PASSAGE, LANDING, AND FIRST BATTLE IN CUBA.
The Tenth Cavalry at Guasimas--The "Rescue of the Rough
Riders"--Was There an Ambush?--Notes.
"The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful," says
General Shafter in his official report. But when the fact is called to
mind that the men had been on board a week before sailing, and were a
week more on the passage, and that "the conveniences on many of the
transports in the nature of sleeping accommodations, space for
exercise, closet accommodations, etc., were not all that could have
been desired," and that the opinion was general throughout the army
that the travel ration was faulty, it cannot be doubted that the trip
was a sore trial to the enlisted men at least. The monotonous days
passed in the harbor at Port Tampa, while waiting for orders to sail,
were unusually trying to the men. They were relieved somewhat by
bathing, swimming, gaming and chatting on the coming events. A soldier
who was in one of the colored regiments describes the inside life of
one of the transports as follows: "After some miles of railroad travel
and much hustling we were put on board the transport. I say _on
board_, but it is simply because we cannot use the terms _under
board_. We were huddled together below two other regiments and under
the water line, in the dirtiest, closest, most sickening place
imaginable. For about fifteen days we were on the water in this dirty
hole, but being soldiers we were compelled to accept this without a
murmur. We ate corn beef and canned tomatoes with our hard bread
until we were anything but half way pleased. In the fifth or sixth day
out to sea the water furnished us became muddy or dirty and well
flavored with salt, and remained so during the rest of the journey.
Then, the ship's cooks, knowing well our condition made it convenient
to themselves to sell us a glass of clean ice water and a small piece
of bread and tainted meat for the sum of seventy-five cents, or one
dollar, as the case might be."
A passage from Port Tampa, around the eastern end of Cuba, through the
Windward Passage, even in June, is ordinarily pleasant. On the deck of
a clean steamer, protected from the sun's rays by a friendly awning,
it may be put down as nearly an ideal pleasure trip; but crowded into
freight ships as these men were, many of them clad in thick and
uncomfortable clothing, reduced to the uninviting travel ration,
compelled to spend most of the time below decks, occupied with
thoughts of home and friends, and beset with forebodings of coming
events, it was very far from being to them a pastime. Of the thousands
who are going to Cuba to magnify the American flag, not all will
return. Occasionally the gay music of the bands would relieve the dull
routine and cause the spirits to rise under the effects of some
enlivening waltz or stirring patriotic air; or entering a school of
flying fish the men would be entertained to see these broad-finned
creatures dart from the waves like arrows from the bow, and after a
graceful flight of perhaps near two hundred yards drop again into the
sea; but taken altogether it was a voyage that furnishes little for
the historian.
The transports were so arranged as to present an interesting and
picturesque spectacle as they departed from our shores on their ocean
march. Forming in three columns, with a distance of about 1,000 yards
between the columns, and the vessels in the columns being distanced
from one another about 400 yards, the fleet was convoyed from Port
Tampa by small naval vessels until it reached a point between the Dry
Tortugas and Key West. Here it was met by the noble battleship Indiana
and nine other war vessels, thus making a convoy altogether of fifteen
fighting craft. Transports and convoy now made an armada of more than
forty ships, armed and manned by the audacious modern republic whose
flag waved from every masthead. Thus spreading out over miles of
smooth sea, moving quietly along by steam, carrying in its arms the
flower of the American army, every man of which was an athlete, this
fleet announced to the world the grim purpose of a nation aroused.
The weather from the time of leaving Port Tampa continued fine until
the fleet entered the passage between the western coast of Hayti and
the eastern end of Cuba, known as the Windward Passage, when the
breeze freshened and a rough sea began, continuing more or less up to
the time of landing. Rounding this eastern coast of Cuba the fleet
headed its course westerly and on the morning of the 20th was able to
determine its position as being off Guantanamo Bay, about fifty miles
east of Santiago. Here, eight days before, the first battle on Cuban
soil, in which four American marines were killed, had been fought.
About noon on the same day, the fleet came to a halt off Santiago
harbor, or a little to the west of the entrance to it, and Admiral
Sampson came on board. He and General Shafter soon after went ashore
to consult the Cuban General, Garcia, who was known to be in that
vicinity with about 4,000 well armed troops.
The voyage over, and the men having been crowded together on
shipboard for nearly two weeks, it was now expedient to get them on
shore as soon as possible. But it was necessary to find out beforehand
what defences were along the coast, and what forces of the enemy were
likely to be encountered in landing. The fleet lay off from the shore
about a mile, and it was no small undertaking to convey the 17,000 men
on board with all their arms and equipments to the shore in small
boats over a rough sea, especially should the landing be disputed. It
was to arrange for the landing and also to map out a general plan of
campaign that the three great leaders, Shafter, Sampson and Garcia met
at Aserradores on the afternoon of June 20th as the American fleet
stood guard over the harbor of Santiago.
General Garcia was already aware of the coming of the fleet, having
received a message from Major-General Miles two weeks previous. The
letter of General Miles ran as follows:
Headquarters of the Army,
In the Field, Tampa, Fla., June 2, 1898.
Dear General:--I am very glad to have received your
officers, General Enrique Collazo and Lieut.-Col. Carlos
Hernandez, the latter of whom returns to-night with our best
wishes for your success.
It would be a very great assistance if you could have as
large a force as possible in the vicinity of the harbor of
Santiago de Cuba, and communicate any information by signals
which Colonel Hernandez will explain to you either to our
navy or to our army on its arrival, which we hope will be
before many days.
It would also assist us very much if you could drive in and
harass any Spanish troops near or in Santiago de Cuba,
threatening or attacking them at all points, and preventing,
by every means, any possible re-enforcement coming to that
garrison. While this is being done, and before the arrival
of our army, if you can seize and hold any commanding
position to the east or west of Santiago de Cuba, or both,
that would be advantageous for the use of our artillery, it
will be exceedingly gratifying to us."
To this General Garcia replied that he would "take measures at once to
carry out your (Miles') recommendation, but concentration of forces
will require some time. Roads bad and Cubans scattered. Will march
without delay." Admiral Sampson also cabled the Secretary of the Navy
that Garcia "regards his (Miles') wishes and suggestions as orders,
and immediately will take measures to concentrate forces at the points
indicated, but he is unable to do so as early as desired on account of
his expedition at Banes Port, Cuba, but will march without delay. All
of his subordinates are ordered to assist to disembark the United
States troops and to place themselves under orders." It was in
compliance with these requests that General Garcia had the five
thousand troops so near Santiago at the time he welcomed Shafter and
Sampson to his camp, as mentioned above, and there is every necessary
evidence that these Cuban troops took part in the fight about
Santiago. Says General Miles of Garcia: "He had troops in the rear as
well as on both sides of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival
of our troops."
