FRENCH AND OTHER SPOLIATIONS
ON July 25, 1785, while the schooner _Maria_, Captain Isaac Stevens, of
Boston, was sailing past Cape St. Vincent, on the southwest corner of
Spain, she was captured by an armed ship from Algiers, and carried to
that port. Five days later the ship _Dauphin_, Captain Richard O'Brien,
of Philadelphia, when fifty leagues west of Lisbon, suffered a similar
fate. These vessels with their cargoes were confiscated, and the crews,
numbering twenty-one men all told, were sold into slavery.
In connection with these facts consider a quotation from Lord Sheffield's
_Observations on the Commerce of the United States_, published in 1784;--
"It is not probable that the American States will have a very free trade
in the Mediterranean; it will not be the interest of any of the great
maritime powers to protect them from the Barbary states. They cannot
protect themselves from the latter; they cannot pretend to a navy."
It will now be instructive to recall a letter written by Edward Church,
American consul at Lisbon, on October 12, 1793, in regard to the Algerine
pirates. Portugal had been protecting her trade from the Algerines by
means of war-ships, and had incidentally afforded convoy to such American
merchantmen as needed it in those waters. Having learned that a number
of Algerine corsairs had gone cruising in the Atlantic, Consul Church
went to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to learn why the
Portuguese war-ships had allowed them to leave the Mediterranean. The
minister replied that Charles Logie, British consul at Algiers, acting
under orders from the British government, had _concluded_ a treaty of
peace between Algiers and Portugal. Portugal, he said, had not authorized
such a treaty, nor had she been consulted as to the terms. The British
government had guaranteed the execution of the treaty, and the payment
of the tribute that it called for, however, and with the British to aid
them the pirates had gone forth to prey on commerce. Church, with more
attention to accuracy than diplomatic language, termed the arrangement
thus made a "hellish conspiracy" against American shipping.
A brief account of the Algerine pirates will now prove interesting. For
time out of mind the people of the north coast of Africa lived by piracy,
but it was not until the seafaring outlaws of Europe taught them to build
and handle large ships that they became really menacing to commerce.
While the English were fighting the Dutch in the middle of the seventeenth
century, they were obliged to send Blake with twenty-five well-armed ships
to overawe these pirates. In 1672 another squadron was sent for the same
purpose. These two squadrons proved that it was easy and inexpensive to
crush the power of the pirates; but instead of continuing to use their
navy to protect their merchantmen, the British made no further attacks
upon the pirates until 1816. Indeed, instead of crushing their power,
the British government adopted the policy of adding to their means of
destroying commerce. And in this policy several European powers soon
joined.
Secretary of State Jefferson, in a report on "Mediterranean Trade,"
dated December 30, 1790, said that Spain paid "from three to five million
dollars to Algiers" in one lump to induce the Dey to make "peace." France
in 1788 had paid an unknown sum in hand, and had since paid an annual
subsidy of $100,000 for immunity from attack. Great Britain paid an annual
subsidy of 60,000 guineas to the four Barbary powers. Portugal alone
of the European maritime powers used her fleet to protect her trade. In
addition to the regular subsidies, the powers named made presents to the
Barbary chiefs, and these presents included usually, if not always, armed
ships and other war material.
The reason for paying subsidies instead of fighting is most interesting.
It was done to encourage the pirates to ravage the shipping belonging to
the rivals of the subsidy payers.
In 1793 England was at war with France. America was the leading neutral
maritime nation. The British statesmen saw that the American shipping
would secure much of the trade in the Mediterranean which English ships
had been doing, unless checked promptly by some extraordinary means, and
it was to administer this check that the pirates were loosed upon the
Atlantic.
The injury done to our shipping in the raid mentioned above was
insignificant, save only as the story gives emphasis to the other
facts given--facts which show the state of civilization among the most
enlightened nations of Europe. The state of American civilization, at the
time, is shown by the treaty made with the pirates, under which we agreed
to pay them tribute; for it was tribute and not subsidy as in our case.
