplied, awaited patiently the
destroying effects of privation and suffering on their enemies. So
desperate was the position of Agathokles, that he was compelled to go
forth and fight. Having tried in vain to draw the Carthaginians down
into the plain, he at length attacked them in the full strength of
their entrenchments. But in spite of the most strenuous efforts, his
troops were repulsed with great slaughter, and driven back to their
camp.[1025]
[1025] Diodor. xx. 64; Justin, xxii. 8.
The night succeeding this battle was a scene of disorder and panic in
both camps; even in that of the victorious Carthaginians. The latter,
according to the ordinances of their religion, eager to return their
heartfelt thanks to the gods for this great victory, sacrificed to
them as a choice offering the handsomest prisoners captured.[1026]
During this process, the tent or tabernacle consecrated to the gods,
close to the altar as well as to the general’s tent, accidentally
took fire. The tents being formed by mere wooden posts, connected
by a thatch of hay or straw both on roof and sides,—the fire spread
rapidly, and the entire camp was burnt, together with many soldiers
who tried to arrest the conflagration. So distracting was the terror
occasioned by this catastrophe, that the whole Carthaginian army for
the time dispersed; and Agathokles, had he been prepared, might have
destroyed them. But it happened that at the same hour, his own camp
was thrown into utter confusion by a different accident, rendering
his soldiers incapable of being brought into action.[1027]
[1026] Diodor. xx. 65. See an incident somewhat similar (Herod.
vii. 180)—the Persians, in the invasion of Greece by Xerxes,
sacrificed the handsomest Grecian prisoner whom they captured on
board the first prize-ship that fell into their hands.
[1027] Diodor. xx. 66, 67.
His position at Tunês had now become desperate. His Libyan allies had
all declared against him, after the recent defeat. He could neither
continue to hold Tunês, nor carry away his troops to Sicily; for
he had but few vessels, and the Carthaginians were masters at sea.
Seeing no resource, he resolved to embark secretly with his younger
son Herakleides; abandoning Archagathus and the army to their fate.
But Archagathus and the other officers, suspecting his purpose,
were thoroughly resolved that the man who had brought them into
destruction should not thus slip away and betray them. As Agathokles
was on the point of going aboard at night, he found himself watched,
arrested, and held prisoner, by the indignant soldiery. The whole
town now became a scene of disorder and tumult, aggravated by the
rumor that the enemy were marching up to attack them. Amidst the
general alarm, the guards who had been set over Agathokles, thinking
his services indispensable for defence, brought him out with his
fetters still on. When the soldiers saw him in this condition,
their sentiment towards him again reverted to pity and admiration,
notwithstanding his projected desertion; moreover they hoped for his
guidance to resist the impending attack. With one voice they called
upon the guards to strike off his chains and set him free. Agathokles
was again at liberty. But insensible to everything except his own
personal safety, he presently stole away, leaped unperceived into a
skiff, with a few attendants, but without either of his sons,—and was
lucky enough to arrive, in spite of stormy November weather, on the
coast of Sicily.[1028]
[1028] Diodor. xx. 69; Justin, xxii. 8. ... τὸ δὲ πλῆθος, ὡς
εἶδεν, εἰς ἔλεον ἐτράπη, καὶ πάντες ἐπεβόων ἀφεῖναι· ὁ δὲ λυθεὶς
καὶ μετ᾽ ὀλίγων ἐμβὰς εἰς τὸ πορθμεῖον, ἔλαθεν ἐκπλεύσας κατὰ τὴν
δύσιν τῆς Πλειάδος, χειμῶνος ὄντος.
So terrible was the fury of the soldiers, on discovering that
Agathokles had accomplished his desertion, that they slew both his
sons, Archagathus and Herakleides. No resource was left but to elect
new generals, and make the best terms they could with Carthage. They
were still a formidable body, retaining in their hands various other
towns besides Tunês; so that the Carthaginians, relieved from all
fear of Agathokles, thought it prudent to grant an easy capitulation.
It was agreed that all the towns should be restored to the
Carthaginians, on payment of 300 talents; that such soldiers as chose
to enter into the African service of Carthage, should be received on
full pay; but that such as preferred returning to Sicily should be
transported thither, with permission to reside in the Carthaginian
town of Solus (or Soluntum). On these terms the convention was
concluded, and the army finally broken up. Some indeed among the
Grecian garrisons, quartered in the outlying posts, being rash enough
to dissent and hold out, were besieged and taken by the Carthaginian
force. Their commanders were crucified, and the soldiers condemned to
rural work as fettered slaves.[1029]
[1029] Diodor. xx. 69.
