1. To begin at home, besides many passages related already for

confirmation, we may add, (1.) That for about 1025 years, the people had

in their choice whom to own, or admit to succeed in the government,

'Even though the kingdom was hereditary; and used to elect, not such who

were nearest in blood and line, but these that were judged most fit in

government, being of the same progeny of Fergus,' Buchanan's History of

Scotland, book vi. pag. 195. in the life of Kenneth III. This continued

until the days of Kenneth III. who to cover his villainous murder of his

brother's son Malcolm, and prevent his, and secure his own son's

succession, procured this charter for tyranny, the settlement of the

succession of the next in line from the parliament: which, as it

pretended the prevention of many inconveniencies, arising from

contentions and competitions about the succession; so it was limited by

laws, precluding the succession of fools or monsters, and preserving the

people's liberty to shake off the yoke when tyranny should thereby be

introduced: otherwise it would have been not only an irrational

surrender of all their own rights, and enslaving the posterity, but an

irreligious contempt of providence, refuting and anticipating its

determination in such a case. However it is clear, before this time,

that as none but the fittest were admitted to the government; so if any

did usurp upon it, or afterwards did degenerate into tyranny, they took

such order with him, as if he had not been admitted at all; as is clear

in the instances of the first period, and would never own every

pretender to hereditary succession. (2.) As before Kenneth's days, it is

hard to reckon the numerous instances of kings that were dethroned, or

imprisoned, or slain, upon no other account than that of their

oppression and tyranny; so afterwards they maintained the same power and

privilege of repressing them, when ever they began to encroach. And

although no nation hath been more patient towards bad kings, as well as

loyal towards good ones; yet, in all former times, they understood so

well the right they had, and the duty they owed to their own

preservation, as that they seldom failed of calling the exorbitantly

flagitious to an account. And albeit, instead of condoling or avenging

the death of the tyrannous, they have often both excused and justified

it, yet no kingdom hath inflicted severer punishments upon the murders

of just and righteous princes: and therefore, though they did neither

enquire after, nor animadvert upon those that slew James III. a

flagitious tyrant, yet they did, by most exquisite torments, put them to

death who slew James the I. a virtuous monarch. Hence, because these and

other instances I mind to adduce of deposing tyrants, may be excepted

against, as not pertinent to my purpose, who am not pleading for

exauctoration and deposition of tyrants, being impracticable in our

case: I shall once for all remove that, and desire it may be considered,

(1.) That though we cannot formally exauctorate a tyrant; yet he may, by

law itself, fall from his right, and may exauctorate himself, by his

laws by whom kings reign; and this is all we plead for as a foundation

of not owning him. (2.) Though we have not the same power, yet we have

the same grounds, and as great and good, if not greater and better

reasons to reject and disown our tyrant, as they, whose example is here

adduced, had to depose of their tyrannizing princes. (3.) If they had

power and ground to depose them, then a fortiori, they had power and

ground to disown them; for that is less, and included in the other, and

this we have. (4.) Though it should be granted, that they did not disown

them before they were deposed; yet it cannot be said that they did

disown them only because they were deposed: for it is not deposition

that makes a tyrant; it only declares him to be justly punished for what

he was before. As the sentence of a judge does not make a man a murderer

or thief, only declares him convict of these crimes, and punishable for

them; it is their own committing them that makes him criminal: and, as

before the sentence, having certain knowledge of the fact, we might

disown the man's innocency or honesty; so a ruler's acts of tyranny and

usurpation make him a tyrant and usurper, and give ground to disown his

just and legal authority; which he can have no more than a murderer or

thief can have innocency or honesty. (3.) We find also examples of their

disowning kings undeposed; as king Baliol was disowned with his whole

race, for attempting to enslave the kingdom's liberties to foreign

power. And if this may be done for such an attempt, as the greatest

court parasites, and sycophants consent; what then shall be done for

such as attempt to subject the people to domestic or intestine slavery?

shall we refuse to be slaves to one without, and be, and own ourselves

contented slaves to one within the kingdom? It is known also that king

James the I. his authority was refused by his subjects in France, so

long as he was a prisoner to the English there, though he charged them

upon their allegiance, not to fight against the party who had his person

prisoner: they answered, They owned no prisoner for their king, nor

owned no allegiance to a prisoner. Hence princes may learn, though

people submit to their government; yet their resignation of themselves

to their obedience is not so full, as that they are obliged to own

allegiance to them, when either morally or physically they are

incapacitate to exercise authority over them. They that cannot rule

themselves cannot be owned as rulers over a people.

2. Neither hath there been any nation, but what at one time or other

hath furnished examples of this nature. The English history gives

account, how some of their kings have been dealt with by their subjects,

for impieties against the law and light of nature, and encroachments

upon the laws of the land. Vortigern was dethroned for incestuously

marrying his own sister. Neither did ever blasphemies, adulteries,

murders, plotting against the lives of innocents, and taking them away

by poison or razor, use to escape the animadversion of men, before they

were priest-ridden unto a belief that princes persons were sacred. And

if men had that generosity now this man that now reigns might expect

some such animadversion. And we find also king Edward, and Richard the

II. were deposed, for usurpation upon laws and liberties, in doing

whereof the people avowed, They would not suffer the laws of England to

be changed.

Surely the people of England must now be far degenerate, who having such

laws transmitted to them from their worthy ancestors, and they

themselves being born to the possession of them without a change, do now

suffer them to be so encroached upon, and mancipate themselves, and

leave their children vassals to popery, and slaves to tyranny.

3. The Dutch also, who have the best way of guiding of kings of any that

ever had to do with them (witness their having so many of them in

chains, now in Batavia in the East Indies) are not wanting for their

part to furnish us with examples. When the king of Spain would not

condescend to govern them according to their ancient laws, and rule for

the good of the people, they declared him to be fallen from the

seigniory of the Netherlands, and so erected themselves into a

flourishing common-wealth. It will not be amiss to transcribe some of

the words of the edict of the states general to this purpose. It is well

known, (say they) 'That a prince and lord of a country is ordained, by

God, to be sovereign and head over his subjects, to preserve and defend

them from all injuries, force, and violence; and that if the prince

therefore faileth therein, and instead of preserving his subjects, doth

outrage and oppress them, depriveth them of their privileges and ancient

customs, commandeth them, and will be served of them as slaves; they are

no longer bound to respect him as their sovereign lord, but to esteem of

him as a tyrant, neither are they bound to acknowledge him as their

prince, but may abandon him, &c.' And with this agrees the answer

William, prince of Orange, to the edict of proscription, published

against him by Philip the II. There is, says he, 'A reciprocal bond

betwixt the lord and his vassal; so that if the lord break the oath,

which he hath made unto his vassal, the vassal is discharged of the oath

made unto his lord.' This was the very argument of the poor suffering

people of Scotland, whereupon they disowned the authority of Charles the

II.

4. The monarchy of France is very absolute; yet there also the state

hath taken order with their tyrants; not only have we many instances of

resistances made against them, but also of disowning, disabling, and

invalidating their pretended authority, and repressing their tyranny. So

was the two Childerici served: so also Sigebertus, Dagabertus, and

Lodowick the II. kings of France.

5. The great body of Germany moves very slowly, and is inured to bear

great burdens: yet there also we find Joanna of Austria, mother of

Charles V. was put to perpetual imprisonment: which example is adduced

by the earl of Morton, in his discourse to the queen of England (whereof

I rehearsed a part before) vindicating the deposing and disowning queen

Mary of Scotland. 'If, saith he, we compare her with Joanna of

Austria--what did that poor wretch commit, but that she could not want a

little lustful pleasure as a remedy necessary for her age? and yet, poor

creature, she suffered that punishment, of which our dame, convicted of

most grievous crimes, now complains.'--Buchanan's History of Scotland,

book xx. p. 748. The duke of Saxon, the landgrave of Hesse, and the

magistrates of Magdeburgh, joined in a war against her son Charles V.

and drew up a conclusion by resolution of lawyers, wherein are these

words----'Neither are we bound to him by any other reason, than if he

keep the conditions on which he was created emperor. By the laws

themselves it is provided, That the superior magistrate shall not

infringe the right of the inferior, and if the superior magistrate

exceed the limits of his power, and command that which is wicked, not

only we need not obey him, but if he offer force we may resist him.'

Which opinion is confirmed by some of the greatest lawyers, and even

some who are patrons of tyranny, Grotius none of the greatest enemies of

tyrants, de jure belli. lib. 1. chap. 4. p. 11. saith out of Barclaius,

and with him, That the king doth lose his power when he seeketh the

destruction of his subjects. It was upon the account of the tyranny of

that bloody house of Austria over the Helvetians, that they shook off

the rule and government of that family, and established themselves into

a republic. And at this present time, upon the same accounts, the

tyranny and treachery of this imperial majesty, the Hungarians have

essayed to maintain and justify a revolt in disowning the emperor, now

for several years.

6. Poland is an elective kingdom, and so cannot but be fertile of many

instances of casting off tyrants. Henricus Valesius, disowned for

fleeing, and Sigismundus for violating his faith to the states, may

suffice. Lex Rex, q. 24. p. 217.

7. In Denmark, we find Christiernus their king, was, for his intolerable

cruelty, put from the kingdom, he and all his posterity, and after

twenty years did end his life in prison.

8. In Swedland, within the compass of one century, the people deposed

and banished the two Christierns, and dethroned and imprisoned Ericus,

for their oppressions and tyranny, and for pursuing the destruction of

their subjects.

9. The Portuguese, not many years ago, laid aside and confined Alphonsus

their king, for his rapines and murders.

10. Some dukes of Venice have been so disowned by these commonwealths

men, that laying aside their royal honours as private men, they have

spent their days in monasteries. Buchan. de jure regni apud Scotos.

11. If we will resolve the old Roman histories, we shall find no small

store of such examples, both in the time of their kings, consuls, and

emperors. Their seventh king Tarquinius Superbus was removed by the

people, for his evident usurpation: saith Livius, 'That is, for he had

nothing for a right to the government, but mere force, and got the rule

neither by the people's consent and choice, nor by the authority of the

senators.' So afterwards the empire was taken from Vitellius,

Heliogabulus, Maximinus, Didius, Julianus, Lex Rex, ubi supra.

12. But it will be said, Can there be any instances of the primitive

christians adduced? Did ever they, while groaning under the most

insupportable tyranny of their persecuting emperors, disown their

authority, or suffer for not owning it? To this I answer, 1. What they

did, or did not of this kind, is not of moment to enquire.: seeing their

practice and example, under such disadvantages, can neither be known

exactly, nor what is known of it be accommodated to our case: for (1.)

