CHAPTER I

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THE PANAMA CANAL AND ITS MAKERS

* * * * *

THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE

SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS

By George W. Crichfield

Illustrated. Two Vols. Royal 8vo, cloth, 25_s._

THE SOUTH AMERICAN SERIES

Edited by Martin Hume

Each Volume Demy 8vo, cloth, 10_s._ 6_d._ net.

VOL. I.

CHILE

Its History and Development, Natural Features, Products, Commerce

and Present Conditions. By G. F. Scott Elliott, M.A., F.R.G.S.,

Author of "A Naturalist in Mid Africa." With an Introduction by

Martin Hume, a Map, and many Illustrations.

"An exhaustive and interesting account, not only of the

turbulent history of this country but of her present conditions

and seeming prospects."--_Westminster Gazette._

"Will be found attractive and useful reading by the student of

history, the geographer, the naturalist, and last, but assuredly

not least, the British merchant."--_Scotsman._

VOL. II.

PERU

Its Former and Present Civilisation, Topography and Natural

Resources, History and Political Conditions, Commerce and General

Development. By C. Reginald Enock, F.R.G.S., Author of "The Andes

and the Amazon." With an Introduction by Martin Hume, a Map, and

numerous Illustrations.

"An important work.... The writer possesses a quick eye and a

keen intelligence; is many-sided in his interests, and on

certain subjects speaks as an expert. The volume deals fully

with the development of the country, and is written in the same

facile and graphic style as before. Illustrated by a large

number of excellent photographs."--_The Times._

"A magnificent collection of information on this interesting

country. The author's vivid and eloquent description invests it

for us with some of the glamour it possessed for the

Conquistadores of the sixteenth century; and on closing the book

the reader feels tempted to set out at once for

Peru."--_Yorkshire Observer._

IN PREPARATION

VOL. III.

MEXICO

By C. Reginald Enock

LONDON: T. FISHER UNWIN

[Illustration: MAKERS OF THE CANAL.]

THE PANAMA CANAL AND ITS MAKERS.

_By_ VAUGHAN CORNISH

_Doctor of Science (Manchester Univ.), Fellow of the Royal

Geographical, Geological, and Chemical Societies of London,

Member of the Japan Society_

WITH MAP, PLANS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY THE AUTHOR

T. FISHER UNWIN

LONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE

LEIPSIC: INSELSTRASSE 20

1909

(_All rights reserved._)

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED

TO

THE REVEREND CHARLES JOHN CORNISH, M.A. (OXON),

OF FLEET, HANTS, AND SALCOMBE REGIS, DEVON,

BY

HIS AFFECTIONATE SON,

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE

I AM indebted to many persons for advice and information in connection

with my study of the Panama Canal, and wish to thank particularly His

Excellency the Rt. Hon. James Bryce, the Rt. Hon. Lord Avebury, Mr.

Claude Mallet, C.M.G., Colonel George E. Church, Colonel George W.

Goethals, chairman of the Isthmian Canal Commission, and his colleagues,

Colonel W.C. Gorgas, M.D., Major D.D. Gaillard, Major William L. Sibert,

Mr. Jackson Smith, and Mr. Bucklin Bishop. Also Major Chester Harding,

Mr. Arango, Mr. G.R. Shanton, Chief of Police, Mr. William Gerig

(formerly in charge of the Gatun Dam), Mr. Mason W. Mitchell, and Mr.

Tracy Robinson.

VAUGHAN CORNISH.

_November_, 1908.

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION 15

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL REVIEW 23

CHAPTER II

ON THE CANAL AS IT IS TO BE 45

CHAPTER III

ON THE PRESENT CONDITION OF THE CULEBRA CUT, AND ON THE METHODS

EMPLOYED FOR EXCAVATION AND DISPOSAL OF THE SPOIL 79

CHAPTER IV

THE MEN ON THE ISTHMUS 99

CHAPTER V

HEALTH ON THE ISTHMUS AND THE FUTURE OF THE WHITE RACE IN THE

TROPICS 119

CHAPTER VI

ON THE SHORTENING OF DISTANCES BY SEA, AND ON THE STEAMSHIPS

AVAILABLE FOR CANAL TRANSIT 151

CHAPTER VII

THE COST OF THE CANAL 171

INDEX 179

ILLUSTRATIONS

MAKERS OF THE CANAL _Frontispiece_

TO FACE PAGE

STATUE OF COLUMBUS, CHRISTOBAL, COLON 18

CHRISTCHURCH, COLON 18

LOCK AND DAM SITE, GATUN 26

(The house is on the crest-line of the dam, which will extend to the

hills on the right)

