SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS. — AGATHOKLES.
It has been convenient, throughout all this work, to keep the history
of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks distinct from that of the Central
and Asiatic. We parted last from the Sicilian Greeks,[917] at the
death of their champion the Corinthian Timoleon (337 B. C.),
by whose energetic exploits, and generous political policy, they
had been almost regenerated—rescued from foreign enemies, protected
against intestine discord, and invigorated by a large reinforcement
of new colonists. For the twenty years next succeeding the death of
Timoleon, the history of Syracuse and Sicily is an absolute blank;
which is deeply to be regretted, since the position of these cities
included so much novelty—so many subjects for debate, for peremptory
settlement, or for amicable compromise—that the annals of their
proceedings must have been peculiarly interesting. Twenty years after
the death of Timoleon, we find the government of Syracuse described
as an oligarchy; implying that the constitution established by
Timoleon must have been changed either by violence or by consent.
The oligarchy is stated as consisting of 600 chief men, among whom
Sosistratus and Herakleides appear as leaders.[918] We hear generally
that the Syracusans had been engaged in wars, and that Sosistratus
either first originated, or first firmly established, his oligarchy,
after an expedition undertaken to the coast of Italy, to assist the
citizens of Kroton against their interior neighbors and assailants
the Bruttians.
[917] See my last preceding Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxv. p. 196.
[918] Diodor. xix. 3. It appears that Diodorus had recounted
in his eighteenth Book the previous circumstances of these two
leaders; but this part of his narrative is lost: see Wesseling’s
note.
Not merely Kroton, but other Grecian cities also on the coast of
Italy, appear to have been exposed to causes of danger and decline,
similar to those which were operating upon so many other portions
of the Hellenic world. Their non-Hellenic neighbors in the interior
were growing too powerful and too aggressive to leave them in peace
or security. The Messapians, the Lucanians, the Bruttians, and other
native Italian tribes, were acquiring that increased strength which
became ultimately all concentrated under the mighty republic of Rome.
I have in my preceding volume recounted the acts of the two Syracusan
despots, the elder and younger Dionysius, on this Italian coast.[919]
Though the elder gained some advantage over the Lucanians, yet the
interference of both contributed only to enfeeble and humiliate the
Italiot Greeks. Not long before the battle of Chæroneia (340-338
B. C.), the Tarentines found themselves so hard pressed by the
Messapians, that they sent to Sparta, their mother-city, to entreat
assistance. The Spartan king Archidamus son of Agesilaus, perhaps
ashamed of the nullity of his country since the close of the Sacred
War, complied with their prayer, and sailed at the head of a
mercenary force to Italy. How long his operations there lasted, we do
not know; but they ended by his being defeated and killed, near the
time of the battle of Chæroneia[920] (338 B. C.).
[919] See Vol. XI. Ch. lxxxiii. p. 22; Ch. lxxxv. p. 133.
[920] Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Camill. 19; Pausan. iii. 10,
5. Plutarch even says that the two battles occurred on the same
_day_.
About six years after this event, the Tarentines, being still pressed
by the same formidable neighbors, invoked the aid of the Epirotic
Alexander, king of the Molossians, and brother of Olympias. These
Epirots now, during the general decline of Grecian force, rise into
an importance which they had never before enjoyed[921]. Philip of
Macedon, having married Olympias, not only secured his brother-in-law
on the Molossian throne, but strengthened his authority over subjects
not habitually obedient. It was through Macedonian interference that
the Molossian Alexander first obtained (though subject to Macedonian
ascendency) the important city of Ambrakia; which thus passed out
of a free Hellenic community into the capital and seaport of the
Epirotic kings. Alexander farther cemented his union with Macedonia
by marrying his own niece Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias.
In fact, during the lives of Philip and Alexander the Great, the
Epirotic kingdom appears a sort of adjunct to the Macedonian;
governed by Olympias either jointly with her brother the Molossian
Alexander—or as regent after his death.[922]
[921] The Molossian King Neoptolemus was father both of Alexander
(the Epirotic) and of Olympias. But as to the genealogy of the
preceding kings, nothing certain can be made out: see Merleker,
Darstellung des Landes und der Bewohner von Epeiros, Königsberg,
1844, p. 2-6.
[922] A curious proof how fully Olympias was queen of Epirus is
preserved in the fragments (recently published by Mr. Babington)
of the oration of Hyperides in defence of Euxenippus, p. 12. The
Athenians, in obedience to an oracular mandate from the Dodonæan
Zeus, had sent to Dodona a solemn embassy for sacrifice, and had
dressed and adorned the statue of Diônê there situated. Olympias
addressed a despatch to the Athenians, reproving them for this as
a trespass upon her dominions—ὑπὲρ τούτων ὑμῖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἦλθε
παρ᾽ Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ὡς ~ἡ χώρα εἴη ἡ Μολοσσία
αὐτῆς~, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἱερόν ἐστιν· οὔκουν προσῆκεν ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ
ἓν κινεῖν. Olympias took a high and insolent tone in this letter
(τὰς ~τραγῳδίας~ αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας, etc.)
The date of this oration is at some period during the life of
Alexander the Great—but cannot be more precisely ascertained.
After the death of Alexander, Olympias passed much time in
Epirus, where she thought herself more secure from the enmity of
Antipater (Diodor. xviii. 49).
Dodona had been one of the most ancient places of pilgrimage
for the Hellenic race—especially for the Athenians. The order
here addressed to them,—that they should abstain from religious
manifestations at this sanctuary—is a remarkable proof of the
growing encroachments on free Hellenism; the more so, as Olympias
sent offerings to temples at Athens when she chose and without
asking permission—we learn this from the same fragment of
Hyperides.
It was about the year after the battle of Issus that the Molossian
Alexander undertook his expedition into Italy;[923] doubtless
instigated in part by emulation of the Asiatic glories of his
nephew and namesake. Though he found enemies more formidable than
the Persians at Issus, yet his success was at first considerable.
He gained victories over the Messapians, the Lucanians, and the
Samnites; he conquered the Lucanian town of Consentia, and the
Bruttian town of Tereina; he established an alliance with the
Pœdiculi, and exchanged friendly messages with the Romans. As far
as we can make out from scanty data, he seems to have calculated on
establishing a comprehensive dominion in the south of Italy, over
all its population—over Greek cities, Lucanians, and Bruttians.
He demanded and obtained three hundred of the chief Lucanian and
Messapian families, whom he sent over as hostages to Epirus.
Several exiles of these nations joined him as partisans. He farther
endeavored to transfer the congress of the Greco-Italian cities,
which had been usually held at the Tarentine colony of Herakleia, to
Thurii; intending probably to procure for himself a compliant synod
like that serving the purpose of his Macedonian nephew at Corinth.
But the tide of his fortune at length turned. The Tarentines became
disgusted and alarmed; his Lucanian partisans proved faithless; the
stormy weather in the Calabrian Apennines broke up the communication
between his different detachments, and exposed them to be cut off
in detail. He himself perished, by the hands of a Lucanian exile,
in crossing the river Acheron, and near the town of Pandosia. This
was held to be a memorable attestation of the prophetic veracity of
the oracle; since he had received advice from Dodona to beware of
Pandosia and Acheron; two names which he well knew, and therefore
avoided, in Epirus—but which he had not before known to exist in
Italy.[924]
[923] Livy (viii. 3-24) places the date of this expedition of the
Molossian Alexander eight years earlier; but it is universally
recognized that this is a mistake.
[924] Livy, viii. 17-24; Justin, xii. 2; Strabo, vi. p. 280.
The Greco-Italian cities had thus dwindled down into a prize to be
contended for between the Epirotic kings and the native Italian
powers—as they again became, still more conspicuously, fifty years
afterwards, during the war between Pyrrhus and the Romans. They
were now left to seek foreign aid, where they could obtain it, and
to become the prey of adventurers. It is in this capacity that we
hear of them as receiving assistance from Syracuse, and that the
formidable name of Agathokles first comes before us—seemingly about
320 B. C.[925] The Syracusan force, sent to Italy to assist
the Krotoniates against their enemies the Bruttians, was commanded by
a general named Antander, whose brother Agathokles served with him in
a subordinate command.
