HEAD II.

_The sufferings of many for refusing to own the tyrant's authority

vindicated._

The other grand ordinance of God, magistracy, which he hath in his

sovereign wisdom, justice, and goodness, appointed, ordained, and

consecrated, for the demonstration, illustration, and vindication of his

own glory, and the communication, conservation, and reparation of the

peace, safety, order, liberty, and universal good of mankind, is next to

that of the ministry of great concern: wherein not only the prudence,

policy, property, and liberty of men, but also the conscience, duty, and

religion of Christians, have a special interest. And therefore it is no

less important, pertinent, profitable, and necessary for every one that

hath any of these to care and contend for, keep and recover, to inquire

into and understand something of the institution, constitution, nature,

and boundaries of the sacred ordinances of magistracy, than into the

holy ordinance of the ministry; so far at least as may consist with the

sphere of every one's capacity and station, and may conduce to the

satisfaction of every one's conscience, in the discharge of the duties

of their relations. Every private man indeed hath neither capacity,

concern, nor necessity, to study the politics, or search into the

secrets, or intrigues of government, no more than he is to be versed in

all the administrations of ecclesiastical policy, and interests of the

ministry; yet every man's conscience is no less concerned, in

distinguishing the character of God's ministers of justice, the

magistrates, to whom he owes and owns allegiance, that they be not

usurping tyrants, everting the ordinances of the magistracy, than in

acknowledging the character of Christ's ministers of the gospel, to

whom he owes and owns obedience, that they be not usurping prelates or

impostors, perverting the ordinance of the ministry. The glory of God is

much concerned, in our owning and keeping pure and entire, according to

his will and word, both these ordinances. And our conscience as well as

interest is concerned in the advantage or hurt, profit or prejudice, of

the right or wrong, observation or prevarication, of both these

ordinances; being interested in the advantage of magistracy, and hurt of

tyranny in the state, as well as in the advantage of the ministry, and

hurt of diocesan, or erastian supremacy in the church; in the advantage

of liberty, and hurt of slavery in the state, as well as in the

advantage of religion, and hurt of profaneness in the church; in the

profit of laws, and prejudice of prerogative in the state, as well as in

the profit of truth, and prejudice of error in the church; in the profit

of peace and true loyalty, and prejudice of oppression and rebellion in

the state, as well as in the profit of purity and unity, and prejudice

of defection, and division or schism in the church. So that in

confidence, we are no more free to prostitute our loyalty and liberty

absolutely, in owning every possessor of the magistracy; than we are

free to prostitute our religion and faith implicitly, in owning every

pretender to the ministry. This may seem very paradoxical to some,

because so dissonant and dissentient from the vulgar, yea almost

universal and inveterate opinion and practice of the world, that

hitherto hath not been so precise in the matter of magistracy. And it

may seem yet more strange, that not only some should be found to assert

this; but that any should be found so strict and strait laced, as to

adventure upon suffering, and even to death, for that which hath

hitherto been seldom scrupled, by any that were forced to subjection

under a yoke, which they had no force to shake off, and wherein religion

seems little or nothing concerned; for not owning the authority of the

present possessors of the place of government: which seems to be a

question not only excentric and extrinsic to religion, but such a

state-question, as for its thorny intricacies and difficulties, is more

proper for politicians and lawyers to dispute about, (as indeed their

debates about this head of authority, have been as manifold and

multiplied as about any one thing) than for private christians to search

into, and suffer for, as a part of their testimony. But if we will cast

off prejudices, and the tyranny of custom, and the bondage of being

bound to the world's mind in our inquiries about tyranny, and suffer

ourselves to ponder impartially the importance of this matter; and then

to state the question right; we shall find religion and conscience hath

no small interest in this business. They must have no small interest in

it, if we consider the importance of this matter, either extensively,

objectively, or subjectively. Extensively considered, it is the interest

of all mankind to know and be resolved in conscience, whether the

government they are under be of God's ordination, or of the devil's

administration? Whether it be magistracy or tyranny? Whether it gives

security for religion and liberty, to themselves and their posterity? Or

whether it induces upon themselves, and entails upon the posterity,

slavery as to both these invaluable interests? Whether they have matter

of praise to God for the blessings and mercies of magistracy, or matter

of mourning for the plagues and miseries of tyranny, to the end they may

know both the sins and snares, duties and dangers, cases and crisis, of

the times they live in? All men, that ever enjoyed the mercy of a right

constitute magistracy, have experienced, and were bound to bless God for

the blessed fruits of it: and, on the other hand, the world is full of

the tragical monuments of tyranny, for which men were bound both to

search into the causes, and see the effects of such plagues from the

Lord, to the end they might mourn over both. And from the beginning it

hath been observed, that as people's sins have always procured the

scourge of tyranny; so all their miseries might be refounded upon

tyrants encroachments, usurping upon or betraying their trust, and

overturning religion, laws and liberties. Certainly mankind is concerned

in point of interest and conscience, to inquire into the cause and cure

of this epidemic distemper, that hath so long held the world in misery,

and so habitually, that now it is become, as it were, natural to ly

stupidly under it; that is, that old ingrained gangrene of the king's

evil, or compliance with tyranny, that hath long afflicted the kingdoms

of the world, and affected not only their backs in bearing the burden

thereof; but their hearts into a lethargic stupor of insensibleness; and

their heads in infatuating and intoxicating them with notions of the

sacredness and uncontroulableness of tyranny; and their hands in

infeebling and fettering them from all attempts to work a cure: or else

it hath had another effect on many that have been sensible of a touch of

it; even equivalent to that, which an ingenious author, Mr. Gee, in his

preface to the divine right and original of the civil magistrate, (to

which Mr. Durham is not absonant) expounds to be the effect of the

fourth vial, Rev. xvi. 8, 9. when in these dog days of the world, power

is given to the sun of imperial, especially popish, tyranny, by their

exorbitant stretches of absolute prerogative, to scorch men with fire of

furious oppressions, they then blaspheme the name of God which hath

power over these plagues, in their male-content complaints, grumblings,

grudgings, and murmurings under the misery, but they do not repent, nor

give him glory, in mourning over the causes promeriting such a plague,

and their own accession in exposing themselves to such a scorching sun,

nakedly without a sconce. Certainly this would be the remedy that

conscience would suggest, and interest would incite to, an endeavour

either of allaying the heat or of subtracting from it under a shelter,

by declining the oblique malignity of its scorching rays. But will the

world never be awakened out of this dream and dotage, of dull and stupid

subjection to every monster that can mount a throne? Sure at length it

may be expected, either conscience from within as God's deputy,

challenging for the palpable perversion of this his excellent ordinance,

or judgments from without, making sensible of the effects of it, will

convince and confute these old inveterate prejudices. And then these

martyrs for that universal interest of mankind, who got the fore-start

and the first sight of this, will not be so flouted as fools, as now

they are. And who knoweth, what prelude or preparative, foreboding and

presaging the downfal of tyranny, may be in its aspirings to this height

of arbitrary absoluteness, and in the many questions raised about it,

and by them imposed upon consciences to be resolved. If we consider the

object of this question; as conscience can only clear it, so in nothing

can it be more concerned. It is that great ordinance of God, most

signally impressed by a very sacred and illustrious character of the

glorious majesty of the Most High, who hath appointed magistracy; in

which, considering either its fountain, or dignity, ends, or effects,

conscience must have a very great concern. The fountain, or efficient

cause of magistracy, is high and sublime. The powers that are, be of

God, not only by the all-disposing hand of God in his providence, as

tyranny is, nor only by way of naked approbation, but by divine

in-institution; and that not only in the general, by at least a

secondary law of nature, but also the special investiture of it, in

institution and constitution, is from God; and therefore they are said

to be ordained of God, to which ordinance we must be subject, not only

for wrath, but also for conscience sake: which is the great duty

required in the fifth commandment, the first commandment with promise;

that hath the priority of place before all the second table, because the

other commandments respect each some one interest, this hath a

supereminent influence upon all. But tyrannical powers are not of God in

this sense. And it were blasphemy to assert they were of the Lord's

authorization, conscience cannot bind to a subjection to this. Again,

the dignity of magistracy, ordained for the maintenance of truth and

righteousness, the only foundations of people's felicity, whether

temporal or eternal, including the bonds and boundaries of all obedience

and subjection, for which they are intended, and to which they refer, is

supereminent; as that epithet of higher, added to the powers that are of

God, may be rendered; making them high and sublime in glory, whose

highest prerogative is, That, being God's ministers, they sit in the

throne of God, anointed of the Lord; judging not for man, but for the

Lord, as the scripture speaks. To this conscience is concerned in duty

to render honour as due, by the prescript of the fifth commandment; but

for tyranny, conscience is bound to deny it, because not due, no more

than obedience, which conscience dare not pay to a throne of iniquity,

and a throne of the devil, as tyranny may be called, as really as

magistracy is called the throne of God. Next, conscience is much

concerned in the ends of magistracy, which are the greatest, the glory

of God, and the good of mankind. And, in the effects of it, the

maintenance of truth, righteousness, religion, liberty, peace, and

safety, and all choicest external blessings; but the ends and effects of

tyranny are quite contrary, domineering for pleasure, and destroying for

profit. Can we think that conscience is nothing concerned here, that

these great ends shall be subverted, and the effects precluded; and to

that effect, that tyranny not only be shrouded under a privilege of

impunity, but by our subjection and acknowledgement of it, as a lawful

power, encouraged into all enormities, and licensed to usurp, not only

our liberties, but God's throne by an uncontroulable sovereignty? But if

we consider the subjective concern of conscience, it must be very graat,

when it is the only thing that prompts to subjection, that regulates

subjection, and is a bottom for subjection to lawful powers. If it were

not out of conscience, men that are free born are naturally such lovers

of liberty, and under corruption such lusters after licentiousness,

that they would never come under the order of this ordinance, except

constrained for wrath's sake: but now, understanding that they that

resist the power, resist the ordinance of God, and they that resist

shall receive to themselves damnation, they must needs be subject, not

only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. If conscience were not

exercised in regulating our duty to magistrates, we would either obey

none, or else would observe all their commands promiscuously, lawful or

unlawful, and would make no difference either of the matter commanded,

or the power commanding: but now, understanding that we must obey God

rather than man, and that we must render to all their dues, fear to whom

fear, honour to whom honour, conscience regulates us what and whom to

obey. And without conscience there is little hope for government to

prove either beneficial or permanent; little likelihood of either a

real, regular, or durable subjection to it. The discernible standing of

government upon conscientious grounds, is the only thing that can bring

in conscience, and a conscientious submission to it; it being the

highest and most kindly principle of, and the strongest and most lasting

obligation to any relative duty. It will not be liberty of conscience,

(as saith the late declaration for it) but reality of conscience, and

government founded upon a bottom of conscience, that will unite the

governed to the governors, by inclination as well as duty. And if that

be, then there is needful a rule of God's revealed preceptive will, (the

only cynosure and empress of conscience), touching the founding and

erecting of government, that it have the stamp of God's authority. It

must needs then follow, that conscience hath a very great concernment in

this question in the general, and that before it be forced to an

abandoning of its light in a matter of such moment, it will rather

oblige people that are conscientious to suffer the worst that tyrants

can do; especially when it is imposed and obtruded upon conscience, to

give its sufferage and express acknowledgment that the present tyranny

is the authority of God, which is so visible in the view of all that

have their eyes open, that the meanest capacity that was never

conversant in laws and politics can give this verdict that the

constitution and administration of the government of the two royal

brothers, under whose burden the earth and we have been groaning these

twenty-seven years past, hath been a complete and habitual tyranny, and

can no more be owned to be magistracy, than robbery can be acknowledged

to be a rightful possession. It is so plain, that I need not the help of

lawyers and politicians to demonstrate it, nor launch into the ocean of

their endless debates in handling the head of magistracy and tyranny:

yet I shall improve what help I find in our most approved authors who

have enlarged upon this question, (though not as I must state it) to

dilucidate the matter in Thesi, and refer to the foregoing deduction of

the succession of testimonies against tyranny, to clear it in Hypothesi.

