CONDITIONS WHICH CONFRONT US
To treat of Cuba as an American country is the purpose of this volume.
If the people of the Island, regardless of nationality, will only
postpone the question of the particular form of government for the
present, and give all their attention to the new economic questions
which confront them, the future will be full of promise. Cuba is no
longer a European colony, but an American country, under the protection
of the United States. So long as the Island is occupied and governed by
the military forces of the United States, law and order will be
maintained and equal rights will be granted to all the people. From an
industrial point of view Cuba will have practically obtained what she
has been fighting for for nearly a generation: namely, industrial and
commercial freedom. The United States will administer the laws for the
Cubans in the interest of Cuba. The United States asks nothing in return
but the same opportunity for trade and commerce as is accorded to the
other countries of the world. The Republic will levy no tribute, nor
will it exact a dollar of taxation over and above the revenue necessary
for protecting life and property, and the cost of inaugurating such
works for the improvement of sanitation, or the carrying on of
industries, as may become necessary.
Many Cubans, and a very large number of Spaniards, who appeared before
the author when in Cuba, for the purpose of giving testimony on
industrial and commercial matters, took it for granted that the United
States would, in making up the new fiscal laws for the Island, exact
discriminating duties in favour of the United States and against
European countries. When told nothing of the sort was contemplated, the
Cubans were surprised and the Spaniards incredulous. Indeed, the latter
were astounded, and seemed to wonder what the United States was in Cuba
for. Even American citizens interested in pushing their Cuban trade have
expressed surprise at the absolute freedom which has been allowed all
fiscal legislation, and the scrupulous care exercised by our Government
not to exact any right itself which is not accorded to other nations. In
such matters we are of course bound by our international treaties, and
so long as Cuba remains under the protection of the Republic, and not
part of it, she must be treated, so far as customs regulations and
navigation laws are concerned, as a free country. In the preliminary
work of economic reconstruction these sound principles have been kept in
mind and adhered to. In fact, the fullest and broadest plan was chosen
by the Administration to secure information in Cuba; and the refrain of
the instructions, both from President McKinley and his able and
broad-minded Secretary of the Treasury, was, to spare neither time nor
money to secure the views of all the people of Cuba; for whatever the
United States Government finds necessary to do in the Island must be
done, as far as possible, by the people of Cuba, for Cubans, and in the
interests of Cuba. By this it must not be inferred that those of Spanish
birth were to be excluded, but, on the contrary, that the views of all
who proposed to remain in Cuba and help by their labour and thrift to
build up the industry and commerce of the Island should be sought and
considered.
In following out the spirit of these statesmanlike instructions, the
author invited, through the newspapers, all persons interested in the
industry, trade, foreign commerce, and currency and banking system of
Cuba to express their views on these and kindred topics. Many responded,
and as may be imagined the information gathered took a wide range, and
will, it is hoped, be of practical value in adjusting the questions with
which the Government of the United States will have to deal during the
military occupation of the Island. In the prosecution of this work,
public hearings were given in Havana, Cienfuegos, and Santiago; and to
committees of persons representing interests at Trinidad, Caibarien,
Sagua la Grande, and other parts of the Island an opportunity was given
to express their views as to the industrial necessities of their
respective communities. In New York and Washington opportunity was given
to those interested in Cuban commerce and such American citizens as
represent large sugar estates, iron mines, and tobacco and fruit
interests in the Island of Cuba, to present a full and free expression
of their views on all topics included in the scope of the investigation.
A large amount of information was thus obtained, and no inconsiderable
assistance rendered by these gentlemen. With hardly an exception, such
assistance has been rendered freely and disinterestedly, and the author
takes this occasion to thank a large number of business men who have
been found ready and willing to drop their business at any moment and
devote much valuable time in an endeavour to elucidate the somewhat
complicated conditions which surround the commerce and industry of Cuba.
