As I said, I was sent to obtain an exact statement of the terms that
the Soviet Government was ready to accept, and I received on the 14th
the following statement from Tchitcherin and Litvinov.
Senator KNOX. Who were they?
Mr. BULLITT. Tchitcherin was Peoples' Commisar for Foreign Affairs of
the Soviet Republic and Litvinov was the former Soviet Ambassador to
London, the man with whom Buckler had had his conversation, and who
was now practically assistant secretary for foreign affairs.
I also had a conference with Lenin. The Soviet Government undertook to
accept this proposal provided it was made by the allied and associated
Governments not later than April 10, 1919. The proposal reads as
follows [reading]:
TEXT OF PROJECTED PEACE PROPOSAL BY THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED
GOVERNMENTS.
The allied and associated Governments to propose that hostilities
shall cease on all fronts in the territory of the former Russian
Empire and Finland on ----[1] and that no new hostilities shall begin
after this date, pending a conference to be held at ----[2] on ----[3]
[Footnote 1: The date of the armistice to be set at least a
week after the date when the allied and associated
Governments make this proposal.]
[Footnote 2: The Soviet Government greatly prefers that the
conference should be held in a neutral country and also that
either a radio or a direct telegraph wire to Moscow should
be put at its disposal.]
[Footnote 3: The conference to begin not later than a week
after the armistice takes effect and the Soviet Government
greatly prefers that the period between the date of the
armistice and the first meeting of the conference should be
only three days, if possible.]
The duration of the armistice to be for two weeks, unless extended by
mutual consent, and all parties to the armistice to undertake not to
employ the period of the armistice to transfer troops and war material
to the territory of the former Russian Empire.
The conference to discuss peace on the basis of the following
principles, which shall not be subject to revision by the conference.
1. All existing de facto governments which have been set up
on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to
remain in full control of the territories which they occupy
at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, except
in so far as the conference may agree upon the transfer of
territories; until the peoples inhabiting the territories
controlled by these de facto governments shall themselves
determine to change their Governments. The Russian Soviet
Government, the other soviet governments and all other
governments which have been set up on the territory of the
former Russian Empire, the allied and associated
Governments, and the other Governments which are operating
against the soviet governments, including Finland, Poland,
Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, to
agree not to attempt to upset by force the existing de facto
governments which have been set up on the territory of the
former Russian Empire and the other Governments signatory to
this agreement. [Footnote 4: The allied and associated
Governments to undertake to see to it that the de facto
governments of Germany do not attempt to upset by force the
de facto governments of Russia. The de facto governments
which have been set up on the territory of the former
Russian Empire to undertake not to attempt to upset by force
the de facto governments of Germany.]
2. The economic blockade to be raised and trade relations
between Soviet Russia and the allied and associated
countries to be reestablished under conditions which will
ensure that supplies from the allied and associated
countries are made available on equal terms to all classes
of the Russian people.
3. The soviet governments of Russia to have the right of
unhindered transit on all railways and the use of all ports
which belonged to the former Russian Empire and to Finland
and are necessary for the disembarkation and transportation
of passengers and goods between their territories and the
sea; detailed arrangements for the carrying out of this
provision to be agreed upon at the conference.
4. The citizens of the soviet republics of Russia to have
the right of free entry into the allied and associated
countries as well as into all countries which have been
formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire and
Finland; also the right of sojourn and of circulation and
full security, provided they do not interfere in the
domestic politics of those countries. [Footnote 5: It is
considered essential by the Soviet Government that the
allied and associated Governments should see to it that
Poland and all neutral countries extend the same rights as
the allied and associated countries.]
Nationals of the allied and associated countries and of the
other countries above named to have the right of free entry
into the soviet republics of Russia; also the right of
sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they
do not interfere in the domestic politics of the soviet
republics.
The allied and associated Governments and other governments
which have been set up on the territory of the former
Russian Empire and Finland to have the right to send
official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity
into the various Russian Soviet Republics. The soviet
governments of Russia to have the right to send official
representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into all
the allied and associated countries and into the nonsoviet
countries which have been formed on the territory of the
former Russian Empire and Finland.
5. The soviet governments, the other Governments which have
been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire
and Finland, to give a general amnesty to all political
opponents, offenders, and prisoners. The allied and
associated governments to give a general amnesty to all
Russian political opponents, offenders, and prisoners, and
to their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted
for giving help to Soviet Russia. All Russians who have
fought in, or otherwise aided the armies opposed to the
soviet governments, and those opposed to the other
Governments which have been set up on the territory of the
former Russian Empire and Finland to be included in this
amnesty.