Thus miserably terminated the expedition of Agathokles to Africa,
after an interval of four years from the time of his landing. By
the _vana mirantes_,[1030] who looked out for curious coincidences
(probably Timæus), it was remarked, that his ultimate flight, with
the slaughter of his two sons, occurred exactly on the same day of
the year following his assassination of Ophellas.[1031] Ancient
writers extol, with good reason, the bold and striking conception
of transferring the war to Africa, at the very moment when he was
himself besieged in Syracuse by a superior Carthaginian force.
But while admitting the military resource, skill, and energy, of
Agathokles, we must not forget that his success in Africa was
materially furthered by the treasonable conduct of the Carthaginian
general Bomilkar—an accidental coincidence in point of time. Nor
is it to be overlooked, that Agathokles missed the opportunity
of turning his first success to account, at a moment when the
Carthaginians would probably have purchased his evacuation of Africa
by making large concessions to him in Sicily.[1032] He imprudently
persisted in the war, though the complete conquest of Carthage was
beyond his strength—and though it was still more beyond his strength
to prosecute effective war, simultaneously and for a long time, in
Sicily and in Africa. The African subjects of Carthage were not
attached to her; but neither were they attached to him;—nor, on the
long run, did they do him any serious good. Agathokles is a man of
force and fraud—consummate in the use of both. His whole life is a
series of successful adventures, and strokes of bold ingenuity to
extricate himself from difficulties; but there is wanting in him all
predetermined general plan, or measured range of ambition, to which
these single exploits might be made subservient.
[1030] Tacit. Annal. i. 9. “Multus hinc ipso de Augusto sermo,
plerisque _vana mirantibus_—quod idem dies accepti quondam
imperii princeps, et vitæ supremus—quod Nolæ in domo et cubiculo,
in quo pater ejus Octavius, vitam finivisset”, etc.
[1031] Diodor. xx. 70.
[1032] This is what Agathokles might have done, but did not
do. Nevertheless, Valerius Maximus (vii. 4, 1) represents him
as having actually done it, and praises his sagacity on that
ground. Here is an example how little careful these collectors of
anecdotes sometimes are about their facts.
After his passage from Africa, Agathokles landed on the western
corner of Sicily near the town of Egesta, which was then in alliance
with him. He sent to Syracuse for a reinforcement. But he was hard
pressed for money; he suspected, or pretended to suspect, the
Egestæans of disaffection; accordingly, on receiving his new force,
he employed it to commit revolting massacre and plunder in Egesta.
The town is reported to have contained 10,000 citizens. Of these
Agathokles caused the poorer men to be for the most part murdered;
the richer were cruelly tortured, and even their wives tortured and
mutilated, to compel revelations of concealed wealth; the children
of both sexes were transported to Italy, and there sold as slaves to
the Bruttians. The original population being thus nearly extirpated,
Agathokles changed the name of the town to Dikæopolis, assigning
it as a residence to such deserters as might join him.[1033] This
atrocity, more suitable to Africa[1034] than Greece (where the
mutilation of women is almost unheard of), was probably the way in
which his savage pride obtained some kind of retaliatory satisfaction
for the recent calamity and humiliation in Africa. Under the like
sentiment, he perpetrated another deed of blood at Syracuse. Having
learnt that the soldiers, whom he had deserted at Tunês, had after
his departure put to death his two sons, he gave orders to Antander
his brother (viceroy of Syracuse), to massacre all the relatives
of those Syracusans who had served him in the African expedition.
This order was fulfilled by Antander (we are assured) accurately
and to the letter. Neither age or sex—grandsire or infant—wife or
mother—were spared by the Agathoklean executioners. We may be sure
that their properties were plundered at the same time; we hear of no
mutilations.[1035]
[1033] Diodor. xx. 71. We do not know what happened afterwards
with this town under its new population. But the old name Egesta
was afterwards resumed.
[1034] Compare the proceedings of the Greco-Libyan princess
Pheretimê (of the Battiad family) at Barka (Herodot. iv. 202).
[1035] Diodor. xx. 72. Hippokrates and Epikydes—those Syracusans
who, about a century afterwards, induced Hieronymus of Syracuse
to prefer the Carthaginian alliance to the Roman—had resided
at Carthage for some time, and served in the army of Hannibal,
because their grandfather had been banished from Syracuse as one
concerned in killing Archagathus (Polyb. vii. 2).