Whence we may see the occasion, and clearly gather the solution of the

question, which is this:

Whether a people, long oppressed with the encroachments of tyrants and

usurpers, may disown their pretended authority; and, when imposed upon,

to acknowledge it, may rather choose to suffer than to own it?

To clear this question: I shall premit some concessions, and then come

more formally to resolve it.

1. It must be granted the question is extraordinary, and never so stated

by any writer on this head; which makes it the more difficult and

odious, because odd and singular, in the esteem of those who take up

opinions rather from the number of votes than from the weight of the

reasons of the asserters of them. It will also be yielded, that this was

never a case of confession for Christians to suffer upon. And the reason

of both is, because, before these seven years past, this was never

imposed upon private and common subjects to give an account of their

thoughts and conscience about the lawfulness of the government they

lived under. Conquerors and usurpers sometimes have demanded an

acknowledgment of their authority, from men of greatest note and stroke

in the countries they have seized; but they never since the creation

urged it upon common people, as a test of loyalty; but thought always

their laws and power to execute them on offenders, did secure their

subjection. Or otherwise to what purpose are laws made, and the

execution of them committed to men in power, if they be not thought a

sufficient fence for the authority that makes them; except it also have

the actual acknowledgment of the subjects to ratify it? Men that are

really invested with authority, would think it both a disparagement to

their authority, and would disdain such a suspicion of the

questionableness of it, as to put it as a question to the subjects,

whether they owned it or not. But the gentlemen that rules us, have

fallen upon a piece of unprecedented policy; wherein they think both to

involve the nation in the guilt of their unparalelled rebellion against

the Lord, by owning that authority that promotes it; and so secure their

usurpations, either by the suffrage of all that own them, or by the

extirpation of the conscientious that dare not, with the odium and

obloquy of being enemies to authority; by which trick they think to bury

the honour of their testimony. Yet in sobriety without prophesying it

may be presumed, at the long run, this project will prove very

prejudicial to their interest: and herein they may verify that Scots

proverb, 'o'er fast o'er loose,' and accomplish these divine sayings,

'He disappointeth the devices of the crafty, he taketh the wise in their

own craftiness, and the counsel of the froward is carried headlong.' For

as they have put people upon this question, who would not otherwise have

made such inquiries into it, and now finding they must be resolved in

conscience to answer it, whenever they shall be brought before them;

upon a very overly search, they see terrible tyranny written in legible

bloody characters almost on all administrations of the government, and

so come to be fixed in the verdict that their conscience and the word of

God gives of it; so it may be thought, this question now started, for as

despicable beginnings it hath, yet ere it come to a full and final

decision, will be more enquired into through the world, and at length

prove as fatal to tyranny, as ever any thing could be, and then they may

know whom to thank. But however, though the question be extraordinary,

and the sufferings thereupon be unprecedented, and therefore, among

other contradictions that may be objected, that neither in history nor

scripture we can find instances of private people's refusing to own the

authority they were under, nor of their suffering for that refusal; yet

nevertheless it may be duty without example. Many things may be done,

though not against the law of God, yet without a precedent of the

practice of the people of God. Though we could not adduce an example for

it, yet we can gather it from the law of God, that tyranny must not be

owned, this will be equivalent to a thousand examples. Every age in some

things must be a precedent to the following, and I think never did any

age produce a more honourable precedent, than this beginning to decline

a yoke under which all ages have groaned.

2. It will be also granted, it is not always indispensibly necessary, at

all times, for a people to declare their disclaim of the tyranny they

are under, when they cannot shake it off; nor, when they are staged for

their duty before wicked and tyrannical judges, is it always necessary

to disown their pretended authority positively; when either they are not

urged with questions about it, then they may be silent in reference to

that; or when they are imposed upon to give their judgment of it, they

are not always obligated, as in a case of confession, to declare all

their mind, especially when such questions are put to them with a

manifest design to entrap their lives, or intangle their conscience. All

truth is not to be told at all times; neither are all questions to be

answered when impertinently interrogate, but may be both cautiously and

conscientiously waved. We have Christ's own practice, and his faithful

servant Paul's example, for a pattern of such prudence and Christian

caution. But yet it were cruel and unchristian rigour, to censure such

as, out of a pious principle of zeal to God and conscience of duty, do

freely and positively declare their judgment, in an absolute disowning

of their pretended authority, when posed with such questions, though to

the manifest detriment of their lives, they conscientiously looking upon

it as a case of confession. For where the Lord hath not peremptorily

astricted his confessors to such rules of prudence, but hath both

promised, and usually gives his Spirit's conduct, encouraging and

animating them to boldness, so as before hand they should not take

thought how or what they shall speak, and in that same hour they find it

given them, it were presumption for us to stint them to our rules of

prudence. We may indeed find rules to know, what is a case of

confession; but hardly can it be determined, what truth or duty we are

questioned about is not, or may not be, a case of confession. And who

can deny, but this may be in some circumstance, a case of confession,

even positively to disown the pretended authority of a bloody court or

council? when either they go out of their sphere, taking upon them

Christ's supremacy, and the cognizance of the concerns of his crown,

whereof they are judges noways competent; then they must freely and

faithfully be declined. Or when, to the dishonour of Christ, they

blaspheme his authority, and the sacred boundaries he hath prescribed to

all human authority, and will assert an illimited absolute authority,

refusing and discharging all offered legal and scriptural restrictions

to be put thereupon, (as hath been the case of the most part of these

worthy though poor martyrs, who have died upon this head) then they must

think themselves bound to disown it. Or when they have done some cruel

indignity and despite to the Spirit of God, and to Christ's prerogative

and glory, and work of reformation, and people, in murdering them

without mercy, and imposing this owning of their king, by whose

authority all is acted, as a condemnation of these witnesses of Christ

their testimony, and a justification of their bloody cruelties against

them, which hath frequently been the case of these poor people that hath

been staged upon this account: in this case, and several others of this

sort that might be mentioned, then they may be free and positive in

disowning this test of wicked loyalty, as the mark of the dragon of the

secular beast of tyranny. And in many such cases, when the Lord gives

the spirit, I see no reason but that Christ's witnesses must follow his

pattern of zeal in the case of confession, which he witnessed before

Pontius Pilate in asserting his own kingship, as they may in other cases

follow his pattern of prudence. And why may we not imitate the zeal of

Stephen who called the council before whom he was staged stiff-necked

resisters of the Holy Ghost, persecutors of the prophets, and betrayers

and murderers of Christ the just one, as well as the prudence of Paul?

But, however it be, the present testimony against this pretended

authority lies in the negative, which obliges always, for ever and for

ever; that is to say, we plead, that it must never be owned. There is a

great difference between a positive disowning and a not owning; though

the first be not always necessary, the latter is the testimony of the

day, and a negative case of confession, which is always clearer than the

positive. Though we must not always confess every truth, yet we must

never deny any.

3. It is confessed, we are under this sad disadvantage besides others,

that not only all our brethren, groaning under the same yoke with us,

will not take the same way of declining this pretended authority, nor

adventure, when called, to declare their judgment about it, (which we do

not condemn, as is said, and would expect from the rules of equity and

charity, they will not condemn us when we find ourselves in conscience

bound to use greater freedom) but also some when they do declare their

judgment, give it in terms condemnatory of, and contradictory unto our

testimony, in that they have freedom positively to own this tyranny as

authority, and the tyrant as their lawful sovereign: and many of our

ministers also are of the same mind. And further, as we have few

expressly asserting our part of the debate, as it is now stated; so we

have many famous divines expresly against us in this point, as

especially we find in their comments upon, Rom. xiii. among whom I

cannot dissemble my sorrow to find the great Calvin, saying, Saepe solent

inquirere, &c. 'Men often enquire, by what right they have obtained

their power who have the rule! it should be enough to us that they do

govern; for they have not ascended to this eminency by their own power,

but are imposed by the hand of the Lord.' As also Pareus saying too much

against us. For answer to this, I refer to Mr. Knox's reply to

Lethington, producing several testimonies of divines against him upon

this very head; wherein he shews, that the occasions of their discourses

and circumstances wherein they were stated, were very far different from

those that have to do with tyrants and usurpers, as indeed they are the

most concerned, and smart most under their scourge, are in best case to

speak to the purpose. I shall only say, mens averment, in a case of

conscience, is not an oracle, when we look upon it with an impartial

eye, in the case wherein we are not prepossessed: it will bear no other

value, than what is allayed with the imperfections of fallibility, and

moreover is contradicted by some others, whose testimony will help us

as much to confirm our persuasion, as others will hurt us to infirm it.

