CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY.

The Capture of the Stone Fort by the Twenty-fifth Infantry.

While the battle of Guasimas was going on, in which the Tenth Cavalry

took so conspicuous a part, the Twenty-fourth Infantry still remained

on board the City of Washington awaiting orders to land. During the

night of the 24th such orders were received by the authorities of the

transport, and they were directed to land their troops, but the

General Commanding, Brigadier-General Kent, did not hear of the matter

until some time the next morning. He relates the following

circumstances in his official report of the debarkation:

"At 9 a.m. of the 25th Lieutenant Cardin, of the Revenue Marine, came

aboard with orders for me to proceed to and disembark at Altares

(Siboney). This officer also handed me a letter from the corps

commander expressing his astonishment that I had remained away three

days."

General Kent also states in his report that his travel rations had

been exhausted seven days before and that but one meal of field

rations remained, and that the ship's supply both of water and

provisions was running low, and that in consequence of these facts as

well as for higher considerations he was very anxious to get on shore.

The debarkation followed as rapidly as possible, and that afternoon

General Kent reported in person to Major-General Wheeler, the troops

bivouacking for the night near the landing. The next day Colonel

Pearson, who commanded the Second Brigade of Kent's division, took

the Second Infantry and reconnoitred along the railroad toward the

Morro, going a distance of about six miles and returning in the

evening, having found no enemy in that vicinity, although evidences

were found that a force had recently retreated from a blockhouse

situated on the railroad about two miles from Aguadores.

On the day following, June 27th, the entire division moved out on the

road toward Santiago and encamped on the same ground that Lawton had

occupied the night previous. The Second Brigade took its place near

Savilla, while the Third Brigade, which included the Twenty-fourth

Infantry, went into camp at Las Guasimas, where the affair of the 24th

had occurred. The order of march had now partially fallen back to the

original plan: Lawton in advance, with whom was the Twenty-Fifth

Infantry; Wheeler next, with whom was the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, and

Kent in the rear, who had, as we have just related, the Twenty-fourth

Infantry in his Third Brigade. In this order the army moved, so far as

it moved at all, until the morning of the 30th, when dispositions for

the general attack began.

The story of the great battle, or as it turned out, of the two great

battles, begins on this day, and the careers of the four colored

regiments are to be followed through the divisions of Lawton, Kent and

Wheeler. Let us begin, however, with General Shafter's official report

and his "Story of Santiago," as told in the "Century" of February,

1899.

From these sources it is learned that on June 30th General Shafter

reconnoitered the country about Santiago and determined upon a plan of

attack. Ascending a hill from which he could obtain a good view of the

city, and could also see San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney,

he observed afresh what had impressed itself upon all immediately

upon landing, to wit: That in all this country there were no good

roads along which to move troops or transport supplies. The General

says: "I had never seen a good road in a Spanish country, and Santiago

did not disappoint my expectations." The roads as he saw them from the

summit of the hill on June 30th were very poor, and indeed, little

better than bridle paths, except between El Caney and San Juan River

and the city. Within this region, a distance of from four to four and

a half miles, the roads were passable. El Caney lay about four miles

northeast of Santiago, and was strongly fortified, and, as events

proved, strongly garrisoned. This position was of great importance to

the enemy, because from it a force might come to attack the right

flank and rear of the American Army as it should make its attempt on

San Juan Hill. El Caney held the road from Guantanamo, at which point

an important Spanish force was posted. While General Shafter was

surveying the country from the hill at El Pozo and making what special

examination he could of the country toward San Juan Hills, Generals

Lawton and Chaffee were making a reconnoisance around El Caney. From

General Lawton's report it would appear that the work of

reconnoitering around El Caney was done chiefly by General Chaffee. He

says: "To General Adna R. Chaffee I am indebted for a thorough and

intelligent reconnoissance of the town of El Caney and vicinity prior

to the battle and the submission of a plan of attack which was

adopted. I consider General Chaffee one of the best practical soldiers

in the army and recommend him for special distinction for successfully

charging the stone fort mentioned in this report, the capture of which

practically closed the battle."

The general plan of attack as explained by General Shafter himself in

his "Century" article was "to put a brigade on the road between

Santiago and El Caney, to keep the Spaniards at the latter place from

retreating on the city, and then with the rest of Lawton's division

and the divisions of Wheeler and Kent, and Bates' brigade to attack

the Spanish position in front of Santiago." Before that he had said

that he wished to put a division in on the right of El Caney and

assault the town on that road. To Admiral Sampson on June 26th he

said: "I shall, if I can, put a large force in Caney, and one perhaps

still farther west, near the pipe-line conveying water to the city,

making my main attack from the northeast and east." His desire at this

time was to "get the enemy in my front and the city at my back." On

June 30th he had modified this plan so as to decide to place one

brigade on the road between El Caney and Santiago, with a view merely

to keeping the El Caney garrison from retreating into Santiago.

As he was explaining his plan to the division officers and others on

the afternoon of the 30th at his own headquarters, Lawton and Chaffee

were of the opinion that they could dispose of the Spaniards at El

Caney in two hours time. "Therefore," says the General, "I modified my

plan, assigning Lawton's whole division for the attack of El Caney and

directed Bates' independent brigade to his support." This last

modification of General Shafter's plan was made in deference to the

opinion of subordinates, and was based upon observations made

especially by General Chaffee.

The force assigned for the reduction of El Caney was to begin its work

early in the morning, and by ten or eleven o'clock at the outside it

was expected that the task would be accomplished and Lawton would join

Kent and Sumner in the assault upon San Juan. Early on the morning of

July 1st Capron's battery was got into position on a line running

directly north from Marianage on a hill about five hundred yards east

of Las Guasimas Creek. Lawton's division began its move on the

afternoon of the 30th, as did in fact the whole army, and bivouacked

that night near El Pozo. The Twenty-fifth Infantry, which belonged to

the Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Miles, a former Major of the

Twenty-fifth, left El Pozo at daylight by way of the road leading

almost due north, and marched about one mile to the little town of

Marianage. Here a halt was made for an hour, from 6.30 to 7.30, during

which time reconnoitering parties were sent out to examine the ground

toward the Ducoureau House, which lay about one mile to the northward

of Marianage, and which had been designated by General Lawton as a

general rendezvous after the engagement should terminate.

Reconnoissance was made also to the front for the purpose of

discovering the enemy, and to ascertain the left of Ludlow's brigade.

This was the first brigade of Lawton's division and consisted of the

Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry and the Second Massachusetts, the

last named regiment being on the right. The Second Brigade was to

connect with this on its right and succeeded in finding the position

of the Second Massachusetts during this halt. At 11.30 Miles' brigade

was ordered to take position on the right of Ludlow's brigade, which

it did in the following order: The Fourth Infantry on the left,

joining with the Second Massachusetts on Ludlow's right; the

Twenty-fifth on the right, with its left joining on the Fourth

Infantry.

We must now review the progress of the battle so far as it is possible

to do so, from the firing of the first shot by Capron's battery up to

11.30, an hour long after the time at which it had been supposed that

El Caney would fall. Capron's reports are very brief. He says: "July

1--Fired shell and shrappnel into El Caney (ranged 2,400) 6.15 a.m. to

11.30 a.m." In another report he says: "Opened fire July 1, with shell

and shrappnel at 6.15 on Caney; range, 2,400 yards; continued until

11.30 a.m." He says that the battery "continued its fire against

specified objectives intermittently throughout the day under the

personal direction of the division commander." The forces we have so

far considered, consisting of Ludlow's and Miles' brigades, and of

Capron's battery, lay to the south of Caney, between it and Santiago,

Ludlow's brigade having been placed there to "cut off the retreat of

the garrison should it attempt to escape." Up to 11.30 there had been

no call for employing it for that purpose. The garrison had made no

attempt to escape. We must now go around to the east and north of

Caney. Here the Third Brigade, consisting of the Seventh, Twelfth and

Seventeenth Infantry, was posted, and early in the morning joined in

the attack, the brigade getting under fire before eight o'clock.

Colonel Carpenter, of the Seventh Regiment, says that one company of

his regiment, by General Chaffee's direction, was detached and sent

forward to reduce a blockhouse, well up on the hill, which commanded

the approach of his regiment to the field of action. After several

ineffectual attempts by the company, the Captain (Van Orsdale) was

directed to abandon the undertaking and rejoin the regiment, which

then took up a position on the crest of a hill running nearly parallel

with the Spanish lines. From this position the men crawled forward

about fifty yards and opened a deliberate fire upon the enemy, keeping

it up for about an hour, but as the losses of the regiment at this

time were considerable and the fire seemed to be without material

effect, the command was withdrawn to its position on the hill where

it found protection in a sunken road. In this condition this regiment

lay when Capron's battery made its lull at 11.30. The fearful fire

this regiment met can be estimated by the losses it sustained, which

during the day were as follows: Killed, 1 officer and 33 enlisted men;

wounded, 4 officers and 95 enlisted men; missing, 3 enlisted men. The

Seventeenth Regiment went into action on the right of the Seventh,

doing but little firing, as their orders were not to open fire unless

they could make the fire effective. Companies C and G fired a few

volleys; the remainder of the regiment did not fire at all. Four

enlisted men were killed and two officers severely wounded, one,

Lieutenant Dickinson, dying from his wounds within a few hours.