Still Agathokles tried to maintain his hold on the Sicilian towns
which remained to him; but his cruelties as well as his reverses
had produced a strong sentiment against him, and even his general
Pasiphilus revolted to join Deinokrates. That exile was now at the
head of an army stated at 20,000 men, the most formidable military
force in Sicily; so that Agathokles, feeling the inadequacy of his
own means, sent to solicit peace, and to offer tempting conditions.
He announced his readiness to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and
to be content, if two maritime towns on the northern coast of the
island—Therma and Kephaloidion—were assigned to his mercenaries and
himself. Under this proposition, Deinokrates, and the other Syracusan
exiles, had the opportunity of entering Syracuse, and reconstituting
the free city-government. Had Deinokrates been another Timoleon, the
city might now have acquired and enjoyed another temporary sunshine
of autonomy and prosperity; but his ambition was thoroughly selfish.
As commander of this large army, he enjoyed a station of power and
license such as he was not likely to obtain under the reconstituted
city-government of Syracuse. He therefore evaded the propositions of
Agathokles, requiring still larger concessions; until at length the
Syracusan exiles in his own army (partly instigated by emissaries
from Agathokles himself) began to suspect his selfish projects,
and to waver in their fidelity to him. Meanwhile Agathokles, being
repudiated by Deinokrates, addressed himself to the Carthaginians,
and concluded a treaty with them, restoring or guaranteeing to them
all the possessions that they had ever enjoyed in Sicily. In return
for this concession, he received from them a sum of money, and a
large supply of corn.[1036]
[1036] Diodor. xx. 78, 79. Some said that the sum of money paid
by the Carthaginians was 300 talents. Timæus stated it at 150
talents.
Relieved from Carthaginian hostility, Agathokles presently ventured
to march against the army of Deinokrates. The latter was indeed
greatly superior in strength, but many of his soldiers were now
lukewarm or disaffected, and Agathokles had established among them
correspondences upon which he could rely. At a great battle fought
near Torgium, many of them went over on the field to Agathokles,
giving to him a complete victory. The army of Deinokrates was
completely dispersed. Shortly afterwards a considerable body among
them (4000 men, or 7000 men, according to different statements)
surrendered to the victor on terms. As soon as they had delivered up
their arms, Agathokles, regardless of his covenant, caused them to be
surrounded by his own army, and massacred.[1037]
[1037] Diodor. xx. 89.
It appears as if the recent victory had been the result of a secret
and treacherous compact between Agathokles and Deinokrates; and as if
the prisoners massacred by Agathokles were those of whom Deinokrates
wished to rid himself as malcontents; for immediately after the
battle, a reconciliation took place between the two. Agathokles
admitted the other as a sort of partner in his despotism; while
Deinokrates not only brought into the partnership all the military
means and strong posts which he had been two years in acquiring, but
also betrayed to Agathokles the revolted general Pasiphilus with the
town of Gela occupied by the latter. It is noticed as singular, that
Agathokles, generally faithless and unscrupulous towards both friends
and enemies, kept up the best understanding and confidence with
Deinokrates to the end of his life.[1038]
[1038] Diodor. xx. 90.
The despot had now regained full power at Syracuse, together with
a great extent of dominion in Sicily. The remainder of his restless
existence was spent in operations of hostility or plunder against
more northerly enemies—the Liparæan isles[1039]—the Italian cities
and the Bruttians—the island of Korkyra. We are unable to follow
his proceedings in detail. He was threatened with a formidable
attack[1040] by the Spartan prince Kleonymus, who was invited by
the Tarentines to aid them against the Lucanians and Romans. But
Kleonymus found enough to occupy him elsewhere, without visiting
Sicily. He collected a considerable force on the coast of Italy,
undertook operations with success against the Lucanians, and even
captured the town of Thurii. But the Romans, now pushing their
intervention even to the Tarentine Gulf, drove him off and retook the
town; moreover his own behavior was so tyrannical and profligate, as
to draw upon him universal hatred. Returning from Italy to Korkyra,
Kleonymus made himself master of that important island, intending to
employ it as a base of operations both against Greece and against
Italy.[1041] He failed however in various expeditions both in the
Tarentine Gulf and the Adriatic. Demetrius Poliorketes and Kassander
alike tried to conclude an alliance with him; but in vain.[1042]
At a subsequent period, Korkyra was besieged by Kassander with a
large naval and military force; Kleonymus then retired (or perhaps
had previously retired) to Sparta. Kassander, having reduced the
island to great straits, was on the point of taking it, when it was
relieved by Agathokles with a powerful armament. That despot was
engaged in operations on the coast of Italy against the Bruttians
when his aid to Korkyra was solicited; he destroyed most part of the
Macedonian fleet, and then seized the island for himself.[1043] On
returning from this victorious expedition to the Italian coast, where
he had left a detachment of his Ligurian and Tuscan mercenaries,
he was informed that these mercenaries had been turbulent during
his absence, in demanding the pay due to them from his grandson
Archagathus. He caused them all to be slain, to the number of
2000.[1044]
[1039] Diodor. xx. 101. This expedition of Agathokles against
the Lyparæan isles seems to have been described in detail by his
contemporary historian, the Syracusan Kallias: see the Fragments
of that author, in Didot’s Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 383.
