constituents are strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature. His
pride and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors his
pretensions and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions.
Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a few aspiring
characters, it must generally happen that a great proportion of the men
deriving their advancement from their influence with the people, would
have more to hope from a preservation of the favor, than from
innovations in the government subversive of the authority of the
people. All these securities, however, would be found very insufficient
without the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth
place, the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in
the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.
Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their
elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be
compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when
their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to
the level from which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a
faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to
a renewal of it. I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation
of the House of Representatives, restraining them from oppressive
measures, that they can make no law which will not have its full
operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass
of the society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds
by which human policy can connect the rulers and the people together.
It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of
sentiments, of which few governments have furnished examples; but
without which every government degenerates into tyranny. If it be
asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making
legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of
the society? I answer: the genius of the whole system; the nature of
just and constitutional laws; and above all, the vigilant and manly
spirit which actuates the people of America, a spirit which nourishes
freedom, and in return is nourished by it. If this spirit shall ever be
so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature,
as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate any
thing but liberty. Such will be the relation between the House of
Representatives and their constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest,
ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity
and sympathy with the great mass of the people.
It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the
caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that government
will admit, and that human prudence can devise? Are they not the
genuine and the characteristic means by which republican government
provides for the liberty and happiness of the people? Are they not the
identical means on which every State government in the Union relies for
the attainment of these important ends? What then are we to understand
by the objection which this paper has combated? What are we to say to
the men who profess the most flaming zeal for republican government,
yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it; who pretend to be
champions for the right and the capacity of the people to choose their
own rulers, yet maintain that they will prefer those only who will
immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed to them? Were the
objection to be read by one who had not seen the mode prescribed by the
Constitution for the choice of representatives, he could suppose
nothing less than that some unreasonable qualification of property was
annexed to the right of suffrage; or that the right of eligibility was
limited to persons of particular families or fortunes; or at least that
the mode prescribed by the State constitutions was in some respect or
other, very grossly departed from. We have seen how far such a
supposition would err, as to the two first points. Nor would it, in
fact, be less erroneous as to the last. The only difference
discoverable between the two cases is, that each representative of the
United States will be elected by five or six thousand citizens; whilst
in the individual States, the election of a representative is left to
about as many hundreds. Will it be pretended that this difference is
sufficient to justify an attachment to the State governments, and an
abhorrence to the federal government? If this be the point on which the
objection turns, it deserves to be examined. Is it supported by REASON?
This cannot be said, without maintaining that five or six thousand
citizens are less capable of choosing a fit representative, or more
liable to be corrupted by an unfit one, than five or six hundred.
Reason, on the contrary, assures us, that as in so great a number a fit
representative would be most likely to be found, so the choice would be
less likely to be diverted from him by the intrigues of the ambitious
or the ambitious or the bribes of the rich. Is the CONSEQUENCE from
this doctrine admissible? If we say that five or six hundred citizens
are as many as can jointly exercise their right of suffrage, must we
not deprive the people of the immediate choice of their public
servants, in every instance where the administration of the government
does not require as many of them as will amount to one for that number
of citizens? Is the doctrine warranted by FACTS? It was shown in the
last paper, that the real representation in the British House of
Commons very little exceeds the proportion of one for every thirty
thousand inhabitants. Besides a variety of powerful causes not existing
here, and which favor in that country the pretensions of rank and
wealth, no person is eligible as a representative of a county, unless
he possess real estate of the clear value of six hundred pounds
sterling per year; nor of a city or borough, unless he possess a like
estate of half that annual value. To this qualification on the part of
the county representatives is added another on the part of the county
electors, which restrains the right of suffrage to persons having a
freehold estate of the annual value of more than twenty pounds
sterling, according to the present rate of money. Notwithstanding these
unfavorable circumstances, and notwithstanding some very unequal laws
in the British code, it cannot be said that the representatives of the
nation have elevated the few on the ruins of the many. But we need not
resort to foreign experience on this subject. Our own is explicit and
decisive. The districts in New Hampshire in which the senators are
chosen immediately by the people, are nearly as large as will be
necessary for her representatives in the Congress. Those of
Massachusetts are larger than will be necessary for that purpose; and
those of New York still more so.
In the last State the members of Assembly for the cities and counties
of New York and Albany are elected by very nearly as many voters as
will be entitled to a representative in the Congress, calculating on
the number of sixty-five representatives only. It makes no difference
that in these senatorial districts and counties a number of
representatives are voted for by each elector at the same time. If the
same electors at the same time are capable of choosing four or five
representatives, they cannot be incapable of choosing one. Pennsylvania
is an additional example. Some of her counties, which elect her State
representatives, are almost as large as her districts will be by which
her federal representatives will be elected. The city of Philadelphia
is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will
therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of federal
representatives. It forms, however, but one county, in which every
elector votes for each of its representatives in the State legislature.
And what may appear to be still more directly to our purpose, the whole
city actually elects a SINGLE MEMBER for the executive council. This is
the case in all the other counties of the State. Are not these facts
the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy which has been employed
against the branch of the federal government under consideration? Has
it appeared on trial that the senators of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
and New York, or the executive council of Pennsylvania, or the members
of the Assembly in the two last States, have betrayed any peculiar
disposition to sacrifice the many to the few, or are in any respect
less worthy of their places than the representatives and magistrates
appointed in other States by very small divisions of the people? But
there are cases of a stronger complexion than any which I have yet
quoted.
One branch of the legislature of Connecticut is so constituted that
each member of it is elected by the whole State. So is the governor of
that State, of Massachusetts, and of this State, and the president of
New Hampshire. I leave every man to decide whether the result of any
one of these experiments can be said to countenance a suspicion, that a
diffusive mode of choosing representatives of the people tends to
elevate traitors and to undermine the public liberty.