EXCAVATING FOR THE DOUBLE FLIGHT OF THREE LOCKS AT GATUN 26

(In fine-grained argillaceous sandstone rock)

RE-LOCATION OF RAILWAY ABOVE GATUN DAM 30

(The trestle embankment will run as a causeway across a bay of the

lake)

MOTOR TROLLEY FOR INSPECTION OF WORKS 30

(In the background are screened houses of employees)

TROPICAL FOREST, WITH HEAVY GROWTH OF PARASITIC PLANTS 36

JUNGLE WITH PIPE THROUGH WHICH OIL IS CONVEYED BY GRAVITATION

ACROSS THE ISTHMUS 36

CHAGRES RIVER NEAR BARBACOES 42

(In the dry season--looking down stream)

CHAGRES RIVER NEAR OBISPO 42

(In the dry season)

FRENCH DREDGER LAID UP 48

(Several of these have recently been put in use again)

FRENCH TRUCKS PARTLY COVERED WITH FOREST GROWTH 48

(Many of these were used at first by the Americans, but are now

replaced by larger ones)

EXCAVATION NEAR TAVERNILLA 52

RIVER CHAGRES AND RAILWAY NEAR GORGONA 52

LIDGERWOOD UNLOADER, WINDING APPARATUS 56

_ANOPHELES_ BRIGADE OILING A DITCH 56

100-TON WRECKING CRANE, GORGONA 62

INTERIOR OF MACHINE SHOP, GORGONA 62

MACHINE SHOPS, GORGONA 66

CLUB HOUSE FOR EMPLOYEES, GORGONA 66

(Managed by the Y.M.C.A.)

EXCAVATION IN THE CUT 72

PIPE FOR DIVERSION OF A RIVER, NEAR EMPIRE 72

IN THE CUT, WIDTH 500 FEET 76

IN THE CUT, LOOKING SOUTH TOWARDS CULEBRA 76

(The gorge between Golden and Silver Hills just visible)

ROCK DRILL 82

(These machines bore a hole 30 feet deep in eight hours)

ROCK DRILLS AT WORK IN THE CUT 82

THE CUT, LOOKING NORTH FROM CULEBRA 86

THE CUT, LOOKING SOUTH FROM CULEBRA 86

FROM CULEBRA, LOOKING EAST TO DISTANT HILLS 92

FROM CULEBRA, LOOKING EAST ACROSS THE CUT 92

(Terraces formed by landslip are just visible behind the smoke of a

distant steam shovel)

FROM CULEBRA, LOOKING EAST TO GOLDEN HILL 96

(Showing excavation in steps and ledges. Each ledge has carried a

railway track)

THE CUT AT CULEBRA, LOOKING NORTH 96

(The scarped face of Golden Hill on the right. Taken April, 1908, in

the then bottom of the cut, 120 feet above Canal bottom)

GANG OF WEST INDIAN LABOURERS 102

(Unloading spoil-train at Gatun)

GANG OF SPANISH LABOURERS AT CULEBRA 102

(Working in the sun in April, which is one of the hottest months,

less than 10 degrees from the equator. The men are wearing European

kit)

STEAM SHOVEL EXCAVATING SOIL AT CULEBRA 106

STEAM SHOVEL UNLOADING INTO A DIRT CAR 106

STEAM SHOVEL NEAR END OF STROKE 112

(The marks of the teeth made in a former stroke are visible on the

right. Golden Hill, with the highest berm, or ledge, in the

distance)

