appointed at the time when they settled the offices for eight years at
once[59]; and this was the last year of the period: and as Antony had
been deposed,--a fact which I stated,[60]--Valerius Messala, who had once
been proscribed by them,[61] became consul with Caesar. About this time a
madman rushed into the theatre at one of the festivals, seized the crown
of the former Caesar and put it on, whereupon he was torn to pieces by the
bystanders. A wolf that darted into the temple of Fortune was caught and
killed, and at the hippodrome during the very contest of the horses a dog
overpowered and devoured another dog. Fire also consumed a considerable
portion of the hippodrome, the temple of Ceres, another shrine dedicated
to Spes, besides a large number of other structures. The freedmen were
thought to have caused this. All of them who were in Italy and possessed
property worth five myriads[62] or more had been ordered to contribute
an eighth of it. The result was numerous riots, murders, and firing of
buildings on their part, and they were not brought to order until they
were subdued by armed force. After this the freedmen who held any land in
Italy grew frightened and kept quiet: they had been ordered, too, to give
a quarter of their annual income, and though they were on the point of
rebelling against this extortion, they were not bold enough after the
demonstration mentioned to show further insubordination, but reluctantly
made their contribution without disputing the matter. Therefore it was
believed that the fire was due to a plot originated by the freedmen: yet
this did not prevent it from being recorded among the great portents,
because of the number of buildings burned.
[-11-] Disregarding such omens as had appeared to them they neither felt
fear nor displayed less hostility but spent the winter in employing spies
and annoying each other. Caesar had set sail from Brundusium and proceeded
as far as Corcyra, intending to attack the ships near Actium while off
their guard, but he encountered rough weather and received damage which
caused him to withdraw. When spring came, Antony made no move at any
point: the crews that manned the triremes were made up of all kinds of
nations, and as they had been wintering at a distance from him they had
secured no practice and had been diminished in numbers by disease and
desertions; Agrippa also had seized Methone by storm, had killed Bogud
there, was watching for merchant vessels to come to land, and was making
descents from time to time on various parts of Greece, which caused
Antony extreme disturbance. Caesar in turn was encouraged by this and
wished to employ as soon as possible the energy of the army, which was
trained to a fine point, and to carry on the war in Greece near his
rival's supporters rather than in Italy near Rome. Therefore he collected
all his soldiers who were of any value, and all of the men of influence,
both senators and knights, at Brundusium. He wished to have the first to
coöperate with him and to keep the second from being alone and acting in
any revolutionary way, but chiefly he wished to show mankind that the
largest and strongest element among the Romans was in accord with him.
Therefore he ordered all to bring with them a stated number of servants
and that, except the soldiers, they should also carry food for
themselves; after this with the entire array he crossed the Ionian Gulf.
[-12-] He was leading them not to the Peloponnesus or against Antony, but
to Actium, where the greater part of his rival's fleet was at anchor, to
see if he could gain possession of it, willing or unwilling, in advance.
Consequently he disembarked the cavalry under the shadow of the Ceraunian
mountains and sent them to the point mentioned, while he himself with his
ships seized Corcyra, deserted by the garrisons within it, and came to
a stop in the so-called Sweet Harbor: it is so named because it is made
sweet by the river emptying into it. There he established a naval station
and from there he set out to sail to Actium. No one came out to meet him
or would hold parley with him, though he urged them to do one of two
things,--come to an agreement or come into battle. But the first
alternative they would not accept through distrust, nor the second,
through fear. He then occupied the site where Nicopolis now stands and
took up a position on a high piece of ground there from which there is a
view over all the outer sea near Paxa, over the inner Ambracian Gulf, and
the intermediary water (on which are the harbors near Nicopolis) alike.
This spot he strengthened and constructed walls from it down to Comarus,
the outer harbor, so that he commanded Actium with his camp and his
fleet, by land and sea. I have heard the report that he transferred
triremes from the outer sea to the gulf through the fortifications, using
newly flayed hides smeared with olive oil instead of hauling-engines.
However, I can find no exploit recorded of these ships in the gulf and
therefore I am unable to trust the tradition; for it was certainly no
small task to draw triremes on hides over a long and uneven tract of
land. Still, it is said to have been performed. Actium is a place sacred
to Apollo and is located in front of the mouth of the narrows leading
into the Ambracian Gulf opposite the harbors at Nicopolis. These narrows
are of uniform breadth, though closely confined, for a long distance, and
both they and all the waters outside the entrance are fit for ships to
come to anchor in and lie in wait. This space the adherents of Antony had
occupied in advance, had built towers on each side of the mouth, and had
taken up the intervening space with ships so that they could both sail
out and retreat with security. The men were bivouacked on the farther
side of the narrows, along by the sanctuary, on an extensive level area
quite suitable for either battle or encampment. The nature of the place
made them far more subject to disease both in winter and in summer.