In Cuba every possible consideration was shown to the writer and no
pains nor trouble were spared on the part of the Spanish officials and
business men to give all required information and to aid in the inquiry
undertaken. In this work neither political prejudice nor nationality
took any part. The Spanish bankers and merchants, whose influence a few
weeks previously had been arrayed against the United States, came
forward and placed such information as they had at the disposal of the
United States Government. The Cubans engaged in business, and the
military commanders in the field, from Generals Gomez and Rodriguez
down, have alike assured me of their sympathy in the work thus
instituted by the United States, and proffered their services in its
prosecution. The following expression from the veteran warrior, General
Gomez, dated Boffill Plantation, October 3, 1898, will be read in this
connection with interest:
"I must congratulate you cordially for the high mission which you
have had entrusted to you. I am completely identified in all and
with all concerning it; I reserve for a better opportunity giving
you my personal views on the matter.... On my side I am working in
the same sense; I am doing all I can for the immediate
reconstruction of the country; its wounds will heal with the rapid
promotion of the work. This is the battle we are now fighting, and
all men of good will should join us in our struggle. I avail myself
of this opportunity to tender my services."
The business men and merchants of Havana and other large cities,
regardless of nationality, have rendered services of incalculable value
to this inquiry, on the ground that the one thing that Cuba wants more
than all else is, as General Gomez truly says, that its people should
lay down their arms and take up the implements of peace. The Presidents
of the Chambers of Commerce of Havana, Cienfuegos, and Santiago have all
taken an interest in this work and elaborate reports were prepared by
committees appointed especially to aid in gauging the industrial
necessities of the Island. A similar report has been prepared for
Matanzas.
Whatever may be the shortcomings of this volume on _Industrial Cuba_,
they must not be attributed either to lack of interest on the part of
the people of Cuba, or to any failure on their part to give information,
especially on all matters relating to foreign commerce. There is, of
course, a dearth of statistical information, in consequence of which it
has been difficult to work out certain fiscal statements and estimates
with the degree of exactitude easily attainable on the same lines at
home. The information which has been obtained, however, would seem to
leave no room for doubt as to the wisest course for the United States
Government to pursue in adjusting Cuban customs duties, in establishing
a sound currency, in protecting the savings of the people, in preventing
usury, in abolishing onerous and iniquitous taxation, in establishing
free schools, in starting new and reviving the old industries of Cuba,
in increasing commerce, in improving the sanitary condition of the
cities, in distributing labour, and in the general industrial and moral
upbuilding of the people.
The present volume touches on all these topics, and endeavours to give
the reader a clear and practical idea of the present industrial
condition of Cuba. The present chapter aims to present in a concise form
a few of the more important problems which the United States Government
was called upon to face January 1, 1899, and with which it may have to
grapple during the first years of the new century. No attempt is made to
forecast the manner of their settlement. It is not, as a rule, wise to
worry about how we are to cross a bridge until we get to it. Many Cuban
economic problems which at a distance seem to be complicated, will
simplify as we come within close range. Once the United States military
authorities are in possession, ways and means will suggest themselves to
overcome obstacles which now seem almost insurmountable. The most urgent
needs of the Island, when it was turned over to our Government, were
those briefly discussed in this review of the economic conditions of
Cuba.
First among these needs of the Island was a tariff that should bear
lightest in directions where the people could least afford the burden of
taxation, and heaviest on commodities which the well-to-do and those
engaged in large enterprises required. The Spanish tariff was made by
Spaniards, for Spain, in the interests of the Spanish. That seems to be
the actuating principle of it. On any other theory it was inexplicable.
In adopting, July, 1898, for an exigency measure, the rates of duty
which Spain levied for her own commodities, the United States acted
wisely. These rates, however, were full of inequalities, and were not
levied on any sound principle, but on the "heads, Spain wins; tails,
Cuba loses" idea which prevailed in the whole fiscal fabric. It was
found that the only way to remedy these inequalities, equalise the rates
of duties, improve the administration, and reduce the rates of duties on
all articles of general consumption, was to frame a practically new
tariff. This was done, and the new tariff now in force will undoubtedly
do its share in the industrial reconstruction of Cuba. In this tariff it
was not thought advisable to make radical changes in the administrative
branches, nor to change weights and measures into United States
equivalents, because the people of Cuba are accustomed to the metric
system. As a rule, all duties in Cuba are levied by the kilo and hundred
kilos. United States currency, however, was substituted for the Spanish
_pesos_. This will simplify collection of taxes, as customs duties were
collected by Spain in three different classes of currency: gold, silver,
and bank notes, all (for the gold coins used in Cuba have fictitious
values) fluctuating in value.