They were never forced to give their judgment, neither was the question

ever put to them, whether they owned their authority or not? If they

transgressed the laws, they were liable to the punishment, they craved

no more of them. (2.) They confess themselves to be strangers, that had

no establishments by law; and therefore they behoved to be passively

subject, when in no capacity to resist; there was no more required of

them. Yet Lex Rex Quest. 35. page 371. cites Theodoret affirming, 'Then

evil men reigned through the unmanliness of the subjects.' (3.) Their

examples are not imitable in all things; they were against resistance,

which we doubt not to prove is lawful against tyrannical violence: many

of them refused to flee from the fury of persecutors: they ran to

martyrdom, when neither cited nor accused; and to obtain the crown

thereof they willingly yielded up their lives and liberties also to the

rage of tyrants. We cannot be obliged to all these. 2. Yet we find some

examples not altogether unapplicable to this purpose. When Barochbach,

the pretended king of the Jews, after the destruction of Jerusalem, set

himself as king in Bitter, a city in Arabia; the Christians that were in

his precincts, refused to own him as king; which was one great cause of

his persecuting them. It is true he persecuted them also for other

things, as for their not denying Christ; so are we persecuted for many

other things, than for our simple disowning of the king: yet this is

reckoned as a distinct cause of their suffering, by Mr. Mede, on the

Revel. Part. 1. Page 43. Gees Magist. Origin. Chap. 10. Sect. 7. Page

361. The same last cited author shews, that when Albinus, Niger, and

Cassius, successively usurped the empire, having none of them any legal

investiture, the Christians declined the recognition of their claim, and

would not own them; and that upon this Tertullian says, That is, the

Christians could never be found to be Albinians, or Nigrians, or

Cassians, meaning they were never owners of these men for magistrates.

And so may we say, We may be ashamed to be found amongst the Charlites

and Jacobites of these times. Not unlike is the passage of Ambrose, who,

in favours of Valentinian the rightful governor, contested against

Maximus the tyrant, and not only disowned him, but excommunicated him,

for which he was threatened with death. And yet it is observable, that

when Maximus offered to interpose his power in defence of Ambrose, that

he might not be banished by Justina the empress, he would not accept of

the help of Maximus, whose power he disallowed and disowned. Whence I

observe, that it is not without a precedent for a minister to disown a

tyrant, to refuse favour from him: yea, and to excommunicate him, yea,

even without the concurrence of his fainting brethren; for all which

some of our faithful ministers have been much condemned in our day,

especially Mr. Donald Cargil for excommunicating Charles the II, and

James, Duke of York, as if such a thing had never been done before:

whereas, we see what Ambrose did to Maximus. And this same faithful

minister, Ambrosius minister at Milan, in Italy, did also hold out of

the assembly of the Christians Theodosius the emperor, though a most

virtuous prince, for that grievous scandal committed by him, against the

innocent people at Thessalonica in killing so many of them in a

passionate transport. But, 3. since this objection of primitive

Christians is much insisted on, both against this and the head of

defensive arms: I shall further take notice of several distinctions,

that do make the difference between their case and ours very vast. (1.)

There is a great difference betwixt a prince of the common religion of

his subjects, but distinct from some of them, whom yet he does not seek

to entice to his religion, but gives them liberty, and the benefit of

the law as other subjects: which was the case of many in these primitive

times sometimes. And a prince, by all means, both foul and fair,

pressing to a revolt from the true, and to embrace a false religion. In

this case (which is ours with a witness) it must be granted we should be

wary, that we neither engage with him, nor own allegiance to him, when

he would withdraw us from our allegiance to God. (2.) There is a great

difference betwixt a prince persecuting the true religion, which only a

few of his subjects here and there did profess, who in regard of their

paucity were never in capacity to be looked upon as the body of the

people, impowering him as their public servant; (which was their case)

and a prince persecuting that religion, which was professed by the body

of the nation, when they set him up. In this latter case, men of great

sense have denied he should be owned for a prince, because then he is

stated against the common good. This was our case under the former king,

and yet under this, though all professors be not now persecuted, the

public religion and ancient reformation is persecuted in a few, whom he

intends to destroy, and in their destruction to bury it. (3.) There is

a difference betwixt a prince persecuting religion, publicly owned and

received of his subjects, yet never approved nor confirmed by law (as it

was not in the primitive times) and a prince persecuting religion

ratified and established by the laws of the land, which is our case. It

will seem clear to every soul, not benighted with court darkness, that

he then of course, and by law, falleth from his right in this case,

because now he is not only stated against the common good, but against

the very laws by which the subjects must be ruled. Then he ruleth not as

a prince, to whom the law giveth his measures and bounds, but rageth as

a tiger and tyrant, and ought to be carried towards as such. (4.) There

is a difference betwixt a prince suppressing that religion established

by law, which he never professed, nor never gave his consent to these

laws (as might be the case of some of the Arian emperors) though it be

unlawful for any people to set up any mortal over them, who is not in

this case bound to the good behaviour; and a prince, opposing and

oppressing that religion, which himself hath professed, and is ratified

by laws with his own consent: which was our case under the former king,

who did give the most solemn ratification of them that ever was given,

but afterwards most perfidiously retracted it.

As also this apostate papist, did sometime profess himself protestant,

and consented to the laws establishing it, and the penal statutes

against papists, though now he is going about to raze all, and ruin that

alone valuable treasure of our nation, religion. (5.) There is a

difference betwixt a prince consenting to laws establishing religion

which he now persecuteth (which might have been the case of Julian the

apostate) and a prince, who not only consented to these laws, but who

did upon these very terms, and no other, get and receive his crown and

sceptre, that he should preserve the religion as reformed, and protect

as a father the professors thereof, and maintain the laws establishing

it, which yet he, perfidiously, being once settled in the government,

breaks, casts, cassates and overturns (which was done by Charles) or,

and a prince who will be bounded by the laws consented to, nor be bound

to the observation of any laws whatsoever; but challenges it as his

prerogative royal, to be absolute above all laws, and denying all

security upon terms, is free to destroy religion and liberty, and all

the valuable interests of the nation, when he pleases. This is James's

character. (6.) There is a difference betwixt a prince breaking the main

and only article of his covenant, in a fit of fury and rage being

transported upon some mistakes (which was the case of Theodosius the

emperor) and a prince not only violating this upon deliberation, but

plainly declaring, that neither oath nor declaration can or will bind

him; but these being made void, he will destroy without restraint all

these covenanted privileges (this was the case of Charles) or, and a

prince who, as he never will come under the bond of a covenant with his

people: so tho' he makes never so many fair promises with the greatest

solemnities, maintains a principle, that he will keep no promises, but

when, and with whom he pleases, and can get a dispensation to break all

when he likes. (This is James's ingenuity.) Sure in this case, such as

are characterized, declare themselves so far from being princes, that

they profess before the world, they are no more men to be conversed

with: for if neither their words, writs, vows, promises, oaths,

declarations, nor protections can bind them, what society can be had

with them? Are they not to be looked upon, and carried towards as common

enemies of morality, religion, righteousness, liberty, humanity, yea

even of mankind itself? Now then, let the world be judge, if the people

of Scotland can be judged in conscience, reason, prudence, policy, or

any imaginable way, bound to own their authority, being so stated, and

by the act rescissory all human ground rescinded, that ever it shall be

otherwise; let them go seek other slaves where they can find them, for

we will not sell ourselves and posterity to tyrants as slaves, nor give

up our religion and the exercise of it to the mouldings of the court.

II. In the second place, it being clear from these forementioned

instances, that tyrants and usurpers have been disowned; and it being

also as clear as light can make any thing, from the foregoing account of

their government, and all the characters of truculency, treachery and

tyranny, conspicuously relucent therein, that these two gentlemen, whose

authority we are pressed to own, were tyrants and usurpers: it remains

therefore to prove from all dictates of reason about government, that

their pretended authority could not nor cannot be owned.

For the argument runs thus; the authority of tyrants and usurpers cannot

be owned; but the authority of Charles and James was and is the

authority of tyrants and usurpers, therefore their authority cannot be

owned. Now it is the major of this syllogism that I undertake to prove,

the minor being so clear from their history, that to prove it by

witnesses were to do what is already done.

1. All authority to be owned of men must be of God, and ordained of God:

for so the apostle teacheth expresly, Rom. xiii. 1. &c. which is the

alone formal reason of our subjection to them, and that which makes it a

damnable sin to resist them; because it is a resisting the ordinance of

God. The Lord owns himself to be the author of magistrates, Prov. viii.

15. By me kings reign and princes decree justice.

As he is the author of man, and hath made him a sociable creature, so he

is the author of the order of human society, which is necessary for the

preservation of mankind, he being the God of order and not of confusion.

And this must hold not only of the supreme authority, but of

subordinate magistrates also; for they must be included in the higher

powers, to whom we must be subject, Rom. xiii. and they that resist

them, resist God's ordinance too. Their judgment is God's, as well as

the judgment of the supreme magistrate, Deut. i. 17. 2 Chron. xix. 6, 8.

They are called gods among whom the Lord judgeth, Psal. lxxxii. 1. He

speaketh not there of a congregation of kings.

We are to be subject to them for the Lord's sake, as well as to the

supreme magistrate, 1 Pet. ii. 13. therefore all magistrates, superior

and inferior, are ordained of God in the respective places. It is true,

Peter calls every degree of magistracy an ordinance of man, not that he

denies it to be an ordinance of God for so he would contradict Paul,

Rom. xiii. but terms it so emphatically, to commend the worth of

obedience to magistrates, though but men, when we do it for the Lord's

sake: not effectively, as an invention of men, but subjectively, because

exercised by men, and created and invested by human suffrages,

considered as men in society, and objectively, for the good of man, and

for the external peace and safety of man, thereby differenced from the

ministry, an ordinance of Christ, for the Spiritual good of mens souls.

Hence, those rulers that are not of God, nor ordained of God, cannot be

owned without sin; but tyrants and usurpers are the rulers, that are not

of God, nor ordained of God, but are set up, and not by him, &c. Hos.

viii. 1.-4. therefore they cannot be owned without sin.

I refer it to any man of conscience and reason to judge, if these

scriptures, proving magistracy to be the ordinance of God, for which

alone is to be owned, can be applied to tyrants and usurpers. How will

that, Rom. xiii. read of tyrants? Let every soul be subject to tyrants,

for they are ordained of God as his ministers of justice, &c. and are a

terror to good works, and a praise to the evil. Would not every man

nauseate that as not the doctrine of God? Again, how would that sound,

Prov. viii. By me tyrants reign, and usurpers decree injustice? Harsh to

Christian ears. Can they be said to be gods among whom the Lord judgeth?

If they be, they must be such as the witch of Endor saw, gods coming out

of the earth, when she raised the devil; in a very catechrestical

meaning, as the devil is called the god of this world. And indeed they

have no more power, nor otherwise to be owned, than he hath: for this is

a truth, tyranny is a work of satan, and not from God; because sin,

either habitual or actual, is not from God; tyranny is sin in habit and

act: therefore----The magistrate, as magistrate, is good in nature and

end, being the minister of God for good, a tyrant as a tyrant, is quite

contrary. Lex Rex saith well, 'A power ethical, politic or moral, to

oppress, is not from God, and is not a power, but a licentious deviation

of a power, and no more from God, but from sinful nature, and the old

serpent, than a licence to sin,' quest. 9. p. 59. Hence sin, a licence

to sin, a licentious sinning, cannot be from God; but tyranny,

usurpation, absolute power enaroaching upon all liberties, laws, divine

and human, is sin, a licence to sin, a licentious sinning:

therefore----But, to make this clear, and to obviate what may be said

against this, let it be considered, how the powers that be are of God,

and ordained of God. Things are said to be of God and ordained of God,

two ways; by his purpose and providence, and by his word and warrant.

