period before and after our war with Great Britain were heard even in
this far-away region of the western frontier. England and her continental
allies were engaged in a gigantic struggle with France under Napoleon,
then at the height of his power. For the purpose of crippling her
adversary England issued, in 1807, her famous Orders in Council, which
declared that the vessels of neutral nations were liable to seizure if
engaged in trade with the enemy. Napoleon retaliated by issuing the
equally famous Decrees of Berlin and Milan, which declared Great Britain
to be in a state of blockade, and that all vessels bound to or from
British ports were liable to capture.
To enforce the Orders in Council was a comparatively easy task for the
English navy, then as now the most powerful among the nations; and in
consequence the ocean commerce of the Americans suffered severely, for at
that time every ocean highway was thronged with the merchant ships of the
United States. The interference with our commerce was greatly aggravated
by the high-handed action of the English in forcibly taking away from
our ships many of their seamen and pressing them into the service of the
English navy. This grievance especially became so exasperating that the
war spirit of the American people was aroused from one end of the land to
the other.
But the protests of the Americans, though made to both England and
France, were disregarded, and it was realized that war could not be
avoided with one or the other of those nations. Indeed, the proposal was
frequently made in the press and in Congress that the country ought to
declare war against both powers in view of the outrages suffered by our
people. "The insolence of the powerful belligerents toward the young
republic of the United States was hard to endure," says Larned, though
"the conduct of the French Government was more insulting, if possible,
and more injurious, than that of Great Britain." But the American people,
still inspired by the feelings inherited from the Revolutionary strife,
seemed more incensed at the treatment they received from the English than
from the French.
The sparse settlements of the West and the isolated posts on the frontier
were confronted with a more serious and imminent menace to their safety
than were the inhabitants of the older portions of the country on the
Atlantic seaboard. They beheld the war cloud gathering, with a dreadful
apprehension of the certainty that it would bring upon them a sanguinary
conflict with the savages of the wilderness.
The increasingly hostile relations between the Americans and the Western
tribes, extending over a period of some years previous to the time of
which we are writing, was brought to a climax through the disturbing
influence of Tecumseh; but at the battle of Tippecanoe in the fall of
1811, where the savages met with disastrous defeat, it was thought that
at length an era of peace on the frontier was about to follow. And this,
no doubt, would have been the case had it not been for the activity of
British agents along the Canada border.
It soon became manifest that Indian hostility was once more increasing,
and it was generally regarded as due to the machinations of the British
at Maiden in Canada, where they gave welcome and shelter to the
discontented chiefs and their followers who sought their protection.
Forays and attacks, sporadic expeditions of the savages for purposes
of plunder or the taking of the scalps of settlers, were continually
reported throughout the years 1811 and 1812. One of the causes of war
recited by President Madison in his message to Congress just previous to
the declaration of war against England was the attacks of the savages
upon the frontier settlements incited by British traders, "a warfare,"
said the President, "which is known to spare neither age nor sex, and
distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity."
When at length the Indian tribes became assured that war between the
English and the Americans was about to follow, it was readily seen that
they would act for their own interests, and that they would be found
opposed to the Americans. The sympathies of the tribes were plainly with
the English by reason of the fact that the latter were more liberal in
making presents to them than the Americans were. Every year the Indians
gathered at Maiden, opposite Detroit, to receive presents both useful and
ornamental. Besides blankets and provisions, a large quantity of objects
suitable for the adornment of their persons were distributed among them
for the purpose, as it was alleged, of "stimulating trade."
Thus the Western Indians passed by the American trading posts at Chicago,
St. Joseph and other stations, and traveled over the old Sauk Trail,
which extended from the Mississippi at Rock Island around the southern
shore of Lake Michigan, loaded with furs, which they sold to the English
traders at Maiden. In addition to the goods received in barter by them,
they were shown many favors by the English Government officials, and the
friendship thus cultivated proved of immense value to the English when
war broke out. In that war the Indians were generally found fighting on
the side of their English friends.
