PRIVATEERS, PIRATES, AND SLAVERS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
When seen in its true light, one of the most curious and interesting
chapters in the history of the American merchant marine is that relating
to the men who, having the might, used it to take from those who were
weaker not only property but liberty and life; but the reader who supposes
that superior ability, natural or acquired, gives him the _right_ to take
more of the good things of life than his less-favored neighbor receives,
will scarcely comprehend the facts.
The fighting done by the American merchantmen who were commissioned as
privateers during the War of 1812 has been well described by our histories
of the navy, but the story of one battle is worth recalling briefly
because it may well stand in some respects for the story of the entire
fleet. On March 26, 1815, the privateer schooner _General Armstrong_,
Captain Samuel Chester Reid, anchored in Fayal Roads, in the Azores.
As night came on, a British squadron, bound for New Orleans, came into
the roads, and on seeing the _Armstrong_, sent four boats full of men
to capture her. A well-directed broadside from the privateer sent them
in haste back to their ships, but a little after midnight the enemy
came again in twelve boats, carrying more than 400 men. Each boat was
armed with a cannon. The _Armstrong_ had 90 men, and she mounted a long
24-pounder on a pivot with four 9-pounders in each broadside.
When the flotilla came within point-blank range, Captain Reid opened a
fire that would have beaten back any other civilized enemy, but this
veteran host pulled steadily in until the boats were alongside from
stem to stern, and then they rose up, as one man, and strove to board
the low-lying schooner. But with sword and pike and battle-axe the
privateersmen fought not only for life but to avenge the wrongs that had
been suffered by American seamen at the hands of press-gangs, and even
British valor could not face them. One of the defeated wrote that the
"Americans fought more like blood-thirsty savages than anything else."
We may believe that they were thrilled with the joy of battle, and if
a modern, peace-loving American is ever permitted to envy any of his
countrymen who have had part in any battle described in the histories of
the nation, the men of the _General Armstrong_ will come to his mind first
of all. But a liner, a frigate, and a brig were at hand to back the boats,
and at last Reid had to burn his ship.
The gallant fight and the ultimate loss stand for much good fighting
without profit in the work of our private armed ships during the War
of 1812. Our histories, almost without exception, have overstated the
success of the privateers and their influence upon the course of the
war. A few of these ships--a very few--made enormous profits; the others
made insignificant gains or actual losses. Our histories laud the work of
the few that really succeeded; they ignore all that failed, save only as
the reader is left to infer that all, or nearly all, did well. Thus the
fact that the _Rossie_, of Baltimore, Captain Joshua Barney, in a single
cruise, captured vessels supposed to be worth more than $1,500,000 is
told in every history; the equally well-authenticated fact that Barney's
share of the plunder amounted to only $1000 (see Mary Barney's _Memoir_),
because the much-vaunted prizes were either destroyed at sea, or were sold
for little or nothing in port,--this fact is deliberately omitted.
In the matter of net gains the _Rossie_ stands as a type of the successful
privateers, with a few exceptions. On November 23, 1812, less than six
months after war was declared, and while the successful privateers were
securing the best of their prizes, the privateer owners of Boston, New
York, and Norfolk united in a petition to Congress, begging help through
legislation because captured goods sold for such low prices that no profit
was made by even the successful privateers. The captured ships, it was
said, could not be sold at any price, even when fit for use as privateers.
In short, "the profits of private naval warfare are by no means equivalent
to the hazard." (Rep. Com. Ways and Means, December 12, p. 3.)
In Guernsey's _New York City During the War of 1812_ is a list of the
privateers sailing from that city--120 in all. Of these, 57 took not one
prize. It is to be presumed that 21 of them made some money, because they
took at least 5 prizes, while 7 took at least 15, and it may be supposed
that they did well. But when it is remembered that in those days a ship
commonly paid for herself in one voyage in ordinary trade, it cannot be
said that privateering was of any special benefit except to three or four
that took many prizes.