4. But now when tyrants go for magistrates, lest my plea against owning

tyranny, should be mistaken, as if it were a pleading for anarchy, I

must assert, that I and all those I am vindicating, are for magistracy,

as being of divine original, institute for the common good of human and

Christian societies, whereunto every soul must be subject, of whatsoever

quality or character, and not only for wrath but also for conscience

sake (though as to our soul and conscience, we are not subject) which

whosoever resisteth, resisteth the ordinance of God, and against which

rebellion is a damnable sin, whereunto (according to the fifth

commandment, and the many reiterated exhortations of the apostles) we

must be subject, and obey magistrates, and submit ourselves to every

ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be unto the king as

supreme, &c. And we account it a hateful brand of them that walk after

the flesh, to despise government, to be presumptuous, self-willed, and

not afraid to speak evil of dignities: and that they are filthy

dreamers, who despise dominion, and speak evil of dignities: and of

those things which they know not. We allow the magistrate, in whatsoever

form of government, all the power the scripture, laws of nature and

nations, or municipal do allow him; asserting, that he is the keeper and

avenger of both the tables of the law, having a power over the church,

as well as the state, suited to his capacity, that is, not formally

ecclesiastical, but objectively, for the church's good; an external

power, of providing for the church, and protecting her from outward

violence, or inward disorder, an imperate power, of commanding all to do

their respective duties; a civil power of punishing all, even

church-officers, for crimes; a secondary power of judicial approbation

or condemnation; or discretive, in order to give his sanction to

synodical results; a cumulative power, assisting and strengthening the

church in all her privileges, subservient, though not servile,

co-ordinate with church-power, not subordinate (though as a christian he

is subject) in his own affairs, viz. civil; not to be declined as judge,

but to be obeyed in all things lawful, and honoured and strengthened

with all his dues. We would give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's,

and to God the things that are God's; but to tyrants, that usurp and

pervert both the things of God and of Caesar, and of the peoples

liberties, we can render none of them, neither God's, nor Caesar's, nor

our own: nor can we from conscience give him any other deference, but as

an enemy to all, even to God, to Caesar, and the people. And in this,

though it doth not sound now with court-parasites, nor with others, that

are infected with royal indulgencies and indemnities, we bring forth but

the transumpt of old principles, according to which our fathers walked

when they still contended for religion and liberty, against the

attemptings and aggressions of tyranny, against both.

5. It must be conceded, it is not an easy thing to make a man in the

place of magistracy a tyrant: for as every escape, error, or act of

unfaithfulness, even known and continued in, whether in a minister's

entry to the ministry, or in his doctrine, doth not unminister him, nor

give sufficient ground to withdraw from him, or reject him as a minister

of Christ: so neither does every enormity, misdemeanor, or act of

tyranny, injustice, perfidy, or profanity in the civil magistrate,

whether as to his way of entry to that office, or in the execution of

it, or in his private or personal behaviour, denominate him a tyrant or

an usurper, or give sufficient ground to divest him of magistratical

power, and reject him as the lawful magistrate. It is not any one or two

acts contrary to the royal covenant or office, that doth denude a man of

the royal dignity, that God and the people gave him. David committed

two acts of tyranny, murder and adultery; yet the people were to

acknowledge him as their king (and so it may be said of some others,

owned still as kings in scripture) the reason is, because though he

sinned against a man or some particular persons, yet he did not sin

against the state, and the catholic good of the kingdom, subverting law;

for then he would have turned tyrant, and ceased to have been lawful

king. There is a great difference between a tyrant in act, and a tyrant

in habit; the first does not cease to be a king. But on the other hand,

as every thing will not make a magistrate to be a tyrant; so nothing

will make a tyrant by habit a magistrate. And as every fault will not

unminister a minister; so some will oblige the people to reject his

ministry, as if he turn heretical, and preach atheism, Mahometanism, or

the like, the people, though they could not formally depose him, or

through the corruption of the times could not get him deposed; yet they

might reject and disown his ministry: so it will be granted, that a

people have more power in creating a magistrate, than in making a

minister; and consequently they have more right, and may have more light

in disowning a king, as being unkinged; than in disowning a minister, as

being unministred. It will be necessary therefore, for clearing our way,

to fix upon some ordinary characters of a tyrant, which may discrimate

him from a magistrate, and be ground of disowning him as such. I shall

rehearse some, from very much approved authors; the application of which

will be as apposite to the two brothers, that we have been burdened

with, as if they had intended a particular and exact description of

them. Buchanan de jure regni apud Scotos, shews, 'That the word tyrant

was at first honourable, being attributed to them that had the full

power in their hands, which power was not astricted by any bonds of

laws, nor obnoxious to the cognition of judges; and that it was the

usual denomination of heroes, and thought at first so honourable, that

it was attributed to the gods: but as Nero and Judas were sometimes

among the Romans and Jews names of greatest account, but afterwards by

the faults of two men of these names, it came to pass, that the most

flagitious would not have these names given to their children, so in

process of time, rulers made this name so infamous by their wicked

deeds, that all men abhorred it, as contagious and pestilentious, and

thought it a more light reproach to be called hangman than a tyrant.'

Thereafter he condescends upon several characters of a tyrant. 1. 'He

that doth not receive a government by the will of the people, but by

force invadeth it, or intercepteth it by fraud, is a tyrant; and who

domineers even over the unwilling (for a king rules by consent, but a

tyrant by constraint) and procures the supreme rule without the peoples

consent, even tho' for several years they may so govern, that the people

shall not think it irksome.' Which very well agrees with the present

gentleman that rules over us, who, after he was by public vote in

parliament secluded from the government, of which the standing laws of

both kingdoms made him incapable for his murders, adulteries and

idolatries, by force and fraud did intercept first an act for his

succession in Scotland, and then the actual succession in England, by

blood and treachery, usurping and intruding himself into the government,

without any compact with, or consent of the people; though now he

studies to make himself another Syracusan Hiero, or the Florentine Cosmo

de medices, in a mild moderation of his usurped power; but the west of

England, and the west of Scotland both, have felt the force of it. 2. He

does not govern for the subjects welfare, or public utility, but for

himself, having no regard to that, but to his own lust, 'acting in this

like robbers, who cunningly disposing of what wickedly they have

acquired, do seek the praise of justice by injury, and of liberality by

robbery; so he can make some shew of a civil mind; but so much the less

assurance gives he of it, that it is manifest, he intends not hereby the

subjects good, but the greater security of his own lusts, and stability

of empire over posterity, having somewhat mitigated the peoples hatred,

which when he had done, he will turn back again to his old manners; for

the fruit which is to follow, may easily be known, both by the seed and

by the sower thereof.' An exact copy of this we have seen within these

two years, oft before in the rule of the other brother.

After God hath been robbed of his prerogatives, the church of her

privileges, the state of its laws, the subjects of their liberty and

property, he is now affecting the praise, and captating the applause of

tenderness to conscience, and love of peace, by offering now liberty

after all his cruelties; wherein all the thinking part of men do discern

he is prosecuting that hellish project, introducing popery and slavery,

and overturning religion, law, and liberty. 3. The kingly government is

according to nature, the tyrannical against it; principality is the

kingly government of a freeman amongst freemen; the tyrannical a

government of a master over slaves. Tyranny is against nature, and a

masterly principality over slaves. Can he be called a father, who

accounts his subjects slaves; or a shepherd, who does not feed, but

devours his flock? or a pilot, who doth always study to make shipwreck

of the goods, and strikes a leak in the very ship where he fails? 'What

is he then that bears command, not for the people's advantage, but

studies only himself, who leadeth his subjects into manifest snares? He

shall not verily be accounted by me either commander, emperor, or

governor.' King James VI. also, in a speech to the parliament in the

year 1609, makes this one character of a tyrant, when he begins to

invade his subjects rights and liberties. And if this be true, then we

have not had a king these many years: the foregoing deduction will

demonstrate, what a slavery we have been under. 4. What is he then, who

doth not contend for virtue with the good but to exceed the most

flagitious in vices? 'If you see then any usurping the royal name, and

not excelling in any virtue, but striving to exceed all in baseness, not

tendering his subjects good with native affection, but pressing them

with proud domination, esteeming the people committed to his trust, not

for their safeguard, but for his own gain, will you imagine this man is

truly a king, albeit he vapours with a numerous levee guard, and makes

an ostentation of gorgeous pomp?' The learned Althusius likewise in his

politics, chap. 38. Num. 15. (as he is cited by Jus Populi, chap. 16. p.

347.) makes this one character of a tyrant, that 'living in luxury,

whoredom, greed and idleness, he neglecteth, or is unfit for his

office.' How these suit our times we need not express; what effrontery

of impudence is it, for such monsters to pretend to rule by virtue of

any authority derived from God, who pollute the world with their

adulteries and incests, and live in open defiance of all the laws of the

universal king; with whom to exceed in all villanies is the way to

purchase the countenance of the court, and to aspire to preferment? No

Heligobaldus, &c. could ever come up the length in wickedness, that our

rulers have professed. 5. He can transfer unto himself the strength of

all laws, and abrogate them when he pleases. King James VI. in that

forecited speech saith, a king degenerateth into a tyrant, when he

leaveth to rule by law. Althusius also, in the forecited place, saith,

'There is one kind of tyranny, which consisteth in violating, changing,

or removing of fundamental laws, specially such as concern religion;

such, saith he, Philip the king of Spain, who, contrary to the

fundamental Belgic laws, did erect an administration of justice by force

of arms; and such was Charles IX. of France, that thought to overturn

the Salic law.' All that knoweth what hath been done in Britain these

twenty-seven years, can attest our laws have been subverted, the

reformation of religion overturned, and all our best laws rescinded; and

now the penal statutes against papists disabled and stopped, without and

against law. 6. He can revoke all things to his nod, at his pleasure.

This is also one part of King James VI.'s character of a tyrant, when he

sets up an arbitrary power; and of Althusius, in the forecited place,

'when he makes use of an absolute power, and so breaks all bonds for the

good of human society.' We allow a king an absolute power taken in a

good sense, that is, he is not subaltern, nor subordinate to any other

prince, but supreme in his own dominions: or if by absolute he meant

perfect he is most absolute that governs best, according to the word of

God; but if it be to be loosed from all laws, we think it blasphemy to

ascribe it to any creature. Where was there ever such an arbitrary and

absolute power arrogated by any mortal, as hath been claimed by our

rulers these years past? especially by the present usurper, who, in this

liberty of conscience now granted to Scotland, assumes to himself an

absolute power, which all are to obey without reserve, which carries the

subjects slavery many stages beyond whatever the grand Signior did

attempt. 7. For by a tyrant strangers are employed to oppress the

subjects: 'they place the establishment of their authority in the

people's weakness, and think that a kingdom is not a procuration

concredited to them by God, but rather a prey fallen into their hands;

such are not joined to us by any civil bond, or any bond of humanity,

but should be accounted the most capital enemies of God, and of all

men.' King James, as above says, he is a tyrant that imposes unlawful

taxes, raises forces, makes war upon his subjects, to pillage, plunder,

waste, and spoil his kingdoms. Althusius as above, makes a tyrant, who

by immoderate exactions, and the like, exhausts the subjects, and cites

scripture, Jer. xxii. 13, 14. Ezek. xxxiv. 1. Kings xii. 19. Psal. xiv.

4.' It is a famous saying of Bracton, he is no longer king, than while

he rules well, but a tyrant whensoever he oppresseth the people that are

trusted to his care and government. And Cicero says, he loseth all legal

power in and over an army or empire, who by that government and army

does obstruct the welfare of that republic. What oppressions and

exactions by armed force our nation hath been wasted with, in part is

discovered above. 8. Althusius in the place above quoted, makes this

another mark, 'When he keepeth not his faith and promise, but despiseth

his very oath made unto the people.' What shall we say of him then, who

not only brake, but burnt, and made it criminal to assert the obligation

of the most solemnly transacted covenant with God and with the people,

that ever was entered into, who yet upon these terms of keeping that

covenant only was admitted to the government? And what shall we say of

his brother succeeding, who disdains all bonds, whose professed

principle is, as a papist, to keep no faith to heretics? 9. In the same

place he makes this one character: 'A tyrant is he, who takes away from

one or more members of the commonwealth the free exercise of the

orthodox religion.' And the grave author of the impartial enquiry into

the administration of affairs in England, doth assert, p. 3. 4.