[-13-] As soon as Antony ascertained Caesar's arrival, he did not delay,
but hastened to Actium with his followers. He reached there in a short
time but did not at once risk an encounter, though Caesar was constantly
marshaling his infantry in front of the camp, often making dashes at them
with his ships and beaching their transports; for his object was to join
battle with only such as were present, before Antony's entire command
assembled. For this very reason the latter was unwilling to risk his all,
and he had recourse for several days to trials and skirmishes until he
had gathered his legions. With these, especially since Caesar no longer
displayed an equal readiness to assail them, he crossed the narrows and
encamped not far from him, after which he sent cavalry around the gulf
and besieged him on both sides. Caesar himself remained quiet, and did not
take any risks which he could avoid, but sent a detachment into Greece
and Macedonia with the intention of drawing Antony off in that direction.
While they were so engaged Agrippa sailed suddenly to Leucas and captured
the vessels there, took Patrae by conquering Quintus Nasidius in a fight
at sea, and later also reduced Corinth. Following upon these events
Marcus Titius and Statilius Taurus made a sudden charge upon Antony's
cavalry, which they defeated, and won over Philadelphus, king of
Paphlagonia. Meantime, also, Gnaeus Domitius, having some grievance
against Cleopatra, transferred his allegiance and proved, indeed, of no
service to Caesar (for he fell sick and died not long after), but still
created the impression that his desertion was due to despair of the
success of the party on whose side he was ranged. Many others followed
his example, so that Antony was no longer equally imbued with courage but
was suspicious of everybody. It was after this that he tortured and
put to death Iamblichus, king of some of the Arabians, and others, and
delivered Quintus Postumius, a senator, to his servants to be placed on
the rack. Finally he became afraid that Quintus Deillius and Amyntas the
Gaul, who happened to have been sent into Macedonia and Thrace after
mercenaries, would espouse Caesar's cause, and he started to overtake
them, pretending that he wished to render them assistance in case any
hostile force should attack. And meantime a battle at sea occurred.
[-14-] Lucius Tarius,[63] with a few ships was anchored opposite Sosius,
and the latter hoped to achieve a notable success by attacking him before
Agrippa, to whom the whole fleet had been entrusted, should arrive.
Accordingly, after waiting for a thick mist, so that Tarius should not
become aware of their numbers beforehand and flee, he set sail suddenly
just before dawn and immediately at the first assault routed his opponent
and pursued him, but failed to capture him; for Agrippa by chance met
Sosius on the way, so that he not only gained nothing from the victory
but perished[64] together with Tarcondimotus and many others.
Antony, because of his conflict and because he himself on his return had
been defeated in a cavalry battle by Caesar's advance guard, no longer
thought it well to encamp in two different places, but during the night
left the redoubt which was near his opponents and retired to the other
side of the narrows, where the larger part of his army had bivouacked.
When provisions also began to fail him because he was cut off from
foraging, he held a council to deliberate whether they should remain in
position and hazard an encounter or transfer their post somewhere else
and make the war a long one. [-15-] After several had given opinions
the advice of Cleopatra prevailed,--that the choicest sites be given in
possession of garrisons and that the rest of the force weigh anchor with
them for Egypt. She held this view as a result of being disturbed by
omens. Swallows had built their nests about her tent and on the flagship
on which she sailed, and milk and blood together had dripped from
beeswax. Their images with the forms of gods which the Athenians had
placed on their Acropolis were hurled down by thunderbolts into the
Theatre. This and the consequent dejection and listlessness of the army
began to alarm Cleopatra and she filled Antony with fears. They did not
wish, however, to sail out either secretly or openly as fugitives, for
fear they should strike terror to the hearts of their allies, but rather
with preparations made for a naval battle, in order that they might
equally well force their way through in case there should be any
resistance. Therefore they chose out first the best of the vessels, since
the sailors had become fewer by death and desertion, and burned the rest;
next they secretly put all their most prized valuables aboard of them by
night. When the boats were ready, Antony gathered his soldiers and spoke
as follows:--
[-16-] "All provisions that I was required to make for the war have
received due attention, fellow-soldiers, in advance. First, there is your
immense throng, all the chosen flower of our dependents and allies; and
to such a degree are you masters of every form of combat recognized among
us that alone by yourselves you are formidable to adversaries. Then
again, you yourselves can see how large and how fine a fleet we have and
how many fine hoplites, cavalry, slingers, peltasts, archers, mounted
archers. Most of these classes are not found at all on the other side,
and so far as they are found they are much fewer and weaker than
ours. The funds of the enemy are small, though obtained by forced
contributions, and can not last long, while they have rendered the
contributors better disposed toward us than toward the men who took them;
hence the population is in no way favorable to the oppressors and is