The tariff adopted by the United States, when the military forces took
charge of the custom-houses, reduced all duties about sixty per cent. on
the old Spanish rate, and averages fully two-thirds less than the rates
exacted by Spain in Cuban ports during the last five months of its
occupancy of the Island. The reasons for these reductions, together with
the reasons which led up to the decision of the President to admit
cattle and agricultural implements free into Cuban ports in possession
of the United States, are fully given in another chapter. Still another
chapter will be devoted to an analysis and discussion of the Cuban
Budget, in which the effect of the new tariff on the revenue of the
country, together with the other sources of revenue, are explained and
discussed. It will naturally be asked: With such a large reduction of
duties, how does the United States expect to secure revenue for the
purpose of administering the government of the Island? There are several
answers to this question, and the facts bearing on the subject are given
in full in the chapter on the Cuban Budget. The general answer is that
by reason of fraudulent classification and smuggling, much of the
revenue collected from the people of Cuba never found its way into the
treasury of that Island, nor of Spain. The cupidity and rapacity of the
Spanish officials in Cuba are beyond conception, and, if one may judge
by the reports of the United States customs officials at Santiago, as
much revenue will be received from a tariff whose duties are from a half
to two thirds less than the Spanish tariff as was received under the
iniquitous and exasperating law which has been abolished by the advent
of the American forces. As the officials recommending the measure
believed, the reduction to a reasonable rate of duty in certain
schedules--such, for example, as those relating to machinery and railway
supplies--would increase importation, and certainly the revenue would be
greater than during the period of prohibitory duties. A railway company
naturally hesitated to import a locomotive when the duty was equivalent
to the value of the engine. With a revised tariff of twenty-five per
cent. ad valorem, it may import two, or four, or even six. In adjusting
such schedules, the revenue features alone need be considered, because
Cuba has no locomotive works, or any iron or steel industry. The same is
true of a variety of other articles.
In all cases where there are home industries in Cuba capable of
supplying a manufactured product made by home labour, care was exercised
by those who framed this tariff (either by making free the raw material,
or by not making a too radical reduction of duty) not to injure their
prospects. In so doing, the Administration is only carrying out the
policy which has been fruitful in developing the industries of the
United States and in securing diversified employment for its labour. If
honestly enforced, the new tariff established in Cuba by the United
States will yield sufficient revenue, enable Cuba to buy in the cheapest
markets of the world, and not compel her to purchase from Spain inferior
commodities at a high price. In every section it is a Cuban measure, and
in no single case can there be found a section that discriminates in
favour of the United States as against any other market. The United
States purposes to take its chances for the Cuban trade with the rest of
the world. If Cuba can purchase cheaper and better articles on more
favourable terms of the United States than of Europe, we shall secure
the trade. If not, the Cuban consumer is free to purchase in the markets
of the world. In this one act alone, conservative, thoughtful Cubans
must realise that they have attained to the commercial freedom which
some, not without reason, contend was the real object of the two
insurrections. However that may be, Cuba has secured a right which
England would never concede to Ireland, namely, a separate revenue
system. In granting this economic freedom to her other colonies, England
has strengthened their ties to the mother country. With industrial
freedom assured, a colonial country may be indifferent to the form of
its political government.