Things may be of God, either of his hand working, or bringing them

about, ordaining and ordering them to be to his glory, either by a holy

over-ruling providence, as Samson's desire of a wife was of God, Judg.

xiv. 4. and Amaziah's insolent and foolish rejection of Joash's

peaceable overture, 2 Chron. xxv. 20. or by a powerful effective

providence; so Rom. xi. 36. Of him and through him are all things, 1

Cor. viii. 6. One God, of whom are all things. Or things be of God, of

his word warranting and authorizing. So we are commanded to try the

spirits; whether they be of God (1 John iv. i.) So in this sense, sin,

tentation, lust, corruptions of the world are not of God, Jam. i. 13, 1

John ii. 16.

Again, things are ordained of God, ether by the order of his counsel or

providential will; either effectively, by way of production, or

direction; or permissively, by way of non-impedition: or they are

ordained by the order of his word and preceptive will. The former is

God's rule, the latter is ours: the former is always accomplished, the

latter is often contradicted: the former orders all actions, even

sinful; the latter only that which is good and acceptable in the sight

of God: by the former Israel rejected Samuel, by the latter they should

have continued Samuel's government, and not sought a king: by the former

Athaliah usurped the government, by the latter she should have yielded

obedience, and resigned the government to the posterity of Ahaziah: by

the former, all have a physical subordination to God at creatures,

subject to his all disposing will; by the latter, those whom he approves

have a moral subordination to God, as obedient subjects to his

commanding will. Now magistrates are of God, and ordained by him both

these ways, tyrants but one of them. I say, magistrates, the higher

powers, to whom we owe and must own subjection, are of God both these

ways; both by his purpose and providence; and that not merely eventual,

but effective and executive of his word, disposing both of the title and

right, and possession of the power, to them whom he approves, and

bringing the people under a conscientious subjection, and by his word

and warrant. So Adonijah the usurper (though he had the pretence of

hereditary right, and also possession by providence) was forced to own

king Solomon in these terms, upon which only a magistrate may be owned:

'the kingdom' says he, 'was mine, and all Israel set their faces on me

that I should reign: howbeit the kingdom is turned about, and become my

brother's, for it was his from the Lord,' 1 Kings ii. 15. He had both

providence turning about the kingdom to him, and also the warrant of the

Lord's approbative and preceptive will. But tyrants and usurpers are

only of God, and ordained of God, by his over-ruling purpose and

permissive providence, either for performing his holy purpose towards

themselves, as Rehoboam's professing he would be a tyrant, and refusing

the lawful desires of the people was of God, 2 Chron. x. 15. or for a

judgement and vengeance upon them that are subject to them, Zech. xi. 6.

whereby they get a power in their hand, which is the rod of the Lord's

indignation, and a charge and commission against a hypocritical nation,

Isa. x. 5, 6. This is all the power they have from God, who 'gives Jacob

to the spoil, and Israel to the robbers, when they sin against him,'

Isa. xlii. 24. This doth not give these robbers any right, no more than

they whose 'tabernacle prosper, into whose hand God bringeth

abundantly,' Job xii. 6. Thus all robbers, and the great legal robbers,

tyrants and their authorized murderers, may be of God, viz. by his

providence. Hence those that are not ordained of God's preceptive will,

but merely by his providential will; their authority is not to be owned;

but tyrants and usurpers are not ordained of God's preceptive, but

merely by his providential will. The minor needs no proof, yet will be

cleared by many following arguments, the major will be afterwards more

demonstrated. Here I shall only say, they that have no other ordination

of God impowering them to be rulers, than the devil hath, must not be

owned; but they that have no other than the ordination of providence,

have no other ordination of God impowering them to be rulers, than the

devil hath: therefore they that have no other than the ordination of

providence, must not be owned.

2. But let us next consider what is comprehended in the ordination of

that authority which is to be owned as of God: and it may be

demonstrated, there are two things in it, without which no authority can

be owned as of God, viz. institution and constitution so as to give him,

whom we must own as God's minister, authority both in the abstract and

concrete, that is, that he should have magistracy by God's ordination,

and be a magistrate by and according to the will of God. All acknowledge

that magistracy hath God's institution, for the powers that be are

ordained of God: which contains not only the appointment of it, but the

qualification and form of it. That government is appointed by divine

precept all agree, but whether the precept be moral natural, or moral

positive, whether it was appointed in the state of innocency, or since

disorder came into the world, whether it be primario or secundario, from

the law of nature, is not agreed upon. It may possibly be all these

ways; government in the general may be from the law and light of nature

appointed in innocency, because all its relative duties are enjoined in

the fifth command, and all nations naturally have an esteem of it,

without which there could be no order, distinction, or communion in

human societies but the specification or individuation may be by a

postnate, positive and secondary law, yet natural too, for though there

be no reason in nature why any man should be king and lord over another,

being in some sense all naturally free, but as they yield themselves

under jurisdiction the exalting of David over Israel is not ascribed to

nature, but to an act of divine bounty, which took him from following

the ewes, and made him feeder of the people of Israel, Psal. lxxviii.

70, 71. yet nature teacheth, that Israel and other people should have a

government, and that this should be subjected to. Next, not only is it

appointed to be, but qualified by institution, and the office is

defined, the end prescribed, and the measures and boundaries thereof are

limited, as we shall hear. 'Again, the forms of it though politically,

they are not stinted, that people should have such a form and not

another; yet morally, at least negatively, whatever be the form it is

limited to the rules of equity and justice, and must be none other than

what hath the Lord's mould and sanction. But there is no institution any

of these ways for tyranny. Hence, that power hath no institution from

God, cannot be owned as his ordinance; but the power of tyrants is that

power, being contrary in every respect to God's institution, and a mere

deviation from it, and eversion of it: Ergo--To the minor it may be

replied; though the power which tyrants may exercise, and usurpers

assume, may be in concrete contrary to God's institution, and so not to

be owned; yet, in the abstract, it may be acknowledged of God. It is but

the abuse of the power, and that does not take away the use. We may own

the power, though we do not own the abuse of it. I answer, 1. I

acknowledge the distinction as to magistrates is very pertinent; for it

is well said by the congregation in a letter to the nobility, Knox's

History of Scotland, Book 2. 'That there is a great difference betwixt

the authority, which is God's ordinance, and the persons of these who

are placed in authority; the authority and ordinance of God can never do

wrong, for it commandeth that vice be punished, and virtue maintained;

but the corrupted person placed in this authority may offend.'

It is certain, higher powers are not to be resisted; but some persons in

power may be resisted. The powers are ordained of God; but kings

commanding unjust things are not ordained of God to do such things; but

to apply this to tyrants, I do not understand. Magistrates in some acts

may be guilty of tyranny, and yet retain the power of magistracy; but

tyrants cannot be capable of magistracy, nor any one of the

scripture-characters of righteous rulers. They cannot retain that which

they have forfeited, and which they have overturned; and usurpers cannot

retain that which they never had. They may act and enact some things

materially just, but they are not formally such as can make them

magistrates, no more than some unjust actions can make a magistrate a

tyrant. A murderer, saving the life of one and killing another, does not

make him no murderer: once a murderer ay a murderer, once a robber ay a

robber, till he restore what he hath robbed: so once a tyrant ay a

tyrant, till he makes amends for his tyranny, and that will be hard to

do. 2. The concrete does specificate the abstract in actuating it, as a

magistrate in his exercising government, makes his power to be magistry;

a robber, in his robbing, makes his power to be robbery; an usurper in

his usurping makes his power to be usurpation; so a tyrant in his

tyrannizing, can have no power but tyranny. As the abstract of a

magistrate is nothing but magistracy, so the abstract of a tyrant is

nothing but tyranny. It is frivolous then to distinguish between a

tyrannical power in the concrete, and tyranny in the abstract; the power

and the abuse of the power: for he hath no power as a tyrant, but what

is abused. 3. They that object thus, must either mean, that power in it

general notion is ordained of God, but this particular power abused by

tyrants, and assumed by usurpers, is not ordained: or they must mean,

that the very power of tyrants and usurpers is ordained of God, but the

way of holding it and using it, is not of God. If the first be said,

they grant all I plead for; for though the power in general be ordained,

yet what is this to tyrants and usurpers? would not this claim be

ridiculous for any man to soy, God hath ordained governments to be,

therefore I will challenge it? God hath ordained marriage, therefore any

may cohabit together as man and wife, without formal matrimony. If the

second be alledged, that the power of these prevailing dominators is

ordained, but not their holding and using of it: this is nonsense, for

how can a power be ordained, and the use of it be unlawful? For the

abuse and use of tyrannical power is all one and reciprocal: an usurper

cannot use his power but by usurpation.

Again, is it not plain, that the abstract and the concrete, the act or

habit, and the subject wherein it is, cannot have a contrary

denomination? if drunkenness and theft, lying or murder, be of the

devil; then the drunkard, the thief, the liar, and the murderer, are of

the devil too: so if tyranny and usurpation, or the use or abuse of

tyrants and usurpers be of the devil, then most the tyrants and usurpers

also be of him: none can say, the one is of the devil, and the other of

God. Wherefore it is altogether impertinent to use such a distinction,

with application to tyrants or usurpers, as many do in their pleading

for the owning of our oppressors; for they have no power, but what is

the abuse of power.

3. As that authority which is God's ordinance must have his institution;

so it must have his divine constitution from himself and by the people.

Wherever then there is authority to be owned of men, there must be these

two, constitution from God and constitution from the people. For the

first, God hath a special interest in the constitution of authority,

both immediately and mediately. Immediately, he declares such and such

forms of government to be lawful and eligible, and does order whom, and

who, and how people shall direct governors. And so, he confers royal

graces, and endowments, and gifts for government on them, as on Joshua

and Saul: so they become the Lord's anointed, placed and set on the

throne of the Lord, 1 Chron. xxix. 23. and honoured with majesty, as his

deputes and vicegerants, having their crown let on by God, Psal. xxi. 3.

But in regard now he doth not by any special revelation determine, who

shall be the governors in this or that place; therefore he makes this

constitution by meditation of men, giving them rules how they shall

proceed in setting them up. And seeing, by the law of nature, he hath

enjoined government to be, but hath ordered no particular in it with

application to singulars he hath committed it to the positive

transaction of men, to be disposed according to certain general rules of

justice. And it must needs be so; for first, without this constitution,

either all or none would be magistrates: if he hath ordained civil power

to be, and taken no order in whom it shall be, or how it shall be

conveyed, any might pretend to it; and yet none would have it, more than

another. If then he hath affixed it to a peculiar having and holding, by

virtue whereof this man is enstated and entitled to the office, and not

that man, there must be a law for constituting him in authority, which

will discover in whom it is. 2. If it were not so, then resisting of a

particular magistrate would not be a resisting of the ordinance of God,

if a particular magistrate were not constitute of God, as well as

magistracy is institute of God: for still it would be undetermined, who

were the owner; and so it would be left as free and lawful for the

resister to take the place, as for the resisted to hold it; the

institution would be satisfied if any possessed it: therefore there must

be constitution to determine it. 3. No common law of nature can put in

practice, without particular constitution regulating it. That wives and

children own their superior relations, is the law of nature; but there

must be such a relation first fixed by human transaction, before they

can own them; there must be marriage authorized of God, there must be

children begotten, and then the divine ordination of these relative

duties take place. So the judges of Israel for four hundred and fifty

years were given of God, Acts xiii. 20. not all by an immediate express

designation, but a mediate call from God by men, as Jephthah; Judg. xi.

