THE BRITISH AGGRESSIONS
BEFORE considering the aggressions of the British government upon our
shipping during the period between the Revolution and the War of 1812, it
seems still more necessary than it was in the case of the French to try
to get the point of view of the aggressor. The men who governed England
were placed in power not only to guard but to promote English interests
against those of all other nations. Patriotism and natural ambition
inspired them to do this as fully as possible. The welfare of the nation
being in their charge, it was their duty to consider first of all entire
safety from invasion, as everybody believed then, and believes now, that
safety depended upon the supremacy of the nation upon the high seas. To
maintain that supremacy every Briton felt obliged to make every needed
sacrifice. Small wonder, then, that in maintaining that supremacy the
rulers of England should have felt obliged to hamper all possible rivals
for that supremacy. The state of public mind at the end of a century
wherein England had been at war four years for every three of peace
demanded that the British supremacy at sea be maintained at _any_ cost;
and the morality of the world has not even yet reached a condition where
an English patriot can feel sentiments differing greatly from those of
the end of the eighteenth century.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, civilized nations acknowledge
certain rules of national conduct called international law, but at the end
of the eighteenth nothing of the kind had any real weight in regulating
international affairs. Men quoted Vattel in their correspondence, but
the one recognized rule contained three words only, "Might makes right."
Practical, not altruistic, considerations controlled all negotiations,
_and no nation had, or could expect to maintain, any "right" which it was
unwilling to support by force_. It was the duty of neutral powers to build
ships of the line, or meekly suffer the consequences. The facts of history
support no statement more fully than this, that American shipping suffered
from spoliations, between 1783 and 1812, solely because they begged,
instead of fighting, for that freedom of the sea which they claimed as a
natural right.
As an introduction to the story of the British aggressions, here are
a few extracts from letters written by one Phineas Bond, a native-born
American who served England as consul at Philadelphia, beginning in 1787.
The letters were written either to the British Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, or to one of the under secretaries. (See _An. Rep. Am.
Hist. Asso._, 1894.)
On February 21, 1787, in referring to an act of Parliament relating to
the registry of English ships, Bond said that "if properly pointed it must
inevitably cramp the remnant of commerce now enjoyed by this country." He
is confident that the "alarm and perplexity" which the act occasioned in
America, prove that it will be beneficial to British shipping.
On May 17 Bond said that the American ships from China were bringing home
more goods than the country could use, and that the surplus was shipped
to Europe, where it would undersell the goods of the British East India
Company. By the use of bribes (he speaks plainly of bribing officials),
he obtained copies of the manifests of all American ships from China, and
forwarded them to England. Then on July 2 he wrote:--
"This country is so restricted by the regulations of trade of other
nations ... and so weak are the resources of the merchants _here_, that
if an early check or restraint can be thrown in their way, either by
thwarting their credit or by withholding the articles suitable to their
commerce, they would never rally; and then, my Lord, they would be
confined to their coasting trade and to illicit communication with the
Spaniards: These come in a secret manner into the ports of America and
bring specie to a large amount ... the amount of specie is enormous ... at
least 500,000 dollars were brought into this port last year." To take away
this trade with the Spaniards Bond advised the "establishing of a free
port in the Bahamas ... from which the Spaniards could draw the supplies
they want."
In a letter dated September 29 Bond took a look ahead: "The rumor of war
has inspired the Americans with new spirits: they anticipate the benefits
of a free trade, and already calculate upon the profits of being the
carriers to all the belligerent powers."
In a letter dated November 20 Bond tells "of two persons, natives of
England who with great resolution and no small personal risque purchased
here and reshipped to Liverpool three machines for spinning cotton and a
machine for carding cotton for spinning." The machines had been brought
from Liverpool "clandestinely ... packed in queensware crates." They were
bought by the "natives of England" and reshipped to Liverpool in order
to hinder the establishment of a cotton-spinning industry in the United
States.
Bond said he did not "apprehend" that any such factories would be
"speedily brought to a state of Rivalship with those of Gt. Britain,"
but it was "fit to guard against an evil which tho' at present in its
infancy," might grow in time.