'Whensoever a prince becomes depraved to that degree of wickedness, as

to apply and employ his power and interest, to debauch and withdraw his

subjects from their fealty and obedience to God, or sets himself to

extirpate that religion which the Lord hath revealed and appointed to be

the rule of our living, and the means of our happiness, he doth by that

very deed depose himself; and instead of being owned any longer for a

king, ought to be treated as a rebel and traitor against the supreme and

universal sovereign.' This is the perfect portracture of our princes;

the former of which declared an open war against religion, and all that

professed it: and the latter did begin to prosecute it with the same

cruelty of persecution, and yet continues without relenting against us;

though to others he tolerates it under the notion of a crime, to be for

the present dispensed with, until he accomplish his design. 10. Ibid. he

tells us, 'That whoso for corrupting of youth erecteth stage plays,

whore-houses, and other play-houses, and suffers the colleges and other

seminaries of learning to be corrupted.' There were never more of this

in any age, than in the conduct of our court, which, like another Sodom,

profess it to be their design to debauch mankind into all villanies, and

to poison the fountains of all learning and virtue, by intruding the

basest of men into the place of teachers, both in church and university,

and precluding all access to honest men. 11. Further he says. 'He is a

tyrant who doth not defend his subjects from injuries when he may, but

suffereth them to be oppressed, (and what if he oppress them himself?)'

It was one of the laws of Edward the confessor, if the king fail in the

discharge of his trust and office, he no longer deserves nor ought to

enjoy that name. What name do they deserve then, who not only fail in

the duty of defending their subjects, but send out their lictors and

bloody executioners to oppress them, neither will suffer them to defend

themselves! But Althusius makes a distinct character of this. 12. Then,

in fine he must certainly be a tyrant, who will not suffer the people,

by themselves nor by their representatives, to maintain their own

rights, neither by law nor force; for, saith my author forecited, 'He is

a tyrant who hindereth the free suffrages of members of parliament, so

that they dare not speak what they would; and chiefly he who takes away

from the people all power to resist his tyranny, as arms, strengths, and

chief men, whom therefore, though innocent, he hateth, afflicteth, and

persecuteth, exhausts their goods and livelihoods, without right or

reason.' All know that our blades have been all along enemies to

parliaments; and when their interest forced to call them, what means

were used always to paque and prelimit them, and overawe them, and how

men, who have faithfully discharged their trust in them, have been

prosecuted with the height of envy and fury, and many murdered

thereupon; and how all the armed force of the kingdoms have been

inhanced into their hand, and the people kept so under foot, that they

have been rendered incapable either to defend their own from inrestine

usurpers, or foreign invaders. All that is said amounts to this, that

when ever men in power to evert and subvert all the ends of government,

and intrude themselves upon it, and abuse it, to the hurt of the

commonwealth, and the destruction of that for which government was

appointed; they are then tyrants, and cease to be magistrates. To this

purpose I shall here append the words of that forecited ingenious author

of the Impartial Inquiry, pag. 13, 14. 'There can be nothing more

evident from the light of reason as well as scripture, than that all

magistracy is appointed for the benefit of mankind, and the common good

of societies; God never gave any one power to reign over others for

their destruction, (unless by his providence when he had devoted a

people for their sins to ruin,) but on whomsoever he confers authority

over cities or nations, it is with this conditional proviso and

limitation, that they are to promote their prosperity and good, and to

study their defence and protection; all princes are thus far

pactional----And whosoever refuseth to perform this fundamental

condition, he degrades and deposes himself; nor is it rebellion in any

to resist him; whensoever princes cease to be for the common good, they

answer not the end they were instituted unto, and cease to be what they

were chosen for.'

6. It will not be denied, but when the case is so circumstantiate, that

it would require the arbitration of judgment to determine, whether the

king be a tyrant or not, that then people are not to disown him: for if

it be a question, whether the people be really robbed of their rights

and liberties, and that the king might pretend as much reason to

complain of the people's doing indignity to his sovereignty, as they

might of his tyranny; then it were hard for them to assume so far the

umpirage of their own cause, as to make themselves absolute judges of

it, and forthwith to reject his authority upon these debatable grounds.

But the case is not so with us; no place being left for doubt or debate,

but that our fundamental rights and liberties civil and religious, are

overturned, and an absolute tyranny, exactly characterized as above, is

established on the ruins thereof. Hence we have not disowned the

pretended authority, because we judged it was tyrannical, but because it

was really so. Our discretive judgment in the case was not our rule, but

it was our understanding of the rule, by which only we could be

regulated, and not by the understanding of another, which cannot be

better, nor so good, of our grievances, which certainly we may be

supposed to understand best ourselves, and yet they are such as are

understood every where. To the question then, who shall be judge between

these usurping and tyrannizing rulers and us? We answer briefly and

plainly. We do not usurp a judgment in the case pretending no more

authority over them in our private capacity, than we allow them to have

over us, that is none at all? Nor can we admit that they should be both

judges and party; for then they might challenge that prerogative in

every case, and strengthen themselves in an uncontrollable immunity and

impunity to do what they pleased. But we appeal to the fundamental laws

of the kingdom, agreeable to the word of God, to judge, and to the whole

world of impartial spectators to read and pronounce the judgment. Lex

Rex, Quest. 24. pag. 213. saith in answer to this, 'There is a court of

necessity no less than a court of justice; and the fundamental laws must

then speak, and it is with the people in this extremity as if they had

no ruler. And as to the doubtsomeness of these laws, he saith, (1.) As

the scriptures in all fundamentals are clear, and expound themselves,

and _in the first instance_ condemn heresies; so all laws of men in

their fundamentals, which are the law of nature and nations, are clear.

(2.) Tyranny is more visible and intelligible than heresy, and it is

soon discerned----The people have a natural throne of policy in their

conscience, to give warning, and materially sentence against the king as

a tyrant;--where tyranny is more obscure, and the thread small, that it

escape the eye of man, the king keepeth possession, but I deny that

tyranny can be obscure long.'

7. I shall grant that many things are yieldable even to a grassonant

dominator, and tyrannical occupant of the place of magistracy; as 1.

There may be some cases, wherein it is lawful for a people to yield

_subjection_ to a lawless tyrant, when groaning under his overpowering

yoke, under which they must patiently _bear the indignation of the Lord,

because_ they _have sinned against him, until he_ arise and _plead_ his

own _cause, and execute judgment_ in the earth, (Mic. vii. 9.) until

which time they must kiss the rod as in the hand of God, and own and

adore the holiness and sovereignty of that providence that hath

subjected them under such a slavery; and are not to attempt a violent

ejection or excussion, when either the thing attempted is altogether

impracticable, or the means and manner of effectuating it dubious and

unwarrantable, or the necessary concomitants and consequents of the cure

more hurtful or dangerous than the disease, or the like. As in many

cases also a man may be subject to a robber prevailing against him; so

we find the people of Israel in Egypt and Babylon, &c. yielded

subjection to tyrants. But in this case we deny two things to them, (1.)

Allegiance or active and voluntary subjection, so as to own them for

magistrates. (2.) Stupid _passive obedience_, or suffering without

resistance. For the first, we owe it only to magistrates, by virtue of

the law, either ordinative of God, or constitutive of man. And it is no

argument to infer; as a man's subjecting himself to a robber assaulting

him, is no solid proof of his approving or acknowledging the injury and

violence committed by the robbery, therefore a person's yielding

subjection to a tyrant a public robber does not argue his acknowledging

or approving his tyranny and oppression. For, the subjection that a

tyrant requires, and which a robber requires, is not of the same nature;

the one is legal of subjects, which we cannot own to a tyrant; the other

is forced of the subdued, which we must acknowledge to a robber. But to

make the parallel; if the robber should demand, in our subjecting

ourselves to him, an owning of him to be no robber but an honest man, as

the tyrant demands in our subjecting ourselves to him in owning him to

be no tyrant, but a magistrate, then we ought not to yield it to the one

no more than to the other. For the second, to allow them passive

obedience is unintelligible nonsense and a mere contradiction; for

nothing that is merely passive can be obedience as relative to a law;

nor can any obedience be merely passive; for obedience is always active.

But not only is the inaccuracy of the phrase excepted against, but also

that position maintained by many, that, in reference to a yoke of

tyranny, there is a time which may be called the proper season of

suffering, that is, when suffering (in opposition to acting or

resisting) is a necessary and indispensible duty, and resisting is a

sin: for if the one be an indispensible duty, the other must be a sin at

the same time, but this cannot be admitted. For, though certainly there

is such a season of suffering, wherein suffering is lawful, laudable and

necessary, and all must lay their account with suffering, and little

else can be attempted, but which will increase sufferings; yet even then

we may resist as well as we can: and these two, resistance and

suffering, at the same time, are not incompatible: David did bear most

patiently the injury of his son's usurpation, when he said, 'Let the

Lord do to me as seemeth him good,' 2 Sam. xv. 26. chap. x. 12. and

betaketh himself to fervent prayers, Psal. iii. and yet these were not

all the weapons he used against him; neither did he ever own him as a

magistrate. We are to suffer all things patiently as the servants of the

Lord, and look to him for mercy and relief, (Psal. cxxiii. 2.); but we

are not obliged to suffer even in that season, as the slaves of men.

Again, suffering in opposition to resistance, does never fall under any

moral law of God, except in the absolutely extraordinary case of

Christ's passive obedience, which cannot fall under our deliberation or

imitation; or in the case of a positive law, as was given to the Jews to

submit to Nebuchadnezzar, which was express and peculiar to them, as

shall be cleared. That can never be commanded as indispensible duty,

which does not fall under our free will or deliberation, but the enemies

will, as the Lord permits them, as the case of suffering is. That can

never be indispensible duty, which we may decline without sin, as we may

do suffering, if we have not a call to it; yea, in that case, it were

sin to suffer; therefore, in no case it can be formally and

indispensibly commanded, so as we may not shift it, if we can without

sin. Suffering simply the evil of punishment, just or unjust, can never

be a conformity to God's preceptive will, but only to his providential

disposal; it hath not the will of the sign for its rule, but only the

will of well-pleasing. All the commands that we have for suffering, are

either to direct the manner of it, that it be patiently and cheerfully,

when forced to it wrongfully, 1 Pet. ii. 19, 20, or comparatively, to

determine our choice in an unavoidable alternative, either to suffer or

sin; and so we are commanded, rather to suffer, than to deny Christ,

Matth. xiii. 33. and we are commanded upon these terms to follow Christ,

to take up his cross, when he lays it on his providence, Matth. xvi. 24.