Several enlisted men were also wounded. At 11.30 this regiment was

lying on the right of the Seventh. The Twelfth Regiment began firing

between 6 and 7 in the morning and advanced to take its position on

the left of the Seventh Infantry. This regiment early reached a

position within 350 yards of the enemy, in which it found shelter in

the sunken road, "free from the enemy's fire." The regiment remained

in this position until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and, hence,

was there at 11.30 a.m. The losses of this regiment during the day

were, killed, 7 enlisted men; wounded, 2 officers and 31 enlisted men.

From these brief sketches the reader will now be able to grasp the

position of Lawton's entire division. Beginning on the south, from the

west, with Ludlow's brigade, consisting of the Twenty-second, Eighth

and Second Massachusetts, the line was continued by Miles' brigade of

the Fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry; then passing over a considerable

space, we strike Chaffee's brigade, posted as has just been described.

General Bates' brigade probably arrived upon the field about noon.

This brigade consisted of the Third and Twentieth Infantry, and is

known as "Bates' Independent Brigade." The brigade is reported as

going into action about 1 o'clock and continuing in action until 4

o'clock. It took a position on the right, partially filling up the gap

between Miles and Chaffee. The first battalion of the Twentieth

Infantry went into action on the left of the Twenty-fifth Infantry's

firing line, and one company, A, took part in the latter part of the

charge by which the stone house was taken. Between 11.30, when

Capron's firing stopped, and when Miles' brigade was moved forward to

join the right of Ludlow's, and 12.20, when the battery recommenced,

the troops, including Bates' brigade, were either in the positions

described above or were moving to them. Noon had arrived and El Caney

is not taken; the garrison has not attempted to escape, but is sending

out upon its assailants a continuous and deadly fire. "Throughout the

heaviest din of our fire," says Colonel Carpenter, "could be heard the

peculiar high-keyed ring of the defiant enemy's shots."

Twelve o'clock on July 1st, 1898, was a most anxious hour for our army

in Cuba. The battle at El Caney was at a standstill and the divisions

of Kent and Sumner were in a most perilous situation. Bonsal's

description of the state of the battle at that time is pathetic.

Speaking of the artillery at El Caney--Capron's battery--he says it

was now apparent that this artillery, firing from its position of

twenty-four hundred yards, could do very little damage to the great

stone fort and earthworks north of the village. The shots were too few

and the metal used too light to be effectual. Three hours of the

morning had worn away and the advance of our men had been slowly made

and at great cost; all the approaches were commanded by Spanish

entrenchments and the fighting was very unequal. A soldier of the

Twenty-fifth says that when he came in sight of the battle at El

Caney, "the Americans were gaining no ground, and the flashes of the

Spanish mausers told us that the forces engaged were unequally

matched, the difference of position favoring the Spaniards." This view

was had about noon, or soon after. At that time "a succession of aides

and staff officers came galloping from headquarters with messages

which plainly showed that confusion, if not disaster, had befallen the

two divisions which, by the heavy firing, we had learned to our great

surprise, had become warmly engaged in the centre. The orders to

General Lawton from headquarters were at first peremptory in

character--he was to pull out of his fight and to move his division to

the support of the centre" (Bonsal). This call for Lawton arose from

the fact that about noon General Shafter received several dispatches

from Sumner, of the Cavalry Division, requiring assistance. General

Sumner felt the need of the assistance of every available man in the

centre of the line where he was carrying on his fight with the

Spaniards on Blue House Hill. This situation so impressed the General,

Shafter, that he finally wrote to Lawton, "You must proceed with the

remainder of your force and join on immediately upon Sumner's right.

If you do not the battle is lost." Shafter's idea then was to fall

back to his original plan of just leaving enough troops at El Caney to

prevent the garrison from going to the assistance of any other part of

the line. Shafter himself says: "As the fight progressed I was

impressed with the fact that we were meeting with a very stubborn

resistance at El Caney and I began to fear that I had made a mistake

in making two fights in one day, and sent Major Noble with orders to

Lawton to hasten with his troops along the Caney road, placing himself

on the right of Wheeler" (Sumner). Lawton now made a general advance,

and it is important to see just what troops did advance. The Seventh

Infantry did not move, for Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter says that

after withdrawing "to the partial cover furnished by the road, the

regiment occupied this position from 8 o'clock a.m. until about 4.30

p.m." The Seventeenth did not move, for Captain O'Brien, commanding,

says the regiment took a position joining "its left with the right of

the Seventh Infantry" and that the regiment "remained in this position

until the battle was over." The Twelfth Infantry remained in its

shelter within 350 yards of the stone fort until about 4 p.m. Then we

have Chaffee's brigade on the north of the fort remaining stationary

and by their own reports doing but little firing. The Seventeenth

fired "for about fifty minutes" about noon, with remarkable precision,

but "it seemingly had no effect upon reducing the Spanish fire

delivered in our (their) front." The Seventh did not fire to any

extent. The Twelfth Infantry lay in its refuge "free from the enemy's

fire" and may have kept up an irregular fire.

About this time Bates' brigade entered the field and one battalion of

the Twentieth Infantry is reported to have joined the left of the

firing line of the Twenty-fifth. General Ludlow says there was a lull

from 12 to 1 p.m., "when the action again became violent, and at 3

p.m. the Third Brigade captured the stone fort with a rush and hoisted

the American flag." From Ludlow's brigade, Captain Van Horne,

commanding the Twenty-second Infantry, after the wounding of

Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson, says that the First Battalion of his

regiment took a position about 800 yards from the town and kept up

firing until the place surrendered. He does not say positively that

the firing was upon the town, but he had said just before that the

Second Battalion slowly moved forward, firing into the town from the

left, so that we may readily conclude from the context as well as from

the position that the First Battalion fired into the town also. Hence

it seems fair to exclude from the fort all of Ludlow's brigade, and it

is observable that Ludlow himself claims no part in the capture of

that stronghold.

General Bates says his brigade took position to the right of Colonel

Miles' brigade and pushed rapidly to the front. He then says that

after remaining sometime in the crossroad to the right of Miles'

brigade, under a heavy fire from the enemy, the brigade moved farther

"to the right to the assault of a small hill, occupied upon the top by

a stone fort and well protected by rifle pits. General Chaffee's

brigade charged them from the right, and the two brigades joining upon

the crest, opened fire from this point of vantage, lately occupied by

the Spanish, upon the village of El Caney." General Chaffee says it

was in consequence of the fire of General Bates' troops upon the fort

that the assault by the Twelfth Infantry was postponed.

In General Chaffee's report this statement occurs: "The action lasted

nearly throughout the day, terminating at about 4.30 p.m., at which

time the stone blockhouse was assaulted by Captain Haskell's battalion

of the Twelfth Infantry, under the personal direction of

Lieutenant-Colonel Comba, commanding the regiment. The resistance at

this point had been greatly affected by the fire of Capron's battery.

A few moments after the seizure of this point--the key to the

situation--my left was joined by General Bates with a portion of his

command." It is to be noted in connection with all of the above

statements that Major McCaskey, who commanded the Twentieth Infantry

(Bates brigade), says: "The First Battalion was moved to the right and

put into action on the left of the Twenty-fifth Infantry's firing

line, and one company, A, took part in the latter part of the charge

by which the stone house was taken." The two points to be noted here

are (1) that this battalion was on the left of the Twenty-fifth's

firing line, and (2) that one company took part in the charge upon the

stone house. When Chaffee's brigade charged the stone house from the

right some of Bates' troops, at least this Company A, from the

battalion near the firing line of the Twenty-fifth Infantry, took part

in the latter part of the charge. The two brigades, Bates' and

Chaffee's, joined immediately after the capture of the stone fort and

opened fire upon the town.

