1. Hostilities to cease on all fronts.

2. All de facto governments to remain in full control of the

territories which they at present occupy.

3. Railways and ports necessary to transportation between

soviet Russia and the sea to be subject to the same

regulations as international railways and ports in the rest

of Europe.

4. Allied subjects to be given free right of entry and full

security to enable them to enter soviet Russia and go about

their business there provided they do not interfere in

politics.

5. Amnesty to all political prisoners on both sides: full

liberty to all Russians who have fought with the Allies.

6. Trade relations to be restored between soviet Russia and

the outside world under conditions which, while respecting

the sovereignty of soviet Russia insure that allied supplies

are made available on equal terms to all classes of the

Russian people.

7. All other questions connected with Russia's debt to the

Allies, etc., to be considered independently after peace has

been established.

8. All allied troops to be withdrawn from Russia as soon as

Russian armies above quota to be defined have been

demobilized and their surplus arms surrendered or destroyed.

You will see the American and British positions were very close

together.

Senator KNOX. With these statements from Col. House as to the American

position and from Mr. Kerr as to the British position, and with the

instructions which you had received, you proceeded to Russia, and, as

you said a moment ago, you made a written report?

Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. Do you want it read, or shall I state the

substance and then put it in the record? I think I can state it more

briefly if I read the first eight pages of it and then put the rest of

it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; do that.

Mr. BULLITT. This report I made to the President and to the American

commissioners, by order of the President transmitted to me on my

return by Mr. Lansing. I should like to say, before I read this

report, that of course I was in Russia an extremely short time, and

this is merely the best observation that I could make supplemented by

the observation of Capt. Pettit of the Military Intelligence, who was

sent in as my assistant, and with other impressions that I got from

Mr. Lincoln Steffens and other observers who were there.

Senator KNOX. How long were you in Russia?

Mr. BULLITT. For only one week. I was instructed to go in and bring

back as quickly as possible a definite statement of exactly the terms

the Soviet Government was ready to accept. The idea in the minds of

the British and the American delegation were that if the Allies made

another proposal it should be a proposal which we would know in

advance would be accepted, so that there would be no chance of another

Prinkipos proposal miscarrying.

I might perhaps read first, or show to you, the official text. This is

the official text of their proposition which they handed me in Moscow

on the 14th of March. Here is a curious thing--the Soviet foreign

office envelope.

The Bullitt Mission to Russia Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, of William C. Bullitt · 第 44 / 89 题