It was agreed that the force of five hundred men under General
Castillo, posted near Daiquiri, should be increased to 1,000, and
should be prepared to make an attack upon the rear of the Spanish
garrison at Daiquiri on the morning of the 22nd, at which time the
debarkation would begin. General Rabi with about 500 men was also to
attack Cabanas at the same time, in the same manner, the transports
and war vessels so manoeuvring as to give the impression that a
landing was to be made at that place. While these attacks in the rear
were distracting the garrisons, the navy, by order of Admiral Sampson,
was to start up a vigorous bombardment of all the villages along the
coast, thus clearing the shore for the landing of the army. Thus did
the conference unite the hands of Americans and Cubans in the fight
against Spain on Cuban soil, and each was pledged to the other by the
expressions of good will. Having accomplished its work the important
conference closed, Admiral Sampson and General Shafter to return to
their ships, and General Garcia to carry out the part of the work
assigned to him, which he did with fidelity and success.[15]
According to orders published on the 20th, General Lawton's Division,
known as the Second Division, Fifth Army Corps, was to disembark
first. This Division contained the three following Brigades: The
First, General Ludlow's, composed of the Eighth and Twenty-second
Infantry (regulars) and the Second Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry;
the Second Brigade, General Miles', composed of the Fourth and
Twenty-fifth Infantry (regulars); the Third Brigade, General
Chaffee's, containing the Seventh, Twelfth and Seventeenth Infantry
(regulars). Next to follow was General Bates' Brigade, which was to
act as reserve to Lawton's Division. This Brigade consisted of the
Third and Twentieth Infantry (regulars) and one squadron of the Second
Cavalry, the only mounted troops in Shafter's army. The cavalry,
however, were not to disembark with the Brigade, but were to be the
last troops to leave the transports. After Bates' Brigade, was to
follow Wheeler's Dismounted Cavalry Division, containing the two
following Brigades: The First, composed of the Third, Sixth and Ninth
Cavalry (regulars); the Second, composed of the First and Tenth
Cavalry (regulars) and the First Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders). To
follow the Cavalry Division was to come the First Division, General
Kent's, containing the following troops: The First Brigade, General
Hawkins', consisting of the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry (regulars)
and the Seventy-first New York Volunteer Infantry; the Second Brigade,
General Pearson's, consisting of the Second, Tenth and Twenty-first
Infantry (regulars); the Third Brigade, Colonel Wikoffs, made up of
the Ninth, Thirteenth and Twenty-fourth Infantry (regulars). Then,
lastly, was to depart the squadron of mounted cavalry.
Thus prepared, both on board the ships and on shore, the morning of
the 22nd dawned to witness the beginning of mighty operations. The war
vessels, drawn up in proper order, early began to hurl shot and shell
upon the towns, forts, blockhouses and clumps of trees that could be
discovered along the shore. The cannonading lasted between two and
three hours and was furious throughout. Meanwhile General Lawton's
Division began the work of going ashore. The sea was rough and the
passage to the shore was made in small boats furnished from the
transports and from the naval vessels, towed by steam launches
belonging to the navy. The larger of the boats were capable of
carrying ten or twelve men each, while the smaller ones could carry
but six or seven. During the passage to the shore several of the men
who had escaped thus far, were taken with seasickness, greatly to the
amusement of their more hardy companions. The landing was made at a
pier which had been used formerly as a railroad pier, but was now
abandoned and somewhat dilapidated. To get from the boats to the pier
in this rough sea was the most perilous part of the whole trip from
Tampa to Cuba. As the boats would rise on the waves almost level with
the landing place it was necessary to leap quickly from the boat to
the shore. In this way two cavalrymen of the Tenth lost their lives,
falling into the sea with their equipments on and sinking before help
could reach them. Some of the boats were rowed ashore and made a
landing on the beach some distance from the pier. By this method some
men of the Twenty-fifth tried to be the first to land, but failed,
that regiment landing, however, in the first body of troops to go
ashore, and being the second in order, in the invasion of the island.
By night of the 22nd more than one-third of the troops were on shore,
and by the evening of the 24th the whole army was disembarked
according to the program announced at the beginning, the squadron of
cavalry coming in at the close of the march to the shore.
The only national movement on our part deserving to be brought into
comparison with the expedition against the Spanish power in Cuba, is
that of fifty years earlier, when General Scott sailed at the head of
the army of invasion against Mexico. Some of the occurrences of that
expedition, especially connected with its landing, should be carefully
studied, and if the reports which have reached the public concerning
it are truthful, we would do well to consider how far the methods then
in use could be applied now. Scribner's recent history, published just
before the outbreak of the Spanish War, tells the story of that
expedition, so far as it tells it at all, in the following sentence:
"On the 7th of March, the fleet with Scott's army came to anchor a few
miles south of Vera Cruz, and two days later he landed his whole
force--nearly twelve thousand men--by means of surf-boats." A writer
in a recent number of _The Army and Navy Journal_ says General Worth's
Division of 4,500 men were landed in one hour, and the whole force was
landed in six hours, without accident or confusion. In the prosecution
of that unholy war, which lasted about a year, nearly three thousand
men were lost in battle and about as many more by disease, peace being
finally made by the cession of territory on the part of Mexico, the
United States paying in return much more than the territory was
worth. The twenty millions paid to Texas probably in great part went
into the coffers of the patriots who occupied that region, some of
whom had not been known as desirable citizens in the parts from which
they came, and had manifested their patriotism by leaving their
country for their country's good. The fifteen millions handed over to
Mexico looks like a contribution to a conscience fund, and an
atonement offered for an assault without provocation. The country
gained Arizona, New Mexico, California and finally Texas, but it lost
six thousand good men, the cost of the war, and all told, in
negotiations, about thirty million dollars, besides. However, it is
not always profitable to look up the harvests of war. There are always
two--the harvest of gain, and the harvest of loss. Death and debt are
reapers, as well as are honor and extent of territory.
The feelings of the six thousand American troops who landed on Cuban
soil on June 22nd, 1898, may well be imagined. Although they felt the
effects of the confinement to which they had been subjected while on
shipboard, there was very little sickness among them. Again possessed
of the free use of their limbs they swarmed the beach and open space
near the landing, making themselves at home, and confronting the
difficulties and perils that lay before them with a courage born of
national pride. Before them were the mountains with their almost
impassable roads, the jungles filled with poisonous plants and the
terrible prickly underbrush and pointed grass, in which skulked the
land crab and various reptiles whose bite or sting was dangerous;
twenty miles of this inhospitable country lay between them and
Santiago, their true objective. And somewhere on the road to that city
they knew they were destined to meet a well-trained foe, skilled in
all the arts of modern warfare, who would contest their advance. The
prospect, however, did not unnerve them, although they could well
conjecture that all who landed would not re-embark. Some in that six
thousand were destined never again to set foot on shipboard. Out of
the Twenty-fifth Infantry and the Tenth Cavalry men were to fall both
before Spanish bullets and disease ere these organizations should
assemble to return to their native shores. These thoughts did not
prevent the men from taking advantage of what nature had to offer
them.