[925] Diodor. xix. 3.
To pass over the birth and childhood of Agathokles—respecting which,
romantic anecdotes are told, as about most eminent men,—it appears
that his father, a Rhegine exile named Karkinus, came from Therma (in
the Carthaginian portion of Sicily) to settle at Syracuse, at the
time when Timoleon invited and received new Grecian settlers to the
citizenship of the latter city. Karkinus was in comparative poverty,
following the trade of a potter; which his son Agathokles learnt
also, being about eighteen years of age when domiciliated with his
father at Syracuse.[926] Though starting from this humble beginning,
and even notorious for the profligacy and rapacity of his youthful
habits, Agathokles soon attained a conspicuous position, partly
from his own superior personal qualities, partly from the favor of
a wealthy Syracusan named Damas. The young potter was handsome,
tall, and of gigantic strength; he performed with distinction the
military service required from him as a citizen, wearing a panoply
so heavy, that no other soldier could fight with it; he was moreover
ready, audacious, and emphatic in public harangue. Damas became much
attached to him, and not only supplied him profusely with money,
but also, when placed in command of a Syracusan army against the
Agrigentines, nominated him one of the subordinate officers. In this
capacity Agathokles acquired great reputation, for courage in battle,
ability in command, and fluency of speech. Presently Damas died of
sickness, leaving a widow without children. Agathokles married the
widow, and thus raised himself to a high fortune and position in
Syracuse.[927]
[926] Timæus apud Polybium, xii. 15; Diodor. xix. 2.
[927] Diodor. xix. 3; Justin, xxii. 1. Justin states the earliest
military exploits of Agathokles to have been against the Ætuæans,
not against the Agrigentines.
Of the oligarchy which now prevailed at Syracuse, we have no
particulars, nor do we know how it had come to be substituted
for the more popular forms established by Timoleon. We hear only
generally that the oligarchical leaders, Sosistratus and Herakleides,
were unprincipled and sanguinary men.[928] By this government an
expedition was despatched from Syracuse to the Italian coast, to
assist the inhabitants of Kroton against their aggressive neighbors
the Bruttians. Antander, brother of Agathokles, was one of the
generals commanding this armament, and Agathokles himself served in
it as a subordinate officer. We neither know the date, the duration,
nor the issue, of this expedition.
[928] Diodor. xix. 3, 4. Diodorus had written more about this
oligarchy in a part of his eighteenth book; which part is not
preserved: see Wesseling’s note.
But it afforded a fresh opportunity to Agathokles to display his
adventurous bravery and military genius, which procured for him
high encomium. He was supposed by some, on his return to Syracuse,
to be entitled to the first prize for valor; but Sosistratus and
the other oligarchical leaders withheld it from him and preferred
another. So deeply was Agathokles incensed by this refusal, that he
publicly inveighed against them among the people, as men aspiring to
despotism. His opposition being unsuccessful, and drawing upon him
the enmity of the government, he retired to the coast of Italy.
Here he levied a military band of Grecian exiles and Campanian
mercenaries, which he maintained by various enterprises for or
against the Grecian cities. He attacked Kroton, but was repulsed
with loss; he took service with the Tarentines, fought for some time
against their enemies, but at length became suspected and dismissed;
he then joined himself with the inhabitants of Rhegium, assisting
in the defence of the town against a Syracusan aggression. He even
made two attempts to obtain admission by force into Syracuse, and
to seize the government.[929] Though repulsed in both of them, he
nevertheless contrived to maintain a footing in Sicily, was appointed
general at the town of Morgantium, and captured Leontini, within a
short distance north of Syracuse. Some time afterwards, a revolution
took place at Syracuse, whereby Sosistratus and the oligarchy were
dispossessed and exiled with many of their partisans.
[929] Diodor. xix. 4; Justin, xxii. 1. “Bis occupare imperium
Syracusarum voluit; bis in exilium actus est.”
In the same manner, the Syracusan exile Hermokrates had attempted
to extort by force his return, at the head of 3000 men, and by
means of partisans within; he failed and was slain—B. C.
408 (Diodor. xiii. 75).
Under the new government, Agathokles obtained his recall, and soon
gained increased ascendency. The dispossessed exiles contrived to
raise forces, and to carry on a formidable war against Syracuse
from without; they even obtained assistance from the Carthaginians,
so as to establish themselves at Gela, on the southern confines of
the Syracusan territory. In the military operations thus rendered
necessary, Agathokles took a forward part, distinguishing himself
among the ablest and most enterprising officers. He tried, with 1000
soldiers, to surprise Gela by night; but finding the enemy on their
guard, he was repulsed with loss and severely wounded; yet by an able
manœuvre he brought off all his remaining detachment. Though thus
energetic against the public enemy, however, he at the same time
inspired both hatred and alarm for his dangerous designs, to the
Syracusans within. The Corinthian Akestorides, who had been named
general of the city—probably from recollection of the distinguished
services formerly rendered by the Corinthian Timoleon—becoming
persuaded that the presence of Agathokles was full of peril to the
city, ordered him to depart, and provided men to assassinate him on
the road during the night. But Agathokles, suspecting their design,
disguised himself in the garb of a beggar, appointing another man to
travel in the manner which would be naturally expected from himself.
This substitute was slain in the dark by the assassins, while
Agathokles escaped by favor of his disguise. He and his partisans
appear to have found shelter with the Carthaginians in Sicily.[930]
[930] Diodor. xix. 5, 6. A similar stratagem is recounted of the
Karian Datames (Cornelius Nepos, Datames, 9).
That Agathokles, on leaving Syracuse, went to the Carthaginians,
appears to be implied in the words of Diodorus, c. 6—τοὺς αὐτῷ
πρότερον συμπορευθέντας ~πρὸς~ Καρχηδονίους (see Wesseling’s
note on the translation of ~πρὸς~). This fact is noticed merely
incidentally, in the confused narrative of Diodorus; but it
brings him to a certain extent into harmony with Justin (xxii.
2), who insists much on the combination between Agathokles and
the Carthaginians, as one of the main helps whereby he was
enabled to seize the supreme power.
Not long afterwards, another change took place in the government
of Syracuse, whereby the oligarchical exiles were recalled, and
peace made with the Carthaginians. It appears that a senate of
600 was again installed as the chief political body; probably not
the same men as before, and with some democratical modifications.
At the same time, negotiations were opened, through the mediation
of the Carthaginian commander Hamilkar, between the Syracusans
and Agathokles. The mischiefs of intestine conflict, amidst the
numerous discordant parties in the city, pressed hard upon every one,
and hopes were entertained that all might be brought to agree in
terminating them. Agathokles affected to enter cordially into these
projects of amnesty and reconciliation. The Carthaginian general
Hamilkar, who had so recently aided Sosistratus and the Syracusan
oligarchy, now did his best to promote the recall of Agathokles,
and even made himself responsible for the good and pacific behavior
of that exile. Agathokles, and the other exiles along with him were
accordingly restored. A public assembly was convened in the temple of
Demeter, in the presence of Hamilkar; where Agathokles swore by the
most awful oaths, with his hands touching the altar and statue of the
goddess, that he would behave as a good citizen of Syracuse, uphold
faithfully the existing government, and carry out the engagements
of the Carthaginian mediators—abstaining from encroachments on
the rights and possessions of Carthage in Sicily. His oaths and
promises were delivered with so much apparent sincerity, accompanied
by emphatic harangues, that the people were persuaded to name him
general and guardian of the peace, for the purpose of realizing the
general aspirations towards harmony. Such appointment was recommended
(it seems) by Hamilkar.[931]
[931] The account here given is the best which I can make out
from Diodorus (xix. 5), Justin (xxii. 2),—Polyænus (v. 3, 8). The
first two allude to the solemn oath taken by Agathokles—παραχθεὶς
εἰς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὤμοσε μηδὲν
ἐναντιωθήσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ—“Tunc Hamilcari expositis ignibus
Cereris tactisque in obsequia Pœnorum jurat.” “Jurare in obsequia
Pœnorum” can hardly be taken to mean that Syracuse was to become
subject to Carthage; there was nothing antecedent to justify
such a proceeding, nor does anything follow in the sequel which
implies it.