6, 11. Inferior judges also are magistrates appointed by God, yet they

have their deputation from men. Our Saviour speaks of all magistrates,

when he applies that of the 82 psalm to them, I said ye are gods; and

shews how they were gods, because unto them the word of God came, John

x. 35. that is, by his word and warrant he authorized them, not by

immediate designation in reference to the most of them, but the word of

God comes to them, or his constitution is past upon them, who are

advanced by men according to his word. When men therefore do act

according to the divine rule, in the moulding and erecting of government

and governors, there the constitution is of God, though it be not

immediate. And where this is not observed, whatever power (so named or

pretended) there may be, or whatsoever persons there be that take upon

them to be the power, and are not thereto appointed or therein instated,

and do exercise such a power as God hath not legitimated, they are not a

power ordained of God. Hence, whatsoever power hath no constitution from

God, either immediate or mediate, cannot be owned: but the authority of

tyrants and usurpers, is a power that hath no constitution from God,

either immediate or mediate; therefore it cannot be owned. The major is

cleared above. The minor is also undeniable: for, either they must

pretend to an immediate constitution by revelation, that James duke of

York a vassal of antichrist, had, by all his plots and pranks, merited

the crown of Britain, and therefore must be constitute king; and this I

hope they will not pretend to, except the Pope hath gotten such a

revelation from Pluto's oracle; or they must have recourse to the

mediate constitution by men: and if so, then either this mediate

constitution of God is left undetermined, indefinitely and absolutely

giving way to any that will assume what power they please and can: and

then, I confess tyrants may have a constitution; but this constitution

cannot be of God; or else it is fixed by a rule, regulating the

succession or constitution of the governors, and obliging the people to

own the government so constituted, with exclusion and disallowance of

any other. And so, if in that constitution there be a substantial

deviation from the rule, as when incompetent or unallowed persons be

the advancers of themselves, or others, into that place by illegal and

sinistrous means, in as much as in that case there is the divine

disapprobation, it may be said there is no ordinance of God, but a

contradiction and contra-ordination to God's order. Gee's magist.

origin. chap. 5. sect. 4. subject 3 page 135. This will shake off this

of ours, and all other tyrants and usurpers, that come into the

government, and hold it not according to God's rule.

4. It is clear also in the second place, that the authority which we can

own out of conscience, must have constitution by the people. The special

way by which men should be called into the place of sovereign power, may

perhaps not be found so expresly defined in scripture, as mens call to

the other ordinance of the ministry is; yet in this two things are

essentially necessary to the constitution of a magistrate, the peoples

consent and compact either formal and virtual. And without these we can

own conscientious subjection and allegiance to no man living. That the

first is necessary will be evident, from the law of nature and nations,

and from scripture. First, The light and law of nature dictates, that

the right and interest of constituting magistrates is in the elective

vote or suffrage of the people. This will appear, 1. If we consider the

original of government among men, especially after they were so

multiplied, that there was a necessity of a reduction into diverse

communities; which, whatever was before the flood, yet after it, behoved

to be by a coalition with consent under an elective government. The

scripture makes it more than probable, that the partition of

commonwealths was in Peleg's days, in whole time the earth was divided,

Gen. x. 2. occasioned by the confusion of "languages at Babel, which did

dissolve their union, and scatter them abroad upon the face of all the

earth," Gen. xi. 9.

Then was it that we may conceive, as Buchanan says, de jure regni apud

Scot. 'The time was when men dwelt in cottages and caves, and as

strangers did wander to and fro without laws, and such as could converse

together of the same language, assembled together as their humours did

lead them or as some common utility did allure them, a certain instinct

of nature did oblige them to desire converse and society.' But this

confusion of languages, and communion of language, in several divided

parcels, could not incorporate these several parties into communities;

that behoved to be the effect of some other cause: and what should that

be, but the joint will, consent and agreement of the severally

languaged? It could not be by consanguinity; for there is no direction

from nature for a confinement of that into such and such degrees, to

make out the bonds of a common-wealth, or possibility of knowing all

within such degrees; besides all within these degrees might not be of

the same language. Now, the scripture says, they "were divided every one

after his tongue, after their families, in their nations," Gen. x. 5.

Next, it could not be by cohabitation: for how that must go to be the

boundaries of a common-wealth, inclusively, or exclusively, is not

defined by nature, nor can it be otherwise determined, than by human

choice. Then, it could not be by mens belonging to such a sovereign:

for, after that division and confusion, they could not all be under one

sovereign, nor under the same that they were subject to before; and a

sovereign cannot be before the aggregation of the subjects whereof he is

head, they must first be a commonwealth before they can belong to it.

Again, it cannot be founded upon the right of fatherhood: for, in that

scattering, such a right could not be uninterruptedly preserved: and

then Noah should also have been the universal magistrate, which he could

not be in these multiplied secessions. And further, if it be refounded

on the right of fatherhood, either every company had one common father

over all, or every father made a commonwealth of his own children: the

latter cannot be said, for that would multiply commonwealths in

infinitum: neither can the first be said; for, if they had one common

father, either this behoved to be the natural father of all the company,

which none can think was so happily ordered by Babel's confusion: or

else the eldest in age, and so he might be incapable for government, and

the law of nature does not direct that the government should alway be

astricted to the eldest of the community: or else, finally, he behoved

to be their political father, by consent. For, before this consent, they

were unengaged as to common order of government; none of the community

having any legal claim to sovereignty more than the rest. When therefore

they were forced to conclude upon association, for their mutual

preservation, they must be thought to act rationally, and not to make

their condition worse, but rather better by that conclusion; and if they

found it worse, to resume their radical right which they had conferred

upon men subject to law, not to tyrannize over them: and in this case,

certainly they had the power of choosing what kind of government suited

most to their advantage, and would best preserve their liberties, and

how far this should be extended, and who should be affirmed into this

combination; still with a reservation of the privilege to their own

safety, if their associates should not do their duty: and so they might

also reserve to themselves a liberty to alter the form, when they found

it productive of more prejudice than advantage, and never to leave their

condition remediless; and to pitch upon this way of succession, and not

another, the way of free election of every successor, or of definite

election limited to one line, or to the nearest in line; and _e contra_,

with a reserve still of their primeve privileges, to secure themselves

from the inconveniences of that determination, or to change it; and to

make choices of such a family and line, and not another, and whether

the eldest always of that family, or the fittest is to be chosen; and

however it be, yet still by the peoples consent: and in all this to have

respect to some good, great and necessary ends, which, if they should be

disappointed of, and find these means useless or destructive to, they

were to be loosed from their obligation to use or to own them. See Jus

populi vindicat. chap. 5. p. 80, &c. 2. If we consider how nature

determines the peoples interest in the constitution of governors: whence

comes it that this man, and not that man, this race and family, and not

that, is invested with that title? It will be found there is no title on

earth now to the crowns, to families, to persons, but the peoples

suffrage: for the institution of magistracy in general does not make

James Stewart a king, no more than John Chamberlain: neither do

qualifications make one, otherwise there might be many better than is

this day extant; for there are many men better qualified: and there is

no prophetical or immediate callings to kingdoms now: and as for

conquest without consent, and having no more for a title, it is no

better than royal Latrociny.

It is certain, God would not command us to obey kings, and leave us in

the dark, that we should not know him that hath a real call to it. And

if he have not the peoples call, where shall we find another? It remains

therefore they must have it from the people, who have it to give

radically and virtually, having a power to preserve themselves, and to

put it in the hands of one or more rulers, that they may preserve

themselves by them. All men are born alike as to civil power (no man

being born with a crown on his head) and yet men united in society may

give it to this man, and not to that man; therefore they must have it

virtually, for they cannot give what they have not. And as cities have

power to choose their magistrates, so many cities have power to create

an universal ruler over them all. The people also have power to limit

the magistrates power with conditions; so that the present ruler shall

not have so much prerogative as his predecessor, as royalists cannot

deny, therefore they must have given that power which they can limit.

See Lex Rex, quest. 4. p. 10. &c. 2dly, The scripture also gives light

in this particular. 1. In giving directions and rules about their

orderly calling their governors, impowering them to "take wise men, and

understanding, and known among their tribes, to be made rulers," Deut.

i. 13. "To make judges and officers in all their gates," Deut. xvi. 18.

"To set one among their brethren king over them, and not a stranger,"

Deut. xvii. 15. To what purpose are these rules given them, if they had

no interest to choose their magistrates? Would God command them to set a

king over them, if they had not power to do it? And to set such a man

over them, and not such an one, if they had no influence in making one

at all? And accordingly that wise statist says very well, 2 Sam. xvi.

18. Hushai to Absalom, nay, but whom the Lord and this people, and all

the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide.

Which will also hold in the negative, whom the Lord and the people, and

all the men of the kingdom do not choose, his we will not be, nor with

him will we abide. 2. The scripture expressly attributeth the making of

kings to the people. All the people of Judah took Azariah, and made him

king, instead of his father Amaziah, whom they had executed, 2 Kings

xiv. 21. They came with a perfect heart to make David king in Hebron, 1

Chron. xii. 38. So they made Joash king, 2 Chron. xxiii. 11. 3. Even

these that were particularly designed of God, and chosen to be rulers,

yet were not formally invested with power, before the people conferred

it upon them. Gideon was called of God to it, but was not judge, till

the people said, Rule thou over us, both thou and thy son, giving him an

hereditary right for his children, Judg. viii. 12. Saul was appointed

to be king, and therefore Samuel honoured him, because he was marked out

of God to be king, 1 Sam. ix. 24. and anointed him with oil, 1 Sam. x.

1. after which he was gifted and qualified for government. God gave him

another heart, vers. 9. yet all this did not make him king, till the

people met for his inauguration, vers. 17. &c. and crowned him, and made

him king in Gilgal, 1 Sam. xi. last verse. David was anointed by Samuel,

and yet was a persecuted fugitive for several years, and never

acknowledged formally king, till the men of Judah came and anointed him,

2 Sam. ii. 4. for if he had been king before, then there were two kings

in Israel at one time, and David failed of his royal duty, in not

punishing the murderer Saul; whereas himself says, he would not touch

the Lord's anointed. Therefore the people made all kings, and that by

choice and consent, without which they were no kings. Hence I argue, if

the consent and choice of the people be so essentially necessary to the

making of kings, then they who set up themselves against the consent of

the body of the land, and without the choice of any, must be usurpers,

not to be acknowledged for lawful kings; but the former is true, as is

proven above: therefore.----Now plain it is, that this duke set up

himself against the consent of the body, being excluded from the

government by the representatives of England, and generally hated of

all; who disdaining to wait upon the formal choice of any, but after he

had paved his passage to the throne upon his brother's blood, did usurp

the title without all law.

5. The second thing necessary for the legal constitution of a king by

the people, is their compact with him: which must either be express or

tacit, explicit or implicit. Two things are here to be proven, that will

furnish an argument for disowning both the brothers. First, that there

must be a conditional reciprocally obliging covenant between the

sovereign and the subjects, without which there is no relation to be

owned. Secondly, that when this compact is broken in all or its chiefest

conditions by the sovereign, the peoples obligation ceases. The first I

shall set down, in the words of a famous author, our renowned countryman

Buchanan, in his dialogue 'de jure regni apud scotos. There is then (or

there ought to be) a mutual compact between the king and his subjects',

&c. That this is indispensibly necessary and essential to make up the

relation of sovereign and subjects, may be proved both from the light of

nature and revelation.