In several letters Bond urged that restrictions be placed upon
passenger-carrying ships leaving England for the United States, "Under
color of a humane provision for the comfort of" emigrants, in order to
stop or at least "discourage" all emigrants, and especially mechanics,
likely to be of value in developing the industries of the United States.
Of especial interest is the warning which Bond sent when he learned that
the British government considered the propriety of admitting American
vessels of limited size, (seventy tons was offered later), into the trade
of the British West Indies. He said:--
"Any indulgence of this sort would certainly divert the trade out of its
present channel--the people of New England are an enterprising people,
the number of their ports and the locality of their situation favor
the increase of seamen. They navigate their vessels frugally and their
outfits are infinitely less expensive than the outfits of Brit. vessels.
When once admitted to trade with the W. India Islands, ship building
which has lain dormant, almost, and which was formerly a source of great
profit to this country, would instantly be revived--_America would soon
monopolize_ the advantages of carrying; limited as to size the numbers of
her vessels would be increased, and by increasing the numbers would supply
the means of conveying all the produce of America which is consumed in
our islands, and that, too, at a much cheaper rate than any other nation
could afford. But the enterprising spirit of the people of New England
would, as soon as they found the channels of profit open, be exerted to
the raising a maritime force which in case of future war might operate
very detrimentally to the interests of England."
That Bond was encouraged in this kind of work appears from the fact that
he was promoted later. There was no detail of American business too small
to escape the careful attention of the British government in its efforts
to throw what Bond called an "early check or restraint" upon all American
progress, and especially upon the prosperity of American shipping.
A comparison, briefly made, of the laws and regulations of England and
the United States follows:--
The British prohibited American vessels from entering the ports of their
West India Islands, Canada, and other American possessions, and their
East India spice market. We admitted British vessels into all our ports
on payment of a tonnage tax of fifty cents per ton (our ships paid six
cents per ton), and goods brought in British ships paid a revenue duty of
10 per cent more than goods in ours.
In the treaty made in 1794 the British offered to let our vessels of no
more than seventy tons enter their West Indies on condition that we would
admit British ships of any size on payment of the same tax and duty as
our own.
The British imposed double lighthouse taxes on American vessels bound to
any port in England except London. We imposed no extra lighthouse dues.
British merchants were prohibited from using American-built vessels in a
number of trades. We allowed our merchants to use British-built vessels
in any trade on payment of the extra dues mentioned above.
The British prohibited the importation of goods by American vessels from
every country except the United States. We permitted the British vessels
to bring us goods from all countries.
The British prohibited the importation of some of our agricultural
products during specified periods of time, and of some at all times.
We admitted the importation of all British agricultural products at all
times.
An American citizen was not allowed to import some goods into some ports
of the British domain, even in British ships. In other ports an extra tax
was laid on the American. We permitted the British citizen to import all
goods into all our ports, and we laid no extra tax upon him.
The British prohibited the consumption of certain American articles the
importation of which they permitted. We did not prohibit the consumption
of any British article.
The British prohibited the importation of American goods from all
countries except the United States. We permitted the importation of
British goods from all countries.
Consul Bond, in a letter (April 19, 1789), to Lord Carmarthen, berated Mr.
Madison because "he by no means adverts to that important consideration,
that so great indulgence has been granted by Gt. Britain to the United
States."
Omitting for want of space any account of many previous attacks upon
American shipping, it may be said that the first made in connection with
the war upon the French Republic was the order to British warships on
June 8, 1793, to "detain all vessels laden wholly or in part with corn,
flour or meal" bound to any French port. It was provided that each ship
so captured should be restored, but the cargo was to be confiscated for
the account of the British government, which was to pay for it the invoice
cost with 10 per cent added. This order was issued ostensibly to starve
the French republicans into submission to the old monarchy, but it was
well known that no such result could follow because France had never
depended upon the United States for any part of its bread worth mention.