See at length this cleared, Lex Rex, Q. 30. page 317-320 otherwise in

no case subjection, even passive, can be a duty; for it is always to be

considered under the notion of a plague, judgment and curse, to be

complained of as a burden, never to be owned as a duty to magistrates.

As we find the Lord's people resenting it as a servitude, under which

they were servants even in their own land, which did yield increase unto

the kings whom the Lord had set over them, because of their sins, Neh.

ix. 36, 37. 2. In divers cases there may be some compliance with a mere

occupant, that hath no right to reign; as upon this account the noble

marquis of Argyle and lord Warriston suffered for their compliance with

the usurper Cromwell. Such may be the warrantableness, or goodness, or

necessity, or profitableness of a compliance, when people are by

providence brought under a yoke which they cannot shake off, that they

may part with some of their privileges, for the avoidance of the loss of

the rest, and for the conveniency and profit, peace and safety of

themselves and their country, which would be in hazard, if they did not

comply; they may do whatsoever is due from them to the public weal,

whatsoever is an office of their station or place, or which they have

any other way a call unto, whatsoever may make for their own honest

interest, without wronging others, or the country's liberties in their

transactions with these powers, even though such a compliance may be

occasionally to the advantage of the usurpers, seeing good and necessary

actions are not to be declined for the ill effects that are accidental

to them, and arise from the use which others make of them. But though

this may be yielded in some cases to such usurpers, especially

conquerors, that have no right of occupying the empire, but are capable

of it by derivation from the people's consent: yet it must not be

extended to such usurpers as are also tyrants, that have no right of

their own, nor are capable of any, and that overturn all rights of

subjects. To such we can yield no compliance, as may infer either

transacting with them, or owning them as magistrates. We find indeed the

saints enjoyed places under these, who were not their magistrates; as

Nehemiah and Mordecai and Esther was queen to Ahasuerus. But here was no

compliance with tyrants (for these heathens were not such) only some of

them were extraordinary persons, raised up by an extraordinary spirit,

for extraordinary ends in extraordinary times, that cannot be brought to

an ordinary rule, as Esther's marriage; and all of them in their places

kept the law of their God, served the work of their generation, defiled

not themselves with their customs, acted against no good, and engaged to

no evil, but by their compliance promoted the welfare of their country,

as Argyle and Warrriston did under Cromwel. Again, we find they paid

custom to them, as Neh. ix. 36, 37. and we read of Augustus' taxation

universally complied with, Luke ii. 1-5. and Christ paid it. This shall

be more fully answered afterwards. Here I shall only say (1.) It can

never be proven that these were tyrants. (2.) Christ paid it with such a

caution, as leaves the title inflated; not for conscience (as tribute

must be paid to magistrates, Rom. xiii. 5, 6.) but only that he might

not offend them. (3.) Any other instances of the saints taxations are to

be judged forced acts, badges of their bondage, which, if they had been

exacted as tests of their allegiance, they would not have yielded.

Strangers also, that are not subjects, use to pay custom in their

trafficking, but not as tests of their allegiance. 3. There may be also,

in some cases, obedience allowed to their lawful commands because of the

lawfulness of the thing commanded, or the coincidency of another just

and obligging authority commanding the same. We may do many things which

a tyrant commands, and which he enforces; and many things also whether

he will or not; but we must do nothing upon the consideration of his

command, in the acknowledgement of obedience, due by virtue of

allegiance, which we own of conscience to a lawful magistrate. We must

do nothing, which may seem to have an accessoriness to the tyrant's

unlawful occupancy, or which depends only on the warrant of his

authority to do it, or may entrench on the divine institution of

magistracy, or bring us into a participation of the usurper's sin. In

these cases we can neither yield obedience in lawful things, nor in

unlawful: 'nor can we own absolute subjection, no more than we can

absolute obedience; for all subjection is enjoined, in order to

obedience: and to plead for a privilege in point of obedience, and to

disclaim it in point of subjection, is only the flattery of such, as

having renounced with conscience all distinction of obedience, would

divest others of all privileges, that they may exercise their tyranny

without controul, Naphtali, p. 28. prior edit.'] 4. There may be

addresses made to such as are not rightful possessors of the government,

for justice, or mercy, or redress of some intolerable grievances,

without scruple of accepting that which is materially justice or mercy,

or seeking them at the hand of any who may reach them out to us, though

he that conveys them to us be not interested in the umpirage of them.

Thus we find Jeremiah supplicated Zedekiah for mercy, not to return to

prison; and Paul appealed to Caesar for justice. But in these addresses

we may not acknowledge the wicked laws that brought on these grievances,

nor conceal the wickedness, no more than the misery of them which we

have endured; nor may we own the legal power of them that we address, to

take them off, nor signify any thing, in the matter and manner of our

representations, that may either import a declining our testimony, for

which we have suffered these grievances, or a contradiction to our

declinature of their pretended authority: only we may remonstrate, what

cruelties we have endured, and how terrible it will be to them to be

guilty of, or accessory to our blood, in not pitying us; which was all

that Jeremiah did. And as for Paul's appeal, we find he was threatened

to be murdered by his countrymen, Acts xxiii. 14. from whose hands he

was rescued, and brought before the judicatory of Festus the Roman

deputy, not voluntarily; thence also they sought to remand him to

Jerusalem, that they might kill him, Acts xxv. 3. whereupon he demands

in justice that he might not be delivered to his accusers and murderers,

but claims the benefit of the heathens own law, by that appeal to Caesar,

which was the only constrained expedient of saving his own life, Acts

xxviii. 19, by which also he got an opportunity to witness for Christ at

Rome. But, as shall be cleared further afterwards, Caesar was not an

usurper over Judea; which not obscurely is insinuated by Paul himself,

who asserts, that both his person, and his cause criminal, of which he

was accused (it was not an ecclesiastical cause, and so no advantage

hence for the supremacy) appertained to Caesar's tribunal, and that not

only in fact, but of right, Acts xxv. 10. 'I stand at Caesar's

judgment-seat, where I ought to be judged.' We cannot say this of any

tribunal; fenced in the name of them that tyrannize over us. 5. I will

not stand neither upon the names and titles of kings, &c. to be given to

tyrants and usurpers, in speaking to them or of them, by way of

appellation or compellation: for we find even tyrants are called by

these names in scripture, being kings in fact, though not by right and

indeed not impertinently, kings and tyrants for the most part are

reciprocal terms. But in no case can we give them any names or titles,

which may signify our love to them whom the Lord hates, or who hate the

Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 2. or which may flatter them, whom Elihu durst not

give, for fear his Maker should take him away, Job xxxii. 22. or which

may be taken for honouring of them, for that is not due to the vilest of

men, when exalted never so high, Psal. xii. ult. a vile person must be

contemned in our eyes, Psal. xv. 4. nor which may any way import or

infer an owning of a magistratical relation between them and us, or any

covenant-transaction or confederacy with them, which is no terms with

them, as such, we will say or own. Isa. viii. 12. Hence many sufferers

upon this head forbear to give them their titles.

8. It will be yielded very readily by us, that a magistrate is not to be

disowned, merely for his differing in religion from us: yea, though he

were a heathen. We do not disown our pretended rulers merely upon that

account, but cheerfully do grant and subscribe to that truth in our

Confession of Faith, chap. xxiii. sect. 4. That infidelity, or

difference in religion, doth not make void the magistrate's just and

legal authority, nor free the people from their due obedience to him: on

which our adversaries have insulted, as if our principle and practice

were thereby disproved. But it is easy to answer, 1. Let the words be

considered, and we are confident, 'That no sober man will think, the

acknowledgement of just and legal authority, and due obedience a

rational ground to infer, that tyranny is thereby either allowed or

privileged,' Napht. p. 60 prior edition. 2. Though infidelity or

difference of religion, does not make void authority, where it is

lawfully invested; yet it may incapacitate a person, and lawfully

seclude him from authority, both by the word of God, which expressly

forbids to set a stranger over, who is not our brother, Deut. xvii. 15.

which includes as well a stranger of a strange religion, as one of a

strange country, and by the laws of the land, which do incapacitate a

papist of all authority, supreme or subordinate. And so, if this James

VII. II. had been king before he was a Roman Catholic, if we had no more

to object, we should not have quarrelled his succession. 3. We both give

and grant all that is the confession, to wit, that dominion is not

founded in grace: yet this remains evident, that a prince, who not only

is of another religion, but an avowed enemy to, and overturner of the

religion established by law, and intending and endeavouring to introduce

a false, heretical, blasphemous and idolatrous religion, can claim no

just and legal authority, but in this case the people may very lawfully

decline his pretended authority; nay, they are betrayers of their

country and posterity, if they give not a timeous and effectual check to

his usurpings, and make him sensible that he hath no such authority. Can

we imagine, that men in the whole of that blessed work so remarkably led

of God, being convocate by a parliament of the wisest and worthiest men

that ever were in England, whom they did encourage, by writing and

preaching, and every way to stand fast in their opposition to the then

king displaying a banner for his prerogative (a court dream) against

religion and liberty, should be so far left, as to drop that as a

principle and part of our religion, which would sacrifice religion

itself to the lust of a raging tyrant? Must we believe, that a religion

destroying tyrant is a righteous ruler? And must we own him to be a

nursing father to the church? Shall we conclude, that the common bounds

and limits, whereby the Almighty hath bounded and limited mankind, are

removed by an article of our Confession of Faith, which hereby is turned

into a court creed: Then welcome Hobs de cive, with all the rest of

Pluto's train, who would babble us into a belief, that the world is to

be governed according to the pleasure of wicked tyrants. I would fain

hope at length the world would be awakened out of such ridiculous

dreams, and be ashamed any more to own such fooleries. And it may be,

our two royal brothers have contributed more to cure men of this moral

madness than any who went before them. And this is the only advantage, I

know, that the nations have reaped by their reign.