"We landed in rowboats, amid, and after the cessation of the
bombardment of the little hamlet and coast by the men-of-war and
battle-ships," writes a brave soldier of the Twenty-fifth Infantry,
and adds immediately: "We then helped ourselves to cocoanuts which we
found in abundance near the landing." Ordinarily this statement, so
trivial and apparently unimportant, would not merit repetition, but in
its connection here it is significant as showing the immediate
tendency of the men to resort to the fruits of the country, despite
all warnings to the contrary. The two weeks' experience on board the
transports had made the finding of cocoanuts an event to be noted, and
the dry pulp and strongly flavored milk of this tropical fruit became
extremely grateful to the palate, even if not altogether safe for the
stomach. If ripe, however, the cocoanut could scarcely be more
ungenial to many, than the raw, canned tomatoes upon which they had in
part subsisted during the voyage. It is to be added that this report
of the finding of the cocoanuts is not the report of an old soldier,
but of a young and intelligent, first enlistment man.
Lawton's Division soon after landing, was ordered to move forward in
the direction of Santiago, on the road leading past Siboney. A staff
officer, writing of that movement, says: "General Lawton, with his
Division, in obedience to this order, pushed forward from Daiquiri
about five miles, when night overtook him and he bivouacked on the
road." An old soldier of the Twenty-fifth, writing me from the
hospital in Tampa, Florida, July 22nd, says of the same event: "After
the regiment landed we marched about four and a half miles through the
mountains; then we made camp." The old soldier says nothing of
cocoanuts, but makes his statement with as much accuracy as possible,
and with no waste of words. The novice describing the same thing says:
"A short distance ahead (from the shore) we bivouacked for the night.
We were soon lying in dreamland, so far from friends and home, indeed,
on a distant, distant shore." These two extracts show at once the
difference between the soldier produced by years of trial and training
on our plains, and the soldier who but yesterday was a civilian. With
the one the march is a short distance; with the other it is about four
and a half miles; one reports that they "made camp," the other talks
of dreamland, friend, home and distant shore; one expresses his
feelings, the other shows control of feeling and reserve in
expression.
That first night on Cuban soil, the night following June 22nd, was one
without events, but one of great concern to the commanders on shore
and on the fleet. The work of disembarking had gone on successfully,
and already about six thousand men were on shore. Nearly the whole of
Lawton's Division, with Bates' independent brigade, were bivouacked,
as we have seen, about five miles from Daiquiri, exactly where the
railroad crosses the wagon road leading to Siboney. General Wheeler's
troops--one brigade--were encamped on the open ground near the
landing, the remainder of his division being still on the transports.
The Twenty-fifth Infantry was with Lawton; the Tenth Cavalry was
ashore with Wheeler's troops. A detachment of the Twenty-fifth was put
on outpost duty on that night of their landing, and five miles within
Cuban territory they tramped their solitary beats, establishing and
guarding the majestic authority of the United States.
Lawton's orders were to seize and hold the town of Siboney at which
place Kent's Division, containing the Twenty-fourth, was to land. It
was then intended that the whole army should advance as rapidly as
would be consistent with supplying the men with rations toward
Santiago. Siboney was to be the base of supplies, and from this point
ammunition and food were to be conveyed to the front by wagons and
pack trains. General Shafter also intended that Lawton with his
division should lead the advance upon Santiago, but circumstances
beyond his control brought about a different result. On the morning of
the 23rd Lawton's division was in motion early, and before half-past
ten o'clock he was able to report that the Spaniards had evacuated
Siboney and were in full retreat, pursued by a body of Cubans under
direction of General Castillo; that the town was in his hands, and he
had also captured one locomotive and nearly one hundred cars loaded
with coal.
General Young's brigade of General Wheeler's cavalry division, got on
shore on the afternoon of the 23rd and after landing received verbal
orders to move out with three days' rations "to a good camping place
between Juraguacito and Siboney, on the road leading to Santiago de
Cuba." In obedience to these orders, at 4.30 in the afternoon Young
with the Rough Riders and a squadron from each of the First and Tenth
Regular Cavalry moved from the bivouack near the landing and arrived
at Siboney at about 7 o'clock. When General Young arrived at Siboney
he had with him the Rough Riders, the other troops having been delayed
by the crowded condition of the trail and the difficulty of following
after nightfall. Although these troops are always spoken of as
cavalry, the reader must not forget that they were dismounted and in
marching and fighting were the same as infantry.
General Young on arriving at Siboney reported to General Wheeler, who
had preceded him to the same place. The statements of the several
commanders here appear somewhat conflicting, although not
inexplicable. General Lawton says: "Yesterday afternoon, late, General
Wheeler and staff arrived and established his headquarters within the
limits of my command. Saw him after dark. Late last night Colonel
Wood's regiment of dismounted cavalry (Rough Riders) passed through my
camp at Division Headquarters, and later General Young, with some of
the dismounted Cavalry, and early this morning others of the
dismounted cavalry." Wheeler says that "in obedience to instructions
from the Major-General Commanding," given to him in person, he
proceeded, on June 23rd, to Siboney, but does not say at what hour. He
says he "rode out to the front and found that the enemy had halted and
established themselves at a point about three miles from Siboney." He
then informs us that "at 8 o'clock on that evening of the 23rd General
Young reached Siboney with eight troops of Colonel Wood's regiment (A,
B, D, E, F, G, K and L), 500 strong; Troops A, B, G and K, of the
First Cavalry, in all 244, and Troops A, B, E and I, of the Tenth
Cavalry, in all 220 men, making a total force of 964 men, which
included nearly all of my command which had disembarked. These troops
had marched from Daiquiri, 11 miles. With the assistance of General
Castillo a rough map of the country was prepared and the position of
the enemy fully explained, and I determined to make an attack."
Lieutenant Miley says that the whole brigade of Wheeler's troops
arrived in Siboney about dark and were occupying the same ground as
General Lawton ("In Cuba With Shafter," p. 76.) General Young says
that after reporting to General Wheeler he "asked and obtained from
General Wheeler authority to make a reconnoisance in force" for the
purpose of obtaining "positive information * * * as to the position
and movements of the enemy in front."