moreover on the point of open revolt. Our treasury, filled from abundant
resources, has harmed no one and will aid all of us. [-17-] In addition
to these considerations so numerous and of such great importance I am
on general principles disinclined to make any bombastic statement
about myself. Yet since this too is one of the factors contributing
to supremacy in war and is believed among all men to be of greatest
importance,--I mean that men who are to fight well must secure an
excellent general--necessity itself has rendered quite indispensable
some remarks about myself, their purpose being to enable you to realize
still more the fact that not only are you such soldiers that you could
conquer even without a good leader, but I am such a leader that I can
win even with poor soldiers. I am at that age when persons attain their
greatest perfection both of body and intellect and suffer deterioration
neither through the rashness of youth nor the feebleness of old age, but
are strongest because in a condition half-way between the two. Moreover I
possess such a nature and such a training that I can with greatest ease
discern what requires to be done and make it known. Experience, which
causes even the ignorant and the uneducated to appear to be of some
value, I have been acquiring through my whole political and whole
military career. From boyhood till now I have been continually exercised
in similar pursuits; I have been much ruled and done much ruling, from
which I have learned on the one hand what kind of orders and of what
magnitude must be issued, and on the other how far and in what way one
must render obedience. I have been subject to terror, to confidence: as a
result I have made it my custom neither to entertain any fear too readily
nor to venture on any hazard too heedlessly. I have met with good
fortune, I have met with failure: consequently I find it possible to
avoid both despair and excess of pride.
[-18-] "I speak to you who know these facts and make you who hear them
my witnesses not in the intention of uttering idle boasts about
myself,--your consciousness of the truth being sufficient glory for
me,--but to the end that you may in this way bring home to yourselves
how much better we are equipped than our opponents. For, while they are
inferior to us in quantity both of soldiers and of money and in diversity
of equipment, in no one respect are they so strikingly lacking as in the
age and inexperience of their general. About him I need in general make
no exact or detailed statement, but to sum up I will say this, which you
all understand, that he is a veritable weakling in body and has never
himself been victor in any important battle either on land or on the sea.
Indeed, at Phillipi and in the same conflict I won the day, whereas he
was defeated.
"To this degree do we differ from each other, and usually victories fall
to the better equipped. And if they have any strength at all, you would
find it to exist in their heavy-armed force on land; as for their ships,
they will not so much as be able to sail out against us. You yourselves
can of course see the size and stoutness of our vessels, which are such
that if the enemy's were equivalent to them in number, yet because of
these advantages the foe could do no damage either by charges from the
side or by charges from the front. For first the thickness of the timbers
and second the very height of the ships would certainly check them, even
if there were no one on board to defend them. Where will any one find a
chance to assail ships which carry so many archers and slingers striking
assailants, moreover, from the towers up aloft? If any one should
approach, how could he fail to get sunk by the very number of the oars
or how could he fail to be plunged under water when shot at by all the
warriors on the decks and in the towers? [-19-] Do not think that they
have any nautical ability because Agrippa won a sea-fight off Sicily:
they contended not against Sextus but against his slaves, not against a
like equipment with ours but against one far inferior. If, again, any one
makes much of their good fortune in that combat, he is bound to take into
equal consideration the defeat which Caesar himself suffered at the hands
of Sextus. By this comparison he will find that conditions are not the
same, but that all our advantages are more numerous and greater than
theirs. And, in general, how large a part does Sicily form of the whole
empire and how large a fraction of our equipment did the troops of Sextus
possess, that any one should properly fear Caesar's armament, which is
precisely the same as before and has grown neither larger nor better,
just on account of his good luck, instead of taking courage from the
defeat that he endured? Reflecting on this fact I have not cared to
risk our first engagement with the infantry, where they appear to have
strength in a way, in order that no one of you should be liable to
discouragement as a result of any failure in that department: instead,
I have chosen to begin with the ships where we are strongest and have a
vast superiority over our antagonists, to the end that after a victory
with these we may despise the infantry. You know well that the whole
outcome of the war depends on each side on our fleets. If we come out
victorious in this engagement, we shall suffer no harm from any of the
rest but cut them off on a kind of islet,--for all surrounding regions
are in our possession,--and without effort subdue them, if in no other
way, by hunger.
[-20-] "Now I do not think that further words are necessary to tell you
that we shall be struggling not for small or unimportant interests, but
it will prove true that if you are zealous you will obtain the greatest
rewards, but if careless will suffer the most frightful misfortunes.