STEAM SHOVEL, STROKE FINISHED, LOADED WITH SOIL 112

STEAM SHOVEL AT CULEBRA 116

SHOVEL-MEN AT CULEBRA 116

SCREENED BUNGALOW, CHRISTOBAL, COLON 122

SCREENED QUARTERS OF EMPLOYEES, CULEBRA 122

READING ROOM, EMPLOYEES' CLUB, CULEBRA 126

HALL OF EMPLOYEES' CLUB, CULEBRA 126

CUT SOUTH OF CULEBRA, LANDSLIP ON LEFT 132

LOOKING NORTH, THE SCARPED FACE OF GOLDEN HILL ON THE RIGHT 132

LOOKING NORTH FROM RAILWAY BRIDGE AT PARAISO 136

ABANDONED FRENCH MACHINERY 136

GANG OF EUROPEAN LABOURERS (IN 1907) 142

A FORMER HOT-BED OF MALARIA, NOW DRAINED 142

NEAR THE SITE OF MILAFLORES LOCKS 146

LOOKING NORTH TO CULEBRA DIVIDE FROM ANCON HILL 146

RIO GRANDE, NEAR LA BOCA 154

RIO GRANDE, FROM ANCON HILL 154

(Country north of that shown in the last photograph)

LA BOCA, FROM ANCON HILL 158

ANCON CEMETERY 158

COMMISSION'S HOTEL AT ANCON 162

ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, ANCON 162

VIEW FROM SPANISH FORT, PANAMA 166

CATHEDRAL SQUARE, PANAMA 166

PALACE OF PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 174

OLD FLAT ARCH AT PANAMA 174

(Adduced as evidence of comparative freedom of Panama from

destructive earthquakes)

MAP OF CANAL ZONE _At end of volume_

(Showing also profile of Canal, cross section of Culebra Cut, the

borings below Gatun dam, and the cross section of Gatun dam as

designed in April, 1908. The design of this dam, however, is still

undergoing modifications)

INTRODUCTION

AT the present moment the Canal Zone of the Isthmus of Panama is the

most interesting place in the world. Here is gathered an army of 40,000

men engaged in the epoch-making work of uniting the Atlantic and Pacific

Oceans, and here is the greatest collection of machinery ever massed for

the accomplishment of one undertaking.

If the present rate of progress continue unchecked, the Canal, it is

calculated, will be opened in 1915. Then will that Isthmus, which has

hitherto been a barrier between two oceans but has failed to act as a

bridge between two continents, be pierced by a waterway capable of

floating the largest ships now built or building. Then will the Pacific

coasts of the Americas be accessible from ports on both sides of the

Atlantic without the necessity of a voyage by the Straits of Magellan.

Then will the distance from New York to San Francisco be shortened by

8,400 and that from Liverpool by 6,000 miles; the distance from New York

to South American ports will be shortened by an average of 5,000 and

that from Liverpool to these ports by an average of 2,600 miles: then

for the first time Yokohama on the north and Sydney on the south will be

brought nearer to New York than to Liverpool or Antwerp, and then will

New Orleans and the ports on the Mexican Gulf be brought nearer than New

York, by sea, to San Francisco, South America beyond Pernambuco,

Australia, and Japan.

[Illustration: STATUE OF COLUMBUS, CHRISTOBAL, COLON.]

[Illustration: CHRISTCHURCH, COLON.]

No one who cares to know the greater things which are shaping the world

can now afford to be ignorant of what is happening on the Isthmus of

Panama. In the former days of unstable companies the student of affairs

might decline to occupy himself in the study of an undertaking of which

the fruition was doubtful. Now, however, that the Government of a great

nation have put their hands to the plough the furrow will be driven

through. The United States have acquired complete ownership and control

of the Canal and of a strip of land five miles wide on either side,

called the Canal Zone. The small State of Panama, in which this zone is

situate, has placed itself under the protection of the United States.

The Government of Great Britain has by a treaty ratified in 1901 waived

the treaty right which it formerly enjoyed to share with the United

States the control of any trans-Isthmian canal. The Isthmus has been

freed from those pestilences which were the greatest obstacles to human

effort, and the engineering difficulties are no longer beyond the scope

of modern science.

* * * * *

Having first visited the Canal works at the beginning of 1907, I decided

to make upon the spot a careful examination of the whole undertaking.

For this purpose I visited Washington and made application through the

proper channel to the Department of State, which kindly consented to

further the inquiry. A set of the published documents was supplied to

me, and I proceeded from New York to the Isthmus by the R.M.S.P.

_Magdalena_, arriving at Colon April 12, 1908. Here Colonel Goethals,

chairman of the Isthmian Canal Commission, provided me with a letter to

those concerned to furnish all information, and proposed that I should

make my way about unattended and pursue my inquiries independently. I

was thus enabled to converse with perfect freedom with the rank and

file, while drawing freely on the special information possessed only by

the heads of departments.