Another cause of the hostility shown by the Indians toward the Americans
was the constant irritation created in their minds after treaties had
been concluded. These treaties, though formally agreed to by the chiefs
representing their tribes, were often regarded by the Indians as without
validity for one reason or another. Indeed, the Indians were not without
grievances against the Americans, some real and others conjured up and
distorted by wrong-headed leaders among them.
Added to this was the difficulty of restraining the squatter and the
bushranger, who defied all treaties, trampled upon the rights of the
Indians, and disregarded the treaty obligations of the Government. The
frontiersman had scant consideration for the red man, whom he looked
upon as his natural enemy and the principal obstacle to his safety and
well-being. This feeling constituted a natural antagonism which was
not allayed until the final removal of all the tribes to Government
reservations many years later.
In the summer of the year 1812 the officers on duty at Fort Dearborn were
Captain Nathan Heald, the commanding officer; Lieutenant Linai T. Helm,
Ensign George Ronan and Surgeon Isaac Van Voorhis. Captain Heald was at
that time thirty-seven years old and the other three officers were all
well under thirty; Ronan was the youngest of them all, having graduated
from West Point only the year before.
The force composing the garrison consisted, according to Captain Heald's
own account written a couple of months afterward, of sixty-six enlisted
men, fifty-four of whom were regulars, and twelve militia. In addition to
these there were nine women and eighteen children. This makes a total,
including the officers, of ninety-seven persons. Some accounts, however,
give a different enumeration, but we shall make no attempt to reconcile
them, as the variations are not many.
The news that the United States had declared war against Great Britain
was received at Fort Dearborn on the seventh day of August, 1812. This
was fifty days afterwards, and it had taken this long time for the news
to reach the remote post on the frontier. The authorities at Detroit,
however, had been informed some three or four weeks before the messenger
was finally despatched to Fort Dearborn. If word had been sent as soon as
received at Detroit, there is no reasonable doubt that timely measures
might have been taken to prevent the terrible disaster which followed.
The despatches containing this important announcement were brought by a
chief of the Potawatami tribe named Winnemeg, also called Winamac, who
was friendly to the Americans and sent by General Hull to Captain Heald.
General William Hull, then in command of the Northwestern army assembled
at Detroit, had served with distinction in the Revolutionary War, and
had rendered excellent service as Governor of the Territory during the
previous seven years. Until he surrendered Detroit he was held in high
esteem and possessed the confidence of the administration.
A letter of instructions to Captain Heald from General Hull was the most
important among the despatches brought by the messenger. This letter gave
specific directions to the officer commanding at Fort Dearborn, and was
as follows:
It is with regret I order the evacuation of your post, owing to the
want of provisions only, a neglect of the Commandant of Detroit. You
will therefore destroy all arms and ammunition; but the goods of the
Factory you may give to the friendly Indians who may be desirous of
escorting you on to Fort Wayne, and to the poor and needy of your
post. I am informed this day that Mackinac and the Island of St.
Joseph's [in the St. Mary's River] will be evacuated on account of
the scarcity of provisions, and I hope in my next to give you an
account of the surrender of the British at Maiden, as I expect 600
men here by the beginning of Sept.
[Signed] Brigadier Gen. Hull.
The letter, the original of which is preserved in the Draper collection
of manuscripts at Madison, Wisconsin, bears the marks of having been
hastily written. Evidently Mrs. John H. Kinzie, when she wrote the
first published accounts of the events here narrated, had never seen
the letter in which is contained the order to evacuate. In her work
entitled _Wau-Bun_ she says that the order received by Captain Heald
from General Hull was "to evacuate the fort, if practicable; and in that
event, to distribute all the United States property contained in the fort
and in the United States' Factory or agency among the Indians in the
neighborhood."