We have now traced the actions and the fortunes of the three following

brigades: Ludlow's Chaffee's and Bates'. But what has become of Miles'

brigade? Unfortunately, the Second Brigade has not been so well

reported as were the others engaged in the action at El Caney. We have

seen that it was ordered to take position on the right of Ludlow's

brigade at 11.30, when Capron's battery ceased its firing for the

fifty minutes. "We were detained in reaching our position by troops in

our front blocking the road," says the brigade commander. "We came

into action directly in front of the stone blockhouse at 12.30, and

from that hour until about 4.30, when the command 'cease firing' was

given, the blockhouse having been captured, my command was

continuously under fire." The reader will note in this report that the

brigade went into action at 12.30, several hours before the charge was

ordered by General Chaffee, and at least an hour and a half before,

according to the report of the commander of the Third Brigade, "this

fort was practically in the possession of the Twelfth Infantry." Major

Baker, who commanded the Fourth Infantry, says: "About 12 m. we

received orders directing us to take our place in the line of battle,

and arriving at the proper point the regiment was placed in line in

the following order: The First Battalion in the fighting line; the

Second Battalion in support and regimental reserve. In this order the

First Battalion, under my command, took up the advance toward the

blockhouse, to our right, south east of Caney." This battalion

advanced until it reached a position about 200 yards from the village,

where it remained, assisted by the Second Battalion until the capture

of the fort. Two companies of this First Battalion "fired into the

town and also into the blockhouse until its fall." A good part of the

fire of this regiment was directed upon the fort.

Colonel Miles says: "The brigade advanced steadily, with such scanty

cover as the ground afforded, maintaining a heavy fire on the stone

fort from the time the fight began until it ended." The reader is

asked to note particularly that this fire was continuous throughout

the fight; that it was characterized by the brigade commander as

"heavy," and that it was "on the stone fort". He says: "As the brigade

advanced across a plowed field in front of the enemy's position the

latter's sharpshooters in the houses in Caney enfiladed the left of

our line with a murderous fire. To silence it Major Baker, Fourth

Infantry, in command of the battalion of that regiment on the left of

our line of battle, directed it to turn its fire upon the town. In so

doing this battalion lost heavily, but its steady front and accurate

volleys greatly assisted the advance of the remainder of the brigade

upon the stone fort."

We have now these facts clearly brought out or suggested: That the

brigade took its place in line of battle soon after 12 o'clock; that

the Fourth Infantry was on the left; that the advance of the First

Battalion of the Fourth Infantry was "toward the blockhouse;" that

aside from the companies of the Fourth Infantry that fired into town,

"the remainder of the brigade advanced upon the stone fort." The

Fourth Infantry, holding the left of the line, however, reached a

position from which it could not advance, its commander having

"quickly perceived that an advance meant annihilation, as it would

involve not only a frontal, but also a flank fire from the town." Here

the Fourth Infantry remained, but continued to maintain a fire upon

both the blockhouse and the town.

There is but one more regiment in all of Lawton's division to be

accounted for, and that is the Twenty-fifth Infantry, holding the

right of Miles' brigade in this advance. This regiment was in place

in the line under its gallant and experienced commander,

Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Daggett, and contributed its full share of

that "heavy fire on the stone fort from the time the fight began until

it ended." Major McCaskey says the First Battalion of his regiment

took a position on the left of the Twenty-fifth's firing line. The

statement seems erroneous, and one is inclined to believe that it was

originally written "on the right," instead of "on the left"; but it is

enough for our purpose now, that the firing line of the Twenty-fifth

is recognized well in advance. Major Baker, who commanded on the left

of the brigade line, and whose advance was stopped by the flank fire

from the village and a frontal fire from the fort, says: "as a matter

of fact the village of El Caney was not charged by any troops. Those

of Bates' brigade and the Twenty-fifth Infantry, after having carried

the stone fort (on a hill some 75 feet higher, and to the east of the

town,) fired into the village, and the Fourth Infantry continued its

fire. Nor was it charged by any of the troops to our left. Such a

charge would necessarily have been seen by us." Major Baker, who was

on the field and had the blockhouse in clear view, declares that some

of Bates' brigade and the Twenty-fifth Infantry carried the stone

fort. Major McCaskey says that one battalion of the Twentieth Infantry

(Bates' brigade) was on the left of the Twenty-fifth's firing line,

and that one company (A) took part in the latter part of the charge by

which the fort was taken. This battalion may be referred to by Major

Baker when he says: "Those of Bates' brigade and the Twenty-fifth

Infantry, after having carried, etc."

As there are some matters of dispute concerning the events which I am

now going to relate, I will present a soldier's statement before I go

to the official records. The soldier in writing to me after the battle

says: "I was left-guide of Company G (25th Infantry), and I received

orders from Lieutenant McCorkle to guide on Fourth Infantry, which

held the left flank. 'Forward, march! Guide left. Don't fire until you

see somebody; then fire to hit!' came the orders. Tramp! tramp! Crash!

crash! On we walked and stopped. We fired into the underbrush for

safety; then in another moment we were under Spanish fire. Balls flew

like bees, humming as they went. Soon we found ourselves up against a

network of Spanish trickery. Barbed-wire fences, ditches and creeks,

too numerous to think of. The only thing left was to go ahead or die;

or else retreat like cowards. We preferred to go ahead. At this first

fence Lieutenant McCorkle was taken to earth by a Spanish bullet.

Lieutenant Moss spoke out, 'Come ahead! Let's get at these Spaniards!'

A few moments more and he, too, was almost dead with exertion, loud

speaking, running and jumping, as onward we swept toward the Spanish

stronghold. The sun was exceedingly hot, as on the slope of a little

mound we rested for a few moments. We lay here about five minutes,

looking into the Spanish fort or blockhouse; we measured the distance

by our eyesight, then with our rifles; we began to cheer and storm,

and in a moment more, up the hill like a bevy of blue birds did the

Twenty-fifth fly. G and H Companies were the first to reach the summit

and to make the Spaniards fly into the city of El Caney, which lay

just behind the hill. When we reached the summit others soon began to

_mount our ladder_. We fired down into the city until nearly dusk."

The brigade made its advance under fire almost from the beginning. The

commander says it was continuously under fire from 12.30 to 4.30 p.m.

"The attack was begun by two companies in each regiment on the firing

line, strengthened by supports and reserves from the remaining

companies until the brigade had but two companies in reserve. At one

time in this hotly engaged contest the commanding officer of the

Twenty-Fifth Infantry sent me word that he needed troops on his right.

I then sent forward 40 Cubans, under command of Captains Jose' Varges

and Avelens Bravo, with Lieutenants Nicholas Franco and Tomas Repelao,

to form on the right of the Twenty-fifth, which was also the right of

the brigade. With these Cubans I ordered Private Henry Downey, Company

H, First Infantry, on duty as interpreter at the headquarters. These

men advanced on the stone fort with our line, fighting gallantly,

during which Lieutenant Nicholas Franco was mortally wounded and died

soon afterwards." (Col. Miles' report.)

From the soldier's story, as well as from the official report of the

brigade commander, it is conclusive that the real objective of the

Second Brigade was the stone fort, and that the Twenty-fifth Infantry,

which occupied the right of the line, had no other objective

whatever.* [Transcriber's Note: No footnote text present for this

footnote anchor.] It also appears that Bates' brigade, although

somewhere on the right, was not so near but that the commanding

officer of the Twenty-fifth could see the need of troops at his right;

and to meet this need the brigade commander "sent forward 40 Cubans,

who advanced on the stone fort with our lines." The fire from this

fort continued severe during the whole of the advance, and until the

last halt made by the Twenty-fifth. At the first fence met by the

Twenty-fifth Lieutenant McCorkle was killed; and, to use the words of

a soldier, "as the regiment swept toward the Spanish stronghold" to

reach the slope of a little mound for cover, many more fell. Behind

this little mound, after resting about five minutes, they began their

last fire upon the enemy. This must have been as late as 3 o'clock,

and perhaps considerably later, and the fire from the stone fort was

vigorous up until their last halt, as their casualties prove. The

battery had begun to fire on the fort again at 12.30 and continued

from the same position until 2.10, the range being as has been already

stated, 2,400 yards. Hence the artillery firing at long range had

ceased, and it is generally conceded that this long range firing had

been ineffective. Captain Capron says he moved his battery at 2.10

p.m. to 1,000 yards from Caney and opened fire on two blockhouses. He

does not say at what hour he opened fire on these two blockhouses, or

how long he continued to fire, or what was the effect of his fire upon

the two block houses. Lieutenant-Colonel Bisbee, who was acting as

support of Capron's battery, says of himself that he "moved with the

battery at 3.30 p.m. by the Dubroix (Ducureaux) road." General Lawton

says the battery was moved to a new position about 2.30, "about 1,000

yards from certain blockhouses in the town, where a few shots, all

taking effect, were fired." From these reports it would appear that

after moving to the second station the battery fired upon two

blockhouses in the town, and not upon the stone fort. General Ludlow,

speaking of the battle, says: "In the present case, the artillery fire

was too distant to reduce the blockhouses or destroy the

entrenchments, so that the attack was practically by infantry alone."