First, It may appear from the light of natural reason. 1. From the rise

of government, and the interest people have in erecting it by consent

and choice (as is shewed above) if a king cannot be without the peoples

making, then, all the power he hath must either be by compact or gift:

if by compact, then we have what we proposed: and if by gift: then if

abused, they may recal it; or if they cannot recover it, yet they may

and ought to hold their hand, and give him no more that they may retain,

that is, no more honour or respect, which is in the honourer before the

honoured get it. Can it be imagined, that a people acting rationally,

would give a power absolutely, without restrictions, to destroy all

their own rights? Could they suppose this boundless and lawless

creature, left at liberty to tyrannize, would be a fit mean to procure

the ends of government? for this were to set up a rampant tyrant to rule

as he listeth, which would make their condition a great deal worse than

if they had no ruler at all, for then they might have more liberty to

see to their safety. See jus populi, chap. 9. pag. 96, 97. 2. This will

be clear from the nature of that authority, which only a sovereign can

have over his subjects; which, whatever be the nature of it, it cannot

be absolute, that is against scripture, nature, and common sense, as

shall be proven at more length.

That is to set up a tyrant, one who is free from all conditions, a

roaring lion and a ranging bear to destroy all if he pleases. It must be

granted by all, that the sovereign authority is only fiduciary,

entrusted by God and the people with a great charge: a great pledge is

impawned and committed to the care and custody of the magistrate, which

he must take special care of, and not abuse, or waste, or alienate, or

sell: (for in that case, royalists themselves grant he may be deposed.)

He is by office a patron of the subjects liberties, and keeper of the

law both of God and man, the keeper of both tables. Sure, he hath no

power over the laws of God, but a ministerial power, he may not stop and

disable them as he pleases; of the same nature is it, over all other

parts of his charge. He is rather a tutor, than an inheritor and

proprietor of the commonwealth, and may not do what his pupil's

interest, what he pleases. In a word, the nature and whole significancy

of his power lies in this, that he is the nation's public servant, both

objectively in that he is only for the good of the people, and

representatively in that the people hath impawned in his hand all their

power to do royal service. The scripture teaches this, in giving him the

titles of service, as watchmen, &c. allowing him royal wages for his

royal work, Rom. xiii. he is God's minister attending continually on

this thing.

There is his work, for this cause pay you tribute also. There is his

wages and maintainance. He is called so in that transaction with

Rehoboam; the old men advised him to be a servant unto the people, then

they should be his servants, 1 Kings xii. 7. There was a conditional

bargain proposed: as to be a servant, or tutor, or guardian upon trust,

always implies conditions and accountableness to them that entrust them.

3. It must needs be so, otherwise great absurdities would follow. Here

would be a voluntary contracted relation, obliging us to relative

duties, to a man that owed none correlative to us, and yet one whom we

set over us. It were strange, if there were no condition here; and no

other voluntarily suscepted relations can be without this, as between

man and wife, master and servant, &c. This would give him the disposal

of us and ours, as if both we and what we have were his own, as a man's

goods are, against which he does not sin whatever he doth with them. So

this would make a king that could not sin against us; being no ways

obliged to us, for he can no otherwise be obliged to us, but upon

covenant conditions; he may be obliged and bound in duty to God

otherwise, but he cannot be bound to us otherwise: and if he be not

bound, then he may do what he will, he can do no wrong to us to whom he

is noways bound. This also is point blank against the law of God, which

is the second way to prove it, by the light of revelation or scripture.

1. In the very directions about making and setting up of kings, the Lord

shews what conditions shall be required of them, Deut. xvii. 15. &c. and

in all directions for obeying them, the qualifications they should have

are rehearsed, as Rom. xii. 3, 4. Therefore none are to be set up but on

these conditions, and none are to be obeyed but such as have these

qualifications. 2. In his promises of the succession of kings, he

secures their continuation only conditionally, to establish the kingdom,

if they be constant to do his commandments and judgments, 1 Chron.

xxviii. 7. There shall not fail a man to sit upon the throne, yet so

that they take heed to their way to walk in God's law, as David did, 2

Chron. vi. 16.

Now he was not otherwise to perform these promises, but by the action

and suffrage of the people setting him up, (which he had appointed to be

the way of calling kings to thrones,) if therefore the Lord's promise be

conditional, the people's actions also behoved to be suspended upon the

same conditions. 3. We have many express covenants between rulers and

subjects in scripture. Jephthah was fetched from the land of Tob, and

made the head of the Gileadites by an explicit mutual stipulation,

wherein the Lord was invocated as a witness, Judg. xi. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11.

So all the elders of Israel came to make David king; and king David made

a league with them in Hebron before the Lord, and then they anointed him

over Israel, 2 Sam. v. 3. he made there a covenant with them before the

Lord, 1 Chron. xi. 3.

He was no king before this covenant, and so it was a pactional oath

between him and the kingdom, upon terms according to the law, Deut.

xvii. He was only a king in fieri; one who was to be king, but now

actually inaugurate a covenanted king upon terms that sanctified them.

It is true, they came to recognosce Rehoboam's rights, and came to

Shechem to make him king, 1 Kings xii. 1. and yet when he would not

enter in covenant-terms with them, to satisfy their just demands, the

people answered the king, saying, what portion have we in David, neither

have we inheritance in the son of Jesse, to your tents, O Israel, vers.

16. They refused to acknowledge such an usurper, and we find no prophets

ever condemning them for it. So when Jehoash or Joash was crowned,

Jehoiada made a covenant between the Lord and the king and the people,

between the king also and the people, 2 Kings xi. 17. 2 Chron. xxiii.

11, 16. From all these reasons and scriptures, it is clear, there must

be a mutual compact between the subjects and every sovereign they own

subjection to, which if he refuse, and usurp the sword, they are under

an anterior obligation to subtract their allegiance, and to make use of

their sword, if they be in capacity to pull it out of his hands, and use

it against him. And of this we are put in mind by the motto of our old

coronation pieces, which have these words about the sword, 'for me, but,

if I deserve, against me:' and surely to him that hath it now in his

hands, it may be said, thou hast deserved, and as yet deserves. We see

then, the allegiance that this usurper alledges is his due, wants a

bottom, to wit, a compact with the people. Whence I argue, if there must

of necessity be a compact between the king and the people, when he is

advanced to the government: then he that advances himself, without and

against this compact, is an usurper not to be owned; but the former is

true: therefore he that advances himself without and against this

compact, is an usurper not to be owned. And who more notoriously

deserving such a signature, than James VII. and II. who hath made horns

of his own strength, or the Pope's bulls, to push his brother out and

himself into the throne, upon no terms at all, or any security for

religion and liberty. One objection is to be removed here: can the

customs of the Jews be binding to all nations? The kings of Judah made

such covenants, shall therefore all kings do so? _Answ._ Why not this

custom, as well as crowning, which they used likewise? These rules are

not typical or ceremonial, nor only so judicial as to be peculiarly

judicial, but are matters of moral equity, bearing a standing reason

founded upon that law, Deut. xvii. 15. &c. limiting the prince to stand

to conditions. If we cast at divine laws for rules of government where

will we find better laws? It is recorded of the first of the British

kings who was Christian, that writing to Eleutherius bishop of Rome,

(before Antichrist took that seat) for the Roman laws, he received this

answer: 'By divine clemency ye have received the law and faith of

Christ, you have the Old and New Testaments, out of them in God's name

by counsel of your states take laws, and govern your kingdom.' And of

another, that he began his laws thus. God spake all these words, &c. And

so repeated the laws of God. The second thing I undertook to prove, is

that assertion of Buchanan ubi supra, de Jure Regni. 'There being a

paction between the king and subjects, he who first recedes from what

is covenanted, and doth counteract what he hath covenanted, he looses

the contract; and the bond being loosed which did hold fast the king

with the people, whatever right did belong to him by virtue of that

compact, he looses it, and the people are as free as before the

stipulation.' Which is also asserted by the author of Jus populi, chap.

6. pag. 112. 'It is no less clear, that when the sovereign doth not

perform the principal, main, and most necessary conditions, condescended

and agreed upon, by right he falleth from his sovereignty: and pag. 117.

when the prince doth violate his compact, as to all its conditions, or

as to its chief, main, and most necessary condition, the subjects are by

right free from subjection to him, and at liberty to make choice of

another.' This is so clear that it needs no labour to prove it, that,

upon this head, we were loosed from all allegiance to the former tyrant,

who was admitted upon terms of an explicit covenant, the conditions

whereof he did as explicitly break.

There are two cases wherein subjects are loosed from covenanted

allegiance to their princes. 1. When the prince remits the obligation of

the subjects, and refuses allegiance upon that basis; then he can no

more demand it by virtue of that compact. He that remits, and will not

have that allegiance, that the subjects covenanted upon such and such

conditions to him, these subjects should not give it that they so

covenanted, for they should not prostitute it to a refuser and remitter:

but Charles the II. remitted and would not have that allegiance, which

we covenanted upon such and such conditions, viz. upon the terms of the

covenant, which he cassed and annulled and made criminal to own:

therefore to him we should not have given it, which we so covenanted. 2.

When the prince doth enter into a mutual covenant with the people upon

mutual conditions, and does not only cease to perform the conditions,

but simply denies all obligation to do it, and makes it a quarrel to

insinuate so much, yea persecutes all who dare assert the obligation of

that covenant; and yet demands allegiance, not upon the obligation of

that covenant which he hath remitted, but absolutely upon the grounds of

his prerogative: in this case it will be evident also, the subjects are

not bound either to own their formerly covenanted allegiance to him, or

that which he demands on other grounds. Grotius de Jure belli, is clear

as to this, lib. 1. cap. 4. num. 12. 'If there be such a clause or

condition in the very devolution of the government upon a prince, as if

he do so and so, the subjects shall be loosed from all bonds of

obedience, then, when he does so, he becomes a mere private person.'