The total number of merchant ships that were used for privateers during
this war was 515, and the total number of prizes was 1345. The British
admiralty reported the capture of 1328 American merchantmen, of which 228
were privateers. The unrecorded disasters to privateers through storms
certainly brought the number of total losses of these vessels up to a
half of all that were commissioned. It is notable, too, that the number
of American merchantmen captured by the enemy was only thirteen less
than the number taken from the enemy, and it follows that the American
losses were greater, in this respect, than those of the British; for the
American ships were, on the average, worth much more than the British. On
the whole it appears that, if the predatory part of the War of 1812 had
any influence upon the result, the Americans were the greater losers.
Then, too, the losses of property were only one part of the injury
inflicted upon the country by this kind of war. A consideration of the
effect of the prevailing greed for a "subject of safe and uncontested
capture" is of special interest here because some of the owners of our
privateers, influenced solely by this greed, became pirates after the war
ended. The Spanish colonists in America had revolted, beginning in 1810.
The insurgent armies were scattered in small bands, here and there, in
the vast territory between Texas and the Rio de la Plata, and the leader
of every band was a law unto himself. But in every revolted province some
aggregation of patriots--some _junta_--was recognized by foreign powers as
enough of a government to be entitled to belligerent rights. When the War
of 1812 came to an end, the privateers that were loath to give up their
predatory career looked away to the Spanish main. The insurgent leaders
were competent to commission armed cruisers for war upon Spanish commerce,
and rich Spanish ships were afloat.
Some of the work done by American ships sailing under Spanish-American
commissions is memorable. Two that were owned in Baltimore brought to
Norfolk, in March, 1817, coin and cochineal valued at $290,000, and there
is reason to suppose that Captain James Chaytor, who was senior officer of
the two, and one of the best known of the men so engaged, brought to port
property worth half a million of dollars in the course of that year. One
of Chaytor's prizes was a galleon from the Philippines, and it was taken
within sight of Cadiz.
Captain Joseph Almeda, of Baltimore, was another noted commander of this
class of cruisers. In a vessel named the _Congress_ he blockaded the port
of Havana for weeks at a stretch, and took prizes almost within range of
the Morro.
For a time the American people applauded the success of these cruisers,
because it was supposed that they were aiding struggling patriots to gain
liberty. The story of one of the cruisers, as told in court, however,
in time changed public opinion. Captain James Barnes, commanding a
Baltimore cruiser named the _Puerrydon_, with a commission from Buenos
Ayres, captured on March 21, 1818, the Spanish brig _Corrunes_, while
she was carrying general merchandise from Tarragona, Spain, to Vera Cruz,
Mexico. A prize crew of seven men was placed upon the prize, and five of
her Spanish crew were left on board to help work ship. On May 8 a storm
separated the two vessels, whereupon the foremast hands upon the prize
mutinied, put their officers upon a passing merchantman, and then went
cruising along the coast of the United States. They were not bound for any
particular port; they were just enjoying life while they might. Eventually
they ran ashore on Block Island, and when the inhabitants came to the
beach to look at the stranded brig, the mutineers began trading the cargo
of the vessel for fresh provisions, and later for coin. The islanders made
such good bargains that they sent for friends in Newport to come over and
share in the good fortune, but that was an error of judgment, because the
revenue officers thereby learned about the trading, and brig, crew, and
some of the traders were haled before the United States court.
The trials that followed were among the most remarkable ever reported in
the annals of the Supreme Court. Although held in jail on the charge of
piracy, the crew libelled the vessel on the ground that they had rescued
her from Barnes, whom they denounced as a pirate. Captain Barnes and the
other owners sued for the property on the ground that Barnes had captured
it while he was a citizen of Buenos Ayres, and in command of a lawful
Buenos Ayres cruiser. A Spanish consul sued for it in behalf of the
original owners. In the court of last resort it was held, in spite of much
perjury, that the naturalization of Barnes in Buenos Ayres was "altogether
in fraud of the laws of his own country," and that the owners of the
cruiser were asking for the possession of a vessel that they had captured
"in violation of the most solemn stipulation of a treaty, and provision
of a law of their own country, and of which they had been dispossessed by
their own associates in guilt."