Next in importance to the fiscal laws for the revenue of the Island
comes the currency question. No country can be permanently prosperous
unless its currency is sound and its credit good. Bad financial
management of state affairs begets bad credit, and impaired credit is
the forerunner of depreciated currency. Although Cuba is afflicted with
many kinds of depreciated currency, the established basis is strictly
gold, and in any commercial engagement the value is understood to be in
Spanish gold, unless there is a specification to the contrary. Indeed,
there is something almost pathetic in the manner in which Cuba, though
plundered and depleted of her resources and wealth, has never wavered
from the gold standard. The business interests of the Island are, as the
author found, unanimously in favour of a continued gold basis; for the
Cubans have suffered so much from Spain's various attempts to force upon
the people a depreciated currency, both in the form of silver and bank
bills, that they want no further experiments with the currency. The
Spanish silver money current in the Island is taken at the daily value
only, which is fixed, partly by the larger or smaller demand for wages
and necessities of the Government to pay troops, but principally by the
continually fluctuating value of the Spanish money in the European
markets. As this Spanish silver is legal tender in Spain for its face
value, it is able to maintain a fictitious value for purposes of
shipment to that country. This silver dollar, therefore, fluctuates in
value with the fitful changes in Spain's credit, and it is probable,
should the United States establish American currency as sole legal
tender for the Island of Cuba, that all the Spanish silver dollars will
be shipped to Spain. There was in Cuba during the last months of Spanish
control a margin of thirty per cent. on the silver dollars. It is not
probable that these dollars will go down to a point where it will not
pay to ship the Spanish silver to Spain and utilise the American dollar
in Cuba. In this event the United States Government will, of course,
ship its own silver dollars to Cuba; which, with the subsidiary coins,
will be required for small payments. At Santiago the immediate
disappearance of Spanish dollars and minor coins has made small
transactions extremely difficult. Some think that the present stock of
Spanish silver in the Island exceeds the necessities; but however this
may be in the western part of the Island, it was evidently not the case
in Santiago.
[Illustration: BATEY OF SANTA CATALINA.]
Besides the silver, there is a bank-note circulation, but that has no
actual bearing on the question of currency, as the trade and business of
the Island has refused to accept it, and the present quoted value is
less than ten cents on the dollar. The greater part of this emission,
which was a war issue made by the Spanish Government at Madrid through
the _Banco Espanol de la Isla de Cuba_ (not _by_ that bank), is largely
in the hands of speculators and government contractors. The only public
application is for the payment in the custom-house of the so-called ten
per cent. ad valorem duty assessed on the official value of imported
merchandise in addition to the regular specific rate of duty exacted.
The abolition of this duty, under the new tariff, ends the life of
these bank bills. There still remains a question as to whether the
Spanish Bank of Cuba was in any way responsible for these bills, and the
question will come up for future adjustment. The Bank will probably deny
responsibility and refer those who hold this depreciated currency to the
Spanish Government at Madrid. It is an interesting fact in this
connection that the credit of the Spanish Bank of Cuba is of a higher
standard than the credit of the Spanish Government, for the Bank has
never failed to redeem its own paper during nearly half a century of its
existence, first as the Bank of Spain of Havana and subsequently under
its present name. It has at times suffered embarrassment, but ultimately
the bills of the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba have always been
redeemed.
The gold coins current in Cuba are the Spanish and French coins, the
bulk of which consists of Spanish twenty-five-_peseta_ pieces, so-called
Alfonsinos, which for many years have been inflated by royal decree to
$5.30, and the French twenty-franc piece, so-called Napoleons, which
have also been given a legal value of $4.24 and decreed since the end of
1893 as legal money.[1] When the necessity for adopting and inflating
another gold coin besides the Spanish Alfonsino was under discussion,
the suggestion was made that the United States gold eagle would make an
excellent coin for this purpose, as it would figure out almost exactly
eleven dollars Spanish gold.[2] The idea was not entertained, because of
the general distrust of Americans, and the fear lest the relations
between the United States and Cuba should become too intimately
interwoven.
STATEMENT SHOWING VALUE OF UNITED STATES GOLD IN COMPARISON WITH
SPANISH AND FRENCH GOLD ON THE BASIS OF PAR VALUE
Spanish Alfonsino $5.
French Napoleon 4.
Spanish Alfonsino, value in Havana $5.
Value in United States mint ($4.80 less shipping
expenses, .024) 4.776
------
$0.224.
Exchange 4-11/16%
French Napoleon, value in Havana $4.
Value in United States mint ($3.84 less shipping
expenses, .0192) 3.8208
-------
$0.1792
Exchange 4-11/16%
Value of $5, less 1/2% shipping expenses $4.975. At 4-11/16%
Quotations: £ Stlg., Spain, $39.40 currency in Havana, 10% £ in U. S.
4.84
STATEMENT SHOWING ACTUAL VALUE OF $1. SPANISH SILVER
100,000 dollars Spanish silver can be bought to-day here with $66,000
Spanish gold, equal to $60,000 U. S. currency.
100,000 silver dollars shipped to Spain after deducting 1% shipping
expenses would produce $99,000.
99,000 dollars Spanish silver on Spain will buy at rate of £1, which is
$7.88, £12,563. £12,563 would produce in the U. S. at $4.84, $60,804.92.
Cost $60,000
Proceeds 60,804.92
----------
$ 804.92, from which deduct
commission, revenue
stamp, interest,
and profit.
While the principal banking concerns are unanimous as to the gold
standard, there is a difference of opinion in relation to the
advisability of squeezing the inflation out of these gold coins. Some of
the Cuban bankers and financiers contend that the United States
Government should add another gold coin to the currency, namely, the
American eagle; and, by maintaining the fictitious value given to the
other two gold coins, leave it equivalent to eleven dollars in Cuba.
This, it is claimed, will be a very easy way of leaving matters _in
statu quo_, as it were, until such time as permanent government and laws
shall be provided for the Island. They fear that to make the United
States currency legal tender would work an injury to the creditor class,
whose contracts would then be payable in gold worth six per cent. less
than the gold specified in such contracts. There are others, whose
opinions are equally worthy of consideration, who recommend as the only
logical remedy for this situation the substitution of the American
currency as sole legal tender. Such action on the part of the United
States Government it is believed would not seriously interfere with
present contracts, which are invariably expressed as payable in Spanish
gold, and which might be arranged for accordingly.
The premium on Spanish gold was never agreed to by the business people.
Having thus arbitrarily put a premium on Spanish gold, the same
authorities later put a premium on French gold, and to make the matter
more complicated, the United States Government is now requested, by some
of the Cuban financiers, to introduce another gold coin, which,
practically, will be worth ten per cent. more in Cuba than in the United
States; that is, a man owing $1,100 gold in Cuba may pay that debt with
$1,000 gold in United States currency. As a temporary measure, and in
view of the fact that this inflation so far as Spanish coin goes has
been in force for over half a century, this may be justifiable. The
process, however, is entirely artificial, and to continue it would
certainly result in many complications. Some Cuban financiers think it
inadvisable to introduce American money at this time, while certain
planters are fearful lest their labourers should refuse to take one
American silver dollar instead of two Spanish silver dollars. The latter
looks larger in amount, it must be granted; but if the purchasing power
of the American dollar, by reason of the sound credit of the United
States, is double that of the depreciated dollar, with only Spain's
guaranty between it and its intrinsic value of fifty cents, there will
be no difficulty in the end. A country which is just now going through
an operation involving its very existence will hardly be seriously
affected by taking this fictitious value out of the gold coin and
establishing once and for all a sound currency that will be good for a
hundred cents on the dollar--no more, no less--the world over.
Cuba has no banks in the national sense. There are some excellent
private banks, and since its establishment, nearly half a century ago,
the Spanish Bank of Cuba has cut an important figure in the finance of
the Island.
In another chapter, a brief history of banking in the Island from the
earliest period to the present time will be given. For the present, the
banking facilities are adequate to the business, because it would be
extremely hazardous to loan money in Cuba on any kind of collateral or
property. Upon the revival of business, however, the agricultural
interests will require facilities for obtaining money in advance of the
crops at reasonable rates of interest, and protection from the
abominable usury which heretofore has blighted the strongest industries
of the Island and added materially to the burdens of the Cuban planters.
There are so many forms of obnoxious taxes in Cuba that even a brief
description of them would occupy considerable space and convert this
volume into a treatise on the evils of Spanish taxation. Foremost among
the taxes which the United States will abolish is the "consumption tax,"
on the killing of cattle, which is an exaction that greatly increases
the price of food to the people. This tax, like many others, was simply
farmed out to private firms or corporations, whose emissaries in its
collection became a constant menace to thrift and industry in their
respective districts. Another tax, which will fall of its own weight,
now that the United States forces control the Island, is the "cedula,"
or head tax, which varied in amount from a few cents to one hundred
dollars, according to the rank and importance of the individual.
Curiously enough, this tax, when not collected, became under Spanish
rule a greater source of injustice and annoyance than when collected. It
was generally allowed to run until some occasion came for the unhappy
victim of Spanish rapacity to require a public document, a permit to
bury a child or relative, a licence to marry, a transfer of real estate,
or a notarial acknowledgment. Then it was that the petty rascals in
charge of public business came down heavily, and unless the fines and
back "cedula" and a handsome "gratification" to the official was
forthcoming, the body must await interment, the marriage must be
postponed, or the transaction be delayed.
The United States Government will not continue taxes that yield nothing
in revenue and were simply the means by which unprincipled officials
whose cupidity seemed to know no bounds were enabled to plunder and
distress the weak and the unfortunate. The "consumption tax," the
"cedula," and the revenue from "lotteries," must necessarily disappear
with the advent of United States administration of affairs.
Until the tax laws of Cuba can be thoroughly revised, the revenue from
customs, from the various forms of internal revenue (and there are
many), and from the receipts from taxes upon municipal real estate will,
if the strictest economy prevail, suffice for immediate wants, without
resorting to measures of taxation which are alike debasing and
tyrannical. It is impossible to make specific suggestions at this time
in relation to a subject so hopelessly complicated. After the
administration of affairs of the Island has been longer in the hands of
United States officials, these matters may be carefully studied and
adjusted on a basis of equality and justice to all concerned. The true
inwardness of Spanish taxation, as developed in the Island of Cuba, can
be studied and remedied only after time has elapsed and all the facts
are in possession of those who have assumed the responsibility of
control.
The question of education is one that will receive early attention, and
in which the President of the United States has personally evinced
considerable interest. Free public schools exist, but the teachers have
the right to take pay scholars, and naturally those who do not pay get
little or no attention. In the cities from which data are available it
was found that only a small portion of the school population attend
school. There were 888 schools for boys and girls in 1893 and the amount
paid for their support was $775,646. It is impossible even to
approximate the situation at the present moment. In a general way, it
may be described as simply deplorable. A free public-school system must
be immediately established, for much of the misfortune and suffering
Cuba has undergone may be traceable to the neglect of education. The
number of people who are illiterate is very great. Some statistics show
only one in forty of the labouring classes able to read and write. There
can be no stable government in Cuba until this has been remedied.
The reader familiar with Cuban history will remember that the first
movement toward the emancipation of the slaves was the practical freeing
of all children born subsequent to 1868, the year the revolution started
which ended in the abolition of slavery. In the same way, the first act
looking toward political emancipation should be the establishment of a
free public-school system, which shall have for its aim the preparation
of the young Cubans for self-government, whether exercised as part of a
Cuban republic or part of the greater republic the basis of which is
industrial freedom and the common school.
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTA CLARA.]
Manufacturing in Cuba is limited to a few industries in Havana, to the
manufacture of sugar and tobacco, and to machine-shops and small
foundries scattered over the Island for the convenience of the railway
companies, sugar-centrals, and harbours. The author visited all the
manufacturing plants in Havana, some of which were located in quarters
of the city reeking of filth and teeming with disease germs. There is
little hope for industrial enterprise in the broader sense until the
sanitary conditions have been improved in all the industrial centres of
the Island. The fear of that deadly enemy to all enterprise and thrift,
yellow fever, which lurks in the vicinity of the most flourishing
industries of Havana, makes it dangerous for those unacclimatised to
enter these occupations. The initiatory success of manufacturing in Cuba
must depend upon the importation of skilled labour from the United
States or Europe. With this invisible and deadly foe in the background,
ready to strike when least expected, and against which, as a Confederate
officer now in the United States Army at Havana said, "You cannot even
raise an old-fashioned rebel yell," the outlook is far from attractive.