Fragm. 4.
[1040] Diodor. xx. 104.
[1041] Diodor. xx. 104; Livy, x. 2. A curious anecdote appears in
the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mirabilibus (78) respecting two native
Italians, Aulus and Caius, who tried to poison Kleonymus at
Tarentum, but were detected and put to death by the Tarentines.
That Agathokles, in his operations on the coast of southern
Italy, found himself in conflict with the Romans, and that their
importance was now strongly felt—we may judge by the fact, that
the Syracusan Kallias (contemporary and historian of Agathokles)
appears to have given details respecting the origin and history
of Rome. See the Fragments of Kallias, ap. Didot, Hist. Græc.
Frag. vol. ii. p. 383; Fragm. 5—and Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. i. 72.
[1042] Diodor. xx. 105.
[1043] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 2. p. 265.
[1044] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 3. p. 266.
As far as we can trace the events of the last years of Agathokles,
we find him seizing the towns of Kroton and Hipponia in Italy,
establishing an alliance with Demetrius Poliorketes,[1045] and giving
his daughter Lanassa in marriage to the youthful Pyrrhus king of
Epirus. At the age of seventy-two, still in the plenitude of vigor
as well as of power, he was projecting a fresh expedition against
the Carthaginians in Africa, with two hundred of the largest ships
of war, when his career was brought to a close by sickness and by
domestic enemies.
[1045] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 4, 8, 11. p. 266-273.
He proclaimed as future successor to his dominion, his son, named
Agathokles; but Archagathus his grandson (son of Archagathus who had
perished in Africa), a young prince of more conspicuous qualities,
had already been singled out for the most important command, and
was now at the head of the army near Ætna. The old Agathokles,
wishing to strengthen the hands of his intended successor, sent his
favored son Agathokles to Ætna, with written orders directing that
Archagathus should yield up to him the command. Archagathus, noway
disposed to obey, invited his uncle Agathokles to a banquet, and
killed him; after which he contrived the poisoning of his grandfather
the old despot himself. The instrument of his purpose was Mænon; a
citizen of Egesta, enslaved at the time when Agathokles massacred
most of the Egestæan population. The beauty of his person procured
him much favor with Agathokles; but he had never forgotten, and
had always been anxious to avenge, the bloody outrage on his
fellow-citizens. To accomplish this purpose, the opportunity was
now opened to him, together with a promise of protection, through
Archagathus. He accordingly poisoned Agathokles, as we are told, by
means of a medicated quill, handed to him for cleaning his teeth
after dinner.[1046] Combining together the various accounts, it seems
probable that Agathokles was at the time sick—that this sickness may
have been the reason why he was so anxious to strengthen the position
of his intended successor—and that his death was as much the effect
of his malady as of the poison. Archagathus, after murdering his
uncle, seems by means of his army to have made himself real master of
the Syracusan power; while the old despot, defenceless on a sick bed,
could do no more than provide for the safety of his Egyptian wife
Theoxena and his two young children, by despatching them on shipboard
with all his rich movable treasures to Alexandria. Having secured
this object, amidst extreme grief on the part of those around, he
expired.[1047]
[1046] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 12. p. 276-278. Neither Justin (xxiii.
2) nor Trogus before him, (as it seems from the Prologue) alludes
to poison. He represents Agathokles as having died by a violent
distemper. He notices however the bloody family feud, and the
murder of the uncle by the nephew.
[1047] Justin (xxiii. 2) dwells pathetically on this last parting
between Agathokles and Theoxena. It is difficult to reconcile
Justin’s narrative with that of Diodorus; but on this point, as
far as we can judge, I think him more credible than Diodorus.
The great lines in the character of Agathokles are well marked.