The distance from Daiquiri to Siboney was but eleven miles, and as the
troops left the former place at 4.30 it is probable that they were all
bivouacked near Siboney before 9 o'clock, as they were all together,
according to General Wheeler's report, at 5.45 on the morning of the
24th. General Young having discovered that there were two roads or
trails leading from Siboney northward toward the town of Sevilla
determined to make his reconnoisance by both these trails. He directed
Colonel Wood to move by the western trail and to keep a careful
lookout and to attack any Spaniards he might encounter, being careful
to join his right in the event of an engagement, with the left of the
column advancing by the eastern trail. Colonel Wood's column was the
left column and was composed of the Rough Riders only. The column
marching by the eastern trail was composed of the First and Tenth
Cavalry (regulars) and was under the command of General Young. It was
the intention of General Young by this column to gain the enemy's
left, and thus attack in front and left. As early as 7.20 a.m. Captain
Mills discovered the enemy exactly as had been described by General
Castillo. When this was done word was sent to Colonel Wood, who was
making his way to the front over a more difficult route than the one
by which General Young's column had marched. A delay was therefore
made on the part of General Young in order that the attack should
begin on both flanks at the same time. During this delay General
Wheeler arrived and was informed of the plans and dispositions for the
attack, and after examining the position gave his approval of what
had been done, whereupon General Young ordered the attack. General
Wheeler in speaking of the same event says: "General Young and myself
examined the position of the enemy. The lines were deployed and I
directed him to open fire with the Hotchkiss gun. The enemy replied
and the firing immediately became general." There can be no question
as to the planning of this fight nor as to the direction of the
American force in the fight so far as any general direction was
possible. Colonel Wood directed one column and General Young another,
while the plan of the attack undoubtedly originated with General
Young. General Wheeler conveys as much when he says: "General Young
deserves special commendation for his cool deliberate and skillful
management." General Young, if only the commander of the right column
consisting of two squadrons of regular cavalry, had not as large a
command, nor as difficult and important a one as had Colonel Wood, and
hence is not deserving of special commendation except upon the general
ground that he had supervision over the whole battle. This position is
taken by General Shafter in his report, who though admitting the
presence of the Division Commander, credits the battle to General
Young, the commander of the brigade. The reconnoissance in force for
which Young had obtained authority from General Wheeler on the night
of the 23rd had developed into a battle, and the plan had evolved
itself from the facts discovered. This plan General Wheeler approved,
but in no such way as to take the credit from its originator; and it
is doubtless with reference both to the plan and the execution that he
bestows on General Young the mead of praise. This statement of fact
does not in the least detract from either the importance or the
praiseworthiness of the part played by Colonel Wood. Both he and the
officers and men commanded by him received both from General Young
and from the division commander the most generous praise. The advance
of Wood's column was made with great difficulty owing to the nature of
the ground, and according to General Young's belief, he was in the
rear when at 7.20 in the morning Captain Mills discovered the enemy,
and a Cuban guide was dispatched to warn Wood, and a delay made to
allow time for him to come up. Colonel Wood, on the other hand, claims
to have discovered the enemy at 7.10 and to have begun action almost
immediately, so that it turned out as Young had planned, and "the
attack of both wings was simultaneous." The Spaniards were posted on a
range of high hills in the form of a "V," the opening being toward
Siboney, from which direction the attack came.
From Colonel Wood's report it appears that soon after the firing began
he found it necessary to deploy five troops to the right, and left,
leaving three troops in reserve. The enemy's lines being still beyond
his, both on the right and on the left, he hastily deployed two more
troops, which made the lines now about equal in length. The firing was
now "exceedingly heavy," and much of it at short range, but on account
of the thick underbrush it was not very effective; "comparatively few
of our men were injured." Captain Capron at this time received his
mortal wound and the firing became so terrific that the last remaining
troop of the reserve was absorbed by the firing line, and the whole
regiment ordered to advance very slowly. The Spanish line yielded and
the advance soon showed that in falling back the enemy had taken a new
position, about three hundred yards in front of the advancing
regiment. Their lines extended from 800 to 1,000 yards, and the firing
from their front was "exceedingly heavy" and effective. A "good many
men" were wounded, "and several officers," says Colonel Wood's
report. Still the advance was kept up, and the Spanish line was
steadily forced back. "We now began," says Colonel Wood, "to get a
heavy fire from a ridge on our right, which enfiladed our line." The
reader can at once see that although the Rough Riders were advancing
heroically, they were now in a very serious situation, with an
exceedingly heavy and effective fire striking them in front, and a
heavy, enfilading fire raking them from the right. Their whole
strength was on the line, and these two fires must have reduced their
effectiveness with great rapidity had it kept up, the Spaniards having
their range and firing by well-directed volleys. It was for the
regiment a moment of the utmost peril. Had they been alone they must
have perished.
It was from this perilous situation of Colonel Wood's command that one
of the most popular stories of the war originated, a story that
contained some truth, but which was often told in such a way as to
cause irritation, and in some instances it was so exaggerated or
mutilated in the telling as to be simply ridiculous. On the day after
the battle the story was told in Lawton's camp according to the
testimony of an intelligent soldier of the Twenty-fifth Infantry. His
words are: "The next day about noon we heard that the Tenth Cavalry
had met the enemy and that the Tenth Cavalry had rescued the Rough
Riders. We congratulated ourselves that although not of the same
branch of service, we were of the same color, and that to the eye of
the enemy we, troopers and footmen, all looked alike." According to
artists and cheap newspaper stories this rescuing occurred again and
again. A picture is extensively advertized as "an actual and
authoritative presentation of this regiment (the Tenth Cavalry) as it
participated in that great struggle, and their heroic rescue of the
Rough Riders on that memorable _July_ day." This especial rescuing
took place on _San Juan Hill_. The editor of a religious paper
declares that it was the _Twenty-fifth Infantry_ that rescued the
Rough Riders and that it was done at _El Caney_![16]
Before we go any farther let us see just what the Tenth Cavalry did do
in this fight. That their action was highly meritorious admits of no
doubt, and the laurels they won were never allowed to fade during the
whole campaign. General Wheeler speaks of them with the First Cavalry.
He says: "I was immediately with the troops of the First and Tenth
Regular Cavalry, dismounted, and personally noticed their brave and
good conduct." There were four troops of the Tenth engaged, composing
the First Squadron of that regiment, under command of Major Norval.
Troop A was commanded by Captain W.H. Beck, who was specially
commended by General Wheeler for good conduct. Second Lieutenant F.R.
McCoy was Captain Beck's assistant. This troop moved over to the left,
receiving the fire of the enemy, but making no response, the distance
being too great for effective carbine firing. This troop reached
Colonel Wood's right and made the line continuous so that there was
now a force in front of that ridge where the Spaniards were securely
entrenched and from which they were pouring their enfilading fire upon
Colonel Wood's line. Troop A, although coming into the line, did not
fire. Their presence, however, gave the Rough Riders the assurance
that their flank was saved. Troop E was commanded by Captain C.G.
Ayres with Second Lieutenant George Vidmar. This troop was placed by
General Young in support of Captain Watson's two Hotchkiss guns, and
also of the troops in their front. The troop was under fire one hour
and a quarter, during which they were in plain view of the Spaniards,
who also had their exact range. One man was killed and one wounded.