"It is a melancholy truth," continued the court, "too well known to this
court, that the instruments used in these predatory voyages, carried
on under the colors of the South American states, are among the most
abandoned and profligate of men."
Under the treaty mentioned, these American-owned cruisers were pirates.
How many cruisers of the kind were fitted out from American ports (there
were some European ships in the business also) cannot be learned now, but
a list of twenty-eight is printed in the Annals of the Fifteenth Congress.
The list is incomplete. Most of them were owned in Baltimore, and in 1823
the Columbia, South Carolina, _Telescope_ denounced that city as "the home
port of a fleet of Spanish-American pirates." In reply to this, _Niles's
Register_, dated May 24, 1823, said:--
"Perhaps it may afford the editor of the _Telescope_ some satisfaction
to learn that _every_ person who was fully regarded as being engaged in
whatever could have given rise to his censure for piracy has become a
bankrupt as well in character as in property."
It is to be noted, further, that these cruisers were not pirates merely
by the existence of a treaty with Spain. They captured the ships of all
nations when it could be done safely, and sometimes they did this openly.
When Almeda was blockading Havana, he seized a British vessel at the mouth
of the harbor because she happened to have some Spanish property on board.
But the most deplorable cases were those in which the ships were seized by
cruisers that had been unlucky. For in such cases the prizes were robbed
and then sunk with all hands.
Still another result of the work of these pirates was the establishment of
two remarkable communities, one in Texas and the other in Florida, both
of which territories were then under the Spanish crown. Both settlements
were made to provide a market for the goods which these cruisers captured;
for after the decision of the courts noted above, the prizes could be no
longer sent to the United States.
The Texas community was established by Jean Lafitte, who had had much
experience as a smuggler at Barataria Bay, Louisiana, both before and
during the War of 1812. He had also made several cruises on pirate
ships--enough to learn that more money could be made buying prizes from
the cruisers than in cruising.
Lafitte went to the island where the thriving city of Galveston now
stands, late in 1816, and found there a number of shanties which had been
built by one Luis de Aury, a pirate who had intended to establish such
a nautical "fence" as Lafitte had in mind. But Aury thought the distance
from the United States too great, and left the place to Lafitte, who at
once sent word to all the ports of the warm seas that he was at the head
of "an asylum to the armed vessels of the party of independence." The
asylum included facilities for repairing vessels, stores for the sale of
supplies, and numerous taverns and other places of resort for the crews.
In short, a town--seaport--was built there by capitalists and mechanics,
but all paid tribute to Lafitte. As at Barataria, slave-ships were more
highly prized than any others because of the ease with which the "goods"
could be smuggled into the United States. When General James Long, a noted
Texas filibuster, visited the settlement, he found that "doubloons were
as plentiful as biscuit," while the harbor was strewn with the wrecks of
prizes.
After a time Lafitte went through with the forms of organizing the
"Republic of Texas," and elected a governor, who appointed a justice
to preside over the court of admiralty that the constitution of the
"Republic" had provided. Then cruisers were commissioned and prizes were
condemned, but when these condemned prizes were sent to New Orleans, they
were seized by the United States authorities, and some of the pirate
crews were hanged. Nevertheless, it was not until 1821--after nearly
five years of unmolested prosperity--that Lafitte was driven away, and
even then he was allowed to carry away all of his portable plunder.
To add to the interest of the story, when Lafitte left the island he
disappeared forever. Rumor said he was seen in Mexico, and in the thick
of a fight at sea, and in France, but the truth is that he had gone to
the port of missing ships. When the Luis de Aury mentioned above left
Galveston Island, he cruised around for a while, and then, on September
2, 1817, landed on Amelia Island, Florida, where Fernandina now stands.
A Scotch adventurer named MacGregor had been trying to build a town
there and organize the "Republic of the Two Floridas," but without
success. He sailed away when Aury came, and Aury continued the work of
nation-building, combined with smuggling goods captured by "the party
of independence." He thought the location admirable because of the
proximity to the United States, but he soon learned that the convenience
due to distance was more than counterbalanced by the attention attracted.