Thus, in 1792, when we exported 546,913 bushels of wheat to Great Britain
and her possessions, France took only 54 bushels. The order, therefore,
had some other object in view, and the brief story of the ship _Neptune_,
Captain Jeffries, is instructive at this point. When the _Neptune_ was
captured under this order, she was restored as soon as convenient to
do so, and an order was issued for the payment of the invoice price
of her cargo with 10 per cent added. The addition of 10 per cent for
profit seemed at first glance to be an effort to act with some degree of
fairness, but as a matter of fact the owners were deliberately robbed; the
market price of wheat in England, at that time, was very much higher than
the invoice price with 10 per cent added, and Captain Jeffries pleaded
for permission, not to go on to the port for which he had been sailing
(where the price was still higher), but for permission to sell the grain
to merchants there in London, who were anxious to give the market price;
but the government insisted on taking it at the mere advance of 10 per
cent.
We may suppose that Captain Jeffries's failure to be satisfied with a
profit of 10 per cent was considered a plain illustration of American
avarice.
On November 6, 1793, British cruisers were ordered to capture all neutral
ships laden with the produce of the French West Indies. American ships
were carrying immense quantities of those goods, and all the larger
because they were excluded from the British West Indies. To make certain
of a clean sweep of these American ships, the order in council was kept
secret for several weeks in order to give the British cruisers time enough
to get on the ground and take everything unawares. (H. Adams, II, 322.)
On January 8, 1794, this order was changed so as to permit American
ships to carry the French colonial produce to American ports, but the
direct trade to Europe was still forbidden. In the meantime more than
200 American vessels had been captured and confiscated under the original
order.
While American ships were forbidden to carry French colonial goods from
the colonies direct to France, they were, as said, yet allowed to carry
the produce to the United States and then reëxport it to Europe, provided
it was entered in the American port, landed, and all duties, etc., paid
before the voyage was continued. In the case of the _Polly_, decided
April 29, 1800, Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell), confirmed this right
of American ships, and the American minister "succeeded in obtaining
from Pitt an express acceptance of this rule." One may note that this
concession was obtained immediately after our warships had been sent to
protect our merchantmen from the aggressions of the French; the guns of
the _Constellation_ had been heard in London, so to speak.
When, on April 29, 1803, England declared war upon Napoleon, however, a
new administration had been inaugurated in the United States, and all
Europe knew that no use would be made of such American war-ships as
remained in commission. Accordingly, as a first measure to hamper the
American ships in their effort to become carriers for the beleaguered
French, two British frigates were sent to Sandy Hook to detain and search
all ships for property belonging to the French. American waters were
occupied for the purpose of hampering American trade. In the course of
the blockade thus established, a British gunner, just for a joke, fired
a shot at a coaster, aiming so as to frighten the crew. The man at the
coaster's helm was killed.
This invasion of American waters was a fair notice of the British
determination to compel the United States to abide by all English laws and
orders in council made for the protection of British shipping. By refusing
to declare war, the American administration justified the aggressors.
Then the British government, still further to promote British trade and
shipping, adopted Phineas Bond's advice, and established free ports in
the West Indies, to which small unarmed traders from the colonies of the
enemy were invited to come and buy British goods. These free ports were
supplied by British ships under convoy.
In the meantime preparations were made to deprive the Americans of the
indirect trade from the French colonies by way of the United States to
Europe. On July 23, 1805, Sir William Scott, reversing his decision in
the case of the _Polly_, decided that a ship called the _Essex_ was a
good prize, although in a voyage from Bordeaux she had called at Salem,
discharged cargo, made repairs, and reloaded before heading away for a
West India port.
The all-influential British navy had joined in with the British ship-owner
to demand that the American ships should be excluded from all trade
between the colonies of the enemy and Europe. The ship-owners demanded it
because the American ship, in spite of the great expense of the indirect
voyage, was yet able to take the trade from the British, even though they
were supported by free ports and other aids. The demand made by or for
the British naval officers was unique. When voiced by one James Stephens
(_War in Disguise; or the Frauds of the Neutral Flags_), he pictured
a British admiral grown old and full of honors in the service, who, in
spite of his honors, had been unable "to wrest [from the enemy] the means
of comfortably sustaining those honors." As long as American ships were
allowed to engage in the indirect trade, the naval officer would have
to "look in vain for any subject of _safe_ and uncontested capture." If
American ships were excluded, they would still take chances, and they
would then be captured without danger and condemned without contest.