Their courage, coolness and discipline in this trying hour and a
quarter were of the very highest order. The troop commander says:
"Their coolness and fine discipline were superb." This troop did not
fire a shot. Thus one-half of the squadron moved to its positions and
held them without being able to do any damage to the enemy, as they
were carrying out to the letter their instructions, which were to fire
only when they could see the enemy. Troop B was commanded by Captain
J.W. Watson with H.O. Willard as Second Lieutenant. A detachment of
this troop was placed in charge of four Hotchkiss mountain guns. This
detachment opened fire upon the enemy, using the ammunition sparingly,
as they had but fifty rounds with them. Twenty-two shots were fired,
apparently with effect. The remainder of the troop under Lieutenant
Williard was ordered to move out to the extreme right, which would
place it beyond the line of the First Cavalry, thus bringing that
regiment between Troop A of the Tenth, which connected it with the
Rough Riders and Troop B, which was to be on its extreme right.
Lieutenant Williard's report of this movement is as follows:
"I ordered the troop forward at once, telling them to take
advantage of all cover available. In the meantime the
volleys from the Spanish were coming in quite frequently and
striking the ground on all sides near where we were. I found
it very difficult to move the men forward after having found
cover, and ran back to a portion of the troop near an old
brick wall, and ordered them forward at once. They then made
a dash forward, and in doing so three or four men were
wounded, Private Russell severely. Who the others were I do
not know. We encountered a severe fire directly after this
move forward; and Private Wheeler was wounded in the left
leg. There was a wire fence on our right, and such thick
underbrush that we were unable to get through right there,
so had to follow along the fence for some distance before
being able to penetrate. Finally, was able to get the
greater proportion of my men through, and about this time I
met Lieutenants Fleming and Miller, Tenth Cavalry, moving
through the thicket at my left. I there heard the order
passed on 'not to fire ahead,' as there was danger of firing
into our own forces. In the meantime there was shouting from
the First Cavalry in our front, 'Don't fire on us in rear.'
My troop had not fired a shot to my knowledge, nor the
knowledge of any non-commissioned officers in the troop.
About this time I found I was unable to keep the troop
deployed, as they would huddle up behind one rock or tree,
so I gave all sergeants orders to move out on the extreme
right and to keep in touch with those on their left. Then,
with a squad of about five men, I moved to the right front,
and was unfortunate enough to lose the troop, i.e., I could
see nothing of them except the men with me.
"But as I had given explicit instructions to my sergeant, in
case I was lost from them, to continue to advance until
halted by some one in authority, I moved ahead myself,
hoping to find them later on. In making a rush forward three
men of my squad were lost from me in some way. I still had
two men with me, Privates Combs and Jackson, and in the next
advance made I picked up a First Cavalry sergeant who had
fallen out from exhaustion. After a terrific climb up the
ridge in front of me, and a very regular though ineffective
fire from the enemy kept up until we were about sixty yards
from the summit of hill, we reached the advance line of the
First United States Cavalry, under command of Captain
Wainwright. I then reported to him for orders, and moved
forward when he next advanced. The firing had ceased, and no
more shots were fired, to my knowledge, after this time.
With the First Cavalry, Troop G, we followed along the right
of the ridge and came down to the right front, encountering
no opposition or fire from the enemy, but finding the
enemy's breastworks in confusion, ammunition and articles of
clothing scattered around; also one dead Spaniard and two
Mauser rifles. At the foot of the ridge we met some of the
First Volunteer Cavalry, and being utterly exhausted, I was
obliged to lie down. Soon after, Captain Mills,
adjutant-general of Second Brigade, Cavalry Division, came
up to where I was and placed me in command of Troop K, First
United States Cavalry, whose officers were wounded. I then
marched them forward on the road to where General Wheeler
was sitting, and received orders from Colonel Wood, First
Volunteer Cavalry, to remain until further orders and make
no further advance. Directly afterwards, learning the action
was over, I reported back to General Young, and received
orders to remain camped with the First Cavalry Squadron,
where the action had closed. In the meantime, I should have
stated that I found the principal part of my troop and
collected them and left them under the first sergeant, when
I went back to receive orders. So far as I know, and to the
best of my knowledge, the men of my troop acted with the
greatest bravery, advancing on an enemy who could not be
seen, and subjected to a severe and heavy fire at each step,
which was only rendered ineffective to a great degree by the
poor marksmanship of the enemy, as many times we were in
sight of them (I discovered this by observation after the
engagement) while we could see nothing. We were also
subjected to a severe reverse fire from the hills in our
right rear, several men being wounded by this fire.
Throughout the fight the men acted with exceptional
coolness, in my judgment. The casualties were: Privates
Russell, Braxton and Morris, severely wounded; Privates F.A.
Miller, Grice, Wheeler and Gaines, slightly wounded, i.e.,
less severely. None killed.
Very respectfully,
HENRY O. WILLIARD.
June 24, 1898.
Troop B, Tenth Cavalry, during action near La Guasima,
Second Lieutenant, Tenth United States Cavalry, Commanding.
Troop I of the Tenth Cavalry was commanded by First Lieutenant R.J.
Fleming with Second Lieutenant A.M. Miller. This troop moved to the
right and wedged in between B Troop and the right of the First
Cavalry. Lieutenant Fleming discovered the enemy posted on the high
ridge immediately in front of his troop, and also extending to his
right, in front of B Troop. Moving his troop a little to the right so
as to secure room to advance without coming in contact with the First
Cavalry, he then directed his course straight toward the hill on which
he had located the enemy. The advance was made with great caution, the
men seeking cover wherever possible, and dashing across the open
spaces at full run. Thus they moved until the base of the steep part
of the hill was reached. This was found very difficult of ascent, not
only because of the rugged steepness, but also on account of the
underbrush, and the sharp-leaved grass, the cacti and Spanish bayonet,
that grow on all these hillsides. Paths had to be cut through these
prickly obstructions with knives and sabres. Consequently the advance
up that hill, though free from peril, was very slow and trying. Twice
during the advance the men obtained a view of their enemies and were
permitted to fire. The instructions were rigidly adhered to: No firing
only at the visible foe. Lieutenant Fleming says: "Owing to the
underbrush it was impossible for me to see but a very few men at a
time, but as they all arrived on the crest about the time I did, or
shortly after, they certainly advanced steadily." He says: "The entire
troop behaved with great coolness and obeyed every order." Farrier
Sherman Harris, Wagoner John Boland and Private Elsie Jones especially
distinguished themselves for coolness and gallantry. The aggressive
work of the Tenth Cavalry, therefore, appears to have been done by
Troops B and I, a detachment of the former troop serving the Hotchkiss
gun battery. Troop I was commanded by Lieutenant Fleming and by him
conducted to the front, although he admits that in their advance up
the slope of the hill he could see but very few of the men at a time,
and declares that their advance was certainly steady, because all
arrived at the crest of the hill simultaneously or nearly so.