Compare also the speech which Justin puts into the
mouth of Bomilkar when executed for treason by the
Carthaginians—“objectans illis (Carthaginiensibus) in Hamilcarem
patruum suum tacita suffragia, quod Agathoclem _sociam illis
facere, quam hostem, maluerit_” (xxii. 7). This points to
previous collusion between Hamilkar and Agathokles.
All this train of artifice had been concerted by Agathokles with
Hamilkar, for the purpose of enabling the former to seize the
supreme power. As general of the city, Agathokles had the direction
of the military force. Under the pretence of marching against some
refractory exiles at Erbita in the interior, he got together 3000
soldiers strenuously devoted to him—mercenaries and citizens of
desperate character—to which Hamilkar added a reinforcement of
Africans. As if about to march forth, he mustered his troops at
daybreak in the Timoleonteon (chapel or precinct consecrated to
Timoleon), while Peisarchus and Dekles, two chiefs of the senate
already assembled, were invited with forty others to transact with
him some closing business. Having these men in his power, Agathokles
suddenly turned upon them, and denounced them to the soldiers as
guilty of conspiring his death. Then, receiving from the soldiers a
response full of ardor, he ordered them immediately to proceed to a
general massacre of the senate and their leading partisans, with full
permission of licentious plunder in the houses of these victims, the
richest men in Syracuse. The soldiers rushed into the street with
ferocious joy to execute this order. They slew not only the senators,
but many others also, unarmed and unprepared; each man selecting
victims personally obnoxious to him. They broke open the doors of the
rich, or climbed over the roofs, massacred the proprietors within,
and ravished the females. They chased the unsuspecting fugitives
through the streets, not sparing even those who took refuge in the
temples. Many of these unfortunate sufferers rushed for safety to
the gates, but found them closed and guarded by special order of
Agathokles; so that they were obliged to let themselves down from the
walls, in which many perished miserably. For two days Syracuse was
thus a prey to the sanguinary, rapacious, and lustful impulses of the
soldiery; four thousand citizens had been already slain, and many
more were seized as prisoners. The political purposes of Agathokles,
as well as the passions of the soldiers, being then sated, he
arrested the massacre. He concluded this bloody feat by killing such
of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and banishing the
rest. The total number of expelled or fugitive Syracusans is stated
at 6000; who found a hospitable shelter and home at Agrigentum. One
act of lenity is mentioned, and ought not to be omitted amidst this
scene of horror. Deinokrates, one among the prisoners, was liberated
by Agathokles from motives of former friendship: he too, probably,
went into voluntary exile.[932]
[932] Diodor. xix. 8, 9; Justin, xxii. 2.
After a massacre thus perpetrated in the midst of profound peace,
and in the full confidence of a solemn act of mutual reconciliation
immediately preceding—surpassing the worst deeds of the elder
Dionysius, and indeed (we might almost say) of all other Grecian
despots—Agathokles convened what he called an assembly of the people.
Such of the citizens as were either oligarchical, or wealthy, or
in any way unfriendly to him, had been already either slain or
expelled; so that the assembly probably included few besides his own
soldiers: Agathokles, addressing them in terms of congratulation on
the recent glorious exploit, whereby they had purged the city of
its oligarchical tyrants—proclaimed that the Syracusan people had
now reconquered their full liberty. He affected to be weary of the
toils of command, and anxious only for a life of quiet equality as
one among the many; in token of which he threw off his general’s
cloak and put on a common civil garment. But those whom he addressed,
fresh from the recent massacre and plunder, felt that their whole
security depended upon the maintenance of his supremacy, and loudly
protested that they would not accept his resignation. Agathokles,
with pretended reluctance, told them, that if they insisted, he would
comply, but upon the peremptory condition of enjoying a single-handed
authority, without any colleagues or counsellors for whose misdeeds
he was to be responsible. The assembly replied by conferring upon
him, with unanimous acclamations, the post of general with unlimited
power, or despot.[933]
[933] Diodor. xix. 9.
Thus was constituted a new despot of Syracuse about fifty years
after the decease of the elder Dionysius, and twenty-two years after
Timoleon had rooted out the Dionysian dynasty, establishing on its
ruins a free polity. On accepting the post, Agathokles took pains
to proclaim that he would tolerate no farther massacre or plunder,
and that his government would for the future be mild and beneficent.
He particularly studied to conciliate the poorer citizens, to whom
he promised abolition of debts and a new distribution of lands. How
far he carried out this project systematically, we do not know; but
he conferred positive donations on many of the poor—which he had
abundant means of doing, out of the properties of the numerous exiles
recently expelled. He was full of promises to every one, displaying
courteous and popular manners, and abstaining from all ostentation
of guards, or ceremonial attendants, or a diadem. He at the same
time applied himself vigorously to strengthen his military and
naval force, his magazines of arms and stores, and his revenues. He
speedily extended his authority over all the territorial domain of
Syracuse, with her subject towns, and carried his arms successfully
over many other parts of Sicily.[934]
[934] Diodor. xix. 9.; Justin, xxii. 2.
The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, whose complicity or connivance
had helped Agathokles to this blood-stained elevation, appears to
have permitted him without opposition to extend his dominion over a
large portion of Sicily, and even to plunder the towns in alliance
with Carthage itself. Complaints having been made to Carthage, this
officer was superseded, and another general (also named Hamilkar) was
sent in his place. We are unable to trace in detail the proceedings
of Agathokles during the first years of his despotism; but he went on
enlarging his sway over the neighboring cities, while the Syracusan
exiles, whom he had expelled, found a home partly at Agrigentum
(under Deinokrates), partly at Messênê. About the year 314 B.
C., we hear that he made an attempt on Messênê, which he was on
the point of seizing, had he not been stopped by the interference of
the Carthaginians (perhaps the newly-appointed Hamilkar), who now
at length protested against his violation of the convention; meaning
(as we must presume, for we know of no other convention) the oath
which had been sworn by Agathokles at Syracuse under the guarantee
of the Carthaginians.[935] Though thus disappointed at Messênê,
Agathokles seized Abakænum—where he slew the leading citizens opposed
to him,—and carried on his aggressions elsewhere so effectively,
that the leaders at Agrigentum, instigated by the Syracusan exiles
there harbored, became convinced of the danger of leaving such
encroachments unresisted.[936] The people of Agrigentum came to the
resolution of taking up arms on behalf of the liberties of Sicily,
and allied themselves with Gela and Messênê for the purpose.
[935] Diodor. xix. 65. καθ᾽ ὃν δὴ χρόνον ἧκον ἐκ Καρχηδόνος
πρέσβεις, οἳ τῷ μὲν Ἀγαθοκλεῖ περὶ τῶν πραχθέντων ἐπετίμησαν,
ὡς παραβαίνοντι τὰς συνθήκας· τοῖς δὲ Μεσσηνίοις εἰρήνην
παρεσκεύασαν, καὶ τὸ φρούριον ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποκαταστῆσαι τὸν
τύραννον, ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Λιβύην.
I do not know what συνθῆκαι can be here meant, except that oath
described by Justin under the words “in obsequia Pœnorum jurat”
(xxii. 2).
[936] Diodor. xix. 70. μὴ περιορᾷν Ἀγαθοκλέα συσκευαζόμενον τὰς
πόλεις.
But the fearful example of Agathokles himself rendered them so
apprehensive of the dangers from any military leader, at once
native and energetic, that they resolved to invite a foreigner.