For the benefit of readers in England I may explain that these

circumstances were to me of especial importance on account of the doubts

thrown by American writers, and also by Americans of repute in

conversation, upon the reliability of official and other information

supplied to the American public on the burning topic of the Isthmus. As

an Englishman, and therefore standing outside American party politics,

and as a scientific student not engaged in commerce or political life,

I came to the study of the subject without prepossessions. This at least

was my happy state when I arrived in Washington in March last. When I

left for the Canal Zone a month later I was filled with gloomy

forebodings that I might after all find a rotten state of affairs on the

Isthmus. It was with intense relief that I found that I had what is

called in America "an honest proposition" to deal with. As my doubts

hitherto had been due to the patriotic anxiety of their compatriots, I

am sure Colonel Goethals and his colleagues will forgive me for this

frank statement of my difficulties and their solution.

Any Englishman, accustomed to see the work of our own soldiers and civil

servants in the Crown Colonies or in Egypt, would recognise in the

officers of the corps of Engineers and of the Army Medical Corps who are

in charge of the Canal Zone men of a like high standard of duty. As this

account is written not only for my own countrymen but also for readers

on the other side of the Atlantic, I should be glad, if it be possible,

to convince of my own _bona-fides_ those anxious patriots who find it

difficult to believe any good report from Panama. It may tend in this

direction to state that I travelled and sojourned at my own charges, and

that I went out on an independent inquiry. That I had promised to give

an account of the Canal works to my brother geographers in London was my

only undertaking, and the acceptance of a free pass on the Panama

Railway my only financial obligation either in Washington or on the

Isthmus.

In order properly to understand the present and future of the Canal

undertaking, it is necessary to give a short account of the history of

Isthmian communication, for the conditions which now face the American

Government and the Commission are not solely due to present physical

causes, but also to previous events.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL REVIEW

THE conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453 completed

their capture of the trade routes between Western Europe and the East

Indies. The East Indian trade had long been a source of great enrichment

to European merchants. It was especially suited to the restricted

carrying power of those times, the products (such as pepper) being small

in bulk and high in price. The maritime nations therefore sought sea

routes to the Indies in pursuit of this trade, and it was Columbus

himself, in his efforts to open up a western route to the Indies and

China, who discovered the Bay of Limon in 1497. He and his successors

sought for a strait or channel which should open the way to the East

Indies. Cortes sought for the strait in Mexico. Others sought as far

north as the St. Lawrence, which was supposed to afford a route to

China. No opening could, however, be found nearer to the Equator than

the Straits of Magellan (1520), and the hopes of a short route westward

to the Indies were disappointed. An Isthmian canal was talked of even in

the days of Charles V. of Spain to open the route to the East Indies. In

those days of small vessels, the river channels would have served for a

great part of the traverse, so that the scheme was not so wild as it may

seem.

[Illustration: LOCK AND DAM SITE, GATUN.]

[Illustration: EXCAVATION FOR LOCKS, GATUN.]

The purpose, therefore, of the first proposal for piercing the Isthmus

was for shortening the distance to the Indies and China. The discovery

of the nearer riches of Peru, however, illustrated the fact that the

Isthmian barrier has its uses as well as its inconveniences. Porto Bello

and Panama were fortified, ships were launched from the latter port for

the Peruvian traffic, the treasure was carried across the Isthmus under

escort and shipped to Spain. The treasure-ships, indeed, were liable to

attack on the Caribbean, but the Isthmian barrier proved an important

safeguard to the Peruvian possessions of Spain.

In the next century, the seventeenth, the importance of the Isthmian

land route declined, owing to the fact that Spain was no longer able to

secure even moderate safety for her ships on the Caribbean. In the

present days, when the importance of naval power is so well understood,

it is hardly necessary to enlarge upon the significance of this fact,

and its bearing upon the problems presented by the Panama route to-day.

The project of an Isthmian canal for the purpose of trade between Europe

and Asia continued to be agitated, but the inducements were inadequate

to overcome the obstacles.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, for the second time, it was the

need of improved communication between the east and west of the American

Continent which provided a sufficient inducement to improve the Isthmian

route.

At this time the Government of the United States were much occupied with

projects of trans-Isthmian communication, particularly by canal, not

with a view to Transpacific commerce, but with the object of improved

communication between the east and west of their own territory.