We paid it in war material, too, as shown by the following extract from
the _Life of General William Eaton_, who, in 1798, was American consul at
Tunis:--
"On the 22d of December Mr. Eaton ... went on board the U. S. brig
_Sophia_, Capt. Henry Geddes, commander, bound to Algiers; in company with
the _Hero_, a ship of 350 tons burden, loaded with naval stores for the
Dey of Algiers; the _Hassan Bashaw_, an armed brig of 275 tons, mounting
eight 6-pounders, destined to Algiers; the _Skjoldabrand_, a schooner of
250 tons, 16 double fortified 4-pounders, destined to Algiers; and the _La
Eisha_, of 150 tons, 14 4-pounders, also destined to Algiers. All these
vessels excepting the _Sophia_ were to be delivered to the Dey of Algiers,
for arrearages of stipulation and present dues."
With these facts in mind we shall be able to comprehend why American
shipping was subjected to ruthless spoliations during the entire
period between the end of the War of the Revolution and our second war
for liberty, which we began in 1812. The sole criterion of right in
international affairs was might.
[Illustration: An Early Type of Clipper Ship: _Maria_, of New
Bedford, Built 1782]
As the reader remembers, the French spoliations grew out of the anarchy
prevailing during the French Revolution. To appreciate the facts, one
needs to put himself in the place of the French people and feel not only
their aspirations but their blinding indignation. A well-meaning, most
energetic, and (more or less) hysterical National Convention displaced
an impotent monarchy. "Of the 11,210 decrees passed by the Convention
one-third have a political aim, two-thirds have a humanitarian aim."
(Hugo, in _Ninety-Three_.) The surrounding nations, alarmed lest
republican principles gain headway among the "common people," formed
a coalition to avenge the death of the French king and destroy the
French Republic. England, without declaring war, held in her ports all
merchantmen (including neutrals) bound for France, and then began to
capture and send into port all neutral ships found at sea with cargoes
of food for French consignees. It was then that France began to strike
back in a way that affected American shipping. In March and April, 1793,
our Minister at Paris had to complain of several ships captured by French
privateers, and in one of his letters to the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs he said:--
"I avoid troubling you with the afflicting recital of the violences
committed on those different occasions, and which were so much the
less excusable inasmuch as they took place after the prizes were taken
possession of, and when no resistence was met with."
On May 9, 1793, the French government authorized the seizure of "all
neutral vessels which shall be laden wholly or in part" with food products
and "destined for an enemy's port."
The decree was contrary to the treaties made between France and the United
States in 1778, but it was confirmed on the 27th of July.
This decree was avowedly made because food was scarce in France and
because England was trying to starve the French into submission by
stopping all food-laden ships bound for France. In the French view it was
justified as a measure of necessity.
On July 2, 1796, however, it was decreed that "the flag of the French
Republic will treat neutral vessels either as to confiscation, as to
searches or capture in the same manner as they shall suffer the English
to treat them."
In the meantime the United States had made, under duress, a treaty with
England (Jay's, 1794), which gave the English advantages of which the
French, though by treaty our allies, were deprived; and this treaty was
ratified in spite of the fact that the British aggressions had exceeded
the French not only in extent, but in their aggravating character.
Moreover, this treaty was not promulgated until May 9, 1796, and France
justly complained of the concealment as disingenuous. It was partly
because of the resentment thus created that the decree of July 2, 1796
was made, and it was wholly because of resentment that, on March 2, 1797,
a decree was issued declaring that "every American vessel shall be a good
prize which has not on board a list of the crew in proper form, such as is
presented by the model annexed to the treaty of the 6th February, 1778."
No American vessel had carried this _rôle d'equipage_ since the end of the
War of the Revolution; the decree was passed with the intention of driving
all American ships from the sea. Then, as a final thrust at America, it
was decreed that, October 29, 1799, American sailors found serving on the
ships of enemies should be treated as pirates, and that they should not
be allowed to plead in extenuation that they had been impressed.