On the other hand, General Chaffee says: "The resistance at this

point," meaning the stone fort at the time of assault, "had been

greatly affected by the fire of Capron's battery." Colonel Comba, of

the Twelfth Infantry, says: "The artillery made the breach through

which our men entered the stone work." Bonsal says that Captain

Capron, "under the concentrated fire of his four guns at a point blank

range of a thousand yards, had converted the fort into a shapeless

ruin," when the infantry charged it.

It is probable that in this case, as in most cases of similar nature,

the truth divides equally between the apparently opposing views. Of

General Ludlow, who is the authority for this statement, that the

stone fort at El Caney was taken by infantry alone, General Lawton

says: "General Ludlow's professional accomplishments are well known

and his assignment to command a brigade in my division I consider a

high compliment to myself." "The fighting was all done with small

arms" were the words written me by an infantryman soon after the

battle. The question, whether Capron fired upon the stone fort after

taking his new position, or fired on two blockhouses, entirely

distinct from the fort, remains undetermined. The author of this work

inclines to the conclusion that the fire of Capron after moving to his

new position was directed for a brief period, at least, upon the stone

fort.

Inasmuch as we are now to trace the career of the Twenty-fifth

Infantry through an unfortunate dispute, on both sides of which are

officers of high rank and unimpeachable honor, it is important to

note, first, to what extent the several statements, both unofficial

and official, can be harmonized and made to corroborate one another.

Major Baker says: "Those of Bates' brigade and the Twenty-fifth

Infantry, after having carried the stone fort," which he explains was

some 75 feet higher than the town, then fired _down_ into the village.

The soldier who acted as left-guide of Company G, Twenty-fifth

Infantry, says, after getting up on the hill, "we fired _down_ into

the city until near dusk." The experience of the soldier agrees

exactly with the report of the officer. The fact that the Twenty-fifth

went up the hill cannot be questioned, and that up to their last halt,

they went under fire, no one will deny. Bonsal, in speaking of

Chaffee's brigade, which was "more immediately charged with the

reduction of Caney" (Ludlow's report), says: "And it was nearly five

o'clock when his most advanced regiment, the gallant Twelfth Infantry,

deployed into the valley and charged up the steep hillside, which was

lined with Spanish trenches, rising in irregular tiers and crowned

with a great stone fort." The stone fort at this time, however, was,

as he says, "a shapeless ruin." Where was the Twenty-fifth Infantry at

this time? Mr. Bonsal continues: "Almost at the same moment the

Twenty-fifth Colored Infantry, the leading regiment of Miles' brigade,

which had been advancing in the centre, started up the hill also."

General Lawton says that after moving the battery to its new position,

1,000 yards from certain blockhouses in the town, Capron fired a few

shots, all of which took effect, and he adds: "This firing terminated

the action, as the Spanish garrison were attempting to escape."

Colonel Comba says there was a breach in the stonework large enough

for his men to enter, and that this had been made by the artillery;

General Chaffee says resistance had been greatly affected by the

artillery, and Bonsal adds, the garrison resisted the last advance

made by the infantry but for a moment.

General Chaffee declares: "The troops arriving at the fort were there

in the following order: Twelfth Infantry, which took the place; the

command of General Bates some moments later; the Twenty-fifth

Infantry."

The facts therefore stand, that the Twenty-fifth Infantry was on the

ground with the first troops that reached the fort and that there was

a captain of that regiment who then and there claimed the capture of

the place, even against the claims of a Major-General. He was told

that his proposition was absurd, and so it may have been from one

standpoint; and yet there may be a ground upon which the captain's

claim was fair and just.

That the Twelfth Infantry arrived on the ground first is not disputed;

but it is questioned whether the fort was belligerent at that time.

General Chaffee says the resistance had been greatly reduced by the

artillery; General Lawton says the action had been finished by

Capron's shots and the garrison was trying to escape; a soldier from

the Twenty-fifth says the Spaniards flew out of the fort to the town;

Bonsal says, they stoutly resisted "for a moment and then fled

precipitately down the ravine and up the other side, and into the

town." If first occupancy is the only ground upon which the capture of

a place can be claimed, then the title to the honor of capturing the

stone fort lies, according to official report as so far presented,

with the Twelfth Infantry. But even upon this ground it will be shown

that the Twenty-fifth's action will relieve the claim of its captain

from absurdity. We are now prepared to read the official report of the

commanding officer of the Twenty-fifth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel

Daggett, who was with the regiment all through the fight, and who bore

himself so well that the division commander said: "Lieutenant-Colonel

Daggett deserves special mention for skillful handling of his

regiment, and would have received it before had the fact been reported

by his brigade commander."

July 5, 1898.

Intrenchments Twenty-fifth United States Infantry,

Adjutant-General, Second Brigade, Second Division, Fifth

Corps.

Sir:--I have the honor to submit the following report of the

part taken by the Twenty-fifth Infantry in the battle of the

1st instant. The regiment formed firing line on the right of

the Fourth Infantry, facing a Spanish fort or blockhouse

about half a mile distant. On moving forward, the battalion,

composed of Companies C, D, E, G and H, and commanded by

Capt. W.S. Scott, received the fire of the enemy, and after

advancing about 400 yards was subjected to a galling fire on

their left. Finding cover, the battalion prepared for an

advance up the hill to the fort. This advance was made

rapidly and conducted with great skill by company officers.

"On arriving within a short distance of the fort the white

flag was waved to our companies, but a cross fire prevented

the enemy from advancing with it or our officers from

receiving it. About twenty minutes later a battalion of some

other regiment advanced to the rear of the fort, completely

covered from fire, and received the flag; but the men of the

Twenty-fifth Infantry entered the fort at the same time. All

officers and men behaved gallantly. One officer was killed

and three wounded; eight men were killed and twenty wounded.

"About 200 men and ten officers were in the firing line. I

attribute the comparatively small losses to the skill and

bravery of the company officers, viz.: First Lieutenant

Caldwell and Second Lieutenants Moss and Hunt. Second

Lieutenant French, adjutant of the battalion, was among

those who gallantly entered the fort.

"The battle lasted about two hours and was a hotly contested

combat. Very respectfully,

"A.S. DAGGETT,

"Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fifth Infantry, Commanding."

Here it is shown by the testimony of the regimental commander, that a

battalion of the Twenty-fifth ascended the hill and arrived at a short

distance from the fort about twenty minutes before any other troops

are mentioned as coming in sight; and that a white flag was waved to

the companies of the Twenty-fifth. It was doubtless upon this ground

that a captain of the Twenty-fifth had the temerity to claim the

capture of the place, even from a Major-General. I do not know who the

captain was, but it is evident that he had what he believed ample

grounds for his claim. Colonel Daggett says, also, that when the men

of the other regiment advanced to this fort after it had waved the

white flag to the companies of the Twenty-fifth, the men of the

Twenty-fifth advanced and entered the fort at the same time. Bonsal

says: "Almost at the same moment that the Twelfth started up the hill

the Twenty-fifth started up the hill also;" while according to Colonel

Daggett's testimony the Twenty-fifth was well up the hill already and

the fort had waved to it the white flag.

Colonel Daggett makes this further report:

Headquarters Twenty-fifth Infantry,

Near Santiago, Cuba, July 16, 1898.

The Adjutant-General, Second Division, Fifth Corps, near Santiago,

Cuba.

Sir:--Feeling that the Twenty-fifth Infantry has not

received credit for the part it took in the battle of El

Caney on the first instant, I have the honor to submit the

following facts:

I was ordered by the brigade commander to put two companies

(H, Lieutenant Caldwell, and G, Lieutenant McCorkle) on the

firing line in extended order. The right being uncovered and

exposed to the enemy, I ordered D Company (Captain Edwards)

to deploy as flankers. The battalion was commanded by Capt.

W.S. Scott. The battalion advanced about 300 yards under

fire, the Fourth Infantry on its left, where the line found

cover, halted, and opened fire on the blockhouse and

intrenchments in front of it. After the line had been

steadied and had delivered an effective fire, I ordered a

further advance, which was promptly made. As the Fourth

Infantry did not advance, my left was exposed to a very

severe fire from the village on the left. I immediately

ordered Company C (Lieutenant Murdock), which was in

support, to the front, and E. Company (Lieutenant Kinnison)

from regimental reserve to take its place. Thus

strengthened, the four companies moved up the hill rapidly,

being skilfully handled by company officers. On arriving

near the fort the white flag was waved toward our men, but

the fire from the village on our left was so severe that

neither our officers nor Spanish could pass over the

intervening ground. After about twenty minutes some of the

Twelfth Infantry arrived in rear of the fort, completely

sheltered from the fire from the village, and received the

white flag; but Privates J.H. Jones, of Company D, and T.C.

