Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enter_The Federalist Papers（#18）

pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a

public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity

and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even

animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most

bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they

lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans

and operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately

assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a

plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important

measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the

state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the

most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the

different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in

planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they

dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to

disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an

indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in

honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the

success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments.

Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of

remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is

sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are

sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of

individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their

caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the

public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the

effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the

human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the

source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation

of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to

introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too

that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of

decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion,

and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government,

though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote

deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the

majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be

at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable.

But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages

of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and

unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve

to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which

they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They

constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the

most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor and expedition,

and this without anycounterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in

which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national

security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal

weight to the first case supposed that is, to a plurality of

magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for

which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though

not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a

council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the

operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that council

would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of

administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of

views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise

of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and

dilatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive,

and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it

tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is

of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The first is the more

important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public

trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy

of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him

obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive

adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes

impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame

or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious

measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with

so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the

public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The

circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or

misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number

of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency,

though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been

mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose

account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

“I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their

opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the

point.” These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true

or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur

the odium, of a strict scrunity into the secret springs of the

transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to

undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between

the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with

so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise

conduct of any of those parties?

In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled

with a council that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the

mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous

appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed,

have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety

of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by

the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have

charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a

loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have been

committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In

tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the

Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities

they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first,

the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on

account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among

a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall;

and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and

clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to

their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which

admit of it.

In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which

has obtained for the sake of the pub lic peace, that he is

unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing,

therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a

constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the

advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility

whatever in the executive department an idea inadmissible in a free

government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of

his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is

the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office,

and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole

discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally

responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British

Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to

apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great

Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of

the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the

national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it

would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and

necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained

in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of

republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a

number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to

be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that

side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the

opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the

executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with

a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be “deep, solid, and

ingenious,” that “the executive power is more easily confined when it

is ONE”;[2] that it is far more safe there should be a single object

for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that

all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly

to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security

sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is nattainable.

Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they

are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and

influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty,

than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power,

therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to

admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common

enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and

more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one

man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more

narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so

great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The

Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number,[3] were more to be

dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No

person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than

that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of

the council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy

combination; and from such a combination America would have more to

fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a

magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally

nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the

instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to

his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident

that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal

end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must

be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would

form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be

incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that,

prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an

intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the

result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was

one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.

PUBLIUS.

[1] New York has no council except for the single purpose of

appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor may

consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their

resolutions do not bind him.

[2] De Lolme.

[3] Ten.

*There are two slightly different versions of No. 70 included here.

THE FEDERALIST.

No. LXX.

The Executive Department Further Considered

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, March 18, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous

Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The

enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least

hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can

never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the

condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a

leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential

to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not

less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the

protection of property against those irregular and high-handed

combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice;

to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of

ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in

Roman story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge

in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of

Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who

aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the

community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as

against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and

destruction of Rome.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on

this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the

government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad

execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory,

must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in

the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to

inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far

can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute

safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination

characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first,

unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its

support; fourthly, competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub lican sense are,

first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for

the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views,

have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous

legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the

most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as

most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal

propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and

wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people

and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision,

activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the

proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the

proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is

increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in

two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting

it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control

and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of

the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the

last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the

States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only

States which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to single

men.[1] Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive

have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the

most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar

objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this

head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be

enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the

Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish

one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the

republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the

military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the Consuls. But

it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the

state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That

the dissensions between them were not more frequent or more fatal, is a

matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in

which the republic was almost continually placed, and to the prudent

policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by

the Consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The

patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the

preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls,

who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united

by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of

their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the

republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became

an established custom with the Consuls to divide the administration

between themselves by lot one of them remaining at Rome to govern the

city and its environs, the other taking the command in the more distant

provinces. This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in

preventing those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have

embroiled the peace of the republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves

purely to the dictates of reason and good se se, we shall discover much

greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the

Executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or