All prisoners of war of non-Russian powers detained in
Russia, likewise all nationals of those powers now in Russia
to be given full facilities for repatriation. The Russian
prisoners of war in whatever foreign country they may be,
likewise all Russian nationals, including the Russian
soldiers and officers abroad and those serving in all
foreign armies to be given full facilities for repatriation.
6. Immediately after the signing of this agreement all
troops of the allied and associated Governments and other
non-Russian Governments to be withdrawn from Russia and
military assistance to cease to be given to antisoviet
Governments which have been set up on the territory of the
former Russian Empire.
The soviet governments and the antisoviet governments which
have been set up on the territory of the former Russian
Empire and Finland to begin to reduce their armies
simultaneously, and at the same rate, to a peace footing
immediately after the signing of this agreement. The
conference to determine the most effective and just method
of inspecting and controlling this simultaneous
demobilization and also the withdrawal of the troops and the
cessation of military assistance to the antisoviet
governments.
7. The allied and associated Governments, taking cognizance
of the statement of the Soviet Government of Russia, in its
note of February 4, in regard to its foreign debts, propose
as an integral part of this agreement that the soviet
governments and the other governments which have been set up
on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland
shall recognize their responsibility for the financial
obligations of the former Russian Empire, to foreign States
parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such
States. Detailed arrangements for the payment of these debts
to be agreed upon at the conference, regard being had to the
present financial position of Russia. The Russian gold
seized by the Czecho-Slovaks in Kazan or taken from Germany
by the Allies to be regarded as partial payment of the
portion of the debt due from the soviet republics of Russia.
The Soviet Government of Russia undertakes to accept the
foregoing proposal provided it is made not later than April
10, 1919.
In regard to the second sentence in paragraph 5, in regard to "giving
help to Soviet Russia" I may say that I was told that that was not a
sine qua non but it was necessary in order to get the proposal through
the Russian executive committee, which it had to pass before it was
handed to me. I was also handed an additional sheet, which I refused
to take as a part of the formal document, containing the following:
The Soviet Government is most anxious to have a semiofficial
guaranty from the American and British Governments that they
will do their utmost to see to it that France lives up to
the conditions of the armistice.
The Soviet Government had a deep suspicion of the French Government.
In reference to this matter, and in explanation of that proposal, I
sent a number of telegrams from Helsingfors. I feel that in a way it
is important, for an explanation of the matter, that those telegrams
should be made public, but, on the other hand, they were sent in a
confidential code of the Department of State, and I do not feel at
liberty to read them unless ordered to specifically by the committee.
I should not wish to take the responsibility for breaking a code which
is in current use by the department.
Senator KNOX. I should think your scruples were well founded. I should
not read those telegrams.
Mr. BULLITT. I can simply inform you briefly of the nature of them.
Senator KNOX. You might give us the nature of them. To whom were they
sent?
Mr. BULLITT. On reaching Petrograd I sent Capt. Pettit out to
Helsingfors after I had had a discussion with Tchitcherin and with
Litvinov with a telegram, in which I said I had reached Petrograd and
had perfected arrangements to cross the boundary at will, and to
communicate with the mission via the consul at Helsingfors; that the
journey had been easy, and that the reports of frightful conditions in
Petrograd had been ridiculously exaggerated.
I described the discussions I had had with Tchitcherin and with
Litvinov, and said they had assured me that after going to Moscow and
after discussion with Lenin, I should be able to carry out a specific
statement of the position of the Soviet Government on all points.
On reaching Helsingfors I sent a telegram to the mission at Paris
"Most secret, for the President, Secretary Lansing, and Col. House
only," in which I said that in handing me the statement which I have
just read, Tchitcherin and Litvinov had explained that the Executive
Council of the Soviet Government had formally considered and adopted
it, and that the Soviet Government considered itself absolutely bound
to accept the proposals made therein, provided they were made on or
before April 10, and under no conditions would they change their
minds.
I also explained that I had found Lenin, Tchitcherin, and Litvinov
full of the sense of Russia's need for peace, and that I felt the
details of their statement might be modified without making it
unacceptable to them, and that in particular the clause under article
5 was not of vital importance. That, on the other hand, I felt that in
the main this statement represented the minimum terms that the Soviet
Government would accept.
