WORLD WAR II AND TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES
Although the Council on Foreign Relations had almost gained controlling
influence on the government of the United States as early as 1941, it
had failed to indoctrinate the American people for acceptance of what
Colonel House had called a "positive" foreign policy.
In 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt (although eager to get the United States
into the Second World War and already making preparations for that
tragedy) had to campaign for re-election with the same promise that
Wilson had made in 1916--to keep us out of the European war. Even as
late as the day before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December,
1941, the American people were still overwhelmingly "isolationist"--a
word which internationalists use as a term of contempt but which means
merely that the American people were still devoted to their nation's
traditional foreign policy.
It was necessary for Roosevelt to take steps which the public would not
notice or understand but which would inescapably involve the nation in
the foreign war. When enough such sly involvement had been manipulated,
there would come, eventually, some incident to push us over the brink
into open participation. Then, any American who continued to advocate
our traditional foreign policy of benign neutrality would be an object
of public hatred, would be investigated and condemned by officialdom as
a "pro-nazi," and possibly prosecuted for sedition.
* * * * *
The Council on Foreign Relations has heavy responsibility for the
maneuvering which thus dragged America into World War II. One major step
which Roosevelt took toward war (at precisely the time when he was
campaigning for his third-term re-election on a platform of peace and
neutrality to keep America out of war) was his radical alteration of
traditional concepts of United States policy in order to declare
Greenland under the protection of our Monroe Doctrine. The Council on
Foreign Relations officially boasts full responsibility for this fateful
step toward war.
On pages 13 and 14 of a book entitled _The Council on Foreign Relations:
A Record of Twenty-Five Years, 1921-1946_ (written by officials of the
Council and published by the Council on January 1, 1947) are these
passages:
"One further example may be cited of the way in which ideas and
recommendations originating at Council meetings have entered into
the stream of official discussion and action.
"On March 17, 1940, a Council group completed a confidential report
which pointed out the strategic importance of Greenland for
transatlantic aviation and for meteorological observations. The
report stated:
"'The possibility must be considered that Denmark might be overrun
by Germany. In such case, Greenland might be transferred by treaty
to German sovereignty.'
"It also pointed out the possible danger to the United States in
such an eventuality, and mentioned that Greenland lies within the
geographical sphere 'within which the Monroe Doctrine is presumed
to apply.'
"Shortly after this, one of the members of the group which had
prepared the report was summoned to the White House. President
Roosevelt had a copy of the memorandum in his hand and said that he
had turned to his visitor for advice because of his part in
raising the question of Greenland's strategic importance.
"Germany invaded Denmark on April 9, 1940. At his press conference
three days later, the President stated that he was satisfied that
Greenland was a part of the American continent. After a visit to
the White House on the same day, the Danish Minister said that he
agreed with the President.
"On April 9, 1941, an agreement was signed between the United
States and Denmark which provided for assistance by the United
States to Greenland in the maintenance of its status, and granted
to the United States the right to locate and construct such
airplane landing-fields, seaplane facilities, and radio and
meteorological installations as might be necessary for the defense
of Greenland, and for the defense of the American continent. This
was eight months before Germany declared war on the United States.
"The Council's report on Greenland was only one item in an
extensive research project which offered an unusual instance of
wartime collaboration between Government agencies and a private
institution.... The project ... exhibited the kind of contribution
which the Council has been uniquely equipped to provide...."
* * * * *
The Danish colony of Greenland--a huge island covered by polar ice--lies
in the Arctic Ocean, 1325 miles off the coast of Denmark. It is 200
miles from Canada, 650 miles from the British Isles. The extreme
southwestern tip of Greenland is 1315 miles from the most extreme
northeastern tip of the United States (Maine). In other words, Canada
and England, which were at war with Germany when we undertook to protect
Greenland from Germany, are both much closer to Greenland than the
United States is.
But history gives better proof than geography does, that the learned
Council members who put Greenland in the Western Hemisphere, within the
meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, were either ignorant or dishonest. The
Monroe Doctrine, closing the Western Hemisphere to further European
colonization, was proclaimed in 1823. Denmark, a European nation,
colonized Greenland, proclaiming sole sovereignty in 1921, without any
hint of protest from the United States that this European colonization
infringed upon the Monroe Doctrine.
* * * * *
Members of the Council on Foreign Relations played a key role in getting
America into World War II. They played _the_ role in creating the basic
policies which this nation has followed since the end of World War II.
These policies are accomplishing:
(1) the redistribution to other nations of the great United States
reserve of gold which made our dollar the strongest currency in the
world;
(2) the building up of the industrial capacity of other nations, at
our expense, thus eliminating our pre-eminent productive
superiority;
(3) the taking away of world markets from United States producers
(and even much of their domestic market) until capitalistic America
will no longer dominate world trade;
(4) the entwining of American affairs--economic, political,
cultural, social, educational, and even religious--with those of
other nations until the United States will no longer have an
independent policy, either domestic or foreign: until we can not
return to our traditional foreign policy of maintaining national
independence, nor to free private capitalism as an economic system.