Mere mention need be made of the British practice of taking American
sailors from American ships and compelling them to serve in British
war-ships. Many American merchantmen were left short-handed upon the high
seas, and there is no doubt that some of them were, for this reason, lost
with all hands. The practice was maintained as one method of depressing
our navigation, but the subject seems to belong to our naval histories.
Brief space will serve for a consideration of the various orders in
council and paper blockades issued and laid in 1806 and 1807. In May,
1806, the British declared that the European coast "from the river Elbe
to the port of Brest inclusive ... must be considered as blockaded." No
blockading fleet was maintained. In reply to this Napoleon issued his
Berlin decree declaring the British islands "in a state of blockade,"
and that "all commerce and correspondence with the British Islands is
prohibited."
The French navy was unable to go to sea; Napoleon had only a few
privateers with which to enforce his decree, but the British used it as
an excuse for the order in council of January 7, 1807, by which no vessel
was "permitted to trade from one port to another both which ports shall"
be so far under the control of the enemy "_that British vessels may not
trade freely thereat_."
"If we may not no one else shall." The chief influence of this order upon
American vessels was to interdict their trade as coasters in Europe, and
to prevent their seeking a cargo in another port when they failed to find
one in the first port entered.
The order in council of November 11, 1807, was issued partly because, as
it stated, that the one of January 7 had failed to induce Napoleon to
withdraw his Berlin decree, and because no neutral power had declared
war upon him because of that failure. The chief reason for issuing it
however (and this was also plainly declared), was "for _supporting that
maritime power_ which the exertions and valor of his [the British king's]
people have, under the blessing of Providence enabled him to establish
and maintain." To this end all the ports from which "the British flag is
excluded" were declared in a state of blockade. "Maritime power" meant
"merchant marine."
The principal ports of the world to which American vessels had been
accustomed to trade, having thus been closed with a paper blockade, they
were all reopened again on condition that the trade to them be carried on
by way of England. On the 25th of the month it was further provided that
the ships thus trading by way of England were to land their cargoes in
the English port visited.
This placed the ships of the United States in the condition endured by
American vessels in colonial days when goods purchased in Europe had
to be carried to an English port and "laid on shore" before they were
taken to America. Some writers have supposed that this was done as a step
toward returning the United States once more to the position of colonies.
The fact is that the rulers of England had found that they could not
exclude American ships altogether from the sea, and they had determined,
therefore, to make them serve British interests as far as possible--first
by carrying _British goods_ to the ports from which British ships were
excluded, and second, by making them pay a tribute by landing their
cargoes in English ports. Practically the United States was thus made a
vassal of England.
In reply to this order Napoleon decreed that any ship that should in any
way submit to or take advantage of it should be good prize.
The dates of the several orders in council and decrees are of some
interest because these show that the British began the series by the paper
blockade from the Elbe to Brest. But the chief interest is in the fact
that the orders were all issued for the benefit of British _trade_. The
talk found in various histories about "retaliation" and England's "death
struggle with tyranny" was all sham. Said Spencer Percival, in a frank
speech in Parliament, (March 3, 1812):--
"The object of the orders in council was not to destroy the trade of the
continent but to force the continent to trade with us."
"I am of the opinion," said Lord Hawkesbury, "that _some decisive measure_
in support of our own commerce ... is become indispensable, not merely as
a measure of commercial policy, _but in order to put the contest in which
we are engaged upon its true grounds_." (Quoted by H. Adams, IV, 90.)
But while England strove by every means to preserve her trade and shipping
at the expense of her American rival, and Napoleon, with motives no higher
than those of a highwayman, confiscated American ships and cargoes to the
value of $10,000,000, the American merchant marine prospered.