The following stories of French aggressions illustrate well the
usual course of life at sea in American ships during the period under
consideration:--
In 1796 the French privateer _Flying Fish_ came to Philadelphia, purchased
supplies, and made repairs. In the meantime her captain, aided by the
French consul, obtained information about all the ships then loading with
valuable cargoes for foreign ports. With these facts in hand the captain
then went to the Capes of the Delaware, waited until one of the most
valuable of the American ships passed out to sea, and then captured her
and turned her crew adrift in a small boat.
In the same year, while the American ship _Hare_ was lying in London, with
a valuable cargo on board, her captain went to Paris and arranged with
the French Minister of Marine to bring her into French waters and have her
condemned as a prize to him as captor. And this bargain was carried out.
Some Philadelphia merchants fitted out a vessel named _Les Jumeaux_ as a
French privateer. When going to sea she drove off a revenue cutter that
tried to stop her, and she finally made a prize of a vessel belonging to
neighbors of her owner.
The brigantine _Patty_, Captain Josiah Hempsted, belonging to Justus
Riley, of Wethersfield, Connecticut, was captured while on her way to St.
Bartholomew, on July 31, 1796. When Captain Hempsted appeared before the
"special agent" (a sort of governor and judge in admiralty) ruling at
Guadaloupe, that official shook his fist under the captain's nose, and
said:--
"I have confiscated your vessel and cargo, you damned rascal."
The French frigate _Thetis_, having captured the brigantine _Eliza_, of
New York, a seaman named Henry Doughty, a native-born citizen of Boston,
was placed with a number of English sailors who had been captured, and
was then delivered to the British in exchange for French sailors. Using
American sailors in effecting exchanges became a common practice with the
French naval commanders.
The crews of American vessels taken to the West Indies were commonly
turned ashore without clothing (except what they were wearing), or
food, or means of procuring either. On November 10, 1797, seven captured
American vessels were lying at Petit Guave, three-fourths of the crews
of which had died because of the hardships they had suffered when thus
turned ashore. In some cases the crews were imprisoned. Captain Breard,
of the schooner _Zephyr_, of Portsmouth, who ventured to go on board the
privateer that had captured him and there beg for a little of the food
of which he had been robbed, was thrown over the rail. Captain Codwise,
of the brig _Glasgow_, was thrown into prison at Leogane and kept for
thirty-six hours without food.
A more cheerful picture of the life at sea in American ships at that time
is found in a letter (written in 1799) from Captain Elias Hasket Derby,
Jr., to his father. The young man was in command of the Salem ship _Mount
Vernon_, and he had arrived at Gibraltar after a passage of seventeen and
a half days.
"The first of our passage was quite agreeable; the latter, light winds,
calm, and Frenchmen constantly in sight for the last four days. The
first Frenchmen we saw was off Tercira--a lugger to the southward. Being
uncertain of his force we stood by him to leeward on our course and soon
left him. July 28th, in the afternoon, we found ourselves approaching a
fleet of upwards of fifty sail, steering nearly N. E. We run directly
for their center; at 4 o'clock found ourselves in their half-moon;
concluding it impossible that it could be any other than the English
fleet, continued our course for their center to avoid any apprehension
of a want of confidence in them. They soon dispatched an 18-gun ship from
their center, and two frigates, one from their van and another from their
rear, to beat towards us--we being to windward. On approaching the center
ship under easy sail I fortunately bethought myself that it would be but
common prudence to steer so far to windward of him as to be a grapeshot's
distance from him, to observe his force and maneuvering. When we were
abreast of him he fired a gun to leeward and hoisted English colors. We
immediately bore away and meant to pass under his quarter, between him and
the fleet showing our American colors. This movement disconcerted him, and
it appeared to me he either conceived we were either an American sloop of
war, or an English one in disguise, attempting to cut him off from the
fleet; for while we were in the act of wearing on his beam he hoisted
French colors and gave us a broadside. We immediately brought our ship
to the wind, and stood on about a mile--wore towards the center of the
fleet--hove about and crossed him on the other tack, about half grapeshot
distance, and received his broadside; several shot fell on board of us
without much damage. All hands were active in clearing ship for action,
for our surprise had been complete. In about ten minutes we began firing
our stern chasers and in a quarter of an hour gave him our broadside in
such style as evidently sickened him, for he immediately luffed in the
wind, gave us his broadside, went in stays in great confusion, wore ship
afterwards in a large circle, and renewed the chase at a mile and a half
distance--a maneuver calculated to keep up appearances with the fleet and
escape our shot.
