In the meantime, the struggle for Soviet control spread all over the
country. In Moscow, especially, this struggle took on an extremely
protracted and bloody character. Perhaps not the least important cause
of this was the fact that the leaders of the revolt did not at once show
the necessary determination in attacking. In civil war, more than in any
other, victory can be insured only by a determined and persistent
course. There must be no vacillation. To engage in parleys is dangerous;
merely to mark time is suicidal. We are dealing here with the masses,
who have never held any power in their hands, who are therefore most
wanting in political self-confidence. Any hesitation at revolutionary
headquarters demoralizes them immediately. It is only when a
revolutionary party steadily and resolutely makes for its goal, that it
can help the toilers to overcome their century-old instincts of slavery
and lead them on to victory. And only by these means of aggressive
charges can victory be achieved with the smallest expenditure of energy
and the least number of sacrifices.
But the great difficulty is to acquire such firm and positive tactics.
The people's want of confidence in their own power and their lack of
political experience are naturally reflected in their leaders, who, in
their turn, find themselves subjected, besides, to the tremendous
pressure of bourgeois public opinion, from above.
The liberal bourgeoisie treated with contempt and indignation the mere
idea of the possibility of a working class government and gave free vent
to their feelings on the subject, in the innumerable organs at their
disposal. Close behind them trailed the intellectuals, who, with all
their professions of radicalism and all the socialistic coating of their
world-philosophy, are, in the depths of their hearts, completely steeped
in slavish worship of bourgeois strength and administrative ability. All
these "Socialistic" intellectuals hastily joined the Right and
considered the ever-increasing strength of the Soviet government as the
clear beginning of the end. After the representatives of the "liberal"
professions came the petty officials, the administrative
technicians--all those elements which materially and spiritually subsist
on the crumbs that fall from the bourgeois table. The opposition of
these elements was chiefly passive in character, especially after the
crushing of the cadet insurrection; but, nevertheless, it might still
seem formidable. We were being denied co-operation at every step. The
government officials would either leave the Ministry or refuse to work
while remaining in it. They would turn over neither the business of the
department nor its money accounts. The telephone operators refused to
connect us, while our messages were either held up or distorted in the
telegraph offices. We could not get translators, stenographers or even
copyists.
All this could not fail to create such an atmosphere as led various
elements in the higher ranks of our own party to doubt whether, in the
face of a boycott by bourgeois society, the toilers could manage to put
the machinery of government in working order and continue in power.
Opinions were voiced as to the necessity of coalition. Coalition with
whom? With the liberal bourgeoisie. But an attempt at coalition with
them had driven the revolution into a terrible morass. The revolt of the
25th of October was an act of self-preservation on the part of the
masses after the period of impotence and treason of the leaders of
coalition government. There remained for us only coalition in the ranks
of so-called revolutionary democracy, that is, coalition of all the
Soviet parties.
Such a coalition we did, in fact, propose from the very beginning--at
the session of the Second All-Russian Council of Soviets, on the 25th of
October. The Kerensky Government had been overthrown, and we suggested
that the Council of Soviets take the government into its own hands. But
the Right parties withdrew, slamming the door after them. And this was
the best thing they could have done. They represented an insignificant
section of the Council. They no longer had any following in the masses,
and those classes which still supported them out of mere inertia, were
coming over to our side more and more. Coalition with the Right
Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki could not broaden the social
basis of the Soviet government; and would, at the same time, introduce
into the composition of this government elements which were completely
disintegrated by political skepticism and idolatry of the liberal
bourgeoisie. The whole strength of the new government lay in the
radicalism of its program and the boldness of its actions. To tie itself
up with the Chernofi and Tseretelli factions would mean to bind the new
government hand and foot--to deprive it of freedom of action and thereby
forfeit the confidence of the masses in the shortest possible time.
Our nearest political neighbors to the Right were the so-called "Left
Social Revolutionists." They were, in general, quite ready to support
us, but endeavored, nevertheless, to form a coalition Socialist
government. The management of the railroad union (the so-called
vikzhal), the Central Committee of the Postal Telegraph employees, and
the Union of Government Officials were all against us. And in the higher
circles of our own party, voices were being raised as to the necessity
of reaching an understanding with these organizations, one way or
another. But on what basis? All the above-mentioned controlling
organizations of the old period had outlived their usefulness. They bore
approximately the same relation to the entire lower personnel as did the
old army committees to the masses of soldiers in the trenches. History
has created a big gulf between the higher classes and the lower.
Unprincipled combinations of these leaders of another day--leaders made
antiquated by the revolution--were doomed to inevitable failure. It was
necessary to depend wholly and confidently upon the masses in order,
jointly with them, to overcome the sabotage and the aristocratic
pretensions of the upper classes.
We left it to the Left Social-Revolutionists to continue the hopeless
efforts for coalition. Our policy was, on the contrary, to line up the
toiling lower classes against the representatives of organizations which
supported the Kerensky regime. This uncompromising policy caused
considerable friction and even division in the upper circles of our
party. In the Central Executive Committee, the Left Social
Revolutionists protested against the severity of our measures and
insisted upon the necessity for compromises. They met with support on
the part of some of the Bolsheviki. Three People's Commissaries gave up
their portfolios and left the government. A few other party leaders
sided with them in principle. This created a very deep impression in
intellectual and bourgeois circles. If the Bolsheviki could not be
defeated by the cadets and Krassnov's Cossacks, thought they, it is
quite clear that the Soviet government must now perish as a result of
internal dissension. However, the masses never noticed this dissension
at all. They unanimously supported the Soviet of People's Commissaries,
not only against counter-revolutionary instigators and sabotagers but
also against the coalitionists and the skeptics.