9. Though we deny that conquest can give a just title to a crown; yet we

grant, in some cases, that by the peoples after-consent it may be turned

into a just title. It is undeniable, when there is just ground of the

war, if a prince subdue a whole land, who have justly forfeited their

liberties, when by his grace he preserves them, he may make use of their

right now forfeited, and they may resign their liberty to the conqueror,

and consent that he be their king, upon fair and legal, and not

tyrannical conditions. And even when the war is not just, but successful

on the invading conquerors side, this may be an inducement to the

conquered, if they be indeed free and unengaged to any other, to a

submission, dedition, and delivery up of themselves to be the subjects

of the victor, and to take him for their sovereign: as it is like the

case was with the Jews in Caesar's time, whose government was translated

by dedition to the Roman power; in the translation, when a-doing, there

was a fault, but after it was done, it ceased; though the beginning was

wrong, there was a post-fact, which made it right, and could not be

dissolved, without an unjust disturbance of public order. Whence,

besides what is said above, in answer to that much insisted instance of

Christ's paying tribute, and commanding it to be paid to Caesar, the

difficulty of that instance may be clearly solved. That tribute which he

paid, Matth. xvii. 14. &c. and that about the payment whereof he was

questioned, Matth. xxii. 21. seem to be two different tributes. Many

think, very probably, they were not one and the same tribute. It is a

question, for whom, and by whom that of Matth. xvii. was gathered; it is

most likely, it was gathered by the officers of the temple for its

service: however, the payment was made, with such caution (tacitely

declining the strict right to exact it from him, but to avoid offence,

in an act in itself unobliging) that their claim is left as much in the

dark, as if the question had never been moved. The other, Matth. xxii.

was exacted for Caesar: but to that captious question our Lord returns

such an answer, as might both solve it, and evade the snare of the

propounder, giving a general rule of giving to God and to Caesar each

their own, without defining which of them had the right to the payment

in question; whether Caesar should have it, or whether it should be paid

only for the temple's use: upon which they marvelled, which they needed

not do, if they had understood in his words an express and positive

declaration of an obligation to make that payment to Caesar; for then

they would have obtained one of their ends, in making him odious to the

people, who were not satisfied with the payment of it. But however, the

knot is loosed, by considering that they were now lawfully subject to

the Roman Emperors, as their governors, to whom they were obliged (I do

not say Christ was) to pay tribute. For they had yielded themselves

unto, and owned the Roman dominion in Pompey, Caesar Augustus and

Tiberius, ere this question about tribute paying was proposed to our

Saviour; and therefore they who stuck at the payment of it, were a

seditious party, dissenting from the body of the nation; else it is not

supposeable readily, that their dominion in Judea could have been

exercised long without some consent, sufficient to legitimate it to the

present rulers; and this is the more likely, if we consider the

confession of the Jews themselves, disavowing the power of capital

punishment. It is not lawful for us to put any man to death, and owning

Caesar as their king, with an exclusive abrenunciation of all other, we

have no king but Caesar; as Paul also acknowledges, he ought to be judged

at Caesar's bar, in his appeal to Caesar. It is also acknowledged by very

good authors, that this was the tribute which Judas the Galilean stood

up to free the people from; and that the sedition of those Jews that

followed him, mentioned Acts v. 37. who mutinied upon this occasion,

was, according to Gamaliel's speech, disallowed by that Sanhedrim, or

council of the Jews. And it may be gathered out of Josephus, that the

Jews of Hircanus' party came under the Roman power by consent and

dedition, while they of Aristobulus' party looked upon the Romans as

usurpers. Which difference continued till our Saviour's time, when some

part of them acknowledged the Caesarean authority, some part looked upon

it as an usurpation; and of this generally were the Pharisees. To

confirm this, Calvin's testimony may be adduced, upon Matth. xxii. who

saith, 'The authority of the Roman emperors was by common use approved

and received among the Jews, whence it was manifest, that the Jews had

now of their own accord imposed on themselves a law of paying the

tribute, because they had passed over to the Romans the power of the

sword.' And Chamiers panstrat. tom. 2 lib. 15. cap. 16. p. 635. 'What

then? if Caesar's authority was from bad beginnings, did therefore Christ

untruly say it was from above? Can no power, at first unjust, afterward

become just? if that were so, then either none, or very few kingdoms

would be just.'

10. As tyranny is a destructive plague to all the interests of men and

Christians; to anarchy, the usual product of it, is no less pernicious,

bringing a community into a paroxysm as deadly and dangerous. We must

own government to be absolutely necessary, for the constitution and

conservation of all societies. I shall not enter into a disquisition,

let be determination of the species or kind of magistracy, whether

monarchy aristocracy or democracy, be preferable. My dispute, at

present, is not levelled against monarchy, but the present monarch: not

against the institution of the species (though I believe, except we

betake ourselves to the divine allowance and permission; we shall be as

puzzled to find out the divine original of it, as cosmographers are in

their search of the spring of Nilus, or theologues of the Father of

Melchizedeck) but the constitution of this individual monarchy

established among us, which, in its root and branch, spring and streams,

in its original, nature, ends and effects, is diametrically opposite to

religion and liberty; and because its contagion, universally converting

and corrupting all the ends and orders of magistracy, doth affect and

infect all the subordinate officers, deriving their power from such a

filthy fountain; we must also subtract and deny their demanded

acknowledgments as any way due, so long as they serve the pride and

projects of such a wicked power: and do not reckon ourselves obliged by

covenant, or any otherwise (though, in the third article of the solemn

league, we are bound to preserve the rights and privileges of our

parliaments, and consequently the honour and deference that's due to our

peers, or other parliament-men, acting according to the trust committed

to them, but not when they turn traitors engaged in a conspiracy with

the tyrant) to own or defend a soulless shadow of a court cabal, made up

of persons who have sold themselves to work wickedness, in conspiring

with this throne of iniquity against the Lord, which is all we have for

a parliament, whom we can in no ways own as our representatives, but

must look upon them as perjured and perfidious traitors to God and their

country, which they have betrayed into the hands of a tyrant; and

therefore divested of that power and authority, which they had of the

people as their representatives, which now is returned to the fountain.

And therefore we must act as we can against them, and also what is

necessary for securing of ourselves, religion and liberty, without them.

We would think nobles, ennobled with virtue, a great mercy and

encouragement; and if they would concur in the testimony for religion

and liberty, we would be glad that they should lead the van, and prove

themselves to be powers appointed by God, in acting for him in his

interest. But for the want of their conduct, we must not surcease from

that duty that they abandon, nor think that the concurrence of peers is

so necessary to legitimate our actions, as that without that formality

our resolutions to maintain the truth of God on all hazards, in a

private capacity, were unlawful in the court of God and nature: but, on

the contrary, must judge that their relinquishing or opposing their

duty, which before God they are obliged to maintain, preserve, and

promove, is so far from loosing our obligation, or exeeming us from our

duty that it should rather press us to prosecute it with the more

vigour, without suspending it upon their precedency. For now they can

pretend to no precedency, when they do not answer the end of their own

private advantage, they cease to be the ministers of God and of the

people, and become private persons. And reason will conclude, 'That when

the Ephori or trustees betray their trust, and sell, or basely give away

the liberties and privileges of the people, which they were entrusted

with, the people cannot be brought into a remediless condition; if a

tutor waste and destroy the pupils estate, the law provides a remedy for

the pupil, Jus popu. vind. cap. 15. page 335, 336.' 'The remedy, in this

case, can only be, as every one must move in his own sphere, while all

concur in the same duty; so if any, in higher place, become not only

remiss, but according to the influence of their power would seduce

others into their apostasy, it is their duty to resist and endeavour

their reformation or removal: and if these more eminently entrusted

shall turn directly apostates, and obstructive and destructive to common

interests, the people of an inferior degree may step forward to occupy

the places, and assert the interests, which they forefault and desert.

Neither is this a breach of good order; for order is only a mean

subordinate to, and intended for the glory of God, and the peoples good,

and the regulation thereof must only be admitted as it is conducible,

and not repugnant to these ends. A general's command to his soldiers in

battle, does not impede the necessity of succession, in case of vacancy

of any charge, either through death or desertion, even of such as in

quality may be far inferior to those whose places they step into,

Naphtali, page 151. first edition.' I do not assert this for private

peoples aspiring into the capacity of primores of peers; but that they

may do that which the peers desert, and dare not, or will not do, if the

Lord put them in a capacity to do it. And more plainly I assert, that if

the peers of the land whose duty it is principally to restrain and

repress tyranny, either connive at it, or concur with it, and so abandon

or betray their trust, then the common people may do it; at least are

obliged to renounce, reject, and disown allegiance to the tyrant,

without the peers. For which I offer these reasons. 1. Because all men

have as much freedom and liberty by nature as peers have, being no more

slaves than they; because slavery is a penal evil contrary to nature,

and a misery consequent of sin, and every man created according to God's

image, is a sacred thing; and also no more subjects to kings, &c. than

they; freedom being natural to all (except freedom from subjection to

parents, which is a moral duty, and most kindly and natural, and

subjection of the wife to the husband, &c.) but otherwise as to civil

and politic subjection, man, by nature, is born as free as beasts; no

lion is born king of lions, nor no man born king of men; nor lord of

men, nor representative of men, nor rulers of men, either supreme or

subordinate; because none, by nature, can have those things that

essentially constitute rulers, the calling of God, nor gifts and

qualifications for it, nor the election of the people. 2. The original

of all that power, that the primores or representatives can claim, is

from the people, not from themselves; from whence derived they their

being representatives, but from the people's commission or compact? when

at the first constitution of parliaments, or public conventions for

affairs of state, necessity put the people, who could not so

conveniently meet all, to confer that honour and burden upon the best

qualified, and who had chief interest by delegation. Hence, if the

people give such a power, they may wave it when perverted, and act

without their own impowered servants. 3. The people's power is greater

than the power of any delegated or constituted by them; the cause is

more than the effect; parliament-men do represent the people, the people

do not represent the parliament: they are as tutors and curators unto

the people, and in effect their servants deputed to oversee their public

affairs, therefore if their power be less the people can act without

them. 4. It were irrational to imagine, the people committing the

administration of their weighty affairs unto them, did denude themselves

of all their radical power; or that they can devolve upon them, or they

obtain any other power but what is for the good and advantage of the

people; therefore they have power to act without them, in things which

they never resigned to them; for they cannot be deprived of that natural

aptitude, and nature's birth-right, given to them by God and nature, to

provide the most efficacious and prevalent means for the preservation of

their rights and liberties. 5. As the people have had power before they

made peers, and have done much without them; so these primores could

never do without them, therefore in acts of common interest, the peers

depend more upon the people than the people do upon them. 6. All these

primeve rights, that gave rise to societies, are equal to both people

and peers, whereof the liberty to repress and reject tyranny is a chief

one. The people as well as peers have a hand in making the king, and

other judges also, as is clear from Deut. xvii. 14. Judg. ix. 6. 1 Sam.

xi. 15. 2 Kings xiv. 21. therefore they may unmake them as well as they.