In 1846 a treaty was made with the State of New Grenada (afterwards

Colombia) with a view to providing facilities for transport in the war

between the United States and Mexico. In its most important provision it

is similar to the present treaty between the United States and the new

Republic of Panama, viz., the United States guarantee the sovereignty of

the State in question over the Isthmian territory. Hence the Isthmus was

thus early constituted a Protectorate of the United States.

But at this time it was generally thought that Lake Nicaragua provided

the best route for a trans-Isthmian canal.

The Pacific seaboard having recently acquired importance to the United

States, the Government desired to further the canal project on that

account. The only practicable Atlantic terminal of a Nicaraguan canal

lay within territory over which Great Britain had long exercised

control. Further, the Pacific Coast of Canada had recently acquired

importance to the eastern provinces and to the home country, and access

thereto was extremely difficult. The outcome of these circumstances was

the conclusion in 1850 of the celebrated Clayton-Bulwer treaty between

the United States and Great Britain, which was duly ratified by

Congress. By this instrument it was agreed that neither Government

should ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control of any

canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, nor erect

fortifications commanding the same.

This treaty remained in force until 1901, and I shall have to refer to

it again. Meanwhile the great rush of gold-seekers to California had

supplied the needful stimulus to a scheme, already mooted, of an

Isthmian railway terminating at Panama. In spite of the enormous

difficulties entailed by the pestilential climate, the undertaking was

completed in 1855. This achievement, originating in New York, was the

work of W.H. Aspinwall, Henry Chauncey, and John L. Stephens.

[Illustration: RE-LOCATION OF RAILWAY ABOVE GATUN.]

[Illustration: MOTOR TROLLEY FOR INSPECTION OF WORKS.]

It was undertaken independently of any canal scheme, but it exercised a

profound effect upon the fate of subsequent schemes. The facilities

which the railway afforded determined de Lesseps's choice of route, and

de Lesseps ploughed so deeply that those who came after him have found

themselves constrained to follow his furrow. The "New World" is in fact

no longer new, and its statesmen now have to solve problems presenting

historical as well as physical factors.

The American Civil War interrupted the prosecution of canal schemes, but

the examination of routes was recommenced by the United States

Government in 1866, a Commission finally reporting in 1876[1] in favour

of the Nicaraguan route.

[1] The report, however, was not published until 1879.

In 1869 the Suez Canal was opened for traffic. Immediately, the route by

Panama ceased to be the shortest from Europe to any part of the East

Indies. The importance of that route to Asia was thus greatly reduced as

far as Europe was concerned, but, relatively, its importance to the

United States was increased, for the Suez Canal does not shorten the

Asiatic voyage from New York, Boston, or New Orleans to the same extent

as it does for European ports.

The Old World had been severed into halves by the enterprise of one man,

and that man no potentate, but merely one possessing the gift of

persuasion. By his achievement, which was immediately crowned by

financial success, Ferdinand de Lesseps suddenly became possessed of

powers such as are not always at the disposal of the Governments even of

great countries. He decided himself to sever the barrier between the

Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, convened a "Congress" at Paris in 1879, and

inaugurated in 1881 the _Compagnie Universelle du Canal Inter-oceanique

de Panama_. He had decided to adopt the Panama route on account of the

facilities afforded by the railway. The money was mainly subscribed in

France. The American railway company was bought out at the enormous

price of $25,500,000, and in the course of the next eight years a large

part of the work required for a tide-level canal was well executed on

sound lines by the genius of the French, who are excelled by none in the

arts of the civil engineer. The exact proportion which the French work

bears to that since accomplished by the American Government will be

shown later. The engineers now on the Isthmus are full of praise for the

work of the French engineers, and their wonder daily grows both at its

quantity and its ingenuity. It is only those at a distance, or

ill-informed, who have belittled these achievements. Unfortunately, the

French engineers were not properly supported. De Lesseps, if he were

ever a practical man, had certainly ceased to be so since his first

great success. A practical man is one who counts the cost of everything

he is about to do. De Lesseps no longer counted cost. He had become as

one believing in his star. His actions remind us of those of some of

the great conquerors whose early successes have led them to undertake

impossible campaigns. The question has been discussed if any human

character can stand more than a certain share of success and yet retain

a sound judgment. Certainly the character of de Lesseps was not equal to

the strain. The expenditure was awful--$300,000,000 in eight years,

_i.e._, more than three times the sum for which the Suez Canal was

constructed. The Company went into liquidation in 1889. Much had been

embezzled. Much, it is said, had been spent in purchasing the silence of

voices which would otherwise have been raised against a Europeanised

canal.

