Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was
produced from scanned images of public domain material
from the Google Print project.)
Every attempt has been made to replicate the original book as printed.
Some typographical errors have been corrected. No attempt has been
made to correct or normalize the printed accentuation or spelling of
Spanish names or words. (etext transcriber's note)
[Illustration: _Frontispiece._ ENTRANCE TO HAVANA HARBOUR.]
INDUSTRIAL CUBA
BEING A STUDY OF PRESENT COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS, WITH SUGGESTIONS
AS TO THE OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED IN THE
ISLAND FOR AMERICAN CAPITAL, ENTERPRISE,
AND LABOUR.
BY
ROBERT P. PORTER
SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA
AND PORTO RICO
WITH MAPS AND 62 ILLUSTRATIONS
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press
1899
COPYRIGHT, 1899
BY
ROBERT P. PORTER
Entered at Stationers' Hall, London
The Knickerbocker Press, New York
TO
WILLIAM McKINLEY
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
THIS BOOK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY
THE AUTHOR
INTRODUCTION
This volume deals with the living questions of Cuba--the questions which
confront the United States in the reconstruction of the Island. It aims
to give a description of Cuba as it appeared to the author when, as
Special Commissioner of the United States, he was sent by President
McKinley to report on its industrial, commercial, and financial
condition, soon after the signing of the protocol of peace, August 12,
1898. It is the result of nearly seven months' inquiry and hard work, in
which the Island has been visited three times, over five hundred
witnesses have been examined, and innumerable statements have been
studied and analysed. In the course of this inquiry the author has
visited all the provinces and nearly all the principal cities and towns.
The merit of the book lies in the freshness and originality of the
material brought together, and the demerit in the fact that it has been
written by one who was obliged to snatch a few hours at a time to map
out or write a chapter. The author realises the defects and asks the
indulgence of the reader on the ground that it is the first attempt to
discuss the economic and political future of Cuba under its new form of
government.
Whatever the future may have in store for this wonderful and unfortunate
Island, the author can truly say that the task allotted him by the
President has, so far as Cuba and the Cuban people are concerned, been
conscientiously and faithfully performed. The measures inaugurated for
the government of the Island, which were based upon the author's
reports, have been scrupulously framed in the interest of Cuba and not
with a view of benefiting by discrimination the United States. The
machinery of the new government has been set running in Cuba, and though
some time may elapse before it is working as smoothly as we would wish,
it has been inaugurated with the sole desire of doing the best possible
by Cuba. Of the rest, the reader must judge for himself. The subject at
least is interesting, even though its treatment here may be a little
statistical. The account of the visit to General Gomez was deemed
sufficiently interesting and important to give it in full, exactly as
the report was made through the Honourable Secretary of the Treasury,
Lyman J. Gage, to the President.
Recognition is due to Mr. W. J. Lampton for his assistance to the
writer.
R. P. P.
36 EAST SIXTY-FIFTH STREET,
NEW YORK.
_February 9, 1899._
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I.--CUBA--POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 1
II.--CONDITIONS WHICH CONFRONT US 14
III.--POLITICAL FUTURE OF CUBA 32
IV.--THE ENGLISH IN JAMAICA 47
V.--THE AMERICANS IN SANTIAGO 62
VI.--OUTLOOK IN CUBA FOR LABOUR 73
VII.--THE POPULATION OF CUBA 90
VIII.--SANITARY WORK IN CUBA 108
IX.--CITIES AND TOWNS OF CUBA 122
X.--HAVANA 139
XI.--COLONEL WARING'S SANITARY REPORT 154
XII.--MUNICIPAL PROBLEMS IN HAVANA 172
XIII.--BANKS AND CURRENCY 190
XIV.--PAYMENT OF INSURGENT SOLDIERS 204
XV.--THE REVENUE OF CUBA--CUSTOMS TARIFFS 211
XVI.--THE AMENDED TARIFF--OFFICIAL 221
XVII.--THE REVENUE OF CUBA--INTERNAL TAXES 248
XVIII.--HOW THE REVENUE WAS SPENT 256
XIX.--COMMERCE 267
XX.--SUGAR 281
XXI.--TOBACCO 302
XXII.--MINES AND MINING 318
XXIII.--AGRICULTURE AND STOCK 329
XXIV.--TIMBER AND FRUIT 338
XXV.--TRANSPORTATION 351
XXVI.--NAVIGATION 362
XXVII.--EDUCATION AND RELIGION 376
XXVIII.--A MEETING WITH GENERAL GOMEZ 390
XXIX.--CONCLUSION--THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 408
[Illustration: _Frontispiece._ ENTRANCE TO HAVANA HARBOUR.]
Illustrations
PAGE
ENTRANCE TO HAVANA HARBOUR Frontispiece
SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF PINAR DEL RIO 8
SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCES OF HAVANA AND MATANZAS 16
BATEY OF SANTA CATALINA 22
SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTA CLARA 28
SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF PUERTO PRINCIPE 38
SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA 44
ON THE ROAD TO CASTLETON, JAMAICA 50
CATHEDRAL STREET, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 66
From a photograph by J. F. Coonley, Nassau, N. P.
CANE CUTTERS 76
A COUNTRY VILLA 92
CUBAN "GUARACHERO" (MINSTREL) 96
A NATIVE HUT 100
From a photograph by J. F. Coonley, Nassau, N. P.
STREET VIEW, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 108
From a photograph by J. F. Coonley, Nassau, N. P.
WATERMAN IN THE COUNTRY 112
MARIANAO WATER VENDOR 116
SQUARE IN FRONT OF GOVERNOR'S PALACE AT SANTIAGO DE CUBA 122
A MULE TRAIN, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 124
From a photograph by J. F. Coonley, Nassau, N. P.
MATANZAS YUMURI RIVER AND ENTRANCE TO THE VALLEY 128
PANORAMA FROM THE ROAD TO THE CAVES, MATANZAS 132
THE PLAZA, CIENFUEGOS 136
HAVANA, FROM ACROSS THE BAY 146
THE PRADO, HAVANA 150
YARD OF AMERICAN CLUB, HAVANA 156
THE PRADO AND INDIAN STATUE, HAVANA 166
HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT, HAVANA 180
TACON MARKET, HAVANA 186
FIRE DEPARTMENT, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 196
MORRO CASTLE, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 206
PALM TREE BRIDGE 220
AVENUE OF PALM TREES, PALATINO 238
ROAD IN A PINE GROVE OF YUELTA ABAJO 252
A COCOANUT GROVE 262
A SUGAR-CANE TRAIN 272
SUGAR-CANE SCALES 276
CANE FIELDS 282
CUTTING SUGAR-CANE 286
UNLOADING CANE AT A BATEY 290
CYLINDERS FOR GRINDING SUGAR-CANE 294
APPARATUS FOR PACKING SUGAR AT THE SAN JOSE CENTRAL 298
PLANTING TOBACCO 302
TOBACCO FARM AND DWELLING 304
WETTING THE TOBACCO LEAF 308
TOBACCO-DRYING HOUSE 310
BALING TOBACCO 314
OLD COPPER MINES AT LA COPERA 318
MINING CAMP AT FIRENEZA 322
ORE BANK OF JURAGUA MINES 326
OX CART 332
A FOWL VENDOR 334
ROYAL PALMS, YUMURI VALLEY 336
SAGO PALM 338
MAHOGANY CARRIED BY OXEN 340
CUBAN FRUITS 344
COFFEE MILL, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 348
A CONVOY IN THE HILLS 352
A CUBAN VOLANTE 354
CUBAN MULE CART 358
A CURVE ON THE YAGUAJAY RAILROAD 360
THE HAVANA FLOATING DOCK 364
A CUBAN FERRY 368
PIER OF THE JURAGUA IRON CO., LTD. 372
OLD ARCH OF THE JESUIT COLLEGE, HAVANA 378
OLD CATHOLIC CHURCH AT LA COPERA 380
THE CATHEDRAL, HAVANA 384
THE CATHEDRAL, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 388
SPANISH FORT ON RAILROAD TO JURAGUA MINES 396
MAP OF CUBA 416
INDUSTRIAL CUBA
CHAPTER I
CUBA--POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
A nation, like an individual, must be gauged by its endowments, its
environment, its opportunities, and the various causes which from time
to time accelerate or retard its progress.
Cuba is richly endowed with natural resources, it is within a short
distance of the best and most profitable market in the world, and its
opportunities, under favourable conditions of trade, should have made
its population contented and prosperous. Had it not been for the
numerous causes which have retarded all progress in this Island, what
would have been its industrial, commercial, and social conditions at the
close of the present century?
Numbering over a million population fifty years ago, the Island of Cuba,
at the rate of growth common to the more prosperous countries of the
western hemisphere, ought to number at the present time between four and
a half and five millions of inhabitants. With this population, and a
government giving everyone the right to the fruits of his own labour,
Cuba's sugar crop alone would have been more than double the high-water
mark of the last prosperous year, exceeding two millions of tons, with a
value of one hundred millions of dollars.
Tobacco, coffee, tropical fruits, iron ore, other minerals of various
kinds, lumber, cattle, and innumerable other products which form the
commercial wealth of this marvellous Island, would have increased the
annual value of its products to figures ranging between two hundred and
two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, and thus more than doubled,
perhaps trebled, its commercial importance. Laws favourable to trade,
and a government interested in development of home industry would have
retained for Cuba a large proportion of this wealth, and there would
have sprung up an industrial system giving actual employment to as many
people in the gainful occupations as will be found in all Cuba when the
last Spanish soldier departs from the desolate and prostrate Island.
Cuba should have developed some diversified industries, if only those
branches of manufacture which are necessary to supply the requirements
of its own population. In its mineral resources it has the basis for the
manufacture of iron and steel and for the establishment of machine-shops
to supply home demands. In its untouched forests of excellent hardwood,
Cuba possesses the chief raw material for the manufacture of furniture
and other articles for which the Spanish race are justly famous. With
steel and wood for the first quality in abundance, and a water tonnage
of considerable magnitude, there should have sprung up, in many of the
unequalled harbours of the coast of Cuba, shipyards of no mean
dimensions. Without becoming a manufacturing country, except in sugar
and tobacco and a few other products in which Cuba excels, it might,
under favourable conditions, at this period of its industrial history
have been producing many articles of home consumption which, by reason
of the unhappy management of its affairs, it has been compelled to
purchase abroad. Not abroad in the open markets of the world, for that
is another story; but of Spain, because the most infamous discriminating
duties have shut Cuba out of the cheaper markets; and while thus gagged
and bound, the Island has been plundered and despoiled by the mother
country. In this manner have resources and revenue alike been drained
away and nothing left, either for home enterprise or improvement, nor
for reserve capital with which to do business.
Cuba should have established a central railway system running the length
of the Island from east to west, with branches extending on all sides,
like its rivers, to the many good towns and harbours on both north and
south coasts. Instead of this it has a little less than a thousand miles
of line, operated by seven timid companies, extending in various
directions, but leaving the two ends of the Island farther apart in
actual days of travel than are New York and San Francisco. The capital
city of Cuba, Havana, has within it the possibilities of a great and
beautiful city; the commercial and industrial city of a prosperous
country of five millions of people, and the winter health-resort for the
rich and fashionable families of all North America. Its public buildings
should have been of the best, its tropical parks and gardens the most
fascinating in the world, its streets and pavements the most
substantial, its healthfulness unquestioned, and its harbours and docks
thronged with shipping and resonant with commercial activity. The
merchants of Havana should rank among the richest and most prosperous in
the world, and the business, manufacturing, and social interests of the
place be equal to those of Boston or Baltimore or San Francisco. What
applies to Havana applies only in a lesser degree to the other cities of
Cuba, many of which are excellently located and should be important
industrial and commercial centres, with numerous fields for the modern
municipal enterprise which has done so much to improve the condition of
the urban population of Europe and of the United States. Last, though
not least, the Island should have been dotted over with the trinity of
civilisation--the home, the schoolhouse, and the church. It is the lack
of these three great elements of national strength and progress,
underlying Cuba's ills, that is the cause of much of its misfortune.
The building of the home, the establishment of the school, and the
tolerance of religious worship in half a century changed Texas from a
wilderness to a great and prosperous State, with the possibilities of an
empire. These same forces, had full play been given them in Cuba during
the same period, would have transformed that Island into all that has
herein been depicted. Its resources are abundant to maintain five and
even ten millions of persons, for only a small proportion of its area is
populated. The climate is healthful and the dangers to those
unacclimated which lurk in its seaport towns may all be controlled by
sanitary and engineering science. That these possibilities have not been
realised does not lie with Cuba itself, but is due to the numerous
causes which have retarded and stopped its development, and which have
finally, after years of strife and war, left the Island with population
depleted, agriculture prostrate, industry destroyed, and commerce
devastated.
It may be necessary for a clear view of the subject in hand to review
briefly the causes which have led to this unhappy end; but, happily, a
work dealing with the rehabilitation or industrial reconstruction of
Cuba does not require the author either to dwell long upon nor to
emphasise the gloomy side of the picture. The results of Spanish robbery
and misrule speak too plainly. The reader has seen what Cuba might have
been under an honest, stable government, or under the protecting ægis of
the United States. The picture presented is not exaggerated, but is
coloured by a moderate brush. What Cuba is, alas! is too well known to
American and English readers to call for more than a brief summary of
conditions as they existed when the author was requested by the
President of the United States to visit the Island, report upon its
industrial condition, and suggest plans for the relief of the population
and for the commercial and industrial reconstruction of the country.
Visiting the Island immediately after the signing of the protocol of the
cessation of hostilities between the United States and Spain, August 12,
1898, and again returning to Santiago in December after that province
had been in charge of the United States military authorities for nearly
six months, he had ample and satisfactory opportunity for the study of
conditions and future needs of the people. Surely the horrors and the
desolating hand of war were never laid more heavily upon a once
prosperous country. Nearly a third of the population wiped out by
battle, wholesale slaughter, starvation, exposure, or disease, and a
large proportion of those left enfeebled by deprivation and too weak to
take up their occupations; the cane-fields and tobacco plantations,
which formed the basis of prosperity, burned, and whole sections of
country swept of every vestige of civilisation; sugar-centrals, houses,
and structures of all kinds destroyed, and inhabitants either dead or
huddled half starved in miserable huts near the towns and cities; not a
living creature to be seen where once browsed innumerable cattle, and
death, destruction, and desolation spread throughout this land that
should, and under ordinary circumstances would, be as full of life and
prosperity as the richest agricultural section of our own country.
Nor were the cities and towns exempted. Trade and commerce at a
standstill; the few sickly manufacturing industries which at the best
struggled under the most adverse conditions closed, the ruined buildings
emphasising the scene of desolation. In Havana, the wharves and numerous
large warehouses were empty, or converted into rendezvous and hospitals
for Spanish troops. Hungry and discouraged, the native population stood
listlessly on the streets and in the public places. At each station the
railroad trains were boarded by half-starving women or children begging
for bread or coppers. The principal signs of life were exhibited by the
Spanish soldiers, who, with their blue cotton uniforms and Mauser
rifles, seemed to form the greater part of the population of the cities
and towns, while at the small country railroad stations the squads of
woe-begone soldiers alongside the blockhouses comprised the only living
relief to miles of waste. The Cuban railways, like all other implements
of industry in the unfortunate Island, show evidences of the conflict.
Stations burned, bridges destroyed, tracks torn up, freight-cars made
into portable blockhouses, locomotives blown to pieces, and
passenger-cars dilapidated and dingy. In short, a country more
systematically pillaged, more infamously deprived of its resources, more
wantonly plundered of its revenues, and a population more completely
deprived of its rights by those who had every reason to foster and
protect a valuable possession cannot be found recorded in ancient or
modern history. Cuba, as it was left at the close of this year by the
Spanish, who to the last moment seemed loth to leave the emaciated body
which their inordinate greed had thus reduced, presents a picture so sad
and sorrowful that, for the sake of our common humanity, it is better to
draw a curtain over the past and direct attention to the happier omens
which point to the possibilities of the future.
The work of industrial, commercial, and social reconstruction of Cuba
must date from the eventful day when the Stars and Stripes were unfurled
above Morro Castle. It is with this work that the present volume deals.
Whatever form the government of Cuba may take, the responsibility of the
commercial and industrial rehabilitation of the Island must rest with
the United States. The power that forced the Spanish to evacuate the
Island is the power which the world will hold responsible for the future
welfare of its people. The timid, the weak, and the craven-hearted who
contend that the United States has no responsibility, after it has
assumed all responsibility, are entitled to no voice in the disposition
of Cuba. The cost to the United States cannot be put in the balance
against the duty of the United States. The moral obligation, therefore,
toward Cuba and humanity must come first. The war was a war of humanity
and not of conquest. The same principle must guide those upon whose
shoulders will fall the more difficult task of restoring peace, forming
a stable government, and reviving commerce and industry. For the United
States to desert Cuba in its hour of greatest need would be more
inhuman than it would have been to have left it to Weyler and his policy
of extermination. The plain duty of the hour, so far as the United
States is concerned, and the best means of solving all political
questions which may arise in connection with the Island, is to begin at
once the work of economic or industrial reconstruction, postponing for
future discussion all political questions. To this end the mission
already referred to was projected. To this end a firm military
government, capable of keeping law and order, will be established. To
this end the attention of the people of Cuba should be at once directed
toward the economic questions upon which depend the progress and
prosperity of the population.
The destruction and disorganisation brought about by the war will make
the work of placing the Island in a favourable economic condition costly
and protracted, and many years must elapse before Cuba will take its
rightful place in the economies of the world. By this is meant the
position to which its resources and location entitle it. If it is true,
and I doubt it not, that the causes which have led to war, both in 1868
and in 1895, were more economic than political (and the greater
importance of economic over political questions in such a colony of
small and mixed population as Cuba is easy to understand), then Cuba
to-day is free. The Spanish Government would have more willingly granted
political freedom to Cuba had it not been for the well-grounded fear
that economic concessions would have necessarily followed. Those United
States officials who have been in Cuba since the signing of the protocol
of peace understand this fully. The United States Military
Commissioners, in their daily intercourse with Spanish officials, have
found no sentiment of resentment toward the United States. The regrets
have all been of a sordid character and may be summed up in loss of
revenue and commerce for Spain.
The war which has just been brought to an end really began in 1868.
Although between 1878 and 1895 there was some appearance of peace, the
real situation in Cuba during these seventeen years was one of silent
economic struggle with Spain. The meaning of the peace of Zanjon (1878)
was that Spaniards and Cubans were to be treated alike. The fact has
been, however, that the Cuban native population has been kept in a
condition similar to slavery. The means employed have been skilful and
full of cunning. Leaving to the Cubans complete liberty of discussion by
means of the press, the Government has felt itself powerful enough to
despise them, and when warned of the danger of a new revolution, always
considered impossible this last extremity. This feeling of absolute
confidence and reliance on the military power of Spain has constantly
been expressed in Madrid, both officially and privately, and also by the
Spanish party in Cuba. During the years 1878-1895, a political
organisation (the Autonomist party) was formed in opposition to the
obstinate Spanish party. It would be too tedious to go now into the
details of contemporary Cuban politics; it is enough to say that the
Spanish Government has been to the last moment strenuously opposed to
any plan of real autonomy, that is, to an autonomy that would grant
industrial freedom to Cuba. Even the laws of autonomy actually conceded
in 1897-1898, as a last and desperate resource against the revolution,
were not granted in good faith, as is well known to those who have
carefully watched the course of Cuban-Spanish politics. Therefore,
although the Cubans knew very well how superior to their own strength
was the Spanish power, and understood equally well how great and
numerous were the dangers of a new insurrection, nevertheless the
sufferings of the entire native population were such that the popular
sentiment became irresistible, and after a few fruitless outbreaks the
war was renewed in 1895.
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF PINAR DEL RIO.]
The long contest between Spain and Cuba has been finally decided by
American intervention, without which the war must have been protracted
until the Island was completely devastated and ruined; and even then
Spain would never have given it up. Not from patriotic motives, but
simply and solely because it yielded revenue to Spain's depleted
treasury, and gave her sons an opportunity for pillage and plunder. The
tenacity with which these officials have clung to the offices, and the
difficulty which the United States Commissioners encountered in
obtaining a relinquishment of the custom-houses, all point to the
cupidity of the Spanish, and show that they were in Cuba for revenue
exclusively.
Considering now the political aspect of Cuban affairs after the protocol
of August 12, 1898, it will be found that no well-defined scheme of
political organisation exists in Cuba, and that the only really popular
and, it may be said, unanimous feeling is that liberty, in all the
legitimate meanings of this word, is necessary. The actual situation may
be compared to an anarchy, for there is really no supreme authority. How
to discuss and establish any political laws in the midst of this
existing legal anarchy and complete lack of political experience, is the
question confronting the United States Government. This situation and
many other conditions that are the natural consequences of the last
events point out the necessity of forming provisionally a strong
government in Cuba, under the guidance and protection of the United
States. Under such protection the work of rebuilding the industries
destroyed, and of once more making productive the fields burned and the
plantations dismantled and devastated, can be carried on, and in no
other way.
With these general conditions in mind, it may be well to ascertain if
there exist any facts of a promising nature, which will contribute to
make easier the work the United States has undertaken. It is undoubtedly
true that the people of Cuba can be brought together on economic
questions, if not on those of a political character. The United States
has specifically disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island," except for "the
pacification thereof." If, therefore, the pacification can be more
easily and surely accomplished by giving Cuba industrial freedom,--the
right to buy in the most advantageous markets in the world, and sell
where the natural demands for its products exist,--the United States has
the right before all the world to carry out that programme. Spain never
granted this right to Cuba, not even in the alleged Autonomist
Government wrung from Madrid when war with the United States seemed
imminent and Spanish diplomacy was in the last ditch.
The signs and omens for crystallising public sentiment in the Island of
Cuba on all industrial questions are far more hopeful at the present
moment than are those which indicate the possibility of establishing a
stable government, and thus leaving the management and control of the
Island to its people. There is now no opposition nor rivalry of
different interests among the Cubans, as the strong and important
industries in Cuba, most of them agricultural, are of such a nature that
they may all thrive at the same time. Until now the condition has been
different, because the prosperity of all Cuban industries has been
thwarted and impeded by the protection and privileges which the Spanish
Government had to grant to the Peninsular industries, whose interests
(always in opposition to the legitimate wants of Cuba) have ever been
systematically preferred to those most vital in the Island. Another fact
is that the productive energy of Cuba and the fertility of its soil are
so great, and the real needs of the population so very small, that the
process of accumulating capital will become very rapid, after the worst
results of the late war are over and a settled and stable government has
been established. How far the natural resources of the country will
contribute to this result will soon be understood and appreciated.
Heretofore, the yearly increase of public wealth has been a very
doubtful quantity, and it has never been possible to build any hope on
that ground, because all industrial profits have been absorbed by Spain,
without leaving any surplus to provide for the accumulation of capital
and the material progress of the Island. The consequences of the
Spanish colonial system have been such that even before the present war
Cuba was already ruined. The 1895-1898 war has completed and aggravated
to the utmost degree the material ruin of the Island. The ultimate
result of this industrial thraldom has been the never-ending removal of
Cuban wealth to Spain, without any return. The means employed for
securing that object were numberless.
The irresponsible methods of governing Cuba converted the Island into a
powerful means of political influence in the hands of the Ministers. The
most difficult political questions, either personal or otherwise, were
usually decided at the expense of Cuba. Very often the single signature
of a Minister of the Colonies was sufficient to make the fortune of a
man for his whole life; and it is easy to understand that every
political party in Spain would be opposed to any reform that should
deprive it of such efficient means of influence and power. With very few
exceptions, all the Spanish officials in Cuba, from the lowest to the
highest, came from Spain. Their number was extraordinarily large, and
their work, as a general rule, pitifully bad; their constant aim being
to do as little work as possible, and to enrich themselves, at the cost
of Cuba, as quickly as they could. The fleet of the Spanish
transatlantic steamers was constantly employed in transferring
impecunious officials from Spain to Cuba, and taking them back again
with more or less wealth acquired during their residence in the Island,
and sometimes with pensions during their lives and the lives of their
widows and daughters. Even a share of the passage money of these
officials "both ways" was paid by Cuba.
Besides this salaried staff of officials, backed by the army and navy
(which were wholly paid by Cuba), Spain depended for the support of its
rule in Cuba on the so-called Spanish political party, known since 1878
as the "Union Constitutional." This party comprises the whole of the
Spanish population in Cuba, which is very numerous; and the blind and
unconditional support it gave to every measure of government, or of
misgovernment, whether the ruling party in Spain was liberal or
conservative, was paid for by the Government in many different ways, and
in such a degree that whatever might be the economic situation of Cuba,
the men belonging to the Spanish party had always the means of enriching
themselves. To these causes of impoverishment must be added the results
of the commercial policy of Spain; a subject which will receive
attention later in this volume. In vain the productive classes of Cuba
protested, during many years, against this deadly regime. It is no
wonder, therefore, that the insatiable ambition of Spain should have led
to such an antagonism of interests as to render a Cuban insurrection
necessary, there being no peaceful means of convincing Spain of its
folly. In the same measure as Cuba was reduced to utter bankruptcy and
poverty, the importation of Cuban wealth into Spain, without any return,
increased year after year. More particularly after the price of sugar
fell permanently (in 1884) to about one-half of its former value, and
after the complete abolition of slavery took place (in 1885), was the
contrast strikingly manifested between the gradual exhaustion of Cuba
and the ever-increasing exactions of the mother country. It may with
accuracy be said that after the slavery of the negroes came to an end,
Spain possessed the power of reducing to real slavery the whole native
Cuban population, both white and black.
For this systematic process of thorough draining, Prime Minister Canovas
invented the name or appellation of _realidad nacional_ (national
reality), meaning thereby that the necessity of maintaining the old
colonial system could not be avoided, as it had become interwoven with
the Spanish economics in such a degree as to make it impossible for any
Government, either conservative or liberal, to interfere with it. The
Cubans could not accept, without repeatedly protesting against it, the
oppressive system of the "national reality," for which name they
substituted, very properly and accurately, the denomination of
"economical slavery." It is now useless to explain in how many forms,
and how often, the Cubans have appealed to the Madrid Government,
especially since 1890. But all their efforts failed, and the necessary
outcome of those failures was war. Cuba, no more a European colony, will
henceforth be an entirely American country. It is now completely ruined
and devastated, and many years of peaceful industry will be necessary in
order to convert its unhappy people into a prosperous nation. How that
can best be accomplished is of far more importance to the people of Cuba
at this time than the question of who shall administer the government.
For the present, at least, if its people are wise, the Island will be
content with the industrial freedom which has been accorded to it, and
rejoice in the fact that it is an American country, and not a Spanish
dependency.