Some Syracusan exiles were sent to Sparta, to choose and invoke
some Spartan of eminence and ability, as Archidamus had recently
been called to Tarentum—and even more, as Timoleon had been brought
from Corinth, with results so signally beneficent. The old Spartan
king Kleomenes (of the Eurysthenid race) had a son Akrotatus, then
unpopular at home,[937] and well disposed towards foreign warfare.
This prince, without even consulting the Ephors, listened at once to
the envoys, and left Peloponnesus with a small squadron, intending to
cross by Korkyra and the coast of Italy to Agrigentum. Unfavorable
winds drove him as far north as Apollonia, and delayed his arrival
at Tarentum; in which city, originally a Spartan colony, he met with
a cordial reception, and obtained a vote of twenty vessels to assist
his enterprise of liberating Syracuse from Agathokles. He reached
Agrigentum with favorable hopes, was received with all the honors
due to a Spartan prince, and undertook the command. Bitterly did he
disappoint his party. He was incompetent as a general; he dissipated
in presents or luxuries the money intended for the campaign,
emulating Asiatic despots; his conduct was arrogant, tyrannical,
and even sanguinary. The disgust which he inspired was brought to
a height, when he caused Sosistratus, the leader of the Syracusan
exiles, to be assassinated at a banquet. Immediately the exiles rose
in a body to avenge this murder; while Akrotatus, deposed by the
Agrigentines, only found safety in flight.[938]
[937] Diodor. xix. 70. After the defeat of Agis by Antipater,
the severe Lacedæmonian laws against those who fled from battle
had been suspended for the occasion; as had been done before,
after the defeat of Leuktra. Akrotatus had been the _only_ person
(μόνος) who opposed this suspension; whereby he incurred the most
violent odium generally, but most especially from the citizens
who profited by the suspension. These men carried their hatred
so far, that they even attacked, beat him and conspired against
his life (οὗτοι γὰρ συστραφέντες πληγάς τε ἐνεφόρησαν αὐτῷ καὶ
διετέλουν ἐπιβουλεύοντες).
This is a curious indication of Spartan manners.
[938] Diodor. xix. 71.
To this young Spartan prince, had he possessed a noble heart and
energetic qualities, there was here presented a career of equal
grandeur with that of Timoleon—against an enemy able indeed and
formidable, yet not so superior in force as to render success
impossible. It is melancholy to see Akrotatus, from simple
worthlessness of character, throwing away such an opportunity; at
a time when Sicily was the only soil on which a glorious Hellenic
career was still open—when no similar exploits were practicable
by any Hellenic leader in Central Greece, from the overwhelming
superiority of force possessed by the surrounding kings.
The misconduct of Akrotatus broke up all hopes of active operations
against Agathokles. Peace was presently concluded with the latter
by the Agrigentines and their allies, under the mediation of the
Carthaginian general Hamilkar. By the terms of this convention,
all the Greek cities in Sicily were declared autonomous, yet under
the hegemony of Agathokles; excepting only Himera, Selinus, and
Herakleia, which were actually, and were declared still to continue,
under Carthage. Messênê was the only Grecian city standing aloof
from this convention; as such, therefore still remaining open to the
Syracusan exiles. The terms were so favorable to Agathokles, that
they were much disapproved at Carthage.[939] Agathokles, recognized
as chief and having no enemy in the field, employed himself actively
in strengthening his hold on the other cities, and in enlarging his
military means at home. He sent a force against Messênê, to require
the expulsion of the Syracusan exiles from that city, and to procure
at the same time the recall of the Messenian exiles, partisans of
his own, and companions of his army. His generals extorted these two
points from the Messenians. Agathokles, having thus broken the force
of Messênê, secured to himself the town still more completely, by
sending for those Messenian citizens who had chiefly opposed him,
and putting them all to death, as well as his leading opponents
at Tauromenium. The number thus massacred was not less than six
hundred.[940]
[939] Diodor. xix. 71, 72, 102. When the convention specifies
Herakleia, Selinus, and Himera, as being under the Carthaginians,
this is to be understood as in addition to the primitive
Carthaginian settlements of Solus, Panormus, Lilybæum, etc.,
about which no question could arise.
[940] Diodor. xix. 72: compare a different narrative—Polyænus, v.
15.
It only remained for Agathokles to seize Agrigentum. Thither he
accordingly marched. But Deinokrates and the Syracusan exiles,
expelled from Messênê, had made themselves heard at Carthage,
insisting on the perils to that city from the encroachments of
Agathokles. The Carthaginians alarmed sent a fleet of sixty sail,
whereby alone Agrigentum, already under siege by Agathokles, was
preserved. The recent convention was now broken on all sides,
and Agathokles kept no farther measures with the Carthaginians.
He ravaged all their Sicilian territory, and destroyed some of
their forts; while the Carthaginians on their side made a sudden
descent with their fleet on the harbor of Syracuse. They could
achieve nothing more, however, than the capture of one Athenian
merchant-vessel, out of two there riding. They disgraced their
acquisition by the cruel act (not uncommon in Carthaginian warfare)
of cutting of the hands of the captive crew; for which, in a few
days, retaliation was exercised upon the crews of some of their own
ships, taken by the cruisers of Agathokles.[941]
[941] Diodor. xix. 103. It must be noticed, however, that even
Julius Cæsar, in his wars in Gaul, sometimes cut off the hands of
his Gallic prisoners taken in arms, whom he called rebels (Bell.
Gall. viii. 44).
The defence of Agrigentum now rested principally on the Carthaginians
in Sicily, who took up a position on the hill called Eknomus—in
the territory of Gela, a little to the west of the Agrigentine
border. Here Agathokles approached to offer them battle—having been
emboldened by two important successes obtained over Deinokrates and
the Syracusan exiles, near Kentoripa and Gallaria.[942] So superior
was his force, however, that the Carthaginians thought it prudent to
remain in their camp; and Agathokles returned in triumph to Syracuse,
where he adorned the temples with his recently acquired spoils. The
balance of force was soon altered by the despatch of a large armament
from Carthage under Hamilkar, consisting of 130 ships of war, with
numerous other transport ships, carrying many soldiers—2000 native
Carthaginians, partly men of rank—10,000 Africans—1000 Campanian
heavy-armed and 1000 Balearic slingers. The fleet underwent in its
passage so terrific a storm, that many of the vessels sunk with all
on board, and it arrived with very diminished numbers in Sicily.
The loss fell upon the native Carthaginian soldiers with peculiar
severity; insomuch that when the news reached Carthage, a public
mourning was proclaimed, and the city walls were hung with black
serge.
[942] Diodor. xix. 103, 104.
Those who reached Sicily, however, were quite sufficient to place
Hamilkar in an imposing superiority of number as compared with
Agathokles. He encamped on or near Eknomus, summoned all the
reinforcements that his Sicilian allies could furnish, and collected
additional mercenaries; so that he was soon at the head of 40,000
infantry and 5000 cavalry.[943] At the same time, a Carthaginian
armed squadron, detached to the strait of Messênê, fell in with
twenty armed ships belonging to Agathokles, and captured them all
with their crews. The Sicilian cities were held to Agathokles
principally by terror, and were likely to turn against him, if the
Carthaginians exhibited sufficient strength to protect them. This the
despot knew and dreaded; especially respecting Gela, which was not
far from the Carthaginian camp. Had he announced himself openly as
intending to place a garrison in Gela, he feared that the citizens
might forestall him by calling in Hamilkar. Accordingly he detached
thither, on various pretences, several small parties of soldiers, who
presently found themselves united in a number sufficient to seize
the town. Agathokles then marched into Gela with his main force.
Distrusting the adherence of the citizens, he let loose his soldiers
upon them, massacred four thousand persons, and compelled the
remainder, as a condition of sparing their lives, to bring in to him
all their money and valuables. Having by this atrocity both struck
universal terror and enriched himself, he advanced onward towards
the Carthaginian camp, and occupied a hill called Phalarion opposite
to it.[944] The two camps were separated by a level plain or valley
nearly five miles broad, through which ran the river Himera.[945]
[943] Diodor. xix. 106.
