representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests;
secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local
circumstances of their numerous constituents; thirdly, that they will
be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least with
the feelings of the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a
permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many; fourthly,
that defective as the number will be in the first instance, it will be
more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the people, and the
obstacles which will prevent a correspondent increase of the
representatives. In general it may be remarked on this subject, that no
political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that
which relates to the number most convenient for a representative
legislature; nor is there any point on which the policy of the several
States is more at variance, whether we compare their legislative
assemblies directly with each other, or consider the proportions which
they respectively bear to the number of their constituents. Passing
over the difference between the smallest and largest States, as
Delaware, whose most numerous branch consists of twenty-one
representatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to between three
and four hundred, a very considerable difference is observable among
States nearly equal in population. The number of representatives in
Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of that in the State last
mentioned. New York, whose population is to that of South Carolina as
six to five, has little more than one third of the number of
representatives. As great a disparity prevails between the States of
Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, the
representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents
than of one for every four or five thousand. In Rhode Island, they bear
a proportion of at least one for every thousand. And according to the
constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to every
ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the proportion in any of
the other States. Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio
between the representatives and the people ought not to be the same
where the latter are very numerous as where they are very few. Were the
representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode
Island, they would, at this time, amount to between four and five
hundred; and twenty or thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the other
hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware,
would reduce the representative assembly of the latter to seven or
eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our
political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men
may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or
seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be
proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry on the supposition
to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The
truth is, that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be
necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion,
and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes; as,
on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain
limit, in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.
In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed,
passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason.
Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly
would still have been a mob.
It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were
applied to the case of biennial elections. For the same reason that the
limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State
legislatures, justify less frequent elections than the public safely
might otherwise require, the members of the Congress need be less
numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and
were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative
bodies. With these general ideas in our mind, let us weigh the
objections which have been stated against the number of members
proposed for the House of Representatives. It is said, in the first
place, that so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much
power. The number of which this branch of the legislature is to
consist, at the outset of the government, will be sixtyfive. Within
three years a census is to be taken, when the number may be augmented
to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants; and within every
successive period of ten years the census is to be renewed, and
augmentations may continue to be made under the above limitation. It
will not be thought an extravagant conjecture that the first census
will, at the rate of one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of
representatives to at least one hundred. Estimating the negroes in the
proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted that the
population of the United States will by that time, if it does not
already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of twenty-five
years, according to the computed rate of increase, the number of
representatives will amount to two hundred, and of fifty years, to four
hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will put an end to all
fears arising from the smallness of the body. I take for granted here
what I shall, in answering the fourth objection, hereafter show, that
the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in
the manner provided by the Constitution. On a contrary supposition, I
should admit the objection to have very great weight indeed. The true
question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of the number, as
a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty? Whether
sixty-five members for a few years, and a hundred or two hundred for a
few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded power of
legislating for the United States? I must own that I could not give a
negative answer to this question, without first obliterating every
impression which I have received with regard to the present genius of
the people of America, the spirit which actuates the State
legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the
political character of every class of citizens I am unable to conceive
that the people of America, in their present temper, or under any
circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second
year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who would be
disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am
unable to conceive that the State legislatures, which must feel so many
motives to watch, and which possess so many means of counteracting, the
federal legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a
conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common
constituents. I am equally unable to conceive that there are at this
time, or can be in any short time, in the United States, any sixty-five
or a hundred men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of
the people at large, who would either desire or dare, within the short
space of two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them. What
change of circumstances, time, and a fuller population of our country
may produce, requires a prophetic spirit to declare, which makes no
part of my pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now before
us, and from the probable state of them within a moderate period of
time, I must pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe
in the number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution. From what
quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If
foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable them
to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that we
are at this time a free and independent nation? The Congress which
conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their
successors will be; they were not chosen by, nor responsible to, their
fellowcitizens at large; though appointed from year to year, and
recallable at pleasure, they were generally continued for three years,
and prior to the ratification of the federal articles, for a still
longer term.
They held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy; they
had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations; through
the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in
their hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our
future representatives; and from the greatness of the prize at stake,
and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well be supposed
that the use of other means than force would not have been scrupled.
Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed;
nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever
suffered, even from the whispers of calumny. Is the danger apprehended
from the other branches of the federal government?
But where are the means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or
both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed, will not, and
without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives cannot,
more than suffice for very different purposes; their private fortunes,
as they must allbe American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of
danger. The only means, then, which they can possess, will be in the
dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her
charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be
exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now,
the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The improbability
of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members
of government, standing on as different foundations as republican
principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to the
society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this
apprehension. But, fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still
further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible
to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments
may be increased, during the term of their election.
No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such
as may become vacant by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these
would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the people, selected
by the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events
ought to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and
unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain. The sincere
friends of liberty, who give themselves up to the extravagancies of
this passion, are not aware of the injury they do their own cause. As
there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain
degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in
human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.
Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a
higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been
drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of
the human character, the inference would be, that there is not
sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less
than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and
devouring one another.
PUBLIUS.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. LVI.