Mrs. Kinzie's account of the order was doubtless gathered from those who
were participants in the affairs of that time and who gave the contents
of General Hull's letter from memory. For it must be remembered that the
author of _Wau-Bun_, in which was printed the first authentic account of
these events, was not a participant in them. She was the wife of John H.
Kinzie, the son of John Kinzie the pioneer of 1804, and she did not come
to Chicago until 1833, twenty-one years after the occurrences of which we
are writing.
[Illustration: FACSIMILE OF LETTER OF GENERAL HULL TO CAPTAIN HEALD.
_By courtesy of the Wisconsin Historical Society._]
The original letter has come to light only within the last few years;
and upon making a comparison with the _Wau-Bun_ account it is seen that
General Hull ordered the evacuation, without leaving anything whatever
to the discretion of the officer to whom the order is addressed, though
discretionary permission is implied by the conditional clause "if
practicable" in the _Wau-Bun_ account. Just how far Captain Heald would
have been justified in using his discretion and disregarding the order
to evacuate in view of the great danger there was in obeying it, is a
question upon which there were opposing views then, and regarding which
there has since been much controversy. It is plain, however, that a
strict construction of the order would have required that the post be
evacuated, no matter how serious the consequences of doing so might be;
and judging from what we know of Captain Heald's character, it is not at
all strange that he interpreted his orders literally.
The difficulties with which Captain Heald was encompassed can be but
dimly realized. Far removed, as he was, from the nearest post; surrounded
by hordes of savages who, though professing friendship, were without
doubt in sympathy with the enemy, he well knew that whatever course he
might adopt would endanger the safety of the people under his care.
His orders to evacuate were indeed positive; but if he could have been
assured of safety by remaining and holding the post, he would have been
justified without doubt in doing so; and it was the unanimous opinion of
his advisers, including the officers of the garrison, that this should be
done.
Captain Heald's problem, however, was a military one; he believed in
obeying orders, on the theory that his superiors issued them as a part of
a comprehensive plan. If he should remain at the post in defiance of his
plain instructions he might embarrass a well-planned campaign and invite
disaster in a larger field than he could be aware of. Thus, he decided
(for though slow in his judgments, he was a man of much decision of
character) that the evacuation must be made, and the many appalling risks
of a retreat through the wilderness must be hazarded.
After his arrival with the despatches, the friendly Winnemeg sought out
and conferred with John Kinzie, In whom the Indians generally placed
much confidence. Kinzie was widely known as "the Indians' friend," and
the regard felt by the savages of the neighborhood toward him and his
family had heretofore been a powerful influence in protecting the post
from their attacks. As it was, many of the young men of the tribes could
scarcely be restrained in their desire to inaugurate hostilities in spite
of their older men, who not only entertained a high regard for Kinzie and
his family, but who also realized that the friendship of the Americans
was of more value to them than that of the British. Mr. Kinzie had taken
up his residence at the fort and was soon in possession of all the
material facts contained in Winnemeg's despatches. Winnemeg, well knowing
the temper of the tribes, advised Mr. Kinzie that it would be dangerous
to evacuate the post and attempt to pass through a country infested with
hostile Indians. The garrison, he said, was well supplied with provisions
and means of defence, and the post could withstand a siege until
reinforcements arrived. But should Captain Heald decide upon abandoning
the post according to his instructions, it ought to be done immediately
by all means, before the tribes had become aware of the actual condition
of affairs.
All this was promptly communicated to the commandant, but it had little
effect upon him, and he expressed his determination to carry out his
instructions to the letter, distribute the supplies to the friendly
Indians, and evacuate the post. Mr. Kinzie strongly reinforced the advice
given by Winnemeg, but without effect, and on the following morning the
order received from General Hull was read to the troops on parade.
Five days after the receipt of General Hull's order Captain Heald called
a council of the Indians, who were then assembled in considerable numbers
in the vicinity of the fort, to acquaint them with his Intentions and
request of them an escort for the garrison on its march to Fort Wayne.