The ghastly wartime and post-war decisions (which put the Soviet Union
astride the globe like a menacing colossus and placed the incomparably
stronger United States in the position of appeasing and retreating) can
be traced to persons who were members of the Council on Foreign
Relations.
Consider a specific example: the explosive German problem.
* * * * *
In October, 1943, Cordell Hull (U. S. Secretary of State), Anthony Eden
(Foreign Minister for Great Britain), and V. Molotov (Soviet Commissar
for Foreign Affairs), had a conference at Moscow. Eden suggested that
they create a European Advisory Commission which would decide how
Germany, after defeat, would be partitioned, occupied, and governed by
the three victorious powers. Molotov approved. Hull did not like the
idea, but agreed to it in deference to the wishes of the two others.
Philip E. Mosely, of the CFR, was Hull's special adviser at this Moscow
Conference.
The next month, November, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt went to
Tehran for his first conference with Stalin and Churchill. Aboard the U.
S. S. _Iowa_ en route to Tehran, Roosevelt had a conference with his
Joint Chiefs of Staff. They discussed, among other things, the post-war
division and occupation of Germany.
President Roosevelt predicted that Germany would collapse suddenly and
that "there would definitely be a race for Berlin" by the three great
powers. The President said: "We may have to put the United States
divisions into Berlin as soon as possible, because the United States
should have Berlin."
Harry Hopkins suggested that "we be ready to put an airborne division
into Berlin two hours after the collapse of Germany."
Roosevelt wanted the United States to occupy Berlin and northwestern
Germany; the British to occupy France, Belgium, and southern Germany;
and the Soviets to have eastern Germany.
At the Tehran Conference (November 27-December 2, 1943), Stalin seemed
singularly indifferent to the question of which power would occupy which
zones of Germany after the war. Stalin revealed intense interest in only
three topics:
(1) urging the western allies to make a frontal assault, across the
English Channel, on Hitler's fortress Europe;
(2) finding out, immediately, the name of the man whom the western
allies would designate to command such an operation (Eisenhower had not
yet been selected); and
(3) reducing the whole of Europe to virtual impotence so that the Soviet
Union would be the only major power on the continent after the war.
Roosevelt approved of every proposal Stalin made.
A broad outline of the behavior and proposals of Roosevelt, Churchill,
and Stalin at Tehran can be found in the diplomatic papers published in
1961 by the State Department, in a volume entitled _Foreign Relations of
the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and
Tehran 1943_.
As to specific agreements on the postwar division and occupation of
Germany, the Tehran papers reveal only that the European Advisory
Commission would work out the details.
We know that Roosevelt and his military advisers in November, 1943,
agreed that America should take and occupy Berlin. Yet, 17 months later,
we did just the opposite.
* * * * *
In the closing days of World War II, the American Ninth Army was rolling
toward Berlin, meeting little resistance, slowed down only by German
civilians clogging the highways, fleeing from the Russians. German
soundtrucks were circulating in the Berlin area, counseling stray
troops to stop resistance and surrender to the Americans. Some twenty or
thirty miles east of Berlin, the German nation had concentrated its
dying strength and was fighting savagely against the Russians.
Our Ninth Army could have been in Berlin within a few hours, probably
without shedding another drop of blood; but General Eisenhower suddenly
halted our Army. He kept it sitting idly outside Berlin for days, while
the Russians slugged their way in, killing, raping, ravaging. We gave
the Russians control of the eastern portion of Berlin--and of _all_ the
territory surrounding the city.
To the south, General Patton's forces were plowing into Czechoslovakia.
When Patton was thirty miles from Prague, the capital, General
Eisenhower ordered him to stop--ordered him not to accept surrender of
German soldiers, but to hold them at bay until the Russians could move
up and accept surrender. As soon as the Russians were thus established
as the conquerors of Czechoslovakia, Eisenhower ordered Patton to
evacuate.
Units of Czechoslovakian patriots had been fighting with Western armies
since 1943. We had promised them that they could participate in the
liberation of their own homeland; but we did not let them move into
Czechoslovakia until after the Russians had taken over.
Czechoslovakian and American troops had to ask the Soviets for
permission to come into Prague for a victory celebration--after the
Russians had been permitted to conquer the country.
Western Armies, under Eisenhower's command, rounded up an estimated five
million anti-communist refugees and delivered them to the Soviets who
tortured them, sent them to slave camps, or murdered them.
All of this occurred because we refused to do what would have been easy
for us to do--and what our top leaders had agreed just 17 months before
that we must do: that is, take and hold Berlin and surrounding territory
until postwar peace treaties were made.
* * * * *
Who made the decisions to pull our armies back in Europe and let the
Soviets take over? General Eisenhower gave the orders; and, in his book,
_Crusade in Europe_ (published in 1948, before the awful consequences of
those decisions were fully known to the public), Eisenhower took his
share of credit for making the decisions. When he entered politics four
years later, Eisenhower denied responsibility: he claimed that he was
merely a soldier, obeying orders, implementing decisions which
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman had made.