[944] Diodor. xix. 107, 108.
[945] Diodor. xix. 108, 109.
For some days of the hottest season (the dog-days), both armies
remained stationary, neither of them choosing to make the attack. At
length Agathokles gained what he thought a favorable opportunity.
A detachment from the Carthaginian camp sallied forth in pursuit
of some Grecian plunderers; Agathokles posted some men in ambush,
who fell upon this detachment unawares, threw it into disorder, and
pursued it back to the camp. Following up this partial success,
Agathokles brought forward his whole force, crossed the river Himera,
and began a general attack. This advance not being expected, the
Grecian assailants seemed at first on the point of succeeding.
They filled up a portion of the ditch, tore up the Stockade, and
were forcing their way into the camp. They were however repulsed
by redoubled efforts, and new troops coming up, on the part of the
defenders; mainly, too, by the very effective action of the 1000
Balearic slingers in Hamilkar’s army, who hurled stones weighing
a pound each, against which the Grecian armor was an inadequate
defence. Still Agathokles, noway discouraged, caused the attack to be
renewed on several points at once and with apparent success, when
a reinforcement landed from Carthage—the expectation of which may
perhaps have induced Hamilkar to refrain from any general attack.
These new troops joined in the battle, coming upon the rear of the
Greeks; who were intimidated and disordered by such unforeseen
assailants, while the Carthaginians in their front, animated to more
energetic effort, first repulsed them from the camp, and then pressed
them vigorously back. After holding their ground for some time
against their double enemy, the Greeks at length fled in disorder
back to their own camp, recrossing the river Himera. The interval
was between four and five miles of nearly level ground, over which
they were actively pursued and severely handled by the Carthaginian
cavalry, 5000 in number. Moreover, in crossing the river, many
of them drank eagerly, from thirst, fatigue, and the heat of the
weather; the saltness of the water proved so destructive to them,
that numerous dead bodies are said to have been found unwounded on
the banks.[946] At length they obtained shelter in their own camp,
after a loss of 7000 men; while the loss of the victors is estimated
at 500.
[946] Diodor. xix. 109.
Agathokles, after this great disaster, did not attempt to maintain
his camp, but set it on fire, and returned to Gela; which was well
fortified and provisioned, capable of a long defence. Here he
intended to maintain himself against Hamilkar, at least until the
Syracusan harvest (probably already begun) should be completed. But
Hamilkar, having ascertained the strength of Gela, thought it prudent
to refrain from a siege, and employed himself in operations for the
purpose of strengthening his party in Sicily. His great victory
at the Himera had produced the strongest effect upon many of the
Sicilian cities, who were held to Agathokles by no other bonds except
those of fear. Hamilkar issued conciliatory proclamations, inviting
them all to become his allies, and marching his troops towards
the most convenient points. Presently Kamarina, Leontini, Katana,
Tauromenium, Messênê, Abakænum, with several other smaller towns
and forts, sent to tender themselves as allies; and the conduct of
Hamilkar towards all was so mild and equitable, as to give universal
satisfaction. Agathokles appears to have been thus dispossessed of
most part of the island, retaining little besides Gela and Syracuse.
Even the harbor of Syracuse was watched by a Carthaginian fleet,
placed to intercept foreign supplies. Returning to Syracuse after
Hamilkar had renounced all attempts on Gela, Agathokles collected
the corn from the neighborhood, and put the fortifications in the
best state of defence. He had every reason to feel assured that the
Carthaginians, encouraged by their recent success, and reinforced by
allies from the whole island, would soon press the siege of Syracuse
with all their energy; while for himself, hated by all, there was
no hope of extraneous support, and little hope of a successful
defence.[947]
[947] Diodor. xix. 110.
In this apparently desperate situation, he conceived the idea of a
novelty alike daring, ingenious, and effective; surrounded indeed
with difficulties in the execution, but promising, if successfully
executed, to change altogether the prospects of the war.
He resolved to carry a force across from Syracuse to Africa, and
attack the Carthaginians on their own soil. No Greek, so far as we
know, had ever conceived the like scheme before; no one certainly
had ever executed it. In the memory of man, the African territory of
Carthage had never been visited by hostile foot. It was known that
the Carthaginians would be not only unprepared to meet an attack at
home, but unable even to imagine it as practicable. It was known
that their territory was rich, and their African subjects harshly
treated, discontented, and likely to seize the first opportunity
for revolting. The landing of any hostile force near Carthage
would strike such a blow, as at least to cause the recall of the
Carthaginian armament in Sicily, and thus relieve Syracuse; perhaps
the consequences of it might be yet greater.
How to execute the scheme was the grand difficulty—for the
Carthaginians were superior not merely on land, but also at sea.
Agathokles had no chance except by keeping his purpose secret, and
even unsuspected. He fitted out an armament, announced as about to
sail forth from Syracuse on a secret expedition, against some unknown
town on the Sicilian coast. He selected for this purpose his best
troops, especially his horsemen, few of whom had been slain at the
battle of the Himera; he could not transport horses, but he put
the horsemen aboard with their saddles and bridles, entertaining
full assurance that he could procure horses in Africa. In selecting
soldiers for his expedition, he was careful to take one member from
many different families, to serve as hostage for the fidelity of
those left behind. He liberated, and enrolled among his soldiers,
many of the strongest and most resolute slaves. To provide the
requisite funds, his expedients were manifold; he borrowed from
merchants, seized the money belonging to orphans, stripped the
women of their precious ornaments, and even plundered the richest
temples. By all these proceedings, the hatred as well as fear towards
him was aggravated, especially among the more opulent families.
Agathokles publicly proclaimed, that the siege of Syracuse, which the
Carthaginians were now commencing, would be long and terrible—that
he and his soldiers were accustomed to hardships and could endure
them, but that those, who felt themselves unequal to the effort,
might retire with their properties while it was yet time. Many of
the wealthier families—to a number stated as 1600 persons—profited
by this permission; but as they were leaving the city, Agathokles
set his mercenaries upon them, slew them all, and appropriated their
possessions to himself.[948] By such tricks and enormities, he
provided funds enough for an armament of sixty ships, well filled
with soldiers. Not one of these soldiers knew where they were
going; there was a general talk about the madness of Agathokles;
nevertheless such was their confidence in his bravery and military
resource, that they obeyed his orders without asking questions. To
act as viceroy of Syracuse during his own absence, Agathokles named
Antander his brother, aided by an Ætolian officer named Erymnon.[949]
[948] Diodor. xx. 4, 5; Justin, xxii. 4. Compare Polyænus, 3-5.
[949] Diodor. xx. 4-16.
The armament was equipped and ready, without any suspicion on the
part of the Carthaginian fleet blockading the harbor. It happened
one day that the approach of some corn-ships seduced this fleet
into a pursuit; the mouth of the harbor being thus left unguarded,
Agathokles took the opportunity of striking with his armament into
the open sea. As soon as the Carthaginian fleet saw him sailing
forth, they neglected the corn-ships, and prepared for battle,
which they presumed that he was come to offer. To their surprise,
he stood out to sea as fast as he could; they then pushed out in
pursuit of him, but he had already got a considerable advance and
strove to keep it. Towards nightfall however they neared him so much,
that he was only saved by the darkness. During the night he made
considerable way; but on the next day there occurred an eclipse of
the sun so nearly total, that it became perfectly dark, and the stars
were visible. The mariners were so terrified at this phenomenon,
that all the artifice and ascendency of Agathokles were required to
inspire them with new courage. At length, after six days and nights,
they approached the coast of Africa. The Carthaginian ships had
pursued them at a venture, in the direction towards Africa; and they
appeared in sight, just as Agathokles was nearing the land. Strenuous
efforts were employed by the mariners on both sides to touch land
first; Agathokles secured that advantage, and was enabled to put
himself into such a posture of defence that he repulsed the attack
of the Carthaginian ships, and secured the disembarcation of his own
soldiers, at a point called the Latomiæ or Stone quarries.[950]
[950] Diodor. xx. 6. Procopius, Bell. Vand. i. 15. It is here
stated, that for nine days’ march eastward from Carthage, as far
as Juka, the land is παντελῶς ἀλίμενος.