To seek to preserve the ends of government, when they are overturned, is

essentially requisite to all societies, and therefore common and

competent to all constituents of these societies, superiors or

inferiors. The glory of God and security of religion, the end of all

Christian government, doth concern all equally. As every one equally is

bound to obey God rather than man, so violence in this case destroys

both the commonwealth, and maketh the end and means of government, and

the injured persons obligation thereto to cease; and this equally to

every man of private or public capacity. In the concern of religion at

least, we must not think because we are not nobles, or in authority,

that the care of it, or reformation thereof does nothing pertain to us;

nay in that, and carrying on the work thereof, there is an equality: as

in the erection of the Old Testament tabernacle, all the people were to

contribute alike half a shekel, Exod. xxx. that it might be for a

remembrance before the Lord. Hence it follows, if we disown the supreme

ruler, and the inferior confederate with him, and cannot have the

concurrence of others: 'now through the manifest and notorious

perversion of the great ends of society and government, the bond thereof

being dissolved, we liberated therefrom, do relapse into our primeve

liberty and privilege: and accordingly, as the similitude of our case,

and exigence of our cause doth require, may, upon the very same

principles, again join and associate, for our better defence and

preservation, as we did at first enter into societies,' Nap. p. 150.

yet, whatever we may do in this case, we are not for presumptuous

assumptions of authority which maleversers have forefaulted: neither are

we for new erections of government, but are for keeping the society, of

which we are members, entire, in an endeavour to have all our fellow

members united unto God, and to one another, in religion and liberty,

according to the bond of the solemn league and covenant. Certain it is,

that greater societies, under one government, may in some cases make a

secession, and divide into lesser, without sedition: or else, how would

there be so many distinct commonwealths in the world? seeing at first

all was under one head: and how comes it to pass, that there are so

many kingdoms in Europe, when it can be instanced, when all, or the most

part, were under one Roman emperor? But this, in our circumstance, is

noway expedient, neither was it ever in projection. But our aim is to

abstract ourselves inoffensively, and maintain our rights that remain

unrobbed, and to adhere closely to the fundamental constitutions, laws,

and laudable practices of our native kingdom.

II. We own the obligation of our sacred covenants, unrepealably and

indispensibly binding to all the duties of christian subjection to

magistrates. But we deny, that hereby we are bound either to maintain

monarchy, especially thus perverted; nor to own the authority of either

of the two monarchs that have monarchized or tyrannized over us these

twenty-seven years past. For as to the first, we assert, That that which

is in its own nature mutable, cannot be simply sworn unto to be

maintained and preserved, but hypothetically at most, else it were

simply sinful; since it were to make things in their own nature, and in

the providence of God changeable, unchangeable; yea it were a downright

swearing not to comply with, but to spurn against, the various

vicissitudes of divine providence, the great rector of the universe. And

it is unquestionable, that when things alterable and unalterable are put

in the same oath, to make the engagement lawful the things must be

understood, as they are in their own nature, and no otherwise: else both

the imposer and the taker grievously transgress; the former, in taking

upon him what is in the power of no mortal, and a contradiction to the

prerogative of the immortal God; and the other, in owning that power as

just. Hence when these two fall to be in the same oath, they must be so

understood as it may not be made a snare to the conscience of the

swearer. For it may fall so out in the providence of God, that the

preservation of both is in all respects made impossible: and an adhesion

to the one, may so far interfere with the preservation of the other, as

if the mutable and that which hath no objective obligation to be stuck

to the other, which with the loss of all interests we are to maintain,

must be abandoned; yea, that which was sworn to be maintained as a mean

only, and a mutable one too, may not only cease to be a mean, but may

actually destroy the main end, and then it is to be laid aside, because

then it inverts the order of things. Hence also it may be questioned, if

it were not more convenient, to leave out those things that are

alterable in themselves, out of the same oath with things unalterable,

and put them in a distinct oath or covenant by themselves; as we see

Jehojadah did 2 Kings xi. 17. 'He made a covenant between the Lord, and

the king, and the people, that they should be the Lord's people; between

the king also and the people.' Here are two distinct covenants; the one

made with God, about things eternally obligatory, wherein the king and

people engage themselves upon level ground to serve the Lord, and Joash

the king, his treacherous dealing with God in that matter, brought the

curse of that covenant upon him: the other covenant was civil, about

things alterable relating to points of government and subjection. And as

he, by virtue of that prior covenant, had obliged himself, under the

pain of the curse thereof, to carry as one covenanted to God with the

people, and so not to tyrannize over his brethren: so, the people, by

virtue of that same covenant, were to yield obedience, but in nothing to

acknowledge him, as having power or authority to countermand God's

command; neither had it been an act of disloyalty, to have broken down

his groves, which he had, with the addition of the guilt of perjury, set

up, and to have bound his ungrateful hands from the blood of the

gracious Zechariah: a perfect parallel to our case under the former

dominator, save that it was outdone as to all dimensions of wickedness

by him. To speak more plainly, the religious part of our covenant is of

an eternal obligation; but as to the civil part, it is impossible it

can ever be so, unless it be well and cautiously understood; that is,

unless instead of any species of government, as monarchy, &c. we put in

magistracy itself. For this is that power which is of God; but monarchy,

&c. is only a human creature, about the creation whereof men take a

liberty, according to what suits them best in their present

circumstances. And as to this species of monarchy; men are never left at

liberty to clothe therewith any inept or impious person. And they are

perfectly loosed from it. 1. When that species of government becomes

opposite to the ends of government, and is turned tyranny, especially

when a legal establishment is pretended, then it affects with its

contagion the very species itself: the house is to be pulled down, when

the leprosy is got into the walls and foundation. 2. When it is

exercised, it is turned inept for answering the ends of its erection,

and prejudicial to the main thing for which government is given, to wit,

the gospel and the coming of Christ's kingdom: hence it is promised to

the church, Isa. xlix. 23. 'Kings shall be nursing fathers to the

church:'----And Isa. lii. 15. It is promised to the Mediator that 'Kings

shall shut their mouths,'----_i.e._ never a word in their head, but out

of reverence and respect to his absolute sovereignty, they shall take

the law from him, without daring to contract, far less to take upon them

to prescribe in the house of God, as they in their wisdom think fit. 3.

When providence, without any sinful hand, makes that species impossible

to be kept up, without the ruin of that for which it was erected: when

things comes to this push, whosoever are clothed with the power, are

then under an obligation to comply with that alteration of providence,

for the safety of the people; else they declare themselves unworthy of

rule, and such who would sacrifice the interest of their people to their

particular interest; in which case the people may make their public

servant sensible, he is at his highest elevation but a servant. Hence

now, when this species named in the covenant, viz. monarchy, is by law

so vitiate, as it becomes the mean and instrument of the destruction of

all the ends of that covenant, and now by law transmitted to all

successors as a hereditary, pure, perfect and perpetual opposition to

the coming of Christ's kingdom, so that as long as there is one to wear

that crown, (but Jehovah will in righteousness execute Coniah's doom

upon the race, Jer. xxii. _ult._ 'Write this man childless'----) and

enter heir to the government as now establishment, he must be an enemy

to Christ; there is no other way left, but to think on a new model

moulded according to the true pattern. As to the second, we are far less

obliged to own and acknowledge the interest of any of the two monarchs,

that we have been mourning under these many years, from these sacred

covenants. For, as to the first of them, Charles II. Those

considerations did cassate his interest, as to any covenant obligation

to own him. 1. In these covenants we are not sworn absolutely to

maintain the king's person and authority, but only conditionally, in the

preservation and defence of religion and liberties. Now, when this

condition was not performed, but, on the contrary, professedly resolved

never to be fulfilled; and when he laid out himself to the full of his

power and authority, for the destruction of that reformed religion and

liberties of the kingdom, which he solemnly swore to defend when he

received the crown, only in the terms that he should be a loyal subject

to Christ, and a true and faithful servant to the people, in order to

which a magistrate is chosen, and all his worth, excellency, and

valuableness, consists in his answering that purpose; for the excellency

of a mean, as such, is to be measured from the end, and its

answerableness thereunto: we were not then obliged, to maintain such an

enemy to these precious interests. 2. Because, as the people were bound

to him, so he was bound to them by the same covenant, being only on

these terms entrusted with the government, all which conditions he

perfidiously broke, whereupon only his authority and our allegiance were

founded; and thereby we were loosed from all reciprocal obligation to

him by virtue of that covenant. 3. Though he and we stood equally

engaged to the duties of that covenant, only with this difference, that

the king's capacity being greater, he was the more obliged to have laid

out that power, in causing all to stand to their covenant engagements,

as Josiah did, 2 Chron. xxxiv. 31, 32, 33. (but alas! there was never a

Josiah in the race,) yet he rose up to the height of rebellion against

God and the people, in heaven daring insolency, and not only brake, but

burnt that covenant, and made laws to cass and rescind it, and made a

not-concurring in this conspiracy, a note of incapacity for any trust in

church or state.

Therefore to plead for an owning of him in this case, were only

concludent of this, that the generation had dreamed themselves into such

a distraction, as may be feared will be pursued with destruction, and

make such dreamers the detestation of posterity, and cause all men

proclaim the righteousness of God, in bringing ruin upon them by that

very power and authority they owned in such circumstances. 4. It is a

known maxim, 'He that does not fulfil the conditions, falls from the

benefit of it, and whoso remits the obligation of the party obliged upon

condition, cannot exact it afterwards.' So then it is evident, that the

subjects of Scotland were by king Charles II. his consent, yea express

command, disengaged from so much of that covenant as could be alledged

in favours of himself: so that all that he did, by burning and

rescinding these covenants, and pursuing all who endeavoured to adhere

to them, was a most explicit liberating his subjects from, and remission

of their allegiance to him, (and in this we had been fools if we had not

taken him at his word;) yea he rescinded his very coronation, by an act

of his first parliament after his return, which did declare null and

void all acts, constitutions and establishments, from the year 1633 to

that present session, not excepting those for his own coronation, after

which he was never recrowned, and therefore we could not own that right,

which himself did annul. But as for his royal brother, James the VII.