Butler, H. Company, Twenty-fifth Infantry, entered the fort

at the same time and took possession of the Spanish flag.

They were ordered to give it up by an officer of the Twelfth

United States Infantry, but before doing so they each tore a

piece from it, which they now have. So much for the facts.

I attribute the success attained by our line largely to the

bravery and skill of the company officers who conducted the

line to the fort. These officers are: First Lieutenants V.A.

Caldwell and J.A. Moss, and Second Lieutenant J.E. Hunt. It

is my opinion that the two companies first deployed could

not have reached the fort alone, and that it was the two

companies I ordered to their support that gave them the

power to reach it. I further believe that had we failed to

move beyond the Fourth Infantry the fort would not have been

taken that night.

The Twenty-fifth Infantry lost one officer killed[18] and

three wounded, and seven men killed and twenty-eight

wounded.

Second Lieutenant H.W. French, adjutant of Captain Scott's

battalion, arrived at the fort near the same time as the

other officers.

I request that this report be forwarded to corps

headquarters.

Very respectfully,

A.S. DAGGETT,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fifth Infantry, Commanding.

General Chaffee's statement is not to be questioned for a moment.

There is not the least doubt that the troops, as organizations arrived

at the fort in the order he describes. General Lawton says: "General

Chaffee's brigade was especially charged with the duty of assaulting

the stone fort, and successfully executed that duty, after which a

portion of the Twenty-fifth, and a portion of Bates' brigade, assisted

in the work, all of which is commendable." He says also, that the

"Twenty-fifth Infantry did excellent service, as reported, though

not better than the others engaged.' This seems to confirm

Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett's report, for he says he is sure the

regiment did excellent work, "as reported;" and at that time he is

commenting on Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett's report, the report printed

above. The broad statements of General Lawton do not touch the exact

question at issue between the reports of the subordinate commanders;

nor do they throw any light on the circumstances of the final charge.

Miles' brigade had been advancing on the stone fort for some hours,

and the Twenty-fifth was so near when the charge of the Twelfth was

made that portions of it were on the hill and near the fort at the

same time. The commander of the Third Brigade saw the fight from one

side and reported events as he learned them. His official statement

requires no support. The commanding officer of the Twenty-fifth

Infantry saw the fight from another standpoint, and his official

reports are entitled to equal respect. Both the General's and the

Lieutenant-Colonel's must be accepted as recitals of facts, made with

all the accuracy that high personal integrity armed with thorough

military training can command. Happily the statements, which at first

appear so widely at variance, are entirely reconcilable. The following

supplementary report of the regimental commander, when taken in

connection with the final complimentary orders published in the

regiment before leaving Cuba, will place the whole subject before the

reader and put the question at rest, and at the same time leave

undisturbed all the reports of superior officers.

Headquarters Twenty-fifth Infantry,

Montauk Point, Long Island, August 22, 1898.

The Adjutant-General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

Sir:--I have the honor to submit a supplementary report to

the original one made on the 19th (16th) of July, 1898, of

the battle of El Caney de Cuba, so far as relates to the

part taken therein by the Twenty-fifth Infantry:

1. I stated in the original report that the Twenty-fifth

Infantry, in advancing, broke away from and left the Fourth

Infantry behind. This may inferentially reflect on the

latter regiment. It was not so intended, and a subsequent

visit to the battle-field convinces me that it would have

been impossible for the regiment to advance to the fort,

and, although it might have advanced a short distance

farther, it would have resulted in a useless slaughter, and

that the battalion commander exercised excellent judgment in

remaining where he did and by his fire aiding the

Twenty-fifth Infantry in its advance.

2. Colonel Miles, the then brigade commander, informed me

that his first report of the battle would be brief and that

a later and full report would be made. In his former report

I think he failed to give credit to myself and regiment. As

he was soon after relieved of the command of the brigade I

assume that no further report will be made.

I have reported what the regiment did, but said nothing

about my own action. I must, therefore, report it myself or

let it go unrecorded. Distasteful as it is to me, I deem it

duty to my children to state the facts and my claims based

thereon, as follows:

1. I was ordered to put two companies in the firing line.

Before this line advanced the brigade commander informed me,

and personal examination verified, that my right was in the

air and exposed. On my own judgment I ordered a company, as

flankers, to that part of the line.

2. As soon as the line had rested and become steadied at its

first halt I ordered it to advance, and it continued to

advance, although it broke away from the rest of the

brigade.

3. As this exposed the left to a galling and dangerous fire,

I ordered, on my own judgment, a company to re-enforce that

part of the line and a company from the regimental reserve

also to the fighting line.

These are the facts, and as my orders were to keep my left

joined to the right of the Fourth Infantry, and received no

further orders, my claims are as follows:

1. That it was necessary to place a company on the right as

flankers.

2. That the conditions offered an opportunity to advance

after the first halt, and I took advantage of it.

3. That the left being exposed by this advance of the line

beyond the rest of the brigade, it was proper and necessary

to re-enforce it by two companies.

4. That the two companies first deployed could not have

reached the stone fort.

5. That the three companies added to the firing line gave it

the power to reach the fort.

6. That the advance beyond the rest of the brigade was a

bold and, without support, dangerous movement, but that the

result justified the act. Had it failed I would have been

held responsible.

7. That I saw at each stage of the battle what ought to be

done, and did it. Results show that it was done at the right

moment.

8. That the Twenty-fifth Infantry caused the surrender of

the stone fort.

I desire to repeat that it is with great reluctance that I

make so much of this report as relates to myself, and

nothing but a sense of duty would impel me to do it.

Very respectfully,

A.S. DAGGETT,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fifth Infantry, Commanding.

LOSSES OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH INFANTRY.

Killed.--Lieutenant H.L. McCorkle, Company G; Private Albert

Strother, H; Private John W. Steele, D; Corporal Benj.

Cousins, H; Private John B. Phelps, D; Private French Payne,

B; Private Aaron Leftwich, G; Private Tom Howe, D.

Wounded.--Company A: Private William H. Clarke, Sergeant

Stephen A. Browne. Company B: Private Tom Brown. Company C:

Lieutenant John S. Murdock, Private Joseph L. Johnson,

Private Samuel W. Harley, Private John A. Boyd. Company D;

Captain Eaton A. Edwards, Sergeant Hayden Richards, Private

Robert Goodwin. Company E: Lieutenant H.L. Kinnison, Private

James Howard, Private John Saddler, Private David C. Gillam,

Private Hugh Swann. Company F: First Sergeant Frank Coleman.

Company G: Corporal James O. Hunter, Private Henry

Brightwell, Private David Buckner, Private Alvin Daniels,

Private Boney Douglas, Private George P. Cooper, Private

John Thomas, Corporal Gov. Staton, Private Eugene Jones.

Company H: Private James Bevill, Private Henry Gilbert.

Wounded July 2.--Private Elwood A. Forman, H; Private Smith,

D; Private William Lafayette, F.

COMPLIMENTARY ORDER.

Headquarters 25th Infantry,

Near Santiago de Cuba, August 11, 1898.

General Orders No. 19.

The regimental commander congratulates the regiment on the

prospect of its speedy return to the United States.

Gathered from three different stations, many of you

strangers to each other, you assembled as a regiment for the

first time in more than twenty-eight years on May 7, 1898,

at Tampa, Florida. There you endeavored to solidify and

prepare yourselves, as far as the oppressive weather would

permit, for the work that appeared to be before you; but,

who could have fortold the severity of that work?

You endured the severe hardships of a long sea voyage, which

no one who has not experienced it can appreciate. You then

disembarked, amidst dangerous surroundings; and on landing

were for the first time on hostile ground. You marched,

under a tropical sun, carrying blanket-roll, three days'

rations, and one hundred rounds of ammunition, through rain

and mud, part of the time at night, sleeping on the wet

ground without shelter, living part of the time on scant

rations, even, of bacon, hard bread and coffee, until on

July 1 you arrived at El Caney. Here you took the battle

formation and advanced to the stone fort, more like veterans

than troops who had never been under fire. You again

marched, day and night, halting only to dig four lines of

intrenchments, the last being the nearest point to the enemy

reached by any organization, when, still holding your

rifles, within these intrenchments, notice was received that

Santiago and the Spanish army had surrendered.