I explained that it was understood with regard to article 2 that the
allied and associated countries should have a right to send inspectors
into Soviet Russia and see to it that the disposition of supplies, if
the blockade was lifted, was entirely equitable, and I explained also
that it was fully understood that the phrase under article 4 on
"official representatives" did not include diplomatic representatives,
that the Soviet Government simply desired to have some agents who
might more or less look out for their people here.
I explained further that in regard to footnote No. 2, the Soviet
Government hoped and preferred that the conference should be held in
Norway; that its preferences thereafter were, first, some point in
between Russia and Finland; second, a large ocean liner anchored off
Moon Island or the Aland Islands; and, fourth, Prinkipos.
I also explained that Tchitcherin and all the other members of the
government with whom I had talked had said in the most positive and
unequivocal manner that the Soviet Government was determined to pay
its foreign debts, and I was convinced that there would be no dispute
on that point.
Senator KNOX. Do you know how these telegrams were received in Paris,
whether favorably or unfavorably?
Mr. BULLITT. I can only say, in regard to that, there are three other
very brief ones. One was on a subject which I might give you the gist
of before I go on with it.
Senator KNOX. Go ahead, in your own way.
Mr. BULLITT. Col. House sent me a message of congratulation on receipt
of them, and by one of the curious quirks of the conference, a member
of the secretariat refused to send the message because of the way in
which it was signed, and Col. House was only able to give me a copy of
it when I reached Paris. I have a copy of it here.
Senator HARDING. Would not this story be more interesting if we knew
which member of the conference objected?
Mr. BULLITT. I believe the objection was on the technical point that
Col. House had signed "Ammission" instead of his name, but I really do
not know which member of the conference it was that made the
objection.
I then sent another telegram, which is rather long, too long to
attempt to paraphrase, and I will ask that I may not put it in,
because the entire substance of it is contained in briefer form in my
formal report. This telegram itself is in code.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Are there any translations of those of your
telegrams that are in code?
Mr. BULLITT. No; I have given you the substance of them as I have gone
along.
As I said to you before, Secretary Lansing had instructed me if
possible to obtain the release of Mr. Treadwell, our consul at
Tashkent, somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 miles from Moscow. In
Moscow I had spoken to Lenin and Tchitcherin and Litvinov in regard to
it, and finally they said they recognized that it was foolish to hold
him; that they had never really given much thought to the matter; that
he had been held by the local government at Tashkent, which was more
than 4,000 miles away; that raids were being made on the railroad
constantly, and they might have some difficulty in communicating.
However, they promised me that they would send a telegram at once
ordering his release, and that they would send him out either by
Persia or by Finland whichever way he preferred. I told them I was
sure he would prefer to go by way of Finland. Here is a copy of their
telegram ordering his release, which will not be of much use to you, I
fear, as it is in Russian. They carried out this promise to the
letter, releasing Treadwell at once, and Treadwell in due course of
time and in good health appeared on the frontier of Finland on the
27th of April. All that time was consumed in travel from Tashkent,
which is a long way under present conditions.
Senator NEW. I saw Mr. Treadwell here some time ago.
Mr. BULLITT. I then sent a telegram in regard to Mr. Pettit, the
officer of military intelligence, who was with me as my assistant,
saying I intended to send him back to Petrograd at once to keep in
touch with the situation so that we should have information
constantly. I will say in this connection that it was not an
extraordinary thing for the various Governments to have
representatives in Russia. The British Government had a man in there
at the same time that I was there. He was traveling as a Red Cross
representative, but in reality he was there for the Foreign Office, a
Maj. A.R. Parker, I believe. I am not certain of his name, but we can
verify it.
I also sent a telegram from Helsingfors, "strictly personal to Col.
House," requesting him to show my fifth and sixth telegrams to Mr.
Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's secretary, so that Mr. Lloyd George
might be at once informed in regard to the situation, inasmuch as he
had known I was going, and inasmuch as the British had been so
courteous as to offer to send me across on a cruiser. When I got to
London and found that the torpedo boat on which I had expected to go
was escorting the President, Mr. Lloyd George's office in London
called up the Admiralty and asked them to give me a boat in which to
go across. Incidentally I was informed by Col. House, on my arrival in
Paris, that copies of my telegrams had been sent at once to Mr. Lloyd
George and Mr. Balfour.
Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, I do not think we need to go into quite so
much detail. You have told us now with what instructions you went,
what the British attitude was, what the American attitude was, and
what the Soviet Government proposed. Now, let us have your report.