Many speculators came to the camp and bought his goods, but the customs
officials pressed them closely. Moreover, while Aury supplied the planters
with cheap slaves, he was so short-sighted as to encourage Georgia slaves
to leave their masters to join his forces. The Georgia planters who
suffered losses in this way had no difficulty in persuading the Washington
authorities to invade Spanish Florida and drive the pirate away--December
23, 1817. But Aury, like Lafitte, was allowed to carry away his plunder.
The effect of the piracies upon American commerce can be traced in the
annual reports of exports and imports. Thus the exports of American
products to the Spanish West Indies amounted to $3,606,588 in the fiscal
year 1816-1817, while American exports of foreign goods to the same ports
reached the sum of $3,477,511. The corresponding figures for 1819-1820
were $3,439,365 of American products and $2,545,717 of American exports
of foreign goods. American tonnage fell off, also, of course. The common
saying that there is no friendship in business is untrue. American
commerce and the use of American ships were increasing in that period at
an astonishing rate in all other trades, but Spanish resentment produced
a "boycott" that is shown by the official returns.
But this boycott was the mildest form of expression of Spanish resentment.
Within a short time after the American-owned cruisers under the
Spanish-American flags began ravaging Spanish commerce, the Spaniards
retaliated by making reprisals after the fashion common in the sixteenth
century. Encouraged by the island authorities, the ship-owners of Cuba
fitted out armed vessels to prey upon American commerce. The Cuban
pirates were in no case commissioned, but the Porto Rico authorities
gave commissions to half a dozen or more. The Cuban pirates, however,
worked openly. Regla, a village on the east side of Havana Bay, was the
chief pirate port. In November, 1821, eleven Spanish pirate vessels were
cruising between Cape Maisi and Santiago, five were working as a squadron
at Cape San Antonio, and at least five more were cruising on the north
coast east of Matanzas. Between Havana and Matanzas was a flotilla of
small boats the crews of which kept constant watch for vessels becalmed in
the offing. All such vessels were attacked as soon as night came. Another
gang of small-boat pirates operated at Cape Cruz, where they lived in the
caves for which the region is noted.
The extent of the depredations of these pirates was never completely
known, of course, but in _Niles's Register_ of May 24, 1823, it is stated
that 3002 piratical assaults had been committed upon merchant ships in
the West Indies since the War of 1812. The "Naval Affairs" volumes of
the American State Papers contain many accounts of such assaults, and it
appears from these that the pirates not infrequently tortured captured
sailors. In March, 1823, the captain and two men of the brig _Alert_, of
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, were killed in the mouth of Havana harbor. The
captain of the brig _Bellisaurius_, captured near Cape San Antonio, had
his arms cut off, after which he was placed on a bed of oakum and burned
to death.
The markets of Cuba were frequently flooded with merchandise taken by the
pirates, and a number of schooners plied between Cape San Antonio and
Regla to carry supplies to the pirate flotilla at work there and bring
back captured goods.
The efforts of the Washington authorities to deal with the situation
created by the American-owned pirate ships were, as noted, hampered at
first by public sympathy for the Spanish-American insurgents. Even after
the Spaniards began making reprisals, nothing effective was done until
May 15, 1820, when Congress provided for the building of five swift war
schooners, a force that was by no means sufficient to cope with the evil.
Other ships of the navy were ordered to the region, and these were still
further reënforced with a flotilla of small schooners bought in Chesapeake
Bay. A number of huge rowboats were built to destroy the pirates operating
in small boats near Havana, but the depredations continued; the aid of the
Cuban authorities was sufficient to keep the pirates at work. It was not
until the independence of the Spanish-American republics was acknowledged,
and the Spanish-American privateers thereby lost their commissions, that
piracy came to an end in the West Indies.
The last American vessel to suffer at their hands was the _Mexico_,
Captain John G. Butman, of Salem. She sailed from home with $20,000
in coin, for Rio Janeiro, on August 29, 1832. On September 20 she was
captured by the schooner _Panda_, Captain Pedro Gibert, of Havana. After
taking out the coin, Gibert fastened the crew in the forecastle and set
the _Mexico_ on fire; but the crew released themselves in time to put out
the fire. The _Panda_ was captured later on the coast of Africa, a number
of the pirates were sent to Salem for trial, and Pedro Gibert and four
others were hanged. It is an interesting fact that two members of the
_Mexico's_ crew lived until 1905 and one until 1908. Life at sea agreed
well with the New Englanders.