But commendable as the record cited may be, the brightest

hours of your lives were on the afternoon of July 1. Formed

in battle array, you advanced to the stone fort against

volleys therefrom, and rifle-pits in front, and against a

galling fire from blockhouses, the church tower and the

village on your left. You continued to advance, skilfully

and bravely directed by the officers in immediate command,

halting and delivering such a cool and well-directed fire

that the enemy was compelled to wave the white flag in token

of surrender.

Seldom have troops been called upon to face a severer fire,

and never have they acquitted themselves better.

The regimental reserve was called upon to try its nerve, by

lying quiet under a galling fire, without the privilege of

returning it, where men were killed and wounded. This is a

test of nerve which the firing line cannot realize, and

requires the highest qualities of bravery and endurance.

You may well return to the United States proud of your

accomplishments; and if any one asks you what you have done,

point him to El Caney.

But in the midst of the joy of going home, we mourn the loss

of those we leave behind. The genial, generous-hearted

McCorkle fell at his post of duty, bravely directing his men

in the advance on the stone fort. He died as the soldier

dies, and received a soldier's burial. He was beloved by all

who knew him, and his name will always be fondly remembered

by his regiment--especially by those who participated in the

Santiago campaign. The officers of the regiment will wear

the prescribed badge of mourning for Lieutenant McCorkle for

thirty days. And Corporal Benjamin Cousins, Privates Payne,

Lewis, Strother, Taliaferro, Phelps, Howell, Steel and

Leftwitch, sacrificed their lives on their country's altar.

Being of a race which only thirty-five years ago emerged

through a long and bloody war, from a condition of

servitude, they in turn engaged in a war which was

officially announced to be in the interest of humanity and

gave all they had--their lives--that the oppressed might be

free, and enjoy the blessings of liberty guaranteed by a

stable government. They also died like true soldiers and

received a soldier's burial.

By order of Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett.

M.D. CRONIN,

First Lieutenant and Adjutant, 25th Infantry.

MAJOR GENERAL AARON S. DAGGETT.

General Aaron S. Daggett is a native of Maine, born at Greene Corner,

in that State, June 14, 1837. He is descended from a paternal ancestry

which can be traced, with an honorable record, as far back as 1100

A.D. His mother was Dorcas C., daughter of Simon Dearborn, a

collateral descendant of General Henry Dearborn. His more immediate

ancestors came from Old to New England about 1630, and both his

grandparents served in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary

War. He was educated in his native town, at Monmouth Academy, Maine

Wesleyan Seminary and Bates College. At the outbreak of the Civil War

he enlisted as a private, April 27th, 1861, in the 5th Maine Infantry;

was appointed second lieutenant May 1, and promoted first lieutenant

May 24, 1861. He commanded his company at the first Bull Run battle,

and was promoted captain August 14, 1861.

[Illustration: Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Daggett]

From the first engagement of the regiment to the end of its three

years' memorable service, Captain Daggett proved a faithful and

gallant soldier. He was promoted major, January 8th, 1863; on January

18th, 1865, was commissioned lieutenant-colonel of the 5th Regiment,

United States Veteran Volunteers, Hancock Corps, and was brevetted

colonel and brigadier-general of volunteers, March 13, 1865, for

"gallant and meritorious services during the war." He also received

the brevets of major in the United States Army for "gallant and

meritorious services at the battle of Rappahannock Station, Va.,"

November 7, 1863, and lieutenant-colonel for "gallant and meritorious

services in the battle of the Wilderness, Va." Immediately after the

battle of Rappahannock Station, the captured trophies, flags, cannons,

etc., were escorted, by those who had been most conspicuous in the

action, to General Meade's headquarters, Colonel Daggett being in

command of the battalion of his brigade. General Upton to whom he owed

this distinction, wrote of him as follows:

"In the assault at Rappahannock Station, Colonel Daggett's

regiment captured over five hundred prisoners. In the

assault at Spottsylvania Court House, May 10, his regiment

lost six out of seven captains, the seventh being killed on

the 12th of May, at the "angle," or the point where the tree

was shot down by musketry, on which ground the regiment

fought from 9.30 A.M. to 5.30 P.M., when it was relieved. On

all these occasions Colonel Daggett was under my immediate

command, and fought with distinguished bravery.

"Throughout his military career in the Army of the Potomac,

he maintained the character of a good soldier and an upright

man, and his promotion would be commended by all those who

desire to see courage rewarded."

General Upton also wrote to the Governor of Maine as follows:

"I would respectfully recommend to Your Excellency, Major

A.S. Daggett, formerly 5th Maine Volunteers, as an officer

highly qualified to command a regiment. Major Daggett served

his full term in this brigade with honor both to himself and

State, and won for himself the reputation of being a brave,

reliable and efficient officer. His promotion to a colonelcy

would be a great benefit to the service, while the honor of

his State could scarcely be entrusted to safer hands."

He was subsequently recommended for promotion by Generals Meade,

Hancock, Wright and D.A. Russell. He was in every battle and campaign

in which the Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac, was engaged, from the

first Bull Run to Petersburg, and was twice slightly wounded. On July

28, 1866, without his knowledge or solicitation, he was appointed a

captain in the U.S. Regular Army, on recommendation of General Grant,

and has since been promoted colonel in this service. During his

subsequent career he has won the reputation of being a fine tactician

and of being thoroughly versed in military law, as is indicated by

Major Hancock's commendatory words in 1878:

"I look upon him as by far the best tactician in the

regiment, and as for a thorough, clear knowledge of tactics

his superior is not in the army. As regards military and

civil law, I know of no one so well informed."

His ability and soldierly qualities have also been highly commended by

General Crook, Colonel Hughes--Inspector-General in 1891--and Colonel

----, Inspector-General in 1892.

Not only as a soldier, but in many other ways, has General Daggett

distinguished himself. As a public speaker the following was said of

him by the Rev. S.S. Cummings, of Boston:

"It was my privilege and pleasure to listen to an address

delivered by General A.S. Daggett on Memorial Day of 1891. I

had anticipated something able and instructive, but it far

exceeded my fondest expectations. The address was dignified,

yet affable, delivered in choice language without

manuscript, instructive and impressive, and highly

appreciated by an intelligent audience."

General Daggett is noted for his courteous and genial manner, and his

sterling integrity of character. He is a member of the Presbyterian

church.

War Department, Inspector-General's Office,

Washington, Jan. 6th, 1899.

To the Adjutant-General, U.S.A., Washington, D.C.

Sir:--I desire to recommend to your favorable consideration

and for advancement in case of the reorganization of the

Regular Army, Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Daggett, 25th U.S.

Infantry.

I have known Colonel Daggett for a long time; he served in

the War of the Rebellion with the 5th Maine Volunteers and

acquitted himself with much honor; he served in Cuba in the

war with Spain, commanding the 25th U.S. Infantry, and was

conspicuous for gallantry at the battle of El Caney. He is

an officer of the highest character, intelligent, courageous

and energetic.

I sincerely trust that he may receive all the consideration

he deserves.

Very respectfully,

(Sd) H.W. LAWTON,

Major-General, U.S.V.

A true copy:

M.D. CRONIN,

First Lieutenant and Adjutant 25th Infantry.

Headquarters Department of the East,

Governor's Island, New York City,

December 29, 1898.

Honorable R.A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D.C.

Sir:--I recommend to the favorable consideration of the

Secretary of War for promotion to Brigadier-General, Colonel

A.S. Daggett, 25th Infantry. This officer has an excellent

war record; his service has been faithful since then, and in

the recent Spanish-American war he distinguished himself by

his good judgment and faithful attention to duty, as well as

for gallant service in action. An appointment of this

character will be very highly appreciated throughout the

army as a recognition of faithful, meritorious and gallant

service. From my observation of Colonel Daggett he is well

qualified for the position.

Very respectfully,

(Sd) WM. R. SHAFTER,

Major-General, U.S. Volunteers.

M.D. CRONIN,

A true copy:

First Lieutenant and Adjutant 25th Infantry.

To this very brilliant official record it is necessary to add but a

word personal. Colonel Daggett is a typical New Englander; tall,

well-formed, nervous and sinewy, a centre of energy, making himself

felt wherever he may be. Precise and forceful of speech, correct and

sincere in manners, a safe counsellor and a loyal friend, his

character approaches the ideal. Stern and commanding as an officer he

is nevertheless tender and sympathetic. His very sensitiveness

concerning the feelings of others embarrasses him in giving expression

to his own feelings on seeing suffering, unless it should be urgent,

but those who know him best know him to be just, humane and tender. No

man could have taken more care than he did for his regiment in Cuba.

Hating oppression and wrong with a vehemency suited to his intense

nature, he nevertheless deplores war and bloodshed. The President of

the United States never did a more worthy act than when he gave to

Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Daggett of the Twenty-fifth Infantry his

commission as Brigadier-General of Volunteers in recognition of his

valor and skill at El Caney and of his general efficiency as an

officer in our army.