On December 31, 1789, ships of an aggregate capacity of 123,893 tons were
registered under the American flag for foreign trade. In 1792 the tonnage
registered was 411,438. In 1793, the first year of extensive spoliations,
the tonnage was reduced to 367,734, but thereafter, in spite of the fact
that Americans were obliged to fight their way through swarming enemies,
our shipping grew until in 1800 we made boast of the possession of 667,107
tons in the foreign trade. Further than that, British shipping aggregating
115,000 tons entered and cleared out of American ports in 1790, but
in 1800, only 40,000 tons. From 1790 to 1792 the American tonnage that
entered and cleared averaged 54,000 tons a year; in 1800 the tonnage that
entered and cleared was 236,000.
Even when the stupidity of the administration added the embargo to all
other ills afflicting our shipping, its vigor was not destroyed. The
registered tonnage fell from 840,163 in 1807 to 765,252 in 1808 under
the embargo, but after the embargo was removed (March 1, 1809), the
figures grew within the year to 906,855, and in 1810 we had 981,019 tons
registered for foreign trade. Moreover, 127,000 tons of new ships were
built during that year, and in that year, too, our ships carried 91.5 per
cent of all American imports and exports.
The reasons for this prosperity are readily found. American enterprise
was, in those days, irrepressible. When Salem merchants heard that dried
sea slugs (_bêche de mer_) were highly prized as food in China, and that
the waters of the Fiji Islands swarmed with the worms, they despatched
the bark _Active_ (July 26, 1811), under Captain William P. Richardson,
to collect and dry enough of the slugs to freight the ship for the Canton
market. A more remarkable illustration of the enterprise of the day is
found, perhaps, in the fact that when a colony of New Englanders settled
at Marietta, Ohio (Captain Abraham Whipple was of the number), they began
to build ships there for the deep-water trade. The brig _St. Clair_, of
110 tons, was launched in 1800. In 1801 a ship of 230 tons and a brig of
126 were built. Three ships of 300 or more tons were completed in 1806
besides a number of smaller ones. A similar record was made the next year.
The largest ship built there was the _Francis_, of 350 tons, built by
Whitney for B. J. Gilman. She was of the largest size of her day. In all,
seven ships, eleven brigs, six schooners, and two gunboats (for the navy),
were built at Marietta before the War of 1812. Imagine a full-rigged ship,
with all sails set, plunging down over the Falls of the Ohio!
To enterprise was added unequalled opportunity. The wars of Europe drove
the ships of European nations from the sea, save only as voyages were made
under convoy. The Americans took the risks because the pay was adequate.
Captain George Coggeshall, in _American Privateers_ (p. 200), says he
received $45 per ton freight from Bordeaux to Boston. In the voyage of
Captain Elias Hasket Derby, described in the last chapter, his cargo
carried to Gibraltar cost him $43,275. The net profit made upon it was
more than $100,000.
How the perils of trade affected the quality of American ships, especially
their speed, must have mention. Hundreds of our vessels were captured by
the enemy, but many more were chased in vain. It was at this time that the
Baltimore clippers gained world-wide fame. The narrow and shoal waters of
the Chesapeake had compelled Baltimore designers to make shallow models
that could beat to windward swiftly in all winds. The peculiarity of these
vessels was the great breadth of beam and a consequent ability to carry
large areas of sail. No models equalled those of Baltimore, and when speed
was the price of safety at sea, the Baltimore model was copied everywhere
in America.
[Illustration: A Virginia Pilot-boat, with a Distant View of Cape
Henry, at the Entrance of the Chesapeake]
When our tonnage in the foreign trade almost reached the million mark in
1810, the most efficient ships in the world were those under the American
flag. And the character of our merchant seamen is shown by the fact that
when the British confiscated one of our ships, they were obliged to cut
down her spars before they could handle her. And yet some of our nautical
writers would have us believe that American ships increased in number
in those days because, they say, a discriminating duty laid on imports
brought to the country in foreign ships afforded "protection" to ships
under the American flag!