and II. we cannot indeed make use of the same reasons and arguments to

disown him, as we have now adduced; yet, as we shall prove afterwards,

this covenant does oblige to renounce him. So it is so clear, that it

needs no illustration, that there lies no obligation from this covenant

to own him. 1. Because, as he is an enemy to the whole of our covenant,

and especially to these terms upon which authority it is to be owned

therein: so he will not come under the bond of this covenant, nor any

other compact with the people, but intrude himself upon the throne, in

such a way as overturns the basis of our government, and destroys all

the liberties of a free people, which by covenant we are bound to

preserve, and consequently, as inconsistent therewith, to renounce his

usurpation. For, a prince that will set himself up without any

transactions with the people, or conditions giving security for religion

and liberty, is an usurping tyrant, not bounded by any law but his own

lusts. And to say to such an one, reign thou over us, is all one as to

say, come thou and play the tyrant over us, and let thy lust and will be

a law to us: which is both against scripture and natural sense. If he be

not a king upon covenant terms, either expresly or tacitely, or general

stipulations according to the word of God, and laws of the land, he

cannot be owned as a father, protector, or tutor, having any fiduciary

power entrusted to him over the common wealth, but as a lawless and

absolute dominator, assuming to himself a power to rule or rage as he

lists: whom to own were against our covenants: for there we are sworn to

maintain his majesty's just and lawful authority, and by consequence

not to own usurpation and tyranny, stated in opposition to religion and

liberty, which there also we are engaged to maintain. Sure, this cannot

be lawful authority which is of God, for God giveth no power against

himself; nor can it be of the people, who had never power granted them

of God to create one over them, with a liberty to destroy them, their

religion and liberty, at his pleasure. 2. As he is not, nor will not be

our covenanted and sworn king (and therefore we cannot be his covenanted

and sworn subjects;) so he is not nor cannot be our crowned king, and

therefore we must not be his liege subjects, owning fealty and obedience

to him. For, 'according to the national covenant, as all lieges are to

maintain the king's authority, consistent with the subjects liberties;

which, if they be innovated or prejudged, such confusion would ensue, as

this realm could be no more a free monarchy;--so for the preservation of

true religion, laws and liberties of this kingdom, it is statute by the

8th act, parl. 1. repeated in the 99th act, parl. 7th, ratified in the

23d act, parl. 11th, and 14th act, parl. 12th of king James VI, and 4th

act. of king Charles I. that all kings and princes, at their coronation

and reception of their princely authortity, shall make their faithful

promise by their solemn oath, in the presence of the eternal God, that

enduring the whole time of their lives, they shall serve the same

eternal God, to the uttermost of their power, according as he hath

required in his most holy word, contained in the Old and New Testaments;

and according to the same word, shall maintain the true religion of

Christ Jesus, the preaching of his holy word, the due and right

ministration of the sacraments, now received and preached within this

realm (according to the confession of faith immediately preceding) and

shall abolish and gainst and all false religion, contrary to the same;

and shall rule the people committed to their charge, according to the

will and command of God, revealed in his foresaid word, and according to

the laudable law and constitutions received in this realm, no ways

repugnant to the said will of the eternal God; and shall procure, to the

uttermost of their power, to the kirk of God, and whole Christian

people, true and perfect peace in all time coming, and that they shall

be careful to root out of their empire all hereticks, and enemies to the

true worship of God, who shall be convicted by the true kirk of God of

the foresaid crimes.' Now, this coronation oath he hath not taken, he

will not, he cannot take; and therefore cannot be our crowned king

according to law. As there be also many other laws, incapacitating his

admission to the crown, being a professed papist, and no law for it at

all, but one of his own making, by a packed cabal of his own complices,

a parliament, wherein himself presided as commissioner, enacting

materially his succession, and rescinding all these ancient laws: which

act of succession (which is all the legal right he can pretend to in

Scotland) because it cannot be justified, therefore his right cannot be

owned, which is founded upon the subversion of our ancient laws. But as

he cannot be our legally crowned king, so he is not so much as formally

crowned. And therefore before his inauguration, whatever right to be

king (whom the representatives may admit to the government) he may

pretend to, by hereditary succession, yet he cannot formally be made

king, till the people make a compact with him, upon terms for the safety

of their dearest and nearest liberties, even though he were not disabled

by law. He might, as they say, pretend to some right to the thing, but

he could have no right in the thing. The kings of Scotland, while

uncrowned, can exercise no royal government; for the coronation in

concrete, according to the substance of the act, is no ceremony (as

they, who make conscience itself but a ceremony, call it) nor an

accidental ingredient in the constitution of a king, but as it is

distinctive, so it is constitutive: it distinguished Saul from all

Israel, and made him from no king to be a king; it is dative, and not

only declarative; it puts some honour upon him that he had not before.

3. Though the laws should not strike against his coronation, and though

the representatives legally should take the same measures with him that

they took with his brother, and admit him upon the terms of the

covenant; yet after such doleful experiences of such transactions with

these sons of Belial, who must not be taken with hands, nor by the hand,

it were hard to trust, or entrust them with the government, even though

they should make the fairest professions; since they, whose principles

is to keep no faith to heretics (as they call us) and who will be as

absolute in their promises as they are in their power, have deservedly

forfeited all credit and trust with honest men; so that none could

rationally refer the determination of a half crown reckoning to any of

them, far less own them and their government in the management of the

weightiest affairs of state, since their malversations are written in

such bloody characters, as he that runs may read them. At least it were

wisdom, and is our duty, to take our measures from the general

assembly's procedure with the other brother, before his admission to the

government, to suspend our allegiance to him, until authority be legally

devolved upon him, and founded upon, and bounded by terms, giving all

security for religion and liberty.

12. As I said, before wary prudence, in waving such an impertinent and

ticklish question, cannot be condemned; since whatever he may be in

conscience, no man in law can be obliged, so far to surrender the common

privilege of all mankind, to give an account of all his inward thoughts,

which are always said to be free. And as in nothing they are more

various, so in nothing they can be more violented, than to have our

opinion and sentiments of the current government extorted from us, a

declining of which declaration of thoughts, where no ouvert act in

project or practice can be proven against it, cannot be treason in any

law in the world: so a cautelous answer, in such a ticklish, and

intrapping imposition, cannot be censured in point of lawfulness or

expediency, even though much be conceded, to stop the mouths of these

bloody butchers, gaping greedily after the blood of the answerer; if he

do not really own, but give them to understand, he cannot approve of

this tyranny. But as these poor faithful witnesses, who were helped to

be most free, have always been honoured with the most signal countenance

of the Lord in a happy issue of their testimony: so those that used

their prudentials most, in seeking shifts to shun severity, and studying

to satisfy these inquisitors with their stretched concessions, were

ordinarily more exposed to snares, and found less satisfaction in their

sufferings even though they could say much to justify, or at least

extenuate their shiftings. I knew one, who had proof of this, who

afterwards was ashamed of this kind of prudence. A short account of

whose managing of answers to this question, because it may conduce

somewhat to the explication of it, may here be hinted. The question

moved after the usual form, was, do ye own the authority of king James

VII. In answer to which, he pleaded first, for the immunity of his

thoughts, which he said were not subject to theirs or any tribunal. When

this could not be an evasion from their extortions, he objected the

ambiguity of the terms in which the question was conceived, being

capable of divers senses: and enquired, what they meant by authority?

What, by owning authority? By authority, whether did they mean the

administration of it as now improved? If so, then he was not satisfied

with it: or the right, as now established? If so, then he was not clear

to give his opinion of it, as being neither significant nor necessary;

and that it was fitter for lawyers and those that were better acquaint

with the secrets of government, than for him to dispute it.

Again he asked, what they meant by owning? Either it is passive

subjection, that he did not decline; or active acknowledgment of it and

that he said he looked upon as all the suffrage he could give to its

establishment in his station, which he must demur upon some scruple. The

replies he received were very various, and some of them very rare,

either for ignorance or imposture. Sometimes, it was answered: to own

the king's authority, is to take the oath of allegiance; this he

refused. Some answered, it is to engage never to rise in arms against

the king, upon any pretence whatsoever; this he refused likewise. Others

explained it to be, to acknowledge his right to be king: to his he

answered, when the authority is legally devolved upon him by the

representatives of both kingdoms, it was time enough for him to give

account of his sentiments. Others defined it, to own him to be a lawful

king by succession. To this he answered, he did not understand

succession could make a man formally king, if there were not some other

way of conveyance of it; it might put him in the nearest capacity to be

king, but could not make him king.

Some did thus paraphrase upon it, that he must own him to be his

sovereign Lord under God, and God's vicegerent, to be obeyed in all

things lawful. To this he answered, whom God appoints, and the people

choose according to law, he would own. When those shifts would not do,

but from time to time being urged to a categorical answer; he told them,

he was content to live in subjection to any government providence set

up; but for owning the present constitution as of God, and according to

law, he durst not acknowledge it, nor own any mortal as his lawful

sovereign, but in terms consistent with the covenant securing religion

and liberty. This not satisfying, when he came to a more pinching trial;

he declared, he owned all lawful authority according to the word of God,

and all authority that was the ordinance of God by his preceptive will,

and he could be subject to any; but further to acknowledge it, he

behoved to have more clearness; for sometimes a nation might be charged

with that, 'Ye have set up kings, and not by me,' &c. Further he

conceded, he owned his providential advancement to the throne; he owned

as much as he thought did oblige him to subject himself with patience;

he owned him to be as lawful, as providence possessing him of the throne

of his ancestors, and lineal succession, as presumed next in blood and

line, could make him: but still he declined to own him as lawful king,

and alledged that was all one, whether he was lawful or not, he refused

not subjection, distinguishing it always from allegiance.

But all these concessions did not satisfy them, and alledged he might

say all this of a tyrant; and therefore commanded him to give it under

hand, to own not only the lineal, but the legal succession of king James

VII. to the crown of Scotland; which he did, upon a fancy, that legal

did not import lawful, but only the formality of their law; withal

protesting, he might not be interpreted to approve of his succession.

But this was a vain protestation against fact. However, by this we see,

what is owning this authority, in the sense of the inquisitors.

The result of all is, to acknowledge allegiance to the present

possessor, and to approve his pretended authority as lawful, rightful

and righteous; which indeed is the true sense of the words, and any

other, that men can forge or find out, is strained. For, to speak

properly, if we own his authority in any respect, we own it to be

lawful: for every authority, that is owned to be authority indeed, is

lawful; authority always importing authorization, and consisting in a

right or call to rule, and is formally and essentially contradistinct to

usurpation: where ever the place of power is merely usurped, there is no

authority but according to his word; a stile without truth, a barely

pretended nominal equivocal authority, no real denomination: if we then

own this man's authority, we own it to be lawful authority: and if we

cannot own it so, we cannot own it all. For it is most suitable, either

to manly ingenuity, or Christian simplicity, to speak properly, and to

take words always in the sense, that they to whom they are speaking will

understand them, without equivocating.

These preliminaries being thus put by, which do contribute to clear

somewhat in this controversy, and both furnish us with some arguments

for, and solutions in most of the objections against my thesis, in

answer to the questions above stated. I set it down thus: A people long

oppressed with the encroachments of tyrants and usurpers, may disown all

allegiance to their pretended authority, and when imposed upon to

acknowledge it, may and must rather chuse to suffer, than to own it. And

consequently we cannot, as matters now stand, own, acknowledge, or

approve the pretended authority of king James VII. as lawful king of

Scotland; as we could not, as matters then stood, own the authority of

Charles II. This consequence is abundantly clear from the foregoing

deduction, demonstrating their tyranny and usurpation. In prosecuting of

this general thesis, which will evince the particular hypothesis, I

shall, 1. Adduce some historical instances, whence it may be gathered,

that this is not altogether without a precedent, but that people have

disowned allegiance to tyrants and usurpers before now. 2. Deduce it

from the dictates of reason. 3. Confirm it by scripture arguments.

I. Albeit, as was shewed before, this question, as now stated, is in

many respects unprecedented; yet the practice, which in our day hath

been the result of it, to disown, or not to own prevailing dominators

usurping the government, or abusing it, is not so alien from the

examples of history, but that by equivalency or consequence it may be

collected from and confirmed by instances.