Memoirs of British military men indicate that Eisenhower went far
_beyond_ the call of military duty in his "co-operative" efforts to help
the Soviets capture political prisoner's and enslave all of central
Europe. _Triumph in the West_, by Arthur Bryant, published in 1959 by
Doubleday & Company, as a "History of the War Years Based on the Diaries
of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,"
reveals that, in the closing days of the war, General Eisenhower was
often in direct communication with Stalin, reporting his decisions and
actions to the Soviet dictator before Eisenhower's own military
superiors knew what was going on.
Regardless of what responsibility General Eisenhower may or may not have
had for _formulating_ the decisions which held our armies back from
Eastern Europe, those decisions seem to have stemmed from the
conferences which Roosevelt had with Stalin at Tehran in 1943 and at
Yalta in 1945.
* * * * *
But who made the decision to isolate Berlin 110 miles deep inside
communist-controlled territory without any agreements concerning access
routes by which the Western Powers could get to the city? According to
Arthur Krock, of the _New York Times_, George F. Kennan, (a member of
the Council on Foreign Relations) persuaded Roosevelt to accept the
Berlin zoning arrangement. Kennan, at the time, was political adviser to
Ambassador John G. Winant, who was the United States Representative on
the three-member European Advisory Commission.
Mr. Krock's account (in the _New York Times_, June 18, 1961 and July 2,
1961) is rather involved; but here is the essence of it:
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed to enclose
Berlin 110 miles within the Soviet occupation zone. Winant
submitted a recommendation, embracing this agreement. Winant felt
that it would offend the Soviets if we asked for guaranteed access
routes, and believed that guarantees were unnecessary anyway. When
submitting his recommendation to Washington, however, Winant
attached a map on which a specific allied corridor of access into
the city was drawn.
Winant's proposal was never acted on in Washington. Therefore, the
British submitted a recommendation. Roosevelt rejected the British
plan, and made his own proposal. The British and Soviets disliked
Roosevelt's plan; and negotiations over the zoning of Berlin were
deadlocked.
George F. Kennan broke the deadlock by going directly to Roosevelt
and persuading him to accept the Berlin zoning agreement, which Mr.
Krock calls a "war-breeding monstrosity," and a "witless travesty
on statecraft and military competence."
Mr. Krock says most of his information came from one of Philip E.
Mosely's articles in an old issue of _Foreign Affairs_--which I have
been unable to get for my files. I cannot, therefore, guarantee the
authenticity of Mr. Krock's account; but I can certainly agree with his
conclusion that only Joseph Stalin and international communism
benefitted from the "incredible zoning agreements" that placed "Berlin
110 miles within the Soviet zone and reserved no guaranteed access
routes to the city from the British and American zones."
It is interesting to note that Philip E. Mosely (CFR member who was
Cordell Hull's adviser when the postwar division of Germany was first
discussed at the Moscow Conference in 1943) succeeded George F. Kennan
as political adviser to John G. Winant of the European Advisory
Commission shortly after Kennan had persuaded Roosevelt to accept the
Berlin zoning agreements.
* * * * *
It is easy to see why the Soviets wanted the Berlin arrangement which
Roosevelt gave them. It is not difficult to see the British viewpoint:
squeezed between the two giants who were his allies, Churchill tried to
play the Soviets against the Americans, in the interest of getting the
most he could for the future trade and commerce of England.
But why would any American want (or, under any conditions, agree to) the
crazy Berlin agreement? There are only three possible answers:
(1) the Americans who set up the Berlin arrangement--which means,
specifically, George F. Kennan and Philip E. Mosely, representing the
Council on Foreign Relations--were ignorant fools; or
(2) they _wanted_ to make Berlin a powder keg which the Soviets could
use, at will, to intimidate the West; or
(3) they wanted a permanent, ready source of war which the United States
government could use, at any time, to salvage its own internationalist
policies from criticism at home, by scaring the American people into
"buckling down" and "tightening up" for "unity" behind our "courageous
President" who is "calling the Kremlin bluff" by spending to prepare
this nation for all-out war, if necessary, to "defend the interests of
the free-world" in Berlin.
George F. Kennan and Philip E. Mosely and the other men associated with
them in the Council on Foreign Relations are not ignorant fools. I do
not believe they are traitors who wanted to serve the interests of the
Kremlin. So, in trying to assess their motives, I am left with one
choice: they wanted to set Berlin up as a perpetual excuse for any kind
of program which the Council on Foreign Relations might want the
American government to adopt.
Long, long ago, King Henry of England told Prince Hal that the way to
run a country and keep the people from being too critical of how you run
it, is to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.
A study of President Kennedy's July 25, 1961, speech to the nation about
Berlin, together with an examination of the spending program which he
recommended to Congress a few hours later, plus a review of contemporary
accounts of how the stampeded Congress rushed to give the President all
he asked--such a study, set against the backdrop of our refusal to do
anything vigorous with regard to the communist menace in Cuba, will, I
think, justify my conclusions as to the motives of men, still in power,
who created the Berlin situation.