"At midnight we had distanced them; the chasing rocket signals being
almost out of sight. We have been in constant brushes ever since. The day
after we left the fleet we were chased till night by two frigates, whom
we lost sight of when it was dark. The next morning off Cape St. Vincent,
were chased by a French lateen-rigged vessel, apparently 10 or 12 guns,
one of them an 18-pounder. We brought to for him, [but] his metal was too
heavy for ours, and his position to windward.... [As] it was not in my
power to cut him off we of course bore away and saluted him with our long
nines. He continued his chase till dark, and when we were nearly by Cadiz,
at sunset, he made a signal to a consort whom we had just discovered
ahead. Having a strong breeze I was determined to pass my stern over him
if he did not make way for me. He thought prudent to do so. At midnight we
made the lights in Cadiz city, but found no English fleet. After lying to
till daylight concluded that the French must have gained the ascendancy in
Cadiz and thought prudent to proceed to this place, where we arrived at 12
o'clock, popping at Frenchmen all the forenoon. At 10 A.M., off Algesiras
Point, were seriously attacked by a large lateener who had on board more
than 100 men. He came so near our broadside as to allow our 6-pound grape
to do execution handsomely. We then bore away and gave him our stern guns
in a cool and deliberate manner, doing apparently great execution. Our
bars having cut his sails considerably, he was thrown into confusion,
struck both his ensign and his pennant. I was then puzzled to know what
to do with so many men. Our ship was running large, with all her steering
sails out, so that we could not immediately bring her to the wind; and we
were immediately off Algesiras Point, from which I had reason to fear she
might receive assistance, and my port, (Gibraltar) in full view. These
circumstances induced me to give up the gratification of bringing him
in. It was, however, a satisfaction to flog the rascal in full view of
the English fleet who were to leeward. The risk of sending here is great
indeed for any ship short of our force in men and guns--but particularly
[when short of] heavy guns. Two nines are better than six or eight sixes,
and two long twelves do better than twenty sixes.... I have now, while
writing to you, two of our countrymen in full view who are prizes to these
villains. Lord St. Vincent, in a 50-gun ship, is in the act of retaking
one of them. The other goes into Algesiras without molestation."
Spain took scores of American ships, and when the French privateers
carried an American ship into a Spanish port, the Spanish officials
invariably assisted in the robbery. The other nations robbed in proportion
to their power and opportunity. The third volume of our _Foreign
Relations_ contains a list of fifty-one American ships that were carried
into the ports of Denmark and Sweden. The French aggressors were inspired
primarily, as said, by indignation; the English were acting in defence of
their maritime supremacy, as shall appear further on, but these smaller
powers of Europe were animated by no other motive than that of the
Algerine pirates.
As to the total of the damages suffered from the French republicans, it
must be said that no complete calculation was ever made. But documents
written under oath show that more than 600 ships were despoiled before
the year 1800, and that losses amounting to more than $20,000,000 were
sustained. These losses included ships and cargoes only; incidental losses
due to the conditions at sea could not be measured.
Though really a part of our naval history, perhaps it may be worth adding
that when, at last, our naval ships, though few in numbers and small in
size, were ordered to sea to protect our trade, no more than three or four
well-fought actions were needed to bring the French Republic spoliations
to an end. It was, and, unhappily, it is yet, in human nature to despise
any appeal to altruistic notions of right in an effort to secure justice,
but all accord hearty respect to him who is able and willing to fight for
his rights. We were amused by the antics of the Japanese as a nation of
artists; we took off our hats and stood erect with our heels together in
the presence of the heroes of the Battle of the Yellow Sea.