What would they not do to us, if they should prevail, when they killed
practically all the followers of Sextus that had been of any prominence,
and even destroyed many followers of Lepidus that coöperated with Caesar's
party? But why should I mention this, seeing that they have removed
Lepidus, who was guilty of no wrong and was further their ally, from
all his powers as general and keep him under guard as if he were some
captive? They have further hounded for money all the freedmen in Italy
and likewise other men who possess any land to such an extent as to
force some of them to take up arms, with the consequence that not a few
perished. Is it possible that those who spared not their allies will
spare us? Will those who seized for funds the property of their own
adherents refrain from our wealth? Will they show humanity as victors who
before victory have committed every conceivable outrage? Not to spend
time in speaking of the concerns of other people, I will enumerate the
audacity that they have displayed toward us who stand here. Who was
ignorant that I was chosen a partner and colleague of Caesar and received
charge of the management of public affairs equally with him, received
similar honors and offices, and have been a great while now in possession
of them? Yet of all of them, so far as is in his power, I have been
deprived; I have become a private citizen instead of a leader, an outcast
from the franchise instead of consul, and this not by the action of the
people or the senate but by his own act and that of his adherents, who do
not comprehend that they are preparing a sovereign for themselves first
of all. For how could one speak of enactments of people and senate, when
the consuls and some others fled straightway from the city, in order
to escape casting any such vote? How will that man spare either you or
anybody else, when he dared while I was alive, in possession of such
great power, a victor over the Armenians, to seek for my will, take it by
violence from those who had received it, open it, and read it publicly?
And how will he manifest any humanity to others with whom he has no
connection, when he has shown himself such a man toward me,--his friend,
his table companion, his relative?
[-21-] "Now in case we are to draw any inferences from his decrees, he
threatens you openly, having made the majority of you enemies outright,
but against me personally no such declaration has been made, though he is
at war with me and is already acting in every way like one who has not
only conquered me but murdered me. Hence, when he treated me in such a
way whom he pretends not yet even at this day to regard as an enemy, he
will surely not keep his hands off you, with whom he clearly admits that
he is at odds. What does it signify that he is threatening us all alike
with arms but in his decree declares he is at war with some and not
with others? It is not, by Jupiter, with the intention of making any
distinction between us, or treating one class in one way and another in
another, if he prevails, but it is in order to set us at variance and in
collision and thus render us weaker. He is not unaware that while we are
in accord and doing everything as one body he can never in any way get
the upper hand, but if we quarrel, and some choose one policy and the
rest another, he may perhaps prevail. [-22-] It is for this reason that
he assumes this kind of attitude toward us. I and the Romans that cleave
to me foresee the danger, although so far as the decrees are concerned we
enjoy a kind of amnesty: we comprehend his plot and neither abandon you
nor look personally to our own advantage. In like manner you, too, whom
he does not even himself deny that he regards as hostile, yes, most
hostile, ought to bear in mind all these facts, and embracing common
dangers and common hopes coöperate in every way and show enthusiasm to an
equal degree in our enterprise and set over against each other carefully
first what we shall suffer (as I said), if defeated, and what we shall
gain, if victorious. For it is a great thing for us to escape being
worsted and so enduring any form of insult or rapacity, but greatest of
all to conquer and effect whatever any one of us may wish. On the other
hand, it is most disgraceful for us, who are so many and so valiant, who
have weapons and money and ships and horses, to choose the worse instead
of the better course, and when we might afford the other party liberty
to prefer to join them in slavery. Our aims are so utterly opposed that,
whereas he desires to reign as sovereign over you, I wish to free you and
them together, and this I have confirmed by oath. Therefore as men who
are to struggle for both sides alike and to win blessings that shall be
common to all, let us labor, fellow-soldiers, to prevail at the present
juncture and to gain happiness for all time."
[-23-] After delivering a speech of this sort Antony put all his most
prominent associates aboard the boats, to prevent them from concerting
revolutionary measures when they got by themselves, as Deillius and some
other deserters had done; he also embarked great numbers of archers,
slingers, and hoplites. And since the defeat of Sextus had been largely
due to the size of Caesar's ships and the number of his marines, Antony
had equipped his vessels to surpass greatly those of his opponents, for
he had had constructed only a few triremes, but the rest were ships with
four banks and with ten banks, and represented all the remaining degrees
of capacity: upon these he had built lofty towers, and he had put aboard
a crowd of men who could fight from behind walls, as it were. Caesar for
his part was observing their equipment and making his preparations; when
he learned from Deillius and others their intention he himself assembled
the army and spoke to this effect:--