The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of
Representatives)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.
HAMILTON OR MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
The second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will
be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its
constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of
the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the
United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of
their interests, without taking into view at the same time the
circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other
legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a
brief explanation of these peculiarities. It is a sound and important
principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the
interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can
extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which
the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a
variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the
compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to
a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining the extent
of information required in the exercise of a particular authority,
recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that
authority. What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those
which are of most importance, and which seem most to require local
knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia. A proper regulation
of commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere remarked;
but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation
of each individual State, a very few representatives would be very
sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils. Taxation will
consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be involved in the
regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark is applicable to
this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more
diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary.
But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few
intelligent men, diffusively elected within the State? Divide the
largest State into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that
there will be no peculiar local interests in either, which will not be
within the knowledge of the representative of the district. Besides
this source of information, the laws of the State, framed by
representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves a
sufficient guide. In every State there have been made, and must
continue to be made, regulations on this subject which will, in many
cases, leave little more to be done by the federal legislature, than to
review the different laws, and reduce them in one general act. A
skillful individual in his closet with all the local codes before him,
might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union,
without any aid from oral information, and it may be expected that
whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases
requiring uniformity throughout the States, the more simple objects
will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be
given to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the
State codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other
State were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising
within itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a
degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the
several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the
labors of the general legislature, and render a much smaller number of
members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great
advantage from another circumstance. The representatives of each State
will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and
a local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in
all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members,
of the State legislature, where all the local information and interests
of the State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed
by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States. The
observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force
to the case of the militia. For however different the rules of
discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout
each particular State; and depend on circumstances which can differ but
little in different parts of the same State. The attentive reader will
discern that the reasoning here used, to prove the sufficiency of a
moderate number of representatives, does not in any respect contradict
what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive
information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time
that might be necessary for acquiring it. This information, so far as
it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult,
not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single
State, but of those among different States. Taking each State by
itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little
diversified. A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge
requisite for a proper representation of them. Were the interests and
affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a
knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in
every other, and the whole State might be competently represented by a
single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the
different States together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws,
and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of federal
legislation, with all of which the federal representatives ought to
have some acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from
each State, may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State,
every representative will have much information to acquire concerning
all the other States.
The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative
situation of the different States, will have an assimilating effect.
The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly,
will be just the contrary. At present some of the States are little
more than a society of husbandmen. Few of them have made much progress
in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to
the affairs of a nation. These, however, will in all of them be the
fruits of a more advanced population, and will require, on the part of
each State, a fuller representation. The foresight of the convention
has accordingly taken care that the progress of population may be
accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the
government. The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind
so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and
which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries,
corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The
number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland
cannot be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of
these eight millions in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and
fifty-eight.
Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four
persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three
persons.[1] It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, and who
do not even reside among the people at large, can add any thing either
to the security of the people against the government, or to the
knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative
councils. On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are more
frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive
magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights.
They might therefore, with great propriety, be considered as something
more than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation.
We will, however, consider them in this light alone, and will not
extend the deduction to a considerable number of others, who do not
reside among their constitutents, are very faintly connected with them,
and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all
these concessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be
the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight millions
that is to say, there will be one representative only to maintain the
rights and explain the situation OF TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY constitutents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of
executive influence, and extending its authority to every object of
legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree
diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that a
valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these
circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable,
in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature
concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the
weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House of
Representatives as above explained it seems to give the fullest
assurance, that a representative for every THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS
will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the
interests which will be confided to it.
PUBLIUS.
[1] Burgh’s _Political Disquisitions_.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. LVII.
The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense
of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.
HAMILTON OR MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
The third charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will
be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy
with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious
sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few. Of all the
objections which have been framed against the federal Constitution,
this is perhaps the most extraordinary.
Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy,
the principle of it strikes at the very root of republican government.
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most
virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next
place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous
whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of
obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government.
The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their
degeneracy are numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a
limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a proper
responsibility to the people. Let me now ask what circumstance there is
in the constitution of the House of Representatives that violates the
principles of republican government, or favors the elevation of the few
on the ruins of the many? Let me ask whether every circumstance is not,
on the contrary, strictly conformable to these principles, and
scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of every class and
description of citizens? Who are to be the electors of the federal
representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned,
more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names,
more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The
electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States.
They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of
electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the State. Who
are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may
recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No
qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil
profession is permitted to fetter the judgement or disappoint the
inclination of the people. If we consider the situation of the men on
whom the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the
representative trust, we shall find it involving every security which
can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their constituents. In
the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the preference
of their fellow-citizens, we are to presume that in general they will
be somewhat distinguished also by those qualities which entitle them to
it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of
their engagements. In the second place, they will enter into the public
service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary
affection at least to their constituents. There is in every breast a
sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence,
which, apart from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for
grateful and benevolent returns.
Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against human nature; and
it must be confessed that instances of it are but too frequent and
flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the universal and
extreme indignation which it inspires is itself a proof of the energy
and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.