After establishing his position ashore, and refreshing his soldiers,
the first proceeding of Agathokles was to burn his vessels; a
proceeding which seemed to carry an air of desperate boldness. Yet
in truth the ships were now useless—for, if he was unsuccessful on
land, they were not enough to enable him to return in the face of
the Carthaginian fleet; they were even worse than useless, since, if
he retained them, it was requisite that he should leave a portion of
his army to guard them, and thus enfeeble his means of action for
the really important achievements on land. Convening his soldiers
in assembly near the ships, he first offered a sacrifice to Demeter
and Persephonê—the patron goddesses of Sicily, and of Syracuse in
particular. He then apprised his soldiers, that during the recent
crossing and danger from the Carthaginian pursuers, he had addressed
a vow to these goddesses—engaging to make a burnt-offering of his
ships in their honor, if they would preserve him safe across to
Africa. The goddesses had granted this boon; they had farther, by
favorably responding to the sacrifice just offered, promised full
success to his African projects: it became therefore incumbent on
him to fulfil his vow with exactness. Torches being new brought,
Agathokles took one in his hand, and mounted on the stern of the
admiral’s ship, directing each of the trierarchs to do the like on
his own ship. All were set on fire simultaneously, amidst the sound
of trumpets, and the mingled prayers and shouts of the soldiers.[951]
[951] This striking scene is described by Diodorus, xx. 7
(compare Justin, xxii. 6), probably enough copied from Kallias,
the companion and panegyrist of Agathokles: see Diodor. xxi.
Fragm. p. 281.
Though Agathokles had succeeded in animating his soldiers with a
factitious excitement, for the accomplishment of this purpose, yet
so soon as they saw the conflagration decided and irrevocable, thus
cutting off all their communication with home—their spirits fell,
and they began to despair of their prospects. Without allowing
them time to dwell upon the novelty of the situation, Agathokles
conducted them at once against the nearest Carthaginian town, called
Megalê-Polis.[952] His march lay for the most part through a rich
territory in the highest cultivation. The passing glance which we
thus obtain into the condition of the territory near Carthage is
of peculiar interest; more especially when contrasted with the
desolation of the same coast, now and for centuries past. The
corn-land, the plantations both of vines and olives, the extensive
and well-stocked gardens, the size and equipment of the farm
buildings, the large outlay for artificial irrigation, the agreeable
country-houses belonging to wealthy Carthaginians, etc., all excited
the astonishment, and stimulated the cupidity, of Agathokles and his
soldiers. Moreover, the towns were not only very numerous, but all
open and unfortified, except Carthage itself and a few others on the
coast.[953]
[952] Megalê-Polis is nowhere else mentioned—nor is it noticed
by Forbiger in his list of towns in the Carthaginian territory
(Handbuch der Alten Geographie, sect. 109).
Dr. Barth (Wanderungen auf den Küsten Ländern des Mittelmeeres,
vol. i. p. 131-133) supposes that Agathokles landed at an
indentation of the coast on the western face of that projecting
tongue of land which terminates in Cape Bon (Promontorium
Mercurii), forming the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Carthage.
There are stone quarries here, of the greatest extent as well as
antiquity. Dr. Barth places Megalê-Polis not far off from this
spot, on the same western face of the projecting land, and near
the spot afterwards called Misua.
[953] Justin, xxii. 5. “Huc accedere, quod urbes castellaque
Africæ non muris cinctæ, non in montibus positæ sint: sed in
planis campis sine ullis munimentis jaceant: quas omnes metu
excidii facile ad belli societatem perlici posse.”
The Carthaginians, besides having little fear of invasion by sea,
were disposed to mistrust their subject cities, which they ruled
habitually with harshness and oppression.[954] The Liby-Phenicians
appear to have been unused to arms—a race of timid cultivators and
traffickers, accustomed to subjection and practised in the deceit
necessary for lightening it.[955] Agathokles, having marched through
this land of abundance, assaulted Megalêpolis without delay. The
inhabitants, unprepared for attack, distracted with surprise and
terror, made little resistance. Agathokles easily took the town,
abandoning both the persons of the inhabitants and all the rich
property within, to his soldiers; who enriched themselves with a
prodigious booty both from town and country—furniture, cattle, and
slaves. From hence he advanced farther southward to the town called
Tunês (the modern Tunis, at the distance of only fourteen miles
south-west of Carthage itself), which he took by storm in like
manner. He fortified Tunês as a permanent position; but he kept his
main force united in camp, knowing well that he should presently have
an imposing army against him in the field, and severe battles to
fight.[956]
[954] Seven centuries and more after these events, we read that
the Vandal king Genseric conquered Africa from the Romans—and
that he demolished the fortifications of all the other towns
except Carthage alone—from the like feeling of mistrust. This
demolition materially facilitated the conquest of the Vandal
kingdom by Belisarius, two generations afterwards (Procopius,
Bell. Vandal. i. 5; i. 15).
[955] Livy (xxix. 25), in recounting the landing of Scipio in
the Carthaginian territory in the latter years of the second
Punic war, says, “Emporia ut peterent, gubernatoribus edixit.
Fertilissimus ager, eoque abundans omnium copiâ rerum est regio,
et imbelles (quod plerumque in uberi agro evenit) barbari sunt:
priusque quam Carthagine subveniretur, opprimi videbantur posse.”
About the harshness of the Carthaginian rule over their African
subjects, see Diodor. xv. 77; Polyb. i. 72. In reference to
the above passage of Polybius, however, we ought to keep in
mind—That in describing this harshness, he speaks with _express
and exclusive reference_ to the conduct of the Carthaginians
towards their subjects during the first Punic war (against Rome),
when the Carthaginians themselves were hard pressed by the
Romans and required everything that they could lay hands upon
for self-defence. This passage of Polybius has been sometimes
cited as if it attested the _ordinary_ character and measure of
Carthaginian dominion; which is contrary to the intention of the
author.
[956] Diodor. xx. 8. Compare Polybius, i. 29, where he describes
the first invasion of the Carthaginian territory by the Roman
consul Regulus. Tunês was 120 stadia or about fourteen miles
south-east of Carthage (Polyb. i. 67). The Tab. Peuting. reckons
it only ten miles. It was made the central place for hostile
operations against Carthage both by Regulus in the first Punic
war (Polyb. i. 30),—by Matho and Spendius, in the rebellion of
the mercenary soldiers and native Africans against Carthage,
which followed on the close of the first Punic war (Polyb. i.
73)—and by the revolted Libyans in 396 B. C. (Diodor.
xiv. 77).
Diodorus places Tunês at the distance of 2000 stadia from
Carthage, which must undoubtedly be a mistake. He calls it _White
Tunês_; an epithet drawn from the chalk cliffs adjoining.
The Carthaginian fleet had pursued Agathokles during his crossing
from Syracuse, in perfect ignorance of his plans. When he landed
in Africa, on their own territory, and even burnt his fleet, they
at first flattered themselves with the belief that they held him
prisoner. But as soon as they saw him commence his march in military
array against Megalêpolis, they divined his real purposes, and were
filled with apprehension. Carrying off the brazen prow-ornaments of
his burnt and abandoned ships, they made sail for Carthage, sending
forward a swift vessel to communicate first what had occurred.