PUBLIUS.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. LVIII.
Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the
Progress of Population Demands Considered
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
The remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am
to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members
will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population
may demand. It has been admitted, that this objection, if well
supported, would have great weight. The following observations will
show that, like most other objections against the Constitution, it can
only proceed from a partial view of the subject, or from a jealousy
which discolors and disfigures every object which is beheld. 1. Those
who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the federal
Constitution will not suffer by a comparison with the State
constitutions, in the security provided for a gradual augmentation of
the number of representatives. The number which is to prevail in the
first instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to
the short term of three years. Within every successive term of ten
years a census of inhabitants is to be repeated. The unequivocal
objects of these regulations are, first, to readjust, from time to
time, the apportionment of representatives to the number of
inhabitants, under the single exception that each State shall have one
representative at least; secondly, to augment the number of
representatives at the same periods, under the sole limitation that the
whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand
inhabitants. If we review the constitutions of the several States, we
shall find that some of them contain no determinate regulations on this
subject, that others correspond pretty much on this point with the
federal Constitution, and that the most effectual security in any of
them is resolvable into a mere directory provision. 2. As far as
experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase of
representatives under the State constitutions has at least kept pace
with that of the constituents, and it appears that the former have been
as ready to concur in such measures as the latter have been to call for
them. 3. There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which
insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the people and of
their representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the latter.
The peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of the legislature is a
representation of citizens, the other of the States: in the former,
consequently, the larger States will have most weight; in the latter,
the advantage will be in favor of the smaller States. From this
circumstance it may with certainty be inferred that the larger States
will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of
that part of the legislature in which their influence predominates. And
it so happens that four only of the largest will have a majority of the
whole votes in the House of Representatives. Should the representatives
or people, therefore, of the smaller States oppose at any time a
reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will
be sufficient to overrule the opposition; a coalition which,
notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent
it on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely
prompted by common interest, but justified by equity and the principles
of the Constitution. It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would
be prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition; and as their
concurrence would be indispensable, the just and constitutional views
of the other branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has
probably created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends
of a numerous representation. Fortunately it is among the difficulties
which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a close and accurate
inspection. The following reflections will, if I mistake not, be
admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point.
Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two
houses on all legislative subjects, except the originating of money
bills, it cannot be doubted that the House, composed of the greater
number of members, when supported by the more powerful States, and
speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the people,
will have no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative
firmness of the two houses. This advantage must be increased by the
consciousness, felt by the same side of being supported in its demands
by right, by reason, and by the Constitution; and the consciousness, on
the opposite side, of contending against the force of all these solemn
considerations. It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation
between the smallest and largest States, there are several, which,
though most likely in general to arrange themselves among the former
are too little removed in extent and population from the latter, to
second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it
is by no means certain that a majority of votes, even in the Senate,
would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of
representatives. It will not be looking too far to add, that the
senators from all the new States may be gained over to the just views
of the House of Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be
overlooked. As these States will, for a great length of time, advance
in population with peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in
frequent reapportionments of the representatives to the number of
inhabitants. The large States, therefore, who will prevail in the House
of Representatives, will have nothing to do but to make
reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other;
and the senators from all the most growing States will be bound to
contend for the latter, by the interest which their States will feel in
the former. These considerations seem to afford ample security on this
subject, and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have
been indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should
all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States,
or their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a
constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger
States, by which they will be able at all times to accomplish their
just purposes. The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but
they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of
government. They, in a word, hold the purse that powerful instrument by
which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant
and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere
of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it
seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other
branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be
regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for
obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect
every just and salutary measure. But will not the House of
Representatives be as much interested as the Senate in maintaining the
government in its proper functions, and will they not therefore be
unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the pliancy of
the Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between the two branches
were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to yield as the
other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect
that in all cases the smaller the number, and the more permanent and
conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger must be the
interest which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the
government. Those who represent the dignity of their country in the
eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to every prospect
of public danger, or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To
those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British
House of Commons over the other branches of the government, whenever
the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute inflexibility
on the side of the latter, although it could not have failed to involve
every department of the state in the general confusion, has neither
been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost degree of firmness that
can be displayed by the federal Senate or President, will not be more
than equal to a resistance in which they will be supported by
constitutional and patriotic principles. In this review of the
Constitution of the House of Representatives, I have passed over the
circumstances of economy, which, in the present state of affairs, might
have had some effect in lessening the temporary number of
representatives, and a disregard of which would probably have been as
rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been shown
by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks on the
difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in
engaging in the federal service a large number of such characters as
the people will probably elect. One observation, however, I must be
permitted to add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very
serious attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies the
greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who
will in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more
numerous an assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the
greater is known to be the ascendency of passion over reason. In the
next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the proportion
of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is
precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and
address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the
ancient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in
person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to
rule with as complete a sway as if a sceptre had been placed in his
single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a
representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of
the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people.
Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of
sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than in
supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain
limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few.
Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, AFTER
SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY, OF LOCAL
INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they
will counteract their own views by every addition to their
representatives. The countenance of the government may become more
democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The
machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret,
will be the springs by which its motions are directed. As connected
with the objection against the number of representatives, may properly
be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the number made
competent for legislative business. It has been said that more than a
majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular
cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision.
That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution, cannot
be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular
interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial
measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences
in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general good
might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued,
the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It
would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be
transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to
particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to
screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in
particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences. Lastly, it
would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions; a
practice which has shown itself even in States where a majority only is
required; a practice subversive of all the principles of order and
regular government; a practice which leads more directly to public
convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other which
has yet been displayed among us.
PUBLIUS.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. LIX.
Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
From the New York Packet. Friday, February 22, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York: