At the historic night session of the Second All-Russian Congress of the
Soviets the decree on peace was adopted. (The full text is printed in
the Appendix.) At that moment the Soviet government was only becoming
established in the important centers of the country and there was very
little confidence abroad in its power. The Soviet adopted the decree
unanimously. But this seemed to many no more than a political
demonstration. Those who were for a compromise preached at every
opportunity that our resolution would bring no results; for, on the one
hand, the German imperialists would not recognize and would not deal
with us; on the other hand, our Allies would declare war upon us as soon
as we should start negotiating a separate peace. Under the shadow of
these predictions we took our first steps to secure a general democratic
peace. The decree was adopted on the 26th of October, when Kerensky and
Krassnov were at the gates of Petrograd. On the 7th of November, we
addressed by wireless an invitation to our Allies and enemies to
conclude a general peace. In reply the Allied Governments addressed to
General Dukhonin, then commander-in-chief, through their military
attaches, a communication stating that further steps to separate peace
negotiations would lead to the gravest consequences. To this protest we
answered the 11th of November by appealing to all the workers, soldiers
and peasants. In this appeal we declared that under no circumstances
would we permit our army to shed its blood under the club of the foreign
bourgeoisie. We swept aside the threat of the Western imperialists and
took upon ourselves the responsibility for our peace policy before the
international working class. First of all, we published, in accordance
with our promises, made as a matter of principle, the secret treaties
and declared that we would relinquish everything in these treaties that
was against the interests of the masses of the people in all countries.
The capitalist governments made an attempt to make use of our
disclosures against one another, but the masses of the people understood
and recognized us. Not a single social patriotic publication, as far as
we know, dared to protest against having all the methods of diplomacy
radically changed by a government of peasants and workers; they dared
not protest against us for denouncing the dishonest cunning, chicanery
and cheating of the old diplomacy. We made it the task of our diplomacy
to enlighten the masses of the peoples, to open their eyes to the real
meaning of the policy of their governments, in order to weld them
together in a common struggle and a common hatred against the bourgeois
capitalist order. The German bourgeois press accused us of "dragging on"
the peace negotiations; but all nations anxiously followed the
discussions at Brest-Litovsk, and in this way we rendered, during the
two months and a half of peace negotiations, a service to the cause of
peace which was recognized even by the more honest of our enemies. The
question of peace was first put before the world in a shape which made
it impossible to side-track it any longer by machinations behind the
scenes. On the 22nd of November a truce was signed to discontinue
military activities on the entire front from the Baltic to the Black
Sea. Once more we requested our Allies to join us and to conduct
together with us the peace negotiations. There was no reply, though this
time the Allies did not again attempt to frighten us by threats. The
peace negotiations were started December 9th, a month and a half after
the peace decree was adopted. The accusations of the purchased press and
of the social-traitor press that we had made no attempt to agree with
our Allies on a common policy was therefore entirely false. For a month
and a half we kept our Allies informed about every step we made and
always called upon them to become a party to the peace negotiations. Our
conscience is clear before the peoples of France, Italy and Great
Britain.... We did all in our power to get all the belligerents to join
the peace negotiations. If we were compelled to start separate peace
negotiations, it was not because of any fault of ours, but because of
the Western imperialists, as well as those of the Russian parties, which
continued predicting the approaching destruction of the workmen's and
peasants' government of Russia and who persuaded the Allies not to pay
serious attention to our peace initiative. But be that as it may, on the
9th of December the peace conversations were started. Our delegation
made a statement of principles which set forth the basis of a general
democratic peace in the exact expressions of the decree of the 26th of
October (8th of November). The other side demanded that the session be
broken off, and the reopening of the sessions was later, at the
suggestion of Kuehlmann, repeatedly delayed. It was clear that the
delegation of the Teuton Allies experienced no small difficulty in the
formulation of its reply to our delegation. On the 25th of December this
reply was given. The diplomats of the Teuton Allies expressed agreement
with our democratic formula of peace without annexations and
indemnities, on the basis of self-determination of peoples. We saw
clearly that this was but pretense; but we had not expected even that
they would try to pretend; because, as the French writer has said,
hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. The fact that the
German imperialists found it necessary to make this tribute to the
principles of democracy, was, in our eyes, evidence that the situation
of affairs within Germany was serious enough.... But if we, generally
speaking, had no illusions concerning the love for democracy of Messrs.
Kuehlmann and Czernin--we know well enough the nature of the German and
Austro-Hungarian dominating classes--it must nevertheless be admitted
that we had not the slightest idea of the chasm which separated the real
intentions of German imperialism from those principles which were put
forth on the 25th of December by Mr. von Kuehlmann as a parody on the
Russian revolution--a chasm which was revealed so strikingly a few days
later. Such audacity we had never expected.
Kuehlmann's reply made a tremendous impression upon the working masses
of Russia. It was interpreted as a result of the fear felt by the
dominant classes of the Central Empires because of the discontent and
the growing impatience of the working masses of Germany. On the 28th of
December there took place in Petrograd a joint demonstration of workmen
and soldiers for a democratic peace. The next morning our delegation
came back from Brest-Litovsk and brought those brigand demands which Mr.
von Kuehlmann made to us in the name of the Central Empires as an
interpretation of his "democratic" formulae.
At the first glance it may seem incomprehensible why the German
diplomacy should have presented its democratic formulae if it intended
within two or three days to disclose its wolfish appetite. What was it
that the German diplomacy expected to bring about? At least, the
theoretic discussions which developed around the democratic formulae,
owing largely to the initiative of Kuehlmann himself, were not without
their danger. That the diplomacy of the Central Empires could not reap
many laurels in that way must have been clear beforehand to that
diplomacy itself. But the secret of the conduct of the diplomacy of
Kuehlmann consisted in that that gentleman was sincerely convinced of
our readiness to play a four-handed game with him. His way of reasoning
was approximately as follows: Russia needs peace. The Bolsheviki got the
power because of their struggle for peace. The Bolsheviki desire to
remain in power and this is possible for them only on condition that
peace is concluded. It is true that they bound themselves to a definite
democratic program of peace, but why do diplomats exist if not for the
purpose of making black look white? We Germans will make it easier for
the Bolsheviki by covering our plunders by democratic formulas. The
Bolshevist diplomacy will have plenty of reason not to dig for the
political essence of the matter, or, rather, not to expose to the entire
world the contents of the enticing formulae.... In other words,
Kuehlmann relied upon a silent agreement with us. He would return to us
our fine formulas and we should give him a chance to get provinces and
peoples for Germany without a protest. In the eyes of the German
workers, the annexations by force would thus receive the sanction of the
Russian Revolution. When during the discussions, we showed that with us,
it was not a matter of empty words or of camouflaging a conspiracy
concluded behind the scenes, but a matter of democratic principles for
the international life of the community of nations, Kuehlmann took it as
a willful and malicious breaking of the silent agreement. He would not
by any means recede from the position taken in the formulas of the 25th
of December. Relying upon his cunning, bureaucratic and judicial logic,
he tried in the face of the entire world to show that white is in no way
different from black, and it was our own perverseness which made us
insist that there was such a difference. Count Czernin, the
representative of Austria-Hungary, played a part in those negotiations
which no one would consider inspiring or satisfactory.
He was an awkward second and upon instructions from Kuehlmann took it
upon himself in all critical moments to utter the most extreme and
cynical declarations. General Hoffmann brought a refreshing note into
the negotiations. Showing no great sympathy for the diplomatic
constructions of Kuehlmann, the General several times put his soldierly
boot upon the table, around which a complicated judicial debate was
developing. We, on our part, did not doubt for a single minute that just
this boot of General Hoffmann was the only element of serious reality in
these negotiations. The important trump in the hands of Mr. Kuehlmann
was the participation in the negotiations of a delegation of the Kiev
Rada. For the Ukrainian middle classes, who had seized the power, the
most important factor seemed to be the "recognition" of their government
by the capitalist governments of Europe. At first the Rada placed itself
at the disposal of the Allied imperialists, received from them some
pocket money, and immediately thereupon sent their representatives to
Brest-Litovsk in order to make a bargain behind the back of the Russian
people with the government of Austria-Hungary for the recognition of the
legitimate birth of their government. They had hardly taken this first
step on the road to "international" existence, when the Kiev diplomacy
revealed the same narrow-mindedness and the same moral standards which
were always so characteristic of the petty politicians of the Balkan
Peninsula. Messrs. Kuehlmann and Czernin certainly had no illusions
concerning the solidity of the new participant in the negotiations. But
they thought, and correctly so, that the participation of the Kiev
delegation complicated the game not without advantage for themselves.
At its first appearance at Brest-Litovsk, the Kiev delegation
characterized Ukraine as a component part of the Russian Federated
Republic that was in progress of formation. This apparently embarrassed
the diplomats of the Central Empires, who considered it their main task
to convert the Russian Republic into a new Balkan Peninsula. At their
second appearance the delegates of the Rada declared, under dictation
from the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, that Ukraine refused to join the
Russian Federation and was becoming an entirely independent republic. In
order to give the reader an opportunity to get a better idea of the
situation which was thus created for the Soviet power in the last moment
of the peace negotiations, I think it best to reproduce here in its
basic parts the address made by the author of these lines in his
capacity as the People's Commissar on Foreign Affairs at the session of
the Central Executive Committee on the 14th of February, 1918.