Rumors of the state of affairs at the fort had already been spread among
the Indians, and there were evidences of considerable excitement in their
actions and conduct. Some of the savages entered the fort in defiance of
the guards and making their way to the officers' quarters strode rudely
around the living apartments. On one occasion an Indian went into the
parlor of the commanding officer and, seizing a rifle, fired it, as an
expression of defiance--so it was thought, though some believed it was
the signal for an attack. "The old chiefs passed backwards and forwards
among the assembled groups," says the _Wau-Bun_ account, "with the
appearance of the most lively agitation, while the squaws rushed to and
fro in great excitement, and evidently prepared for some fearful scene."
Notwithstanding these demonstrations, the commanding officer, in a
perhaps mistaken endeavor to avoid any appearance of fear or hesitation,
attended the council which he had called, though warned against doing
so. This council was held on the esplanade adjoining the fort. He was
accompanied only by Mr. Kinzie, the officers declining to participate.
The officers had been secretly informed, they asserted, that the young
men of the tribes intended to fall upon them when they attended the
council and treacherously murder them, but Captain Heald was not
convinced that there was any truth in the information.
After the two passed out of the fort gates, the portholes of the
blockhouses were opened and the cannons were pointed so as to command
the whole assembly. This precaution no doubt saved the lives of the two
white men who attended the council. Captain Heald informed the assembled
Indians that he proposed to evacuate the fort, but before doing so it
was his intention "to distribute among them, the next day, not only the
goods lodged in the United States' Factory, but also the ammunition and
provisions, with which the garrison was well supplied."
Following this statement he asked the Potawatamis to furnish him an
escort for his troops on their march to Fort Wayne, promising that a
liberal reward would be paid to them on their arrival, in addition to the
presents he was then about to distribute. This proposal, apparently, was
well received, and, "with many professions of friendship and good will,
the savages assented to all he proposed, and promised all he required."
But Mr. Kinzie, well knowing the disposition of the Indians, did not
place reliance upon the assurance they had given. After the council he
had an interview with Captain Heald and earnestly tried to convince
him of the utter worthlessness of the promises made by the Indians. He
reminded him of the many instances of hostility shown by them during the
past year, especially by the Wabash Indians, with whom the Potawatamis
were closely associated; and that it had become the settled policy of
the Americans to withhold from the savages whatever would aid them in
carrying on warfare against the scattered white inhabitants of the
frontier; and that the distributions he was now making would directly
assist them in their bloody purposes.
Owing to the representations thus made, Captain Heald at length became
convinced that it would be dangerous to place in the hands of those who
might at any moment become enemies the ammunition he had intended giving
to them, and he determined to destroy all except what was necessary for
the use of his own troops.
A letter written by Lieutenant Helm some two years afterwards has
recently come to light. In this letter is given the amount of supplies
and war material at the fort when the order to evacuate was received. "We
had," says Helm, "two hundred stand of arms, four pieces of artillery,
six thousand pounds of powder, and a sufficient quantity of shot, lead,
etc. There was a supply of Indian corn and provisions to last three
months, exclusive of a herd of two hundred head of horned cattle, and
twenty-seven barrels of salt."
The next day after the council was held, the thirteenth, there was a
general distribution of blankets, broadcloths, calicoes, paints, etc.,
among the Indians of the neighborhood; but in the evening the ammunition
was thrown into a well and the liquors emptied into the river. The
Indians, who were particularly eager for the ammunition and the liquors,
had observed that neither of these articles was forthcoming in the
distribution of the day, and under cover of darkness crept as near to the
fort as possible in order to ascertain if any attempt was being made
to destroy them, as they strongly suspected there would be. A guard had
been placed, however, so that the Indians could not approach close to the
scene. But though the prowling savages may not have actually witnessed
the proceedings, the work of destruction was accomplished. The Indians
were well convinced that all this had been done, especially as the river
was so impregnated with the liquors that its waters had the taste of
strong grog for some time afterward. All the weapons of warfare not
necessary for the use of the soldiers were broken up and thrown into the
well, along with quantities of powder, shot, flints and gunscrews.