He was of the stamp of Gelon and the elder Dionysius—a soldier of
fortune, who raised himself from the meanest beginnings to the summit
of political power—and who, in the acquisition as well as maintenance
of that power, displayed an extent of energy, perseverance, and
military resource, not surpassed by any one, even of the generals
formed in Alexander’s school. He was an adept in that art at which
all aspiring men of his age aimed—the handling of mercenary soldiers
for the extinction of political liberty and security at home, and
for predatory aggrandizement abroad. I have already noticed the
opinion delivered by Scipio Africanus—that the elder Dionysius and
Agathokles were the most daring, sagacious, and capable men of
action within his knowledge.[1048] Apart from this enterprising
genius, employed in the service of unmeasured personal ambition,
we know nothing of Agathokles except his sanguinary, faithless,
and nefarious dispositions; in which attributes also he stands
pre-eminent, above all his known contemporaries, and above nearly
all predecessors.[1049] Notwithstanding his often-proved perfidy, he
seems to have had a joviality and apparent simplicity of manner (the
same is recounted of Cæsar Borgia) which amused men and put them off
their guard, throwing them perpetually into his trap.[1050]
[1048] Polyb. xv. 35. See above in this History, Vol. XI. Ch.
lxxxiii. p. 46.
[1049] Polybius (ix. 23) says that Agathokles, though cruel
in the extreme at the beginning of his career, and in the
establishment of his power, yet became the mildest of men after
his power was once established. The latter half of this statement
is contradicted by all the particular facts which we know
respecting Agathokles.
As to Timæus the historian, indeed (who had been banished from
Sicily by Agathokles, and who wrote the history of the latter
in five books), Polybius had good reason to censure him, as
being unmeasured in his abuse of Agathokles. For Timæus not only
recounted of Agathokles numerous acts of nefarious cruelty—acts
of course essentially public, and therefore capable of being
known—but also told much scandal about his private habits, and
represented him (which is still more absurd) as a man vulgar and
despicable in point of ability. See the Fragments of Timæus ap.
Histor. Græc. ed. Didot. Frag. 144-150.
All, or nearly all, the acts of Agathokles, as described in the
preceding pages, have been copied from Diodorus; who had as good
authorities before him as Polybius possessed. Diodorus does not
copy the history of Agathokles from Timæus; on the contrary,
he censures Timæus for his exaggerated acrimony and injustice
towards Agathokles, in terms not less forcibly than those which
Polybius employs (xxi. Fragm. p. 279). Diodorus cites Timæus by
name, occasionally and in particular instances: but he evidently
did not borrow from that author the main stream of his narrative.
He seems to have had before him other authorities—among them
some highly favorable to Agathokles—the Syracusan Kallias—and
Antander, brother of Agathokles (xxi. p. 278-282).
[1050] Diodor. xx. 63.
Agathokles, however, though among the worst of Greeks, was yet
a Greek. During his government of thirty-two years, the course
of events in Sicily continued under Hellenic agency, without the
preponderant intervention of any foreign power. The power of
Agathokles indeed rested mainly on foreign mercenaries; but so had
that of Dionysius and Gelon before him; and he as well as they,
kept up vigorously the old conflict against the Carthaginian power
in the island. Grecian history in Sicily thus continues down to the
death of Agathokles; but it continues no longer. After his death,
Hellenic power and interests become incapable of self-support,
and sink into a secondary and subservient position, overridden or
contended for by foreigners. Syracuse and the other cities passed
from one despot to another, and were torn with discord arising out
of the crowds of foreign mercenaries who had obtained footing among
them. At the same time, the Carthaginians made increased efforts to
push their conquests in the island, without finding any sufficient
internal resistance; so that they would have taken Syracuse, and made
Sicily their own, had not Pyrrhus king of Epirus (the son-in-law
of Agathokles) interposed to arrest their progress. From this
time forward, the Greeks of Sicily become a prize to be contended
for—first between the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus—next, between the
Carthaginians and Romans[1051]—until at length they dwindle into
subjects of Rome; corn-growers for the Roman plebs, clients under the
patronage of the Roman Marcelli, victims of the rapacity of Verres,
and suppliants for the tutelary eloquence of Cicero. The historian of
self-acting Hellas loses sight of them at the death of Agathokles.
[1051] The poet Theokritus (xvi. 75-80) expatiates on the bravery
of the Syracusan Hiero II., and on the great warlike power
of the Syracusans under him (B. C. 260-240), which
he represents as making the Carthaginians tremble for their
possessions in Sicily. Personally, Hiero seems to have deserved
this praise—and to have deserved yet more praise for his mild and
prudent internal administration of Syracuse. But his military
force was altogether secondary in the great struggle between Rome
and Carthage for the mastery of Sicily.