Grotius there supposes the power is transferred upon a resolutive

condition; that is, if he transgress the condition, the power shall be

resolved into its first fountain: much more if it be transferred

expresly also upon a suspensive condition, that he shall continue to

maintain the ends of the covenant, defend religion and the liberties of

the subjects, in the defence whereof we shall own allegiance to him,

otherwise not. In that case, if he do not maintain these ends, plain it

is, our obligation ceases; for how can it stand upon a conditional

obligation, when his performance of the condition sists? But whatever be

the conditions mutual, it flows natively from the nature of a mutual

compact, 'That he who doth not perform the conditions agreed upon, hath

no right to the benefit granted upon condition of performance of these

conditions; especially if he perform not, or violate these conditions

upon supposition whereof he would not have gotten the benefit: it were

very absurd to say in a mutual conditional compact, one party shall

still be found to perform his conditions, though the other perform none,

but break all. Were it the act of rational creatures to set up a

sovereign, upon conditions he shall not play the tyrant, and yet be

bound to him though he tyrannize never so much? We have the name of

mutual compacts in the spies covenant with Rahab, Josh. ii. 20. "If thou

utter this our business, then we will be quit of thine oath, which thou

hast made us to swear:" if she should break, condition, then the

obligation on their part should cease. But next, all the stress will ly

in proving that the covenant, on such and such conditions between a

prince and subjects, doth equally and mutually oblige both to each

other: for if it equally oblige both, then both are equally disengaged

from other by the breach on either side, and either of them may have a

just claim in law against the other for breach of the conditions. But

royalists and court slaves alledge, that such a covenant obliges the

king to God, but not to the people at all: so that he is no more

accountable to them, than if he had none at all. But the contrary is

evident: for, (1.) If the compact be mutual, and if it be infringed on

one side, it must be so in the other also; for in contracts, the parties

are considered as equals, whatever inequality there may be betwixt them

otherwise: I speak of contracts among men. (2.) If it be not so, there

is no covenant made with the people at all: and so David did no more

covenant with Israel, than with the Chaldeans: for to all with whom the

covenant is made it obliges them to it. Otherwise it must be said, he

only made the covenant with God, contrary to the text: for he made it

only before the Lord as a witness, not with him as a party. Joash's

covenant with the Lord is expresly distinguished from that with the

people. (3.) If it be not so, it were altogether nonsense to say, there

were any covenant made with the king on the other hand: for he is

supposed to be made king on such and such terms: and yet, by this, after

he is made king he is no more obliged unto them, than if there had been

no compact with him at all. (4.) If he be bound as king, and not only as

a man or Christian, then he is bound with respect to the people; for

with respect to them he is only king: but he is bound as king, and not

only as a man or Christian, because it is only with him as king that the

people covenant, and he must transact with them under the same

consideration. Next, that which he is obliged to, is the specifical act

of a king, to defend religion and liberty, and rule in righteousness;

and therefore his covenant binds him as a king. Again, if he be not

bound as king, then as a king he is under no obligation of law or oath,

which is to make him a lawless tyrant; yea, none of God's subjects. It

would also suppose that the king as king could not sin against the

people at all, but only against God: for as king he could be under no

obligation of duty to the people, and where there is no obligation,

there is no sin; by this he would be set above all obligations to love

his neighbour as himself, for he is above all his neighbours, and all

mankind, and only less than God; and so by this doctrine, he is loosed

from all duties of the second table, or at least he is not so much

obliged to them as others. But against this it is objected: both prince

and people are obliged to perform their part to each other, and both are

obliged to God, but both are not accountable to each other; there is not

mutual power in the parties to compel one another to perform the

promised duty; the king hath it indeed over the people, but not the

people over the king, and there is no indifferent judge superior to

both, to compel both, but God. Ans. 1. What if all this should be

granted? Yet it doth not infringe the proposition: what if the people

have not power to compel him? Yet, if by law, he may fall from his

sovereignty, though, indeed, he is not deposed: he loses his right to

our part, when he breaks his part. 2. There is no need of a superior

arbiter: for as in contracting they are considered as equal, so the

party keeping the contract is superior to the other breaking it. 3.

There may be mutual co-active power, where there is no mutual relation

of superiority and inferiority: yea, in some cases, inferiors may have

a co-active power by law, to compel their superiors failing in their

duty to them; as a son wronged by his father, may compel him to

reparation by law; and independent kingdoms, nothing inferior to each

other, being in covenant together, the wronged may have a co-active

power to force the other to duty, without any superior arbiter. 4. The

bond of suretiship brings a man under the obligation to be accountable

to the creditor, though the surety were never so high, and the creditor

never so low: Solomon says, in general, without exception of kings; yea,

including them because he was a king that spake it, Prov. vi. 1, 2. "My

son, if thou be surety for thy friend,----thou art snared with the words

of thy mouth." Now a king's power is but fiduciary; and therefore he

cannot be unaccountable for the power concredited to him. And if this

generation had minded this, our stewards should have been called to an

account for their stewardship ere now. Hence I argue, if a covenanted

prince, breaking all the conditions of his compact, doth forfeit his

right to the subjects allegiance, then they are no more to own him as

their sovereign; but the former is proved, that a covenanted prince,

breaking all the conditions of his compact, doth forfeit his right to

the subjects allegiance: Therefore----And consequently when Charles II.

expresly bound by covenant to defend and promote the covenanted

reformation and liberties of the kingdom, to whom only we were bound in

the terms of his defending and promoting the same, did violently and

villainously violate and vilify these conditions, we were no more bound

to them. Somewhat possibly may be objected here, 1. If this be the sense

of the covenant, then it would seem that we were not bound to own the

king, but only when and while he were actually promoting and carrying on

the ends of the covenant. _Ans._ It does not follow, but that we are

obliged to preserve his person and authority in these necessary

intervals, when he is called to see to himself as a man; for we must

preserve him as a mean, because of his aptitude and designation for such

an end, albeit not always formally prosecuting it: we do not say, that

we are never to own him, but when actually exercised in prosecuting

these ends: but we say, we are never to own him, when he is tyrannically

and treacherously abusing his authority for destroying and overturning

these ends, and violating all the conditions of his compact. It may be.

Object. 2. Saul was a tyrant, and a breaker of his royal covenant, and

persecutor of the godly, and murderer of the priests of the Lord,

usurper upon the priest's office, and many other ways guilty of breaking

all conditions: and yet David and all Israel owned him as the anointed

of the Lord. _Ans._ 1. Saul was indeed a tyrant, rejected of God, and to

be ejected out of his kingdom in his own time and way, which David, a

prophet knowing, would not anticipate. But he was far short, and a mere

bungler in acts of tyranny in comparison of our grassators: he broke his

royal covenant in very gross particular acts, but did not cass and

rescind the whole of it, did not burn it, did not make it criminal to

own its obligation, nor did he so much as profess a breach of it, nor

arrogate an absolute prerogative, nor attempt arbitrary government, nor

to evert the fundamental laws, and overturn the religion of Israel, and

bring in idolatry as ours have done: he was a persecutor of David upon

some private quarrels, not of all the godly upon the account of their

covenanted religion: he murdered 85 priests of the Lord, in a transport

of fury, because of their kindness to David; but he did not make laws

adjudging all the ministers of the Lord to death, who should be found

most faithful in their duty to God and his church, as ours have done

against all field preachers: he usurped upon the priest's office, in one

elicit act of sacrificing: but he did not usurp a supremacy over them,

and annex it as an inherent right of his crown. 2. He was indeed such a

tyrant, as deserved to have been dethroned and brought to condign

punishment, upon the same accounts that Amaziah and Uzziah were deposed

for afterwards: and in this the people failed in their duty, and for it

they were plagued remarkably. Shall their omission be an argument to us?

3. As the question was never put to the people, whether they owned his

authority as lawful, or not? So we do not read, either of their

universal owning him, or their positive disowning him: however, that is

no good argument, which is drawn from a not doing to a doing; because

they did it not, therefore it must not be done. 4. They owned him; but

how? As the minister of God, not to be resisted or revolted from under

pain of damnation? (as all lawful magistrates ought to be owned, Rom.

xiii. 2, 4.) This I deny: for David and his six hundred men resisted him

resolutely; and though the body of the nation did long lazily ly and

couch as asses under his burden, yet, at length, weary of his tyranny,

many revolted from under him, and adjoined themselves to David at

Ziklag, "while he kept himself close, because of Saul the son of Kish,"

1 Chron. xii. 1. who are commended by the Spirit of God for their

valour, verse. 2. &c. "and many out of Manasseh fell to him, when he

came with the Philistines against Saul, to battle," verse 19. This was a

practical disowning of the tyrant, before the Lord deposed him. 5. David

did indeed pay him and his character some deference, as having been the

anointed of the Lord; yet perhaps his honouring him with that title, the

Lord's anointed, 1 Sam. xxiv. 1 Sam. xxvi. and calling him so often his

Lord the King, cannot be altogether justified, no more than his using

that same language to Achish king of Gath, 1 Sam. xxix. 8. I shewed

before how titles might be allowed; but this so circumstantiate, does

not seem so consistent with his imprecatory prayer, for the Lord's

avenging him on him, 1 Sam. xxiv 12. and many other imprecations

against him in his Psalms. In some of which he calls the same man, whom

here he called, Psal. lix. 63, 14. and the evil, violent and wicked man,

Psal. cxl. 1, 4. and the vilest of men, Psal. xii. ult. However it be,

there can be no argument from hence, to own the authority of tyrants and

usurpers.

6. Though this necessary conditional compact, which must always be in

the constitution of lawful rulers, be not always express and explicit,

so that a written authentic copy of it cannot be always produced; yet it

is always to be understood, implicitly at least, transacted in the

ruler's admission to the government, wherein the law of God must

regulate both parties; and when he is made ruler, it must be understood

that it is upon terms to be a father, feeder, and protector, and not a

tyrant, murderer and destroyer. All princes are so far pactional, that

they are obliged by the high and absolute Sovereign from whom they

derive their authority, to reign for the peace and profit of the people.

This is fixed unalterably by the laws of the supreme legislator, and

solemnly engaged unto at the coronation: and whosoever declines or

destroys this fundamental condition, he degrades and deposes himself. It

is also not only the universal practice, but necessary for the

constitution and conservation of all commonwealths, to have fundamental

laws and provisions about government, both for the upholding, and

transmitting and transferring it, as occasion calls, and preventing and

punishing violations thereof, that there be no invasion or intrusion

upon the government; and if there be any entrance upon it not according

to the constitution, that it be illegitimated, and the nation's

liberties always secured. This doth infer and regulate a conditional

compact with all that are advanced to the government, albeit it should

not be expressed. For it is undeniable that in the erection of all

governors, the grand interests of the community must be seen to, by

legal securities for religion and liberty, which is the end and use of

fundamental laws. Now, how these have been unhinged and infringed, by

the introduction and present establishment by law of that monster of the

prerogative, enacted in Parliament _anno_ 1661, the apologetic relation

doth abundantly demonstrate, lect. 10. Concerning the King's civil

supremacy, enhancing all the absoluteness that ever the Great Turk could

arrogate, and yet far short of what hath been usurped since, and

impudently proclaimed to the world; especially by him who now domineers,

in his challenges of sovereign authority, prerogative royal, and

absolute power, which all are to obey without reserve; whereby the whole

basis of our constitution, and bulwark of our religion, laws and

liberty, is enervated, and we have security of no law but the king's

lust. Hence I argue, those princes that, contrary to their virtual

compact (at least) at their coming to the crown, overturned all

fundamental laws: Ergo they cannot be owned. The major is plain; for

they that overturn fundamental laws are no magistrates; thereby all the

ends of government being subverted, and the subverter cannot be owned as

a father or friend, but an open enemy to the commonwealth, nor looked

upon as magistrates doing their duty, but as tyrants, seeking themselves

with the destruction of the commonwealth. And in this case, the compact,

the ground of the constitution, being violated, they fall from their

right, and the people are liberated from their obligation; and they

being no magistrates, the people are no subjects; for the relation is

mutual, and so is the obligation, Jus populi, chap. 9. page 183. The

minor is manifest, both from the matter of fact, and the mischiefs

framed into laws, by the sovereign authority, prerogative royal, and

absolute power foresaid: whereby what remains of our fundamental

constitutions, either in religious or civil settlements, unsubverted as

yet, may be subverted when this absolute monarch pleases. Which

absolute authority we cannot in conscience own, for these reasons, taken

both from reason and scripture. First, It is against reason, 1. A power

contrary in nature cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for that

which takes away, and makes the people to give away their natural power

of preserving their lives and liberties, and sets a man above all rule

and law, is contrary to nature: such is absolute power, making people

resign that which is not in their power to resign, an absolute power to

destroy and tyrannize. 2. A power contrary to the first rise of its

constitution cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for the first rise

of the constitution is a people's setting a sovereign over them, giving

him authority to administer justice over them: but it were against this,

to set one over them with a power to rage at random, and rule as he

lists. It is proven before, a king hath no power but what the people

gave him; but they never gave, never could give an absolute power to

destroy themselves. 3. That power which is against the ends of

government cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for that which will

make a people's condition worse than before the constitution, and that

mean which they intended for a blessing to turn a plague and scourge to

them, and all the subjects to be formal slaves at the prince's devotion,

must needs be contrary to the ends of government; but absolute power is

such: for against the exorbitance thereof, no means would be left to

prevent it obstructing all the fountains of justice, and commanding laws

and lawyers to speak; not justice, righteousness, and reason; but the

lust and pleasure of one man, turning all into anarchy and confusion:

certainly it could never be the intention either of the work or workers,

at the constitution of government, to set up a power to enslave the

people, to be a curse to them, but their ends were to get comfort,

safety and liberty, under the shadow of government. 4. That power which

invalidates, and is inconsistent with the king's compact with the

people, cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for the tenor of that

is always to secure laws and liberties, to rule according to law; but to

be absolute invalidates, and is inconsistent with that: that which were

an engagement into contradictories cannot consist with that compact; but

to engage to be absolute, and yet to rule by law, is an engagement into

contradictories, which no people could admit for a security. It is

inconsistent with this compact, to give the king absolute power to

overturn religion and liberty; and to assume that which was never given,

were to invalidate this compact, and to make himself no king; but to

restore unto the people the power they conferred upon him for the

defence of religion and liberty. 5. That power which is not from God,

nor of God, cannot be owned; but absolute power is not of God; because

it is a power to tyrannize and sin, which, if it were of God, he should

be the author of sin; for if the moral power be of God, so must the acts

be; but the acts of absolute power being lawless, cannot be from God:

Ergo, neither the moral power to commit these acts. 6. That ruler who

cannot be God's minister for the people's good, cannot be owned; (for

that is the formal reason of our conscientious subjection to rulers,

Rom. xiii. 4, 5.) But absolute sovereigns are such as cannot be God's

ministers for the people's good; for if they be God's ministers for

good, they must administer justice, preserve peace, rule by law, take

directions from their master; and if so, they cannot be absolute. 7. A

tyrant in the signal act and exercise cannot be owned; but an absolute

prince is such; being a power that may play the tyrant if he pleases,

and by law as king; and so if kings be by action tyrants, then people

are by action slaves; and so royal power cannot be a blessing to them;

yea, a lawless breaker of all bonds, promises, and oaths, cannot be

owned as lawful power; but absolute power is such: for, it cannot be

limited by these obligations, at least people cannot have any security

by them. 8. A lawless power is not to be owned; an absolute power is a

lawless power: ergo, not to be owned. The major is plain. Cicero says,

lib. 2. 'The reason of making laws was the same, as of the creation of

kings.' And Buchanan, de Jure Regni, very excellently, when 'the lust of

kings was instead of laws, and being vested with an infinite and

immoderate power, they did not contain themselves within bounds.----The

insolency of kings made laws to be desired; for this cause laws were

made by the people, and kings constrained to make use, not of their

licentious wills in judgment, but of that right and privilege which the

people had conferred upon them, being taught by many experiences, that

it was better that their liberty should be concredited to laws, than to

kings; better to have the law, which is a dumb king, than a king, who is

not a speaking law.' If then laws be necessary for the making of kings,

and more necessary than kings, and the same cause requires both, then a

king without laws is not to be owned. A king must be a speaking and

living law, reducing the law to practice. So much then as a king hath of

law, so much he hath of a king; and he who hath nothing of the law, hath

nothing of a king. Magna charta of England saith, 'The king can do

nothing but by law, and no obedience is due to him but by law.' Buchanan

rehearses the words of the most famous emperors, Theodosius and

Valentinianus, to this effect, 'It is,' say they, 'a word worthy of the

majesty of a king, to confess he is a tied prince to the laws; and

indeed it is more to submit a principality to the laws, than to enjoy an

empire.' But now that an absolute power must be a lawless power, is also

evident; for that is a lawless power that makes all laws void, needless

and useless; but such is absolute power: for it cannot be confined to

the observance of laws. 9. That power which is destructive to the

people's liberties cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for such a

licentious freedom as is absolute cannot consist with the people's

liberties; for these may infringe when he pleases. Now these, in their

own nature, and in all respects, being preferable to the king's

prerogative, and it being no prerogative which is not consistent with,

yea in its own nature adapted to, the precious interests of religion and

liberty: when the king's absolute authority is stated in contradictory

terms to these, we cannot own that authority; for now he hath another

authority than could be given him for the preservation of these

interests; in the preservation whereof he can only have an authority to

be owned, seeing he claims a power to destroy them, if he please. 10. If

we should own absolute authority, then we should own a royal prerogative

in the king to make and dispense with laws: now that cannot be owned;

for, it would infer that the king had a masterly dominion over his

subjects, to make laws, and inflict penalties without their consent.

And plain it is, they that make kings must have a co-ordinate power to

make laws also; but the people, in their representatives, make kings, as

is proven. Next, a prerogative to dispense with laws, except such laws

as are in their own nature dispensable, without prejudice to any law of

God or liberties of men, cannot be owned: for any power to dispense with

reason and law, not grounded on any other reason but mere will and

absolute pleasure, is a brutish power. It cannot be a right annexed to

the crown, to do so; for a king, as a king, can do nothing but what he

may do by law. Nay, this is not only a brutish power, but a blasphemous

power, making him a kind of god on earth, illimited, that can do what he

pleases: and to dispute it further, were to dispute whether God hath

made all under him slaves by their own consent? or, whether he may

encroach on the prerogative of God or not? By this prerogative, he

arrogates a power to dispense with the laws of God also, in pardoning

murderers, &c. which no man hath power to do; the law of God being so

peremptorily indispensible. Gen. ix. 6. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by

man shall his blood be shed." Numb. xxxv. 30, 31. "Whoso killeth any

person, the murderer shall be put to death----Moreover, ye shall take no

satisfaction for the life of a murderer, but he shall be surely put to

death." These pardons are acts of blood to the community. If the

judgment be God's, as it is, Deut. i. 17. and not for man, but for the

Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 6. then no king can arrogate a power to dispense

with it, no more than an inferior judge can dispense with the king's

laws; for the king is but a minister, bearing the sword, not in vain,

but as a revenger, to execute wrath upon them that do evil, Rom. xiii.

4. They are but bastard kings who give out sentences out of their own

mouth, contrary to God's mind.

And if he may do acts of grace by prerogative above law, then may he

also do acts of justice (so pretended) by the same prerogative; and so

may murder innocents, as well as pardon murderers; he may condemn the

just, as well as justify the wicked; both which are alike abomination to

the Lord, Prov. xvii. 15. This power cannot be owned in any man. 11. To

own absolute power, were to recognosce the king as the proper and sole

interpreter of the law. This Buchanan shews to be very absurd, 'When you

grant the interpretation of laws to a king, you give him such a license,

that the law should not speak what the lawgiver meaneth, but what is for

the interpreter's interest; so that he may turn it to all actions, as a

Lesbian rule, for his own advantage; and so what he pleases the law

shall speak, and what he will not, it shall not speak.' Now the king's

absolute pleasure can no more be the sense of the law, than it can be

the law itself: he is king by law, but he is not king of law; no mortal

can make a sense to a law, contrary to the law; for it involves a

contradiction: the true meaning is only the law. This also would take

away the use of all laws; for they could not declare what were just and

unjust, but as the king pleased: their genuine sense could not be the

rule. 12. If we own the law to be above the king, then we cannot own the

king to be absolute; but the former is true; for he must be under it

several ways: (1.) Under its directive power; that will not be denied.

(2.) Under its constitutive power; he is not a king by nature, but by

constitution and law: therefore the law is above the king; because it is

only from the law that there is a king, and that such a man and not

another is king, and that the king must be so and so qualified, and they

that made him a king, may also unmake him by the same law. (3.) Under

its limiting and restrictive power, as a man he cannot be absolute, nor

as a king by law. (4.) Under its co-active power. A lawmaker, said king

James the VI. should not be a law-breaker: but if he turn an overturner

of the fundamental laws, that law or covenant that made him king, doth

oblige to unmake him. Whatever power he hath, it is only borrowed

fiduciary power, as the nation's public servant: and that which was lent

him in pledge or pawn may be reclaimed, when abused by him.

Especially if he turn parricide, kill his brother, murder his nobles,

burn cities, then he may and ought to be punished by law. Otherwise God

should have provided better for the safety of the part than of the

whole, though that part be but a mean for the safety of the whole: for

if he turn a tyrant in his absoluteness, the people must be destroyed,

if they may not repress him: thus he is secured, and the whole exposed

to ruin. Yea, if he be a man, as well as a king, he must be under rule

of law; and when he transgresses, either his transgressions are

punishable by men, or they are not transgessions with men. See many

arguments to this purpose in Lex Rex, quest. 14, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26,

27. But secondly, I prove it by scripture, 1. Even as a king he is

regulated by law, not to multiply horses, nor wives, nor money, but to

keep the words of the law, and not lift up himself above his brethren,

Deut. xvii. 16, 17, 19, 20. he must observe to do according to the law,

and not turn from it to the right hand or to the left, Josh. i. 7.

therefore he must not be absolute. 2. He is certainly under that law,

Matth. vii. 12. Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do you

even so to them: which is the universal fundamental law. If then he

would have us keeping in our line of subordination to him, he must keep

his line, and so cannot be absolute. 3. What is God's due and peculiar

prerogative, can be owned in no mortal; but absolute power is God's due

and peculiar prerogative. He alone does whatsoever pleases him, Psal.

cxv. 3. He alone worketh all, things after the counsel of his own will,

Eph. i. 11. Acts or commands founded upon the sole pleasure of the

agent, are proper to God. It is God's will and not the creature's that

can make things good or just. It is blasphemy therefore to ascribe

absolute power to any creature. 4. That which the Spirit of God

condemned as a point of tyranny in Nebuchadnezzar, that is no

prerogative to be owned; but the Spirit of God condemned this in him,

proceeding from absolute power, that whom he would he slew, and whom he

would he kept alive, whom he would he set up, and whom he would he put

down. And his heart was lifted up, Dan. v. 19, 20. 5. That which God

condemns and threatens in tyrants in the word in general, cannot be

owned; but absolute power God condemns and threatens in the word in

general; that they "turned judgment into gall," and said, "Have we not

taken to us horns by our own strength?" Amos vi. 12, 13. 6. The word of

God speaks nothing of the king's absolute prerogative, to make laws as

he will. It is plain the king of Judah had it not: but the Sanhedrim

had a great part of the legislative power, and of the punitive power in

a special manner: the princes and people had it by Jeremiah's

acknowledgement, Jer. xxvi. 14. And Zedekiah confesses to them, The king

is not he that can do any thing against you, Jer. xxxviii. 5. 7. We find

the king in scripture had not an absolute power, to expone or execute

the law as he would; Saul made a law, 1 Sam. xiv. 24. Cursed be the man

that eats any food until the evening. But exponing it, and thinking to

execute it after a tyrannical manner, he was justly resisted by the

people, who would not let him kill innocent Jonathan. 8. Nor had he the

sole power of interpreting it; for inferior judges were interpreters,

who are no less essential judges than the king who are set to judge for

the Lord, and not for the king, 2 Chron xix. 6. and therefore they were

to expone it according to their own conscience, and not the king's. They

were to speak righteousness and judge uprightly, Psal. lviii. 1. hence

called gods as well as kings, Psal. lxxxii. 1.