As the facts thus far given show plainly, the slave-trade had intimate
relations with the pirates who operated under the Spanish-American flags,
and later with those fitted out from Cuba; for the _Panda_ cleared out
from Havana for a cargo of slaves. But she carried no trade goods; her
clearance for the African coast was merely a cover for the real purpose in
view. Still, she might have brought a cargo of slaves to Cuba but for the
interference of a British war-ship. But the American slave-trade lasted
for thirty years after the captain of the _Panda_ was hanged, and such
acts of piracy as his had long been out of fashion in American waters.
By the act of Congress dated March 2, 1807 (it passed the House by a
vote of sixty-three to forty-nine), the importations of slaves into the
United States after January 1, 1808, was forbidden. The penalties provided
included forfeiture of the vessel, and fines, together with imprisonment,
for those involved.
As this legislation had been provided for in the Constitution of the
nation, the trade in slaves was naturally brisk in the years immediately
preceding prohibition. Thus, from January 1, 1804, to December 31,
1807, 202 ships imported 39,075 slaves into the port of Charleston,
South Carolina. Of these ships, 61 were registered at Charleston (though
generally owned elsewhere), 59 were owned in Rhode Island, from 1 to 4
in each of several other American ports, and 70 in England. While the
prospect of prohibition increased the importations at this time beyond
the normal, it is evident that a strong demand for slaves existed among
slave-owners. The demand was particularly strong in the Mississippi
Valley, where the profits on cotton were enormous. This demand naturally
raised the price as soon as lawful importations came to an end. At
the same time the existence of the American prohibitory law (England
prohibited the trade at about the same time, too) depressed the price on
the coast of Africa. Thus a premium was placed on smuggling, and 202 ships
were afloat that had been engaged in the trade to one port alone.
All this is to say that while the law drove many ships out of the trade,
it added much to the profits of those that remained in it.
Because the trade was continued, an effort was made to strengthen the law
in 1818 by increasing the emoluments of informers. Then, by the Act of
March 3, 1819, Congress authorized the President to use the naval ships to
intercept slavers, and finally by the Act of May 15, 1820, all Americans
engaging in the trade were declared pirates, who should be hanged on
conviction.
One would be glad to believe that these laws were enacted because the
American people had become sufficiently enlightened to appreciate the
effects of the trade upon the human race, and especially upon the white
people connected with it, but it is impossible to do so. The laws were
enacted because of a passing wave of sentiment that had its origin in
the work of the pirates herein described. In a dim way people saw that a
connection existed between some of the pirates and the slave-trade. The
slave-trade was held responsible (properly, too) for some of the horrors
of the piracies, and while Congress was legislating against the pirates,
it was easy to get acts against the trade passed. Moreover, the desire of
the slave-owners to rid their States of free negroes was just then giving
strength to the movement for sending those negroes to Africa--Liberia. In
short, the prohibitory laws were the result of a sort of hysteria rather
than of any real enlightenment of the American people. In truth, we are
not so enlightened even now as to appreciate our whole duty toward the
inferior race--properly a race of children--we brought from Africa.
As said, prohibiting the trade did but increase the profits of those who
disregarded the law, but a more memorable result of prohibition was the
effect upon the unfortunate victims of the trade--the increase in the
horrors of the middle passage. A brief description of the ships used in
the trade will help one to understand how the slaves were affected.
The American slave-ships were usually small vessels, say 100 feet or
so long, and 10 or 12 deep. On the way to the coast what was called the
slave-deck was laid. By means of beams, stanchions, and rough planks a
temporary deck was built 3 feet below the regular deck. The naked slaves
were placed upon this deck. In the days of the lawful trade they were
compelled to lie down on their backs, shoulder to shoulder, with heads
outboard in a row all around the slave-deck. Then other rows of the kind
were made on the deck inside of the first row until the deck was entirely
covered. When the law prohibited the trade, the slavers increased the
number carried to the utmost capacity of their vessels, in order to
increase the profits and cover the risks. To do this they compelled the
negroes to lie down on their sides breast to back,--"spoon fashion,"--or
else they were made to sit in rows, breast to back, from the wall of the
ship to the centre. When sitting thus, the only air-space between the two
decks was that over the rows of shoulders and between the rows of heads.