The affairs of the Company were taken over by the New Panama Canal

Company, who continued to administer the railway, and, with small means,

did excellent work for the next twelve years in keeping the machinery

and the works from deterioration, in excavations at the summit, and

above all in extending the scientific examination of the country so as

to obtain much-needed data for the construction of the high-level canal

which was now proposed in place of de Lesseps's project of a tide-level

waterway.

In 1869 President Grant, in a message to Congress, had recommended the

construction of an Isthmian canal under the sole control of the United

States, and popular opinion since that time, if not before, has always

strongly held that if a canal be made it should be exclusively under

that control. It was not the least of de Lesseps's imprudences that he

proceeded with his project in spite of warnings on this matter. In 1898

an event occurred which made the American nation feel that an Isthmian

canal was necessary, and that it must be under their exclusive control.

At the outset of the war with Spain, the _Oregon_, one of the best of

America's small fleet of battleships (we write of ten years since), was

lying in the Pacific. She had to steam more than 13,000 miles to reach

Key West, and the whole nation was in a state of nervous tension for

many weeks pending her junction with the main fleet.

It seemed at the time that the Panama route could hardly be obtained for

a canal under purely American control, and a further investigation of

the Nicaraguan route was ordered--that route which had been preferred by

the American experts before de Lesseps intervened. The New Panama Canal

Company had by this time brought their labours to the point where it

seemed practicable to appeal to the investing public of the world for

funds to construct a high-level Panama canal. To do this in the face of

a Nicaraguan canal, undertaken as a national affair by the United

States, would have been hopeless: they therefore laid their detailed

plans before President McKinley. A Commission was accordingly appointed

by Congress to inquire into the best route for an Isthmian canal "under

the control, management, and ownership of the United States."[2] The

report was presented to Congress on December 4, 1901, rather more than

two years later, and is a document of great historical and scientific

interest. The quarto volume of 688 pages is accompanied by a portfolio

of 86 maps, plans, and panoramic views. The last of these, showing the

mountainous skyline of the Isthmus east of Colon, with altitudes marked,

illustrates in a striking manner the conclusion of the Commission that

the San Blas route, or any route east of Colon, would involve a ship

tunnel. These routes are dismissed as impracticable on account of the

altitude of the divide. The Nicaraguan and Panamanian are found to be

the only practicable routes, and the details of both are fully

discussed. The high-level canal was preferred by the Commission to the

sea-level at Panama, and on the Nicaraguan route only a high-level canal

is possible, so that in this respect the two routes were considered to

be on a par.

[2] Act of Congress approved by President, March 3, 1899, Commission

appointed June 10.

[Illustration: TROPICAL FOREST WITH PARASITIC GROWTHS.]

[Illustration: PIPE CONVEYING OIL ACROSS THE ISTHMUS.]

The relative advantages of the two routes are carefully set out in the

report, the general tenor of which is favourable to that by Panama.

Nevertheless, the Commission recommend that the Nicaraguan route be

adopted, on account of the excessive valuation which, they state, was

placed by the New Panama Canal Company on their works and property. The

value of these, including the Panama Railway, was estimated by the

Commission at $40,000,000. The New Panama Canal Company, learning that

the Commission had thus reported, cabled an offer to sell at this price,

and the Commission accordingly sent in a supplementary report in favour

of the Panama route. By June 28, 1902, the "Spooner" Act had been passed

and ratified, authorising the President to purchase the canal works at

this price, and to acquire from the Republic of Colombia the necessary

rights for the control of a Panama canal, then to be constructed; but in

the event of his not being able to acquire such control, then to proceed

with the Nicaraguan project.

Meanwhile, by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, ratified by the Senate December

16, 1901, Great Britain had waived the right of joint control of any

Isthmian canal which she had held since the ratification of the

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in 1850. It remained therefore only to negotiate a

treaty with Colombia. The treaty of 1846 with New Grenada afforded a

precedent as far as the question of control was concerned, and the

negotiations appear to have been related mainly to the question of

price. A treaty was negotiated by officials of the two Republics, by

which the United States was to pay a sum of $10,000,000 to Colombia, and

after nine years an annual sum of $100,000. This was confirmed by

Congress but rejected by the Colombian Senate, and negotiations came to

an end with the adjournment of that body, October 31, 1903.