TESTIMONIES CONCERNING THE WORK OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH INFANTRY BEFORE EL

CANEY.

Headquarters First District, Southern Luzon,

El Deposito, P.I., April 20, 1900.

My Dear General Daggett:--Some time ago I received a letter

from you asking me to make an official statement as to where

and at what objective the energies and fire of the 25th

Infantry were directed during the battle of El Caney, Cuba,

July 1, 1898.

In reply I have the honor to officially state that about

noon July 1, 1898, the regiment moved from the mango grove,

near the Ducro House, toward a stone fort located on a hill,

near the town of El Caney.

It arrived at about one of the afternoon at a point about

eight hundred yards to the south and east of the fort;

immediately deployed, and the First Battalion, under command

of Captain Walter S. Scott, and of which I was adjutant,

designated as the attacking line. Presently, after advancing

a few yards, we were subjected to a galling fire from the

stone fort, the trenches in its front and from a blockhouse

on its right. The line steadily moved forward, directing its

fire at the stone fort and the trenches surrounding it. When

within about one hundred and fifty yards from the fort the

line was halted, and several sharpshooters, directed by

their company officers to fire at the loopholes. Finally,

when the men had regained their wind, a rush was made, part

of the line going through a cornfield. At the foot the line

was again halted, and after a few moments' rest charged up

the hill, and the fort surrendered.

I went to the fort and found a Spanish lieutenant and seven

enlisted men whom I passed out and were taken charge of by

an officer of the 12th Infantry. This was about 3.50 P.M.

* * * * *

Note.--Since the above was written, General Daggett

served with great distinction in the Philippines and in

China, and was retired as a brigadier-general--a hero

of four wars. A bill is now before Congress to make him

a major-general, an honor to which he is most justly

entitled.

* * * * *

As soon as the line reached the top of the hill it was

fired on from the town, which had before been masked by the

hill; the fire was of course returned, and this was the

first fire from the battalion directed at the town. About

five o'clock firing had ceased, the battalion was assembled

and marched away.

(Sd) H.W. FRENCH,

First Lieutenant, 17th Infantry (late Second Lieutenant 25th

Infantry).

A true copy:

H.G. LEARNARD,

Capt. and Adj. 14th Infantry.

Manila, P.I., March 30, 1900.

I certify that in the action of El Caney, Cuba, July 1,

1898, the company I commanded, i.e., H, 25th Infantry,

directed its fire almost exclusively on the stone fort and

the trench a few yards from its base. That very little of

this company's fire was directed on the town and none before

the fort was carried.

(Sd) VERNON A. CALDWELL,

First Lieutenant, 25th Infantry.

A true copy:

H.G. LEARNARD,

Capt. and Adj. 14th Infantry.

Tayug, Luzon, Philippine Islands,

April 17th, 1900.

To Those in Military Authority.

Regarding the battle of El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898, I

hereby certify:

1. From about 1.20 o'clock P.M. to the time of the capture

of the town of El Caney, I was in command of two

companies--C and G--forming part of the 25th U.S. Infantry

firing line.

2. From about 2.55 o'clock P.M. to the time of the capture

of the town, very nearly the entire 25th Infantry firing

line was under my observation.

3. From about 2.55 o'clock P. M. to about 3.20, the time of

the surrender of the stone fort to the east of the town, the

fire of the entire 25th Infantry firing line within my sight

was directed against the fort.

4. During this period of the battle the 25th Infantry firing

line was about 150 yards from the stone fort.

5. From the time the firing line began firing--about 1

o'clock P.M.--to the time of the surrender of the stone

fort--about 3.20 P.M.--the companies under my command and

all others under my observation concentrated their fire on

the fort.

6. About 3.20 P.M., I was standing about 150 yards from the

stone fort, and I plainly and distinctly saw a Spaniard

appear in the door of the fort, and, for two or three

seconds, wave a white flag at the 25th Infantry firing line,

and upon being shot down, another Spaniard picked up the

flag and likewise waved it at the 25th Infantry firing line.

7. After the white flag had twice been presented to the 25th

Infantry firing line, and after all fire from the stone fort

had ceased, the firing line rushed forward, took up a

position facing to their left--that is, facing the town--and

began a vigorous fire on a small blockhouse and on the town.

Respectfully,

JAMES A. MOSS,

First Lieutenant, 24th U.S. Infantry.

RECOLLECTIONS OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN, BY CAPTAIN R.H.R.

LOUGHBOROUGH, 25TH U.S. INFANTRY.

The 25th U.S. Infantry left its stations in Montana on the

10th of April, 1898; six companies (B, C, D, E, F and H)

went in camp at Chickamauga National Park; the other two

companies (A and G) went to Key West, Fla.

On May 6th the six companies at the Chickamauga National

Park moved by rail to Tampa, Fla., arriving the night of the

7th, where they were joined by the two companies from Key

West. With the exception of three days in 1870, the regiment

had never been together since its organization in 1869. It

necessarily followed that many of the officers, as well as

men, were strangers to each other.

Our camp at Tampa was fair; the ground is sandy and flat,

but as the rainy season had not set in, it was dry and the

health was good. Drills and parades were held daily (Sundays

excepted), but on account of the intense heat the hours for

it were limited to the early mornings and after sunset. The

clothing of the men was the same they had worn in Montana,

and did not add to their comfort. Supplies of all kinds

(except rations) came by piecemeal, and we finally sailed

for the tropics with the same clothing used in the

Northwest.

At 6 o'clock P.M. June 6th the regiment received orders to

strike tents and be ready to move within an hour; the order

was immediately complied with, though the necessary

transportation to move the baggage did not report until the

forenoon of the following day; it was not far from noon when

the last of it left the camp for the railroad station, en

route to Port Tampa, where we were to embark on transports

for the seat of war.

As soon as the camp equipage was started, the regiment was

formed and marched to West Tampa (about three miles), where

we took a train for Port Tampa, distant nine miles. On

arrival, the regiment boarded the steamer "Concho," one of

the vessels to carry the expedition to its destination. The

4th U.S. Infantry had preceded us, and the next day a

battalion of the 2d Massachusetts Volunteers was put on, but

owing to the crowded condition of the ship, a few days later

they were transferred to another vessel.

The "Concho" is a large ship, but without the comforts I

have seen since then on the U.S. Army transports plying

between San Francisco and Manila. The ships used were

hastily fitted up for the occasion, and it could not be

expected that they would be all that was required, but some

of the appointments could and should have been better. After

a tedious wait until June 14th, we sailed down Tampa Bay and

out on the Gulf of Mexico, still in ignorance of our

destination. The evening of the 15th the light at Dry

Tortugas was seen to our right. June 16th, 17th and 18th our

course was a little south of east, and part of the time the

north coast of Cuba was visible. The weather (except the

intense heat) was fine. On Sunday morning, June 18th, we

entered the Windward Passage, and it seemed certain, from

our course, that Santiago was our objective. Early the next

morning the high mountains of Santiago de Cuba were in plain

sight to our north. June 20th and 21st, remained off the

coast; the sea was rough and the vessel rolled considerably,

adding to the discomfort of every one, especially those

subject to seasickness. During the evening of the 21st,

orders were received to be ready to disembark the following

morning. About 8 A.M. on the 22d our warships began shelling

the coast, and two hours later the troops started in small

boats from the transports to the shore. By evening most of

the Second Division and part of the Cavalry Division were on

Cuban soil. There was no opposition to our landing; I

believe that a small force well handled could have made it

very difficult, if, indeed, it could not have prevented it.

As soon as the regiment had landed it was marched out about

four miles and bivouacked for the night. The country is

rugged and covered with a dense tropical vegetation. A few

"Cuban Patriots" had joined us and formed the extreme

advance, saving us some disagreeable outpost duty. This was

the only service that I know of them doing throughout the

campaign, though they were always on hand ration day. Later

developments showed that the service rendered was not so

important, as any Spanish force had retired to a safe place,

something our friends looked out for whenever there was any

danger.

June 23d, the regiment started shortly after daylight

towards the city of Santiago. About 9 o'clock there was a

report that the enemy were in our front. The regiment was

immediately formed for battle, and reconnoitering parties

sent forward; after about thirty minutes' delay the supposed

enemy proved to be the large leaves of some tropical trees

being moved by the wind, giving them the appearance of

persons in motion. Our route was over a narrow trail,

through a dense wilderness; water was scarce and the heat

was intense. About noon we arrived at Siboney, where we

bivouacked for the night. Before daylight next morning the

troops in our rear were heard passing on the trail by our

camp. Shortly after daylight Captain Capron's battery of

four guns passed, and the men lined up along the road and

cheered lustily. About an hour later, musketry fire and the

occasional discharge of a Hotchkiss gun could be plainly

heard towards Santiago. About three-quarters of an hour

later we received orders to march. By mistake, the wrong

trail was taken, and after marching fourteen hours we

returned to our camp of the previous night, all fagged out.