When lying down, the air-space was greater, but whenever the vessel heeled
to the wind, those on the lee side had to lie with their feet higher than
their heads, and when the vessel rolled to the waves all of them sawed
to and fro over the cracks between the unplaned deck boards. Moreover,
the slaves were kept fastened to the deck--they were not allowed to leave
their cramped berths for any purpose save only at fixed hours, when they
were fed and, in small gangs, were taken to the upper deck for a short
airing. In storms the washing of the waves across the deck compelled
the crew to put on the hatches and keep them on sometimes for days at a
stretch.
Meantime the allowance of water was a pint a day. In short, the slave-ship
was a horrible floating cesspool. How the inhuman drivers added to the
sufferings of the wretched slaves by the use of the whip, and other means
of torture, may be suggested by one story.
When the slaver _Brillante_, Captain Homans, with 600 slaves in her hold,
was overhauled by British cruisers during a calm, and Homans saw that the
boats of the cruisers would soon come to the vessel, he got the anchor in
position as if for anchoring the vessel. Then the iron cable was stretched
along the rail outside of all and held in place by slender cords. To this
chain all the slaves were carefully secured by means of ropes and chains.
Then, just before the cruisers' boats came into view (it was at night),
the anchor was cast loose and the 600 slaves were dragged down to the
bottom of the sea.
To save a vessel worth at most $5000 from confiscation, Homans murdered
600 negroes. The story is told in detail in the _African Repository_, Vol.
XXIII, p. 371.
The profits in the trade are shown by the fact that slaves costing from
$12 to $20 on the coast of Africa sold for $350, when delivered alive and
able to walk, in Cuba. When smuggled into the United States, they sold
all the way from $750 to $1000.
Old ships of known speed were in demand. Speed was necessary because
the British government maintained cruisers on the coast that captured
and confiscated vessels found with slaves actually on board. Our navy
department sold the schooner _Enterprise_ (the second of the name) to men
in the slave-trade at a small fraction of her value. The swift privateers
of the War of 1812 were also bought for the purpose. In later years it
was the custom to build swift vessels especially for the trade. Baltimore
and New York builders were patronized more than others, New York having
the lead in later years. The builders always knew what trade the vessels
were to enter, and charged accordingly. No builder ever lost standing
in society because he turned out ships for this purpose. In fact, the
slave-traders were well known, and they lived among the wealthiest society
people of New York--at the Astor House, for instance, where they were
in the habit of meeting to arrange the details of their voyages. Public
documents show that the most respected merchants of the city were ready to
go on the bonds of these slavers, when bonds were required. A New Bedford
whale-ship owner who was convicted of fitting out one of his vessels for
the trade was afterward elected mayor of his city. Even after the Civil
War was begun, a United States district attorney--a man appointed by
Lincoln--was seen dining at the leading New York restaurant with a slaver
whom he should have been prosecuting at that moment; for while the two ate
together, the slaver talked about a slave voyage that he intended to make.
Though American packets had for years controlled the trade between the
United States and Europe, and the American clippers were making records
that stirred the whole nautical world, the flag from those proud ships was
used to cover the reeking slime in the slaver's hold, and it was the only
flag that could protect the slaver from inspection on the African coast.
These facts were well known, but they roused not a tremor of indignation
among the American people, not one, save only in the breasts of a few
"fanatics," and the arguments of the fanatics were answered by asking,
"How would you like to have your sister marry a nigger?"
The story might well be forgotten--it would have been omitted here but
for the fact that the humiliation of it may serve in righting wrongs
as yet unheeded, or but partly heeded, which, if less brutal, are born
of the same greed and the same disregard for human rights that made the
slave-trade possible in the United States until after the middle of the
nineteenth century.