Three days later the Province of Panama renounced its allegiance to

Colombia.

Another three days, and the independence of the New Republic was

recognised and guaranteed by the United States.

In less than a fortnight afterwards a treaty was signed at Washington by

which the United States acquired complete ownership and control of the

proposed canal for the sum of $10,000,000 and an annual payment of

$250,000, to commence nine years afterwards. This treaty was ratified at

Panama December 2, 1903, and by the United States Senate February 23,

1904.

One significant point must be mentioned with reference to the Panamanian

revolution. The inability of Colombia to make an effective effort to

assert its power on the Isthmus was due to naval weakness in the absence

of communication by land. No army could march through the tropical

forests which still isolate the Canal Zone from South America, and

control at Colon and Panama still depends upon sea power.

Thus, at last, the United States owns and controls its Canal Zone. We

will now state precisely the position in which that nation stands in

reference to this matter, and then we may leave the work of the

diplomats to consider the task of the engineers.

_The National Status of the Canal._

The position which will be held by the United States in relation to

other Powers is foreshown in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with Great

Britain and in Article XXIII. of the treaty with Panama. The

Hay-Pauncefote treaty is in supersession of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

The latter stipulated that no fortifications should be erected

controlling the Canal. In the Hay-Pauncefote treaty this clause is

omitted. On the other hand, it is stated in Article III., Sec. 2, that "the

Canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised

nor any act of hostility be committed within it." Hence, the reader may

have remained in doubt whether the United States Government had intended

to reserve to themselves the right to fortify. However, the terms of the

subsequent treaty with the Republic of Panama answer this question, for

after stating in Article XVIII. that the Canal shall be opened in

accordance with all the stipulations of the treaty of 1901 with Great

Britain, Article XXIII. states that "the United States shall have the

right to establish fortifications."

As a matter of fact, such fortifications are to be constructed, and the

plan of the Canal has been adjusted to the requirements of military

defence.

There have been, among public men in the United States, two schools of

thought on the vital question of the defence of the Canal. One school

has held that the best safeguard was to be obtained by leaving the Canal

unfortified (as is the case with the Suez Canal), and by the

establishment of a general Convention, by which all the Powers,

including the United States, should bind themselves to respect the

neutrality of the Canal and leave it inviolate. Other public men

preferred forts, guardships, and a garrison. The general public in the

United States, on the other hand, appears to have unanimously held that

an international guarantee would be ineffectual and, moreover,

derogatory. As we have seen, the popular view has prevailed, but traces

of the antagonistic and incompatible notion of internationalisation

remain in the language of the treaties. This is not surprising when we

recollect that the first draft of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was drawn

up with a view to neutralisation, according to the precedents afforded

by the Suez Canal. Thus we find that Article III. commences with the

words: "The United States adopts as the basis of the neutralisation of

the Canal ..."; and in Article XVIII. of the treaty with Panama we find:

"The Canal when constructed, and the entrances thereto, shall be neutral

in perpetuity...."

[Illustration: CHAGRES RIVER NEAR BABACOES.]

[Illustration: CHAGRES RIVER NEAR OBISPO.]

What then are we to understand by the term "neutral" as applied to the

Panama Canal in war time? I suppose the meaning to be that if there be a

war to which the United States is not a party, the Canal will be used by

belligerents in exactly the same way as was the Suez Canal, _e.g._, in

the Russo-Japanese War, and that the Government of the United States has

pledged itself to see that such neutrality is preserved. But if there be

a war in which the United States is a party, the circumstances of

fortification and operation by the United States in fact render it

impossible for the other belligerent to use the Canal, and are

intended[3] to have that effect. This being so, the United States is

preparing to defend the Canal from attack. Thus it is important to the

proper understanding of the undertaking on which the United States

Government has embarked that we should clearly realise that the Canal is

only neutral in a restricted sense.

The commercial status of the Canal, however, is similar to that of Suez,

in that by Article III., Sec. 1, of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, "The Canal

shall be free and open[4] to the vessels ... of all nations ... on terms

of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any

such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions

or charges of traffic, or otherwise."

[3] See Report of Canal Commission, 1897, p. 168.

[4] In Article XVIII. of the treaty with Panama this clause is cited,

with the addition "and the entrances to the Canal."

The Panama Canal and Its Makers · 第 1 / 7 章