A great many men of the brigade were overcome with heat

during this long, tiresome and fruitless ramble. I cannot

say how many of these were of the 25th Infantry, but in my

own company (B) there was not a man out of the ranks when

the camp was reached. (I have called the above-mentioned

place "Siboney." There is probably some other name for it,

as the Cubans have one for every hamlet. It is not far from

Siboney, and not knowing the name, have called it Siboney.)

On the morning of the 25th we got rations from the transport

and all enjoyed a hearty breakfast. At 1 P.M. we broke camp

and marched to Sevilla, about six miles. Here we remained

until the morning of the 27th, part of the regiment being

out on picket duty. June 27th, the regiment marched three

miles towards Santiago and bivouacked on the banks of a

small creek. Bathing was forbidden, as the creek was the

only water supply for the army. The troops remained at this

place until the afternoon of June 30th. The camp was in the

valley of the creek, the ground is low and flat, and with

the heavy rainfall every one was uncomfortable. Rations had

to be brought from Siboney over a trail and did not arrive

regularly.

About 1 o'clock in the afternoon on the 30th, the officers

of the regiment were assembled at headquarters and were

notified that there would be an attack on the Spanish

position the next morning. About 4 o'clock the regiment

started for its position, arriving after 10 o'clock, having

covered a distance of less than three miles. The route was

over an excuse for a road, but was crowded with some of the

troops of almost every organization of the army, causing

numberless halts, but worse than all, breaking the

much-needed rest of the troops. On one part of this route I

heard men asking, "What regiment is this?" and heard various

responses, as follows: "The W.W.W.'s, the 1st Cavalry, the

4th Infantry, the 10th Cavalry," etc. Some one asked, "What

are the W.W.W.'s?" and some one replied, "Wood's Weary

Walkers." I do not know who is responsible for that

condition of affairs. Had we had an enterprising enemy in

our front, disaster certainly would have followed. Here were

a number of organizations scattered along a narrow, muddy

trail, at the mercy of an active foe. All this was only

three or four miles from the Spanish works. The men were

cheerful, and few if any realized that there might be

danger.

Most of the men were up and moving about before daylight the

next morning. Shortly after, the regiment started in the

direction of El Caney. At 9 A.M. we halted in a mango grove

near the Ducureau mansion. Shortly before noon a mounted

orderly appeared with a message for the brigade commander. A

few minutes later the march towards El Caney was taken up.

Heavy musketry fire had been heard in that direction since

shortly before 7 o'clock. A march of little more than a mile

and the regiment was formed for battle, Companies G and H in

the firing line, C and D in support, the remaining four

companies in reserve.

For two hours or perhaps more the firing was very heavy,

especially during the second hour. Attention is called to

report of Colonel A.S. Daggett, pages 387 and 388, "Report

of the War Department, 1898, Vol. I," and endorsement on

same by Major-General A.R. Chaffee. He says: "This stone

fort was practically in the possession of the 12th Infantry

at about 2 P.M. July 1." I cannot reconcile this statement

with the fact that between the hours named some of the

heaviest firing was going on, which does not indicate that

its defenders were ready to give up. Lord Wellington once

said, "At the end of every campaign truth lies at the bottom

of a deep well, and it often takes twenty years to get her

out." This may not be an exception. About half-past 4

o'clock the firing ceased and El Caney was ours.

The dead were collected near a hedge and the regiment was

formed in column of masses to pay a silent tribute of

respect to our departed comrades.

The regiment then started for the mango grove where we had

left our blanket rolls and haversacks. Just as we were

starting, some men with canteens started for water (about a

mile away), when orders were received to be ready to march

in twenty minutes. A few rods took us back to the road

leading to Santiago. We moved down the road about

three-quarters of a mile and halted. Two hours later, the

pack train arrived with ammunition and then another with

rations. Before the latter were issued orders were issued to

move at once to the rear. The regiment marched over the

trail it had come on the day before, arriving at El Poso

about 8 o'clock A.M. Here we took the road leading to

Santiago. About 9 A.M. we passed under San Juan Hill and

moved to our right. Our forces held the crest of the hill.

In passing along the hill we were sheltered from the fire

except a short space, where one or two men were slightly

wounded. Arriving at the La Cruz house near the road leading

from El Caney to Santiago about 3.30 P.M. and bivouacked for

the night. About 10 o'clock the troops on our left were

attacked by the Spanish. The firing was very heavy for an

hour, when it suddenly ceased, and we retired for the night.

During this time we were under the hill and protected from

the fire.

Next morning (Sunday, July 3d) desultory firing began at

daylight. About 7 A.M. the regiment left the La Cruz house

and moved across the Caney-Santiago road and formed line to

the left and moved forward to a ridge overlooking the city.

A number of shots fell about us, but no one was struck.

Shortly after, we were in possession of the ridge and began

intrenching. The firing was kept up and two men were

wounded. About noon we were informed that a truce had been

established and all work was stopped. This gave all a

much-needed rest, though it proved to be of short duration,

caused by a false alarm by Major Webb, the inspector of the

division staff.

During the afternoon the regiment was moved to the foot of

the ridge, leaving only the pickets on the crest. About 8.30

P.M. we were ordered to the picket line and began

intrenching. The tall grass was wet from a drenching rain a

few hours before. The ground, though wet, was hard, and slow

progress was made, having only their bayonets for picks and

their bare hands for shovels. All night this work went on.

The men were tired, and hungry (as rations had not come up

that day), but worked faithfully. During this, and I will

add, throughout the campaign, I never heard a murmur nor a

complaint; even when almost all the men of the regiment were

down with fever and bowel trouble they were cheerful and

ready to do any duty they were called on for.

The morning of July 3d Cervera's fleet sailed down the bay.

An officer rode by our part of the line about half-past 9

and informed us of it. A few minutes later we heard the roar

of the big guns, though at the time I little thought of what

was going on. In the afternoon we heard cheering on our line

way to the left, and as the good news came along it was

taken up, and soon the whole line was shouting.

On the morning of July 5th the non-combatants left Santiago

by two roads, one passing through our line. It was a pitiful

sight. During the forenoon of the 5th we moved about a mile

to the right and began intrenching. This position was very

near the Spanish line, and quite elaborate works were

constructed. We remained in this position until the morning

of the 11th, when the regiment was ordered to the right of

the line, about three miles. Here we intrenched. About 1

P.M. a truce was announced.

At 9.15 P.M. a staff officer came to the regimental

commander's tent and informed him that the regiment was to

be on the line at 12 o'clock midnight, and as soon as the

moon rose to advance through the jungle until fired on, when

the line was to halt and intrench. The night was stormy and

any moon there might have been was obscured by the clouds.

We were up, however, standing until daylight in a drenching

rain, for it was so dark that any movement was impossible.

Our rest was broken, without accomplishing anything that I

know or heard of.

However, the rain and storm were providential, for I will

always believe if the movement had been started we should

have met with disaster. The ground was broken, deep ravines

and underbrush with wire fences running through it. I have

never learned who was "the father" of this order, and

possibly never will. He must be ashamed of it.

The afternoon of the 12th the regiment advanced several

hundred yards to the front and dug more intrenchments. They

were still on this work the afternoon of the 14th when it

was announced that the Spanish army had agreed to surrender.

This came none too soon, for our men were coming down with

malarial fever. A few days later nearly half the regiment

were on the sick list, and the balance could not have done

much.

The regiment was moved the same afternoon to higher ground

in rear of the trenches. Strong guards were kept to look out

for our prisoners and to prevent "our allies," the Cubans,

from going into the city.

On the morning of the 17th the formal surrender of the city

and Spanish army took place. We were some distance away and

did not see anything of the ceremony.

On July 25th the regiment was moved about a mile further

back in the hills and made camp, our tents, etc., having

been brought up from the transport. Medicines appeared very

scarce, resulting in much suffering. The food supplied was

totally unfit for our new surroundings, and I believe not a

little of the sickness can be traced to this. Our last camp

was as good as any to be found in that vicinity.

The regiment remained in camp until August 13th, when it

embarked on the transport "Camanche" for Montauk Point,

arriving on the 18th, and landed on the 23d.

B.H.R. LOUGHBOROUGH,

Captain, 25th Infantry.

FOOTNOTES:

[18] First Lieutenant McCorkle killed; Captain Edwards and First

Lieutenants Kinnison and Murdock wounded.