Before this vessel arrived, however, the landing of Agathokles had
been already made known at Carthage, where it excited the utmost
surprise and consternation; since no one supposed that he could have
accomplished such an adventure without having previously destroyed
the Carthaginian army and fleet in Sicily. From this extreme dismay
they were presently relieved by the arrival of the messengers from
their fleet; whereby they learnt the real state of affairs in
Sicily. They now made the best preparations in their power to resist
Agathokles. Hanno and Bomilkar, two men of leading families, were
named generals conjointly. They were bitter political rivals,—but
this very rivalry was by some construed as an advantage, since each
would serve as a check upon the other and as a guarantee to the
state; or, what is more probable, each had a party sufficiently
strong to prevent the separate election of the other.[957] These two
generals, unable to wait for distant succors, led out the native
forces of the city, stated at 40,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, derived
altogether from citizens and residents—with 2000 war-chariots. They
took post on an eminence (somewhere between Tunis and Carthage) not
far from Agathokles; Bomilkar commanding on the left, where the
ground was so difficult that he was unable to extend his front, and
was obliged to admit an unusual depth of files; while Hanno was on
the right, having in his front rank the Sacred Band of Carthage, a
corps of 2500 distinguished citizens, better armed and braver than
the rest. So much did the Carthaginians outnumber the invaders—and
so confident were they of victory—that they carried with them 20,000
pairs of handcuffs for their anticipated prisoners.[958]
[957] Diodor. xx. 10.
[958] Diodor. xx. 10-13. See, respecting the Sacred Band of
Carthage (which was nearly cut to pieces by Timoleon at the
battle of the Krimesus), Diodor. xvi. 80, 81; also Vol. XI. of
this History, Chap. lxxxv. p. 171-177.
The amount of native or citizen-force given here by Diodorus
(40,000 foot and 1000 horse) seems very great. Our data for
appreciating it however are lamentably scanty; and we ought to
expect a large total. The population of Carthage is said to have
been 700,000 souls; even when it was besieged by the Romans in
the third Punic war, and when its power was prodigiously lessened
(Strabo, xvii. p. 833). Its military magazines, even in that
reduced condition, were enormous,—as they stood immediately
previous to their being given up to the Romans, under the
treacherous delusions held out by Rome.
Agathokles placed himself on the left, with 1000 chosen hoplites
round him, to combat the Sacred Band; the command of his right he
gave to his son Archagathus. His troops—Syracusans, miscellaneous
mercenary Greeks, Campanians or Samnites, Tuscans, and Gauls—scarcely
equalled in numbers one-half of the enemy. Some of the ships’ crews
were even without arms,—a deficiency, which Agathokles could only
supply in appearance, by giving to them the leather cases or wrappers
of shields, stretched out upon sticks. The outstretched wrappers thus
exhibited looked from a distance like shields; so that these men,
stationed in the rear, had the appearance of a reserve of hoplites.
As the soldiers however were still discouraged, Agathokles tried to
hearten them up by another device yet more singular, for which indeed
he must have made deliberate provision beforehand. In various parts
of the camp, he let fly a number of owls, which perched upon the
shields and helmets of the soldiers. These birds, the favorite of
Athênê, were supposed and generally asserted to promise victory; the
minds of the soldiers are reported to have been much reassured by the
sight.
The Carthaginian war-chariots and cavalry, which charged first, made
little or no impression; but the infantry of their right pressed the
Greeks seriously. Especially Hanno, with the Sacred Band around him,
behaved with the utmost bravery and forwardness, and seemed to be
gaining advantage, when he was unfortunately slain. His death not
only discouraged his own troops, but became fatal to the army, by
giving opportunity for treason to his colleague Bomilkar. This man
had long secretly meditated the project of rendering himself despot
of Carthage. As a means of attaining that end, he deliberately sought
to bring reverses upon her; and no sooner had he heard of Hanno’s
death, than he gave orders for his own wing to retreat. The Sacred
Band, though fighting with unshaken valor, were left unsupported,
attacked in rear as well as front, and compelled to give way along
with the rest. The whole Carthaginian army was defeated and driven
back to Carthage. Their camp fell into the hands of Agathokles, who
found among their baggage the very handcuffs which they had brought
for fettering their expected captives.[959]
[959] Diodor. xx. 12. The loss of the Carthaginians was
differently given—some authors stated it at 1000 men—others at
6000. The loss in the army of Agathokles was stated at 200 men.
This victory made Agathokles for the time master of the open country.
He transmitted the news to Sicily, by a boat of thirty oars,
constructed expressly for the purpose—since he had no ships of his
own remaining. Having fortified Tunês and established it as his
central position, he commenced operations along the eastern coast
(Zeugitana and Byzakium, as the northern and southern portions of
it were afterwards denominated by the Romans) against the towns
dependent on Carthage.[960]
[960] Diodor. xx. 17.
In that city, meanwhile, all was terror and despondency in
consequence of the recent defeat. It was well known that the African
subjects generally entertained nothing but fear and hatred towards
the reigning city. Neither the native Libyans or Africans,—nor the
mixed race called Liby-Phœnicians, who inhabited the towns[961]—could
be depended on if their services were really needed. The distress of
the Carthaginians took the form of religious fears and repentance.
They looked back with remorse on the impiety of their past lives, and
on their omissions of duty towards the gods. To the Tyrian Herakles,
they had been slack in transmitting the dues and presents required
by their religion; a backwardness which they now endeavored to make
up by sending envoys to Tyre, with prayers and supplications, with
rich presents, and especially with models in gold and silver of
their sacred temples and shrines. Towards Kronus, or Moloch, they
also felt that they had conducted themselves sinfully. The worship
acceptable to that god required the sacrifice of young children,
born of free and opulent parents, and even the choice child of the
family. But it was now found out, on investigation, that many parents
had recently put a fraud upon the god, by surreptitiously buying
poor children, feeding them well, and then sacrificing them as their
own. This discovery seemed at once to explain why Kronus had become
offended, and what had brought upon them the recent defeat. They
made an emphatic atonement, by selecting 200 children from the most
illustrious families in Carthage, and offering them up to Kronus
at a great public sacrifice; besides which, 300 parents, finding
themselves denounced for similar omissions in the past, displayed
their repentance by voluntarily immolating their own children for
the public safety. The statue of Kronus,—placed with outstretched
hands to receive the victim tendered to him, with fire immediately
underneath—was fed on that solemnity certainly with 200, and probably
with 500, living children.[962] By this monstrous holocaust the full
religious duty being discharged, and forgiveness obtained from the
god, the mental distress of the Carthaginians was healed.
[961] Diodor. xx. 55.
[962] Diodor. xx. 14. ᾐτιῶντο δὲ καὶ τὸν Κρόνον αὑτοῖς
ἐναντιοῦσθαι, καθόσον ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις θύοντες τούτῳ
τῷ θεῷ τῶν υἱῶν τοὺς κρατίστους, ὕστερον ὠνούμενοι λάθρα παῖδας
καὶ θρέψαντες ἔπεμπον ἐπὶ τὴν θυσίαν· καὶ ζητήσεως γενομένης,
εὑρέθησάν τινες τῶν καθιερουργημένων ὑποβολιμαῖοι γεγονότες·
τούτων δὲ λαβόντες ἔννοιαν, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς τείχεσιν
ὁρῶντες στρατοπεδεύοντας, ἐδεισιδαιμόνουν ὡς καταλελυκότες τὰς
πατρίους τῶν θεῶν τιμάς· διορθώσασθαι δὲ τὰς ἀγνοίας σπεύδοντες,
διακοσίους μὲν τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παίδων προκρίναντες ἔθυσαν
δημοσίᾳ· ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἐν διαβολαῖς ὄντες, ἑκουσίως ἑαυτοὺς ἔδοσαν,
οὐκ ἐλάττους ὄντες τριακοσίων· ἦν δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀνδριὰς Κρόνου
χαλκοῦς, ἐκτετακὼς τὰς χεῖρας ὑπτίας ἐγκεκλιμένας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν,
ὥστε τὸν ἐπιτεθέντα τῶν παίδων ἀποκυλίεσθαι καὶ πίπτειν εἴς τι
χάσμα πλῆρες πυρός. Compare Festus ap. Lactantium, Inst. Div. i.