Lieutenant Fleming does not show that his troop of excellent men were
in any sense _peculiarly_ dependent upon their white officers as some
have asserted. They advanced steadily, just as the regulars always do,
advanced noiselessly and without any reckless firing, and reached the
crest of the hill in order, although he could not see them as they
were making their advance. They kept their line despite all the
obstructions. Lieutenant Fleming also says that in moving to his
position he passed Troop B, which then "inclined to the right, and
during the remainder of the action was on my right." Troop B,
therefore, went through about the same experience as Troop I, and
being on the extreme right of the line may have been more directly in
front of that foe which Fleming says was in his front and to the
right. Why did not the officer who directed or led B Troop in its
advance upon the enemy report the action of his troop as vividly and
generously as did Lieutenant Fleming the men of Troop I? With not the
slightest reflection upon the gallant officer, he himself has the
manliness to say he was so unfortunate as to lose the troop. The
troop, however, did not become demoralized, but went into action under
command of its First Sergeant, _John Buck,[17] and remained on
Lieutenant Fleming's right during the action_. It has been proven more
than once that should the commissioned officers of a company or troop
of colored regulars be killed or incapacitated, the non-commissioned
officers can carry on the fight. Speaking of this same regiment it is
equally true that at San Juan the officers of Troops D and G were all
shot and the commands of these troops fell to their First Sergeants,
the first to Sergeant William H. Given, the second to Sergeant Saint
Foster, and it is generally understood that these two men were
appointed Lieutenants of Volunteers because of their success in
handling their troops in battle.
The entire attacking force at this end of the line, if we count only
those engaged in actual firing, consisted of two troops of the Tenth
Cavalry and two of the First Cavalry--four troops--while to the left
the entire eight troops were on the firing line. The action of the
troops of the First Cavalry was quite similar to that of the troops of
the Tenth Cavalry, and equally deserving of commendation. Of them all
General Young says:
"The ground over which the right column advanced was a mass
of jungle growth, with wire fences, not to be seen until
encountered, and precipitous heights as the ridge was
approached. It was impossible for the troops to keep in
touch along the front, and they could only judge of the
enemy from the sound and direction of his fire. However, had
it not been for this dense jungle, the attack would not have
been made against an overwhelming force in such a position.
Headway was so difficult that advance and support became
merged and moved forward under a continuous volley firing,
supplemented by that of two rapid-fire guns. Return firing
by my force was only made as here and there a small clear
spot gave a sight of the enemy. The fire discipline of these
particular troops was almost perfect. The ammunition
expended by the two squadrons engaged in an incessant
advance for one hour and fifteen minutes averaged less than
ten rounds per man. The fine quality of these troops is also
shown by the fact that there was not a single straggler, and
in not one instance was an attempt made by any soldier to
fall out in the advance to assist the wounded or carry back
the dead. The fighting on the left flank was equally
creditable and was remarkable, and I believe unprecedented,
in volunter troops so quickly raised, armed and equipped."
The five hundred men of Colonel Wood's regiment were stretched over a
space of 800 to 1,000 yards, and were entirely without support or
reserve, and appear to have advanced to a point where this very strong
force on the right swept a good part of their line both with rifle
fire and the fire of their two machine guns. Men and officers were
falling under both the front and flank fire of the enemy, and had not
the squadrons of the First and Tenth made their successful assault
upon that ridge, which, according to General Wood's report, was "very
strongly held," the situation of the Rough Riders would have been
extreme. Because this successful assault was participated in by the
Tenth Cavalry the story arose that the Rough Riders were rescued by
that regiment. The fair statement would be: That the Regular Cavalry,
consisting of a squadron of the First and a squadron of the Tenth,
made their advance on the right at the precise moment to deliver the
Rough Riders from a fire that threatened their annihilation. The
marksmanship and coolness of the men of the Tenth have been specially
commented upon and their fire was described as very effective, but the
same remarks could be made of the men of the First, who fought side by
side with them. It is probable that the volunteers advanced more
rapidly than did the regulars, using more ammunition, and manifesting
a very high degree of courage and enthusiasm as well as deliberation;
but the regulars reached their objective at the proper time to turn
the battle's tide. Each advancing column was worthy to be companion to
the other.
General Wheeler said the fire was very hot for about an hour, and "at
8.30 sent a courier to General Lawton informing him that he was
engaged with a larger force of the enemy than was anticipated, and
asked that his force be sent forward on the Sevilla road as quickly as
possible." ("In Cuba With Shafter," p. 83.) General Lawton, however,
with the true instinct of a soldier had already sent orders to General
Chaffee to move forward with the First Brigade. The Second Brigade was
also in readiness to move and the men of the Twenty-fifth were
expecting to go forward to take a position on the right and if
possible a little to the rear of the Spanish entrenchments in order to
cut off their retreat. The rapid movements of the cavalry division,
however, rendered this unnecessary, and the routing of the foe gave to
the Americans an open country and cleared the field for the advance on
Santiago. The first battle had been fought, and the Americans had been
victorious, but not without cost. Sixteen men had been killed and
fifty-two wounded. In Colonel Wood's regiment eight had been killed
and thirty-four wounded; in the First Cavalry, seven killed and eight
wounded; in the Tenth Cavalry, one killed and ten wounded. The
percentage of losses to the whole strength of the several
organizations engaged was as follows: Rough Riders, over 8 per cent.;
First Cavalry, over 6 per cent.; Tenth Cavalry, 5 per cent. But if we
take those on the firing line as the base the rate per cent. of losses
among the regulars would be doubled, while that of the volunteers
would remain the same.
The strength of the enemy in this battle is given in the Spanish
official reports, according to Lieutenant Miley, at about five
hundred, and their losses are put at nine killed and twenty-seven
wounded. At the time of the fight it was supposed to be much larger.
General Young's report places the estimates at 2,000, and adds "that
it has since been learned from Spanish sources to have been 2,500. The
Cuban military authorities claim the Spanish strength was 4,000."