The eight days intervening between the arrival of the order to evacuate
the fort and the actual departure of the garrison were filled with
forebodings and anxiety. The inmates of the fort, which now included not
only the garrison but the civilian inhabitants of the neighborhood as
well, believed that an appalling fate--death at the hands of a savage
foe--inevitably awaited them. The one exception was Captain Heald, who
still had faith that the Indians would be true to their promise and
furnish an escort on the "march through." He was convinced that he had
succeeded in creating an amicable feeling among the savages, and that
the safely of all was assured. The officers of the garrison, finding
that Captain Heald failed to call a council with them and that he had
expressed an intention of abandoning the fort and proceeding to Fort
Wayne with an Indian escort, drew up and presented a remonstrance to him
in which it was recited that it was highly improbable that the command
would be permitted to pass through the country in safety to Fort Wayne.
For although it had been said that some of the chiefs had opposed an
attack upon the fort, planned the preceding autumn, yet it was well
known that they had been actuated in that matter by motives of private
regard to one family, that of Mr. Kinzie, and not to any general friendly
feeling toward the Americans; and that at any rate it was hardly to be
expected that these few individuals would be able to control the whole
tribe, who were thirsting for blood.
In another clause of the remonstrance it was added that the march of the
troops must be necessarily slow, as their movements must be accommodated
to the helplessness of the women and children, of whom there were a
number with the detachment; and that their unanimous advice was to remain
where they were and fortify themselves as strongly as possible.
The reply made by Captain Heald to the remonstrance was that his force
was totally inadequate to an engagement with the Indians;--that is,
in withstanding a siege;--that he should unquestionably be censured
for remaining when there appeared a prospect of a safe march through;
that, upon the whole, he deemed it expedient to assemble the Indians,
distribute the property among them, and then ask of them an escort to
Fort Wayne, with the promise of a considerable reward upon their safe
arrival;--and that he had "full confidence in the friendly professions of
the Indians."
The gathering perils that now environed the fort and its inmates
were rapidly approaching a climax. A fatal mistake had been made in
disregarding Winnemeg's advice to begin the retreat without delay if that
course was determined upon. Winnemeg had advised that in such an event
everything about the fort should be left standing as it was, and while
the Indians were engaged in plundering the abandoned fort the troops
might be well on their way to Fort Wayne, and perhaps escape attack
altogether. John Kinzie likewise strongly urged the necessity of prompt
action if the movement was to be made at all.
The officers held aloof from Captain Heald after the distribution of the
supplies had taken place, convinced at length that further efforts to
dissuade him from his course were useless. They denounced his purpose as
"little short of madness." There were many evidences of insubordination
observed among the soldiers, and an atmosphere of gloom pervaded the
minds of all in the fort.
On the fourteenth, the day before that decided upon for the evacuation,
the general despondency was relieved by the arrival of Captain William
Wells from Fort Wayne at the head of a band of about thirty friendly
Indians of the Miami tribe mounted on ponies. Captain Wells will always
be classed among the heroic figures of the time. He was then in the
prime of life, a man about forty years of age, and known throughout the
frontier as a "perfect master of everything pertaining to Indian life
both in peace and war, and withal a stranger to personal fear."
When General Hull had sent the order to Captain Heald to evacuate his
post, he also sent an express to Major B. F. Stickney, Indian agent at
Fort Wayne, advising him of the order and requesting him to render to
Captain Heald all the information and assistance in his power to give.
In accordance with this request. Major Stickney had promptly despatched
Captain Wells with a party of Miami warriors. A warm attachment existed
between Wells and Heald, and upon the arrival of Wells with his Miamis he
was hailed with joy, and the hopes of the people at the fort were revived.