21; Justin, xviii. 6, 12.
In this remarkable passage (the more remarkable because so little
information concerning Carthaginian antiquity has reached us),
one clause is not perfectly clear, respecting the three hundred
who are said to have voluntarily _given themselves up_. Diodorus
means (I apprehend) as Eusebius understood it, that these were
fathers who gave up _their children_ (not themselves) to be
sacrificed. The victims here mentioned as sacrificed to Kronus
were children, not adults (compare Diodor. xiii. 86): nothing
is here said about adult victims. Wesseling in his note adheres
to the literal meaning of the words, dissenting from Eusebius:
but I think that the literal meaning is less in harmony with the
general tenor of the paragraph. Instances of self-devotion, by
persons torn with remorse, are indeed mentioned: see the case of
Imilkon, Diodor. xiv. 76; Justin, xix. 3.
We read in the Fragment of Ennius—“Pœni sunt soliti suos
sacrificare puellos:” see the chapter iv. of Münter’s work,
Religion der Karthager, on this subject.
Having thus relieved their consciences on the score of religious
obligation, the Carthaginians despatched envoys to Hamilkar in
Sicily, acquainting him with the recent calamity, desiring him
to send a reinforcement, and transmitting to him the brazen prow
ornaments taken from the ships of Agathokles. They at the same time
equipped a fresh army, with which they marched forth to attack
Tunês. Agathokles had fortified that town, and established a strong
camp before it; but he had withdrawn his main force to prosecute
operations against the maritime towns on the eastern coast of the
territory of Carthage. Among these towns, he first attacked Neapolis
with success, granting to the inhabitants favorable terms. He then
advanced farther southwards towards Adrumetum, of which he commenced
the siege, with the assistance of a neighboring Libyan prince named
Elymas, who now joined him. While Agathokles was engaged in the siege
of Adrumetum, the Carthaginians attacked his position at Tunês, drove
his soldiers out of the fortified camp into the town, and began to
batter the defences of the town itself. Apprised of this danger
while besieging Adrumetum, but nevertheless reluctant to raise the
siege,—Agathokles left his main army before it, stole away with
only a few soldiers and some camp-followers, and conducting them to
an elevated spot—halfway between Adrumetum and Tunês, yet visible
from both—he caused them to kindle at night upon this eminence a
prodigious number of fires.[963] The effect, of these fires, seen
from Adrumetum on one side and from Tunês on the other, was, to
produce the utmost terror at both places. The Carthaginians besieging
Tunês fancied that Agathokles with his whole army was coming to
attack them, and forthwith abandoned the siege in disorder, leaving
their engines behind. The defenders of Adrumetum, interpreting these
fires as evidence of a large reinforcement on its way to join the
besieging army, were so discouraged that they surrendered the town on
capitulation.[964]
[963] Diodor. xx. 17. λάθρα προσῆλθεν ἐπί τινα τόπον ὀρεινὸν,
ὅθεν ~ὁρᾶσθαι δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀδρυμητινῶν καὶ τῶν
Καρχηδονίων τῶν Τύνητα πολιορκούντων~· νυκτὸς δὲ συντάξας τοῖς
στρατιώταις ἐπὶ πολὺν τόπον πυρὰ καίειν, δόξαν ἐν εποίησε,
τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς μετὰ μεγάλης δυνάμεως ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς
πορευόμενος, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκουμένοις, ὡς ἄλλης δυνάμεως ἁδρᾶς
τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς συμμαχίαν παραγεγενημένης.
[964] Diodor. xx. 17. The incident here recounted by Diodorus
is curious, but quite distinct and intelligible. He had good
authorities before him in his history of Agathokles. If true,
it affords an evidence for determining, within some limits, the
site of the ancient Adrumetum, which Mannert and Shaw place at
Herkla— while Forbiger and Dr. Barth put it near the site of the
modern port called Susa, still more to the southward, and at a
prodigious distance from Tunis. Other anthem have placed it at
Hamamat, more to the northward than Herkla, and nearer to Tunis.
Of these three sites, Hamamat is the only one which will consist
with the narrative of Diodorus. Both the others are too distant.
Hamamat is about forty-eight English miles from Tunis (see Barth,
p. 184, with his note). This is as great a distance (if not too
great) as can possibly be admitted; both Herkla and Susa are very
much more distant, and therefore out of the question.
Nevertheless, the other evidence known to us tends apparently
to place Adrumetum at Susa, and not at Hamamat (see Barth, p.
142-154; Forbiger, Handb. Geog. p. 845). It is therefore probable
that the narrative of Diodorus is not true, or must apply to some
other place on the coast (possibly Neapolis, the modern Nabel)
taken by Agathokles, and not to Adrumetum.
By this same stratagem—if the narrative can be trusted—Agathokles
both relieved Tunês, and acquired possession of Adrumetum. Pushing
his conquests yet farther south, he besieged and took Thapsus,
with several other towns on the coast to a considerable distance
southward.[965] He also occupied and fortified the important position
called Aspis, on the south-east of the headland Cape Bon, and not far
distant from it; a point convenient for maritime communication with
Sicily.[966]
[965] Diodor. xx. 17.
[966] Strabo, xvii. p. 834. Solinus (c. 30) talks of Aspis as
founded by the _Siculi_. Aspis (called by the Romans Clypea),
being on the eastern side of Cape Bon, was more convenient for
communication with Sicily than either Carthage, or Tunis, or
any part of the Gulf of Carthage, which was on the western side
of Cape Bon. To get round that headland is, even at the present
day, a difficult and uncertain enterprise for navigators: see
the remarks of Dr. Barth, founded partly on his own personal
experience (Wanderungen auf den Küstenländern des Mittelmeeres,
i. p. 196). A ship coming from Sicily to Aspis was not under the
necessity of getting round the headland.
In the case of Agathokles, there was a further reason for
establishing his maritime position at Aspis. The Carthaginian
fleet was superior to him at sea; accordingly they could easily
interrupt his maritime communication from Sicily with Tunis, or
with any point in the Gulf of Carthage. But it was not so easy
for them to watch the coast at Aspis; for in order to do this,
they must get from the Gulf round to Cape Bon.
By a series of such acquisitions, comprising in all not less than
200 dependencies of Carthage, Agathokles became master along the
eastern coast.[967] He next endeavored to subdue the towns in the
interior, into which he advanced as far as several days’ march. But
he was recalled by intelligence from his soldiers at Tunês, that the
Carthaginians had marched out again to attack them, and had already
retaken some of his conquests. Returning suddenly by forced marches,
he came upon them by surprise, and drove in their advanced parties
with considerable loss; while he also gained an important victory
over the Libyan prince Elymas, who had rejoined the Carthaginians,
but was now defeated and slain.[968] The Carthaginians, however,
though thus again humbled and discouraged, still maintained the
field, strongly entrenched, between Carthage and Tunês.
[967] Diodor. xx. 17. The Roman consul Regulus, when he invaded
Africa during the first Punic war, is said to have acquired,
either by capture or voluntary adhesion, two hundred dependent
cities of Carthage (Appian, Punica, c. 3). Respecting the
prodigious number of towns in Northern Africa, see the very
learned and instructive work of Mövers, Die Phönikier, vol.
ii. p. 454 _seqq._ Even at the commencement of the third Punic
war, when Carthage was so much reduced in power, she had still
three hundred cities in Libya (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). It must be
confessed that the name cities or towns (πόλεις) was used by some
authors very vaguely. Thus Posidonius ridiculed the affirmation
of Polybius (Strabo, iii. p. 162), that Tiberius Gracchus had
destroyed three hundred πόλεις of the Celtiberians; Strabo
censures others who spoke of one thousand πόλεις of the Iberians.
Such a number could only be made good by including large κῶμαι.
[968] Diodor. xx. 17, 18.