These figures are doubtless too high. The force overtaken at Las
Guasimas was the same force that evacuated Siboney at the approach of
Lawton and the force with which the Cubans had fought on the morning
of the 23rd. It may have consisted solely of the garrison from
Siboney, although it is more probable that it included also those from
Daiquiri and Jutici, as it is quite certain that all these troops
proceeded toward Santiago over the same road. The force at Siboney had
been given by the Cubans at 600, at Daiquiri at 300, and at Jutici at
150. If these had concentrated and the figures were correct, the
Spanish force at Guasimas was upwards of 1,000. If, however, it was
the force from Siboney alone, it was about as the Spanish official
report gives it. On this latter basis, however, the losses are out of
proportion, for while the attacking party lost a little less than 7
per cent. of its entire strength in killed and wounded, the losses of
the entrenched, defending party, were even a little greater, or over 7
per cent. of its strength. It is, therefore, probable that the Spanish
force was greater than officially reported and included the troops
from the other posts as well as those from Siboney. The engagement was
classed by General Shafter as unimportant, although its effect upon
our army was inspiring. It did not cut off the retreat of the Spanish
force, and the men who faced our army at Guasimas met them again in
the trenches before Santiago. General Shafter desired to advance with
his whole force, and cautioned strongly against any further forward
movement until the troops were well in hand. The two battles between
the Cubans and Spaniards, fought on the 23rd, in which the Cubans had
sixteen men wounded and two killed, were engagements of some
consequence, although we have no reports of them. There is no evidence
that the Cubans took part in the battle of Guasimas, although they
arrived on the grounds immediately after the firing ceased.
The story thus far told is, as the reader cannot fail to see,
directly from official records, and the conclusions arrived at are
those which result naturally from the facts as therein detailed. Not
one word is quoted from any but military men--actors in the affair. We
may now go briefly over the same ground, giving the views and
conclusions of able civilian correspondents who followed the army to
see what was done, and who were trained observers and skilled writers.
How have these able war journalists told the story of Las Guasimas?
To quote from Stephen Bonsal in substance, not in words, is to
contradict what General Shafter says officially in one particular, but
in no such way as to discredit the General, or to weaken Bonsal. It is
not a case of bringing two universal, antagonistic propositions face
to face, but a case where two men of different training look upon an
action from different standpoints and through different field-glasses.
General Shafter says of the collision of the Rough Riders with the
Spanish force: "There was no ambush as reported." As a military man,
he says there was no more concealment on the part of the Spanish force
than what an attacking party should expect, no more than what is usual
in modern warfare, hence he does not regard it as an ambush, and does
not officially take notice of any surprise or unexpected encounter on
the part of his force. To do so would be to reflect, however slightly,
upon the professional skill of the commander of the left column.
General Shafter thus says officially in a manly way: "There was no
ambush." Beyond this his duty does not call him to go, and he halts
his expressions exactly at this line, maintaining in his attitude all
the attributes of the true soldier, placing himself beyond criticism
by thus securing from attack the character of his subordinate.
Mr. Bonsal is a writer and author, accustomed to view actions in the
broader light of popular judgment, entirely free from professional
bias, and having no class-feeling or obligations to serve. His pen is
not official; his statements are not from the military standpoint; not
influenced in any way by considerations of personal weal or woe with
respect to others or himself. He says that one troop of the Rough
Riders, Troop L, commanded by Captain Capron, was leading the advance
of the regiment, and was in solid formation and within twenty-five
yards of its scouting line when it received the enemy's fire. This
troop was so far in the advance that it took the other troops of the
regiment more than a half hour to get up to it. The writer speaks of
the advance of that troop as having been made "in the fool-hardy
formation of a solid column along a narrow trail, which brought them,
in the way I have described, within point-blank range of the Spanish
rifles, and within the unobstructed sweep of their machine guns." He
sums up as follows: "And if it is to be ambushed when you receive the
enemy's fire perhaps a quarter of an hour before it was expected, and
when the troop was in a formation, and the only one in which, in view
of the nature of the ground it was possible to advance quickly, then
most certainly L Troop of the Rough Riders was ambushed by the
Spaniards on the morning of June 24th."
Mr. Bonsal also brings into clear view the part taken in this battle
by Lawton's Infantry. He shows by means of a simple map the trail by
which Miles' brigade, in which was the Twenty-fifth Infantry, moved in
order to flank the Spanish position, while Chaffee's brigade was
hurrying forward on the Royal Road to reinforce the line in front. A
letter from a soldier of the Twenty-fifth written soon after these
events fully confirms Mr. Bonsal in what he says concerning the
movement of Miles' brigade. The soldier says: "On the morning of the
24th the Rough Riders, Tenth and First Cavalry were to make an attack
on a little place where the Spanish were fortified. The Second Brigade
was to come on the right flank of these troops and a little in rear of
the fortifications; but by some misunderstanding, the former troops,
led by the Rough Riders, made an attack before we got our position,
and the result was a great many lives lost in the First Cavalry and
Rough Riders--only one in Tenth Cavalry, but many wounded. They
captured the fortification." This letter by a humble soldier, written
with no thought of its importance, shows how gallantly Lawton had
sprung to the rescue of Wheeler's division. According to Bonsal, who
says he obtained his information from Spanish officers who were
present in this fight, it was the information of the approach of this
brigade and of Chaffee's up the main road that caused the Spaniards to
withdraw rapidly from the position. The whole force was in imminent
danger of being captured. Another soldier of the Twenty-fifth wrote:
"The report came that the Twenty-fifth Infantry was to cut off the
Spanish retreat from a stronghold, toward Santiago." These glimpses
from soldiers' letters illustrate how clearly they comprehended the
work upon which they were sent, and show also how hearty and cordial
was the support which the infantry at that time was hurrying forward
to the advancing cavalry.
The official reports show that the strength of the Spanish position
was before the right of our line. Mr. Bonsal says: "Directly in front
of the Tenth Cavalry rose undoubtedly the strongest point in the
Spanish position--two lines of shallow trenches, strengthened by heavy
stone parapets." We must remember that so far as we can get the
disposition of these troops from official records, Troop A connected
the Rough Riders with the First Cavalry, and Troops I and B were on
the right of the First Cavalry. Troop A did not fire a shot; the
fighting, therefore, was done by Troops I and B on the extreme right
of the line, and it was on their front that "undoubtedly the strongest
point in the Spanish position" lay--nor should the reader forget that
at this very important moment Troop B was commanded by its First
Sergeant, Buck, Lieutenant Williard having by his own report been
"unfortunate enough to lose the troop." This is said with no
disparagement to Lieutenant Williard. It was merely one of the
accidents of battle.
Says Mr. Bonsal: "The moment the advance was ordered the black
troopers of the Tenth Cavalry forged ahead. They were no braver
certainly than any other men in the line, but their better training
enabled them to render more valuable services than the other troops
engaged. They had with them and ready for action their machine guns,
and shoved them right up to the front on the firing line, from where
they poured very effective fire into the Spanish trenches, which not
only did considerable execution, but was particularly effective in
keeping down the return fire of the Spaniards. The machine guns of the
Rough Riders were mislaid, or the mules upon which they had been
loaded could not be found at this juncture. It was said they had
bolted. It is certain, however, that the guns were not brought into
action, and consequently the Spaniards suffered less, and the Rough
Riders more, in the gallant charge they made up the hill in front of
them, after the Tenth Cavalry had advanced and driven the Spaniards
from their position on the right."