There was no essential difference between a king of God's approving, and

a judge; there being but one law to both, Deut. xvii. 9. He was subject

to judgment as well as others: for being but a brother, even while on

the throne, who was not to lift up his heart above his brethren, Deut.

xvii. ult. When this cause was to be judged, his person, though never so

great, was not to be respected: nor were they to be afraid of the face

of man, for the judgment was God's, Deut. i. 17. therefore the judges

were to give out sentence in judgment, as if the Lord were to give it

out: there was no exception of kings there. Yea we find, according to

common law, they judged and punished offending kings, as shall be made

appear: 10. If they were under church censures, then they were not

absolute; but we find kings were under church censures; not only rebuked

sharply to their face, of which we have many instances; but also

subjected to church discipline, as Uzziah shut up for his leprosy.

And certainly at all times this must be extended to all: for the king is

either a brother, or not: if not, then he should not be king, according

to the scripture, Deut. xvii. 15. then also he is not a Christian, nor

can he say the Lord's prayer: if he be, then if a brother offend, he is

subject to the church, Matth. xviii. there is no exceptions of kings

there. The objection from Eccles. viii. 3, 4.--he doth whatsoever

pleaseth him, where the word of a king is, there is power, and who may

say unto him, What dost thou? is of no significancy here. For, 1. This

argument will enforce absolute obedience, if the power be to be taken

absolutely; for it is obedience that is there commanded: and so we must

not only own the absolute authority, but obey it without reserve, which

never any yet had the impudence to plead for, until James the unjust

claimed it in a Scots proclamation: but we answer, It is better to obey

God than man. 2. If he may do whatsoever pleases him, then he may turn

priest, then he may kill whom he pleases, and take possession; and yet

for Saul's usurpation Samuel could say more than what dost thou? even to

tell him, he had done foolishly, and his kingdom should not continue, 1

Sam. xiii. 13, 14. And for Ahab's tyranny, Elijah could tell him, the

dogs shall lick thy blood, even thine, 1 Kings xxi. 19, And Ezekiel,

thou profane wicked prince of Israel, Ezek. xxi. 25. 3. The meaning is

then only this; that a righteous king's just power may not only be

controlled: he is armed with power that may not be resisted, for he

beareth not the sword in vain, and therefore we must not stand in an

evil matter against them. I conclude then this argument, with the word

of an ingenious author, upon this same subject, both in thesi and

hypothesi: 'Whosoever shall offer to rule arbitrarily, does immediately

cease to be king by right, seeing by the fundamental, common and

statute laws of the realm, we know none for supreme magistrate and

governor but a limited prince, and one who stands circumscribed and

bounded in his power and prerogative. Ill effects of animosities,' page

17.

7. From what is said, this is the result, that it is essentially

necessary to a moral power and authority, to have a right and title,

without which we can own none, but as a tyrant without a title. For what

is authority, but a right to rule? if then it have not a right, it is

not authority. This will be undeniable, if we consider, that as private

dominion, or property, consists in a right to enjoy; so public dominion,

in a right to rule. Some things indeed are exposed to the common and

arbitrary use of every man, and also at the beginning, by reason of the

fewness of mankind, dominion was not reduced to distinct property; yet

now, upon the multiplication of occupants, of necessity it must be

stated by peculiar appropriation, from the law of nature, and by the

grant of the supreme king, who hath given the earth to the children of

men, Psal. cxv. 16. not to be catched up as the food of beasts, which

the stronger seize, and the weaker get only what the other leave them,

but divided by right as an inheritance, by him who separated the sons of

Adam, and set the bounds of the people, Deut. xxxii. 8. Especially

public dominion cannot be without a foundation, for its relation to the

subjected, and must be so tied up, that it may be said, this man is to

command, and these are to obey. I shew, that authority is from God, both

by institution and constitution; so that the subjects are given to

understand, such an one is singled out by God to sustain this authority,

by prescribing a rule for men's entry into the authoritative relation,

whereby he communicates that power to them which is not in others, and

which otherwise would not be in them. Hence it is, that orderly

admittance that must give the right, and upon men's having or not having

such an entrance to it, depends the reality or nullity of the power

they challenge.

Where therefore there is no lawful investiture, there is no moral power

to be owned; otherwise John of Leyden's authority might have been owned:

the unlawfulness of such a power consists in the very tenor itself; and

if we take away the use or holding of it, we take away the very being of

it: it is not then the abuse of a power lawfully to be used, but the

very use of it is unlawful. But in the usurpation of this man, or

monster rather, that is now mounted the throne, there is no lawful

investiture in the way God hath appointed as is shewed above; therefore

there is no moral power to be owned. To clear this a little further, it

will be necessary to remove the ordinary pretences, pleaded for a title

to warrant the owning of such as are in power, which are three chiefly,

to wit, possession, conquest, and hereditary succession. The first must

be touched more particularly, because it hath been the originate error,

and spring of all the stupid mistakes about government, and is the

pitiful plea of many, even mal contents, why this man's authority is to

be owned, asserting, that a person attaining and occupying the place of

power (by whatsoever means) is to be owned as the magistrate. But this

can give no right: for, 1. If providence cannot signify God's

approbative ordination, it can give no right; for without that there can

be no right; but providence cannot signify his approbative ordination,

because that, without the warrant of his word, cannot signify either

allowance or disallowance, it is so various, being often the same to

courses directly contrary, and oftentimes contrary to the same course;

sometimes savouring it, sometimes crossing it, whether it be good or

bad, and the same common providence may proceed from far different

purposes, to one in mercy, to another in judgment; and most frequently

very disproportionable to men's ways. Providence places sometimes

"wickedness in the place of judgment, and iniquity in the place of

righteousness," Eccl. iii. 16. that is, not by allowance. By providence

it happens to the just according to the work of the wicked, and to the

wicked according to the work of the righteous, Eccl. viii. 14. No man

knoweth either love or hatred by all that is before them. All things

come alike to all, there is one event to the righteous and to the

wicked, Eccl. ix. 1, 2. It were a great debasing of the Lord's anointed,

to give him no other warrant than sin hath in the world, or the falling

of a sparrow. 2. Either every providential possession, in every case,

gives a title; or, God hath declared it as a law, that it shall be so in

this particular matter of authority only.

The first cannot be said: for that would justify all robbery: nor the

second, for where is that law found? Nay, it were impious to alledge it;

for it would say, there is no unjust possessor or disorderly occupant,

but if he were once in the possession, he were right enough, and then

usurpation would be no sin. 3. If none of the causes of magistracy be

required to the producing of this possessory power, then it cannot give

or have any right; for without the true causes it cannot be the true

effect, and so can have no true right to be owned: but none of the

causes of magistracy are required to the production of this; neither the

institution of God, for this might have been, if magistracy had never

been instituted; nor the constitution of men, for this may usurp without

that. 4. That which must follow upon the right, and be legitimated by

it, cannot be owned as the right, nor can it give the title: but the

possession of the power, or the exercise thereof, must follow upon its

right, and be legitimated by it: therefore.----A man must first be in

the relation of a ruler, before he can rule; and men must first be in

the relation of subjects, before they obey.

The commands of public justice, to whom are they given but to

magistrates? They must then be magistrates, before they can be owned as

the ministers of justice: he must be a magistrate, before he can have

the power of the sword: he cannot, by the power of the sword, make

himself magistrate. 5. That which would make every one in the possession

of the magistracy a tyrant, cannot be owned: but a possessory occupation

giving right, would make every one in possession a tyrant; for, that

which enervates, and takes away that necessary distinction between the

king's personal capacity and his legal capacity, his natural and his

moral power, will make every king a tyrant (seeing it makes every thing

that he can do as a man, to be legally done as a king) but a possessory

occupation giving right, would enervate and take away that distinction:

for how can these be distinguished in a mere possessory power? The man's

possession is all his legal power; and if possession give a right, his

power will give legality. 6. What sort or size of possession can be

owned to give a right? Either it must be partial or plenary possession:

not partial, for then others may be equally entitled to the government,

in competition with that partial possessor, having also a part of it:

not plenary, for then every interruption or usurpation on a part, would

make a dissolution of the government. 7. Hence would follow infinite

absurdities; this would give equal warrant, in case of vacancy, to all

men to step to, and stickle for the throne, and expose the commonwealth

as a booty to all aspiring spirits: for they needed no more to make them

sovereigns, and lay a tie of subjection upon the consciences of people,

but to get into possession: and in case of competition, it would leave

people still in suspense and uncertainties whom to own; for they behoved

to be subject only to the uppermost, which could not be known until the

controversy be decided: it would cassate and make void all

pre-obligations, cautions, and restrictions from God about the

government: it would cancel and make vain all other titles of any, or

constitutions, or provisions, or oaths of allegiance: yea, to what

purpose were laws or pactions made about ordering the government, if

possession gave right, and laid an obligation on all to own it? Yea,

then it were sinful to make any such provisions, to fence in and limit

the determination of providence, if providential possession may

authorize every intrusive acquisition to be owned: then also in case of

competition of two equal pretenders to the government, there would be no

place left for arbitrations.

If this were true, that he has the power that is in possession, the

difference were at an end; no man could plead for his own right then; in

this also it is inconsistent with itself, condemning all resistance

against the present occupant, yet justifying every resistance that is

but successful to give possession. 8. That which would oblige us to own

the devil and the pope, cannot be a ground to own any man; but if this

were true, that possession gave right, it would oblige us to own the

devil and the pope. Satan we find claiming to himself the possession of

the world's kingdoms, Luke iv. 6. which as to many of them is in some

respect true, for he is called the god of this world, and the prince of

this world, John xiv. 30. 2 Cor. iv. 4. Are men therefore obliged to own

his authority? or shall they deny his, and acknowledge his lieutenant,

who bears his name, and by whom all his orders are execute, I mean the

man that tyrannizes over the people of God? For he is the devil that

casts some into prison, Rev. ii. 10. Again, the pope, his

captain-general, lays claim to a temporal power and ecclesiastic both,

over all the nations, and possesses it over many; and again, under the

conduct of his vassal the duke of York, is attempting to recover the

possession of Britain: shall he therefore be owned. This cursed

principle disposes men for popery, and contributes to strengthen popery

and tyranny both on the stage, to the vacating of all the promises of

their dispossession. 9. That which would justify a damnable sin, and

make it a ground of a duty, cannot be owned; but this fancy of owning a

very power in possession would justify a damnable sin and make it the

ground of a duty; for, resistance to the powers ordained of God is a

damnable sin, Rom. xiii. 2. But the resisters having success in

providence, may come to the possession of the power, by expelling the

just occupant; and, by this opinion, that possession would be ground for

the duty of subjection for conscience sake. 10. If a self-created

dignity be null and not to be owned, than a mere possessory is not to be

owned; but the former is true: as Christ saith, John viii. 54. If I

honour myself my honour is nothing. 11. That which God hath disallowed

possession without right, Ezek. xxi. 27. I will overturn, overturn,

overturn it, until he come whose right it is, Hos. viii. 4. They have

set up kings and not by me, Matth. xxvi. 52. All they that take the

sword shall perish with the sword; by this the usurper of the sword is

differenced from the true owner. 12. Many scripture examples confute

this; shewing that the possession may be in one, and the power with

right in another.