Not only the commercial prosperity of Cuba, but to a considerable extent
that of the southern portion of the United States depends upon the
possibility of destroying the foci of yellow fever which exist in the
larger cities and towns--especially in Havana and Matanzas--and which
have been the cause of the epidemics of this disease which have occurred
in the United States during the present century. It is believed that to
destroy these germs is possible, and from a mere industrial and
commercial point of view it would be a paying investment to spend
several millions of dollars, if necessary, to effect it. Until this has
been accomplished, and the centres of industrial activity of Cuba made
safe for the influx of skilled artisans, whose advent alone will make it
possible for Cuba to diversify its industries and elevate the condition
of its labour, it will be vain to hope for the establishment of new
manufactures. The importance of sanitation is so great and the subject
of so much general interest to all those looking towards Cuba with the
idea of residence or investment there, that considerable space in this
volume will hereafter be devoted to a consideration of the subject.
The railway system of Cuba, consisting of seven companies, the aggregate
length of whose lines is only 1,467 kilometres, or 917 miles, is
entirely inadequate in bringing the extreme ends of the Island together;
Santiago and Havana in point of time being as far apart as San Francisco
and New York, though only separated by a distance of a few hundred
miles. The facts gathered on this subject and the maps presented
elsewhere point to the advisability of immediately constructing a trunk
railway from end to end of the Island, with branches extending north and
south to the important cities and ports. From whatever standpoint it may
be viewed, no one enterprise could do so much to improve the situation
on the Island. No revolution could have existed in Cuba if such a
railroad had been completed by the former Government, and nothing will
so rapidly tend to the revival of commercial and general business as the
facility for quick passage from one end of the Island to the other, and
from the trunk line over branches to the seaboard cities. All political
turbulence will be quieted thereby and prevented in the future. The
entire country will be open to commerce; lands now of practically no
value, and unproductive, will be worked; the seaport towns will become
active and commerce between the Island and the United States will soon
be restored to the former figures of approximately one hundred millions
of dollars per annum. Business enterprise, ever alert to conditions such
as herein described, has already surveyed the route, and there are
several projects on foot looking toward prompt action in this direction.
After a careful study of the situation, it would seem extremely doubtful
if such an enterprise could be made a commercial success for many years
to come, without material assistance from those responsible for the
industrial future of Cuba.
The questions arising in relation to navigation between Cuba and the
United States are delicate, and involve, as does the question of
discriminating duties in favour of the United States, in a greater or
less degree our international relations with other countries. Those
interested in American shipping suggest discrimination in favour of
American vessels between Cuba and the United States, and some go so far
as to indicate that a joint arrangement of the American and Cuban flags
would be a solution of the problem. Much of this is mere speculation. We
cannot discriminate in favour of American vessels in the trade between
Cuba and foreign countries, just as we cannot do so in the case of
American vessels in trade between New York and foreign countries, on
account of our commercial treaties. The chapter on this subject has been
submitted to Mr. Eugene T. Chamberlain, Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation of the Treasury Department, and this experienced and
efficient official has thrown considerable light on the subject which,
it is believed, will be of value to the commercial interests of both
Cuba and the United States.
These are some of the most important economic questions with which the
United States will be called upon to deal during its military occupancy
of Cuba. That we are capable of dealing with them intelligently and
satisfactorily can hardly be doubted. Questions of far greater magnitude
are continually presenting themselves at home, and as a rule the people
of the United States have been found equal to the task of adjustment. To
doubt our capacity as a nation to bring about complete pacification of
the Island, industrially and politically, is to throw a doubt on our
most cherished institutions and to cast a shadow on the Republic
itself.