Corporal W.F. Johnson, B Troop, was the non-commissioned officer in
charge of the machine guns during the brief fight at Las Guasimas, and
his action was such as to call forth from the troop commander special
mention "for his efficiency and perfect coolness under fire." Here I
may be pardoned for calling attention to a notion too prevalent
concerning the Negro soldier in time of battle. He is too often
represented as going into action singing like a zany or yelling like a
demon, rather than as a man calculating the chances for life and
victory. The official reports from the Black Regulars in Cuba ought to
correct this notion. Every troop and company commander, who has
reported upon colored soldiers in that war, speaks of the coolness of
the men of his command. Captain Beck, of Troop A, Tenth Cavalry, in
the Guasimas fight, says: "I will add that the enlisted men of Troop
A, Tenth Cavalry, behaved well, silently and alertly obeying orders,
and without becoming excited when the fire of the enemy reached them."
The yell, in the charge of the regulars, is a part of the action, and
is no more peculiar to Negro troops than to the whites, only as they
may differ in the general timbre of voice. Black American soldiers
when not on duty may sing more than white troops, but in quite a long
experience among them I have not found the difference so very
noticeable. In all garrisons one will find some men more musically
inclined than others; some who love to sing and some who do not; some
who have voices adapted to the production of musical tones, and some
who have not, and it is doubtless owing to these constitutional
differences that we find differences in habits and expressions.
Lieutenant Miley, of General Shafter's staff, in his description of
the departure of General Shatter from General Garcia's tent, gives us
a glimpse of the character of the men that composed the Cuban army in
that vicinity.
"While the interview was going on, the troops were being
assembled to do honor to the General on his departure.
Several companies were drawn up in front of the tent to
present arms as he came out, and a regiment escorted him to
the beach down the winding path, which was now lined on both
sides by Cuban soldiers standing about a yard apart and
presenting arms. The scene made a strong impression on all
in the party, there seemed to be such an earnestness and
fixedness of purpose displayed that all felt these soldiers
to be a power. About fifty per cent. were blacks, and the
rest mulattoes, with a small number of whites. They were
very poorly clad, many without shirts or shoes, but every
man had his gun and a belt full of ammunition."
B.
EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM A SOLDIER OF THE 10TH CAVALRY, TROOP B,
CONCERNING THE BATTLE OF LAS GUASIMAS:
"... The platoon which escaped this ditch got on the right
of the 1st Cavalry on the firing line, and pushed steadily
forward under First Sergeant Buck, being then in two
squads--one under Sergeant Thompson. On account of the
nature of the ground and other natural obstacles, there were
men not connected with any squads, but who advanced with the
line.
Both squads fired by volley and at will, at the command of
the sergeants named; and their shots reached the enemy and
were effective, as it is generally believed.
Private W.M. Bunn, of Sergeant Thompson's squad, is reported
to have shot a sharpshooter from a tree just in front of the
enemy's work. Private Wheeler was shot twice in the advance.
Sergeant Thompson's squad was once stopped from firing by
General Wheeler's adjutant-general for fear of hitting the
Rough Riders.
It seems that two distinct battles were fought that day.
Colonel Wood's command struck the enemy at about the tame
time, or probably a Little before, ours did, and all unknown
to the men in our ranks; and got themselves into a pretty
tight squeeze. About the same time our force engaged the
enemy and drew part of the attention they were giving the
Rough Riders. This, the latter claimed, enabled them to
continue the movement on the enemy's works.
But as our command had an equal number of 1st and 10th
Cavalrymen, I am of the opinion that the story of our saving
the Rough Riders arose from the fact that as soon as the
fight was over, the 1st Regular Cavalry was opening its arms
to us, declaring that we, especially B Troop, had saved
them; for the 1st Regular Cavalry was first in the attack in
General Young's command; and when the enemy began to make it
pretty warm, he ordered B and I Troops of the 10th forward
on the right. Troop B was in the lead; and the alacrity
with which these two troops moved to the front has always
been praised by the 1st Cavalry; and they declare that that
movement helped them wonderfully. In making this movement my
troop had three or four men wounded; and later, when
Sergeant Thompson's squad was fighting far to the front, it
had in it several members of the 1st Cavalry, who are always
glad to praise him.
So, I think that by the Rough Riders first attributing their
success, or their rescue from inevitable defeat, to the
attack made by our command; and by the 1st Regular Cavalry's
very generously, in the heat of success, bestowing upon us
the honors of the day, it finally became a settled thing
that we saved the whole battle.
That evening, after the battle, I was met by Lieutenant
Shipp, later killed at San Juan Hill, who, on inquiring and
being told that I belonged to Troop B, congratulated me on
its conduct, and said it had made a name for the regiment.
Lieutenant Shipp was not in that fight, but had come up
after it was over and had heard of us through the 1st
Cavalry."
C.
Sergeant John Buck was born September 10th, 1861, at Chapel
Hill, Texas; enlisted in 10th Cavalry, November 6, 1880, and
passed over ten years in active Indian service. He is a man
of strong character, an experienced horseman and packer, and
so commanded a portion of the firing line in the battle of
June 24 as to elicit remarks of praise from officers of
other troops "for his gallantry, coolness and good judgment
under fire." Sergeant Thompson's good conduct in the same
battle was noticeable also. Sergeant Buck was made second
lieutenant in the 7th U.S. Volunteer Infantry and
subsequently captain in the 48th United States Volunteers.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] See Note A at the end of this chapter.
[16] THE TWENTY-FIFTH AT EL-CANEY.
American valor never shone with greater luster than when the
Twenty-fifth Infantry swept up the sizzling hill of El-Caney to the
rescue of the rough riders. Two other regiments came into view of the
rough riders. But the bullets were flying like driving hail; the enemy
were in trees and ambushes with smokeless powder, and the rough riders
were biting the dust and were threatened with annihilation.
A rough rider described the feelings of his brigade when they saw the
other regiments appear and retreat. Finally this rough rider, a
Southerner, heard a well-known yell. And out of the distance moved a
regiment as if on dress parade, faces set like steel, keeping step
like a machine, their comrades falling here, there, everywhere, moving
into the storm of invisible death without one faltering step, passing
the rough riders, conquering up the hill, and never stopping until
with the rough riders El-Caney was won. This was the Twenty-fifth
Regiment (colored), United States Infantry, now quartered at Fort
Logan, Denver. We have asked the chaplain, T.G. Steward, to recite the
events at El-Caney. His modesty confines him to the barest recital of
"semi-official" records. But the charge of the Twenty-fifth is
deserving of comparison with that of "the Light Brigade" in the
Crimean War, or of Custer at the massacre of the Big Horn.
(Editorial in religious paper.)
[17] See Note C at the end of this chapter.